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CONSIDERATIONS FOR NATION BUILDING IN COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFIGHTING

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL EARLE C. RICHARDSON

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Insurgent warfare occurs on the lower end of the spectrum of conflict. The Soviets continue to use this type of conflict as a very feasible weapon to advance their strategy of denial. Denial strategy success represents a serious threat to the national security of the United States. The United States must pursue, therefore, a successful counterinsurgency warfighting strategy. This study examines types of insurgent warfare, Foreign Internal Defense strategy, foreign assistance programs and nation building. The examination leads to consideration of how the United States Army Corps of Engineers can best

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A Contributory Role for the United States Army Corps of Engineers

by

Lieutenant Colonel Earle C. Richardson

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

		Page
ABSTRACT		ii
CHAPTER I.	INTRODUCTION	1
	Background	1
	Study Objective	2
	Study Scope	2
	Significance	2
	Relevance	4
II.	INSURGENCY	8
	Types of Insurgency	8
	Conditions Conducive to Insurgency	8
	Characteristics of Insurgency	10
	Phases	10
	Requirements	11
III.	FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE	15
	Strategy	15
	Phases	16
	Campaign Plans and the Principle of Self-Sufficiency	17
IV.	FOREIGN ASSISTANCE	22
	Organization and Players	22
	Security Assistance Programs	23
	The Future Trend of Security Assistance	24
V.	NATION BUILDING	28
	Definition	28
	Purpose	28
	Relationship to Phases of Counterinsurgency	29
	Considerations	30
VI.	CONTRIBUTION BY THE UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS	36
	Traditional Approach	36
	Alternatives to Enhance Self-Sufficiency	36
	Participation in the Development Process	38
	Expansion of Electric Power Production	39
VII.	SUMMARY	42
BIBLIOGRAPHY		44

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE V-1.	Summary of Counterinsurgency and Nation Building Actions by Phase	31
TABLE VI-1.	Contributory Opportunities for the United States Army Corps of Engineers	40

CONSIDERATIONS FOR NATION BUILDING IN COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFIGHTING

A Contributory Role for the United States Army Corps of Engineers

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

Many sources[1] recognize that insurgencies, a form of low intensity conflict,[2] represent a serious threat to the national security of the United States. The threat stems from the fact insurgencies often result in changes in the ideology of nations making them unfriendly to the United States. The cumulative effect[3] of a number of insurgencies would cause a dangerous alteration of the political and economic balance in the world. Since the right of the United States to claim world leadership is founded on economic power,[4] significant adverse change in the balance of power certainly represents a vital,[5] if not survival, interest to the country. The United States must, therefore, pursue a successful national strategy for counterinsurgency warfighting.

This is particularly true in Central and South America where several important insurgencies exist in various phases of development. The best known is the one ongoing in El Salvador. Other insurgencies are active in Guatemala, Honduras, Colombia, and Peru,[6] to name a few.

Foreign Internal Defense[7] serves as the current national

strategy by applying political, economic, socio-psychological and military elements of power to defeat insurgencies.[8] Within this strategy, the concept of nation building[9] provides for the application of the full range of state power to create a more rational, equitable national reality. The United States Army Corps of Engineers has the expertise to make a major contribution to this concept.

STUDY OBJECTIVE

To identify opportunities for the United States Army Corps of Engineers to contribute to the concept of nation building.

STUDY SCOPE

The study begins with a chapter on the types of insurgency and the conditions conducive to this type of conflict. The following chapter discusses the strategy of Foreign Internal Defense, campaign plans and the major considerations to be kept in mind when developing these campaign plans. The next chapter reviews the organization and players involved in the process of foreign assistance. This chapter also includes a comment on the future of foreign assistance. The last two chapters address nation building and the contributory role of the United States Army Corps of Engineers.

SIGNIFICANCE

In order to understand how to develop a successful strategy for counterinsurgency warfighting, it is important to see how insurgent warfare is being fought today.

An overview[10] of insurgencies since World War II reveals a trend demonstrating the possibility of a grand strategy by the Soviet Union to circumvent the containment strategy of the United States. This grand strategy uses insurgency as a primary weapon.

Immediately after World War II, the Soviet Union moved to solidify its border with Western Europe. The countries of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Albania and Bulgaria were rapidly brought under Soviet influence, and governments sympathetic to the Soviet Union were installed. Concurrently, the Soviets tried to bring countries along their southern border under Soviet control. Attempts to overthrow the governments of Turkey and Greece, however, caused an American response historically referred to as the Truman Doctrine. The strategy expressed by this doctrine is known as containment and has as its objective preventing the expansion of the Soviet Union along its periphery.[11]

The Soviet response to the strategy of containment has been termed the strategy of denial.[12] This strategy strives to moderate, reduce or eliminate the influence of the United States throughout the world by weakening the economic strength of the United States and causing a shift in the balance of power favorable to the Soviet Union.

Insurgent warfare supports the strategy by seeking to replace governments friendly to the United States with governments friendly to the Soviet Union. Once this change occurs, subsequent action would be designed to disrupt the economic fabric and international,

political support of the United States.[13]

Consider, for example, what has already occurred in the Caribbean and Central and South America. The economic exchange between the United States and Cuba and Nicaragua has been complicated considerably as a result of the successful Marxist-Leninist insurgencies in these countries. While some may argue this has had only a slight impact on the economy of the United States, none can deny the potential for disastrous effect on the interests of the United States in maintaining a favorable balance of power if, in addition to Cuba and Nicaragua, the insurgencies identified earlier are successful. Since this area represents the fourth largest import and export market of the United States, behind only Canada, Japan and Europe;[14] any significant change in the economic complexion of the region would have a serious impact on the economy of the United States.

The impact could become even more serious if one were to consider the effect successful insurgencies in Africa and Southeast Asia could have on the economies of Europe and Japan.[15] Clearly, the cumulative effect of insurgencies worldwide present a serious threat to the economy and national security of the United States and its allies.

From this discussion, it becomes clear that the United States must have a workable national strategy for counterinsurgency warfighting.

RELEVANCE

The relevance of this study derives from the above background

discussion and the following assumptions.

- The Soviets will continue to encourage and support insurgent warfare as a means to advance their strategy of denial through support for wars of national liberation.

- Congress will recognize that insurgent warfare represents an increasing threat to the national and international economic system and imperils the national security of the United States.

- The foreign assistance program will change from its principal emphasis on maintaining the balance of power in the Middle East[16] to an emphasis on assistance to developing countries.

- Burden sharing will continue as a major consideration in foreign assistance and result in a postion held by the Congress of the United States that Europe has primary responsibility for Africa,[17] that Japan has primary responsibility for the Pacific Rim[18] and that the United States has primary responsibility for Central and South America and the Caribbean.

ENDNOTES

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2. U.S. Department of the Army, Final Draft Field Manual 100-20 and AFM 2-XY: Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict, p. 1-10.

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7. U.S. Department of Defense, JCS Pub 1: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, p. 152. Reference defines Foreign Internal Defense as participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

8. A Paper by the Future Security Environment Working Group submitted to the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Supporting U.S. Strategy For Third World Conflict, June 1988. p. 2.

9. The concept of nation building is applicable across a wide range of the conflict spectrum from peaceful competition through other forms of low intensity conflict and operations short of war.

10. The two predominant views of the world today can be defined as a regionalist view and a globalist view. The regionalist view tends to express and analyze world events in terms of isolated circumstances, within regions, and pays little attention to the relationship these events have to one another. For example, the situation in Angola is thought of only in terms of its significance in southern Africa. In this regard, its importance to the national security of the United States is discounted, and the threat is considered rather insignificant. The regional view does not recognize the cumulative effect of the threat to national security.

The globalist view, on the other hand, tends to view circumstances with a perspective of the global geostrategic significance. Continuing the example of Angola, those with a globalist view would relate this to a plan which includes Zambia and Mozambique in an effort to isolate and control southern Africa and the Cape of Good Hope; thus, jeopardizing access by the West to essential resources and shipping lanes. The globalist would note in his argument that this relates to apparent efforts by the Soviets to do very much the same thing in other parts of Africa and the world. Specific mention would be made of efforts to control South Yemen and Ethiopia, on opposite sides of the southern entrance to the Suez Canal; of efforts in the Caribbean and Central America adjacent to the Panama Canal; and of efforts in the southwestern pacific adjacent to the sea lines through the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca.

The globalist view takes the position that the cumulative effect of these threats is extremely important to the national security of the United States.

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CHAPTER II

INSURGENCY

TYPES OF INSURGENCY

The two basic types of insurgencies are those that gain control of the government from within and those that gain control by revolution. Subversive and critical cell[1] insurgencies represent the first type. These insurgencies, in one fashion or another, attempt to infiltrate or penetrate the existing government and its institutions. Once successful, they seek to change the form of government.[2]

Mass oriented and traditional insurgencies[3] represent the much more widely known second type. These attempt to use external pressure, normally in the form of violence, to overthrow the government, gain recognition for the insurgents allowing them to participate in the government or establish separate governments for specifically identifiable groups.[4] Mass oriented insurgencies typify the most prevalent type of insurgency commonly experienced in Central and South America and the Caribbean.

CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE TO INSURGENCY

Mass oriented insurgencies depend on the support of the people. This support comes from the frustration the people have with the inability of the existing government to correct adverse social, political and economic conditions.[5] A firm understanding of these adverse conditions is essential to counter-insurgency warfighting.

Adverse social conditions include lack of adequate health care; a low rate of literacy; lack of potable water; excessive drug production; overpopulation, especially in urban areas; an abnormally high birth rate, resulting in rapid population growth; and excessive migration and low nutrition levels.[6] Of these, the low rate of literacy presents the most serious problem. There exists a striking correlation between the rate of literacy and the presence of insurgency. Those countries with literacy rates below seventy percent, as is the case with most of the countries mentioned in Chapter I, appear extremely vulnerable to insurgency.[7] The significance of this point must lie in the fact countries with low literacy rates have difficulty solving their problems. As a result, they become ideal targets for the Soviets or their surrogates to target for insurgency. Correction of social problems, therefore, must start with raising the literacy rate.

Adverse economic conditions include widespread poverty, low per capita income, staggering foreign debt, high unemployment, and rapid inflation. These conditions result in a stagnant economy with a small middle class, skewed income distribution and a large urban population.[8]

Clearly, the staggering foreign debt represents the principal problem. With so much of the gross national product being consumed to pay debt principal and interest, governments cannot generate revenues and capital to address economic and social problems.

To correct these economic conditions a solution to the

foreign debt problem must be achieved; skilled manpower and resources must be free to operate within a less regulatory national legal environment; revenues and capital must be generated; effective trade unions must be organized; agrarian reform* must be accomplished and economic infrastructure[10] must be built.

Adverse political conditions derive primarily from authoritarian or totalitarian forms of government with control by dictators, elite groups and the army. Conditions like this foster incompetent leaders and public administrators; corruption; favoritism; irrelevant judicial systems; ineffective police forces; brutal leaders; an untrustworthy army and an absence of national will to defeat insurgency.[11] Correction of these conditions requires the institution of democratic government responsive to the people. Until this happens, execution of long lasting programs to fight insurgences remain a near impossibility.

CHARACTERISTICS OF INSURGENCY

Phases

Revolutionary movements begin when people have become severely dissatisfied and frustrated with the above mentioned adverse social, political and economic conditions. The inability of the people to effect legitimate change within the system causes them to revert to other means. This usually results in the development of an insurgency dedicated to change the government and the economic, social and political order.[12] In the case of a mass oriented insurgency, this occurs through a three phased process.[13] The first phase involves creation

of political and military structures and gathering popular support. The second phase includes continued growth of the organization and popular support, and the initiation of violence against the government. The third phase emphasizes a general uprising followed by overthrow of the government.

Requirements

To accomplish their objectives mass oriented insurgencies require widely scattered support; avoidance of urban areas; control of rural areas, especially in the first two phases; decentralized command; considerable commitment; a common cause and external assistance.[14]

These insurgencies are generally most vulnerable during the first phase when their numbers are small and the basis of support has not been fully established. During this phase, insurgents must remain on the move to avoid being located and captured. This becomes easier in an environment containing a number of support bases located over a wide area, as one would find in a rural agricultural economy[15] or particularly mountainous terrain.

Urban areas, on the other hand, present a danger during the early phases.[16] Urban dwellers generally support the government and expose insurgents. The insurgents find it nearly impossible to maintain secrecy and dispersion in the cities and generally find it healthier to restrict their activities to the countryside.[17] Successful insurgencies must control rural areas where insurgents can disperse and maintain secrecy and freedom of movement.[18]

This identifies one of the key considerations which should be kept in mind in developing a campaign plan to fight insurgency.

The necessity for dispersion places a considerable burden on command and control of insurgencies. Understandably, directing an organization composed of a number of dispersed cells requires considerable self-dedication on behalf of the insurgents. A common cause[19] often provides the spark which generates the commitment.

This common cause often stems from an injustice perpetrated by the government which creates a martyr[20] or serves as a basis for criticism of the government. For example, the assassination in 1933 of Augusto Cesar Sandino[21] by the government provided a rallying cry for the Sandinista National Liberation Front in Nicaragua some 28 years later. Another example can be found in the activities of the El Salvadoran death squads.[22] Insurgents have taken advantage of these activities to incite their followers and to discredit the government.

These examples indicate another mandatory consideration for developing campaign plans to fight insurgencies. The government must be extremely careful in responding to insurgencies. Every effort has to be taken to avoid circumstances which may benefit the insurgents.

The armed forces[23] must be especially aware of this requirement. Their actions must be just and completely responsive to the government so as to avoid any circumstance which might result in alienation of the people.

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21. Shirley Christian, Revolution in the Family, pp. 24,32.

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CHAPTER III

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

STRATEGY

Foreign Internal Defense provides the national strategy for defeating an insurgency. The strategy applies political, social, economic and military elements of power to achieve a program of balanced development[1] accomplishing a goal of national security for a country friendly to the United States.

The political element of power is applied to promote a democratic system of government[2] with national values similar to the United States. These values include belief in human dignity, personnel freedom, individual rights and pursuit of happiness.[3] Success results when the government becomes just and responsive to the desires of the people. Without success in this regard improvements in other conditions cannot be assured of making an enduring contribution to the defeat of an insurgency.[4]

The socio-psychological and economic elements of power are employed to create the support for and the means with which to develop essential educational, health and welfare systems.[5] Success results when literacy exceeds ninety percent, disease and malnutrition are controlled, migration decreases and the growth of the population nears zero.

The socio-psychological and military elements of power are employed to isolate and neutralize the insurgent movement and insure security for the legitimate government.[6] This is accomplished by improving the capability of the indigenous armed

forces through training, equipment and logistics support.[7] Success results when the insurgency becomes ineffective; thus, affording the opportunity to accomplish necessary improvements in other areas. Military success alone never insures victory. Unless social, political and economic reform occurs concurrent with equitable development, insurgencies will eventually return.[8]

The socio-psychological and economic elements of power are employed to assist with an attack the chronic problem of poverty by mobilizing manpower and resources.[9] This requires creation of jobs through the growth of services and the industrial base.[10] Reduction in the rate of unemployment and an increase in the per capita income provide measures of success.

PHASES

Foreign Internal Defense progresses through three phases termed the initial phase, the transition phase and the consolidation phase.[11] While all elements of power are employed in each phase, the objectives and emphasis change.

The initial phase emphasizes the application of the political element of power to establish a democratic form of government at the national level. Other elements of power play supporting roles. Military power serves to stabilize the situation. The degree to which military power must be employed depends on the status of the insurgency. Obviously, the more advanced the insurgency the more military power must be applied. Some socio-psychological and economic power may be necessary to correct the most pressing problems thus assuring support for the evolving

government.

The transition phase emphasizes the application of military power to neutralize and defeat the insurgent forces. Application of the political element of power, now in a supporting role, continues until the democratic process extends to the local level. If the military and political situations allow, increased investment in social and economic programs may become possible in the later stages of this phase.

The consolidation phase emphasizes application of social and economic power. Democratic processes, now established down to local level, provide a public administration system comfortably free of corruption, excessive regulation and favoritism. What emerges is a government capable of executing large scale social and economic programs which address peoples' frustrations.

CAMPAIGN PLANS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY

A successful counterinsurgency operation requires a national campaign plan.[12] This plan defines the long range program for neutralization of the insurgent, and the correction of adverse conditions conducive to insurgency. Campaign plans must comply with national policy for dealing with insurgencies. This policy specifies actions be feasible, discreet, founded on national security interests, in conformance with international and domestic law,[13] and with major focus on improving social, political, and economic conditions.[14] National policy further states that the best actions take advantage of the fact that economic power offers the most leverage to achieve national objectives.[15]

Foreign assistance, therefore, becomes the strongest weapon.[16]

The major factor which must be considered during the development of a campaign plan is the principle of self-sufficiency.[17] This principle advocates that countries execute their own counterinsurgency programs. Self-sufficiency takes account of the duration of counterinsurgency campaigns, avoids any perception of domination by the United States[18] and promotes acceptance of the government by the people.

A counterinsurgency campaign often becomes a tedious and protracted[19] process for a variety of reasons. Some governments balk at instituting democratic reform which can make the initiation phase quite time consuming. Also, the protracted strategy adopted by the insurgents probably will cause the transition phase to last much longer than desired. Finally, correction of the adverse conditions mentioned above cannot be accomplished overnight and may take years. Consider that after ten years in El Salvador, much still remains to be done to end the insurgency there.

Because counterinsurgency campaigns take so long, the development of self-sufficiency becomes extremely important. The United States cannot become directly involved in a lengthy counter-insurgency operation.[20] Given the spector of Vietnam, criticism from Congress, the media and the people makes direct involvement with armed forces of the United States in these situations difficult, dangerous and almost unthinkable.

Self-sufficiency acts to satisfy another important need. It helps the government gain the support of the people.[21] What

a government does, as opposed to what the United States does, goes a long way toward establishing their legitimacy.

The United States must avoid any perception of dominating the action.[22] The nature of nationalism and pragmatism in friendly governments mandates a spirit of cooperation.[23] Self-sufficiency, preparing the host nation to assume the principal role in nation building, enables the United States to refrain from highly visible involvement. Further justification for self-sufficiency comes from the fact that as nations successfully assume more of the responsibility, they tend to gain confidence and develop a driving national will necessary to prevail over the insurgents.[24]

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CHAPTER IV

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

ORGANIZATION AND PLAYERS

Foreign assistance programs provide the major instrume of foreign policy[1], and ultimately, Foreign Internal Defense. These programs encompass security, humanitarian, civic and developmental assistance to countries all around the world.[2] The most well known examples of foreign assistance are probably the Lend Lease[3] assistance programs for military assistance of our allies prior to and during World War II, and the Marshall Plan[4] for the economic recovery of Europe after the war.

The organizations involved in the development of foreign policy from which foreign assistance programs evolve include the President; National Security Council; Secretaries of State, Defense, Commerce, Treasury and Agriculture; United States Agency for International Development; Central Intelligence Agency; United States Information Agency; Department of Immigration; Drug Enforcement Agency; country team and Congress as the principal players.[5] Of these, the Departments of State and Defense have the most significant role in developing assistance programs.

Within the State Department; the principal players include the ambassadors and their country teams; the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology; and the five assistant secretaries responsible for regional activities.[6] The country team works for the ambassador and consists of representatives from the United States Agency for International Devel-

opment, Security Assistance Office, United States Information Agency and the embassy staff.[7] This team reviews the national campaign plan prepared by the government, justifies assistance requirements and forwards these requirements to the State Department. Requirements are considered and acted upon by several offices including the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology; Regional Assistant Secretaries; Inspector General of Foreign Assistance; Under Secretary for Political Affairs; and the Bureau of Political Militarv Affairs.[8]

The organization for security assistance within the Department of Defense starts with the Security Assistance Office.[9] Security assistance requirements defined in the campaign plan are forwarded through the Commander-in-Chief of the appropriate Unified Command to the Joint Chiefs of Staff[10] and ultimately to the Defense Department. Here the Defense Security Assistance Agency, under the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, integrates security assistance requirements with overall national security objectives.[11]

SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

Legislation for security assistance in force today includes the Mutual Defense Assistance Act (MDAA) of 1949, the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, and the Foreign Military Sales Act (FMSA) of 1968.[12] These legislative acts created the various assistance programs managed by the State Department or the Defense Department. The Defense Department manages the programs for military assistance, international military training and education

and foreign military sales.[13] The State Department manages the security assistance programs for peacekeeping operations, commercial export and economic support.[14] The State Department also provides supervision and direction for humanitarian, civic and developmental foreign assistance programs.[15]

The economic support and developmental assistance programs are the two principal programs for financing infrastructure and capital projects.[16] As such, they represent the principal means for implementing nation building.

THE FUTURE TREND OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE

While security assistance has almost always provided some funding for Foreign Internal Defense, the emphasis has never been in this area. Instead, the emphasis has focused on the use of security assistance to support countries facing regional, military confrontation or to attain regional political objectives. An examination of the use of security assistance since World War II, reveals how the emphasis has changed. After the war, the immediate emphasis for security assistance was the economic recovery of Europe. The Marshall Plan provided over $13 billion over a five year period for this purpose.[17]

Emphasis changed during the period of 1950-1960, to support for allies facing regional confrontations and to advance efforts forming a system of global alliances.[18] The United States provided considerable assistance to the French during the war in Indochina. Alliances like the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and the Baghdad Pact were created in this period.

Emphasis changed again after the election of President Kennedy. He used security assistance to deal primarily with problems in the Third World.[19] As a result, security assistance played a part in new initiatives such as the Alliance for Progress.[20]

Over the last fifteen years, security assistance has insured the balance of power in the Middle East.[21] The wars between Israel and other Arab nations devastated their economies.[22] Security assistance provided by the United States has underwritten stability in this region and prevented further conflict.

Undoubtedly, emphasis for security assistance must change again. The need will diminish for appropriation of nearly eighty percent of the budget for security assistance to Egypt, Israel, Turkey and Greece.[23] These countries will soon achieve a level of economic capability which will insure regional stability without massive amounts of assistance. This, coupled with the fact Congress must recognize a growing requirement to support economic development in the Caribbean and Central and South America, will hopefully revive new consideration and growing support for ideas and proposals like the Caribbean Basin Initiative[24] and even the Alliance for Progress.[25] As a result, emphasis for assistance uses will change to meet the threat in developing countries of the western hemisphere.

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pp. A-19,20,21.

3. "Lend Lease," Encyclopedia Americana, 1987, Vol. 17, p. 200.

4. Ernest Graves and Steven A. Hildreth, U.S. Security Assistance: The Political Process, p. 4.

5. James R. Greene and Brent Scowcroft, Western Interests and U.S Policy Options in the Caribbean Basin, p. 101.

6. U.S. Department of the Army, Final Draft Field Manual 100-20 and AFM 2-XY: Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict, pp. A-2,7.

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CHAPTER V

NATION BUILDING

DEFINITION

The concept of nation building focuses on the development of economic and social infrastructure.[1] This entails the construction of lines of communications including roads, bridges, railroads, navigable waterways, harbors and ports, and airports; communications facilities; manufacturing and processing plants; power production plants; water treatment and distribution facilities; wastewater and environmental treatment facilitites; transportation terminals and handling facilities; mass transit systems; hospitals; schools; and public administration facilities.

PURPOSE

The principal purpose of nation building is stimulation of the economy. A growing economy creates jobs and results in the reduction of unemployment and migration.[2] It also increases revenues to the government allowing expansion of social programs, promotes capital formation permitting further development of infrastructure, and increases per capita income resulting in an improvement in standards of living.

These improvements attack the very source of frustration and grievence which cause the people to turn away from the government and support the insurgents.[3] As people see their concerns being addressed, they gain confidence in the government and deny support vital to the insurgency.

RELATIONSHIP TO PHASES OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

The phases of counterinsurgency have previously been defined as initiation, transition, and consolidation. Similar to the application of the elements of power, the focus and emphasis in nation building changes with each phase.

Nation building should be limited to only essential projects during the initiation phase. These might include roads, bridges and other facilities required to support military operations or enhance the legitimacy of the government. For example, a road project which supports an operation into a rural area also encourages growth in the rural economy by improving access from farm to market. This is not to say, however, that all projects must support military operations. Projects to support economic, social and political programs may also be required. For example, construction of a radio or television station to communicate with the people.

Massive nation building programs, however, must be discouraged during this phase. The absence of just government and adequate security means a high probability of corruption and sabotage. If large amounts of money are wasted because of theft by corrupt officials or destruction by the insurgents, Congress will undoubtedly criticize the program and jeopardize further appropriations. Efforts above and beyond those mentioned in the preceeding paragraph should be focused on developing self-sufficiency by training competent architects, engineers, managers, skilled workers and public administrators in an effort to prepare for the transition

and consolidation phases.

The transition phase continues the type of projects mentioned above and offers the first opportunity to begin development of a large scale nation building program. At the national level, the presence of elected officials and trained professionals should make possible the formulation of a comprehensive and equitable developmental program. Some local programs can be initiated once democracy spreads to the state and local level. However, controlling corruption and military success are essential to generate confidence within the system that these programs will provide enduring benefit. Massive development programs must be delayed until the consolidation phase. Only after democracy reaches the local level and neutralization of the insurgency assures security, can there be reasonable confidence that large, capital investments will endure and be worthwhile.

A summary of the counterinsurgency and nation building actions by phase is shown in Table V-1.

CONSIDERATIONS

Campaigns for nation building must keep in mind the above described phase characteristics. Other considerations important in the development of nation building include the requirements to develop self-sufficiency, transfer technology,[4] determine the host country absorption capacity,[5] emphasize rural infrastructure and expand production of electric power.[6]

Self-sufficiency can be developed by training indigenous personnel to build their own nation. This provides them the

Phase	Counterinsurgency	Nation Building
Initiation	Emphasis: Political power to establish a just, democratic form of government at national level	Projects limited to those essential to support military operations or enhance the legitimacy of the government (e.g., roads, bridges)
	Military power to neutralize insurgents	
	Economic and socio-psychological power to correct most pressing problems	
Transition	Emphasis: Military power to neutralize and defeat the insurgents	Projects limited to those mentioned above for the initiation phase
	Political power to extend the democratic process to the local level	Some long-term, local projects may be possible (e.g., transportation networks, regional water treatment systems)
	Socio-psychological and economic power may be increased if situation allows	Formulation of a long-term developmental program
Consolidation	Emphasis: Economic and socio-psychological power to implement long-term improvements to alleviate root causes of the insurgency	Implementation of long-term developmental programs (e.g., port and harbor development, expansion of navigable waterways, electric power production plants)

TABLE V-1. Summary of Counterinsurgency and Nation Building Actions by Phase

capability to achieve long range success without direct involvement by the United States. If they accomplish their own nation building, countries fighting insurgencies will have a major advantage over the insurgents in the battle for popular support.

Most developing countries experience a pressing demand for advanced technology. The shortage of engineers and scientists because of educational systems which stress liberal arts,[7] and the chronic absence of research facilities cause a systemic problem which must be considered. Since the building of infrastructure demands the availability of advanced technology, any nation building campaign must take this need into account.

The absorption capacity of a country must be determined prior to developing a program for nation building. The finite limit for the amount of work which can be accomplished with current levels of professional skill, labor, equipment, material and support must be known. For example, a country may only be able to accommodate a program of $1.5 billion over a two year period. Common sense would indicate an efficient program must remain below this amount.

Nation building programs financed by foreign assistance programs should give priority to rural development. Private development provides for the urban areas because of the profit incentive. On the other hand since little incentive exists, private development normally shies away from rural areas. The responsibility for rural development, therefore, falls on the government.

Satisfying the requirement for infrastructure in rural areas yields two benefits. When government provides essential transportation networks, utilities and the like, private development can be expected to follow. The combined effect of government and private development creates tremendous work opportunities and draws the population out of urban areas. This reduces urban strain. Secondly, the people moving back into the rural areas would, most probably, support the government and deny support to the insurgent. The insurgents would experience, therefore, a reduction in their freedom of movement and a loss of capacity to sustain their efforts.

Increasing electrical power production represents another significant consideration for nation building. Since most developing countries consume nearly all the power they produce, it makes sense that expansion of economic infrastructure must be accompanied by a corresponding increase in the production of electric power. Developing countries suffer a dilemma, however, because of their problem with foreign debt. The debt makes it extremely difficult to raise the capital necessary to construct power plants. In this regard, foreign assistance programs may have to include power production facilities. Another aspect of this consideration has to be kept in mind. Foreign debt problems in many developing countries originated, for the most part, from a dependence on the importation of oil. Importing oil costs many countries anywhere from one third to more than one half of their export earnings.[a] Construction of power plants fueled by oil compounds

this problem and must be avoided. Fortunately, many of these same countries have tremendous hydroelectric power potential.[8] Development of this source would provide power without increasing the debt problem.

Programs for nation building must also consider the priority of development. In other words, what comes first has to be determined. Should transportation networks have priority? Administrative facilities? Schools? The answer depends on a thorough assessment of existing infrastructure and development needs. Only by preparing an assessment can anyone propose a feasible and efficient program.

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9. James R. Greene and Brent Scowcroft, Western Interests and U.S. Policy Options in the Caribbean Basin, p. 275.

CHAPTER VI

CONTRIBUTION BY THE UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

TRADITIONAL APPROACH

The preceeding discussion identifies numerous opportunities for the United States Army Corps of Engineers to expand beyond the traditional approach to nation building. Traditionally, the Corps has limited its participation to specific projects. A district manages all or selected aspects of the project from design through completion. For example, Mobile District has managed construction of bridges in El Salvador.

This concept of Corps managed construction is commonly used when the complexity of the work exceeds the capabilities of indigenous civilian or military engineers. The Corps of Engineers working with qualified local architects and engineers to the extent they are available normally accomplishes design, contracting, and project management, while a military unit or a contractor accomplishes the work.

Many other opportunities exist for the Corps to contribute to nation building. These include enhancement of self-sufficiency, participation in program development, determination of absorption capacity and assistance in expansion of electric power production.

ALTERNATIVES TO ENHANCE SELF-SUFFICIENCY

The Corps of Engineers can enhance self-sufficiency by providing professional training, promoting industry assistance, assisting technology transfer and encouraging involvement by

various professional organizations. These enhancements improve the skills and expertise of indigenous personnel allowing them to perform their own nation building.

Professional training envisions host nation architects, engineers and scientists being offered an opportunity for employment in the Corps of Engineers for a period of three to five years. After working in laboratories, support activities, or district and division offices; they would return to their countries and apply their newly acquired skills to the development and execution of nation building.

Industry assistance calls for the employment of superintendents, operators and laborers from the host nation with contracting firms in the United States. These firms impart the necessary skills and techniques to construct large projects. As with professional training, these people would be closely monitored to ensure that they return home and use their skills to construct infrastructure. The Corps maintains an impressive working relationship with industry and can promote and encourage industry assistance.

Technology transfer features making available the vast wealth of design, construction, and problem solving expertise available in the Corps. Host nation engineers, architects, and construction managers would be allowed to request assistance from the many laboratories,[1] districts, divisions, and experts in the Corps. This can be instituted by establishing relationships between countries and districts.[2] Districts would serve as

points of contact to assist their assigned country in problem solving and obtaining required technological information.

A secondary benefit of this concept derives from the opportunity for districts to encourage relationships between local governments in their areas and communities in their assigned countries. Through these relationships public officials and administrators can share knowledge and expertise for the development of infrastructure.

Association involvement takes advantage of the expertise available in the many professional organizations such as the American Society of Civil Engineers and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers. These organizations can provide considerable technological assistance. They publish technical journals and have as members the prominent experts in their fields. The Corps, through its affiliation with these associations, can coordinate the support of these organizations.

PARTICIPATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

The section on organization and process of foreign assistance reveals several opportunities for United States Army Corps of Engineers to participate in the development of nation building programs. These opportunities include spreading awareness of the capability of the Corps, assigning personnel to various agencies and providing advice to involved departments.

The Corps must make sure its capability is known to all the players in the process. Ambassadors, country teams, Commanders-in-Chief of Unified Commands (especially Southern

Command), and Security Assistance Offices must understand what the Corps can do for them. They need to understand that the Corps is not limited to the management of specific projects, but can offer expertise across a wide spectrum of planning initiatives.

The Corps of Engineers can assign personnel to agencies of the country team to participate in the planning process. Of note, the Corps can assist in the determination of the absorption capacity and in the preparation of the infrastructure assessment. As part of the assessment process, the information management capability of the Corps is particularly well suited to integrate and analyze the compartmentalized data generated by the various agencies involved.

Finally, the Corps can provide advice to the agencies within the State and Defense Departments. Particularly significant are the Defense Security Assistance Agency, the Agency for International Development and the Commanders-in-Chief of the Unified Commands. Others include the Center for Low Intensity Conflict at Langley Air Force Base and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations. These agencies need to know that assistance and advice can be provided on a wide range of specialties involved in nation building. Specialties include all disciplines of engineering, geology, environmental protection, safety, real estate, architecture, operations research and systems analysis, hydrology, computer application and public administration.[3]

EXPANSION OF ELECTRIC POWER PRODUCTION

The Corps stands to make a major contribution to nation building by assisting in the expansion of electic power production. Our experience, as the foremost organization in the world for development of hydroelectric power, provides an invaluable resource to help satisfy this pressing requirement of developing countries. Assistance can be provided in a manner commensurate with the traditional approach mentioned at the beginning of this chapter or through any of the other alternatives mentioned above.

A summary of the contributory opportunities for the Corps of Engineers is shown below in Table VI-1.

Contributory Opportunities for the United States Army Corps of Engineers

Traditional Projects

Enhance Self-sufficiency
Provide Professional Training
Promote Industry Assistance
Assist Technology Transfer
Encourage Involvement by Professional Organizations

Participate in the Foreign Assistance Process
Determine Absorption Capacity
Inform Agencies of Corps Capability
Provide Advice to Involved Agencies
Assign Personnel to Involved Agencies

Assist Preparation of Infrastructure Assessment
Provide Information Management Support

Assist Expansion of Electrical Power Production

TABLE VI-1. Contributory Opportunities for the United States Army Corps of Engineers

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1. James R. Greene and Brent Scowcroft, Western Interests and U.S. Policy Options in the Caribbean Basin, p. 47.

2. Abraham F. Lowenthal, Partners in Conflict, p. 119.

3. Jonathan S. Thompson, CPT, The Corps Work Force in Transition, p. A-12.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY

Nation building embodies a concept for the strategy of Foreign Internal Defense. It provides for the development of economic and social infrastructure. This entails the construction of lines of communications including roads, bridges, railroads, navigable waterways, harbors and ports, and airports; communications facilities; manufacturing and processing plants; power production plants; water treatment and distribution facilities; wastewater and environmental treatment facilities; transportation terminals and handling facilities; mass transit systems; hospitals; schools; and public administration facilities.

The United States continues to press the strategy of Foreign Internal Defense in the Caribbean and Central and South America. The success achieved in the spread of democracy indicates that the initiation phase nears completion. Nation building takes on increased significance in the succeeding transition and consolidation phases. Since the United States Army Corps of Engineers can make major contributions to nation building, it has a golden opportunity to contribute to counterinsurgency warfighting and, ultimately, national security.

This contibution can take the form of developing self-sufficiency, participating in the development of foreign assistance programs and assisting in the expansion of electic power production. Self-sufficiency can be facilitated by promoting the concepts of professional training, technology transfer, industry assistance

and professional association involvement.

Participation in the development of foreign assistance programs is accomplished by working with the various offices and agencies involved in the process. These include the country team, Commanders-in-Chief of the Unified Commands, Defense Security Assistance Agency, and United States Agency For International Development.

Assistance in the expansion of electrical power production can be provided through the traditional approach discussed at the beginning of Chapter VI or any of the other ways, mentioned in the same chapter, which enhance self-sufficiency.

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