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THE DOD KEY ASSET PROTECTION PROGRAM

BY

MR. THOMAS L. BOVEN

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23 MARCH 1989

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(Cont)
definitions, the historical basis and program objectives are reviewed; a
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THE DOD KEY ASSET PROTECTION PROGRAM
AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT
by
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The DOD Key Asset Protection Program

Chapter I

Introduction

Is America's industrial base protected against sabotage and terrorist attack? Can the United States ensure the security of industrial production during a mobilization or other national emergency? If so, whose responsibility is it? One of President Reagan's national security objectives was "To maintain the security of our nation and our allies." ¹ Further, he stated that "Defense mobilization policies focus on steps that industry and government can take during peacetime and in the early stages of a crisis to acquire long-lead time items and to prepare for surge production." ² Moreover, Vice-president Bush stated, "before both World Wars there [was] time for mobilization but that this probably will not be the case in the future." ³ National security objectives of the new Bush administration have not yet been stated. However, this paper will analyze just one of the current initiatives that the Federal government is taking to respond positively to the above questions, the DOD Key Asset Protection Program (KAPP).
BACKGROUND

The problem of industrial mobilization has received critical commentary from many sources for several years. A review of the critical writing on this topic indicates that much has been said but little done. In a 1981 report on DOD's industrial preparedness programs, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) stated that the issues "had been studied repeatedly over the past several years. Although many recommendations had been made to correct the deficiencies identified, little action has resulted." In "The Defense Industrial Base," Jacques S. Gansler concluded that "The United States is the only major nation that does not treat its defense industrial base as a critical national resource." Most recently, Robert B. Costello, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics, also expressed deep concern over shortfalls in the nation's industrial preparedness base.

These critical observations focus primarily on issues such as globalization, surge capabilities, strategic materials, and long-term investment. While these are important mobilization issues, they fall beyond the scope of this analysis, which will focus on protecting or securing the industrial base. In fact, outside of federal regulations and guidance, very little has been written on the subject of protecting vital industries during periods of national emergency. Specifically, this paper will describe the current Department of Defense (DOD) Key Asset Protection Program (KAPP). In addition, it will address roles
and responsibilities of federal, state and local governments and of industry itself. Finally, conclusions and recommendations will be presented.

AUTHORITIES

KAPP's mission and authorizations are set forth in a variety of documents: official memoranda, directives, and regulations. It is highly probable that all such documents were not identified or reviewed. The bibliography cites those that were located. In addition, interviews were conducted, which are also cited.

DEFINITIONS

Appendix 1 is a list of definitions extracted from DOD Regulation 5160.54-R (coordinating draft).

ENDNOTES


2. Ibid., p. 21.


KAPP is the latest chapter in a long history of U.S. efforts to prepare for mobilization. What follows is a discussion of this program history, current program objectives, and a current program overview.

PROGRAM HISTORY

Prior to 1983, security for the national industrial base was addressed by the Industrial Protection Program (IPP). This program set forth procedures for developing and maintaining two lists of key industrial facilities: the "Key Facilities List (KFL)" and the "Mobilization Means List (MML)." Private industrial and defense-related facilities volunteered to appear on these lists and to undergo security inspections. This program focused strictly on defense related industries, the "war-stoppers." DOD set no priorities for facility protection.

In 1983, as a result of efforts by the DOD "Key Facilities Coordinating Committee," the program was substantially upgraded. Non-DOD related facilities that were considered "war-stoppers"
would be analyzed. The definition of a key facility was broadened to include infrastructure as well as manufacturing. Priorities were established and plans to protect these mobilization resources were initiated.\(^1\) This enhanced effort served to "revitalize and rationalize all DOD programs for the physical security of industrial facilities and mobilization means."\(^2\)

In 1984 and 1985, the conceptual framework for this revitalized program developed further. The following issues were considered: overcoming inherent military resistance to defend the "home front"; defining roles and responsibilities as they related particularly to command and control; developing an "enduring list process" that would maintain a list of key assets; and initiating a capability to conduct threat estimates.\(^3\) These initiatives led to consolidation of the KFL and the MML into one list, the Key Assets List (KAL). In addition, U.S. Army Readiness Command (USREDCOM), now Commander-in-Chief, Forces Command (CINCFOR), was designated the DOD Executive Agent for program administration. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was given responsibility for program coordination with all federal agencies outside DOD.\(^4\)

**CURRENT PROGRAM OBJECTIVES**

The Department of Defense Directive for KAPP describes an emergency mobilization policy that will:

- ensure that government at all levels, in partnership with the private sector and the American people, can respond decisively and effectively to any major
national emergency with defense of the United States as the first priority. This mobilization capability includes such resources as construction assets, energy sources and conduits, civil defense assets, medical facilities, economic institutions, food sources and storage facilities, labor sources, communications facilities, and law enforcement/public safety assets.

Alston noted that threats to U.S. mobilization are like a "can of worms." First there are such threats as natural disaster (major earthquake), technological disaster (Chernobyl), or economic disaster (stockmarket crash). In addition, there are the potential threats of terrorism, sabotage, espionage, demonstrations, and other "enemy attack related" disruptions. Then there are choke points. Protection of key assets is not limited to what might happen "inside the perimeter fence." For example, some threats may be imposed at some distance from critical facilities. Consider threats to locks or canals used for shipping; highway or railroad bridges and tunnels; or energy distribution systems, such as pipelines or electric lines. Our critical need for preparedness planning was dramatized in 1988 by an industrial explosion and subsequent disruption in Nevada of our supply of solid rocket fuel additive.

So KAPP would attempt to address this wide range of potential threats to U.S. mobilization plans.

The objectives of the Department of Defense (DOD) Key Asset Protection Program (KAPP) is to develop an enduring and dynamic process to identify, categorize, prioritize, and survey key assets; to develop essential civil and military physical security plans; and to promote key facility protection within the U.S. and its possessions and territories.
So emergency mobilization preparedness requires a partnership between government, the private sector and the American people. However, "responsibility for protecting Key Assets rests primarily with the civil sector and with local, state, and federal law enforcement authorities [in that order]." These roles and responsibilities will be discussed in more detail in Chapter III.

CURRENT PROGRAM OVERVIEW

What follows is a brief description of the current program—specifically, the KAPP process. This process will be divided into four phases: nomination, evaluation, survey, and planning. Each phase contributes to program objectives. Basic requirements set forth in DOD Directive 5160.54 and DOD Regulation 5160.54 provide a discussion model.

Nomination Phase

During this phase, both industrial assets and infrastructure assets are identified as candidates for inclusion on the Key Assets List. Nominations are submitted by all DOD components and non-DOD agencies. Assets identified within DOD are submitted to CINCFOR. Assets identified by other federal agencies are submitted to FEMA. However, since the publication of Executive Order 12656 (November 18, 1988), the role of FEMA in this process has become less clear. Nominating agencies designate whether the asset is Category I (no replacement available) or Category II (alternatives available) at the time of nomination.
Identification of an industrial asset is facilitated by the definition linking it to the Commanders-in-Chief Critical Items List (CINCIL). However, identifying an infrastructure asset is difficult, since criteria have not been clearly set forth. For example, if it is agreed that production of critical items, or "war-stoppers", depends on energy sources, then should the total energy distribution system of the nation (all pipelines and power lines) be nominated? If they are, to what end, since all energy transmitters could not be protected anyway? This lack of precise criteria presents serious problems in the current program guidance.

Evaluation Phase

CINCFOR is responsible for evaluating defense related nominations. This evaluation ensures that the nominees meet selection criteria. In addition, the centralized review sifts out redundancy when the same asset is nominated by more than one Planning Agent. Non-DOD or infrastructure nominations are evaluated by FEMA. If a resource is selected, it is forwarded to CINCFOR to be added to the KAL. But, feedback (except for the publication of the KAL every two years) from nominations is not routinely provided, so nominating agencies are not certain of the status of nominations or of given resources or facilities. In short, they do not know when their task is complete. Plans are being implemented at FORSCOM to make the KAL a "living" document by using computer software. This will provide more immediate feedback to the nominating agency. In the meantime, the
regulation clearly states that there will be a biennial review of the KAL by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Also, CINCFOR is charged to "compile, publish, and distribute the KAL during the fourth quarter of each even-numbered year and publish updates as required." Since Planning Agents are required to submit changes or deletions to the KAL as they occur, it makes sense that FORSCOM be able to respond in an equally flexible manner.11

Survey Phase

The KAPP survey serves two purposes: First, it identifies all vulnerabilities. Second, it encourages managers of key facilities to reduce those vulnerabilities. More specifically, information from the survey will be used by land defense planners to develop an appropriate physical security plan. These plans will be designed "to prevent the loss of production or service capabilities and to provide for rapid restoration of such capabilities should disruption occur." In addition, recommendations will be provided to managers for emergency preparedness self-improvement efforts.12

Surveys are conducted by the Defense Investigative Service (DIS). Regulations require completion of the survey within 90 days of the Executive Agent's notification that a facility is on the list. A representative from the appropriate State Area Command/Territory Area Command (STARC/TARC) should be on the survey team. These representatives will be responsible for developing the physical security plan.
Surveys are conducted using simple procedures. However, security requires that all discussions and communications with civil agencies and the private sector must closely follow policy guidelines and regulations. Preparation for the survey includes coordination with facility management. In-coming and exit briefings with designated plant representatives are conducted. Written notification of the survey results are provided to the facility management within 30 days following completion of the survey. A final written report must be forwarded to the Executive Agent within 90 days.13

Planning Phase

Developing a physical security plan is the responsibility of STARC/TARC staff:

Upon receipt of a KAPP survey, develop a physical security defense plan for the key asset based on the survey, to include essential coordination of military planning with civil agencies. The plan will be generic in nature and will assume a "worst case" threat against the asset (no civil support available).14

These plans, when approved by FORSCOM, are then classified as part of U.S. land defense strategy. In addition, the plans assume that civil law enforcement and military intelligence will be warned of terroristic or sabotage attempts which may target a given asset.15

ENDNOTES


5. U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 5160.54 (draft), p. 3. (hereafter referred to as "DOD 5160.54-D").


8. U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Regulation 5160.54 (coordinating draft), p. 1-1. (hereafter referred to as "DOD 5160.54-R").


12. Ibid. p. 3-1.

13. Ibid. p. 3-1 to 3-3.


15. Interview with James Brandon, LTC, FORSCOM, Atlanta, November 16, 1988.
Any program of national scope and impact is bound to have its peaks and valleys--strong and weak points. A brief review of some of the program documentation, including interviews with a few program managers, indicates that the program has a solid foundation. Johnson and Latimer's unpublished paper identified many "technical" program recommendations, but at the same time it indicated that the program philosophy "is sound." The observations in this paper are more programmatic and can generally be discussed under three headings: roles and responsibilities, force structure, and security classification. These three matters do not comprehensively address total key asset program considerations (any of which could be the subject of an entire paper).

**ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES**

The "paper trail" or legal basis for the KAPP could be traced back to the Constitution, if necessary. However, given the number of departments and agencies involved, it would be an immense task to get all the currently applicable documents to
agree on roles and responsibilities at the same time. Recently, the National Security Council achieved one of its "highest priority national security emergency preparedness (NSEP) goals" with the publication of Executive Order (EO) 12656 on November 18, 1988.\(^2\) This Executive Order, which assigns emergency preparedness responsibilities for federal departments and agencies, replaced EO 11490 (1969). It appears to authorize the FBI's taking an increasing role in the identification of non-DOD or infrastructure assets. The role of FEMA as a clearinghouse for the nominations is unclear. The FBI is currently developing a program, including both a staffing structure and budget request, that will help define and support their new role.\(^3\)

The protection of infrastructure assets has become increasingly more critical in this age of terrorism. Testimony of Mr. Oliver B. Revell, Executive Assistant Director, FBI, to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Technology and the Law, described the FBI objective:

> to develop, implement, and maintain a national program which addresses potential and actual acts of terrorism directed against key assets of the infrastructure of the United States.

This will be done through their 58 field offices and cooperatively with "[CINCFOR, FEMA, DOE]; the Committee on Terrorism of the International Association of Chiefs of Police; private industry; and independent research groups."\(^4\)

At the same time DOD is trying to round out the coordination required to publish a directive and regulation which will govern DOD responsibility with this program.
Coordination between DIS and FBI will become more important, as will coordination with FEMA, since FEMA also has a direct constituency connection with local government. For example, protection planning encompasses more than simply a security plan for a given facility or infrastructure asset. Joseph LaFleur, Director of the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA), expressed his concern at having planning concentrated in law enforcement agencies. He fears that state and local government planning for a terrorist event (such as plans for evacuation, transportation, medical support, shelter, etc.) will not be adequate. In his words "there needs to be multi-agency coordination to ensure a safe response to high threat situations."\(^5\)

One problem, perhaps not a major problem, is that critical terms are not used in the same way across the spectrum of planning. For example DOD uses the terms "key assets" and "critical items." FEMA uses the terms "key assets" and "essential industries." Essential industries are those that will ensure that government can continue to serve, or operate, at the local level. FEMA's terminology does not focus exclusively on national security or defense.\(^6\) Moreover, at least one of the Regional Defense Commands, the Western Defense Command (WDC),\(^*\)

\(^*\) The Continental USA is divided into five Regional Defense Commands which report to CINCFOR: First Army, Eastern Defense Command (DC); Second Army, Southern DC; Fourth Army, Northern DC; Fifth Army, Central DC; and Sixth Army Western DC.
is using the term "Critical Facilities List" to identify key vulnerabilities in the mobilization process. These examples illustrate some lack of coordination and cohesion in program management.

At the federal level, confusion in roles and responsibilities can probably be cleared up rather easily. A larger challenge is posed at the state level. It is not at all clear when, how, (or if) STARC/TARC will coordinate with the state office of emergency services (OES). The Joint Mobilization Command Readiness Program Answer/Discussion Pamphlet used in a 1988 exercise discusses the involvement of the state OES and its direct linkage between FEMA and local government. This exercise indicates that such coordination, at least in the West, is being considered, and may prove adequate. LaFleur indicates that, in Pennsylvania, he "knows something is going on but is not involved with anything specific relative to KAPP." In addition, he would go out on a limb and guess that other state directors of OES are in similar straits.

Similarly, Major General Appleby, Deputy Commander of the Pennsylvania STARC, indicates that he is not aware of PEMA's planning and operating capabilities. The WDC significantly notes that the "state OES is one of the only places where there are adequate safeguards for security of DOD classified materials."

Roles and responsibilities are even less clear at the local level, including the private sector, for two reasons. First, as discussed above, if the state is not actively involved how can local government know what is expected of them? Second, security
classification issues adversely impact the communication process required to implement the program. This is discussed in more detail later. Individual facilities, however, may provide their own protection voluntarily.

FORCE STRUCTURE

Force structure, or staffing, does not seem adequate at all levels of the program. FORSCOM now has a staff of five assigned to the program which is currently sufficient. More importantly, only one or two KAPP planners are assigned to each STARC/TARC. General Palastra, CINCFOR, stresses that "force requirements [are] the most pressing problem." For all practical purposes, there are "no forces currently allocated" to this mission. He further suggests a "'downpayment' force of eighteen military police battalions--about 11,000 men" to support requirements. Moreover, FEMA's lone staff person may not be adequate if program coordination requirements increase because of EO 12656. The staffing of DIS and FBI was not investigated. Finally, the ability of the public and private sectors to provide their own protection is "problematic" relative to profit and budget considerations. Both industry and local government are sure to ask "What's in it for me?" "Who pays for it?" and "What is the threat anyway?"
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Security classification of the KAPP presents an obvious dilemma: The federal government seeks a lot of information from the private sector without providing much, if any, information in return. Gaining access to a facility for the DIS survey and subsequent planning requires "talking around" the real purpose of the visit. Guidelines are vaguely addressed, as DOD 5160.54-R indicates:

DOD personnel should limit discussion of the KAPP with private-sector organizations and civil agencies to the following points:

1. The DOD has determined that the facility in question requires military planning for any contingency requiring augmentation of civil police by military forces during a national emergency.13

3. During the peacetime planning process selected STARC/TARC personnel...are authorized to coordinate with local law enforcement and civil emergency agency personnel to facilitate protection planning of KAPP facilities. Coordination should be limited to the minimum required to effectively accomplish planning and will not entail discussion of classified or proprietary information.14

At the other end of the spectrum is the obvious need to keep identified assets and the related threats and vulnerabilities "classified." Yet, this necessity deprives the very persons or groups threatened of vital information. This problem is not unique to KAPP. But what may be unique is the highly visible interaction among individuals not normally associated with classified programs--the private sector and state/local government officials. So, from the perspective of keeping critical information secure, everyone associated with
KAPP seems to be walking on thin ice. The timeless issues of "need to know" and "how much to say" become less clear and are subsequently subject to unwitting compromise, perhaps more than in any other DOD classified program. The classification issue was summarized by an Army War College lecturer, in a non-attribution forum, as a major hurdle.

ENDNOTES


11. Interview with James Brandon, LTC, FORSCOM, Atlanta, November 16, 1988.

13. U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Regulation 5160.54 (coordinating draft), p. 4-1. (hereafter referred to as "DOD 5160.54-R").

This paper has reviewed the background, status, and capability of the DOD Key Asset Protection Program. It has specified some challenges the Program must address. The ways, means, and ends of a national security strategy include, according to Clausewitz, "all activities that exist for the sake of war, such as the creation of the fighting forces, their raising, armament, equipment, and training."\(^1\) He also stated that the government's decision regarding the size of the military is "indeed a vital part of strategy."\(^2\) A nation's ability to mobilize the military is critical to this strategy. Many leaders and planners recognize that in the future there may not be much time available for mobilization. "The ability to offset warfighting shortfalls with industrial base capability is an important part of our national deterrent" according to General Vuono.\(^3\)

Clearly, then, the protection of our industrial base is critical to a reliable, responsive national security strategy. Yet our industrial and infrastructure base is very vulnerable. In view of budgetary decisions to reduce sustainment capability,
it is imperative that particularly those industrial assets that are key to the defense effort be protected. The DOD Key Asset Protection Program represents the major initiative to ensure this protection.

It is equally clear that the multi-organization coordination required to successfully identify the threat, to assess vulnerability, to develop plans, and, if required, to implement these plans is a major undertaking. The program should focus on the following areas: roles and responsibilities, management emphasis, and training. Further, all roles and relationships, to include state and local government, need to be clearly defined and agreed upon. Most important, who is in charge of the overall--DOD and non-DOD--program? At the same time we should identify specific program needs, goals, and milestones to enhance the existing program. Coordination of this effort may best come from the FEMA Civil Security Committee.

Equally important, our highest decision-makers must realize that additional resources may be required to fully implement program requirements. They should be prepared to justify additional funding to the Congress, even in light of the current concern for deficit and budget reduction. If the U.S. industrial and infrastructure base is a critical link in the deterrence chain then it must be adequately resourced.

Finally, all program participants should be considered for additional training. It may be useful to hold a national conference to discuss these issues, recommend solutions, and generally energize the program. Even after admitting the
difficulty with security classification, it seems that there may be an increased need for training, whether it be for broadening program awareness, enhancing interview or survey skills, or sharpening planning skills.

We have begun real planning to protect America's industrial base against sabotage and terrorism. The DOD KAPP addresses the nation's ability to secure industrial production during a national emergency. This program offers vital insurance in our overall strategy of deterrence. If deterrence fails, it will enable us to fight and to win.

ENDNOTES


APPENDIX 1

DEFINITIONS

1. Categories of Importance: Key assets shall be assigned to one of the following categories:
   
a. Category One. An industrial or infrastructure asset for which there is no replacement, substitute, or alternative. Partial or complete loss would have an immediate and serious impact on national defense.
   
B. Category Two. An industrial or infrastructure asset for which alternative assets are available, but all of which are required for contribution to national defense needs.

2. Commanders-in-Chief Critical Items List (CINCIL): A priority list of items or weapon systems prepared annually by OJCS/J4 from the annual situation report (SITREP) submissions of the Commanders-in-Chief.

3. DOD Executive Agent: The command, agency, or organization to which the Secretary of Defense has assigned responsibility and delegated authority to carry out certain programs or functions. Commander-in-Chief, Forces Command (CINCFOR), is designated DOD Executive Agent for KAPP.

4. DOD Key Asset: Any industrial or infrastructure facility located in the United States or its possessions and territories which is nominated and accepted for inclusion in the DOD Key Asset List.
5. **DOD Key Asset List (KAL):** The biennially published listing of key assets. The KAL contains identifying information for each asset and the products or services for which it was nominated, a vulnerability survey, supporting assets (if applicable), and defense requirements.

6. **DOD Key Asset Protection Program (KAPP):** A DOD program to promote the protection of critical civil facilities within the United States and its possessions and territories from sabotage and other hostile or destructive acts, by providing to the owners or managers of such facilities advice, guidance, and planning assistance concerning the application of physical security and emergency preparedness measures, and by developing plans to protect such facilities with military forces, if necessary.

7. **Industrial Asset:** Any factory, plant, building, or structure used for manufacturing, producing, processing, repairing, assembling, storing, or distributing a product or components of a product which appears on the CINCIL or a similar list of critical items prepared by a DOD Component, the loss of which would halt or unacceptably delay DOD mobilization, deployment, or sustainment efforts. This includes vendor and subcontractor performance locations where components or materials are produced for delivery to the prime or main plant.

8. **Infrastructure Asset:** Any communication or computer facility or system; energy source or distribution system; air, rail, road, or water transportation asset (including bridges, tunnels, locks, dams, and intermodal connection points); or other infrastructure facility which is required to support an asset listed in the KAL
or to otherwise support DOD mobilization, deployment, or sustainment efforts.

9. **KAPP Survey**: A survey conducted by the Defense Investigative Service (DIS) to determine the vulnerability of a key asset to sabotage and other hostile or destructive acts by assessing the adequacy and effectiveness of physical security systems and emergency preparedness measures, and to provide pertinent recommendations.

10. **Nominating Agency**: The DOD Component or federal agency which submits an asset for inclusion in the KAL.

Definitions taken from DOD Regulation 5160.54-R (coordinating draft).


