CIVIL AFFAIRS IN SUPPORT OF THE UNIFIED COMBATANT COMMAND--A PROPOSAL FOR USCENTCOM

An Individual Study Project
Intended for Publication

by

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ABSTRACT

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U.S. strategy and policy for low-intensity conflict (LIC) is currently evolving. Civil Affairs assets, in addition to their role of facilitating direct support through Host Nation Support to U.S. forces in combat operations, possess functional specialties which can be useful in assisting Third World countries within the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) in internal development. This paper proposes inclusion of Civil Affairs assets in Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (H/CA) activities as a way of promoting internal development and thereby reducing or eliminating conditions which could be characterized as latent or incipient insurgency within the LIC environment. Such participation would enhance Civil Affairs training and could be used to validate area assessments concerning the availability of needed Host Nation Support within the AOR in support of USCENTCOM contingency operational plans. The program can be accomplished with minimal investment of financial resources, but more importantly can promote U.S. interests in the region for the long term.
INTRODUCTION

The core issue being addressed herein is whether Civil Affairs assets may be productively employed during peacetime in support of evolving U.S. low-intensity conflict (LIC) strategy and policy—particularly by U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) within its area of responsibility (AOR). While there are ongoing efforts to better define LIC and to recognize the challenges it presents to U.S. strategic interests, there is confusion in the use of terms addressing certain activities within LIC. For example, the concept of proactive efforts to address insurgency in so-called "Third World" countries includes references variously identified as Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Internal Defense and Development (IDAD), or Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. 1.

In addition, personal experience of the author has demonstrated that although Civil Affairs units/personnel have viable and important missions under current USCENTCOM operations plans, these units/personnel have extremely limited opportunity (and in many instances are completely unable) to gain first-hand experience and/or training in many of the countries within which they would have to operate in LIC or greater intensity conflicts. With the objective of supporting U.S. strategic interests in the LIC arena and enhancing Civil Affairs training and skills, this paper proposes that a proactive Humanitarian/Civic Assistance (H/CA) program be initiated within USCENTCOM. The proposal will both enhance the training and practical experience of Civil
Affairs units/personnel, and could possibly arrest or eliminate conditions that would otherwise be conducive to the development of active (violent) insurgencies in countries within the USCENTCOM AOR.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Until recently, many people associated with Civil Affairs the bulk of their military careers have thought of themselves as part of the Civil Affairs community--a community which likes to trace its origins back to Alexander the Great. While it is true that Alexander the Great tended to assimilate desirable customs of conquered peoples and to permit the continuance of other cultural customs in conquered lands, it is not clear whether this was by design (as a "civil affairs" policy) or resulted simply from the absence of a need to impose an ideology or different way of life on the conquered peoples. In any event, from the Romans to this country's more recent subjugation of the American Indian, policies and actions have been carried out which could be viewed as similar to modern Civil Affairs, that is the establishment of relations between the military and the civilian authorities and populace. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that in the main these relations were conducted in terms of conqueror and conquered, the apparent idea being to insure a pacific populace under the rule of the conqueror.

With World War II and its aftermath, Civil Affairs in its modern form emerged. During the war, particularly in Europe, the
U.S. Army established military governments to administer territory wrested from enemy control. These temporary governments were intended to provide essential public services in those liberated areas. These actions by Civil Affairs personnel relieved combat troops for battlefront duty and contributed to the conclusion that Civil Affairs was a "force multiplier." Doctrine at that time distinguished Civil Affairs and military government by operational environment. Operations in friendly countries were considered to be Civil Affairs and those in enemy territory as military government. 2. Doctrine now has evolved to the point that military government, currently incorporated under the umbrella term "civil administration," is subordinated to Civil Affairs as just one of the missions within Civil Affairs capabilities. 3. This is especially true for current Civil Affairs operations in the USCENTCOM AOR.

CURRENT PERSPECTIVE

Of more current interest to USCENTCOM is Civil Affairs direct support to U.S. forces in the form of Host Nation Support (HNS). 4. The acquisition of logistics and necessary services, to the extent that it is possible through HNS, among other benefits, frees critical transport resources, both air and sea, which would otherwise be needed to move that support from CONUS to the USCENTCOM AOR, a distance of over 7,000 miles.

As a part of operational planning, Civil Affairs personnel identify from open sources gross logistics and services
capabilities for each of the Host Nations in the AOR through the process of making a written Area Assessment. However, unqualified acceptance of the concept of HNS can lead to an over reliance on its being available to meet U.S. operational needs. Such reliance could lead to the creation of "hollow" logistics support based on the simple belief that "HNS will be there." This, in turn, could have serious impact on military operations. For example, an Air Force wing might not take the heavy equipment and materials necessary for runway repair because this support, according to the Area Assessment, is available through HNS. If, in fact, it is not present in the quantity/condition needed, air operations could be severely affected or curtailed because a damaged runway could not be repaired in a timely manner. The Area Assessment, therefore, should not be relied on for operational planning purposes until it has been validated by means of on-site surveys by Civil Affairs personnel familiar with the operational plan. But many of the countries in the USCENTCOM AOR allow little or no opportunity for CA personnel to validate the country area assessment by visiting the country, which represents the crux of the problem for effective Civil Affairs operations in the AOR.

During USCENTCOM Exercises Bright Star 85 and 87, (major USCENTCOM exercises held within the AOR every two years), a small number of Civil Affairs personnel taking part were afforded a very limited opportunity in a few countries to interact with Host Nation nationals. Although such participation is highly valued for the development and training of those few Civil
Affairs personnel allowed on the exercise, in the future this participation still does not afford a structured, predictable (long term), broad Civil Affairs training opportunity.

In addition to utilizing Civil Affairs assets to facilitate HNS and/or to operate military governments, during and after a conflict, a commander-in-chief (CINC) of a unified combatant command could utilize some or all of the Civil Affairs' 20 functional specialties to advise/assist a friendly civilian government in providing services to its people. 5.

In sum, Civil Affairs units, both Army and Marine, have contingency and current real-world missions in support of USCENTCOM, but with little or no opportunity to accomplish on-the-ground training necessary to make these units and personnel true force multipliers for USCENTCOM. This paper, in part, attempts to propose a solution for this basic problem.

Regional Considerations

The area of the world of interest to USCENTCOM includes Egypt in the west, to Kenya in the south, the Arabian peninsula, to Pakistan in the east. Per capita income within the region ranges from over $27,000 in Qatar to approximately $600 for Egypt and $300 for Somalia. 6. Between 1974 and 1987, the United States provided $23 billion in economic and military aid to Egypt. As demonstrated by the Bright Star exercises, there clearly is a closer military relationship between the U.S. and Egypt. Somalia too is of significant military interest to the U.S. because of its strategic location on the Horn of Africa.
In addition, Afghanistan is on the threshold of transformation now that Soviet troops have been withdrawn. Its entire infrastructure has suffered significant damage over the past nine years of Soviet occupation and the response to it by the mujaheddin. Its strategic location, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, Pakistan, and Iran, means that Afghanistan is of more than casual interest to the United States. Further, the U.S. has provided significant support to the Afghans in their efforts against the Soviet "invaders." Clearly, Afghanistan will need assistance in the rebuilding of its infrastructure.

There are many other examples, e.g., Egypt, Somalia, and Sudan, of the need for assistance to countries in their efforts toward internal development within the USCENTCOM AOR. Absent that development, the risk remains that these conditions of latent or incipient insurgency will lead to active insurgency and/or the destabilization of one or more of these countries. Before suggesting a program to address these concerns, it would be useful to further define the environment in which the proposal is made. This environment includes the concepts of low-intensity conflict and internal development of Third World countries.

Low-Intensity Conflict

Low-intensity conflict (LIC) recently has attained enhanced visibility, if not greater clarity, as to what it is and as to its scope of impact as a concept. For example, the President has stated that:
"(L)ow-intensity conflict typically manifests itself as political-military confrontation below the level of conventional war, frequently involving protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies, and ranging from subversion to the direct use of military force." 7.

The term is further defined, with slight variations, by the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the U.S. Army. 8. These definitions—all of which are useful descriptions—range in substance from active terms such as "terrorism, subversion, and insurgency" involving "military action below the level of sustained combat," to the more benign "political-military confrontation...below conventional war and above the routine competition of states." In the author's view, LTC Rudolph Barnes, Jr., a Judge Advocate who has written on the subject, comes closer to the heart of the matter when he describes LIC as "an environment of political transition." 9. He has further noted that LIC "reverses traditional priorities, subordinating military force to political objectives." 10.

Nevertheless, the military can have a role in this environment, particularly in terms of countering insurgency in LIC situations.

Foreign Internal Defense/Internal Defense and Development

A review of the definitions for LIC indicates a common theme of the existence of an identifiable, ongoing "confrontation." Thus, much has been written about how to react to confrontation (active or violent insurgency) within the LIC environment. However, this view seems to accept the notion that the initiative
to act is in the hands of those fomenting an insurgency and that the U.S. response in those instances may be only reactive in nature—e—even though it is recognized that those reactive measures may contain proactive elements. If LTC Barnes is correct that the real LIC environment is one of political transition, then there should be proactive measures which can be taken to arrest, or avoid, the development of active "confrontation." In any event, the application of proactive measures by the United States would mean that the initiative would be in its hands.

Nation building or internal development is already recognized as a means of countering active insurgency. This approach has been referred to, in part, as Foreign Internal Defense (FID) when viewed from the U.S. perspective. Host Nations taking similar measures to counteract internal instability are said to be involved in Internal Defense and Development (IDAD). Thus, the objective of internal development is common to both terms, the only difference being in whether the matter is acted on from a U.S. perspective (FID), or from that of the Host Nation (IDAD). But, just as conditions exist within a country which provide at least part of the impetus for an active insurgency, most, if not all, of the same conditions are present prior to the initiation of active insurgency. Because it involves no major outbreak of violence or active insurgent activity, this phase of insurgency is referred to as latent or incipient insurgency.

"In FID, military civic action consists of operations that involve military forces in short-term projects useful to the local population...Projects should fit into current or
programed internal development programs." 15.

A PROGRAM PROPOSAL

The conceptual basis then for the program proposed by this paper is that the United States can take the initiative in countries with latent or incipient LIC environments and thus should establish a proactive program for those countries within the USCENTCOM AOR. The objective of the program would be to contribute to the assisted nation's internal development, thereby arresting (or possibly eliminating) conditions conducive to the fomenting of an active or violent insurgency against governments and peoples friendly to the United States. (In this regard, the U.S. would do well to adopt the Arab philosophy that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." In other words, the U.S. should be sophisticated enough to offer and provide assistance regardless of whether the assisted nation does or will always act consistent with U.S. interests--so long as that nation does not act in concert with countries hostile to U.S. interests. It should be understood that U.S. interests are served in the long run whether the country so assisted acts consistent with U.S. interests or simply does not act in concert with those against the U.S.)

As indicated above, Host Nation Support (HNS), as a means of supporting USCENTCOM forces, has taken on a substantive and, therefore, critical role in the successful implementation of USCENTCOM OPLANS. It follows then that USCENTCOM cannot permit itself to rely on area assessments as to the availability of
needed HNS without on-the-ground validation that those requirements realistically can be met. Consequently, if USCENTCOM is to continue to allocate a significant role in its operational planning for war to HNS, it must be assured that the support will be there, as validated by Civil Affairs personnel.

Given the fact that many of the countries in the AOR are otherwise sensitive to the presence of U.S. forces within their borders, it would seem prudent to utilize Civil Affairs skills to the benefit of those countries as a vehicle for gaining access. The underlying concept of the program proposal is that most of the countries within the AOR are in need—some more than others—of internal development. Civil Affairs personnel possess the technical skills, which when applied in an advisory capacity, can contribute significantly to a country's internal development.

Based on these salient considerations, USCENTCOM should expand its participation in Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (H/CA) activities, to include the employment of Civil Affairs assets. The Deputy Secretary of Defense advised the CINC's of the unified combatant commands in November 1985 that in planning and executing cooperative programs with friendly nations, "consideration should be given to the utilization of Reserve Components to the maximum extent possible." (Emphasis added.) 16. The Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA) has been designated to serve as the single point of contact within DOD and with other executive agencies. 17. A DOD Directive which implements the Humanitarian Assistance authority contained in Title 10, U.S. Code, Chapter 20, Section 401, et
seq., and which verifies the ASD/ISA as the DOD single point of contact has been promulgated in draft form and is in final coordination. The Directive, consistent with the statutory authority cited above, confirms DOD policy that H/CA activities must promote the security interests of both the U.S. and the country in which the activities are carried out, and the specific operational readiness skills of the forces participating. The activities also must complement, not duplicate, any other social or economic assistance that may be provided by any other U.S. Department or Agency and should serve the basic economic and social needs of the people of the country.

Humanitarian and civic assistance, in conjunction with authorized military operations, is defined to include: (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. 18. It is the sense of the Congress that such assistance to developing countries facing the potential of LIC is a valid military mission. 19. Civil Affairs units have personnel with the technical expertise to provide advisory assistance in all of these areas.

The above referenced draft Directive sets out the procedures to be followed by the unified commanders in long range planning and budgeting for H/CA activities. Under the program proposed herein, the unified command, USCENTCOM, would prioritize the countries to be assisted through this program and would
coordinate projects with the Country Team before submitting them to OJCS and ASD/ISA. The Country Team would be in the best position to identify projects which would benefit from or be enhanced by Civil Affairs personnel acting in an advisory role to host country civilian authorities. (It is important to note that this prioritization would not be for the purpose of military intelligence or solely political considerations, but rather for the purpose of providing meaningful training to CA personnel and to afford them the opportunity to obtain on-the-ground validation of their unclassified area assessments in those countries of greatest interest from the perspective of providing HNS.)

Consistent with U.S. objectives, this program should not be subject to the criticism that it is just another program where Americans are going in to tell the locals how to run their country. Rather, it must be seen by the Host Nation as a genuine offer of assistance to their managers and leaders in the development of their country. Accordingly, the Civil Affairs functional specialist would act more like a personal staff advisor to the responsible local manager or official. Not only would this contribute to the maintenance of personal dignity and local prestige of the advisees, but this approach should result in the development of personal relationships which would be invaluable to U.S. forces should they ever have to enter the country. In sum, the national or local governments of the Host Nation, at no expense to them, would be the beneficiaries of expert advice which could be used by them to develop their
country. (It also is important to understand that many of the Civil Affairs functional specialists do the same type of work in civilian life. Therefore, they can contribute substantive, practical experience, as well as advise the local civilian authorities, and are culturally sensitized to do it in a way that maintains the dignity of those whom they are advising.)

The staff of USCENTCOM is extremely limited (1-2 personnel) in Civil Affairs expertise. The Army element of USCENTCOM, USARCENT (Third U.S. Army, TUSA), has been delegated authority for Civil Affairs matters. One Civil Affairs Command (USAR), commanded by a BG, is assigned to USCENTCOM and its commander is dual hatted as the TUSA G5 upon mobilization. In order to translate gross requirements identified by the Country Team into specific requirements, it is anticipated that USCENTCOM staff would delegate this task to the TUSA G5, which would be augmented by Civil Affairs Command personnel.

Before proceeding further with this proposal, it is appropriate to state again that the bulk of Civil Affairs assets are within the Reserve Components and are assigned to USSOCOM for commitment in support of U.S. commands and U.S. national objectives through the spectrum of conflicts. However, within the Marine Corps Reserve there currently are two Civil Affairs Groups (CAG). 20. In this regard, the author has been advised that the Marine CAG's have not been assigned to USSOCOM. 21.

The specific requirements for Civil Affairs assets would then be passed to 1st Special Operations Command (1st SOCOM), as the Army component of USSOCOM, which, similar to U.S. Forces
Command in the case of requests for other Reserve Component units, would determine the forces available to meet the requirements. Funding aspects and considerations will be addressed below.

At this point in the process, with requirements known and the forces necessary to meet those requirements identified, scheduling for and implementation of the H/CA mission(s) would be the next logical steps. These responsibilities should fall to the Civil Affairs Command staff because it would provide the Command with invaluable training in the deployment and employment of Civil Affairs assets over a wide geographic area, very similar to its responsibilities after mobilization. Civil Affairs personnel/units then would be deployed to meet the identified H/CA mission requirements.

This then describes the overall process and some responsibilities associated with implementing the proposed Civil Affairs enhancement of the H/CA program. There also are several bureaucratic factors which could seriously affect or impede the process, as are next discussed.

BUREAUCRATIC FACTORS

Department of State

State Department participation, particularly by the Country Teams, will be critical to the success of this proposal. Therefore, it would be useful for the Department of State (DOS) to designate a single point of contact (e.g., possibly the
regional bureau, the office of Politico-Military Affairs, the Agency for International Development, or the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance), to be responsible for encouraging U.S. embassies (and their Country Teams) in the USCENTCOM AOR to identify H/CA needs which could be addressed through the capabilities of the Civil Affairs functional specialists. Clearly, each embassy will have to be committed to the utility of the program as a means of furthering U.S. interests within that country.

As previously mentioned, within the Civil Affairs community are functional specialists who could be tapped to advise Host Nation authorities and leaders in various aspects of nation development. (The office of the ASD/ISA should be staffed to provide professional advice to DOS as to the Civil Affairs functional specialties and their use in the potential LIC environment.)

If an embassy cannot identify viable H/CA missions for Civil Affairs personnel, or is located in a country which does not want or need the expertise available from the Civil Affairs functional specialists, the embassy could take advantage of that expertise itself by using selected specialists to assist its embassy staff, e.g., to prepare studies within the functional task areas. Regardless, if the proposed program is to succeed, the State Department must appreciate and support the utility of Civil Affairs as a non-lethal means of advancing U.S. interests in the USCENTCOM AOR. As a part of the "Country Team," the Civil Affairs assets committed to H/CA missions can contribute to the
success of the embassy, while gaining professional training and development which could well be invaluable to USCENTCOM should conditions advance to the stage of active insurgency or worse.

ASD/ISA

The ASD/ISA, as the single point of contact with other executive agencies, should affect coordination/liaison with the State Department to obtain support for the proposed form of H/CA. Given the responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict [ASD(SO/LIC)], to establish policy guidance for Special Operations Forces, the ASD/ISA should also coordinate with him to insure that Civil Affairs participation in H/CA is properly prepared and monitored. Further, the ASD(SO/LIC) is in the best position to assure the appropriate level of visibility and support within USSOCOM and its Army component, 1st SOCOM. Close coordination and cooperation between the Active and Reserve Components also is critical to the viability of this proposal and, therefore, should be of particular interest to ASD(SO/LIC) in its oversight role, as well as to the ASD/ISA.

USCENTCOM

As the unified combatant command with the regional responsibility for U.S. military interests in the Middle East AOR, USCENTCOM recognizes that preserving the peace has equal importance with preparing for wartime contingencies. In this regard, utilizing Civil Affairs assets in H/CA activities in the region could represent a relatively inexpensive way, in terms of
personnel and attendant costs, to advance U.S. interests while enhancing USCENTCOM wartime capabilities. With such a commitment, USCENTCOM also stands to benefit from a closer working relationship with the regional Country Teams. 24.

FUNDING

In this time of scarce fiscal resources, the central question affecting any proposal is who pays the costs of providing the Civil Affairs functional specialists to their overseas locations? A good part of the Civil Affairs personnel costs are already funded in that pay and allowances for these Reservists can be met with annual training (AT) funds. These monies also cover the costs of moving the Reservists from home station to the overseas embarkation point and from there back to home station. However, the costs of transportation overseas and back, and subsistence and housing while overseas, are currently borne by the overseas command receiving the overseas deployment training (ODT) assets, in this instance USCENTCOM.

There is a limit on the length of AT for Reservists, normally 17 days (travel inclusive), unless, with DA approval the period is extended to 22 days. This does not mean that the commitment of Civil Affairs assets would be limited strictly to these periods. Reservists can also be activated, with their consent, for various periods of active duty for training (ADT) for up to 179 days without a DA exception to policy. Each day of ADT is referred to as a man-day space (MDS) and must be budgeted
to include travel and per diem costs. If USCENTCOM wished to increase the availability of manpower, budgeting for additional MDS could be a means of accomplishing this objective. In addition, with Department of Army approval, a number of Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) positions could be created, which would allow for full-time support to the administration of the proposed H/CA program by selected Reservists. 25. The limited funding problem can be solved in at least three ways by USCENTCOM, by Department of State (USAID), or by USSOCOM. Pursuant to the draft DOD Directive on H/CA activities and using the statutory authority of 10 U.S.C. 401, et seq., USCENTCOM would submit its five year plan for H/CA, to include Civil Affairs participation, with associated costs to OJCS and ASD/ISA. Obligations or expenditures under this authority are currently limited to $16,400,000 for each of fiscal years 1987 through 1991.

If requirements for this and other H/CA activities exceed this amount, DOD could either seek expanded obligation and expenditure authority or alternative financing. In the latter event, another source of funding would be through reimbursement to DOD by the U.S. Agency for International Development pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. 2392(c). This section and the Economy Act (31 U.S.C. 1535) require reimbursement which is fair to both agencies for direct and indirect costs of the performing agency, which are attributable to accomplishing the requesting agency’s work. 26. The obvious limitation to this funding authority is the ability of USAID and its parent agency, the U.S. International Development and Cooperation Agency, to
obtain appropriations to pay for reimbursement.

A third method of funding would seem to address the limitations of the two methods discussed above. Under 22 U.S.C. 2392(c), DOD, the "owning" agency, may enter into an agreement with DOS which states that DOD does not require reimbursement for the services of its personnel in a given civic or humanitarian project. This approach is based on recognition that DOS and DOD objectives in undertaking similar activities may complement each other; but that DOD can achieve substantial training benefit while at the same time enhancing DOS efforts in conducting assistance programs under its authority. As discussed above, the predominant DOD interest under the proposal would be to enhance Civil Affairs training for mobilization missions within the AOR and to validate the viability of projected HNS to be available in support of USCENTCOM OPLANS. Under this approach, and assuming funds were not thought to be available under H/CA funding authority or through reimbursement, USSOCOM conceivably could fill the void. 27.

In any event, the funding issue is solvable. It would appear desirable to do so if it is recognized and accepted that the relatively minor cost of the proposed Civil Affairs H/CA program--even if the additional funds needed (over those provided as a part of AT) were provided by DOD--is really minimal in contrast to the potential benefits of the program, particularly over the long term, if it is successful in reducing or eliminating an active insurgency threat(s).
POTENTIAL BENEFITS

The primary benefit of this proposal is that it represents a practical means of implementing the Civil Affairs Master Plan proposal that there should be a "cohesive and coordinated interagency structure for CA activities to achieve U.S. strategic interests." 28. As discussed above, the State Department and ASD/ISA, at a minimum, must be involved in the program. A close working relationship between the various embassy Country Teams and USCENTCOM would necessarily develop under a successful Civil Affairs H/CA program. Such a relationship should be most beneficial should a crisis arise which requires military assistance or intervention in any of the countries affected by this program.

Certainly equal to the benefit of H/CA activities to Civil Affairs training and professional development would be the long term benefit derived from internal development activities accomplished by the Host Nation(s). If the program were fully successful, active insurgency should not begin, much less flourish.

"In a country in which the government is threatened by subversive insurgency (for the purposes of this paper, even latent or incipient insurgency), every military act must be designed to accomplish a political end: to establish, maintain and preserve a government that can operate effectively, under law, to meet the needs and aspirations of the people of that country...The long-range goal...is nation building." 29.

A successful Civil Affairs H/CA program will mean that Civil Affairs personnel will spend considerable time in several of the countries within the USCENTCOM AOR. Debriefing of these
personnel by psychological operations (PSYOPS) and military intelligence personnel could prove highly valuable. It would be naive not to recognize this potential, even by those countries being helped under the program. However, to be successful, or even accepted, the perception and the reality must be that the purpose of the H/CA mission is to help and assist the Host Nation. Accordingly, in no circumstance should Civil Affairs personnel be tasked to carry out a PSYOPS or intelligence gathering mission, either overtly or covertly. (Having said this, it is recognized that PSYOPS could render valuable assistance to Civil Affairs personnel in the effective "selling" of the program to the Host Nation(s).) In the final analysis, the success of this form of H/CA activities will depend, in large part, on the trust established between USCENTCOM (through Civil Affairs personnel) and Host Nation personnel. A betrayal of that trust by such actions could have a significant adverse impact on this program, the outer bounds of which cannot be predicted. In short, any perceived short-term benefit which might be gained by using Civil Affairs personnel for these missions would surely be negated by the potential long-term impact of the targeted country canceling the program. It is conceivable that adverse reactions to such activities could spread to other countries in the region, resulting in the cancellation of H/CA, regardless of whether such activities were pursued in those countries.

If accepted, and properly coordinated, the proposed Civil Affairs H/CA program could be of significant benefit to the State
Department and to the U.S. embassies in the USCENTCOM AOR. The program would provide a reservoir of highly trained, culturally acclimated manpower to assist the Host Nation at minimal cost to the United States. As previously mentioned, if there was little or no need for direct Civil Affairs assistance to the Host Nation, some of the same expertise could benefit the embassy by providing assistance to its staff—again at minimal or no cost to the State Department.

CONCLUSION

As the term is defined to include conditions short of armed or hostile insurgency, a LIC environment exists in most, if not all, of the countries within the USCENTCOM AOR. To be sure, there are pockets of wealth and affluence; but, on balance, there is widespread poverty, disease, and joblessness in these so-called Third World countries. In his speech of 7 December 1988 to the United Nations, President Gorbachev recognized the conditions present in the Third World and urged new efforts to address those problems. He proposed that this be done in partnership with the United Nations. Given the fact that a majority of the member nations do not have representative democracies as their form of government, it is not yet clear what is the true meaning of Mr. Gorbachev's statements, particularly in terms of addressing the conditions which are conducive to active insurgency. The United States can ill afford to wait. As stated by Dr. William J. Olson, Director, Low-Intensity Conflict
Organization, ASD(SO/LIC):

"There are no shortcuts in dealing with the riddle of LIC; but if this country is ever to effect a coherent and sustained effort, if it is not to painfully relearn anew all the hard lessons and if it is to address the LIC challenge to its long-term interests, then it must face up to the need to develop and sustain the institutional elements, the concepts and the ongoing educational programs required to make LIC a serious component in our strategy. There is no guarantee of success even if all these things are done perfectly, but failure is a certainty if nothing is done."

31.

In the same article, Dr. Olson also observed that:

"The picture of U.S. capability and will to respond to LIC is a mixed one. On the one hand, there are ample signs of a growing awareness of and ability to respond to LIC. On the other hand, there are indications that few have yet grasped the importance of the issues or are prepared to do what is necessary."

32.

As demonstrated in this paper, the main thrust of doctrine in the LIC arena is oriented toward "reacting" to active (armed) insurgencies. The proposed Civil Affairs H/CA program takes one step back from active insurgency and represents an attempt to address the problems/conditions associated with the LIC environment in a proactive way while they are still "in transition," with the objective of forestalling active insurgency. Done successfully, this proposal will require far less of the national treasure than dealing with the potential impact of an active (or worse, successful) insurgency.

In any event, it is in the vital national strategic interest of the United States to encourage the development of stable, representative democracies in the Third World and to encourage that development by assisting Host Nation governments in meeting the internal development needs of their peoples. Civil Affairs
possesses capabilities which, being directly relevant to this
development and the proposed H/CA program, can be a practical
means of achieving that goal. The fact that the bulk of
resources will come from the Reserve Components does present
substantive problems. However, they are problems which can be
addressed and solved if there is a commitment by the Departments
of State and Defense to actively support the program.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has recently
observed that there is no way to separate the political from the
military in dealing with problems. In his view "(o)ur challenge
is to develop leaders who can fight and manage and fighters who
can contribute to policy making." 33. This proposal directly
impacts the warfighting capabilities of USCENTCOM because of the
significant reliance of USCENTCOM on the availability of often
critical Host Nation Support. At the same time, it would provide
USCENTCOM, and other regional unified combatant commands, with an
initiative which could be a significant tool in preserving the
peace and in supporting U.S. policy interests in the Third World.
In the opinion of the author, this proposal does provide a
practical means to meet, and perhaps best, the challenges
presented by the problems of internal development by nations in
the Third World. If the United States does not respond to these
challenges, others, who do not necessarily support the
development of representative democracies, most surely will.
ENDNOTES

1. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 41-10, pp. 3-1 thru 3-11 (hereinafter referred to as "FM 41-10") and U.S. Department of the Army, Department of the Air Force, Field Manual 100-20 (Final Draft), p. 2-1 (hereinafter referred to as "FM 100-20").


3. FM 41-10, pp. 1-4 to 1-5 and 5-1 thru 5-6.

4. Ibid, see pp. 2-9 to 2-12 for a discussion of the role of Civil Affairs in HNS.

5. Ibid, Appendix A. The 20 functional specialties are civil defense, labor, legal, public administration, public education, public finance, public health, public safety, public welfare, civilian supply, economics and commerce, food and agriculture, property control, public communications, public transportation, public works and utilities, arts, monuments and archives, civil information, cultural affairs, and dislocated civilians. See also Field Manual 100-16, pp. 11-4 thru 11-11, for another discussion of what tasks each of these functional specialties includes. However, it should be noted that the term "Displaced Persons, Refugees, and Evacuees" (DPRE) has been supplanted by the current term, "Dislocated Civilians" (DC).

6. U.S. Department of State, Background Notes, Nov 87 (Qatar), Dec 87 (Egypt), Nov 86 (Somalia).


8. The Secretary of Defense (Frank C. Carlucci, Annual Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1989, 11 February 1988, p. 58.) has noted that "LIC involves indirect, or ambiguous, aggression such as terrorism, subversion, and insurgency." The Deputy Secretary of Defense (U.S. Department of Defense, DOD Directive No. 5138.4, 4 January 1988, p. 1.), in addressing the authority and responsibilities of the ASD(SO/LIC), defines LIC as "political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition of states." The Army variously describes LIC in the same words as the DOD Directive, i.e., FM 100-20 (Final Draft), p. 1-1, and as involving "military action below the level of sustained combat between regular forces," FM 100-1, p. 11. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Pub 1 provides yet another slightly distinguishable view by defining LIC in terms of a "limited political-military struggle" ranging from "diplomatic, economic, and psychosocial pressures through terrorism and insurgency," which is "generally confined to a geographic area"
and is "often characterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and the level of violence."


11. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff Pub 1, "Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms" (hereafter referred to as "JCS Pub 1"). JCS Pub 1 defines Foreign Internal Defense (FID) as "Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free or protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency."

12. FM 100-20, pp. 2-14 thru 2-25.

13. From the author's perspective, there is an inconsistency between FM 100-20 and FM 41-10. For example, FM 100-20 includes FID in its glossary of terms, but discusses only IDAD in the text of the manual. While it is important to recognize IDAD for what it is, because FM 100-20 is written for use by U.S. forces, it would appear that FID also should be discussed in conjunction with IDAD and that cross reference should be made to Chapter 3, FM 41-10.

14. FM 41-10, pp. 3-2 to 3-3.

15. Ibid, p. 3-6.


18. Title 10, United States Code, Chapter 20, Section 405.

19. The legislative history for Public Law 99-661 (10 U.S.C. 401, et seq.) states that "(t)he committee believes that the provision of humanitarian and civic assistance activities to the civilian populace of developing foreign countries potentially confronted with low intensity conflict should be explicitly recognized as a valid military mission." (Emphasis added.) U.S. Code and Congressional News, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 6482.

21. Apparently after some inter-service disagreement, it has been determined that the Reserve Component Marine CAG's are a part of the two "embarked" Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF's). However, 10 U.S.C. 167(b), Assignment of Forces (to SOCOM), provides that "(u)nless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, all active and reserve special operations forces of the armed forces stationed in the United States shall be assigned to the special operations command." (Emphasis added.) The author is not aware that the Secretary has so excepted the Marine CAG's. In any event, the facts indicate that the particular USCENTCOM designated Marine Reserve CAG in question is stationed in Los Angeles, CA. Its personnel are trained by the Army. When mobilized, it will have an Army Civil Affairs Company (soon to be Battalion) attached to it to help provide support to the MEF. Further, such separateness has the potential for promoting competition for scarce resources within the AOR because the Marine and Army Civil Affairs units have not worked and coordinated together in peacetime. Secondly, the splitting of this single function of Civil Affairs along service lines does not promote jointness. Accordingly, in the author's opinion, this decision should be revisited.

If the Marine CAG's were assigned to USSOCOM, this would facilitate the CINCCENTCOM, pursuant to authority under paragraph 3-26d, JCS Pub 2, establishing a "functional component command" under the 352d Civil Affairs Command to address Civil Affairs matters for USCENTCOM. The criteria for establishing a functional component command are found in paragraph 3-9a. In a message change to JCS Pub 1 [JCS Msg, Subj: JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)- Terminology, dtd 291626Z Oct 87], the term "functional component command" is defined as a "command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more services which may be established in peacetime or war to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time."

22. FM 41-10, Appendix A.


24. As the responsible command, USCENTCOM should consider forming a functional component command, as referenced in Note 20 above, with the mission of conducting the proposed program. This command could be formed out of existing assets of the 352d Civil Affairs Command and the Marine CAG. Such a command would not only assure full Marine participation in H/CA activities, but would provide for better wartime planning for the employment of Army and Marine Civil Affairs units.
25. The obvious concern with the use of Reservists in H/CA activities is their limited time on station. However, there simply are no Active Component (AC) assets available because of the heavy commitment of the one AC Civil Affairs battalion to other real-world missions. Secondly, with forethought and planning, the author believes that viable missions could be identified which would lend themselves to the incremental commitment of Civil Affairs Reservists.

26. Guidance in this area can be found in various Comptroller General opinions including 57 Comp. Gen. 674 (1978), 63 Comp. Gen. 422 (1984), and 63 Comp. Gen. at 22-26, among others.

27. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 167(e), CINCSOCOM, among other functions, has responsibility for "(B) Training assigned forces... (F) Ensuring combat readiness... (and) (H) Ensuring the interoperability of forces" by monitoring the preparedness of SOF assigned to other unified combatant commands to carry out assigned missions. The author believes that a strong case has been made that probably the only way Civil Affairs personnel can be fully trained and prepared to perform wartime missions is for them to get in country and to practice their skills with host country nationals during peacetime. Assuming this interpretation is accepted as valid, the CINCSOCOM has authority to propose funding of "selected operations" pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 167(f) and 166(b)(4). These budget proposals are submitted as Program 11 funding. In the author's view, this approach appears most viable in terms of visibility, prioritization, and as a counter to generalized budgetary objections and constraints.

28. Master Plan, p. 5-1.


30. Critics may charge that a "bond of trust" will be an unlikely development over a short 2-3 week period. In the short term and with no followup, this probably is so. However, the proposal assumes a long-term relationship through an incremental infusion of Civil Affairs personnel.


32. Ibid., p. 15.

33. Bruce van Voorst, "Of War and Politics," Time, 26 December 1988, p. 73.