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JOINT STAFF ORGANIZATION;
IS THERE A PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING FUNCTION SPLIT?

BY
LIEUTENANT COLONEL EARL D. GREER

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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-505
Joint Staff Organization: Is There a Planning and Programming Function Split?

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March 1989

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In October 1986, President Reagan signed into law the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. As a result of the Act, the Department of Defense underwent one of its most massive reorganization efforts since 1947. With a focus toward streamlining the National Command Authorities (NCA) decisionmaking process, the Act was, in part, designed to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and contingency planning while simultaneously using available resources efficiently. The result was a

(Note continues on reverse side)

The Act aimed at improving the National Command Authority's ability to make effective decisions, and to that end, it established a Joint Staff Organization (JSO) with the explicit purpose of enhancing the Joint Staff's planning and programming capabilities. This new structure was intended to facilitate a more coordinated and efficient approach to strategy formulation and contingency planning, thus allowing the JSO to better address the challenges posed by the evolving security environment.

The Individual Study Project described the JSO's efforts to integrate planning and programming functions, which were previously divided among various components. The study highlighted the significance of this integration in the context of modern military operations, where strategic and operational planning must be closely linked to ensure effective resource allocation and deployment.

By focusing on the JSO as a whole, the study provided insights into the broader organizational changes that occurred within the Department of Defense. These changes were not only aimed at improving the JSO's performance but also had implications for the overall Defense Department's ability to respond to emerging threats and challenges.

This study serves as a valuable reference for understanding the evolution of military planning and programming in the context of the Joint Staff Organization, and it underscores the importance of strategic integration and cohesive planning in contemporary military doctrine.
reorganization and expansion of the Joint Staff. It has now been over two years since the Act was passed. One of the principal features of the reorganization was the establishment of the Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment Directorate (J-8). Upon examination of the Joint Staff organization chart, it appears that the planning and programming functions are partially split between the J-8 and the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5). This study will examine the background of the Goldwater-Nichols Act; its effect on the DOD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System; and will provide observations and conclusions on the question of a perceived functions split between the J-5 and J-8.
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JOINT STAFF ORGANIZATION; IS THERE A PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING FUNCTION SPLIT?

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
14 March 1989
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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Earl D. Greer, LTC, AR

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In October 1986, President Reagan signed into law the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. As a result of the Act, the Department of Defense underwent one of its most massive reorganization efforts since 1947. With a focus toward streamlining the National Command Authorities (NCA) decision-making process, the Act was, in part, designed to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and contingency planning while simultaneously using available resources efficiently. The result was a reorganization and expansion of the Joint Staff. It has now been over two years since the Act was passed. One of the principal features of the reorganization was the establishment of the Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment Directorate (J-8). Upon examination of the Joint Staff organization chart, it appears that the planning and programming functions are partially split between the J-8 and the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5). This study will examine the background of the Goldwater-Nichols Act; its effect on the DoD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System; and will provide observations and conclusions on the question of a perceived functions split between the J-5 and J-8.
JOINT STAFF ORGANIZATION;
IS THERE A PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING FUNCTION SPLIT?

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In October 1986, President Reagan signed into law the "Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986."\(^1\) This law, known as Public Law 99-433, was the most massive reorganization of the Department of Defense (DoD) since 1947. The Reorganization Act was, in part, designed and implemented to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning while using federal resources in a more efficient manner.\(^2\)

A focused attention toward strategy, contingency planning and efficiency of resources dictated major changes to the DoD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). In a 645 page staff report provided to the Senate Committee on Armed Services, it was reported that the PPBS failed to "emphasize the output side of the defense program."\(^3\) There were five basic causes cited for the failure of the PPBS; of the five causes, the last was described as "the inability of the JCS system to make meaningful programmatic inputs."\(^4\) As a result, the Joint Staff was reorganized with the Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment Directorate (J-8) being created to provide the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) a means for increased attention toward the programming side of PPBS.
In the spring of 1987, barely six months after the signing of the law and upon examination of the Joint Staff organization chart, an observation was made by students and faculty at the U.S. Army War College indicating that the planning and programming functions appeared to be partially split between the J-8 and the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5). It has now been two years since the Act was passed. This study will revisit the observation made in 1987 and attempt to clarify who "should" be doing which functions, planning or programming, and who "is" really performing which function.

ENDNOTES

2. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
General David C. Jones, USAF, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, published an article in the March 1982 issue of Armed Forces Journal International entitled "Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change." In his article, General Jones was critical of the archaic JCS structure, suggesting a major reorganization to improve its cohesiveness and effectiveness. General Edward C. Meyer, former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, agreed with General Jones' assessment in his follow-on article, "JCS: How Much Reform is Needed?" General Meyer further suggested that even more definitive reorganization efforts might be required to give the Chairman more authority in the process of planning and programming forces to meet U.S. national security goals and objectives.

Pre-1986 and under the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), the Joint Staff played what was perceived as a relatively small role in the overall PPBS with its Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS).

The J-5 at that time was responsible for preparation and staffing of the Joint Long Range Strategic Assessment (JLRSA), the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD), the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM), the Joint Security Assistance Memorandum (JSAM), and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).
The JLRSA, prepared quadrennially and reviewed annually, provided long range vision based on threat assessment. The JSPD, prepared biennially and reviewed annually, was the major JSPS document that provided advice to the National Command Authorities (NCA) on strategies and force structure, surfaced issues generated by the Services and the Joint Staff, provided "unconstrained" planning forces, and provided a risk assessment of the forces to accomplish world-wide missions in support of national security goals and objectives. The JSPD was broken into three parts. The first part, JSPD I, directed the CINC's to generate an estimate against a specified planning scenario; amplified national military objectives and strategy; and required the CINC's to respond with their "unconstrained" minimum risk force requirements. The second part, JSPD II, consolidated CINC input and provided JCS "designed" forces required to guarantee a reasonable assurance of success. The third and final part, JSPD III, was the document that "created" a planning force for the CINC's and the Services to use that guaranteed reasonable success. The completed JSPD initiated the five-year PPBS cycle by providing the NCA with a joint military position on resources required to meet national goals and objectives.

Using the JSPD, the Secretary of Defense's Defense Guidance (DG) was developed and issued. The DG was intended to become the link between the planning and programming phases of the PPBS. It provided planning guidance and fiscal constraints to be used by the Services in developing their respective Program Objective Memorandum (POM). Service POM's were to identify resources required to
meet DG strategies considering CINC requirements. There was, however, no workable system for central control of POM input at the JCS or NCA level. This lack of centralized control resulted in stovepipe, and often disjointed, input from the Services.

Service POM's were submitted simultaneously to the Joint Staff for assessment and to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) for approval. CINC's were to provide comment to the JCS on the Service POM's adequacy to support strategic plans. The Joint Staff was to provide an assessment, after comparing risk assessment with Service POMs, to the SECDEF via the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM). Due to time and resource constraints, the Joint Staff was neither able to provide a completely staffed position, nor was it able to provide a focused, forceful position on issues to the SECDEF. As a result, the SECDEF often made decisions that did not provide a clearly consolidated defense program to the President for inclusion in his budget submission to Congress. The end product was a fragmented budget, generally approved by Congress, that did not provide a "joint" military program that would meet national security objectives and goals. CINCs were not completely assured of sufficient resources required to meet theater needs; Services continued to work "pet rock" programs without regard to what the other Services were doing; and the Joint Staff was performing a yeoman's service with little benefit to the common military goal.

As a result of the comments made by Generals Jones and Meyer and others, Congress concluded that the DoD was broken; that it
could not fix its own problems; and that Congress was the only organization that could solve the DoD dilemma. Over the next four years (1982-1986), a multitude of hearings, testimonies, books, reports, and variations of proposed public laws were attended, reviewed, voted upon, discarded, and finally approved. From the mounds of paper that were produced over those four years, two significant documents were published that would ultimately shape the JCS.

SENATE STAFF REPORT

The first document produced was a Senate Staff Study entitled "Defense Organization: The Need for Change." The study was conducted at the direction of Senator John Tower and the late Senator "Scoop" Jackson, then Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. Its intended purpose was to provide comprehensive information on the "organization and decision making process of the Department of Defense." In its response to the current Chairman, Senator Barry Goldwater, and Ranking Minority Member, Senator Sam Nunn, the staff provided information on issues affecting DoD. The report provided a detailed examination of the PPBS that revealed significant weaknesses affecting the DoD and the Congress' ability to make timely and coherent recommendations and decisions on national security. In its summation, the study provided the following conclusions:

"1. The PPB system is capable of responding to changes in policy and management style and generally supporting the management needs of DoD leadership."
2. The PPB system has no deficiencies so severe that it should be considered the primary reason for changing the fundamental organizational relationships in DoD.

3. DoD resource allocation is currently hampered by ineffective strategic planning; accordingly, the strategic planning process in DoD should be strengthened.

4. Both OSD and OJCS have important roles to play in DoD strategic planning; accordingly, efforts should be made to strengthen the strategic planning capabilities of both organizations.

5. There is an insufficient relationship between strategic planning and fiscal constraints.

6. The absence of realistic fiscal guidance results in a loss of much of the value of the PPBS product and undermines confidence in DoD's resource allocation process.

7. The PPB system fails to emphasize the output side of the defense program.

8. The JCS system is unable to make meaningful programmatic inputs.

9. The PPB system gives insufficient attention to execution oversight and control.

10. The PPBS cycle is too long, complex, and unstable."

The PPBS in the early to mid-1980's represented a cycle of approximately 15 months with three distinct phases (encl 1). The planning phase began in October with the Joint Long Range Strategic Appraisal (JLRSA) and the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) being submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) by the JCS. The JLRSA reflected foreign policy inputs from other agencies and identified broad threats to our national interests. The JSPD provided the JCS opinioned military threat and unconstrained U.S. force requirements. Based on the JLRSA and JSPD, OSD provided its "draft" Defense Guidance (DG) to the Services
outlining objectives and missions. Before the DC was finalized, it was provided to the unified and specified commanders for comment.

Issuance of the final version of the DG in January initiated the programming phase of the PPBS as the Services developed their Program Objective Memoranda (POM) for submission to the OSD and the OJCS in May. The Services established priorities for manning, equipping, training, and maintaining their internal organizations and infrastructures. POM review, completed by the OSD and the OJCS through the Defense Resources Board (DRB), focused on duplication of effort by the Services, compliance with the DG, and programmatic content. The unified and specified commanders, as well as the OMB, were able to appear before the DRB to provide comment on program issues arising from the POM's. Issuance of Program Decision Memoranda (PDM) by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) signaled the end of the formal programming phase. 13

The Budgeting phase began in September with the Services review of their respective budget estimates. It was during this phase that constraints were applied and POM adjustments were made. During December, final resolution of issues was made in preparation for the President's budget submission to Congress in January.

Through the entire process the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff itself had little influence on the system during the programming and budgeting phases. Ironically, the SECDEF had the authority to exert a great deal of influence during these two critical phases. Unfortunately, the SECDEF had neither the staff nor the time to conduct the analysis
and assessment of each POM necessary to ensure a "coordinated" Service effort in meeting established national security goals and objectives.

THE PACKARD COMMISSION

The second most significant document produced during the four year study period and one that probably had a greater, more immediate impact on the reorganization of the DoD and the role that the Joint Staff played in the PPBS was a report from the Packard Commission. The document, entitled "An Interim Report," was prepared by the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, headed by the Honorable David Packard. It should be noted that the interim report was adopted in its entirety by the President and used as the basis for his National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 219. The final report, entitled "A Quest for Excellence," was published on 30 June 1986, ninety days after NSDD 219 went into effect. In its report, the Commission recommended several measures with respect to military organization and command.

The Commission found a significant number of flaws in the structure of the unified and specified combatant commands that were as serious as the flaws found in the Joint Staff structure. The key elements of the report discussed effective long-range planning, intended to produce a defense strategy and a budget based on national security objectives, and increased CJCS responsibilities in the PPBS process. A third element discussed
was the defense acquisition process. That topic will not be covered in this paper.

In its findings, the Commission concluded that there was "a great need for improvement" in the way the governmental structure thought through and tied together national security objectives, the spending to achieve these objectives, and what was finally purchased with the funding allocated. Encompassed in their conclusions were the requirements for a better long-range planning system that accounted for fiscal constraint up front, was fully integrated across Service lines, and incorporated a concise assessment of net capabilities in light of threat postures. Based on the perception that the DoD, the Congress, and the National Command Authorities required a more coherent process by which long-range planning and assessment of military requirements were to be accomplished, the Commission made several far reaching recommendations. The salient points brought out in the recommendations were:

"1. That defense planning would start with a statement of national security objectives and priorities.

2. That the President should issue provisional five-year budget levels to the DoD based on the objectives.

3. That the CJCS would prepare a military strategy to meet the national objectives based on the President's budget guidance.

4. That the CJCS would prepare military options, with the advice of the JCS and the CINC's of the unified and specified commands, that would be the framework for specific trade-offs among the Services. The SECDEF would then present these to the President for approval.

5. That the CJCS would prepare a net assessment of U.S. Forces capabilities to meet the world-wide threat."
6. That after approval of the proposed program by the President, the DoD would develop a five-year defense plan with a biennial budget based on national security objectives and operational concepts rather than line items.

ENDNOTES


8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Defense Organization, p. III.

11. Ibid., pp. 526-528.

12. Ibid., p. 490.

13. Ibid.


CHAPTER III
THE EFFECT

Congressional pressure for change in the DoD organization culminated in 1986. In the spring of that year, the Goldwater-Nichols Act was nearing approval by both Houses of Congress, and the Packard Commission's recommendations had been openly received by the President. Change and reorganization were inevitable within the DoD.

NSDD 219

The President, recognizing the need for change, acted before Congress approved the DoD Reorganization Act and issued his National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 219. Procedural changes to the PPBS and organizational changes within the DoD were massive. In his directive, the President implemented virtually all the Packard Commission's recommendations made in its "Interim Report." The most important changes included re-alignment of the Joint Staff mission so that it would provide "staff support and such operational assistance as the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, may require in discharging his responsibilities," and increased roles and responsibilities of the CJCS in the PPBS. The CJCS now has the authority and the staff necessary to provide a single, focused view on the requisite Joint Service requirements to meet national security goals and objectives. The bottom line has been an increased, meaningful role in the planning and programming functions of the PPBS for the JCS. The planning function,
although appearing self-explanatory from a JCS perspective, will require an expanded explanation to depict some of the more significant procedural changes caused by NSDD 219 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The programming function will require a shorter explanation because, in the true sense, the Joint Staff does not program forces or other resources .... this is accomplished by the Services in their respective POM's. It is important, however, that the relationship of the Joint Staff to the programming process be shown in order to best draw a conclusion relative to the thesis and observation made in 1987.

REORGANIZATION

Previous to NSDD 219 and the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986, the Joint Staff consisted of the J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, and J-5. At that time the J-5 was the largest directorate on the Joint Staff and was performing the majority of the PPBS functions within JCS.

NSDD 219 resulted in the creation of the Command, Control, and Communications Systems Directorate (J-6), the Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7), and the Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment Directorate (J-8). The J-6 and J-8 Directorates were organized using existing divisions from the overly large J-5 Directorate. The J-7 Directorate was organized using existing assets from the J-3. The net result of the organizational changes was to be a more efficient Joint Staff designed to provide timely and responsive "joint" military
information to the NCA, through the CJCS, leading to a stronger relationship between strategic planning and fiscal constraints.

The stated purpose of the DoD PPBS is to "produce a plan, a program, and a budget for the Department of Defense."\(^\text{18}\) The JSPS is the formal means by which the CJCS discharges his new found responsibilities in the planning and programming of resources. It is at this point that the PPBS and JSPS should be discussed to demonstrate how both systems have been re-designed to meet the intent of the President and of the Congress.

PROCEDURAL CHANGE: PLANNING

In the spring of 1985, the Congress approved legislation requiring biennial budgeting for the DoD beginning with fiscal years 88-89.\(^\text{19}\) In addition to a biennial budget, the DoD was to begin its PPBS with budget constraints set forth by the President. This meant that the planning sequence for the JSPS is now intended to begin with fiscal constraints, ending the Joint Staff practice of producing unconstrained, hollow plans.

As stated previously, the PPBS was intended to be a 15 month cyclic process. In reality it was a 30-48 month process, designed to service the needs of a five-year program, that was uncontrolled and often wasteful. The current PPBS and JSPS process will take about the same time, but with two significant features. First, it now serves a six-year program that is reviewed biennially; and second, it services an eight-year cycle that has four concurrent biennial cycles (encl 4). The current planning process begins
with a CINC assessment of the scenario, tasks, and threat given in the previously published JSCP. The CINC's develop and submit their perceived Essential Elements of Information (EEI) through the CJCS to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The DIA, in turn, updates the Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning (IPSP) and returns it to the CJCS for approval. Intelligence resulting from the IPSP is now used to develop the Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning (JIEP). The JIEP is published biennially, four years before its effective short and mid-range planning period.\(^2\)

Containing "estimative intelligence on possible world-wide and regional situations that could affect U.S. security interests,"\(^2\)^\(^1\) the JIEP "forms the basis for the Illustrative Planning Scenario (IPS)"\(^2\)^\(^2\) used in the JSPD and its supporting analyses. The JSPD produced in March 1988\(^2\)^\(^3\) was the first attempt by the Joint Staff to assist the CJCS in his new role as primary military advisor to the President. The March 1988 JSPD began its life cycle in January 1987 when President Reagan sent to the SECDEF his decisions concerning national purpose, policy objectives and strategy. For the first time these decisions came to the DoD with provisional budget levels for each of the five (soon to be changed to six) programming years.\(^2\)^\(^4\) Included in the NSDD's and National Security Study Directives (NSSD) that convey the President's decisions is the requirement for an OSD study of the national security situation with options and recommendations from which the President may make his final strategy decision. The JSPD provides the advice of the CJCS, with input for the Services and CINCs, to the President,
National Security Council, and the SECDEF on a recommended national military strategy and the force structure required to support this strategy. Under the Staff supervision of the J-5, the JSPD is now prepared biennially and provides the CJCS' advice to the President, through the SECDEF, on the national military strategy and force structure required to achieve national security goals and objectives during a six, rather than five, year planning period.

The JSPD now consists of two supporting documents. "The JSPD-PG (Planning Guidance) provides the JCS strategy and force planning guidance to the CINC's of the unified and specified commands and to the Military Services and requests input concerning size and type of forces required to execute the mid-range (2-10 years) strategy." Beginning 1 January 1990, the JSPD-PG will be published biennially on even numbered years. The JSPD-PG is prepared and staffed by the J-5.

The JSPD-PF (Planning Force) contains a planning force and gives a JCS view on the attainability of that planning force in the mid-range years. The JSPD-PF, developed based on CINC input, provides the force that is considered capable of executing the JSPD-PG strategy with "reasonable assurance of success." The J-8 is responsible for analysis of CINC input prior to publication of the JSPD-PF. In its analysis, the J-8 will focus on producing a "joint" force to meet the strategies contained in the JSPD-PG. The product of the analysis is a force that is normally smaller than the total submitted by the CINC's and Services because redundant forces are
eliminated. Recent information received from J-8 action officers
indicates that the JSPD-PF will be published biennially by
15 January of the odd numbered fiscal years beginning in 1991.

The JSPD-PF will normally call for a net assessment of both
U.S. and potential adversary capabilities that may be used in de-
v eloping plans for the planning period in support of the
DG. The Chairman's Net Assessment for Strategic Planning (CNASP) pro-
vides a force capabilities assessment (U.S. vs adversary); assess-
ment data to support strategic advice in the JSPD; and information
on the analysis conducted, to include how information was developed.
The CNASP also provides assessments of military options recommended
in the JSPD. These assessments were originally to occur in a
third supporting document to the JSPD, entitled the JSPD-MA
(Military Assessment). A decision was made in January 1989 which
eliminated the JSPD-MA and incorporated the assessment in the
CNASP. The CNASP is prepared biennially by the J-8 and is pub-
lished simultaneous to the JSPD. A CNASP executive summary is
included as an annex to the JSPD which assures a staff coordinated
effort.

The J-5 is responsible for consolidation of the essential
elements of all supporting documents and information into the JSPD
itself. The JSPD now provides the SECDEF and the President with
the JCS views on force issues; it is also the document that serves
as the CJCS response to the SECDEF. The JSPD provides the CJCS the
opportunity to voice his concerns, as the senior military advisor
to the NCA, on forces required to meet national security goals and
objectives during the planning phase of the PPBS.

The JSPD becomes the basis for the SECDEF response to the President's request for a study of the national security situation, providing strategy recommendations and military force options. These recommendations and options are used by the President to produce his Strategy and Option Decision (SOD). Within the OSD, the SOD, previous years DG, Program Decision Memoranda (PDM), and Congressional budget decisions are considered with the JSPD to produce the SECDEF's Defense Guidance (DG). The DG is considered the final event in the planning phase of the PPBS. The DG links the planning phase to the programming phase and provides planning guidance and funding constraints to the Services to be used in the development of their Program Objective Memoranda (POMs). The timing from publication of the JSPD to publication of the DG is expected to take approximately six months. Target date for the first DG under the new system is 15 January 1992.

PROCEDURAL CHANGE: PROGRAMMING

Resource programming in the PPBS, although a Service responsibility, is worthy of discussion but only to demonstrate that the Joint Staff and CJCS really do play a part in the process. The programming phase of the PPBS begins with issuance of the DG. The Services develop and submit their respective POMs based on the DG and CINC warfighting requirements. The CINCs also provide to the SECDEF and the CJCS, by way of an Integrated Priority List (IPL), their respective highest priority requirements and needs. The use
of the IPL will be discussed later. As each of the Services develop their POM's, they are required to ensure that an accurate assessment of the risks associated with the current and proposed forces and support programs is made. A POM reflects a particular Service's total requirement for each year in the, now, six-year plan. Included in the POM will be those issues or differences of opinion between the CJCS and the Service Secretary on the need for a given item. Of significance is the requirement for the Services to include sufficient annexes that adequately describe how their respective POMs address the needs of the supported CINCs.

Service POMs are submitted through the CJCS to the SECDEF for approval. It is at this point in the process that the Joint Staff, particularly the J-8, becomes involved in the programming phase of PPBS. As mentioned earlier, CINC IPLs are submitted to the SECDEF and CJCS. As each IPL is received by the J-8, it is immediately sent out to the rest of the Joint Staff for comment. These comments are consolidated and used as the J-8 prepares an assessment of the Service POM's and produces the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM) for the CJCS. "The JPAM is a risk assessment document" that makes a comparison of the JSPD-PF, the composite Service POM recommendations, and the IPL. The JPAM will include JCS views on the balance and capabilities of the overall DoD POM force and support levels to execute the approved military strategy contained in the DG. The CINCs now have a positive voice in the programming phase through the J-8, to the CJCS. The JPAM will make appropriate recommendations on actions to improve the overall
force capabilities within SECDEF suggested alternative funding levels. The JPAM is also used by the CJCS to present issues to the SECDEF. All potential issues are ultimately examined by the Defense Resources Board (DRB), resolved, and final decisions are provided in appropriate PDMs. Budget estimates are subsequently prepared by the Services and forwarded to OSD. Upon review of all budget estimates, the SECDEF submits these estimates to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for consolidation and inclusion into the President's budget. It is then forwarded to Congress by the President as part of his budget. Once authorization and appropriation bills are approved by Congress and signed into law, the Services execute the budget and new forces and capabilities are procured. The JCS J-5 then prepares the next Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) for the CJCS' approval.

The chart found at enclosure two provides an overview of the PPB and JSP systems as they were (Cycle 90-94), as they are (Cycle 92-97 and as they are becoming (Cycle 94-99). It is important to note that this is an evolutionary process that cannot be implemented overnight. Enclosure three reflects the Force Structure Planning process, in general, as it is developed through the JSFS and the PPBS. Enclosure four provides an overview of how the system will eventually look when it is fully implemented. It should be noted that enclosure four reflects the forces structure process as it progresses through an eight-year planning cycle, using the two-year PPBS cycle.
ENDNOTES


17. Armed Forces Staff College, Pub 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide, 1988, 1 July 1988, (hereafter referred to as "AFSC Pub 1").

18. AFSC Pub 1, p. 103.


20. AFSC Pub 1, p. 105.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.


25. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum of Policy No. 84, 1 February 1989, p. 17 (hereafter referred to as "MOP 84").

26. Special Text, p. 4.


28. Ibid., p. 43.


30. AFSC Pub 1, p. 108.

31. Ibid.
A review of the pre-1986 national security planning procedures and follow-on investigation efforts have demonstrated the obvious need for restructure of the DoD, and, in particular, the Joint Staff. The result of the President's NSDD 219 and the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 has been one of massive restructure in both organization and procedural guidelines. The issue under examination in this paper has not been whether reorganization was required or not, but whether the restructuring effort is doing what it was designed to do. The question of a perceived split in the planning and programming staff functions of the J-5 and J-8 has revealed several related issues that require response. The purpose of this chapter is to make a retrospective examination and analysis of the significant issues surfaced in this study.

First, the question of a partial split in the planning and programming functions has been thoroughly examined. The J-5 is responsible for and, in fact, develops plans to meet global contingencies that support national security goals and objectives. As discussed earlier, the J-8 is now the agency held accountable for review of these plans as programmed force capabilities are matched with concept. Neither the planning nor the programming functions have proven to be split, partially or otherwise, between the two staffs. A distinct split does and should exist in relationship to functional responsibilities of each of the staffs;
the J-5 plans and the J-8 reviews programmed forces to support the plan. Using the old JSPS, the J-5 was responsible for both the plan and review of programmed input from the Services. The J-8, as the new reviewer of CINC capabilities and Service abilities to support contingency plans, has been placed in the position of providing non-partisan advice and recommendations to the CJCS as he further advises the SECDEF on courses of action. In a sense, the J-8 is now the Joint Staff's "honest broker" in resolving issues between the planning and the programmed force.

Because of the functional separation between the J-5 and J-8 staffs, the issue of coordination was raised. When asked whether coordination was a problem, members of the Joint Staff made the assurance that this was not the case. Much of the J-8 organization evolved from the J-5 Directorate, and, as a result, informal lines of communication and coordination that had previously been established, remained in effect.

One of the more significant changes made to the planning sequence of the PPBS was the 1985 Congressional requirement for a biennial budget that provided estimated out year constraints to the DoD. These estimates would be considered by the President as "most likely," based on economic and political considerations. Members of the Joint Staff indicate that the President does provide estimated constraints, and, because of this, the J-5 has a more solid foundation from which planning forces may be developed. This process also provides the CINCs with a better base from which to work as they compare available forces to projected constraints.
The CINCs are also afforded more opportunity in the process to voice concerns on capability to meet the requirements of the plan. The interaction between the supported CINC, the supporting CINC, the respective Services, and the Joint Staff has improved significantly. As previously mentioned, when Service POMs are submitted to the Joint Staff, they are in turn transmitted to the supported CINC for final comment. These final comments are used to develop the JPAM and provide the basis for issue book development. Members of the J-8 feel that this relationship and process has improved significantly since the reorganization and continues to work toward maturity.

Members of the Joint Staff have also admitted that the PPBS, and, likewise, the JSPS processes continue to be evolutionary. The example given was the March 1988 JSPD produced by the J-5. Because the Joint Staff had never worked in terms of constrained resources as the initial planning force was developed, they felt, and have since learned from field feedback, that the 1988 JSPD was too general and did not contain sufficient guidance for either the CINCs or the Services to adequately begin the planning sequence. Systemic flaws of this nature are believed, by members of the Joint Staff, to be providing valuable lessons learned that may be applied to future iterations of JSPS documents.

Members of the Joint Staff further suggested that, even though lessons are being learned every day, changes to the system cannot be made overnight. Based on their experience, they felt that the basic system, as it was intended by Congress and the Packard...
Commission, is in place and is working. In their opinion, however, it may not be until 1994 before the effect of the reorganization will be fully realized. It is expected that even then, some change or modification to what is being learned today may be necessary.38

ENDNOTES

28. Interview with Roger H. Dougherty, LTC, USMC, JCS, J-8, 30 November 1988 (hereafter referred to as LTC Dougherty).

29. Interview with Franklin D. McCleskey, CDR, USN, JCS, J-8, 30 November 1988 (hereafter referred to as CDR McCleskey).

30. Ibid.

31. LTC Dougherty

32. CDR McCleskey

33. LTC Dougherty

34. LTC Dougherty and CDR McCleskey

35. LTC Dougherty

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.
Examination of the thesis and question of a perceived partial planning and programming functions split between the JCS J-5 and J-8 has resulted in a non-partisan assessment of not only the functions themselves, but an assessment of the effectiveness of the newly created J-8 as well. This paper provides the following conclusions based on research and observations focused on the PPBS, the JSPS, and the Joint Staff as they pertain to the force structure planning and programming functions.

1. A split in the planning and programming functions does and should exist between the J-5 and J-8. The J-5 prepares the plan; the J-8 assesses the plan using the programming inputs from the CINCs and the Services.

2. The J-5 is effectively conducting planning operations in support of the CJCS and national security goals and objectives.

3. There exists an unwritten line of communication between the J-5 and J-8 as the planning function evolves into the programming function.

4. The J-8 provides a composite assessment of J-5 plans, CINC assessment of forces required, Service recommended application of resources, and risk.

5. The J-8 may well become the GAO equivalent on the Joint Staff, providing "honest broker" recommendations to the CJCS.

6. The requirement to make the JSPD a reflection of "most likely" fiscal constraints has been met with enthusiasm by at least the J-5 and J-8. They feel that the plans and programmed forces can be now developed in a more pragmatic light.

7. The new JSPD process is working; there is much more CINC involvement than in past years in identifying and programming forces to meet contingency requirements.
8. The JSPD produced in March 1988 was the first effort of its kind to use fiscal constraint up front. It may have been too general in nature, but the Joint Staff must be given time to iron out the wrinkles of the process.

9. The requirement for reorganization and the resulting procedural changes in both the PPBS and the JSPS are still in the evolution stage. It was premature in the spring of 1987, as it is now, to make an observation that judged the system to be non-working. The system, with all its changes, is working. The full effect of such a massive reorganization and change to procedures that took over 40 years to create, will not be felt for at least another three to five years.
CHAPTER VI
RECOMMENDATION

Patience is not one of the virtues that Americans have adapted to very well. Both military and Congressional leaders must make a concerted effort to allow the provisions of President Reagan's NSDD 219 and the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act to reach maturity. Once mature, the system should be fully examined and an assessment made on the roles and functions of the Joint Staff. During such an assessment, particular emphasis should be placed on examining the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and its interaction with the Department of Defense Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). Such an assessment will reveal any staff function abnormality or duplication of effort.


DOD PPBS

PLANNING

[NOV] [JAN]

SECRETARY
OF
DEFENSE

(DEFENSE RESOURCES
BOARD)

JCS

JLRS

JPAM

MILITARY
DEPARTMENTS
& AGENCIES

CINCS

PROGRAM
OBJECTIVE
MEMOS

CINCS
PRESENTATIONS
TO DRB

PROGRAM
DECISION MEMOS

ISSUE
BOOKS

DEFENSE
GUIDANCE

DEFENSE
GUIDANCE

DRAFT
DEFENSE
GUIDANCE

JSPD

JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING DOCUMENT

JPAM

JOINT PROGRAM ASSESSMENT MEMORANDUM

JLRS

JOINT LONG RANGE STRATEGIC APPRAISAL

BUDGETING

[SEP] [OCT-DEC] [JAN]

BUDGET
DECISIONS

PRESIDENT'S
BUDGET

BUDGET
ESTIMATES

CINCS
PRESENTATIONS
TO DRB

ENVELOPE 1
FIGURE 2. PLANNING SEQUENCE FOR THE JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM
THE FORCE STRUCTURE PLANNING PROCESS
Reprinted from a handout provided by LTC Dougherty, J-8 action officer, on 30 Nov 88.