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LANGUAGE TRAINING AND THE ACTIVATION OF COMBAT ELECTRONIC WARFARE INTELLIGENCE (CEWI) UNITS IN THE RESERVE COMPONENT

BY

COLONEL JOHN W. FROST

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DTIC ELECTED 24 MARCH 1989

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
The decision to activate CEWI units in the reserve components presents many challenges for the CEWI commander. CEWI units lack equipment, specialists in CEWI units go through long training periods and are thus difficult to replace, and CEWI units are also required to train linguists. This study explores these challenges and analyzes their impact upon unit readiness. CEWI battalions, with their linguist capabilities, are force multipliers.
for the combat commander. This study will review how well units are balancing the numerous requirements of Military Occupational Specialties (MOS), training, language training, and administration in order to meet mobilization readiness standards; it will highlight problems in the reserve community and it will make recommendations.

The author interviewed several individuals in the reserve community who are charged with activating CEWI units, training linguists, and preparing the units for mobilization. Soldiers were candid in their impressions of the foreign language efforts in the reserves.

This study is not intended to degrade the Army's efforts to fix foreign language problems. Rather, it will focus attention on the problems and challenges faced by those charged with implementing the program at the battalion level.
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LANGUAGE TRAINING AND THE ACTIVATION OF COMBAT ELECTRONIC WARFARE INTELLIGENCE (CEWI) UNITS IN THE RESERVE COMPONENT

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Colonel John W. Frost, AR

Colonel Jack D. Rives
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
24 March 1989
ABSTRACT

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LANGUAGE TRAINING AND THE ACTIVATION OF COMBAT ELECTRONIC WARFARE INTELLIGENCE (CEWI) UNITS IN THE RESERVE COMPONENT

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Army's vision is to prepare and field sufficient forces to fight and win in the event deterrence should fail. To carry out this mission, the Army must systematically build a carefully constructed force mix, constrained only by the resources available. Limited resources call for alternative approaches, such as more reliance upon the reserve components, despite the risk in the process. There are not enough resources available to fully man the active component. Trade-offs are made in manpower and equipment. More reliance is placed upon the reserve component, since it costs less overall. With this increased reliance and major role played by the reserve component, the readiness of reserve component personnel and equipment is critical. CEWI units are a part of this increased reliance and play a very important role. Trained linguists are critical to CEWI unit readiness. The Army faces many challenges with linguists training programs, and these challenges are training distractors for the Reserves. CEWI units need well-trained linguists, but the Army does not produce or retain many linguists. This study addresses these challenges of reserve component CEWI units. It will answer the question, will CEWI units be force multipliers when needed?
Reservists want to be good at their jobs, and they want to be good linguists. However, being a linguist is not a part-time job.

Reserve Component CEWI Activation

Force Development is the beginning of the Functional Life Cycle of the Army. It is the process which consists of defining the military threat, designing units and a force structure capable of defeating the threat, determining personnel and material requirements, and within available resources, the authorizations for manning and equipping the Army.¹

The Army is constantly reviewing the threat defined in the Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning and the force requirements necessary to execute the approved national military strategy with reasonable assurance of success. These reviews focus on the current force structure across the spectrum. Active component requirements and capabilities are measured against the threat. Shortfalls are often eliminated by activating Army Reserves and National Guard units.

This was the case with the activation of Military Intelligence reserve component units under the Army of Excellence (AOE). In 1984, the Army Vice Chief of Staff decided to place CEWI units in the reserve component. Thus these units were needed to ensure combat readiness for the total Army. Many active units rely heavily on the reserve component for intelligence and other support. For example, 97 percent of the Army's civil affairs assets, 92 percent of pathfinder units, and 67 percent of the Army's Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) hospitals are in the reserves.
Activation of intelligence units under the CEWI concept began on 1 October 1985; it has continued according to the implementation timetable. However, these activations have not occurred without some serious problems, such as the lack of equipment and shortage of trained personnel, especially linguists. Of the 24 divisional CEWI Battalions programmed for the force, 33 percent will be activated in the reserves.

Conversion of the Army Reserve Military Intelligence and Army Security Agency (MI/ASA) assets to the AOE combat electronic warfare intelligence design remains a high priority. The current reorganization program employs a backfill strategy that takes advantage of existing equipment and personnel support. Additionally, it follows the Army leadership's priority of implementation, beginning with Corps and active component separate brigades, and progressing to MI/CEWI support of reserve component divisions and separate brigades.

This comprehensive reorganization in Army Reserve Intelligence units involves modernization of the Army MI/ASA structure and an increase of Army Reserve Military Intelligence personnel authorizations from about 6,000 to more than 10,000. Thus, there is a corresponding increase in linguists assigned to these units. Implementation of the Army Reserve Intelligence Plan which began in FY 1986 will continue through FY 1993. The goal is to ensure that the reserve intelligence force is modernized to support current doctrine under the AOE design.²

Herein lies the problem. Many CEWI specialists require as much as 18 months of resident training. Also CEWI units have
significant language training requirements. Language training in the reserve component competes with Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) training and other duties required of the soldier on Individual Drill Assemblies weekends. It also competes for annual training time and civilian employment. Budgetary constraints have also placed additional burden upon the activation process. This study addresses some of these burdens and how those charged with the activation process are coping with the many challenges.

Author's Background and Experiences

As a United States Army Reserve (USAR) Officer, I have spent many years in organizations where military intelligence units were assigned for command and control. Additionally, I have served two tours as an Inspector General in the U.S. Army Reserve. As an Inspector General, I have had the opportunity to evaluate training in one of the first CEWI battalions activated over two years ago. I also evaluated training and other areas in military intelligence units that have been used as backfill for CEWI units.

In many other positions in the USAR, I have enjoyed many opportunities to discuss the various challenges faced during force structure changes in the reserve component. These challenges have tremendous impact upon training and unit readiness, especially when newer and more sophisticated equipment is fielded or when unit types are changed within the same geographical location.
It is the author's opinion that greater reliance can be placed upon the reserve component. However, this reliance must be tempered with a clear understanding of peacetime capabilities. Upon mobilization, the Reserves have 100 percent of the time available to conduct intensive training prior to deployment. Many distractors such as administrative housekeeping tasks will be assumed by units designed solely for those purposes. Today's reserve component commanders should be given mission essential tasks and administrative tasks that are realistic and in which they are capable of achieving. This would have a tremendous impact upon training, morale, and retention. Currently, the commander must recruit his soldiers, train to standards on all mission essential tasks, as well as perform all administrative duties. Administrative duties such as getting soldiers paid, responding to requests at various command levels, and many other duties normally not found in an active unit are extremely time consuming.
ENDNOTES


CHAPTER II
THE ENVIRONMENT

In a period of budgetary constraints, the reserve component CEWI activation has been extremely difficult. The training challenge is but one obstacle. Equipment fielding has slipped, and there is a great need for recruiting soldiers with prior service. If prior service military intelligence personnel cannot be recruited into CEWI linguist positions, the unit is faced with a long training process for a new enlistee. Even with adequate resources, CEWI activations present many challenges—fielding requisite equipment, training the troops, and coordinating activities with the active component.

Language Training
Requirements and Challenges

Forces Command (FORSCOM) Regulation 350-22 requires a reserve component commander to recruit language-qualified soldiers into reserve component troop program units (TPU's) in language-requiring Specialty Code/Military Occupational Specialty (SC/MOS) or Modified Table Organization and Equipment positions. FORSCOM policies allow for recruits who are qualified for training in the required language. Prior to enlistment, the recruited applicant is tested through the Defense Language Aptitude Battery. Once the applicant has demonstrated the aptitude for language, recruitment into the unit is made with the understanding that the soldier enroll in a training program to acquire the language within one year.
FORSCOM Regulation 350-22 requires the reserve unit commander to remove and or reclassify soldiers from a linguist MTOE position MOS if the soldier does not enroll in a language program within one year or if language qualification is not obtained within two calendar years of enrollment.\footnote{1} The transfer of a soldier would require the commander to start the recruiting and training processes over for that position. Language qualification for award of Skill Qualification Identifier "L" is prescribed by Army Regulation 611-6. This regulation sets forth the standard and the language identification code at proficiency level 1/1 (Speak, Listen, Read), which represents an entry training requirement.

The level 1 entry training requirement for listening is to have sufficient comprehension to understand utterances about basic survival needs and minimum courtesy and travel requirements. The linguist can understand simple questions and answers on very familiar topics, and can conduct simple face-to-face conversations in a standard dialect. The linguist as a level 1 reader has sufficient comprehension to read very simple connected written material in a form equivalent to usual printing or typescript. As a level 1 speaker, the linguist can satisfy minimum courtesy requirements and maintain very simple face-to-face conversations on familiar topics. The linguist has a functional, but limited proficiency.\footnote{2}

Army Regulation 220-1 allows a commander to report a linguist on the unit status report if a 1/1 proficiency is obtained.
FORSCOM has raised this standard to proficiency level 2/2 (Speak, Listen, Read) for reporting military intelligence MOS. Level 2 is a limited working proficiency of the language. The level 2 requirement for speaking requires the linguist to be able to satisfy routine social demands and limited work requirements. The linguist can handle with confidence most normal high-frequency social conversational situations, including casual conversation about work, family, current events, and autobiographical information. The linguist as a listener has sufficient comprehension to understand conversations on routine social demands and limited job requirements. As a level 2 reader, the linguist has sufficient comprehension to read simple, authentic written material in a form equivalent to usual printing or typescript on subjects within a familiar text.

FORSCOM Regulation 350-22 also requires the unit commander test qualified soldiers annually with the Defense Language Proficiency Test. Likewise, the unit must provide foreign language training, and/or access to such training, during prime training hours. Demanding for the active component, these requirements are devastating to the reserve component and its language program, as well as to other training.

Activation of reserve component CEWI battalions has brought numerous problems with regard to language training and linguist proficiency. FORSCOM Regulation 350-22 currently requires the electronic warfare signal intelligence MOSs, Career Management Field (CMF) 98 to have a proficiency level of 2/2. CMF 98 has the following MOSs: 98CL-Electronic Warfare/Signal Intelligence
Analyst; 98G-Electronic Warfare/Signal Intelligence Voice Interceptor; 98J-Electronic Warfare/Signal Intelligence Noncommunications Interceptor; and 98Z-Electronic Warfare/Signal Intelligence Chief.

It also requires the intelligence analyst MOSs, CMF 96 to have the same proficiency levels. CMF 96 has the following MOSs which require 2/2 language proficiency: 97BL-Counter-intelligence Agent and 97E-Interrogator. These are two of the major CMF's located in the CEWI battalion. The high standards required have placed additional burdens since it is difficult to obtain language proficiency at this level in the reserves.

The Language Challenge

The overall problem began with the activation of the CEWI reserve battalions to meet intelligence requirements of the battlefield. Many military intelligence units were inactivated, and the personnel from those units were used as backfill whenever possible. For example, the 338th CEWI Battalion activated at Fort Meade, Maryland was backfilled with personnel from the 223d Military Intelligence Company and 226th Military Intelligence Detachment, Washington, D.C.; 345th Army Security Agency Company, Camden, N.J.; 268th Military Intelligence Detachment, Richmond, Va.; and the 362d Military Intelligence Detachment, Fort Meade, Maryland. These units will be inactivated. But many of the soldiers will be lost because of MOS mismatch and because of geographical dispersion. Also, many will be lost due to the change of force structure and grade mismatch. To further complicate the new commander's problem,
the unit mission is targeted in a part of the world for which
previously acquired languages of backfill personnel are no
longer applicable.

So the commander must find a way to qualify his personnel
in the new languages. For senior soldiers in the reserves,
attending the Defense Language Institute can be very difficult--
even impossible--because of employment restrictions. When
soldiers do become available, often no quotas are available for
them.

The 126th Military Intelligence Battalion (CEWI) was back-
filled from a unit that had a Corps military intelligence
mission. Its force structure matched its mission. The unit
force structure consisted of Majors and Lieutenant Colonels,
but very few Lieutenants. The unit also had a large group of
Warrant Officers. Upon activation of the 126th MI Battalion
(CEWI) and subsequent inactivation of the old unit, the Majors
and Lieutenant Colonels were displaced by Lieutenants and
Captains. Many of the senior non-commissioned officers were dis-
placed by Specialists and Sergeants. The Warrant Officers,
despite their language proficiencies and expertise, were lost to
the unit. Most senior officers and non-commissioned officers
were placed in other units within the area, such as the United
States Army Reserve Forces School. Through efforts of First
United States Army, the Warrant Officers were placed in
Intelligence Training Army Area Schools around the country, so
their expertise was not lost to the system. The newly activated
CEWI battalion commander was now faced with the challenge of
recruiting lower graded enlisted soldiers to fill the unit.\(^6\) This has been met with great success, however, these soldiers are not MOS and language qualified.

Once the soldiers have been recruited, the commander has only two years to get them MOS and language-qualified. The Commander of the 94th United States Army Reserve Command (ARCOM) in a letter to the First United States Army Commander, made this statement: "As Commander of the 94th ARCOM, I have some serious concerns relative to the qualification standards imposed upon the 126th Military Intelligence Battalion (CEWI). I recognize that the other newly activated United States Army Reserve CEWI Battalions must strive to meet the same standards, however, I question the wisdom of a program that appears to be designed for failure."\(^7\)

This Commander elaborated on the infeasibility of a reserve CEWI unit's ability to qualify a linguist to the 2/2 level even if the maximum training resources were available for the reservists. Time is surely the critical factor in the process. Limited time must be allocated between civilian employment, which is the main source of income, and the demands of the reserves. To further complicate the reserve commander's problems, the force structure of the CEWI battalion lacks incentives beyond the rank of Sergeant, E-5. However, the requirement seems most unrealistic in that it requires this standard to be accomplished in two years.
The demand for linguists continues to grow in the reserve component. On 10 August 1988, the 90th ARCOM needed 464 linguists in 17 units. These linguists were located in psychological operations units, civil affairs units, and military intelligence units. With the activation of the 301st Tactical Exploration Battalion (TEB) on 16 September 1988 and the corresponding inactivation of one ASA battalion and two military intelligence detachments, the 90th ARCOM's linguist requirements increased to 583 in 15 units. Two hundred sixty-six linguists are required for the military intelligence units. This is 50 percent of the ARCOM's total linguist needs. Therefore, language training is not only a military intelligence CEWI problem but a total Army problem.

The reserve component faces daily the problem of how to train linguists in view of the various program distractors. The preferred method is use of the language program at the Defense Language Institute (DLI). However, DLI does not provide sufficient quotas for reserve component soldiers to attend the language program.

The Commander of the 126th Battalion (CEWI) stated in a telephone interview that the recruiters were not recruiting linguists for his units because of a lack of quota over the next year. This void causes continual staffing problems for his unit. A number of other factors serve as well to reduce the number of personnel who can attend DLI: high dollar cost, lack of flexibility in the system, and difficulty of the employed
reservists to obtain the 47 plus weeks away from civilian employment. Linguists training time must be added to the time for MOS training, so the reservists are faced with a very difficult challenge. Ideally, young soldiers should be recruited prior to permanent employment; sent through basic, advanced and language training prior to returning home. This program, however, needs to be improved. One commander stated that reserve component soldiers are sent home for fiscal reasons when there is a gap between the advance training date and the language school. Soldiers have to take menial jobs or remain unemployed until their school date. If they find a good job, they are often not available for school when the date arrives. 10

The DLI, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and FORSCOM need to establish a flexible system which allows the reserve component soldiers various opportunities to attend language school. The reservists should be given the various school dates, then they could select dates agreed upon between them and their employers. This would be transmitted through command channel and confirmed. This flexibility would allow better planning by reservists who must coordinate long absenteeism with employers. Unlike active component soldiers, reservists stand to lose their employment when they are not available for the employers.

Currently, the reserve unit requests a quota for the soldiers based upon several possible dates given by the
reservists. The reservists often are unaware of the exact date until late in the process.

At the Fifth Army In Process Review (3 November 1988), the Commander, 135th Military Intelligence Battalion (CEWI), raised the issue, as other commanders have done, of quotas from DLI. The recruiting battalion had been unable to obtain quotas from DLI for several potential recruits. The Fifth Army's Program Manager indicated quotas could be obtained for prior service soldiers in most instances, despite problems with the computerized quota management system. The quotas would be obtained through manual manipulation of the system. Fifth Army would discuss with FORSCOM the problem of quotas for non-prior service recruits. Newly-formed CEWI battalions are having significant manpower problems among non-prior service enlistees.

Even after going through the long process, many soldiers are lost to the active component upon completion of school. The movement of soldiers from the reserves to the active component is another area that the CEWI commander must be concerned. While the loss of a soldier from the reserves to the active is not a loss to the system, it does create a recruiting, training, and administrative burden upon the reserve unit. Young soldiers with no significant employment ties to the civilian community see active duty as an opportunity to practice what they have learned.

The Commander of the 301st Military Intelligence Battalion (TEB) for example, stated that during the past year at least 12 soldiers left the Headquarters Company for active duty. Seven of
these soldiers were Private First Class or below. The unit must now recruit persons who are capable of obtaining a language and the MOS.\textsuperscript{12} This must be accomplished within two years as prescribed in FORSCOM Regulation 350-22.

The status reports on the 135th Military Intelligence Battalion (CEWI) (Figure 1) and the 301st Military Intelligence Battalion (TEB) (Figure 2) exemplify the tasks facing the battalion commander in recruiting and training linguists for their unit.\textsuperscript{13}

Faced with the number of soldiers who must be qualified as linguists, the reserve component commander needs an alternative. One way of doing it is through the FORSCOM Basic Language Acquisition Program (BLAP), which calls for private contract language training. BLAP is a very expensive program: it requires Organizational Maintenance Army Reserve (OMAR) dollars to pay the contractor and Reserve Personnel Army (RPA) dollars to the reservists who attend weekly training twice a week for one year. The average contract cost per soldier in the 90th ARCOM was $2,500 for 48 days annually. The soldier attends two four-hour evening classes per week and was paid two full days, since the reservist must be placed on orders when required to attend classes.

While this is one method of obtaining language training, many reserve personnel feel that one cannot train a soldier to a 2/2 standard using the contract method or through local colleges' foreign language courses. Many feel that there are
**Figure 1**

**135th MI BN (CEWI)**

**LINGUIST STATUS REPORT**

(As of 25 Oct 88)

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FIGURE 2
301st MI BN (TEB)
LINGUIST STATUS REPORT
(As of 3 Nov 88)

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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98GLGM</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO-PL</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO-GM</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% REQUIRED</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td>9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% AUTH</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td></td>
<td>11%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
not enough hours to make it work. It requires a tremendous individual effort from the soldier. This is more difficult, given other requirements. The regular Army has a difficult time keeping its linguists qualified, yet the reservists are expected to do the same on a part-time basis. Even so, the emphasis must be on getting qualified people and keeping them qualified.

FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY PAY (FLPP)

Proficiency pay for reserve linguists is not equitable. A reserve component linguist is being asked to maintain a proficiency level ranging from 1+ for Category IV languages such as Arabic, Japanese, and Korean to a 2/2 for Category I such as French, Spanish, and Italian. The FLPP is considered an incentive pay for increased proficiency and professional development. This pay is authorized under Title 37, USC Section 316. This statute currently reads "The member may be paid an increase in compensation equal to one-thirtieth of monthly special pay authorized." The following schedule is based on the assumption that four multiple unit training assemblies (MUTA-4) equals thirty days in the active component. The current FLPP is shown in Figure 3.
FIGURE 3
CURRENT RESERVE FLPP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MUTA</th>
<th>PAY</th>
<th>FLPP-1</th>
<th>FLPP-2</th>
<th>FLPP-3</th>
<th>FLPP-4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1/30</td>
<td>$ .83</td>
<td>$1.66</td>
<td>$ 2.50</td>
<td>$ 3.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2/30</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>6.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3/30</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4/30</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>6.66</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>13.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FLPP levels are determined by using proficiency ratings and language difficulty categories in accordance with Figure 4.

FIGURE 4
FLPP PAYMENT LEVELS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proficiency Rating</th>
<th>Language Difficulty Category (LDC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1+</td>
<td>1+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2+</td>
<td>2+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The lowest of the proficiency ratings received will be used to determine the FLPP level. For example, for LDC IV and proficiency ratings of 1+ (L), 2 (S), and 2+ (R), FLPP-2 will be awarded. This is due to 1+ listening being on the LDC IV, FLPP-2 line, even though 2 (S) and and 2+ (R) puts the soldier at FLPP-3 and FLPP-4, respectively. The soldier would be paid a maximum
of $6.66 for a MUTHA-4, as an incentive to maintain proficiency in Arabic, Chinese-Mandarin, Cantonese, Japanese, or Korean.

The FLPP is clearly not an incentive to reserve component soldiers and needs to be restructured. On 10 August 1987, the Director of Military Personnel Management asked the sixth QRMC to review FLPP for reserve component personnel. It was recommended that Title 37, USC Section 316 be amended. Greater compensation should be given for personal initiative and effort and demands upon non-duty time. It further recommended that additional compensation would assist in the recruiting and retention of critical skilled personnel vital to CEWI units and unit readiness.16

The current amounts and method of payments are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly Rate</th>
<th>Amount of Pay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FLPP-1</td>
<td>$ 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLPP-2</td>
<td>$ 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLPP-3</td>
<td>$ 75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLPP-4</td>
<td>$100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The member would be authorized compensation equal to seven and one-half thirteenth of the monthly special pay authorized. Figure 5 reflects the proposed pay as well as the cost of the change.

CEWI battalion commanders have expressed a need for more proficiency pay. The pay should be for the entire month once the soldier has been qualified. This will allow the commander to
FIGURE 5
MODIFICATION OF RESERVE FLPP

Proposed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MUTA</th>
<th>PAY</th>
<th>FLPP-1</th>
<th>FLPP-2</th>
<th>FLPP-3</th>
<th>FLPP-4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>7.5/30</td>
<td>$6.25</td>
<td>$12.50</td>
<td>$18.75</td>
<td>$25.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>15.0/30</td>
<td>12.50</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>37.50</td>
<td>50.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>22.5/30</td>
<td>18.75</td>
<td>37.50</td>
<td>56.25</td>
<td>75.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>30.0/30</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>75.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of reserve component linguists, FY 88-93:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>FY88</th>
<th>FY89</th>
<th>FY90</th>
<th>FY91</th>
<th>FY92</th>
<th>FY93</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRR</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NG</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>2300</td>
<td>2300</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>2800</td>
<td>3800</td>
<td>4800</td>
<td>5300</td>
<td>7000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparison of current U.S. proposed annual cost ($M):

a. Current:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>FY88</th>
<th>FY89</th>
<th>FY90</th>
<th>FY91</th>
<th>FY92</th>
<th>FY93</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRR</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NG</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total $M</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average annual rate is $120 per linguist ($10.00 per MUTA-4)

b. Proposed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>FY88</th>
<th>FY89</th>
<th>FY90</th>
<th>FY91</th>
<th>FY92</th>
<th>FY93</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>1.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRR</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>1.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NG</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>2.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total $M</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>4.77</td>
<td>6.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average annual rate is $900 per linguist ($75.00 per MUTA-4)
place greater emphasis, in addition to the professionalism of
the soldier, upon sustainment language training, which must be
done during non-duty hours. One commander expressed a serious
dilemma faced during each annual training. While the entire
battalion needs to conduct battalion level training operations,
letting soldiers do alternative individual training must be
weighed. However, if greater reliance is to be placed upon the
skills of the soldiers, the decision should be to send them to
a refresher course for language during those two weeks. Once
soldiers are qualified and able to maintain proficiency during
the year, the battalion can then concentrate on collective
battalion training.

On 5 May 1987, the Army Language Program Review Committee
(ALPRC) decided to pursue legislative change to attain full
parity between active and reserve components' incentive pay for
language proficiency. The Army leadership needs to continue
this effort to ensure quality and to provide an incentive for
recruitment and retention.
ENDNOTES

1 U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters Forces Command, FORSCOM Regulation 350-22, pp. 3-5.


4 Army Regulation 611-6, pp. 29-35.


6 Interview with Colonel John C. C. Roth, 94th U.S. Army Reserve Command, Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts, 1 Dec 1988.

7 John Ricottilli, Jr., MG, "Language Qualification Issues Affecting the 126th MI Bn (CEWI)," Memorandum for Commander First United States Army, 13 September 1988.


9 Telephone interview with Tom Gribbon, LTC, USAR, 126th MI Bn (CEWI), E. Windsor, CT, 2 February 1989.

10 Telephone interview with Bobby Crow, LTC, USAR, 301st Exploitation Battalion, Houston, Texas, 4 February 1989.


12 Telephone interview with Bobby Crow, 4 February 1989.


15 Ibid.

16 W. G. O'Leksy, MG, "Sixth QRMC (RC) Review of Foreign Language Proficiency Pay (FLPP)," Memorandum for Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), 10 August 1987, p. 1.
17 Ibid., p. 3.
18 Ibid., p. 2.
CHAPTER III
FORCE DEVELOPMENT

Force development is defined as the beginning of the functional life cycle of the Army and the basis for all other functions. It is a process which begins by looking at the military threat. Once the military threat has been defined, units and a force structure capable of defeating that threat are designed. Personnel and material requirements are identified, and units are authorized to be manned and equipped.

The Concept Base Requirements System (CBRS) is used in the Army force development process. The CBRS is based on the premise that Army requirements for doctrine, training, organizations, and material ought to be derived from concepts of how-to-fight and support. Given CBRS derived or other requirements for new or modified organizations, the first force development task is to design a unit model. This unit model is a Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE). A TOE prescribes the required structure, manpower, and equipment for several organizational options for a particular type unit. These organizational options provide the model for fielding a unit at full capacity or at a reduced capability.¹

Force design guidance provides TOE developers with recommended TOE additions/modifications required to resolve battlefield weaknesses. "The mission and probable areas of utilization of a unit are provided by policy and doctrine. Policy includes guidance, procedures, and standards in the form of regulations
on how to develop TOE's. Policy also contains guidance in the form of Standards of Grade Authorizations (SGA), which provides for the equitable grading of all MOS positions for use in the development of requirements documents." 2 This is where the problem for CEWI units exist.

In his article, "Our Endangered Force Multiplier" Colonel Wesley A. Groesbeck points out that "many linguists are leaving the active army because they see no career program for linguists with appropriate promotion and incentives." 3 He indicated that Foreign Language Proficiency Pay was a step in the right direction.

This, however, does not help reserve soldiers who are having difficulty obtaining the language. Further, the lack of clear career progression encourages soldiers to leave CEWI units for positions wherein they can be promoted. MOS advancements beyond the junior non-commissioned officer ranks are limited, and soldiers abandon the linguist's role in order to get promoted or because they are not being used as a linguist.

This problem must be addressed by the Army leadership. A well-defined career progression path needs to be established for linguists which allows them the same opportunities as their peers for career progress. If the Army is serious about the needs for linguists--and I believe it is--then it must address this critical force structure and personnel issue.

The FLPP will help in keeping the active component soldiers beyond their first enlistment, but it will have little or no
impact upon retention in the reserves unless the standards are changed and acquisition of language is made simpler. First, the ability to attain language beyond the 1/1 level is hampered by numerous outside influences, such as job, time, and the availability of the taught language in the geographical area. Second, sustainment is hampered by these very same influences. Unless the individual speaks the language as a second language in the home because he is Russian, Polish, or Hispanic, etc., a lot of time and energy must be expended obtaining and sustaining the skill.

For reservists, FLPP does not provide an incentive for soldiers to stay in the program. Its inequity makes it a disincentive. Reservists expend a considerable amount of personal time in language training. This is often done without compensation.

Reserve soldiers should be recruited into linguist positions which readily provide a future after considerable time and energy have been spent on language and MOS acquisition. The TOE's for CEWI units currently does not provide the grade structure wherein young enlisted soldiers can progress systematically through the ranks.

A senior reserve officer stated that such a structure would create a problem for his civilian company. Personnel like to feel that they can progress up the company ladder. They would not join the organization if they knew that advancement was limited by a problem in the organizational structure rather than
by their own abilities. It would be discouraging to employees after reaching a certain grade and not obtain a senior grade because there were few intermediate grades through which to progress.

The TOE's for CEWI units have a large concentration of linguists in the Specialist and Sergeant grades. There are little or no requirements at the Staff Sergeant level. Beyond the Staff Sergeant level, however, there is the linguist MOS with no clear career progression. The amount of time soldiers must remain as a Sergeant, E-5, the time it takes to get promoted, and the time required to obtain language proficiency are forcing reservists to choose between being linguists and seeking careers in other specialties. Commanders can keep the linguist as a soldier, but they are being forced to transfer them to non-linguist positions.\(^4\)

Another concern raised by commanders has been the means by which the Army assigns languages to the unit. For example, the TOE for the 301st Military Intelligence Battalion (TEB) requires German and Polish linguists. This unit, along with its CAPSTONE Headquarters, has submitted a letter to FORSCOM requesting that this requirement be changed to Russian and German primarily. The unit would add the secondary languages as well. The Battalion commander felt this would help with recruiting.\(^5\) The unit itself was activated in a high Spanish-speaking environment.

Even though FORSCOM currently allows CEWI units to recruit in the FORSCOM's ten identified languages, CEWI units cannot

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send soldiers to school unless in a language required by the unit TOE. Soldiers cannot be promoted and cannot get language sustainment training.

We need to create a more viable career program for linguists. We need a program where commanders can retain qualified linguists because of career-enhancing incentives.
ENDNOTES


2Ibid., p. 11-7.


5Telephone interview with LTC Bobby Crow, USAR, 301st Tactical Exploitation Battalion, Houston, Texas, 4 February 1989.
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The activation of Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence units in the reserve component has presented major challenges for reserve commanders. The critical factor guiding force development of CEWI battalions and their ability to see the threat, has been the recognition that intelligence is critical to the combat commander. The CEWI battalion upon mobilization must have soldiers who are technically proficient in their assigned MOSs. Many of these MOSs require languages as integral parts of the job. Without proficient personnel in the assigned languages, the unit loses its capabilities in direct proportion to its linguists' qualifications. This impacts upon whether the unit is a force multiplier capable of being deployed when needed.

The requirements for trained linguists have been documented substantially in the past. Both Korea and Vietnam demonstrated the necessity for linguists. Treaty negotiations, combined operations, and the requirement to gather intelligence rapidly have demonstrated the need for linguists. The active components have had problems maintaining sufficient numbers of linguists.

The requirement for linguists in the reserve component has increased as more and more responsibilities have shifted from the active components to the reserve components. These shifts of responsibilities have increased the demand for language training. There is a need for improvement in the acquisition of this training.
The Forces Command which has command and control of all reserve forces provides a resident and nonresident foreign language training program for active component and reserve soldiers. There is a tendency, however, to place the same requirements for the active component upon the reserve component when they seem unobtainable and unrealistic.

For example, it does not make sense for a commander to spend an exorbitant amount of time recruiting and training a soldier only to kick him out after two years, which equates to 48 drills/24 days and 14 days annual training each year. Yet this is what FORSCOM's regulations require of the reserve commander. Additionally, the commander is expected to bring the soldiers to a 2/2 proficiency level in their languages in order to retain them. While this officer would like to see the same standards applied throughout the Army, we must acknowledge when the standards are unrealistic because of factors outside the soldier's control. Surely some will meet the standards, but the majority--as commanders in the field have stated--get discouraged and see the standards as an insurmountable obstacle.

The Army needs to take a new look at the reserve linguists requirements. Better programs are needed to enhance recruiting and to qualify the soldiers. For example, commanders should be allowed to recruit soldiers in languages other than those on the unit's TOE. A data base should be maintained on all these personnel. Upon mobilization, personnel cross leveling would take place. The gaining unit would receive a proficient
linguist capable of performing the mission.

Recommendations

The Army leadership should consider establishing a career development path for linguists which allows advancement beyond the junior non-commissioned officer ranks.

TRADOC and FORSCOM should coordinate a program wherein United States Army Reserve Forces (USARF) Schools can assume the responsibility for nonresident language training at USARF Schools or local colleges and universities.

USARF Schools, in coordination with CEWI commanders, should establish language training contracts when needed.

FORSCOM should review standards for reserve component linguists.

FORSCOM should develop new alternatives, such as cross leveling and establishing language units.


5. Gribben, Tom, LTC. USAR, 126th MI Bn (CEWI), E. Windsor, CT. Telephone Interview, Carlisle, PA: 2 February 1989.


7. HQ, DA Message 141601Z Aug. 87, MILPER Message Number 87-314, "Implementation of Foreign Language Proficiency Pay (FLPP) Program for Total Army (AC and RC)."


