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THE CINCS AND THE ACQUISITION PROCESS

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## THE CINCS AND THE ACQUISITION PROCESS

The Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) of the Unified and Specified Commands are the key element in translating potential U.S. military capability into military power on the battlefield. It was the purpose of this study to examine how to better bring views of the CINCs to bear on the major defense acquisition choices of our time.

The CINCs were formally established by the 1958 Amendments to the National Security Act. For the next twenty years, a number of failed attempts were made to involve CINCs in acquisition processes. From the late 1970s through 1986, small steps were taken to involve the CINCs in the whole PPB and acquisition processes, including the early weapons requirements processes. More recently the requirement was stated in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, that the CJCS reflect CINC priorities within a constrained program and budget. The creation of the position of Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) to carry out the law and the accompanying reorganization of the Joint Staff have created the mechanism to reflect more fully CINC views in the acquisition and the planning, programming and budgeting (PPB) processes.

### ABSTRACT

The CINCs were formally established by the 1958 Amendments to the National Security Act. For the next twenty years, a number of failed attempts were made to involve CINCs in acquisition issues. From the late 1970s through 1986, small steps were taken to involve the CINCs in the whole PPB and acquisition processes, including the early weapons requirements processes. More recently the requirement was stated in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, that the CJCS reflect CINC priorities within a constrained program and budget. The creation of the position of Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) to carry out the law and the accompanying reorganization of the Joint Staff have created the mechanism to reflect more fully CINC views in the acquisition and the planning, programming and budgeting (PPB) processes.

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Important interests--regional and theater, joint, and combined--are neglected if the CINCs are not well represented in the PPB and acquisition processes. Moreover, the Unified CINCs are the only senior officers, other than the CJCS and VCJCS, who do not have their positions tied to particular Services and are in a position to have a joint rather than a single-Service view; thus, their inputs constitute important additions to the deliberations of the DoD. But as the record over the years shows, there is a tendency of the system to ignore the CINCs, derived from the nature of the CINC staff and the lack of provision for direct analytic and technical support; lack of timely information flow at critical decision points; the (appropriately) limited interest of the CINCs in medium and long term acquisition issues; and differing incentives between the Services and the CINCs.

Improvements worthy of consideration include: (1) addition of technical, analytic and costing support; (2) formation of a mechanism that brings together the users of the weapons with their Service Developers; (3) presentation of an alternative (to Service) joint resource constrained program that has the same standing in the DRB as the Service POMs; and (4) increased CINC liaison with the various staff elements in the Pentagon.
PREFACE

This task was undertaken as part of Task T-A0-461, "Special Studies of Critical Defense Issues," Contract Number MDA 903 84 C 0031. Its objective "...is to provide for research support by IDA on important defense issues of direct interest to USD(A)." The publication of this paper completes a subtask, "The CINCs and the Acquisition Process," of that task order.

The Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) of the Unified and Specified Commands are the key element in translating potential U.S. military capability into military power on the battlefield. Moreover, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act requires that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reflect CINC priorities "within projected resource levels, and guidance provided by the Secretary...". It is therefore critical to examine how the CINC views can and should be translated into useful advice--advice that will be in conformance with the law by carrying weight in the determination of the capabilities of future military forces. These capabilities must include potential new military missions and capabilities, as well as the development of new weapons that incorporate new and changing technology into the warfighting missions of the Armed Forces of the Unified and Specified Commands. It was the purpose of this subtask to examine this problem.

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Interviews were conducted by the authors to gather the views and discuss the experience of retired CINCs and DCINCs: General Russell Dougherty, USAF (Ret.), General Andrew Goodpaster, USA (Ret.), General Paul Gorman, USA (Ret.), General Richard Lawson, USAF (Ret.), Admiral Robert Long, USN (Ret.), General William Y. Smith, USAF (Ret.), and Admiral Harry Train, USN (Ret.). In addition, other current and former military and civilian officials were interviewed: LTG John Ahman, USAF (Ret.), Col. Robert Chandler, USAF (Ret.), Seymour Deitchman, Alexander Flax,
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) of the Unified and Specified Commands are the key element in translating potential U.S. military capability into military power on the battlefield. It is therefore critical to examine how the CINC views can and should be translated into useful advice. By useful advice is meant advice that will carry weight in the determination of future military operational requirements, including new military missions and capabilities, advice that will influence the development of weapons that incorporate new and changing technology into the warfighting missions of the armed forces of the Unified and Specified Commands. It was the purpose of this study to examine how better to bring CINC views to bear on the major defense acquisition choices of our time.

The goal of President Eisenhower in 1958 was to eliminate the separate Service approaches to warfare:

Separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever.... strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into united commands...singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of service.\(^1\)

That goal, after 30 years, has still not been achieved. Recently, however, after much outside and inside criticism of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting system, a reorganization of the Joint Staff and a strengthening of the Chairman's role relative to the Service Chiefs have been vehicles to bring the Department of Defense more into line with President Eisenhower's vision. In particular, the problem of balancing Service interests and of representing CINC interests, as written into the Goldwater-Nichols Act.\(^2\) is dealt with by requiring that the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, represent these "national" military views, using the Joint Staff as a staff


that is to be independent of the Services, and act as the Pentagon representative of the CINCs. A major organizational issue is whether that input can be adequately represented by the Vice Chairman or whether other mechanisms will be necessary. A good deal of change has occurred in regard to this issue in the past 18 months. Although some of this change is now reflected, this paper emphasizes the longer lasting fundamental aspects.

The CINC role in the acquisition process cannot be discussed without linking participation in that process to the CINC role in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting (PPB) process. If the two processes are not connected, then any CINC participation could well be disregarded by the Services because each of the Services can say accurately that it does not have enough funds in its program and budget to fund all CINC requests. Because the emphasis of the Commanders-in-Chief will, perforce, be on short-term issues connected with current operations and on near-term acquisition, their views on the longer term acquisition issues will carry little weight.

The CINCs were formally established by the 1958 Amendments to the National Security Act. In the period following that, a number of failed attempts were made to involve CINCs in acquisition issues. The Joint Staff produced documents which attempted to incorporate CINC views, but the CINCs normally relied heavily on the Service components for their inputs. As a result, the CINC inputs were, as a rule, not found useful by the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff documents were, in turn, not influential in affecting Service acquisition programs.

From the late 1970s through 1986, small steps were taken to involve the CINCs in the whole PPB and acquisition processes, including the early weapons requirements processes. These actions, which have ranged from involvement in Defense Resources Board meetings to formal submission of an Integrated Priority List, have slowly increased participation. At the same time small amounts of resource increases: staff, Modern Aids to Planning Program assets, limited study money, and small liaison offices in the Pentagon, have added to the CINC capabilities to play a larger role.

There is a requirement in the Goldwater-Nichols Act that the CJCS reflect CINC priorities within a constrained program and budget, that is, within the constrained resource levels considered in the PPB process. To help implement the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Congress created the position of Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. To carry out the law, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, reorganized the Joint Staff participation in the
requirements, PPB and acquisition processes. One of the roles of that staff is to assure that CINC views are incorporated into these processes.

Based on interviews of former CINCs, and on the public testimony and speeches of current officials, the system is still not sufficiently responsive to CINC views on acquisition. To some this is appropriate, and is viewed as being due to emphasis of the CINCs on short-run warfighting which is the role of the CINC. Too much emphasis on acquisition would take away from his major job of elaborating war plans and the training, readiness, and logistic support of his existing forces.

Nevertheless, important interests--regional and theater, joint, and combined--are neglected if the CINCs are not well represented in the PPB and acquisition processes. Moreover, the Unified CINCs are the only senior officers, other than the CJCS and VCJCS, who do not have their positions tied to particular Services and are in a position to have a joint rather than a single-Service view; thus, their inputs constitute important additions to the deliberations of the Department of Defense. This quite proper emphasis of the CINCs on current capabilities and on the near-term readiness of the forces tends to argue for limited CINC representation in the acquisition of major weapons. The CINCs themselves may not see any pressing reason for trying to influence a decision to be made regarding, for example, a joint communications system or major weapon that might not be available for 10 to 15 years.

But as the record over the years shows, there are other reasons for the tendency of the system to ignore the CINCs. They often are not adequately represented in Washington when critical decisions are made in the Defense Acquisition Board and the Defense Resources Board. The Services' major players in those processes can ignore those CINC inputs which are not consistent with Service preferences. CINC direct participation is limited, though increasing. The CINCs now submit, in each two-year Program Objectives Memorandum cycle, Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs) which express their major (and minor) concerns in the Program Objectives Memorandum process. The Services are able to satisfy only 70 to 80 percent of the requests. The Services do however choose which of the IPL items to honor, though they must show and explain in a Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) Annex how all the IPL items were treated.

The major problems of CINC participation in the PPB and acquisition processes are:
the nature of the CINC staffs and their capability for direct analytic and technical support;

lack of timely information flow at critical decision points;

the (appropriately) limited interest of the CINCs in medium- and long-term acquisition issues; and,

differing incentives between the Services and the CINCs.

The Unified commands are made up of Service component commands and are dependent on them and on "responsible agencies" for the major part of their information and expertise on future weapon possibilities. Their major inputs to the processes are through permanent Service components which are themselves major commands, or through tactical or operational combat organizations that are themselves part of major commands, or major commands which serve as so-called "responsible agencies" that must serve as advocates for the CINCs in the PPB and acquisition processes.

The CINCs lack sufficient analytic, budgeting and particularly technical resources. Where the arguments for a system are technical and to a lesser extent analytic, and where they are presented in a resource-constrained environment, the CINC view can be difficult to sustain. It is frequently arrived at with only limited technical and analytic support, and it is set forth in an environment in which realistic budget levels are not assumed or considered as part of the exercise of providing inputs to the Services.

Improvements worthy of consideration are:

• addition of technical, analytic and costing support;

• formation of a mechanism that brings together the users of the weapons with their Service developers;

• presentation of an alternative (to Service) joint resource-constrained program that has the same standing in the Defense Resources Board as the Service POMs; and

• improvement in CINC liaison with the various staff elements in the Pentagon.

(1) The CINCs might be given additional technical, analytic and costing support that would allow for fuller participation in the PPB and acquisition processes. Here it is up to the CINC to decide whether such a staff would be more valuable than the current staff. Contract support is something that could be added, including the tasking of DoD labs, thus giving the CINC more direct access to technical personnel.
(2) If the CINCs could meet on a regular basis with Service R&D personnel responsible for developing major systems on which the CINC inputs are especially needed, this would allow for more direct matching of critical CINC needs with technological possibilities. One possibility would be annual conferences between the CINCs and the Services which would include full reports on all systems coming up for Milestone I and II in the Defense Acquisitions Board.

(3) A CJCS-approved alternative recommendation to the Service POMs for major CINC-oriented programs that was resource constrained would go a long way toward giving greater weight to joint views in the PPB and acquisition processes. The current Joint Program Analysis Memorandum (JPAM) is considered in OSD as a pulling together of the Service POMs with only small changes. The JPAM does not have the same standing in the Defense Resources Board review that the Service POMs have.

(4) Finally, having a working level liaison for PPB and acquisition issues in the Pentagon would be an aid for two-way communication in alerting the CINC to problems with acquisition programs that he thought important. The liaison individual or staff would be free to visit the materiel commands, the laboratories, and the contractors to obtain information. Limited arrangements of this sort already exist in the Pentagon for all CINCs.

These four changes, or elements of them, would help bring the CINCs more directly into the process of weapons acquisition as independent actors. Implementation of the changes would not and should not involve the CINCs in the details of participation in the requirements aspect of the acquisition process, although it would provide for the CINCs to have a voice regarding those new weapons systems that had been designed to satisfy CINC requirements.

These four suggestions, nevertheless, could have drawbacks. They could absorb undue time of the CINCs that should be devoted to more immediate problems of the operational readiness of the forces and operational planning to carry out assigned missions. They might add confusion to a system that is already dynamic and changing. They might use additional resources for the CINCs at a time when the CINCs, among others, are being told they are overstaffed. If successful, the suggestions would add one more player to the acquisition process, possibly adding to development times and the complexity of acquisition.
However, consideration of the four suggestions does raise the issue of whether or not the Services actually accept the notion of the CINCs as the senior warfighters who can best judge the ultimate use of weapons. In the final analysis, that acceptance should rest on the capabilities of the individual CINCs; but, in any case, the judgments of the CINCs on the weapons that they deem critical to their missions should be sought.

Next, although the specialized and regional concerns of the CINCs must be heard in the PPB and acquisition processes, emphasis by a CINC on his particular problems may give undue weight in the processes to narrow and peculiar problems of that single CINC. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, will largely be responsible for assuring that this does not occur. Given the importance of the CINCs, taking steps to give added weight to their views would seem appropriate, even at the cost of added system complexity and added personnel resources.

Perhaps the most controversial suggestion is the one that would have the CJCS and the CINCs offer their own balanced resource-constrained alternative program that would cover major operational and acquisition matters -- a program that would have equal standing in the POM review with the Service proposals. This resource-constrained program would be a vehicle for the CJCS to balance the Service and CINC requirements within a resource-constrained environment. This could represent a major and revolutionary change that would allow the CJCS to carry out his mandate of:

> Submitting to the Secretary alternative recommendations and budget proposals, within projected [i.e. realistic] resource levels....

The change is revolutionary because the JCS and CINCs have generally avoided such mechanisms that would force them to express priorities in a resource-constrained environment, the most recent example being when the CINCs were invited to prepare their IPLs in a form which might be used to highlight their priorities. The CINC requests were large and varied enough that the Services felt comfortable in their quantitative discussion of CINC support, testifying that their 70 to 80 percent support of CINC goals was all they could afford.

A vehicle for this alternative program could be a restructured Joint Program Analysis Memorandum which could serve as the Chairman's Program Assessment Memorandum. Short of this change, the Services will be asked to do more than they are able to do within "projected resources." They will thus give preference to their own
priorities when differences arise, not having documented views of what the CJCS or CINCs would do with limited budget resources.
I. BACKGROUND

A. THE ACQUISITION PROCESS

The process by which weapons and other major military systems are conceived, designed, built, tested, produced, tested again, and incorporated into the forces is the "acquisition process." The process by which the Defense Department goes from strategy to programs -- of forces, dollars and people -- to annual budgets approved by the Congress, is known as the Planning, Programming, and the Budgeting System (PPBS). These two systems are closely related, the former being oriented around milestones in the life cycle of individual weapons, the latter covering the whole program through successive annual cycles. As will become clear, it is impossible to make milestone acquisition decisions without considering priorities within limited budgets and, therefore, without incorporating acquisition decisions into the PPB process.

The defense acquisition process for major weapons and other military systems can be thought of as consisting of a process that attempts to answer two questions:

What should we buy?

How should we buy it?

If those two questions were separable, the former might be considered a military-technical question and the latter, a management question. The first question -- what should we buy? -- might be further subdivided and elaborated on --

What do we need at some future date in the way of missions and capabilities?

What is or what might be made available to fit those needs?

Again, if we could separate the questions, we could give each one to the appropriate military or civilian organization and avoid much confusion. In fact, those two questions -- and a third question -- What can we afford? -- run through all phases of the acquisition and PPB processes, and cannot be answered in isolation. They cannot even be separated from
the earlier question of how to buy a weapon. Thus the subject of this paper must be expanded to cover the consideration of major acquisition issues in the PPB System. Since acquisition issues are not considered in isolation in the PPBS, the PPBS becomes part of the subject of this paper.

Further, even when it is possible to say that a question could be properly answered by the military user, the "military user" is unclear -- some would say the CINC, other would say the Services. The military users are sometimes thought of as the Services that are buying the weapons, recruiting and training the people who will use and maintain them, and managing the logistics system that will support the operational commands. But in 1958, the CINCs, the Commanders-in-Chief of the unified and specified commands, were established by the 1958 Amendments to the National Security Act in order to formalize the separation of the unified warfighting commands from the single-Service staffs.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the role of CINCs in the acquisition process which, as suggested above, must extend to the PPB processes. There have been initiatives from time to time to increase CINC participation in the requirements, PPB and acquisition processes. Nevertheless, the Services have continued to dominate these processes, even in areas where there is a strong joint interest. They retain a monopoly on requirements determination in the acquisition process, controlling the flow of information to the CINCs that would allow increased CINC participation, and strongly influencing the joint organization that approves military requirements.

B. OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING PROCESS

The role of the CINCs can best be understood in the context of the overall defense structure. The structure is presented first in an idealized way (Figure I-1). The national strategy is determined by the President in consultation with the National Security Council, which includes the Secretaries of Defense and State and receives the military advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Secretary of Defense conveys the guidance to the Chairman who is responsible for developing a military strategy to support that national strategy. Until recently that military strategy was, by design, for the most part developed independently of fiscal considerations. More recently, the CJCS is required to develop a program "within projected resource levels," that is, a fiscally constrained program (see Exhibit I-1, especially, section 153a (4) (c)).
Figure I-1. A Framework for Tying Weapons Acquisition and Deployment to National Strategy
a. Planning; Advice; Policy Formulation. —Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be responsible for the following:

"(1) STRATEGIC DIRECTION. —Assisting the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing for the strategic direction of the armed forces.

"(2) STRATEGIC PLANNING.—(A) Preparing strategic plans, including plans which conform with resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense to be available for the period of time for which the plans are to be effective.

"(B)* Preparing joint logistic and mobility plans to support those strategic plans and recommending the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the armed forces in accordance with those logistic and mobility plans.

"(C)* Performing net assessments to determine the capabilities of the armed forces of the United States and its allies as compared with those of their potential adversaries...

"(3) CONTINGENCY PLANNING; PREPAREDNESS.—(A) Providing for the preparation and review of contingency plans which conform to policy guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense.

"(B)* Preparing joint logistic and mobility plans to support those contingency plans and recommending the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the armed forces in accordance with those logistic and mobility plans.

"(C) Advising the Secretary on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities (including manpower, logistic, and mobility support) identified during the preparation and review of contingency plans and assessing the effect of such deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security objectives and policy and on strategic plans.

"(D)* Establishing and maintaining, after consultation with the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands, a uniform system of evaluating the preparedness of each such command to carry out missions assigned to the command

"(4) ADVICE ON REQUIREMENTS, PROGRAMS, AND BUDGET.—(A) Advising the Secretary, under section 163(b) (2) of this title, on the priorities of the requirements identified by the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands.

"(B)* Advising the Secretary on the extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of the military departments and other components of the Department of Defense for a fiscal year conform with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the priorities established for the requirements of the unified and specified combatant commands.

"(C)* Submitting to the Secretary alternative program recommendations and budget proposals, within projected resource levels and guidance provided by the Secretary, in order to achieve greater conformance with the priorities referred to in clause (B).

"(D)* Recommending to the Secretary, in accordance with section 166 of this title, a budget proposal for activities of each unified and specified combatant command.

"(E) Advising the Secretary on the extent to which the major programs and policies of the armed forces in the area of manpower conform with strategic plans.

"(F)* Assessing military requirements for defense acquisition program.

The development of a long term military strategy includes new missions, capabilities and weapons. These missions and weapons come in a few cases from the CINCs\(^1\), but the major inputs in the past have been received from the Services, OSD, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) within DoD, and from the defense industry and not-for-profit laboratories and think tanks outside DoD.

The CJCS is the overall military coordinator of defense requirements as well as being the senior military adviser to the Secretary of Defense, the President and the National Security Council. The CINCs are the operational commanders who plan for war and conduct operations. The Services, on the other hand, are the providers of manpower and the materiel necessary to fight the war. CINC responsibilities include the integration of service forces and the operation of U.S. forces with allied forces. Since the CINCs are not responsible for providing the forces to be used in combat, they are dependent on the Services or on Allied Commanders for the forces. In the case of the Services, a Component Commander provides the interface, working for the CINC as a component, but at the same time part of his Service command structure. Finally, the technical and industrial community is the provider of weapons and new technology, including information on the cost and capability of proposed new and modified weapons.

A major defense organization issue that has been facing the Congress and the President in recent years is how these critical functions should be divided among the various elements of the Executive Branch. Decisions have been made that widened the responsibilities of the CJCS, created a VCJCS, and made it clear that individual officers who are assigned to the Joint Staff work for the Chairman and Vice Chairman, and not for the Services from which they come. Institutions have been created which are meant to make that system work -- to increase the authority of the Chairman and increase the relative importance of the joint point of view at the expense of the Services, and perhaps also at the expense of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Parallel to the changes in organization, new procedures have been set up and old ones have adapted to the new conditions. In particular the CINCs' Integrated Priority List (IPL) has taken on new importance in the

\(^1\) Throughout the paper, the term CINCs will refer primarily to the Unified CINCs, who are not double-hatted as CINCs of Major Service Commands as are the Specified CINCs. The Specified CINCs, who are also CINCs of Major Commands do participate directly in their Service structure. They do not therefore face the same limitations and difficulties in participating in the process that Unified CINCs have faced.
The IPL is a list in which a CINC has an opportunity to specify his warfighting needs and priorities in writing. The IPLs become part of the formal process and the Services must respond to them in their POMs. Thus, although the Services are in a position to ignore the requests in substance, they are forced to state why they are ignoring them.

What is not yet clear is whether the changes made in the Washington structure and with respect to the CINCs will take full advantage of the CINC advice in the PPB and Acquisition processes, and indeed, whether the advice that the CINCs can offer in the area of acquisition is limited in any case. Some observers believe that the CINCs have only a limited role to play in the development of new military capabilities and new weapons, and that therefore only the modifications already accomplished are necessary to accommodate CINC views. On the other hand, others believe that the CINCs as individuals and in their institutional roles have a great deal more to contribute to the process than they will be able to under the current system, and that further changes will therefore be necessary to accommodate CINC views.

C. NATURE OF THE ISSUE

The issue of the proper role of the CINCs in defining U.S. military requirements centers around two basic views of how we should prepare for war in the period five to twenty years in the future. The more traditional, pragmatic U.S. view, implicit in our defense structure with strong Services and a relatively weak joint military structure, is that we best prepare for war by developing weapons that are preferred by each Service and even by each branch within each Service, that is, the branches which incorporate the new system into the operational tactics, training and logistics support system that supports existing systems. These weapons are then combined in the field by the war planners and warfighters in exercises and in actual warfare -- as they fit at the time -- based on technology, enemy capabilities and the geographic environment. A second view is that such a system as just described is inherently irrational and haphazard, wasteful and dangerous. In this view the best way to define future military requirements is to bring together the best information we have today, based on historical experience of the Services.

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2 See Department of Defense Authorization for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 100th Congress, 1st Session on S.1174, Port I, "U.S. Military Posture" and "Budget Overview," especially pp. 55-143. See also data from that hearing presented in Chapter V of this study, "The Current System: In the Midst of Change."
and branches as well as other observers, and based on the intelligence projections of the intelligence community and on the technology projections of Service, industrial and non-profit technical communities. These are to be combined with the judgment of those who derive future military objectives from broad national security goals.

One study put the contrast in its context as follows:

Some defense observers believe that it is essential to define a national military strategy and that this step would be useful in informing the Congress and public of the rationale for the proposed defense budget by showing how service requests [for acquisition programs] fit into a national matrix of needs.

Still others observe that the vast majority of the acquisition programs are required simply to defray depreciation and that they are relatively independent of strategy. Trucks, ships, airplanes, and small arms will be required for any conceivable U.S. military strategy, and old equipment will need to be replaced by newer equipment that can survive in battle against Soviet equipment. In this view, strategy thus becomes secondary.³

The pragmatic view holds that the CINC role should be confined to planning to employ the weapons, logistics and doctrine that he is provided by the Services. The CINC is expected to cite problems and deficiencies, but it is up to the Services to decide how to deal with these deficiencies, using the resources provided by the President and the Congress. Oversight of the Services, by the Congress, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and perhaps now the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), is based on service performance in keeping promises on performance, schedule, and cost. The CINCs, under this regime, have a limited role involving resource issues in support of current war plans, because preparing war plans is their primary peacetime role; the CINCs are to have only a minimal role in determining long term requirements. Those issues that involve future commitments by area of the world, the incorporation of new technology into the forces, and differing approaches to combined arms are to be handled at the Service level, with cross-service problems handled by negotiation between or among the Services.

The Service or branch orientation emphasizes the role of new weapons as replacements for existing systems, incorporated into existing forces. Innovation is left to the armor branch of the Army, or the carrier forces in the Navy. The whole structure that produces technology is also controlled by the Services -- the government laboratories, the

universities. The contractors have relationships with the Services, not the CINCs or the Joint Staff.

This Service or branch orientation is criticized as representing too narrow a focus, on the grounds that wars are fought not by air forces, land forces or naval forces but by the joint forces of the U.S. Indeed, wars will rarely be fought by U.S. forces alone, but by U.S. and Allied forces in concert. On the other hand, most of the detailed knowledge concerning research and development (R&D) is in the hands of the Services, of their branches, and of the laboratories they control. Budgets are controlled at the Service level, as is most important technology and design capability. It has proven difficult to bring the CINCs into weapons and systems requirements and acquisition in any detail. In particular there is a sharp contrast between broad general guidance used to shape future policy and the detail needed by the Services to develop specific weapons that provide specific capabilities. The well documented problem in the past has been that Service interests often tended to conflict with, or at least did not represent, national military views as expressed by the unified CINCs.

Attempts to guide the Services in their development of weapons have been typically written in too broad a fashion to constrain the Services in any meaningful way. More specific guidance becomes too constraining, not giving sufficient leeway to the Services to exercise their specialized knowledge of warfare and technology. Moreover, requests for additional capabilities by the CINCs normally exceed the resources available to the Services by substantial amounts. This allows the Services to choose which requests to ignore. Since the CINCs emphasize short-term readiness issues, longer term CINC acquisition requests can be set aside. CINC - Service conflicts can be treated as the balancing of short term versus long term capabilities rather than as choices among future weapons and missions -- as they often are. General Herres, the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff has characterized part of his job as "ensuring balance between the long term views of the builders of force structure, the Military Departments and their Service Chiefs with the daily and often immediate operational requirements of the Combatant Commanders, the CINCs"."4

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Some CINC problems have been recognized if not solved: command and control of current operations, resource support for current warplans, and the development of at least some C3 systems. Receiving less attention is the role that CINCs can play in acquisition. The CINCs are, in theory, the customers for the weapons and other systems that the Services, as the resource providers, are expected to develop and procure.

Most of the interservice problems involving the acquisition of new capabilities and even those involving operations in so-called collateral missions, are now handled directly between the Services, rather than involving either Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Staff, or the CINCs, although the CINCs have some opportunity to provide their views and comments as the concepts evolve. There is also the problem of communication between the CINCs as users, and the R&D and industrial community. Efforts have been made in recent years to increase such contact. The interest of the former Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) in the Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) capability has given some visibility to a particular instance of the more general problem of how the CINCs are to make their weight felt in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting (PPB) and Acquisition processes, when it comes to issues that are heavily affected by specialized knowledge of the theater and that have a long time horizon.

Although the situation is changing to some extent, the CINCs are largely dependent on their Service component commands for information on Service programs and future technical possibilities. There is limited "joint" capability in the CINC staffs to review what the Services are proposing in the Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) and Extended Planning Annexes (EPAs) for future programs although every CINC now has a Program and Budget shop on his staff. The expanded role of the Joint Staff may provide some of the capability to represent the CINCs.
II. THE CINCS, THE SERVICES, AND THE CJCS

The Commanders-in-Chief, the CINCs, are, in a formal sense, the operational commanders of the military forces. The CINCs do not in every case have this operational command of forces on a continuous basis. Forces, components of the Services, are assigned and withdrawn by the Services who supply the forces. Moreover, the CINCs, again with minor exceptions do not control resources.

On the other hand, the CINCs are uniquely charged with fighting wars. The unified CINCs in particular, cover all Services; they have responsibilities as combined commanders and they are organized regionally. Beyond that, they are among the few officers with responsibilities to all four Services. Thus they may offer a mature joint perspective on the appropriate military strategy for the nation to follow. They also offer points of view, by reason of their positions and seniority, which are not necessarily well represented in the give and take of formulating Service POMs and budgets.

The remainder of the chapter is concerned with relationship of the CINCs and their components commands, the Services and their major commands, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A. SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES

The Services are the providers of the forces, the resource units in the DoD. The commands within the Services provide forces to the CINCs. The Services are the buyers of weapons and the managers of the weapons acquisition process; they provide the major supplies and spare parts and maintain the weapons; they recruit, train and assign personnel; they make recommendations to OSD and the Congress on pay and personnel retention policies; and they manage the career paths and specialization of their officer corps -- although the CJCS plays a role in the assignment and promotion of Joint Specialty

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1 The discussion in this chapter is based on interviews with former CINCs as well as the extensive record set forth by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees in their hearing and reports over four years. This testimony is also discussed in more detail in Chapter V.
Officers, and he has final approval of selection of senior officers for certain designated key positions.

The Services are quite properly oriented to this resource and strategic warfighting role. It is the unified commanders who combine the forces of the Services and of Allies into tactical fighting forces. Smooth operation of the defense establishment demands that the Services not try to represent their own single Service (or even branch) views of operational war-fighting to the exclusion of joint warfighting. Indeed single-Service views ought to be subservient to, joint views. If the Services do try to represent their own interests they may be serving the wrong interests, -- being too narrow and parochial -- at least at the critical times when Service views clash with CINC views.

Important decisions in the past, such as the creation of light army divisions, or the split of deployment of attack submarines between the Atlantic Command (LANT) and the Pacific Command (PAC) have been made at times without full consultation with the CINCs. Concerns seen as important by CINCs have been overridden with these Services views prevailing in the PPB process. Examples include the adequacy of combat support and combat Service support (both primarily in the reserves) in U.S. forces in Europe; the adequacy of Air Force air defense forces (F-4s) in Iceland; and the adequacy of vulnerable submarine sensors. The point here is that in many cases the Services should be --and are-- proponents for aspects of tactical warfighting (unit employment on the battlefield, strategic bomber delivery profiles, ASW tactics, for example). In the area of strategic warfighting, the broader application of military forces in a joint sense, the Services should ensure their concepts support the national (and joint) concepts.

The major Service interests have tended to be in their major weapon systems: warships, combat aircraft, tanks or combat battalions. Also the Services tend to support those CINCs in which their forces play a major role and to give less emphasis to CINCs that are dominated by other Services. Of course the relationships between CINCs and the Services is different in the case of each Service and each CINC. The forces of the Services are generally under the administrative control of their major commands -- these major commands in turn being the component commanders of the unified CINCs. Operational command is exercised by the unified CINC; operational control by the component. In the case of the specified or single Service CINCs, the CINC is both a CINC and a major Service commander.

2 These were both cited as examples in interviews with former CINCs.
A major area where unified CINCs should have influence is in the development of joint weapons programs. Rather than growing out of joint requirements of the JCS or CINCs, these programs usually grow out of Service programs and are generally meant to satisfy requirements of several Services. There are few exceptions where joint programs are not Service initiated, but these are generally related to C3I programs rather than weapons. It appears that the Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA) program was one force related system that did grow out of a CINC requirement that led to reorientation of a set of Service programs. But it is exceptional for a unified CINC to have such influence on Service programs.\(^3\)

Formal directives on the functions of the Services make it clear that it is the unified and specified commands which have "current and future operational requirements."\(^4\) At the same time, the Services are responsible for:

Determining Service force requirements and making recommendations concerning force requirements to support national security objectives and strategy to meet the operational requirements of the unified and specified commands.\(^5\)

These are presumably future as well as current operational requirements. But the legislated functions of unified and specified commanders do not appear to include the determination of "operational requirements" -- present or future.\(^6\)

B. THE CINCS AND THE SERVICES

A major aspect of the problem of a CINC input to resource allocation is the relationship of the unified CINC to the Services/Military Departments. Part of this problem is the relationship of the CINCs to their Service components, which are themselves major Service commands or operational units of major commands.

There is a natural and probably inevitable tension between the CINCs and the Services. Of the four pillars of defense expenditures--force structure, modernization, readiness, and sustainability--the first two are usually given top priority by the Services, the second two primarily by the CINCs, although the Services have a key role in readiness-

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3 This was the example that was often cited to show CINC influence.
4 See DoD Directive 5100.1, September 25, 1987, p. 10. The chain of command for meeting those requirements is through the SECDEF and the Secretaries of the Military Departments.
5 Op cit, p. 12.
-having their force prepared to fight through training, manning, and maintaining equipment. The Services -- as managers of acquisition -- want the best equipment possible and tend to emphasize the development and procurement of new major weapons that replace existing systems in the Services' current missions. Some CINCs have seen the Services' preoccupation with the future as jeopardizing their current mission readiness capability, and their emphasis on single-Service missions as failing to meet joint requirements. Furthermore, the CINCs tend to stress matters like sustainability which require large quantities while developers of new systems tend to stress new technology and capability of individual weapons at the expense of numbers.

Beyond this basic difference in outlook in the matter of acquisition there are other important differences related to the geographic and specific threat orientation of the CINCs as opposed to the Services' more general view which may not satisfy the CINCs. This tension between CINCs and Services has some value, if controlled, but the numerous studies of defense organization across the years have generally found the result to be detrimental.7

The undimensional approach has tended to be the Service approach. The CINCs view new systems within that "operating environment" and must consider the problems of interoperability, with potential allied forces as well as all four U.S. Services.

The advice of the CINCs will invariably involve "tailoring of technology." The Services, faced with fiscal constraints, prefer the "common purpose" system rather than the more expensive tailored system to meet CINC needs. It is therefore not difficult to understand why the CINC input has often not been welcomed by the Services and this has led to the CINC advice being given less than full consideration, if not being ignored. Under the new system it will not be possible for the Services to ignore the CINC input. Service POMs must have a CINC annex that provides an audit trail in fulfilling CINC IPL items. However this certainly cannot be taken to mean that the CINC-required "tailoring" will be accommodated, only that it will be "addressed." In the debate the Services will have the weight of budgetary concern on their side.

Added to the inequality of influence is the fact that the Services headquarters' staffs have not been attuned to the operational requirements of the CINCs, especially in regard to

7 In the CINC-Service relationship, it should be recognized that the CINC may not be dealing with a single entity, since each Service is composed of several competing parts. The Services themselves have difficulty in integrating the views of their branches.
readiness. A CINC who does not have a Service solidly behind him does not carry much weight. The Senate Staff Report of 1985 on defense organization stressed that the dominant power of the Services was the result of the weakness of joint organizations. For example, while the Chiefs are not formally in the chain of command as individuals, by the nature of the fact that they control the resources, they are, in fact, key participants in operational command matters. The Chiefs have the responsibility for allocating shortages, which always exist—since available resources are always less than the CINCs request. One former CINC, for example, recalled that a Vice Chief of Naval Operations, studied and determined upon a change in deployment of attack submarines between Atlantic Command and Pacific Command without consulting CINCLANT or CINCPAC. Another example offered was that the beddown of incoming United States Air Force (USAF) squadrons for the reinforcement of Europe is determined by the Air Force rather than Commander-in-Chief Europe (CINCEUR).

It is difficult for a CINC to reallocate resources within his command. Given competing demands for resources among CINCs, he cannot "trade off" between Services without going back through the CICS to the Secretary of Defense. Further while a CINC might prefer to acquire more ammunition for naval aviation forces and less for his ground forces because of a change in the tactical situation, he is unlikely to have such an action approved. The CINCs' job is to make do with the Service resources provided to them by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the United Command Plan and to plan to conduct operations with what they have been given.

C. THE CINCS AND THEIR SERVICE COMPONENTS

The CINCs have not in the past had the staff support to be major players in acquisition, except perhaps for the support from various NATO staffs and labs available to CINCEUR in his SACEUR role. Thus, one issue to be raised is the staff support to be provided to the CINCs. Indeed the CINCs are in large part primarily planning staffs in peacetime. The fighting forces of the CINCs operate under component commanders, for example, Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet in the Navy, and Commander-in-Chief Pacific Air Force in the Air Force, and Commander Western Command (Army, PACOM) in the Army. Sub-unified commands may represent an additional command layer.

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Formally, these component commanders provide a special link between their parent Service and the CINC or CINCs for whom they work. Indeed they are part of the Service, typically a major command of that Service. It is because of these conflicting roles that they might find it difficult to represent the CINC interests in precisely the situations in which it would be most critical, i.e., those situations in which there is a conflict between the CINC and the Service Chief. In most cases and for most purposes, including particularly the provision of resources, the component is part of the Service and not the unified command.

The component commanders serve two masters. For some purposes they are within their Service structure, reporting to the Chief of their Service. For other purposes they report to the CINC. In any case, it is only at the CINC level that the forces are integrated into a multi-Service fighting force. Each of the Services has a mechanism by which the component commanders of that Service communicate formally with the Service Chief.10 Since the component commanders are the people who spend the operating funds for their force, they are more concerned with the short term issues, flying and steaming hours, ship overhauls, aircraft reworks, training exercises, etc.

Thus the CINCs have found themselves, not as independent operators who are the customers of the Services, but rather as war planners who must use tools that are provided by the Services at their discretion, with the budget levels provided to the Services by the Congress, the President, and the Secretary of Defense. In this case they must be able to ensure that components are not only reflecting their CINC views in the Service system, but also representing Service views to the CINCs.

The relationship of the CINC to his components has been clouded. Until passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the components were dominated by the Services, and the intent of the bill is to provide the CINCs with a somewhat greater hold over the components. In the process of making a CINC input, the CINC had to depend, in part, upon the components which, in turn, had to depend upon their parent Services. A CINC could at times use the components as a means of reaching the Service chiefs, and thus save his own political capital in a quest for something he wanted. Generally, however, the

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10 Rear Admiral Joseph Metcalf II, USN, in a paper on the Navy PPBS mentioned, as an example, the difference in point of view between a Navy Major Command CINC such as CINCLANTFLT and a Unified CINC such as CINCEUR, when viewing the problem of sailing the fleet off the coast of North Africa. “Service PPBS: Comparison of Navy Programming,” by Rear Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, USN, and Captain Ray Walsh, USN, in Conference on the Defense Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS): Past, Present and Future, 4-6 November 1982, Naval Studies Group Proceedings, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA, March 1983.
component was a creature of the Service and even if a component were to suggest
requirements to its Service, in the words of a former CINC, "The components proposed
and the Services disposed." Much depends upon personal relationships. General Rogers
as SACEUR, for example, worked personally through the Chiefs as well as through his
components. He would go through the Army Chief of Staff and at the same time direct a
request through Commander-in-Chief U.S. Army Europe (CINCUSAREUR), so that the
request would reach the JCS from two directions and, hopefully, acquire a double
blessing.11

The CINC-component relationship becomes even more complex when the
component is a major Service command that acts as component for more than a single
CINC. How, for example, does Forces Command, itself a specified Command, prioritize
its needs when it acts as component for the Atlantic Command and as "responsible agent"
for the Army components for Central Command, and Southern Command? How does
TAC, a USAF Major Command, act as component for Atlantic Command, and a parent to
Air Force Components for Central Command and Southern Command, choose among its
various roles in making recommendation to the Air Force? In these instances, one has to
hope that the Service commanders take a balanced view of their responsibilities.
Unfortunately that has not always happened in the past.

D. THE CJCS RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE CINCS

The Chairman, with the advice of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
utilizing the Joint Staff, is at the heart of the military system translating guidance to the
military structure, giving guidance and coordination to the military, and representing
professional military views to the President and the rest of the Executive Branch and the
Congress. In particular the CJCS is responsible for: translating the demands of the CINCs
into guidance to the Services; balancing resources among the Services to provide an
appropriate program; balancing the allocation of existing forces among the CINCs and their
regions; translating national strategy into guidance to the CINCs to construct realistic
Operation Plans (OPLANs) within the constrained resources available to be used in each
theater and to assure that all weapons and other systems are interoperable among the
Services and with our Allies.

11 For more examples of this situation, see Chapter V.
The Joint Chiefs of Staffs provide entry for the CINC inputs to the acquisition process and can maintain the balance among the CINCs. Formally, one function of the CJCS is said to be to "Assess military requirements for defense acquisition programs."\footnote{DoD Directive 5100.1, September 25, 1987, p.5. A major part of this directive is included as Appendix D of this paper.}

The intent of recent legislation is for the CJCS and the VCJCS to provide the counterbalance to the Service views and interests, and the military judgment to get the Services to develop systems that operate together rather than going separate ways.

In any case the CINCs are responsible for: the allocation to warfare tasks within their theater; for sustaining forces in battle; for readiness, including unit training, morale, operation of joint and combined forces to test fighting doctrine and tactics, including major exercises; C$^3$I including the architecture that enables the disparate forces to talk to each other; and the political-military aspects of foreign policy.

In this area of major weapons acquisition, the CINC responsibilities would include -- rather clearly -- modifications to existing weapons and those about to enter the inventory, including any planning for the entry of new weapons into the inventory. At issue is the extent to which the CINCs should be involved in the introduction of new weapons, or more broadly, new capabilities into the Armed Forces.

What is involved in the recent reorganization is a possible shift of power and authority from the Services to the CJCS and the CINCs, in the critical area involving the introduction of new technology into the forces. At issue is whether the recently completed reorganization will allow the CINCs sufficient latitude and give them sufficient staff support to be able both to present their ideas and to have those ideas matured in sufficient detail. Only then can the CINCs engage the other elements in the Defense establishment and be taken seriously on issues involving new weapons and capabilities.

E. CONCLUSION

In summary, the relationship of the CINCs to the Services and the implications for CINC input to the (PPBS) were described in 1985 by General William Y. Smith, former Deputy Commander-in-Chief Europe (D/CINCEUR):

The ability of the CINCs to influence policy has been greater than their ability to influence specific programs in the final stages of the programming-budgeting cycle. In other words, the CINCs have had more clout in
determining the broad guidance establishing the basic strategy, guidelines for force employment, and the priorities for future action than they have in seeing that the approved guidance is faithfully carried out in Service budgets. One reason for this is that as decision time approaches, the specific elements of a proposed program--under constant discussion between the military departments and OSD--often change rapidly, and the CINCs learn that they have been asked to advise on an alternative no longer under active consideration.

In truth, the military departments--the administrative chain of command--play the dominant role in the allocation of resources outside of a specific operational necessity. That dominance comes from the legislation setting forth the responsibilities of the military departments--to organize, train, equip, administer. That is a large order which contains many broad implications that find expression in a myriad of different ways. Unless the law is changed, a large Service participation in these matters is assured.\textsuperscript{13}

The \textit{Goldwater-Nichols Act}, although it modified the law to support additional participation of the CINCs in the allocation of resources, has not changed the essential nature of the system. The Service priorities are generally represented in the Service proposed POMs and budgets. Although they can be modified by the Secretary of Defense, based on the recommendations of the CJCS and CINCs, as well as his own staff, it is the Services that preserve the central resource allocation role of the Services.

The major limitations on CINC participation in the PPB and Acquisition process are the staff resources available to them and their participation in the process. The first is dependent on the analytic and planning resources given to the CINCs, to allow them to operate independently of their Service components. The second is dependent on the rules of the PPB and acquisition processes, and on the ability of CINCs to get sufficient operational and technical data to make sound contributions.

The remainder of the paper will address past experiences by the CINCs in the acquisition process: (1) by reviewing the problems in the context of the history of earlier attempts to involve the CINCs in the acquisition of new weapons; (2) by describing the current system in the light of recent reforms; and (3) by discussing the aforementioned problems as well as possible ways to alleviate them.

\textsuperscript{13} Art et al., \textit{Reorganizing America's Defense}, p. 308.
III. THE CINCS IN THE JOINT MILITARY SYSTEMS
REQUIREMENT PROCESS, 1958-1986

A. GRADUAL INCREASE IN PARTICIPATION, 1958-1977

The issue of a CINC input to the DoD R&D and acquisition programs goes back at least to the legal establishment in 1958 of the unified and specified Commands as we know them today. It has always been part of the issue of the JCS role in R&D and acquisition and has been the subject of repeated studies and efforts to improve that input.

While the 1958 Reorganization Act assigned to the JCS responsibilities in the area of R&D guidance to OSD, the precise nature of those responsibilities remained unclear. It was not until June 1961 that a major organizational step toward meeting these statutory responsibilities was taken with the establishment of a Requirements and Development Division within J5 to have cognizance over R&D matters within the Joint Staff.

The document creating the new division spelled out JCS responsibilities in research and engineering matters. It emphasized that while the principal source of military requirements had been and would continue to be the military Services and departments, there was a continuing need for close collaboration and coordination among the Services and the unified and specified Commands, primarily through the component commanders, in the orientation of the Service R&D programs. In addition, the commanders of the unified and specified commands were to be encouraged to submit their views directly to the JCS concerning requirements for major weapons systems that might have an impact upon their missions and that did not fall exclusively within the functional area of a particular Service. The CINCs in the meantime had already been assigned certain R&D responsibilities in the Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) of 1959 (Exhibit III-1).

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41002. Procedure

d. When responsibility for a particular weapons system or its component parts does not clearly fall exclusively within the functional area of a particular Service, the commander of a unified command, after consultation with his component commanders, will provide statements of qualitative and quantitative requirements to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will forward their recommendations for fulfilling these requirements to the Secretary of Defense. As appropriate, their recommendation will include assignment of development and equipment operating responsibilities, and their determination of the relative importance of the project for development. The agency, normally one of the Services, assigned development responsibility by the Secretary of Defense and the interested commanders should collaborate to achieve the objective.

41003. Responsibilities of the Commanders of the Unified Commands

a. To provide statements of qualitative requirements for equipment which is needed to control assigned or programmed combat forces of more than one Service, except for that control equipment which is integral to a uni-Service weapon system. The statement should include sufficient background and justification to permit consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection with their role in the integration of weapon systems.

b. To provide information to the Service or agency to which development responsibility is assigned.

c. To conduct joint training as may be required to achieve effective integration of weapons systems.

d. To state qualitative requirements in areas in addition to those referenced above and to state quantitative requirements at the appropriate time and in accordance with established procedures.


Exhibit III-1. CINC Responsibilities for Weapon Systems

These responsibilities, however, proved ambiguous and the CINCs only played a minor role in the R&D function of the JCS. Nevertheless, lip service was played to a CINC role. In 1966, for example, when the JCS directed that a formal R&D document, the "Joint Research and Development Objectives Document" (JRDOD) be added to the Joint Strategic Planning System, J5 informed the Director of Defense Research and Engineering that the new JRDOD would, among other things, consider the needs of the commanders of the unified and specified commands. The annual document would look at scientific and technological possibilities from close in to twenty years ahead. The CINCs would send in their perceived requirements for inclusion in the JRDOD.

The CINCs were charged specifically for many years with the responsibility for the development of their own C³ systems and only in this area did they play a large role, one that was not always successful, for example, when the European and Pacific Commands developed systems that could not communicate directly with each other. In addition, each year the CINCs forwarded to the JCS their recommendations for R&D, but these were
never specifically identified as such either in the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) or in the JRDOD. Each year that the JRDOD was produced, from 1967 to 1977, the cycle began with a Guidelines Paper that specifically asked the CINCs for their comments on the previous JRDOD:

One of the principal contributions of the JRDOD should be the provision of a clear understanding of operational requirements to which R&D effort should be applied, any limitations or alternatives, and rationale to include the impact of adopting or omitting certain courses of action in R&D. Information of this nature which has particular impact on the mission and capabilities of the several unified and specified commands is desired.2

No standard system was created for either the CINC generation or evaluation of operational requirements. Each CINC tended to handle the responsibility in his own fashion. Only Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) acquired an R&D section in the headquarters, so that the CINCs remained largely dependent on their component commands relative to R&D matters. The dependence on component inputs tended to weaken the value of CINC comment in the eyes of Office of the Director Defense Research and Engineering (ODDR&E), since it was apparently not uncommon for a requirement to originate in a Service headquarters and to be sent to a component commander for transmission through the CINC back to the JCS. Service-generated requirements could thus be given added stature through CINC/JCS validation. Duplication of effort could also result when requirements generated in a unified command went back via the components to their Services where the latter might pursue separate projects aimed at the single original objective.

It was obvious that the components depended on the Services in R&D matters, since it was the Services that could tell the component commanders what technology might be able to do and could solicit the component commanders' views as to the possible uses of that technology in the form of weapons or support systems. The Service route was certainly the more familiar one for the components to follow, particularly if they wanted a quick response to their R&D recommendations. The component-CINC-JCS-Service route seemed circuitous and far more lengthy than the direct component-Service route.

In this period the CINC inputs to the JCS R&D guidance role generally were not considered as useful as they might have been. They tended to be very specific and detailed,

mission- or area-oriented, and short range. The nature of the CINC mission, of course, influenced the time factor of their R&D interests.

CINC inputs to the 1973-90 JRDOD, for example, ranged from immediate to very long range needs, but the list does leave the impression that the CINCs were concerned mostly with the long lived low priority problems that never seemed to get solved and that continued while resources were devoted by the Services to more prominent R&D programs. These are the problems the CINCs have to live with, but often these tend to be the most intractable problems. CINCPAC, for example, was concerned about the losses in Vietnam to mines and booby traps and regularly appealed for more R&D on the problem. Mines and booby traps had been a problem since the Civil War but had never been the object of R&D efforts in keeping with the record of these devices as casualty producers. This last example suggests that one major benefit from the tying of the CINCs to the R&D community would be in the applications of existing technology to the improvement of weapons in the field.

The CINC role was examined in the 1970 Report of the President's Blue Ribbon Defense Panel which stated:

The requirement process is highly Service unilateral. To the extent requirements originate with combatant units, they are processed not through operational channels, but through Service unilateral channels. There is no opportunity for the Office of the Secretary of Defense to review total requirements for priority, urgency, or duplication before they are screened and filtered by the Services. Many changes can and do occur between the presumed initiator and any validation review by OSD.

The Panel urged development of greater CINC capability to establish their own well founded requirements:

The mission of the combatant forces should determine their required operational capabilities, which should be the principal factor in initiating development. This can be accomplished only if the combatant commanders possess the capability to analyze their missions, determine their operational capabilities, deficiencies and potential deficiencies, and state their requirements in a meaningful way....

A major problem with the requirements process occurs at its very beginning. The originating command often lacks the capability for operational validation which should be prerequisite to transmittal to higher

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3 Ibid, p. 4.
5 Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, 1 July 1970, p. 68.
headquarters. The application of military judgment to requirements is essential, but not sufficient in itself. Operational validation should be based on a thorough analysis of the assigned mission and the present or programmed means for accomplishing it in the predicted threat environment. The Air Force has for many years maintained operations analysis in such originating organizations. The extent to which they participate in the validation or operational requirements varies considerably. The Navy has some analysis capability, though much less, at such levels. The Army analysis capability at this point in the requirements process can scarcely be said to exist at all. There is no doubt that the overall requirements process could be improved greatly by specifying that operations analysts study requirements at the point of origin. In this way, those requirements reaching higher headquarters should have greater validity.6

The Panel recognized, however, that the development of a meaningful CINC analytical capability would not be without problems. Its utility and desirability could both be questioned. An effort to improve CINCPAC's analytical capability by establishment of a DDR&E field office there in 1966 did not work out.

In this period General Goodpaster recalls that as CINCEUR/SACEUR (1969-1974) his inputs had very little effect on the PPBS. The "system" as it functioned then was essentially ad hoc and depended upon personal relationships. He would work with his component commanders, meeting with them quarterly and visiting each quarter to learn their areas of weakness. He would try to pass this information on to the CJCS, the Secretary of Defense, or the Deputy Secretary of Defense, but found that usually unsolicited advice from a CINC was not welcome in OSD.

B. MODEST REFORM, 1977-1984

The period since 1977 has seen a preoccupation with organizational matters, particularly a concern for efficiency in the midst of budget stringency and a separate concern for the proper role of the military in defense planning. Part of this concern has focused on the role of the CINCs in defense resource decisions as a counterbalance to the Services.

With the Carter Administration coming into office in 1977, Secretary of Defense Brown requested that all CINCs write him quarterly letters concerning their requirements, shortfalls, and views. The Secretary would forward sections of these letters to relevant offices in OSD. Some CINCs would include requests they had already sent to the JCS, so that the Secretary might also bring pressure concerning the issue, perhaps strengthening the

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CINC position against Service resistance. While this was seen as an opening to the PPBS for the CINCs, there was not much action apparent in response to the letters. At the same time, Secretary Brown, in a directive of 13 April 1977, ordered that the JRDOD be discontinued. The long time span covered by the JRDOD had robbed it of any credibility and it had been generally ignored.

The Steadman and Rice Reports of 1978 did not discuss the issue of a CINC input to the PPBS, and Robert Komer, as First Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in 1980, does not recall the CINCs being queried by the Defense Resources Board (DRB).

In March 1981 a memo from the Deputy Secretary, now Secretary, Frank Carlucci, directed that the CINCs would be involved in the PPBS cycle in their areas of interest during management decisions. A follow up memorandum afforded the CINCs the opportunity to input early in the process to develop the Defense Guidance. This was the first occasion on which the CINCs had been invited formally to the Defense Resources Board (DRB). However, fifteen minutes per CINC was hardly adequate for a meaningful presentation of CINC requirements.

During this period the views of the CINCs were heeded more in the planning phase than in the programming phase. As the programming phases approached the budget year, the CINCs' voices tended to be drowned out in a host of competing views from the key players in Washington. Last minute program changes, the subject of continuous negotiations between OSD and the military departments, left little room for an interested but remote player who did not have his hands on the purse strings.

It was in this period that the idea of giving the CINCs certain small discretionary funds to process specialized requirements was initiated. In 1978 the Defense Science Board, in a report on command and control, suggested that the using commands should be

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7 April 13, 1977 Directive etc.
10 The Planning Phase of the DoD PPB System, Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense, June 12, 1981.
more deeply involved in the development of their own C² systems.¹² A follow-up OSD/Joint Staff Steering Committee report recommended that a fixed amount of discretionary funds should be provided to each CINC to adapt, modernize, and maintain his C² systems to fit the needs of his command. It was felt that the funds would reduce the need for reprogramming requests to the Services and would be more responsive to CINC C² problem areas. OSD implemented the recommendation by providing FY 81 funds to initiate the program.

Using these funds, the CINCs were able to satisfy relatively low cost one-time requirements. The program, however, received mixed reviews. While the OJCS called the fund a success, the Services were concerned with both loss of control over acquisitions and the potential growth in ancillary manpower and operating costs. The CINCs felt the program was underfunded and overmanaged.¹³

That the program was carefully hedged is illustrated by the CINCPAC Instruction, reflecting JCS guidance which established the requisite policies and procedures for that command. The emphasis was to be placed on low cost, near-term fixes to existing systems that promoted interoperability between the Services/Allies and that would result in evolutionary upgrade to the system or greater adaptability to PACOM needs. Funds were not to be used to purchase equipment or Services for a specific project year after year. Projects were to be capable of completion within a year from funds obligation. The funds could be used to support an engineering solution to specific problems (studies and analysis), procure equipment/hardware, upgrade software for existing systems, and for test and evaluation of procedures or equipment. Furthermore, the funds could not be used for projects that had been specifically denied in the normal PPBS process.¹⁴

The CINC Initiative Funds program continues, along with the CINCs' External Study Program which is administered by the OJCS. This latter Program is currently funded at about the two million dollar level, half of what it was originally. With ten CINCs to participate, the external Study Program can make only a small contribution to supporting CINC participation in the PPB and acquisition process.

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¹⁴ CINCPAC, Instruction 2880.1, PACOM Command and Control Initiatives Program, 1 September 1981.
The CJCS's Special Study Group in 1982 noted the still limited influence of the CINCs in the resource allocation process:

Today the CINCs are at best only superficially involved in many things critical to their commands. They play almost no role in the programming and budgeting process (though they recently were invited by the Secretary of Defense to participate occasionally in meetings of the Defense Resources Board) and have little influence in the JCS force allocation process. In addition, they are not strongly supported by either the Services or the Joint Staff.¹⁵

In this period Admiral Long, as CINCPAC, had his input prepared by his J5. The process started with presentations by his components, and Long found it revealing that his component commanders knew so little about their own Service budgets. However, by the time Long left in 1983, there had been a major improvement in this area. The lesson was that if the ability of the CINC to obtain information was to be improved, the same should be done for the components. One former CINC stated that there was no mechanism before this period to accommodate the lack of a regular flow of information to the CINCs, so that consequently each budget became "a shootout" in the CINCs' efforts to get their requirements recognized. Of course, differences among the CINCs and the inevitable competition among them were often used as a reason for canceling out CINCs' inputs.

C. THE BEGINNING OF SIGNIFICANT CINC PARTICIPATION, 1984-1986

Beginning in January 1982, JCS reform once again became an important issue of public debate and concern. The issue of a CINC input to the PPBS became part of that discussion over the next two years, leading -- in 1984 -- to increased emphasis on the CINC role. In response to recommendations from the members of the DRB and from the CINCs, a memorandum from the Deputy Secretary in November 1984 gave the CINC requirements greater visibility in the POMs and more participation in the DRB. The CINCs would continue to submit requirements to the Military Departments through their component commanders, and would, in addition, prepare a list of their higher priority needs, with priorities being set across Service and functional lines, and with consideration of reasonable fiscal constraints. Copies of the list known as the Integrated Priorities Lists

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¹⁵ The Organisation and Functions of the JCS, Report for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the Chairman's Special Study Group, April 1982, p. 32.
(IPLs) were to be transmitted to the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary, and the CJCS each December.

The CINCs were authorized direct contact with the Military Departments on issues of concern to them during POM development. Also, in order to assess the degree of responsiveness to CINC requirements in the POMs, the Deputy Secretary called for sufficient visibility of the manner in which those requirements were addressed. In the past, he noted, when confronted by DRB issues of unfunded CINC priorities, it had been difficult to measure the shortfall against other priorities which were accommodated in the POMs. Consequently, he called for a separate annex for each POM which clearly identified the CINCs' requirements as submitted through their component commanders, whether they were met in the POM, with supporting rationale where such needs were not met. Follow up actions were intended to strengthen further the CINC role.\(^\text{16}\)

The thrust of the Deputy Secretary of Defense's directive was to provide the CINCs a substantially stronger voice in the PPBS process, and at the same time, to put a substantially greater burden on the CINC to document adequately his needs and to cast these requirements into a form that could be integrated into the PPBS process.

Since that time each of the Services has incorporated innovations to support the CINCs. These Service actions have included more opportunities for direct inputs, briefings, conferences, issue papers and other methods of improved communications, most of which are carried out through components or through the major command which provide the operational units to the CINCs.

Within the OJCS, the Strategic Planning and Resources Analysis Agency (SPRAA) was created in 1984 with the specific duties of (1) analyzing the war-fighting requirements and resources of the CINCs; (2) assessing the inputs to the PPBS. It was hoped that SPRAA would be able to integrate the CINC inputs for presentation to the Services and also thereby provide the crucially needed establishment of priorities. SPRAA was eventually merged into the new J8 of the Joint Staff in response to the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

The DoD Authorization Act of 1985 provided that the CJCS would act "as the spokesman for the commanders of the combatant commands on operational requirements." This, it was hoped, would add weight to the CINC inputs through the permanent involvement of the CJCS at the highest levels of the PPB process. In the spring of 1985 a questionnaire was sent to the CINCs by OSD on behalf of the Congress, seeking their views on their role and their projected roles. OSD assembled the replies and forwarded them to Congress where they became inputs for the investigations and discussions that led to the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

One of the major purposes of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was to strengthen the CINCs "to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands and ensure that the authority of those commanders is fully commensurate with that responsibility." The act stated that the CJCS would advise the Secretary on the extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of the military departments and other components of the Department of Defense for a fiscal year conform with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the priorities established for the requirements of the unified and specified combatant commands. The act further states that the CJCS serves as the spokesman for the commanders of the combatant commands, especially on the operational requirements of their commands. In performing this function the CJCS is required to (1) confer with and obtain information from the commanders of the combatant commands with respect to the requirements of their commands, (2) evaluate and integrate such information, (3) advise and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense with respect to the requirements of the combatant commands, individually and collectively, (4) communicate, as appropriate, the requirements of the combatant commands to other elements of the Department of Defense.

A number of points remain unclear about the impact of the Act, in good part because it is too early to tell. It is not clear how much in the acquisition and PPBS

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processes will actually change, and whether there will be any real difference in the impact that the CINC input has on these processes. Structures have been created at the CINCs' Headquarters to implement the process. Special Operations Command has its programming and budgeting function in J-8; Central Command has its Programming and Budgeting office reporting directly to the Chief of Staff, while the other CINCS have that function in J-5. The Goldwater-Nichols Act leaves some unanswered problems with respect to the CINCs, their relationships to the Services and their participation in the PPB and Acquisition processes, particularly the latter process. The ability to answer these questions is, however, contained in the authority given to the CJCS. As noted, some positive steps already have been taken. To achieve a proper balance between Service and CINC priorities, however, further strengthening of the CINCs' role is mandatory.
IV. THE CINC INPUT TO THE ACQUISITION PROCESS

A. THE NATURE OF CINC INPUT

One of the major uncertainties in the issue of the CINCs' inputs to the acquisition process concerns the appropriate nature of those inputs. There is considerable controversy over the appropriate CINC inputs to the PPB and acquisition process. CINC inputs tend to concentrate on the short run operations of their forces. Nevertheless, there is considerable support for having the CINC views on broader long-term issues appropriately introduced into the PPB and acquisition processes, tending to emphasize not only joint but also regional and specialized issues.

An examination was undertaken in this report of the Congressional testimony of the CINCs on the substantive issues of concern to them. The purpose of this investigation was to determine if there were any patterns revealing CINC emphases on short-, medium-, or long-term issues. It was found, in general, that the CINCs emphasized short-term rather than the medium- to long-term issues. Nevertheless, there were a limited number of important medium- and long-term acquisition issues that were of enough interest and importance to the CINCs that they were willing to discuss them with the Congress.

The more detailed discussion from which this chapter is drawn, is contained in Appendix B.

The detail of this input is presented as Appendix B, "CINC Congressional Testimony on Issues." The characterization of CINC concerns voiced in their Congressional testimony was accomplished by grouping the issues they raised into seven categories. These categories encompassed the full spectrum of issues on the time-line (i.e., short- versus long-term) of CINC concerns. The groupings were as follows:

a) Current logistics and operational shortfalls for readiness and sustainability;
b) Joint service and Alliance interoperability;
c) Major capability shortfalls;
d) Long term net assessments;
e) Modifications and tradeoffs involving weapons now in the field or about to be deployed;
f) Design and deployment of weapons now on the drawing board, with IOCs on the order of three to nine years in the future; and

g) Major new weapons developments with IOC ten or more years in the future.

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It should be recognized that not all CINCs will be able to provide equally useful inputs on acquisition issues.\textsuperscript{3} Each CINC's input will reflect his own military problems and perspectives, and the inputs tend to differ not only in specific priorities, but in amount of detail. Of all the unified and specified commands CINCEUR and Commander-in-Chief Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC) have the clearest missions, and in that they are unique. They follow a bounded pre-defined strategy; they know the primary war they must fight, although CINCEUR has a wide range of contingency responsibilities. The other CINCs, particularly the regional CINCs, face a whole spectrum of possible operations under widely varying circumstances. They need forces and capabilities of very diverse nature, and their input to the PPBS must necessarily be less specific than Strategic Air Command (SAC) or European Command (EUR).

CINC advice should ideally fall into two time periods, depending on the nature of that advice. For general requirements guidance to the budgetary process, the CINCs should be associated with near term issues such as training and operational tempo, the issues and developments that will take place in the next two years. The second time period would be further out. The CINC should be free to comment on further out developments but these comments would not be expected to carry equivalent weight in the resource allocation arena.

Indeed, there is much ambiguity about the presumed relationship between long range strategic planning and acquisition. The CINCs are supposed to concentrate primarily on the present or the immediate future. They are also presumed to think in terms of the longer range threats, responses, and needs. It is quite unclear how much attention actually is paid by the CINC staffs to the latter.

The Defense Science Board in its 1985 report stated:

The CINCs represent the most knowledgeable user community. OSD and the Services must strive to bring the CINCs' inputs into their decisions on long range development needs and into the operational capability/cost/risk trades being performed during the development process. The CINCs in turn must be required to engage in longer range force development planning to make their inputs to the resources allocation and systems acquisition processes more useful. They must remain in the loop as cost/capability trades are made during development.

This DSB view, inserted by a subpanel that was meant to represent CINC views, is exactly the point that is most controversial. Though personally knowledgeable, there is considerable controversy about the CINC, and whether he should have the staff to be the "knowledgeable user" of future weapons, or whether the knowledgeable user is the Service that must incorporate the weapon into existing forces.

A former CINCSAC, General Russell Dougherty, suggested an even longer view in testimony to Congress in 1986. Referring to the CINCs, General Dougherty said:

They need to know what is underway with regard to the planning, research, development programming, and the 5 year PPBS is not enough. They need to look beyond five years, and be required to do 10 year planning. They have got a four year tour. It is always easy now to say that it is not going to happen on my watch or, it happened before my watch. But if the CINCs keep a rolling 10 year plan, they are required to think carefully beyond themselves and beyond their tenure.

One former CINC suggested that the quality of this advice depended on how well the CINC was able to fulfill his resource concerns. This involved assuring that: (1) reasonable war plans were prepared; (2) the forces and resources to execute those plans are available; (3) those resources are properly positioned; (4) the forces were in a proper state of readiness for unilateral or bilateral operations; (5) his C3 system is adequate to support potential operations. This requires that his components be interoperable. The CINC should also be trying to ensure that wartime requirements keep in phase with what technology is providing in the field of C3.

Another aspect of this type of advice concerns the policy implications of resource allocation decisions. Especially in EUCOM and PACOM it is important to alert the CINC to such decisions, not only to get his views and guidance on implications and reactions among the allies but to allow him time to explain those decisions to the allies. The "teeth-to-tail" issue in Europe in the early 1970s was just such a case where the CINC must be involved early and where his judgment should be given great weight in the decisions.

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4 The panel included Admiral Isaac Kidd, formerly CINCLANT and General Russell Dougherty, formerly CINCSAC.

sort of alerting is probably best achieved by a close relationship between a CINC and the CJCS/VCJCS.

The other aspect of CINC advice, that pertaining to R&D, is more controversial. One point of view is that the CINCs, because of their short-run warfighting responsibilities, have little to contribute early in the development of major systems. The other point of view is that while the CINCs should have a strong voice in presenting ideas on new systems, it should come early in the concept phase. The CINCs should have limited input and authority in the development phase, otherwise they may interfere with the acquisition process itself. If you place the CINC input too close to acquisition and not in the long range R&D needs category, that input will consist solely of short run procurement needs, such as those contained, for the most part, in the Integrated Priority Lists. The CINCs would not then offer an independent view of long run requirements for R&D and for new systems.

In 1984 Admiral Crowe, then CINCPAC, in calling for more feedback to the CINCs, told the Defense Science Board:

I do not want the capability to design or build systems, but I do need sufficient involvement in the development process to be able to point out any major design changes of omission or commission which would affect my capabilities and/or strategy. A mechanism to permit CINC interface with the developers is necessary to ensure that trade-offs do not result in end items which do not satisfy CINC requirements. ...

The key words in the feedback process are visibility and communication. I need to know what weapons system requirements the Services generate and be allowed to provide my views on how these affect my ability to perform joint missions. There exists the possibility that a Service will submit a requirement, without CINC consultation, which does not contribute to the completion of assigned missions. Also, once requirements are identified and submitted by the Services, there are changes to the original submission which are not identified to the CINCs. This can result in a similar disparity between mission and requirement.6

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in their 1987 report on the acquisition process, recommended early involvement by those with the operational perspective.

A second potential difficulty in the DoD acquisition process concerns integrating expert technical and operational advice at the earliest stages of weapons development. Technical and operational input seldom, if ever, gets a fully objective hearing during the critical early phases of the requirements-setting process.

In general, the advocates for innovative high technology have often overwhelmed those who recognize the subsequent difficulties in field operation and maintenance of highly sophisticated equipment. In many cases, 'gold plating' of requirements or pushing technology beyond achievable technical limits regularly occurs. This can prove very costly not only in development and procurement, but also in the ever-lengthening and increasingly expensive logistic consequences, which have generally been ignored by the acquisition community. Possibly the greatest single impact of the revised DoD organization will be how well or badly the conflicting demands for technological and operational prowess are balanced.  

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The unstated implication is that the long-term operational guidance would come from the CINCs. However, a criticism of the CINCs across the years has been that CINC staffs do not provide that sort of long-term operational guidance, either because of the quality or expertise of the staffs or because long-term planning has tended to have a back burner priority.

It is generally believed that in the R&D field the CINCs should not offer guidance on specific systems but rather on needed capabilities (target acquisition, air logistic support, intelligence fusion). The CINCs do not have in their staffs the technical expertise to deal with specific characteristics of newly proposed systems nor are the CINCs themselves usually trained in that direction. While the CJCS, for example, may ask their advice on such specifics, it has usually had very little impact. Furthermore, the problem of monitoring Service R&D developments by the CINCs is complicated by the growing number of "black" programs. Most of the items on a CINC list will be of long standing, with perceived capabilities/requirements shortfalls appearing year after year. Yet the maintenance of emphasis through repetition does provide a red flag for DoD.

One former CINC stressed the importance of a requirements framework for each CINC. The CINCs should avoid getting drawn into detail but should deal in large requirement areas to build a structure. They can thereby better provide an operational point of view to inform the Washington planning process. The CINCs should establish their own priorities for requirements, and let their integrated priority lists indicate that what is

presented is not an absolute priority list but rather a series of overlapping priorities. There is, in short, an internal CINC integration necessary. It was also generally felt that concentration on a short list of key items would be more productive than a lengthy all-inclusive one. On the other hand the latter would offer a better overall picture of the command's status.

A broad generalization can be made that in the past the CINC inputs to the resource allocation process have tended to be amorphous. There are exceptions, the Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA) concept propounded by General Rogers as CINCEUR being a notable example. From the strategic concept flowed a whole series of R&D initiatives. However, it must be recognized that this was a special case. General Rogers' command was the focus of the scenario that drives the whole U.S. military budget. Furthermore, he was CINCEUR/SACEUR for eight years, a length of time that permitted him to pursue the requirement in a way that the average CINC could not in a two- to four-year tour. As SACEUR General Rogers had to deal with a second constituency and had to back new weapons that he believed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would support and could afford. While interoperability as applied in NATO is probably honored more in the breach, persistent reference to it by CINCEUR/SACEUR kept the problem in the forefront.

B. CINC RESOURCES FOR ACQUISITION PLANNING

Some of the authority of the resource manager has been passed to the CINCs as a result of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols bill that calls for more direct and intensive involvement by the CINCs in the PPB process. However, the implications of this in terms of CINC staff capability have yet to become clear. While the CINCs may have the capability to provide an enhanced input in regard to readiness and sustainability, there is some doubt that they will be able to offer much more in regard to acquisition. One former CINCLANT who served within the last four years states that he had only two officers and a secretary to handle his acquisition input to the PPBS. The European Command is probably an exception, given its very special circumstances. The other CINCs will have to alter their staff structures to accommodate the new responsibilities, either by an increase in staff or by cutting some other activity or by absorbing some personnel from the component staffs.

While it is generally agreed that the CINCs should play a significant role in the acquisition/PPB process, it is also generally accepted that their current staffs have neither the size nor quality to carry out the enhanced responsibility. One former CINC suggests
that what is needed on the CINC staff would include: (1) an analytical group to determine what is needed for operations; and (2) a PPBS group who know how to "work" the PPB system. Staff increases need not be large; quality will count far more than numbers. Impartial observers have criticized the scale and quality of much of the CINCs' staffs, with many personnel involved in pursuits of secondary importance. Again it must be emphasized that CINC staffs vary widely in quality as well as in size. European Command has more experienced and more senior officers than Southern Command. Central Command has a relatively large number of senior staff officers.

Central Command has recently added a Science and Technology Advisor to its staff. Pacific Command has a similar official while SAC has a Science and Research Section in the HQ. Furthermore, since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, all the CINCs have a staff division to handle PPBS matters and "to work the system."

Simple numerical comparisons alone do not fully explain the differences in staffs. One former CINC stressed the difference in the "ambience" of headquarters staffs that deal regularly with large assigned forces in their area of responsibility and with major issues in an environment of greater immediacy, and those commands that deal in areas of less daily concern. CINCEUR and CINCPAC in contrast with Commander-in-Chief Central Command (CINCCENT) or CINCSOUTH are examples. Nevertheless, the "ambience" alone is no guarantee that the staff will be able to produce the best CINC guidance to the PPBS.

In 1986 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Admiral Crowe was asked whether the CINCs currently express their priorities in net assessment terms. His written reply was:

The CINCs do not have the resources to accomplish net assessments in the fullest sense of the term. However, a JCS initiative to provide added planning capability to the CINCs is underway. The CINCs currently develop their requirements primarily through subjective, qualitative analyses of the warfighting capability of their forces. These analyses aid in formulating degrees of military risk from which priorities are developed. These priorities are then input to the CJCS for consideration in the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System.⁸


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Admiral Crowe supported the idea that the CINCs should have both the capacity to task net assessment capability and the capability to do their own net assessment.

The source of CINC requirements should logically be the development and analysis of plans, exercises, wargames and simulations. The former are written to fulfill an assigned mission and present the resources necessary to accomplish that mission. The exercises test the feasibility of plans to some extent and show shortfalls. Consequently the CINCs should have a greater role in the design and control of exercises and training in their theaters. A former D/CINCEUR has said that "for a variety of reasons the CINC historically has not achieved what he believes to be a satisfactory level of joint training. He has had to rely heavily on Service training for the readiness of his units but he has little or no influence or control over that training."

A suggestion from one former CINC was that the CINCs should have sophisticated war gaming facilities to test their plans and to carry out training between actual exercises. The same CINC said that he found it hard to get radical innovative thinking from his staff (and from the Washington staffs) and would have liked the support of some outside group to help interpret the relationships between exercises and plans. This could give the regional CINC the capability to have his own regional problems thought through since former CINCs uniformly feel that they cannot rely upon such thinking coming from Washington. They must be able to take the "school solution" offered by the Services and the combat/operational implications of it and put it into a regional context.

In regard to the above expressed needs, there are currently two programs that support CINC requirements for analytic support and assessment capabilities: (1) the CINCs External Study Program, funded and administered by the OJCS, provides a vehicle for conducting assessments and studies specifically requested by the CINCs; (2) the Modern Aids to Planning Program is an initiative of the former CJCS, General Vessey, to provide hardware and software directly to the CINCs to support their planning activities.

An example of this sort of support occurred in September 1984 when CINCPAC tasked Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to review the planning process at CINCPAC, in order to determine how best to use the Modern Aids to Planning resources to: evaluate CINCPAC war plans; and (2) to develop analytically supported warfighting requirements.

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for input into the PPBS. The procedure then in use at CINCPAC HQ did not directly tie the PPBS requirements to the war plans, and the impact of the issues on the war plans was not quantified. The system proposed by IDA would formally link the war plan evaluation with the development of PPBS issues.

It has also been suggested that CINCs be given a small R&D budget to permit preliminary investigation (primarily in Service labs) of the feasibility of some of their identified requirements. (The dangers in this course are obvious--new layers of bureaucracy and weakened unified standards.) Indeed, one of the assigned missions of the U.S. Special Operations Command is "the developing and acquiring of unique special operations forces equipment, materiel, supplies and services."10 Commander-in-Chief Special Operations Command (CINCSOC) is the only CINC so charged, who can lay claim to an R&D budget as part of his mission.

Former CINCSAC, General Russell Dougherty, made a strong plea for CINC funds in 1986:

The CINCS need some money. They do not need to acquire big weapon systems, and I think the Services should not be scared off nor even made nervous, but the CINCS do need some money to conduct some training that is oriented toward their responsibility.

They need some money to tune and evolve their command and control process to make them fit their personalities. They need some money to be able to find out what is going on and to have knowledge and staff that tells them what is upstream in the development and research area.11

In addition to a strengthening of the CINC staff element that handles acquisition matters, it has been recommended that each CINC be given a Pentagon liaison office. Having a local point of contact would vastly improve the flow of information to the CINCs. They would no longer have to rely upon others to transmit what was thought to be significant information. The liaison officers could establish regular data gathering networks for information pertaining to acquisition and R&D matters of interest to the CINC.

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In the 1987 DoD Appropriations Hearings, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Kelly, strongly supported the idea of a Washington liaison group, recalling his very successful experience with such an office for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force:

And I am not talking about a poor colonel liaison officer who is trying to do a thousand things at once. I am talking about a functional group that can represent a commander-in-chief's requirements in a coherent way. And we have now given the commanders-in-chief a lot more authority, particularly in the programming and budgeting process. So in my professional view, I would like to see every CINC have a Washington element called a Washington liaison element or whatever.

General Kelly clearly believed that a liaison office directly responsible to the CINC would offer a useful tool in exercising his influence.

C. STRATEGIC PLANNING AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION

The 1985 Senate Staff report on defense organization states:

The PPBS is DoD's formal process for arriving at resource allocation decisions. Its purpose is the translation of military strategy and planning into specific defense programs and the development of defense programs into a budget request. DoD Directive 7045.14 states, "The ultimate objective of the PPBS shall be to provide the operational commanders-in-chief the best mix of forces, equipment and support attainable within fiscal constraints." 12

Yet one of the continuing problem areas in regard to the CINC role in the PPB concerns the relationship of strategic planning to resource allocation.

General Edward Meyer, former Chief of Staff of the Army, in 1985 stated some of the reasons why CINC planning has been inadequate:

1. The guidance from the JCS to the CINC has, in most cases, been imprecise. Until very recently, the JCS has not focused on contingency planning, nor has there been a clear, overall, strategic perspective into which the individual commanders' plans could be fitted.

2. For nearly twenty years, the planning element of the military was permitted to atrophy because of the emphasis placed on programming and budgeting. This state of affairs became frighteningly visible as the fledgling rapid deployment force took its first tentative steps.

12 Defense Organization: The Need For Change, Staff Report to Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Committee Report, Senate Report 99-86, 49th Congress, 1st Session, October 16, 1985, p.3.
3. There are many disparate, uncoordinated, planning elements throughout the Department of Defense. The Under Secretary for Policy, each of the Services, and the Joint Staff all have planning staffs. Much of the work they do is duplicative. Much is not only not orchestrated, but is even cacophonous.

4. There has been little linkage in the past between contingency plans developed by the CINCs, on the one hand, and force development plans developed by the Services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, on the other. The low caliber of the plans has been one reason why they have not been used to assist in force development. This lack of linkage has created a situation in which the views of the field commander have only a modest impact on the force development plans of the Services. The question of who the Services are developing the forces for must be addressed.¹³

DoD strategic planning and policy direction theoretically encompasses development of a strategy to achieve the military goals—short-, mid- and long-range—of national security policy. The basis of the strategy is an assessment of risk coupled with likely resources available in the period two to seven years ahead. The potential contribution of allied forces is included in the assessment. With determination of the strategy, the capability of the current resources to accomplish the military goals can be assessed.

The Defense Guidance is the current output document of the planning process. It has been criticized on the grounds that its broadly stated objectives generally preclude translation into specific military objectives and the conversion of resources into capabilities that are measurably linked to the guidance. Accordingly it has been less useful as a basis for acquisition planning than originally hoped.

Theoretically the planning process from the President's National Security Strategy to National Military Strategy to the more detailed Secretary of Defense's Defence Guidance should flow logically into the development of acquisition programs. However, opinions vary as to whether an even lower level of planning should play a key role in resource allocation. General Rogers stated in 1986 that there is a disconnect between CINC contingency plans and Service force development plans, while General Galvin, then U.S. CINCSO, stated the same year that "we could still do more to ensure that strategy is the driving force that translates policy into resources in DoD. The recent changes to address the imbalance between the CINC's operational responsibilities and his influence over the

resource allocation process, while moving in the right direction, have not completely solved this problem."14

Under the new organization the Vice Chairman JCS is charged with overseeing the operational plans of the CINCs, assisting in the development of joint doctrine, and reviewing war plans with an eye to matching national military strategy with available resources.

The 1985 Senate Report on Defense Organization concluded that strategic planning was inhibited by the absence of an organizational focus on major missions and strategic goals. A sharp focus on missions was lost in functional diffusion, with the focus of organizational activity on functional efficiency and not on major missions, their objectives and strategy. The report stressed that the failure to give due emphasis to strategic planning was a major weakness of the PPBS, since there was "insufficient assured connection between national military strategy and the formulation of military requirements.15

The responsibility for strategic planning is diffused through the Joint Staff, Services, OSD and the CINCs. While Admiral Crowe stated in 1985 that the CINC has the ultimate responsibility for strategic formulation in the theater and has the responsibility as well to dovetail a Service's actions with his overall strategy, it is clear that this responsibility is not executed to its fullest. The Vice Chairman JCS stated in January 1988 that J5 is responsible for transmitting national military strategy and the strategic objectives for combatant commanders.16 Furthermore, the JCS give fairly explicit instructions to the CINCs in regard to tasks. Similarly the Services create doctrine for their Services in their staffs and schools. This doctrine has a very substantial impact on strategy. Consequently the concept that the CINC creates his theater strategy and the Services comment on it is only partially true at best.

A basic issue in the whole resource allocation process arises from the concentration of the Services and the JCS on the major global war against the Soviet Union. The philosophy commonly expressed is that if we can handle the most dangerous threat to the

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15 Defense Organization: The Need for Change, Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Committee Print 99-86, October 16, 1985, U.S. GPO, Washington, DC, 1985, p.3.

16 Inside the Pentagon, February 19, 1988, p. 7.
United States, we can handle anything less. Thus planning for specific contingencies has been given a lower priority. Understandably, the Services base most of their resource needs on war with the Soviet Union, since it is that which can justify both force structure and modernization. On the other hand some CINCs live with a series of small (though potentially large) contingencies, which often require specialized equipment and forces to be deployed quickly. It is these types of operations in which the U.S. has participated repeatedly over the last four decades.

A former D/CINCEUR has stressed that one of the major contributions of a CINC to the DRB is to try to move the concentration of the JCS on the major war in the direction of greater attention to the resource implications of the regularly occurring contingencies. That officer pointed out that in three years in the post he experienced 42 contingency situations involving some sort of action by EUCOM.

Illustrative of the "big war outlook," this former D/CINCEUR was unable to get support for a new command center because Washington kept insisting that it be hardened, although none of the contingencies for which the command center was needed involved the danger of attack. He also emphasized the fact that for Europe, especially, political factors immeasurably complicate contingency operations. The CINC must take account of these in his planning and attempt to compensate for them with available additional resources in order to fulfill the contingency mission.

A force for further rationalization of the strategi: planning process may be the requirement of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that the President transmit to the Congress each year a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the U.S. Additionally, the Act requires that in the Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress the Secretary shall include: (1) a description of the major military missions and of the major force structure of the United States for the next fiscal year; (2) an explanation of the relationship of those military missions to that force structure, and (3) the justification for those military missions and that force structure.

D. NEGATIVE VIEWS ON THE CINC ROLE

Two years after the new system came into effect under the terms of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, progress has been made, although it is premature to determine just how much change has occurred in the matter of CINC involvement in the acquisition process. Changes to the acquisition process still involve sensitivities and remain unsettled. Long-term problems and deficiencies are unlikely to be resolved quickly.
Some caution was expressed in the Congressional hearings of the several years preceding the new system about expanding the role of the CINC in the acquisition/PPB process. This caution was primarily expressed by military officers, although some civilian officials shared the same view. The main thrust of the criticism was over concern that by increasing CINC responsibilities additional layers of bureaucracy would be added. It was seen, too, that a duplicative burden might fall on the Joint Staff in the handling of the CINC input.

Another and even more serious line of caution concerned a potential shift of CINC attention and staff resources away from the primary war-fighting focus to the acquisition process and to the in-fighting that is part of it. Enhanced involvement could produce a divisiveness among the CINCs over resource and force allocations, creating another situation, like the budget jockeying among the Services themselves, that is generally seen to be pernicious. In short, the result could be a reduction rather than an increase in jointness, with a new split along geographical/functional lines in addition to the Service split.

The short term nature of any individual CINC's role was also seen as having an influence on an enhanced role. While he is in command, that officer's specific interests, predilections and ideas could carry weight in the acquisition process, but with his departure, those same ideas and interests may not be pursued by his successor. If the CINC is too deeply enmeshed in the acquisition process, the result of this personality turnover could be disruptive to the orderly working of the long term process. Critics of an enhanced CINC role point out that it is the Services that represent continuity in R&D, not the CINCs.

On the other hand, there is no evidence that the CINC role would be made more disruptive by turnover than would turnover by senior Service staffs, since disruption is offset by the permanent interest of the CINC. The geography and major strategic concerns of each unified command remain the same. Each new commander-in-chief brings a fresh viewpoint that may inspire a fresh look at the area's problems, but there is relatively little room for significant change.

The nature of CINC advice has also been questioned. For example, one OSD official interviewed pointed out that, in his experience, the CINC staffs could usually tell you the failings of the equipment they had, rather than be able to describe in feasible terms what new systems they would like to have. This was a reflection of the relative lack of thinking by the CINC staffs even about systems that were close to deployment, let alone
systems further out in the development process. The thinking about operational tactics and the employment of new systems is done primarily by the Services.

The Vice Chairman JCS, in an interview in the fall of 1987, bluntly expressed his concerns over the effect of the new system. The notion that the reforms, in effect, have created a dozen "little Pentagons," with each CINC advancing his own requirements and causes may be more than rhetoric. The Vice Chairman said that he "shared these concerns, and to a certain degree, I still do." He was especially concerned that the effort to strengthen the CINCs by weakening the Military Departments may have swung the pendulum too far in favor of the CINCs and that this could have long term disruptive effects. Few observers believe this is yet a problem or likely to be for many years.

General Herres said that quite understandably, "the CINCs don't want to give in to the Military Departments—they just want them to stay off their turfs and to provide them with the needed equipment and forces." The issue of parochialism on the part of individual CINCs must be "dealt with on a continuing basis. If you let each CINC have his own way and if we were completely responsive to all the CINCs' needs, there wouldn't be enough money in the Gross National Product (GNP) to pay for it." Given free rein, the General said, the CINCs would want "several different air forces, several different navies, and several different armies." The penchant for tailoring forces to narrow needs of individual CINCs came to the fore in connection with the special operations issue. The JCS had to come to grips with the question, "Should we build a unique air force, or unique sets of equipment for Special Operations Forces (SOF) when we have a whole lot of other force structure to support?" Herres said that the tug of war over SOF pointed up the risks of the pendulum swinging too far away from the broader common concerns of the Defense Department. General Herres stressed that his role in the PPBS process was not to defend CINC-stated requirements that do not "make sense," saying that neither the Secretary of Defense nor the CJCS expected him to be a "blind spokesman for the CINCs."

He pointed out that the role of the military departments was to train, equip, organize, administer and provide forces for deployment by the CINCs: "The majority of the requirements, [most of the definition] of what's needed and how it should work, the training requirements, the doctrine, the employment techniques -- most of that comes from the military departments."\(^{17}\)

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The choice of SOF as an example of the dangers of parochialism is pertinent. One of the most persistent criticisms of the Services across the years has been that they develop systems pretty much on a unilateral basis. Since Commander-in-Chief Special Operations Command is specifically charged with developing unique equipment for special operations, this may well represent something of a test case as to how far the acquisition system will permit regionally or functionally specialized equipment, when it fits clearly into the mission of a CINC.

E. CONCLUDING COMMENTS

There is a consensus that the CINCs do have a contribution to make in the determination of longer term requirements, but some disagreement on how important such a contribution is, and whether the current system of choosing and defining weapons -- dominated by Services as it is -- is appropriate or not. Part of the consensus that has led to the Goldwater-Nichols Act included a number of CINCs who felt that major organizational changes were needed, to allow them to increase their participation in the PPB and acquisition processes. It is to these views, as presented to the Congress, that we turn next. Following that will be a discussion of the system as it has evolved in the last two years.
V. THE VIEWS OF THE CINCS ON INPUT TO THE ACQUISITION PROCESSES

To examine CINC testimony on the conduct of acquisition issues: CINC participation in the requirements process was summarized into four possible problem areas (see Exhibit V-1). First, was the possibility that the CINCs are too dependent on the Joint Staff and the Service components for technical and analytic support. Second, CINCs, by their nature, have a tendency to be geared toward shorter-term concerns and away from the longer-term considerations of their war-fighting plans, i.e., they are not interested or equipped to participate in longer-term acquisition issues. Third, overall CINC participation in acquisition issues is limited and occurs too late in the bureaucratic process to have much impact. Fourth, CINC staffs have a limited window of opportunity to interact with the Service POMs and frequently must do so through the components, whose influence is similarly constrained. Given this characterization of the problem areas facing the CINCs in the acquisition process, this chapter will discuss statements, on the public record, made by serving and former CINCs, found primarily in congressional testimony and answers to congressional inquiries, concerning their role in the PPB process. In this chapter we present both a chronological analysis of available public testimony and within each set of hearings (or other testimony) -- show which problem areas appear to be of greatest concern to those testifying.

1. CINCs too dependent on Joint Staff and Service components for technical and analytic support.

2. By the nature of the job, CINC inputs are structured to shorter-term concerns, and away from longer-term war plan and warfighting that would influence weapons requirements.

3. Even when there is CINC participation in acquisition issues, that participation is limited and occurs too late in the weapons life cycle.

4. Following through on acquisition issues is difficult because CINCs' staffs have little chance to interact with Service POMs--much of that through components.

Exhibit V-1. CINC Acquisition Problem Areas
The summarized congressional testimony was given during three sets of hearings. The first were hearings concerning reorganization proposals for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, held by the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, during April, June, July and August of 1982.1 The second set of hearings, titled Organization, Structure and Decisionmaking Procedures of the Department of Defense, were held before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, on October 4, 1983.2 The third set of hearings addressed the reorganization of the Department of Defense and were again held before the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, during February and March of 1986.3 A final source of public testimony was CINC responses to questions posed in the Conference Report on the 1985 DoD Authorization Act. In order to facilitate an overall understanding of the tenor of these public statements, two tables have been constructed: the first table presents, in summary form, views on the then serving CINCs on whether changes in the organization structure surrounding their input into the PPB process are necessary (see Table V-1), while the second presents the same issue as addressed by former CINCs (see Table V-2). Because the 1983 hearing did not include CINC testimony, but rather that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is not included in the tables.

A. THE 1982 HEARINGS

The 1982 hearings included testimony from the following current or retired CINCs: General Andrew J. Goodpaster, General Russell E. Dougherty, Admiral Robert L. J. Long, General Donn Starry and Admiral Harry D. Train. All of those testifying expressed support for an increased role by the CINCs in the PPB process and placed a great deal of emphasis on the third problem area discussed above; that CINC influence in the requirements process is too limited and occurs too far along in the administrative process to be of any real influence.

1 Hearings before the Investigations Subcommittee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 99th Congress, 2nd Session, on Reorganization Proposals for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, held in April, May, June, July and August of 1982.

2 Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 98th Congress, 1st Session, on Organization, Structure and Decisionmaking Procedures of the Department of Defense, part four, held October 4, 1983.

3 Hearings before the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 99th Congress, 2nd Session, on Reorganization of the Department of Defense, held in February and March, 1982.
Table V-1. CINC Views on Defense Organization and Need for Change:
Serving CINCs

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<th>CINC</th>
<th>Congressional Statements</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
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<td>1982</td>
<td>1985</td>
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<td>CINCMAC: Ryan</td>
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<td>USCINCPAC: Long</td>
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<td>USCINCSO: Gorman</td>
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<td>CINCAD/SPACE: Herres</td>
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<td>USCINCLANT: Train</td>
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<td>USCINCEUR: Rogers</td>
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<td>CINCSAC: Davis</td>
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"1986" refers to hearings before the Investigations Subcommittees of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 99th Congress, February and March 1986.

Table V-2. CINC Views on Defense Organization and Need For Change:
Retired CINCs

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<th>CINC</th>
<th>Congressional Statements</th>
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<td>1982</td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINCLANT: Train</td>
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<td>USCINCEUR: Goodpaster</td>
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<td>CINCSAC: Dougherty</td>
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1 See footnote to Table V-1.
Both General Starry and Admiral Long took strong positions concerning the need for change in the CINC's level of input into planning, procurement and strategy development. General Starry, the serving CINCP, addressed the third problem area, stating that the CINCs need to be involved at the front end of the acquisition process to enable the Services to develop the POMs within a framework that already had CINC support. He stated that "in their statutory role as executors of the national military strategy, the CINCs of our unified and specified commands should have a stronger voice in the front end guidance process, especially in that part relating to development of feasible military courses of action" and the development of those resources necessary to support such action. He went on to express his support for the proposed legislation, especially the section which read, "Insure that the Services and unified and specified commands have an opportunity to provide formal comments where appropriate upon the reports and recommendations of the Joint Staff."

Admiral Long, the then serving CINCPAC, was even more explicit in his analysis of the CINC's role in the PPB and budget process. He stated that he was "particularly heartened by the fact that the views of the unified and specified commanders are increasingly being sought by the Secretary of Defense and by the Joint Chiefs on matters pertaining to resource prioritization and allocation and global strategic planning. I believe, however, that we must do more to involve the CINCs in these processes. Heretofore, the CINCs have been relatively isolated from the budget process and from the development of national defense strategy. Effective interaction between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCs on these matters is absolutely essential. In my opinion, CINCs are in the best position to assess the threat in their respective theaters and to determine whether forces assigned to them are sized and constituted to accomplish their mission."

General Dougherty and General Goodpaster stated in very general terms that they supported an increased role for the CINCs in the resource allocation process. General Dougherty stated that the CINCs must have input into "the provision of technology, the provision of logistics, training, and doctrine, things that are only peripheral now." It was

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5 Ibid, p. 676.
6 Ibid, p. 676.
7 Ibid, p. 825.
8 Ibid, p. 472.
his belief that "CINCs must have resource responsibility and input if they are to be charged with ultimate responsibility." 9

Admiral Train, serving CINCLANT, was the least critical of the status quo, stating that he was "not sure whether we require a change in law as much as a change in practice.... The machinery exists to incorporate the unified and specified commander fully into both the planning and budgetary processes, if the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff desire and the Secretary of Defense desire to avail themselves of that type of input." 10

The CINCs who testified during the 1982 hearings focused on what they described as a general need for increased CINC involvement in the acquisition and PPB processes. Most mentioned the unique position and responsibilities of the CINCs as justification for their recommendation of an increased role. Their more specific complaints lend support to this study's conclusion that CINC involvement in the PPB process has been limited and late (problem area three).

B. THE 1983 HEARINGS

During 1983 hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, General David C. Jones, General John W. Vessey and General Louis H. Wilson made only passing comments concerning the CINCs and the JCS role as the voice of the CINCs in the defense policy hierarchy. Only General Vessey responded directly to a question that dealt with the CINCs' capacity to make their views known to the JCS. He was asked if he felt that the Chairman had adequate access to the unified and specified commanders and their views on such matters as resource allocation. He responded, "Yes, the unified and specified commanders' view are often solicited and they have direct access to me and I to them. And I am their spokesman in Washington. I also encourage them to air their views at our periodic CINCs Conferences. The CINCs are charged with carrying out our war plans. Their needs are central to the PPBS process. As such, steps have been taken for the CINCs to fulfill the role established for them by the National Security Act. Through their active participation in the Defense Resources Board summer program review and Defense

9 Ibid, p. 472.
10 Ibid, p. 792.
Guidance development, the CINCs have a significant influence in PPBS both in their own right and through me, their spokesman for operational requirements."\(^1\)

C. THE 1985 DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT QUESTIONNAIRE

During the course of the debate surrounding the Defense Authorization Act for 1985, Congress forwarded a number of questions to the Secretary of Defense, the JCS and the CINCs\(^2\). A number of the questions directed to the CINCs focused on their role in the acquisition process. Responses were varied. Some of the CINCs argued that little, if anything, needed to be changed. However, the majority argued that modifications and fine tuning of the process were still necessary. In general their complaints fell into two areas. First, they argued that their input frequently occurred too late within the PPB cycle to have any impact (problem area three), and second, they expressed frustration with the results of their attempts to influence the Service POM process (problem area four).

Of the four CINCs who argued that the status quo was satisfactory, two were commanders of specified commands who stated explicitly that their status afforded them advantages in acquisition and budget areas that were unavailable to CINCs of unified commands. Both General Robert T. Herres, CINCAD, and General Bennie L. Davis, CINCSAC, pointed to benefits derived from their standing as specified commanders. General Herres stated, "As commander in chief of a specified command, I have, in most cases, sufficient influence over resource decisions to support operational responsibilities and accountability. There are several reasons. First of all, my requirements are incorporated within the Air Force POM where I have direct influence. This differs markedly from the situation faced by a unified CINC who must rely upon his individual Services components to advocate requirements within the respective military departments. Second, almost two-thirds of ADCOM's operational assets are resource managed by Space Command. Because of dual-hat responsibilities, ADCOM has a direct input into the Space Command POM submission for these programs. Third, the vast majority of the non-Space

\(^{11}\) Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 98th Congress, 1st Session, on Organization, Structure and Decisionmaking Procedures of the Department of Defense, Part 4, p. 177-178.

Command assets are resource managed by the Tactical Air Command. We closely coordinate on these programs and co-advocate where appropriate—thereby strengthening our influence over resource decisions." General Davis made a similar argument, stating that he felt satisfied with the current situation because his command is both a specified command and an Air Force major command. This dual role provides him with a dual opportunity to be involved in the PPB process. The specified command position allowed him the opportunity to express his views on resource allocation and defense policy during the semiannual Defense Resources Board reviews. In addition, he stated that "the MAJCOM channel allows me to identify requirements, request resources, and participate in the Air Force POM development process along with all the other MAJCOM commanders. With these dual avenues, I can appropriately present the SAC's requirements in both arenas and underscore our urgent military requirements."\textsuperscript{13}

The remaining two CINCs who were satisfied with the system in its current form were Admiral Wesley J. McDonald and General Thomas M. Ryan. In addressing the question "Is there an imbalance between your responsibilities and accountability as an operational commander and your influence over resource decisions?" General Ryan made a brief response stating that he felt that he had sufficient input into the PPB process and concluded that "the changes outlined in the DEPSECDEF memo, 14 November 84, should improve the unified CINC's influence in planning and programming."\textsuperscript{14} Admiral McDonald was more explicit, stating, "Prior to the current programming cycle, there were occasions where programs of priority importance to a unified commander were not perceived to receive that same priority attention from the Service. This situation, while not widespread, has been altered by the new initiatives designed to enhance the role of the unified commanders in the PPBS process, particularly in the POM development.... I am convinced that a workable and useful framework has been established which will significantly enhance my participation in the PPBS process."\textsuperscript{15}

General Robert C. Kingston, General Wallace H. Nutting, Admiral William J. Crowe and General Bernard W. Rogers were all of the opinion that procedural changes adopted since 1981 had made a tremendous difference in their ability to influence acquisition policy in a manner commensurate with their responsibilities in this area.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
However, these CINCs continued to assert that further changes were necessary to bring the whole process into balance. They appeared to be particularly concerned about the timeliness of their input into acquisition and budgetary decisions, and about their role in the formulation of the Service POMs.

General Kingston addressed both problem area three and problem area four in his remarks. He began by stressing that "When Service decisions on resource procurement do not coincide with CINC desires, the DoD provides the CINCs an opportunity to make their case before the Defense Resources Board.... However, this occurs toward the end of the programming cycle and it is important to highlight CINC warfighting needs earlier in the cycle." He went on to evaluate initiatives currently under discussion that would "...afford the CINCs an opportunity to influence the Service's Program Objective Memorandum prior to final 'lock-up'." He argued that such initiatives, if adopted, would "...further improve the programmatic relationships between the unified commanders and the Services."

General Nutting focused on problem area three. In his words, "There is an imbalance between my operational responsibilities and influence over resource allocations.... USCINCREDS has limited influence on resource allocations and limited control over operations funds, particularly crucial in the area of training." General Nutting, like General Kingston, expressed his support of OSD and JCS efforts to increase CINC involvement in the planning, programming and budgeting system process. He argued that these proposals "point the way toward a practical and timely influence allowing the CINCs the formal opportunity to anticipate the budget cycle by formulating and presenting strategic requirements. The statement and considerations of operational requirements 'up front' are essential to a rational process."

General Rogers and Admiral Crowe both recounted past experiences in which they, as CINCs, had had great difficulty achieving desired procurement or acquisition goals. Similarly, they both asserted that changes adopted since 1981 have made the PPB process far more accessible to the CINCs. However, both stressed that further corrections were necessary. Admiral Crowe asserted that in the recent past "the results of major Service

16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.

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decisions, not previously coordinated with me, have affected my ability to execute USPACOM strategy. In some instances I have learned about Service initiatives, which ultimately impacted on PACOM's war-fighting capabilities, after the fact during POM deliberations. At this point, development of the issues were so far down the road that it was difficult for my views to be considered in the DoD decision-making process. In essence, some Service POM decisions altered or affected my strategy without adequate concern for PACOM's overall theater requirements." He concludes, in direct support of the findings of this study, "I am persuaded that giving the unified commanders an earlier and stronger voice in the resource allocation process would strike a better balance between responsibility and accountability."20

In 1985 the serving CINCs were relatively divided in their views concerning the need for change in the CINC's role in acquisition and budget planning. However, the previous section makes clear that those opposed to such changes fell into two significant sub-groups. First, there were the CINCs who were simultaneously commanders of specified commands and of Service major commands, and by virtue of their relationship to the Services, who, by-passed some of the problems otherwise characteristic of CINCs. Second, the remaining two CINCs supporting the status quo specifically cited recent bureaucratic changes that they felt certain would alleviate existing problems as the very reason that they supported the status quo. They were therefore implicitly arguing that the system in its current form was flawed. The CINCs sitting on the other side of the fence lent nearly unanimous support to the findings of this study that assert that CINC involvement occurs too late in the budget and acquisition cycle and that the POM process is relatively closed to CINC input.

D. THE 1986 HEARINGS

The CINCs who testified during the 1986 hearings on the Reorganization of the Department of Defense were far more divided in their views concerning the need for change in the role of the CINCs in the acquisition and procurement process. Testimony was heard from General Andrew J. Goodpaster, General Russell E. Dougherty, General John R. Galvin, General Robert T. Herres, General Fred K. Mahaffey, General Bernard Rogers, Admiral Harry D. Train and General Larry D. Welch. General Galvin, General Herres, General Mahaffey and General Rogers (at that time, all serving CINCs) all stated explicitly

20 Ibid.
that the status quo provided CINCs with adequate means of influencing relevant acquisition policy. They did not, however, believe that the PPB structure was without flaws. Both General Galvin and General Herres discussed problems that this study has specifically addressed. The remaining CINCs, General Dougherty, General Goodpaster, Admiral Welch and Admiral Train, expressed dissatisfaction with the manner in which CINCs are currently incorporated into the PPB process. These complaints included all of the problem areas noted by this study. First, they placed greatest emphasis on the fact that they believed CINC participation in acquisition issues to be severely limited by bureaucratic policy and that the opportunities for input were typically late in the budget negotiation process, leaving the CINCs relatively impotent in both the acquisition and PPB processes. Another common complaint was that CINC inputs have traditionally been structured towards shorter-term, quick turn around items, and that they have been very limited in their ability to contribute to considerations of longer-term strategies. Another problem area discussed was that technical and analytic support for the CINCs was seen as sorely lacking. Finally, a near majority stated that current procedures that required CINCs to submit budgetary requests through the component commands necessarily caused the CINCs (in the budgetary realm) to be relegated to the back seat behind the component commanders (who were themselves behind the Service chiefs).

Among the CINCs who argued that current policies were sufficient to allow adequate CINC input in the PPBS, General Galvin was among those who nevertheless acknowledged that the status quo was flawed. He began by stating that, "in terms of the budget procedures, the PPBS and the whole POM cycle, I feel that, as CINC, I am doing about enough of that now."\(^{21}\) He asserted that he had no need or desire to take over the budget fight at his level. He pointed out that the Services devote close to a third of their man-hours to budgets and stressed that if the CINCs were pulled any farther into the budgetary process, a similar time commitment would be required. He asserted that "I would rather be able to submit the budget directly to the Service and then let the Service fight the question up here [in Congress]... I am obviously happy with the DRB, and as of now, I think it gives me my opportunity to be heard."\(^{22}\) He did, however, express his dissatisfaction with current bureaucratic procedures that required him to submit his budget

\(^{21}\) Hearings before the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 99th Congress, 2nd Session, on Reorganization of the Department of Defense, held February and March of 1986, p. 860.

\(^{22}\) Ibid, p. 861.
to the Services by way of the component commands, specifically through CINCLANTFLT, Forces Command and Tactical Air Command. He argued that the Services often follow recommendations from component commanders regarding CINC proposals, rather than the CINC's original recommendation; thus, the CINCs were often superseded by the component commanders.\(^{23}\)

General Herres, much like General Galvin, was strongly against any increase in the CINCs' resource management role. He argued that an increased role by the CINCs in the PPB process would lead to divisive demands on the part of the CINCs. To illustrate his point, he stated that as an example, the Air Force that CINCPAC wants is very different from that which CINCEUR wants. Herres did, however, speak in support of this study's conclusion that the CINCs have a limited window of opportunity to interact with the Service POMs, arguing that the CINCs should have more "timely" involvement in the POM process. He thought that this could be accomplished, at least in part, by moving to a two-year budget cycle, which has occurred.\(^{24}\)

General Mahaffey, the serving CINCREDC, addressed the PPB issue in much the same vein as the aforementioned testimony. During his tenure as CINCREDC he stated that he had experienced "no instance in which there was clear-cut evidence of an inadequacy in my command authority to get my job done, nor of any overt resistance or stonewalling by my assigned Service components."\(^{25}\) He flatly stated that in his belief there was nothing wrong with the current CINC command structure. In his words, "I think we have progressed to the point today where we have about the right balance between the CINC's ability first to identify his prioritized war-fighting requirements; second to have those war-fighting requirements programmed by his Service components; third, to be able to audit how those requirements fare in the Service program building process that occurs annually, or at least, is updated annually and finally, to see how they are ultimately acted upon by the DRB. As a CINC, under current procedures, I have an entry at all of those points, including the DRB."\(^{26}\)

General Rogers, the serving CINCEUR, also voiced his opposition to increasing the CINC's programming and budgeting authority. He stated that "the CINCs are

\(^{23}\) Ibid, p. 861.  
\(^{24}\) Ibid, p. 808.  
\(^{25}\) Ibid, p. 790.  
\(^{26}\) Ibid, p. 792.
responsible for the operational side of what goes on within the theater. I believe that with
the major input that they would make to the Chairman as he integrated the POMS and the
budgets, that that would be satisfactory from the CINC standpoint. Rather than having
each CINC coming in with a program and with a budget, I believe the Services themselves
need to retain that final authority of being able on a broad, global scale to determine what is
necessary, but knowing that what they determine to be necessary as a program and as a
budget will be scrutinized by the Chairman for the purpose of integration into a final
product to be presented to the Secretary of Defense. 27

On the other side of the coin, General Goodpaster, General Dougherty, Admiral
Train and Admiral Welch were critical of their role in the formulation of budget and
acquisition priorities. General Goodpaster argued that the CINC's interests were
frequently treated as secondary to those of the Services, 28 and stated that it was essential
that we "give the commanders of the unified and specified commands a stronger voice in
setting defense requirements..." 29

General Dougherty specifically addressed both the second and the third problem
areas, stating that the CINC's "need to know what is underway with regard to the
planning, research, development and programming, and the 5-year PPBS is not enough.
They need to look beyond five years and this is why I recommend that the CINCs be
required to do 10-year planning." 30 He also focused on problem area four, asserting that
the CINCs' appearing before the DRB during the year is simply not enough. "They not
only need to appear before it, they should have impact upon the process that brings you to
the DRB.... They should look upstream at those things in order to be able to find out what
is coming, so that they can influence things before they get to the DRB because after it gets
there it is almost too late to change it." 31

Admiral Train's comments centered around his view of the role of the Services in
the budget and acquisition process. He argued that it was very difficult for a CINC to
accomplish anything that related to procurement if what he was attempting to procure came
from a Service other than his own. In his view, the CINCs, although they represent the

27 Ibid, p. 715.
31 Ibid, p. 434.
unified commands, are still seen as being part of their permanent Service. He cited a specific example of this problem that occurred while he was CINCLANT. One of his responsibilities in that post was to ensure that Iceland remained secure. Iceland had (in his words) stone-age radars and an insufficient number of F-4s. He advocated upgrading the F-4s to F-15s and pushed for radar improvements and an overall increased Air Force presence in Iceland. He argued in his testimony that because he personally came from the Navy, the Air Force was extremely slow to respond to his demands (and in almost all cases failed to respond at all). He also argued that the options available for pursuing such force improvements were limited at best. He asserted that changes were necessary in the structure surrounding procurement recommendations being made by the CINCs.\textsuperscript{32}

General Welch focused on problem area three, stating, "Regarding CINC participation in the planning, programming, and budgeting cycle, I think that participation is vital. The earlier that it comes in the budget formulation process the more useful it is."\textsuperscript{33}

E. CONCLUSION

Of the four problem areas cited by the study, two were cited quite frequently by the CINCs: CINC participation in the acquisition process and interaction with Washington staff during the POM cycle (see Table V-3). The problem of excessive CINC dependence on the components and Services and lack of resources to participate in the requirements process, was cited infrequently in open testimony. However, other evidence gathered during the study, including interviews and other reports, offers substantial support to the assertion that this is indeed a problem for the CINCs. Evidence supporting the fourth problem CINC emphasis on short run issues, can be found in Appendix B, which examines CINC Congressional testimony on substantive issues.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid, p. 162.

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid, p. 781.
Table V-3. Testimony in Support of Problem Areas Cited by Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROBLEM AREA¹</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1982</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>General Dougherty</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>General Goodpaster</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>General Starry</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Admiral Long</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1985</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>General Kingston</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Nutting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Rogers</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admiral Crowe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1986</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Galvin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Herres</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Goodpaster</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>General Dougherty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Admiral Train</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Welch</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹The problem areas are as follows:

1) CINCs too dependent on OJCS and Service components for technical and analytic support.

2) By the nature of the job, CINC inputs are structured to shorter-term concerns, and away from longer-term war plans and warfighting that would influence weapons requirements.

3) Even when there is CINC participation in acquisition issues, that participation is limited and occurs too late in the weapons life cycle.

4) Following through on acquisition issues is difficult because CINCs’ staffs have little chance to interact with Service POMs -- much of that through components.
VI. THE CURRENT SYSTEM: IN THE MIDST OF CHANGE

Based on the views that CINC participation was deficient, changes were instituted that have gradually increased CINC input into the PPB and acquisition processes. These changes were begun by Secretary of Defense Brown in the late 1970s, with further changes made by the new Administration under Secretary of Defense Weinberger, beginning in 1981. Passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act gave the force of law to what had been a series of administration changes, made by various directives and memoranda. In particular, the CJCS and particularly the new VCJCS were given enhanced roles as the Washington representatives of the CINCs. These changes bring us to a point where the CINC roles are increasing, with each Service attempting to enhance the CINC interaction during the PPB processes.

A. STRENGTHENING CINC PARTICIPATION

The Congressional and Executive initiatives of the past three or four years have aimed at requiring that the planning process improve the linkage of defense programs to military strategy and to incorporate the operational viewpoints of the combatant commanders in the advice provided to the Secretary of Defense. There are basically five major points at which the CINCs contribute.1

1. During the development of the Defense Guidance the unified and specified commanders provide inputs and comments on the document. Comments must be provided with an unusually short suspense.

2. The CINCs provide input to the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) and are often asked to comment on the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Again, this is with an unusually short suspense.

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3. The CINCs' Integrated Priority Lists are submitted to the Secretary of Defense, the CJCS and the Services for use in planning and programming. The Services respond by developing CINC Annexes for their POMs in order to highlight the CINC-stated requirements in the IPLs. This clearly shows the audit trail in addressing IPL items.

4. In order to keep the CINCs informed on Service actions, they are invited to selected meetings of the DRB, at which they are briefed by the OJCS and the Services on the Service POMs, focusing on the programs of particular interest to the CINCs.

5. Finally, the CINCs are given a chance to comment on the Service POMs in the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum.

Beyond that there are many other occasions in which the CINCs can present their views to the relevant decision makers on particular PPBS issues (see Exhibit VI-1).

Exhibit VI-1. Opportunities for CINC Inputs to the PPBS

Over the last decade the CINCs have been invited to testify before the Congress, and this published testimony gives the flavor of the types of substantive issues that concern the CINCs in the whole PPB process. These issues range from short term issues of readiness and sustainability to expressions of support for long term R & D and weapons investments (for examples see Exhibit VI-2). The issues most often cited are those involving readiness and sustainability shortfalls, interservice and Alliance interoperability shortfalls, and major capability shortfalls. They spent relatively little time on issues involving future weapons with IOCs over three years in the future. (The detail of this testimony is presented as Appendix B.)
The process by which the CINCs participate in the PPB Process was spelled out in an April 1987 DoD Instruction (Exhibit VI-3). The last paragraph of the Instruction stresses a continuing problem, that of prioritization by the CINCs of their own requirements. There are currently no standardized preparation instructions for the IPLs, thus complicating the problem of analysis and "cross-CINC" comparison. The Service Secretaries, in their study of OSD stated:

Once established, such [standardized IPL], instructions would serve to help clarify the linkage of strategy to programs by alleviating the challenge of integration of the priorities, which are currently difficult to align because of the differing perspectives of the combatant commanders. These instructions should at a minimum: (1) define what constitutes a 'priority' (2) require justification based upon both national military strategy and regional plans, and (3) provide guidelines for integrating and rank-ordering the priorities.

Currently, methods used to determine priorities within the Integrated Priority Lists vary between the Commanders-in-Chief. Some base their lists on how well various programs are faring on the Hill or within the Department's resource allocation process, while others prioritize shortfalls in war reserves which would be needed to go to war tomorrow. For example, Item "A" may be absolutely critical to a commander's combat operations, but even though it may remain in short supply, the overall program is fully funded and enjoys strong support in the Congress. Item "B," on the other hand, could be far less critical to combat operations, but lack program supporters on the Hill. Therefore, one commander might rank
A. Objective

The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System should provide the Commanders in Chief of the Unified and Specified Commands (CINCs) the best mix of forces, equipment, and support attainable within resource constraints. This enclosure describes how the CINCs participate in each phase of PPBS.

B. Planning Phase

The CINCs shall be invited to provide, at the beginning of the Defense Guidance (DG) drafting process, their personal recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for major changes to the existing DG. These comments, along with those of DRB members, shall be considered during the drafting process. Successive drafts of the DG shall be forwarded to the CINCs for comment. The DRB shall meet with the CINCs before the final draft is provided for the Secretary's signature in order to consider their views on the adequacy of the DG's treatment of policy, strategy, forces, and resource planning guidance.

C. Programming Phase

The primary interaction between the CINCs and the Military Departments shall be through component commanders. At a time specified by the Military Departments, each CINC shall identify his requirements to the Service commands responsible for providing programming support. The components shall be afforded every opportunity to resolve CINC concerns. In addition, direct communications between the CINCs and the Military Departments may be used to resolve CINC problems and concerns during POM development.

Each CINC shall prepare a list of his high priority needs, prioritized across Service and functional lines and with consideration of reasonable fiscal constraints. These IPLs shall be submitted to the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the CJCS on a date determined by the Executive Secretary to the DRB (Programming Phase). The IPLs are intended to provide visibility for those few key problem areas which, in the judgment of a CINC, require the highest-priority attention by the Department of Defense in finding solutions.

D. Budgeting Phase

Normally, the CJCS shall present CINC concerns during the OSD/OMB budget review and during discussion of major budget issues with the Deputy Secretary. The Chairman shall establish appropriate procedures to inform the CINCs of significant budget review events.

Exhibit VI-3. Participation in the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System by the Commanders in Chief of the Unified and Specified Commands (CINCs)
Item "B" well ahead of Item "A" to highlight concern and gain program support, while another commander might reverse the priority. These types of inconsistencies make it difficult for the Office of the Joint Chiefs, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Services to judge and prioritize exactly which items are "war stoppers."²

In November 1987 General Herres, the VCJCS, described the current process. Under the institution of the CINC Annexes to the Service POMs, he said, "unresourced" CINC items would have "very high visibility" and would necessarily be a "central" subject of DRB discussions. He also described the Joint Staff role in which J5, J7, and J8 of the Joint Staff would play complementary roles in the coordination of strategic priorities with the operational requirements of the theater commanders. J5 derives the resource-constrained national military strategy and the strategic objectives for the combatant commanders' campaign plans. J7 is the Joint Staff focal point at the front end for defining CINC requirements and evaluating their plans. The VCJCS stated that the new J5/J7 mission balance should provide definitive lines of authority and responsibility that would enable the CJCS and the VCJCS to represent better the combatant commanders in various acquisition and resource allocation decision bodies. J8 is the focal point for Joint Staff participation in the PPBS; providing recommendations on force structure; developing trade-off analyses between effectiveness and alternative resource levels; producing the Military Net Assessment; and developing resource-constrained force structures.

The VCJCS is chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (formerly the Joint Requirements and Management Board) and vice-chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board (formerly the DSARC), representing continuous and formal connection between the combatant commanders as advocates of requirements and the various resource allocation decision bodies. The emphasis in the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) is on fulfilling the CINCs' requirements while ensuring interoperability, reducing duplication, and promoting economies of scale.³ The JROC is now chartered to provide program oversight at the front end of the acquisition process to determine joint program feasibility.

B. THE SERVICE-CINC INTERACTION

The system whereby the Services interact with and respond to the CINCs was spelled out by the Service Secretaries in February 1987 before the Senate Committee on

Armed Services. Their testimony reflects the process in place before the Goldwater-Nichols Act came into effect in October 1986, a process which -- with minor modifications -- currently prevails, although the process continues to evolve in favor of greater CINC participation.

The Secretary of the Army pointed out that the CINCs become involved in the process at the time of the Defense Guidance, usually in December. Copies go to the CINCs and they make their inputs through the JCS to the Secretary of Defense. They also make inputs to the Army Plan which is derived from the Defense Guidance. The CINC response comes through their Integrated Priority Lists that lay out in priority the CINC needs. During January to March the CINC priorities are represented in the Army programming procedure by representatives from the CINCs who work with the Army programmers to ensure that the CINCs' views and programs are reflected in the Army Plan.

The then Army Chief of Staff asserted in 1986 that he sent a team out to every CINC three times a year in order to tell the CINCs what the Army was doing in resourcing their requirements. When the POM is considered by the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff, the CINCs' needs are weighed. Afterwards representatives from the Army explain to the CINCs how and why their requests were treated as they were in the Army POM CINC annex.

Usually the CINCs are not satisfied, and they in turn prepare their evaluation of the Army Program which is presented to the Army in Washington in May. In July the CINCs return for the meeting of the Defense Resources Board and make their presentations to it. Deliberations of the DRB last two or three weeks, after which decisions are published and the Army updates their CINC annex so the CINCs will know what they did or did not get from the DRB. Following the budget review there is a third edition of the CINC annex, with CINC requests coded as fulfilled, partially fulfilled or denied.

The Secretary of the Army provided a breakdown of CINC requests, some 130 issues. Of these 92 were coded green which meant that they were "supported" and

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4 HASC, Reorganization of the Department of Defense, p.139.
5 Senate Armed Services Committee, DoD Authorization..., p.60.

VI-6
"addressed" in the five year plan (see Table VI-1). The CINC requests over the five year period total $126 billion of which about $76 billion were responded to favorably.⁶

The combination of all the CINCs' requests and the degree to which they were supported in the Army five year plan was illustrated by the Army bar chart shown in Figure VI-1.⁷

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CINC</th>
<th>Submitted</th>
<th>Reqs Green</th>
<th>Amber</th>
<th>Red</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REDCOM</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANTCOM</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure VI-1. Support of CINC Requirements*

⁶ Ibid, p. 68.
⁷ Ibid, p. 70.
What the CINCs did not get, in the words of Secretary Marsh, fell "generally in the area of sustainability, war reserves, major items, munitions, and secondary items" as indicated in Exhibit VI-4.\(^8\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sustainability (war reserves, major items, munitions, secondary items)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUCOM (PWRS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM (PWRS, Spares)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM (TR2/TR3, POL) (TRs--theater reserve categories)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REDCOM (Munitions, WRS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANTCOM (TR12)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CS/CSS Equipment/Personnel Readiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Structure (CS/CSS)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Exhibit VI-4. Major CINC Unmet Needs (Army)

It is unclear what the term "unmet" means on the Army chart, but it may be surmised that it means the CINCs received less than they had asked for to one degree or another. The absence of CINC designations under the Force Structure category seems to imply that all the CINCs were unsatisfied.

The Navy procedures, resembling closely those of the Army, were described at the Hearings. During all phases of the PPB process, the Chief of Naval Operations' (CNO's) and Marine Corps Commandant's staffs interact directly with CINCs' staffs to ensure liaison. The unified commanders provide inputs to the warfare area appraisals, the first step in the Navy's program planning. The warfare area appraisals assess the CINCs' capability to execute elements of the maritime strategy that is part of the national military strategy. The Director of Naval Warfare on the Navy Staff includes CINC priorities in each warfare appraisal area.

For the fiscal years of 1988-1989 the Navy claimed that 56 percent of its Total Obligational Authority (TOA) supported readiness, thus going a long way toward meeting

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\(^8\) Ibid, p. 80
CINC requests. Navy support of CINC requirements is shown in Figure VI-2, in a Navy bar chart.\footnote{Ibid, p. 70.}

![Figure VI-2. Navy Support of CINC Identified Funding Requirements](image)

The Secretary of the Air Force did not provide any comments on how the Air Force dealt with CINC inputs but offered two charts (Figures VI-3 and VI-4). The first chart "compared forces planned over the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP) to the aggregate of CINC requests, after eliminating duplication and overlap in requirements." The second chart "compared Air Force capability to meet specific requirements identified by the CINCs in their responses to the FY 88-92 Air Force Program.\footnote{Ibid, p. 82}

The information presented in these charts is too aggregated to be meaningful in terms of a comparison with the CINCs' IPLs. For one thing, aggregating the very dissimilar CINC requests alone blurs the significance of the statements. In any case, the results of the presentation by percentage of CINC requests shows that the Services are supplying CINC requests at considerably less than an 100 percent. That of course is because the CINC requests are not resource constrained or even costed -- the Services can pick and choose which items are to be bought. In the end they can reflect Service priorities rather than CINC priorities.
C. RECENT INNOVATIONS$^{12}$

The 1988 PPB cycle introduced more changes in the process, one related directly to acquisition.

First, the Services have responded to CINC complaints of lack of input or communications, with some new methods of increasing that communication directly to CINCs and through components. This communication typically involves the POM and

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$^{12}$ This section is based on number of interviews of current participants in PPB process.
therefore the monitoring of acquisition programs after many of the important milestone decisions are made.

The other more direct change in acquisition has been in strengthening the JROC, the Joint Requirement Oversight Committee. That group is chaired by the VCJCS and has as its members, the individual Service Vice Chiefs of Staff. The JROC charter specifies that it ...is an instrument of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "It is the body that provides early program oversight and monitoring at the front end of the acquisition process to determine joint program feasibility." Emphasis is placed on fulfilling the requirements of the unified and specified commands and Services, while ensuring interoperability, reducing parallel and duplicative development efforts, and promoting economies of scale.

The CINCs are not themselves members of the JROC. They are dependent, within the JROC, on the Services to provide the technical opportunities and other alternatives to fulfill their mission needs. The VCJCS and J7, the Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate represent the CINCs views on requirements.

General Herres, the VCJCS, has said that he sees his role in the JROC as linking "...the needs of the CINCs with a judicious and appropriate degree of Service influence. [I] must find a way to balance the views of the builders of force structure, that is, the Military Departments and their Service Chiefs, with the needs and views of the Combatant Commanders, that is, the CINCs."13

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VII. OUTSTANDING ISSUES AND POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS

The major issues limiting CINC participation in the PPB and acquisition processes involve: 1) the nature of the CINC staffs and their capability for direct analytic and technical support, 2) short term information flow at critical decision points, 3) the (appropriately) limited interest of the CINCs in medium and long term acquisition issues and 4) differing incentives between the Services and the CINCs.

The unified commands are composed of and are dependent upon Service component commands and "responsible agencies" for the major part of their information and expertise on future weapon possibilities. Although the IPLs go directly to the CJCS and the Services, major field inputs to the Service POM and budget processes are either through permanent Service components which are themselves major commands, or through tactical or operational combat organizations that are only part of major commands--major commands which then serve as so-called "responsible agencies." In both cases these component commands are supposed to serve as advocates for the CINCs in the PPB and acquisition processes.

The CINCs lack sufficient analytic, budgeting and particularly technical resources to support them. Where the arguments for a system are technical and to a lesser extent analytic, and where they are presented in a resource constrained environment, the CINC view can be difficult to sustain -- frequently arrived at with only limited technical and analytic support, and in an environment in which realistic budget levels are not assumed or considered, as part of the exercise of providing inputs to the Services.

Improvements being given consideration fall in four areas: (1) some added technical, analytic and costing support; (2) formation of an organization that brings together the users of the weapons with their Service developers; (3) presentation of an alternative (to Service) Joint resource constrained program that has the same standing in the DRB as the Service POMs; and (4) strengthened CINC liaison in the Pentagon.
(1) The CINCs might be given additional technical, analytic and costing support that would allow for fuller participation in the PPB and acquisition processes. Here it is up to a CINC to decide whether such a staff would be more valuable than the current staff. Contract support is something that could be added, including the tasking of DoD labs, thus giving the CINC more direct access to technical personnel.

(2) The CINCs could meet with Service developers of major systems essential to their mission -- on which the CINC inputs are especially needed -- on a regular basis, perhaps once or twice per year. This would allow for more direct matching of critical CINC needs with technological possibilities. One possibility would be annual conferences between the CINCs and the Services which would include full reports on all systems coming up for Milestone I and II on the DAB. Another possibility would be to expand the JROC to include CINCs, and to emphasize more participation by the technical communities in support of the Vice Chairman and Service Chiefs.

(3) An alternative program to the Service POMs that was resource constrained, would go a long way toward giving greater weight to joint views, in the PPB and Acquisition processes. The current JPAM is with minor exceptions, a stapling together of the Service POMs. It does not have the same standing in the DRB review that the Service POM has. The alternative program would not have the same detail as a POM, but it would be constructed separately from the Service POMs.

(4) Finally, having an enhanced working level liaison arrangement in the Pentagon is viewed by some as an aid for two way communication in alerting the CINC to problems with acquisition programs that he thought important. The liaison individual or staff should be free to visit the material commands, and the laboratories, and contractors to acquire information. Limited arrangements of this sort already exist in the Pentagon for all CINCs.

One or more of these four changes should help bring the CINCs more directly into the process of weapon acquisition. The changes would not and should not draw the CINCs into the details of the methods of how weapons are bought.

The process of CINC involvement in the PPBS is evolutionary and continuing. Just as the organization and operation of the Joint Staff is periodically changed and improved, the role of the CINCs will be further refined. However, this is not likely to be an open-ended process, such as Joint Staff improvement, since there is probably a clearer limit to just what the CINCs can do in the acquisition and PPB processes. Nevertheless, The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 has probably been as influential in defining and
clarifying a CINC role as were the several steps undertaken in the 1981-1985 period, steps which indeed molded the current role of the CINCs. It has been made clear as a matter of law that the CJCS, VCJCS and Joint Staff are to be the Washington representatives of the CINCs.

Suggestions for increasing CINC involvement must be evaluated in a way that balances these real or perceived burdens against the value of increasing CINC influence in the acquisition process -- the value of introducing regional and alliance considerations and of emphasizing joint and warfighting values.

The current system and organizational structures have already moved in the direction of some of these suggestions. Nevertheless, it is useful to examine what else might be done. Two types of suggestions for improving CINC participation are offered. The first type are those improvements that increase the resources available to the CINCs so as to enhance the capability of the CINCs to contribute to both the formal and the informal processes of defense decision making. The second type are those that enhance CINC participation in the formal PPB and acquisition processes by changing the rules for participation -- giving them more direct access and information.

A. ANALYTIC, STRATEGIC, AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT

Full participation in the PPB and acquisition processes requires adequate analytic and strategic support. Three areas are suggested where such support might be used: more CINC funding for their own initiated studies, better use of the available "Modern Aids to Planning Program" (MAPP) assets, and an enhanced role for the National Defense University (NDU) and other organizations in support of the CINCs.

The concept of CINC funds is not new. As noted earlier in the study it has been done in the C3 area. The practice has been advocated by former CINCs in their testimony before Congress over the past few years. A small discretionary fund would permit the CINC to gain some of the support he felt he needed. Such funds could be used to pay for studies and other support in long range strategic planning and requirements, since most CINC staffs have in the past found little time for this activity. The control of some funds would allow each individual CINC the freedom to select the problems he thought ought to be studied and the best groups to provide the support. At the same time there already exist programs with the CINC staff and in the defense establishment which might provide support. The MAPP program could be integrated with the Joint Staff, OSD and Service planning and programming functions.
There was disagreement among the former CINCs whom the authors interviewed about the need for expanding the role of CINC scientific advisors. However, members of the technical community believe that increased contact between CINCs and the Washington R&D community could yield benefits during the early stages of the requirements process when weapons are being defined, and in particular, could balance the views of the individual Services. This increased contact and communication could come about through added travel funds or an expanded CINC technical staff, which would be used to make CINCs more aware of future technical possibilities, and to make the technical community more aware of CINC views concerning the requirements for new systems.

Engaging the CINCs more deeply in longer range planning--technical possibilities, threat developments, future economic and political developments--would require not only the support that could be provided by the CINCs' individual discretionary funds, but also a structuring of the CINC staff organization. A firm requirement for imposing this sort of thinking on the CINCs, could enforce a better utilization of manpower in this direction. The corollary of this requirement, of course, would be an effort by the CJCS to coordinate CINC long-range thinking with the resource allocation process.

The problem will not be solved by merely adding bodies to the planning effort. The CINCs should receive a fair share of the best planning officers of the Services. However, CINCs will have to decide where staff enhancement will occur -- in the staff sections dealing with CINC participation in the PPBS -- the direct connection -- or in the staff sections dealing with long-range planning -- the indirect connection with the resource allocation process.

B. INCREASED INTERACTION BETWEEN THE CINCS AND THE DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY

To increase the ability of the joint system to deal with acquisition, it might be useful to arrange for meetings between the CINCs and the development community to consider not only early requirements definition, but to cover later milestones (I&II) in the DAB process. This might be done by including the CINCs in the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and increasing the responsibility of the JROC. The JROC membership could include not only Service representatives (the Vice Chiefs), but also the CINCs or

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1 For a description of the responsibilities of the JROC, see Unified Action Armed Forces, (UNAAF). The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Pub. 2, Washington, DC, December 1986, p. 4-55 to 4-62.
their senior representatives. Moreover, the staffing in the Services for the JROC might include the laboratories and other developers, while the staffing done in support of the VCJCS might include DARPA. Currently CINCs are kept apprised of the JROC Agenda and can attend, or send representation, if they choose.

The CINCs would be participating at an early stage in the acquisition process, as a weapon or system is being defined. The CINCs could comment on the military requirement not only for joint weapons but also for major systems which are to be procured by a single Service for its own use -- an airplane, a tank, a torpedo. All three of these weapons are examples of systems that have important joint resource and warfighting implications, and should be reviewed by the unified commanders before going forward.

C. CJCS/CINC ALTERNATIVE PROGRAM

As a method of allowing the CINCs to follow through on their priorities, the CJCS could produce his own resource constrained program for the major items of interest to the CINCs, that would reflect joint and CINC priorities with approved SecDef fiscal guidance. Most of the work of formulating such a program would fall to the Joint Staff, but the CINCs and their staffs would play an important role in such an effort. The CINC staffs would be monitoring the program as it was formulated, partly through the liaison offices suggested below, but also through periodic meetings to adjudicate particularly difficult issues. The new J7 and J8 staffs would probably be adequate with some contract support.

The ability to prepare a separate program would be dependent on having models that reflect an appropriate level of the program detail, a level that can be somewhat more aggregated than the detail now found in Service POMs. Such models exist, but are and will be dependent on the Services willingness to share information -- planning factors and cost data -- with the Joint Staff and CINCs.

D. CINC LIAISON OFFICES IN THE PENTAGON

Despite the improvement in interaction between the CINCs and the Pentagon in the past several years, a case has been made by some CINCs for larger permanent liaison offices for the CINCs in Washington. This is especially the case for the overseas CINCs--Europe, the Pacific, and the Southern Command. While CINC staff members do come to Washington during the POM process and Service representatives visit the CINCs, there is no way to keep up with the constant interactions of Service, OSD, and OJCS staffs, interactions that in many cases frame options and decisions without direct reference to
CINC interests and requirements. Now that the budget process is on a biennial basis, there will be considerable periods of time between the contacts specified under the POM process.

There has been some movement in this direction. All CINCs have liaison offices, of varying sizes, in Washington. Proponents of CINC liaison offices believe they could be most useful to cover the interim periods. A continuing complaint of the CINCs has been the difficulty of remaining current on new programs and technological development and opportunities. Recent changes such as the new PPBS Electronic Distribution System connects the CINCs to OSD for PPBS documents as quickly as they are distributed in the Pentagon. Still the CINC staff must rely upon others to help them anticipate critical decisions. A liaison office could accomplish that task with a better awareness of the CINCs' interest and needs, and could reduce the amount of personal travel between the CINC headquarters and Washington. One problem with CINC participation involves the schedule and the quick responses needed during the Program Budget Decision cycle. The CINCs, who must participate from distant locations, can not take full advantage of the opportunities that exist within the current process. However, the establishment of Washington liaison offices which could follow the action on a daily basis and keep the CINCs informed in a timely manner, could to some degree mitigate the negative aspects of remote CINC locations, provided these liaison offices were given access to appropriate information.

Despite advantages in increasing CINC participation, these four suggestions could have drawbacks. They could absorb time of the CINCs that should be devoted to more immediate problems of the readiness of the forces. They would be added to a system that is dynamic and changing, perhaps disrupting it. They might use additional resources for the CINCs at a time when the CINCs, among others, are being told they are overstaffed. The liaison offices, rather than speeding up communications, may be adding a filter that could delay or distort communications. If successful, the suggestions would add one more player to the acquisition process, possibly adding to development times, and acquisition complexity.

However, the suggestions do raise the issue of whether or not the Services actually accept the notion of the CINCs as senior warfighters, who can best judge the ultimate use of weapons. Since the CINCs have specialized and regional concerns, taking steps to give added weight to those views would seem appropriate even at the cost of added system complexity and added personnel resources—although a shift of resources from the Service staffs to the CINCs might be appropriate.
Perhaps the most controversial one of the suggestions is the one that would give the CJCS the chance to offer his own balanced resource constrained alternative program based on CINC inputs--an alternative program that would have standing in the POM review. The acquisition part of this program would be a vehicle for the CJCS to balance the Service and CINC proposed acquisition programs, within a resource constrained environment. This could represent a major and revolutionary change that would allow the CJCS to carry out his mandate of:

Submitting to the Secretary alternative recommendations and budget proposals, within projected [i.e. realistic] resource levels....

Short of this change the Services will be asked to do more than they are able to within "projected resources." They will be forced to express their own priorities, not knowing what the CJCS or CINCs would do with this limited budget. The change is also revolutionary because the JCS and CINCs have always avoided such mechanisms that would force them to express priorities in a resource constrained environment, the most recent example being when the CINCs were asked to prepare their IPLs in a form which might be used to highlight their priorities.
APPENDIX A

THE UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED
COMMANDS
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THE UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS

The National Security Act of 1947, as amended in 1958, seeks to "provide for unified strategic direction of the combatant forces, for their operation under unified command, and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval and air forces...."\(^1\)

The basic charter of the Unified Commands was the Unified Command Plan, prepared by the JCS and approved by President Truman on December 14, 1946. On the same day the Strategic Air Command became the first example of what was later to be designated a specified command, although the term did not come into use until 1951. In the 42 years since there have been numerous changes as commands changed designation, were established, and disestablished. Several of the present commands were only recently established: U.S. Space Command in 1985, U.S. Special Operations Command in 1986, U.S. Forces Command and U.S. Transportation Command in 1987.

Since the Reorganization Act of 1958 and the *Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986* that amended the 1947 Act, the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands report through the CJCS to the Secretary of Defense. The chains of command are illustrated on Figure A-1. The CJCS is next in the chain of command but acts as a channel of communications between the CINCs and the NCA and directs their operational activities for the NCA.

The CINCs represent the operational level in the national military chain of command. Each unified CINC with a regional responsibility and each specified CINC with a functional responsibility operates under the terms of the Unified Command Plan. The CINCs and their staffs concern themselves with the planning for and employment of the forces that will be under their command in time of war. As directed by the Secretary of Defense through the CJCS or as authorized by his mission, the CINC issues guidance and orders to his component commanders. It is in the component commands that the

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operational and administrative chains of command link together. In the words of a former D/CINC, General William Y. Smith:

The unified commander has scant control and limited influence over the day-to-day activities of his component commands. That responsibility rests with the military departments. The Reorganization Act of 1958 removed the departments from the operational chain of command but charged them with responsibility to organize, train, equip, and administer service forces so that they become combatant forces to be assigned to a unified or specified command. The broad, service-oriented charter of the military departments means that U.S. present and future military capabilities are developed predominantly on a unilateral service basis. The bulk of the operational doctrine for its forces is, likewise, decided by each individual service. Similarly, the nature and extent of the training necessary to make service forces combatant, that is, the readiness of the forces, is a service responsibility.²

This relationship, despite recent changes, will continue to complicate a more active CINC role in the acquisition process.

A major problem in establishing a formal mechanism by which the CINCs can contribute to the acquisition process derives from the variation in the nature of the unified commands. The problem is particularly difficult for the theater commands and less so for the functional commands -- Space, Transportation and Special Operations -- and for the specified commands -- SAC and Forces Command. Major differences exist in scale, mission, forces assigned in peacetime, and relationship to components. The theater commanders also carry the burden of dealing with allied and other foreign countries, a circumstance that reflects itself in their identified requirements. Each command functions under a unique set of strategic requirements, within a particular environment, and with its own set of constraints. Diversity is reflected also in the dissimilar methodologies for planning used at the commands.

One former CINC with whom the issue was discussed is convinced that the "notional CINC," as dealt with in the law, including the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, is an obsolete concept. The requirements of the CINCs tend to be so dramatically different that he believes generalization only obfuscates the problem.

He also asserted that these differences among CINCs have in the past provided the Services and the JCS with a rationale for cancelling out the CINCs' requests.

The organizational relationships for the theater CINCs are shown in Figure A-2.

Figure A-2. Theater CINC Organizational Relationships
1. **Pacific Command**

Some 368,000 personnel are assigned within PACOM's three components and two subordinate unified commands. The three components (plus the Fleet Marine Force Pacific HQ) are located along with CINCPAC on Oahu, but the forces are dispersed between California and Japan and Okinawa. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) controls some 220 ships and 158,000 personnel, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic (FMFPAC) having another 80,000 personnel.


2. **European Command**

The European Command based in Stuttgart has probably the clearest cut primary mission of all the regional CINCs, exercising peacetime command of some 317,000 personnel of all four Services. Its primary mission in the event of war is deployment of U.S. reinforcements to Allied Command Europe and logistic support of the U.S. forces. Additional peacetime responsibilities are regional contingencies in the Near East and Africa and the administering of security assistance to 52 countries in the area of responsibility. USCINCEUR is also SACEUR and all his component commanders have similar two-hatted roles within the NATO structure along with completely separate NATO staffs. The components are:

a. United States Army Europe (USAREUR) at Heidelberg (220,000 personnel)

b. United States Air Force Europe (USAFE) at Ramstein (61,000 personnel)

c. United States Navy Europe (USNAVEUR) at London and Naples (15,000 personnel)

3. **Southern Command**

The Southern Command is perhaps the most anomalous of all the CINCs. Certainly in terms of assigned personnel it is the smallest, except for the Central Command which is in peacetime essentially a planning HQ. The components are:

a. United States Army Southern (Command) (USARSOOUTH) with some 7,000 personnel based in Panama,
b. U.S. Southern Air Force (12th Air Force) with HQ at Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas. In Panama is the USAF Southern Air Division with some 2,400 personnel, representing the component command in-country.

c. U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command, with some 400 personnel, maintaining a special boat unit, is based in Panama.

4. Atlantic Command

The Atlantic Command, based in Norfolk, consists of four Service components plus several subordinate unified commands. The components are:

a. Atlantic Fleet (LANTFLT), based in Norfolk, with some 250,000 personnel,

b. FMFLANT, based in Norfolk, with some 50,000 personnel,

c. Army Forces Atlantic Command (ARLANT) which in peacetime is the Army's Forces Command, a major Army Command, and also, as U.S. FORSCOM, a specified command.

d. Air Forces Atlantic Command (AFLANT) which in peacetime is the Tactical Air Command, a major Air Force Command, based at Langley AFB, VA.

Neither U.S. Army nor U.S. Air Force forces are assigned to CINCLANT on a day-to-day peacetime basis except for an Air Force unit in Iceland (5,000 personnel). In addition to the Iceland Defense Force, three other subordinate Unified Commands are U.S. Forces Azores (1,400 personnel), U.S. Forces Caribbean (a small planning HQ in Key West), and the Special Operations Command Atlantic, at Fort Bragg.

5. U.S. Central Command

The newest regional unified command has responsibility for U.S. operations in Southwest Asia, the Middle East, and East Africa. Only in 1987 were U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf assigned to CENTCOM's operational control. Previously, its major function was to plan and to administer security assistance programs in the area. CENTCOM is based at MacDill AFB, Florida, and its three wartime components that would provide forces are:

a. Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT) is the Third U.S. Army, based at Fort McPherson, Georgia,

b. Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT) is the Ninth U.S. Air Force at Shaw AFB, South Carolina,
c. U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, based at Pearl Harbor. It has in addition a small task force, the Mideast Force, located primarily at Bahrein in the Persian Gulf.

CENTCOM also plans for the use of United States Marine Corp (USMC) forces.

6. The U.S. Space Command

Based at Peterson AFB, Colorado, the Space Command has as its components:

a. The Air Force Space Command, based at Colorado Springs,

b. The Naval Space Command, Dahlgren, Virginia

c. The Army Space Command, Colorado Springs

7. The U.S. Special Operations Command

United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is based at MacDill AFB, occupying the former Readiness Command Headquarters (REDCOM HQ) and having absorbed the REDCOM staff. The total active and reserve special operations forces assigned to USSOCOM number some 35,000. The components are:

a. The Army 1st Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg

b. The Naval Special Warfare Command, Coronado and Little Creek, Va.

c. The 23rd Air Force, Hurlburt Field, Florida

d. The Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg

The operational role of CINCSOC is ambiguous. In virtually all cases he will assign forces to operate under a supported CINC, and only in very special circumstances would USSOCOM run an operation. The main mission is development of doctrine, training, and special equipment, and budgeting for special operation's forces.

8. The U.S. Transportation Command

This new Unified Command has a global instead of a specific regional orientation. It was formed by combining the three Service Transportation Operating Agencies which have become components of the new unified command based at Scott AFB. The components are:

a. Military Airlift Command at Scott AFB (93,000 personnel), which remained a Specified Command until October 1988.
b. Military Sealift Command at Washington, D.C. (8,600 personnel)

c. Military Traffic Management Command at Falls Church, VA (17,800 personnel)

9. Specified Commands

There are currently two specified commands consisting of single-Service forces only -- the Strategic Air Command and the Army's Forces Command. (The Military Airlift Command which was disestablished in October 1988.) FORSCOM functions as an Army component to the Atlantic Command and as a strategic land force reserve, responsible for defense of Continental United States (CONUS) and for training and readiness of all Army Active, Reserve, and National Guard forces within the CONUS. The specified commands, because of their relationship to one Service, do not share those problems common to the unified commands that derive from the joint character and the relationship of CINC to component. SAC is an Air Force major command, responsible not only for strategic nuclear operations but also for conventional support and reconnaissance to theater CINCs.
APPENDIX B

CINC CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY
ON ISSUES
APPENDIX B

CINC CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY ON ISSUES

An examination was undertaken of the Congressional testimony of the CINCs on the substantive issues of concern to them. The purpose of this investigation was to determine if there were any patterns revealing CINC emphases on short-, medium-, or long-term issues. It was found, in general, that the CINCs emphasized short-term rather than the medium- to long-term issues.

The characterization of CINC concerns voiced in their Congressional testimony was accomplished by grouping the issues they raised into seven categories and presenting the concerns as direct quotations from the testimony. These categories encompassed the full spectrum of issues on the time-line (i.e., short- versus long-term) of CINC concerns. The groupings were as follows:

a) Current logistics and operational shortfalls for readiness and sustainability;
b) Joint Service and Alliance interoperability;
c) Major capability shortfalls;
d) Long term net assessments;
e) Modifications and tradeoffs involving weapons now in the field or about to be deployed;
f) Design and deployment of weapons now on the drawing board, with IOCs on the order of three to nine years in the future; and
g) Major new weapons developments with IOC ten or more years in the future.

These groupings are not mutually exclusive; i.e., an issue categorized as a major capability shortfall (c) may also have been categorized as either of groupings e, f, or g, e.g., a weapon system required to alleviate the shortfall. The remainder of this section summarizes the CINC's concerns according to these categories, paraphrasing the CINCs' testimony for FY78, FY82, and FY86. Additional categories dealing with the CINCs' role in the process and their overall views about their priorities are also listed.
A. FY78 TESTIMONY

General Alexander Haig, USA, CINCEUR:


1. Role in the Process

Haig has discussed several of his concerns about NATO’s chemical posture with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. Overall Views

Our most serious vulnerabilities can generally be categorized under Readiness, Rationalization, and Reinforcement. Specifically, our units are not as ready as they must become...; they are not now adequately configured for smooth integration of multinational, multiservice formations; and they cannot be reinforced as quickly or as smoothly as would be necessary.... All our ongoing force improvement programs are designed to correct those deficiencies, or to moderate their impact where complete correction is infeasible.

   a. Current Logistics and Operational Shortfalls for Readiness and Sustainability

GENERAL

We must improve the readiness of our in-place forces. This aim can be helped by the collocation of combat units with their initial supplies of ammunition.

   It is simply a mistake to suppose that sophisticated weaponry can substitute without limit for adequate manpower levels. On the contrary, more sophisticated weapons are likely to increase, not reduce, the manpower required to maintain and support them.

SPECIFIC ISSUES

POMCUS: We want to improve POMCUS stockage. Also, there is a shortfall in trucks.
War reserve stocks: War reserve stocks are in less satisfactory shape than POMCUS, and lead times for getting well take us into the 1980s. Ammunition stocks should be brought up to authorized levels.

Ammunition storage: EUCOM has plans to increase ammunition storage capacity. An inhibitor is the availability of real estate and facilities to absorb these additional stockages. We are still far from out of the woods in obtaining our total requirements for increased stockage areas.

Air defense: The critical shortage of surface-to-air missiles must be remedied.

Reinforcement: We require the development of quick-debouchment shipping and hasty port facilities.


Manpower:
-- Reserves: Shortfalls in reserve structure, time lag to get reserves ready in time of crisis.
-- National manpower: Some nations do not have full-strength in-place forces, with some percentage of these units located back in the country of origin. The Dutch have about 80 percent of their forces not forward. We are looking for additional facilities to take forces forward.
-- New DoD regulations concerning the security of nuclear weapons storage sites will require additional manpower allocations for Europe.
-- I would be opposed to any reduction of American force levels in Europe.

Support: We are now operating at the margin of a finely-tuned combat-to-support balance.

Positioning: We are suffering from problems of malpositioning and maldeployment of our in-place forces. Many maneuver battalions are situated away from those areas in which they will have to fight. Repositioning would not be cost effective, so we must compensate by increasing our mobility, readiness, and ability to move rapidly with our ammunition in time of crisis (c also).
b. Joint Service and Alliance Interoperability

GENERAL

We have moved in the direction of more standardized systems in the last five years. A very fundamental problem with NATO standardization is that the ramifications and the problems that go with it are far more than just military problems, e.g., it affects national economies. But such problems are not totally insurmountable. I would like to add my voice here as a supporter of standardization, recognizing the great difficulties.

We are expanding our combined exercise program to improve the ability of allied units to operate together in the field.

Standardization of ammunition is critically important. Several NATO projects are underway aimed at reducing the variety of weapons of different calibers and increasing interchangeability of ammunition of the same caliber.

NATO must be ready now. For that reason, while supporting political efforts to improve standardization, we in the military are putting priority in the short term on improving the interoperability of disparately equipped national forces; tank harmonization is only one area promising substantial progress.

Interoperability of arms and equipment within the Alliance must be relentlessly pursued. Although progress has been made, much more needs to be done. Serious consideration should be given to establishing within each ministry of defense powerful bureaucratic constituencies committed solely to achieving standardization and interoperability. For DoD, this might entail creation of an office of standardization in both OSD and with each service.

SPECIFIC ISSUES

Tactical communications: We are not going to realize interoperability or standardization until the 1990s in terms of systems acquisitions. Tactical communications is one of the great motivations behind our exercise programs, in which we have forced units of different nationalities to operate together. What they end up doing is sending a radio set from one national unit to another with a bilingual team. That is the short term fix. The longer term solution requires some standardization decisions (c.g also).

Trucks: Ninety-three percent of our combat trucking requirements in time of combat would be provided by the West Germans. A great deal of this host nation support
is going to be dependent on a parliamentary decision on the justification for the diversion of these resources from the civil sector. This affects our ability to improve our readiness before conflict.

Hydrofoil: Five Allied nations have participated in development of a new Patrol Hydrofoil, the first of which has been launched (b also).

c. Major Capability Shortfalls

GENERAL

Proposed changes to basic divisional organization being studied by the Army...should increase the effectiveness of U.S. forces assigned and earmarked to NATO.

Soviet military posture is quantitatively superior to that of the West in many key areas and is constantly increasing in technological sophistication to the point where the West's traditional qualitative advantage is rapidly evaporating. (Haig agrees that NATO still has the edge in land warfare technology, but the gap has narrowed.)

A quantum jump is needed in NATO's conventional firepower. Certain imbalances in firepower are a product not only of less than adequate artillery, rocket, and in some cases tactical air firepower, but also of fundamental deficiencies in ammunition.

SPECIFIC ISSUES

I am very encouraged by the Army programs initiated recently to deal directly with deficiencies, including increased densities of artillery (one of the most longstanding and pronounced ground deficiencies), increased Cobra/Tow capability, increased antitank capability, increased stockage levels of ammunition, and increased air defense capability, an area that we are increasingly weak in due to lack of modernization (e also).

Reinforcement: We must enhance our reinforcement capability, including improved airlift and sealift, and equally important, must properly identify commercial air and sealift resources which the nations can provide in time of crisis and conflict.

We are going to want to expand our prepositioned capability beyond the Two Plus Ten forces we have now.

There is a shortfall of organic movement capability in the forward deployed units.

C3: C3 is the area of greatest deficiency in our overall structure (f,g also).
-- AWACS: NATO military authorities have established a high priority requirement for a capability such as the AWACS system provides. Therefore, we are strongly behind the acquisition of such a capability (f also).

-- To enhance command and control, we have begun an extensive program of headquarters collocation.

Lance: We have lost something by the decision to eliminate the conventional round for the Lance. We are short of firepower in Western Europe today, and this is an asset that provides firepower in depth. Giving the nuclear Lance a conventional capability would improve our ability to hit massing armor in depth before it is committed and would improve our air defense suppression on fixed sites (e also).

Air: On balance, with the improvements in the Soviet threat, I would like to see some additional air capability in Europe.

As we get our new systems (A-10, F-15, F-16, additional F-111s), we are increasing our ability to conduct all-weather operations (e also).

Anti-tank: I want to look very carefully at exploiting the state-of-the-art in scatterable mine anti-tank capability.

Repositioning maldeployed forces would not be cost effective, so we must compensate by increasing our mobility, readiness, and ability to move rapidly with our ammunition in time of crisis (a also).

We have some fundamental deficiencies in the chemical-biological area where we have not kept pace with Warsaw Pact capabilities. Also, the new tank and mechanized infantry combat vehicle (MICV) have not been provided with chemical biological protection (f also).

We should be concerned not with reductions in our theater nuclear capability but with the need to modernize our theater nuclear capability in light of the changing Soviet threat (f also).

e. Modifications/Tradeoffs Involving Deployed or Almost-deployed Weapons

Conventional Lance: Conventional Lance would enable us to hit targets 75 miles deep in as an area coverage weapon.

Nike: The Nike system is rapidly reaching the limits of its utility.
Increasing NATO's firepower can be accomplished in the short term by procuring additional artillery, antitank and air defense systems.

Recently initiated Army program to increase Cobra/Tow capability (c also).

As we get our new systems (A-10, F-15, F-16, additional F-111s), we are increasing our ability to conduct all-weather operations (c also).

Hydrofoil: Five Allied nations have participated in development of a new Patrol Hydrofoil, the first of which has been launched (c also).

f. Design and Deployment of Weapons now on the Drawing Board, with IOC's on the Order of Three to Nine Years in the Future

C3: The so-called NICSMA program for modernization in the NATO framework runs well into 1985 for its completion. It is already incrementally making a major contribution (c,g also).

AWACS: NATO military authorities have established a high priority requirement for a capability such as the AWACS system provides. Therefore, we are strongly behind the acquisition of such a capability (c also).

Mechanized infantry combat vehicle: MICV now in development clearly has a large silhouette, and in some respects that is a disadvantage. On the other hand, it has certain other assets (maneuverability, power train, weapons system) which suggest that the vehicle is superior to its counterpart BMP. Certain problems with the commander's turret location and visibility have been corrected; other criticisms concern the main armament weapons system (also being corrected), silhouette size, and antitank capability. Also, neither the MICV nor the new tank have been provided with chemical biological protection (c also).

We should be concerned not with reductions in our theater nuclear capability but with the need to modernize our theater nuclear capability in light of the changing Soviet threat (c also).

Firepower: In the long term, increases in NATO firepower can be obtained only by accelerated exploitation of ongoing technological advances in munitions and delivery systems (cannon-launched guided projectiles, air- and artillery-delivered mines, laser-guided weapons, tactical applications of cruise missile technology, and multiple rocket launchers).
g. Major New Weapons Developments with IOC Ten or More Years in the Future

Tactical Communications: In tactical communications, we are not going to realize interoperability or standardization until the 1990s in terms of systems acquisitions. Some of the systems are still on the drawing board (b, c also).

B. FY78 TESTIMONY

Admiral Maurice F. Weisner, USN, CINCPAC:

_Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Strengths, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 95th Congress, Part 3: Manpower and Personnel, Mar 1-11, 1977._

1. Role in the Process

Withdrawal from Korea: We have completed our comments and submitted them to the Joint Chiefs (about proposed troop withdrawals).

2. Overall Views

Overall sea control forces are first in my priorities now. I would like an increased number (25-50%) of ships across the board. I am including air (land- and sea-based) that would go with the forces for sea control (c,e,f also). Next priority would be improvements in projection forces.

a. Current Logistics and Operational Shortfalls for Readiness and Sustainability

Readiness:

-- The biggest problem regarding readiness is the lack of sufficient funding to permit exercise and routine operational activity.

-- (Weisner feels that his forces are not receiving adequate funds to maintain an acceptable level of readiness.)

Manpower: I solicit your support to preclude any further erosion of servicemen's entitlements and benefits.... There is a continuing shortage of qualified enlisted
supervisory personnel which negatively affects training, maintenance and operational capabilities. Skill levels of some assigned personnel are less than required.

Forces in Japan: We must carefully consider any further reductions of facilities and forces in Japan and elsewhere in PACOM in light of the impact on both our military capability and our allies' perception of our resolve.

c. Major Capability Shortfalls

GENERAL

The Pacific force structure has been reduced substantially since 1972. That is, our overall capability has been reduced. Our capabilities will further decline unless the trends are changed.

Overall sea control forces are first in my priorities now. I would like an increased number (25-50 percent) of ships across the board. I am including air (land- and sea-based) that would go with the forces for sea control (c, f also). Next priority would be improvements in projection forces.

SPECIFIC ISSUES

Potential loss of Philippine bases: Loss of bases would result in decreased contingency response time, reduced forward based POL and WRM storage, longer logistic pipelines, degraded communications, loss of ship repair facilities and loss of training areas.

Naval gun power: We would like to have more firepower to support a full division of marine assault (e also).

Sea lanes: With the existing forces, the U.S. has a 50-50 chance of keeping the sea lanes open. Five years ago that chance was 60 percent.

e. Modifications/Tradeoffs Involving Deployed or Almost-deployed Weapons

GENERAL

Overall sea control forces are first in my priorities now. I would like an increased number (25-50 percent) of ships across the board. I am including air (land- and sea-based) that would go with the forces for sea control (c, f also). Next priority would be improvements in projection forces.
SPECIFIC ISSUES

Withdrawal from Korea: From a purely military point of view, I would prefer to see the ground forces not reduced because I think it would reduce the deterrent.... If necessary, reductions should be based in part on the development of a ROK capability to assume the responsibility for the missions of U.S. units withdrawn.... Some reduction within support organizations could be possible without seriously affecting capabilities and deterrent value.

Withdrawal from Asia generally: Major withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from the Western Pacific area could be a destabilizing factor....

Naval gun power: We would like to have more firepower to support a full division of marine assault (c also).

Sea lanes: With the existing forces, the U.S. has a 50-50 chance of keeping the sea lanes open. If we take approximately half of those forces away, we will only be able to keep the sea lanes of communication open to Hawaii and Alaska.

Panama Canal: There would be a need for an increase in U.S. naval strength if we did not have control of the Panama Canal. We would have to put critical items being shipped by sea over a greater area.

f. Design and Deployment of Weapons now on the Drawing Board, with IOCs on the Order of Three to Nine Years in the Future

Overall sea control forces are first in my priorities now. I would like an increased number (25-50 percent) of ships across the board. I am including air (land- and sea-based) that would go with the forces for sea control (c, e also). Next priority would be improvements in projection forces.

C. FY82 SUMMARY

General Richard H. Ellis, USAF, CINCSAC:

1. Overall Views

Budgets must place major emphasis on both modernization and readiness.

As Secretary Weinberger said, "It is absolutely essential that we first improve the readiness of our forces and simultaneously begin to improve the strategic balance." Judicious, timely and fiscally responsible strategic force modernization can -- in fact -- simultaneously upgrade readiness and realign the balance. In my opinion, this must be our nation's number one priority.

MX must be our first priority. The strategic manned penetrator remains critical for an effective triad. The immediacy of the near term threat demands an interim bomber. We need an advanced technology bomber for the 1990s, and without an effective C3I network, strategic modernization does not regain needed capability (f also).

Force modernization has become a necessary investment.... In my view, multi-year procurement should be explored as a means of meeting these objectives.

a. Current Logistics and Operational Shortfalls for Readiness and Sustainability

GENERAL

In recent years, O&M appropriation has been seriously underfunded. Since SAC cannot cover such shortfalls, supplemental funding becomes essential to maintaining readiness and training. As in prior years, we are again forced to defer critical maintenance and repair of runways, buildings, and other facilities.... Funding for fuel, supplies, spare parts and a host of other training and readiness-related requirements limit the level of readiness we can achieve.

O&M shortfalls in areas not directly related to the operational mission contribute to lower retention rates.

SPECIFIC ISSUES

Flying hours: Due to budget constraints, SAC's flying hour program, for the past several years and projected for the next five, shows an ever-increasing margin of difference between the number of flying hours needed and those approved and funded.... Less training has translated into unsatisfactory aircrew performance on operational readiness inspections and increased accidents attributable to personnel factors.
Trainers: Our antique inventory of training devices reduces our inflight training activity by about 8 percent. Our present B-52 cockpit procedural trainers, bombing and navigation trainers and defensive system trainers are very outdated.

SRAM: We are short several hundred short range attack missiles over what our aircraft can carry.

Underfunded aircraft: Considering POS and WRM requirements, the B-52 is our most severely underfunded aircraft. The FB-111 is SAC’s most severely underfunded aircraft when considering only POS.

Location of ordnance: Our problem with ordnance is location; they are not usually where we need them.... One of the more critical things in our conventional capability has been the reduction of our overseas base structure in the past 10 years. Today, the only base that we have for full utilization outside of CONUS is Andersen AF Base on Guam.

Strategic Projection Force: Funds must be made available for prepositioning war reserve materials (WRM), petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL), and munitions that are required to support immediate employment needs.

Personnel: Today we are undermanned in both quality and quantity. These shortages are a function of our inability to retain vital personnel resources.

Insufficient funding for SAC POS, WRSK/BLSS and OWRM requirements limited logistics supportability for the initial period of a contingency operation as well as long term sustainability.

c. Major Capability Shortfalls

GENERAL

The serious strategic imbalance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union that I described last year has worsened, and under current programming, will continue to exist to some degree throughout the decade. Even with the forces now programmed, we cannot achieve military damage expectancy (MDE) representing a balance of power any time in the [deleted].... The big dip happened in 1980 when we went from just below the balance line of 1977 to well down into the depths of the difference in hard target kill capability and military kill capability.
Unfortunately, we have allowed concurrent weaknesses to develop within two legs of the triad. Our ICBMs are vulnerable and our bombers are old. The result is an adverse tilt in the strategic nuclear balance.

SPECIFIC ISSUES

ICBM vulnerability: The combined effect of improved Soviet warhead accuracy and increased MIRV capability threatens the survivability of our Minuteman and Titan forces (f also).

Mobility: Mobility (of ICBMs) is the essential ingredient. It provides us the ability when deployed to rapidly reconfigure the force. In the long term, it provides us the capability to hedge against unpredictable threats.

Bomber:

-- Lacking a near term interim bomber, our deterrent capabilities would remain significantly constrained for most of the 1980s.

-- Several major modifications required to enhance the B-52's capability to penetrate in the mid-1980s remain unfunded.

Strategic connectivity: Without an upgrade to our C3I systems, we cannot properly talk to nor execute our forces. The current system is highly vulnerable to attack. SAC is also concerned about the capability to detect and assess an ICBM, SLBM or atmospheric attack.... Neither the terrestrial- nor space-based segment fulfills our need.

Strategic reconnaissance: There is a need to improve Rivet Joint (aircraft) tactical communications.

Tankers: Current air refueling assets are insufficient to carry out even our most fundamental tasks (e also). The KC-10 provides a long range deployment capability desperately needed by the general purpose forces.

Rapid deployment force: I urge this committee to support the funding necessary to expand this RDF capability through resources currently requested.

Air defense: We are very vulnerable to their air-breathing leg of the triad, the Backfire. Our strategic air defense capability today is very weak to poor. They are very limited and could only begin to act in response to very light attacks.
Interdiction: Our sea power interdiction capability is severely limited by the lack of weapons with enough range to allow aircraft survivability.

d. Long Term Net Assessments

The Soviet residual force advantage will continue to grow until around 1986, when the MX begins to enter the operational inventory.

e. Modifications/Tradeoffs Involving Deployed or Almost-deployed Weapons

ALCM: It cannot duplicate the many advantages inherent in manned penetrating systems.... ALCMs start coming on line this year with our first full operational squadron by December 1982.

B-52:

-- In the very near future, the B-52 must be relegated to a standoff role. The B-52G models should convert to ALCM carriers in the mid-1980s, followed by the newer B-52H models by the end of the decade.

-- We are improving our offensive avionics system in the B-52G and H force, and updating both with certain defensive systems.

-- The SAC plan was presented to OSD to upgrade 35 B-52Hs as part of the Strategic Projection Force.

Tankers: To offset refueling degrades, additional tankers are needed today (c also). The opportunity to modernize our air refueling capability is available through continued acquisition of the KC-10 and implementation of the KC-135 reengine (KC-135R) program.... The KC-10 is about equal to an additional two to three KC-135s.... It is not just a tanker. It is also a cargo carrier.

C3I:

-- JCS Connectivity Study recommendations centered on improving the present C3I network with procedural changes and off-the-shelf equipment.

-- The only way to ensure survivable and enduring strategic connectivity in the 1980s is to increase our reliance on mobile and space-based systems and to upgrade aging systems. We are now replacing the SAC Communications System with an upgraded digital network (SACDIN). We have also proposed the acceleration of our airborne command posts program,... and are now deploying the AFSATCOM network.
To assure receipt of infrared sensor warning information, SAC supports the
addition of mobile ground terminals as an interim solution for providing
communications and processing capability.

SAC's highest priority programs begin with the accelerated acquisition of
seven E-4B aircraft.

Minuteman:

-- We need near-term and far-term improvements to the Minuteman force to
continue to improve its effectiveness.

-- I support replacing Minuteman II missiles with Minuteman IIIIs to the extent of
deploying 50 additional MMIIIs.

-- The FY82 amended budget request includes funds to continue the effort to
install lithium batteries in MMIII launch facilities.

-- If it were possible to harden the Minuteman force to the point of survivability,
it would negate part of the problem which MX addresses. But studies have
indicated that upgrading the current Minuteman silos is not feasible. Even if it
were survivable, Minuteman does not provide the necessary capability against
the increasingly hard, time-urgent, Soviet target base in the 1990s.

GLCM and PII: I strongly support the deployment of that force.

Titan II: Modifications funding is in the 1981 and 1982 budget.

Air defense: Since 1979, one Air National Guard F-101 squadron has begun its
conversion to F-4 aircraft, and the date for formation of the first strategic air defense F-15
fighter interceptor squadron has been accelerated.... The Strategic Defense fighter forces
do need to be modernized. The Air Force recommendation for such modernization calls for
a one-for-one conversion of the active F-106s with F-15s. The Air National Guard F-106s
will be modernized with either F-4s, F-16s, or F-15s, depending upon availability.

Strategic reconnaissance: We need: numerical increase in force structure (aircraft);
acceleration of modernization, sensor and ECM programs; and development of an advanced
data transmission system.... Regarding the RC-135, I again stress the importance of fully
modernizing all Rivet Joint aircraft.

f. Design and Deployment of Weapons now on the Drawing Board,
with IOCs on the Order of Three to Nine Years in the Future

Bombers: If one of the bomber programs must yield to fiscal limitations and only a
single bomber program can be pursued, it should be the new-technology bomber.
-- B-52 conversion: We have also recommended that the B-52H convert to ALCM (hopefully, an advanced ALCM).

-- Interim bomber: For the past two years, SAC has recommended the early deployment of an interim bomber to offset the serious near-term threat. The two candidate aircraft are a modified FB-111 or some version of the B-1. SAC continues to believe that the FB-111 is the best alternative. The choice should be made in terms of availability, cost and minimum impact on a new technology bomber program.

-- Follow-on bomber: As the B-52 transitions..., we must design, develop, and deploy a follow-on bomber.... We should start now to develop a new technology bomber...with the capability to penetrate the projected defense environment of the Soviet Union into the next century.... A sound planning date for the first operational squadron of such penetrators is 1990.

MX:

-- MX must be our first priority.... We must correct our vulnerability by deploying the MX in a mobile basing configuration. As MX full-scale engineering development progresses, SAC continues to believe our operational requirements are covered (c also).... Interruptions or delay in its development and acquisition will leave a void in our strategic capabilities.

-- It is the mobile aspect of MX that will offset the current vulnerability of our ICBM force and makes it a critical deterrent weapon system for the later part of the 1980s.

-- Deploying MX in existing Minuteman silos would push its IOC back one year and be significantly more expensive than current plans. If we had the mobility in the Minuteman force that we are building into the MX force, the need for MX would not be as pressing.

-- There are major operational disadvantages to the option of placing MX in vertical MPS.

-- There are problems with two proposals for putting MX to sea.

-- Launch on warning is an option we have and must maintain.

C3I:

-- To correct deficiencies, SAC is urging the earliest possible deployment of a survivable military satellite communications systems as the best long term solution for insuring two-way connectivity from the NCA to the forces.... First aircraft modification for the Air Launched Control System (ALCS) Phase III is scheduled for March 1984.
-- The development of follow-on ballistic missile launch detection systems with on-board processing and cross-linked communications should be accelerated.

-- Two additional PAVE PAWS sites are needed to close gaps in our current SLBM warning radar. Timely action on the southeast radar would avoid the necessity of costly modification to the Eglin and MacDill radars.

-- The development of a survivable atmospheric surveillance system is required to decrease our vulnerability to a precursor bomber and cruise missile attack.

-- I would stress that funding be maintained to insure a Consolidated Space Operations Center IOC by 1986. The CSOC will provide a peacetime backup to the Satellite Control Facility.

SLCMs: From a targeting standpoint, the addition of SLCMs on a survivable platform would be desirable; however, I think the Navy would take exception to the operational constraints on nuclear attack subs used in such a role.

g. Major New Weapons Developments with IOC Ten or More Years in the Future

ABM:

-- We should increase the R & D that is going into ABM.

-- Depending upon the threat, the MX will be adapted to provide adequate survivability. This could be achieved by proliferating the number of MX missiles or shelters, deploying an ABM system or a combination of the three.

-- Defending MX with BMD may become an attractive option depending upon the Soviet threat.

-- The concept of defending MX and Minuteman with space lasers seems promising for the future and I fully support the technology which would make this possible.

-- Minuteman: Defense of the Minuteman system is not a very attractive option.

D. FY82 TESTIMONY

General Robert E. Huyser, USAF, CINCMAC:

1. Role in the Process

MAC, through Headquarters USAF, works closely with the JCS in developing... force requirements... translated into budgetary requirements which are then presented to Congress.

2. Overall Views

The Air Force's action to temporarily defer long-term aircraft production in favor of increased operating support of our existing forces through increased spares funding...is the way to go. I firmly believe that maximizing the readiness of our current forces and providing the funding to sustain that level will result in the greatest short-term return on our readiness dollars. Then, once we have achieved this position, we can return attention to readiness enhancements through new aircraft production and other modernization programs.

The three priorities for our command are first, to realize the full potential of existing assets: second, to enhance present assets through modification to increase their capability; and third, to procure new assets to meet the remaining requirements.

I am not sure that my first priority has been a priority in the budgetary process in the past. In the last budget exercises in the Air Force that was recognized as the No. 1 priority. (Huyser agrees that the cause of maximizing existing resources was supplanted by procurement of new aircraft). I do not think O&M funds have received the attention they receive now.

We have identified sustainability as the one top funding priority for FY83-87.

a. Current Logistics and Operational Shortfalls for Readiness and Sustainability

GENERAL

Readiness is our lifeline because we have to sustain increased rates of utilization of equipment.

The most significant constraint on our capability is the lack of spare parts.

Real growth in our force readiness posture can be ultimately satisfied by the initiatives taken in increasing the CRAF capability and purchasing the C-X, H-60, H-X and weather support equipment (c,e also).
SPECIFIC ISSUES

Skilled personnel: We have lost 7.5 percent of our career people and gained 9 percent more first-termers.... Unless we take immediate action to reverse this trend, the command will be in serious trouble within the near future.

Spare parts: Spare parts deficiencies for the C-5 and C-141 are what causes the deficit in our ability to meet requirements. Spares and parts are my lifeline. We have to increase our tempo to fulfill the need. During the year there were 20,000 times when we had to cannibalize from other aircraft to meet the priority missions.... In general, we lack about 50 percent of spare capability.

Vehicles: We are very short of vehicles and those we have are largely outdated. Spares for the vehicles, pallets, and material handling equipment (a percentage of which is outdated) are also deficient.

Flying time: I am confident that we must provide more flying time than we are now authorized to keep our crews properly trained and our support functions adequately exercised to be able to properly respond to our wartime mission. Flying time is also constrained by lack of spares and support manpower.

Maintenance: Twenty-seven percent of our backlog of maintenance and repair for FY80 was related to readiness facilities.

Rescue and weather: Readiness improvements in the areas of rescue and weather are also essential.

c. Major Capability Shortfalls

GENERAL

We have two types of deficiencies when it comes to large contingencies. With the major strategic airlifters, the C-5s and C-141s are only capable of meeting 62 percent of the surge requirement; and in a sustained operation, only 52 percent.... In larger scenarios, we have an overall deficiency in airlift, principally in outsize cargo-carrying capability. We need more airlift aircraft.
SPECIFIC ISSUES

Rescue: We are very deficient in capability in rescue forces (see f,a). Recent transfers of rescue helicopters have left us extremely short of the required combat rescue capability.

Weather: As for weather, where we also have a deficit, it is primarily updating and getting modernized equipment (e also).

Mobility: Cannot meet requirement for tonnage to be moved in the first 20 days of conflict.

Command and control: Command and control system lacks the capability for broad-scale, decentralized force control. Unless this capability is upgraded, MAC will not be able to properly meet the nation's mobility requirements (e also).

C-X: C-X will provide the capability to cruise long range with outsize cargo into small, austere airfields (f also).

Reserves: I strongly encourage an increase in support missions for our Air Reserve Forces.... Additional support missions will increase MAC's ability to perform its wartime mission.

There is a shortfall in intratheater airlift in Europe (e also).

e. Modifications/Tradeoffs Involving Deployed or Almost-deployed Weapons

C-141: We are stretching the fuselage by 23 feet, adding increased volume to its carrying capacity and adding an air refueling capability. Regarding augmentation of the fleet, the C-141 is out of production and tooling is not available for restart....

C-5: Our program is to correct the deficiency in the wing, to put a new wing or new parts for the stress-carrying capability on the aircraft. In addition, procurement of additional C-5s is being considered against the wartime airlift requirement in the C-X request for proposal.

C-130: Additional C-130 aircraft...would do nothing to redress the need to carry outsize cargo. In an effort to fill a gap being created by the age of the present active duty C-130 fleet, the Air Force is considering requesting funding for the purchase of additional C-130 aircraft in the FY83 and FY84 budgets.
Civil aircraft: We have been pursuing the Civil Reserve Air Fleet enhancement program to modify new civil aircraft to provide a convertible capability between cargo and passengers. We have not been too successful (only one aircraft on contract). But there are plenty of potential takers for the program to modify current assets (104 airplanes). That is a very economical way to increase our cargo carrying capability.

Weather: Equipment for the Air Weather Service needs to be added, updated and replaced (c also).

Command and control: Major upgrade of MAC command and control system will implement a broad scale program to provide the minimum essential facilities and equipment to execute our combat mission (c also).

Intratheater airlift: Additional C-130 squadrons in Europe would relieve some but not all of the lift shortfalls... as it cannot address the problem of outsized lift... (c also).

f. Design and Deployment of Weapons now on the Drawing Board, with IOC's on the Order of Three to Nine Years in the Future

CX: We have enough money to have an initial operating capability by 1986 or 1987. Personally, I would like to see it sooner because a deficit exists today. The collective combat experience of the command was tasked to assist in the development of the defensive systems requirement for the C-X. A unique aspect of the C-X is its ability to perform both the intertheater and intratheater roles of any contingency.... The CX is not an interim solution. It is the mid- and long-term solution to our airlift shortfall.

H-X: We have a program for a new rescue helicopter called H-X to address the deficiency in that capability.

g. Major New Weapons Developments with IOC Ten or More Years in the Future

Advanced Civil Military Aircraft: MAC supports the joint development of an aircraft capable of being used by the military and civilian sectors. The technology required...is not expected to be available until the 1990s.... The ACMA is a long term program to replace the C-141s and C-5s as they reach the end of their service lives.... The savings that can accrue through jointly developed aircraft are significant.
E. FY82 TESTIMONY

General Bernard W. Rogers, USA, CINCEUR:


1. Overall Views

The modernization of LRTNF is my No. 1 priority, to follow through and get those GLCMs and Pershing IIs deployed.

In the face of the challenges in European Command, my priorities are readiness, reinforcement and sustainability.

a. Current Logistics and Operational Shortfalls for Readiness and Sustainability

GENERAL

All of us must improve and accelerate our readiness, our reserve capability, host nation support, airlift, ammunition stocks, pre-positioned war reserve stocks.

Readiness:

Personnel must have the highest priority.... They need military construction funding for living and working conditions.... I underscore O&M funding because it degrades theater readiness.

Reserve components are not at this time in a state of readiness at which they could be mobilized quickly.

Sustainability:

We have some dangerous shortages in certain types of ammunition.

Our industrial base today cannot support us in time.

We do not have a sufficient manpower base in the U.S. Army today. This country will run out of infantrymen, tankers, artillerymen, and combat medics before the draft can take over and send me a steady stream for replacements.
SPECIFIC ISSUES

  POMCUS stocks need to be brought up to full level.

  There is a need for more logistics support personnel.

  One major problem is the lack of realistic chemical stimulants for training.... On a more basic level, very few of our personnel are trained in chemical employment.

c. Major Capability Shortfalls

GENERAL

  It is my opinion that NATO has now been surpassed, or very soon will be, in all categories of war-fighting capability necessary to carry out our strategy. There is the continual decline of NATO's capabilities versus those of the Warsaw Pact.... The coupling of the steady accumulation of Soviet military power with the insufficient and faltering response by the alliance places in jeopardy the very credibility of our deterrent.

SPECIFIC ISSUES

  Chemical warfare: We must improve our capability for chemical warfare. What I want is for the alliance to have a chemical retaliatory capability in adequate numbers to deter the use of chemical weapons by the other side.

  Reinforcement: We must improve our strategic lift.

e. Modifications/Tradeoffs Involving Deployed or Almost-deployed Weapons

  The U.S. and the Allies must provide additional forces and resources, not just redistribute resources that are already inadequate.

  LRTNF: The alliance must follow through on the decision to modernize its forces with the Pershing II and the GLCM.... Efforts such as the TNF Command, Control and Communications System Improvement Program and the Long Range Security Program are directed at improving the [deleted] supporting the theater nuclear force. We also have a very extensive research and development program underway which is addressing technological aspects related to security and survivability of theater nuclear weapons.

  Chemical weapons: The U.S. should start producing the binary chemical round.
Enhanced radiation: I believe we should produce the enhanced radiation, reduced blast warhead. But pushing for ER at this time would jeopardize TNF modernization.

155mm warhead: I would like to have a new 155 warhead to replace the one which I think is almost obsolescent. I was very pleased to learn that the decision was being made to build the new warhead.... We need the 155 modern nuclear warhead.

g. Major New Weapons Developments with IOC Ten or More Years in the Future

This country and the alliance must make major efforts in exploiting the collective technological and scientific superiority of the West to find breakthroughs which will be helpful on the battlefield.

F. FY82 TESTIMONY

Admiral Harry D. Train, USN, CINCLANT:


1. Role in the Process

(Train believes that CINC inputs have been considered.)

2. Overall Views

Combat readiness deficiencies differ somewhat from force level deficiencies in that an intelligent application of increased funding can effect relatively sharp near-term increases in combat readiness, whereas significant force level increases, even when amply funded, often take years to materialize.

One of the issues that is constantly being addressed is how to find the knee of the curve between readiness and modernization. Those two things must come into balance. Another way to describe it is, "what is the balance between sustainability and war-fighting capability?" If you can't win the first battle, there is not much utility in investing a great deal of effort in those things that permit you to fight the battle for a long time. Today we are very wisely applying assets to our readiness problem, and the recent budgets do reflect
a renewed awareness of readiness, but we cannot forget modernization and initial war-fighting capability.

So I make no apologies for speaking very strongly in favor of those modernization steps that will give us the weapons to fight the war in the mid-1980's and late 1980's. That is absolutely necessary.

We must have adequate numbers of ships and aircraft to accomplish our assigned missions and sufficient ordnance to match the numbers of assets. Both issues are very important to our national security and I believe a balanced approach is necessary.

The CNO's program emphasizes force readiness and sustainability at the expense of out year force levels.

Priorities for personnel and material support as well as weapons must, to a great degree, be in consonance to achieve a true improvement in force posture.

Priorities: 1. Building up to a 15-carrier battle group navy. 2. Acquisition of Aegis cruiser and SM-2 missile. 3. Readiness measures to provide necessary amounts of ammunition, spare parts, and other war-sustaining capability. 4. Personnel actions.

a. Current Logistics and Operational Shortfalls for Readiness and Sustainability

GENERAL

Overall readiness of forces and ability to support sustained combat operations is degraded as a result of budgeting constraints and shortages of qualified personnel.

While we are short of ships and aircraft, we are at least proportionally short of armament, ancillary equipment, and support. The prioritization of resources was probably correct, but the magnitude of the budget shortfall over such a long time has turned some broad but manageable issues in sustainability into some major problems in readiness.

SPECIFIC ISSUES

Readiness deficiencies:

-- Significant decline in operational readiness rates within the fleet (especially lower fleet unit COR rates); ships, aircraft, ship personnel, aircraft personnel, ASW, and ASuW readiness are all low or unsatisfactory.

-- Ship overhauls and aircraft rework programs have been deferred.
Sustainability:

-- I am concerned about our ability to out-sustain our adversary...we are support-force poor; as a result, overall logistics support for these forces is marginal. Shortages in mobile logistic support force will make it exceedingly difficult to sustain our at-sea forces.

-- Current available fuel and prepositioned war reserve stock levels ashore, and level-of-effort weapons can support sustained operations for a short period. Threat-oriented weapons (e.g., Mk-46 torpedoes, Phoenix missiles) would probably be expended well before that time. Also short of Sparrows, Sidewinders, AEGIS weapon systems, SAM-2 missiles, and Harpoons.

Other issues:

-- AAW: Shortages of officers, F-14 and other armament ancillary and support equipment, air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles, other equipment, training services. Downward trend in AAW readiness.

-- ASW: Same as in other areas: deficiencies in equipment, spares, personnel, and training, and a downward trend. Close-in carrier ASW defense has been limited. Also low on sonobuoys.

-- Amphibious warfare: Principal deficiencies are aircraft availability and aircrew tactical proficiency.

-- ASuW: Equipment shortfalls, shortages of gun ammunition and personnel, training problems.

-- Subs: Spare shortages for 688-class subs.

-- Insufficient east coast capacity to overhaul all LANTFLT subs on that coast.

-- Ammunition: Restricted prepositioning and support of stocks due to funding shortfall for ordnance handling equipment.

-- Torpedoes: Current stocks of ASW torpedoes (Mk46,48) are insufficient to support adequate training. Nonavailability of torpedo spares and the number of unserviceable torpedoes awaiting parts has increased.

-- Surge Capability: Not much of a surge capability due to requirement for presence in Indian Ocean.

-- P-3s: Overseas bases for P-3s have inadequate support assets.

-- O&MN funding: Shortfalls have caused deficiencies in general purpose forces overhauls. Funding has been barely adequate for ship steaming days and training operations, aircraft flying hours and training. Supply and Equipage Program is also inadequately funded.
Manpower shortages, lack of maintenance support, and spare parts deficiencies, cannibalization of major end items; lack of sufficient trained personnel, inadequate support facilities, large amount of cross-decking for spares, repairs, and ammunition (for cargo ammunition ships).

c. Major Capability Shortfalls

GENERAL

Our capability is limited to the sequential execution of our missions due to lack of forces. (Train is not confident that we could prevail even in a best-case scenario.)

Current force deployments, in conjunction with training and exercise requirements, preclude additional forward presence to react to areas of potential instability or to respond to threats.

Shortages of adequate armament support equipment significantly degrade fleet capabilities.

SPECIFIC ISSUES

AAW: Capability is not keeping pace with the threat. We do not have a weapon system at sea that can cope with a large percentage of the threat missiles that the Soviet Navy presents today. Also, personnel shortfalls seriously impact upon our AAW capability.

Adequate forces (primarily carriers) are not available for Norwegian Sea operations without a drawdown elsewhere.

Amphibious lift: Present 1.15 MAF lift capability of ships is certainly not enough; 1.5 MAF lift would be minimum.

F-4s programmed for reinforcement have range limitations.

Mine Warfare: Current capability compared to the threat is unsatisfactory.

-- MCM: Limited MCM forces and personnel are not sufficient. Lack of assets severely impacts airborne MCM capability.

-- Minehunting: 40-ship tripartite minehunter program would certainly increase our capability.

-- Mines: Do not have an extensive inventory of mines. Captor mines would enhance our (ASW) capability to constrain and attrit the Soviet submarine force in the North Atlantic (also).
Our ability to protect the S. Atlantic SLOCs has diminished.

Our capability to carry out the peacetime objective of preserving a favorable balance of political/military influence through military presence in the southern area is, at best, marginal.

Second priority (acquisition of Aegis cruiser) would be an essential part of the 15-carrier battle group and the AAW capability that would be required to fight the Soviet Navy.

e. Modifications/Tradeoffs Involving Deployed or Almost-deployed Weapons

General: Risk would be reduced by increasing the number of active, in-service carrier battle groups available to the fleet commanders to 15 (number one priority). In the near-term, I recommend recommissioning Oriskany and Bon Homme Richard. We also require surface combatants with credible offensive firepower, as well as additional battle group escorts, and mobile logistic support ships and additional P-3 squadrons.

Our forces are more modern than before and this qualitative technological trend should continue.

AAW: Increased funding to support the AAW modernization of the DDG-37 class guided missile destroyer is important. Increases to our F-14 and F/A-18 aircraft inventories are essential.... Other forces such as more EA-6B AEW aircraft are also important.... Inventory shortfalls include the Phoenix, Sparrow, and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles.

The Mk48 torpedo and Harpoon missile inventories are short of objectives.

I support the reactivation of the Iowa class battleships, fitted out with SLCMs and SAMs....

Tacair: Acquisition of additional sea-based tactical air capability must be continued.

Mine Warfare: We have a limited number of MCM ships and a very limited number of airborne MCM helicopters. Our mine inventory is not extensive. Recent decision to fund CH-53E production through FY82-83 has significant long-term benefits.

ASW: We need to purchase more torpedoes and sonobuoys.

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f. Design and Deployment of Weapons now on the Drawing Board, with IOC's on the Order Three to Nine Years in the Future

AAW: Acquisition of the Aegis-class cruiser with SM-2 missiles will reconcile AAW problem.

Mine Warfare:

-- Mines: Captor mines would enhance our (ASW) capability to constrain and attrite the Soviet submarine force in the North Atlantic (c also). CNO: Programs that support the requirement to be able to establish minefields at chokepoints "include the Captor ASW mine for deep water, an intermediate water depth (IWD) mine, and Quickstrike for air and sub delivered shallow water mines."

-- Minesweeping: Tripartite minesweeping program involving the acquisition of 40 fiberglass minehunters would certainly increase our capability. The British have a somewhat larger program.

-- U.S. MCM: Surface and airborne MCM equipments now under development...will afford our forces of the 1985-90 period and thereafter a substantial step up in meeting a mine warfare threat. New MCM ships...begin entering our inventory in FY86.

Carriers: I recommend authorizing construction of an additional large deck nuclear powered aircraft carrier....

Amphibious lift: Our amphibious lift should be increased by procurement of about nine additional amphibious ships.

G. FY86 TESTIMONY

Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., USN, CINCPAC:

1. Overall Views

As a theater commander, I am naturally concerned with what is on hand now, because we might be called upon to fight at any moment. On the other hand, I cannot lose sight of the need to keep pace with modern technology and the requirements for advanced weapons systems and munitions (on which we count so much) to counter the numerical advantages enjoyed by potential adversaries. With limited resources, we simply cannot satisfy simultaneously in one year all of the immediate and long-term requirements. Put in
that light, programs in the 1986 budget achieve the appropriate balance between CINCs' current and future needs.

The budget doesn't call for massive force building, and I don't want that. But we do need to sustain forces, and the budget takes quantum steps there.

It would be inappropriate to prioritize O&M, readiness, and sustainability over modernization. All are important and each warrants emphasis. To protect modernization items, spending cuts are normally taken in the areas of repair parts and maintenance and WRM programs like ammunition and petroleum. Such cuts impact sustainability and can limit our ability to respond.

Thus, I would respond "yes" (to the question "Should we minimize reductions in O&M, readiness, and sustainability and should these be the "last" cut?"). The balance between modernization and support for existing or new systems cannot be maintained if cuts are made to O&M, readiness, and sustainability in favor of modernization.

a. Current Logistics and Operational Shortfalls for Readiness and Sustainability

GENERAL

Over the past four years, there was significant improvement of on-hand balances of key general supplies, munitions and petroleum stocks. However, the increased Soviet threat has increased requirements, so there is still a considerable way to go.

Theater commanders are particularly sensitive to sustainability needs because they're charged with being prepared to conduct operations at any time. It is not a simple problem given the continuing introduction of new weapon systems and munitions. Shortages of essential war-fighting items still remain to be addressed and the FY86 budget is another important step in correcting deficiencies.

My primary sustainability objective would be to have sufficient capability to fight one day longer than any enemy. However, we have established a lesser but optimum affordable level of stocks to support operations until resupply. In the key general materiel categories (munitions, petroleum, critical spares, and major end items), we must continue progress toward our goal of minimal stocks. Our most critical shortages are in munitions (Navy and AF air-to-air, standoff, and force multiplier/modern munitions for ground forces).
SPECIFIC ISSUES

A few categories deserve special mention:

-- Navy and AF threat-oriented air-to-air missiles (the "largest deficiency"; Navy AIM-9 Sidewinders and Phoenix missiles), and Army and Marine Corps improved conventional artillery munitions (155mm, 8-inch, Copperhead) must be protected. Slippage in AMRAAM delivery has added urgency to AIM-7 and AIM-9 acquisitions (c also).

-- Spares and repair parts programs, critical to a unified commander, must not slacken.

-- Military construction, especially storage facilities for petroleum and ammunition, is needed to support wartime requirements.

-- Wartime hospitals should be prepositioned in-theater in a "turn key" mode.

Readiness- O&M funds, especially ship maintenance, steaming hours, flying hours, personnel improvements, are very important.

To sustain personnel readiness, must increase emphasis on enlightened personnel policies.

-- Army is OK, but Navy is hard-pressed to maintain readiness posture under current end-strength limitations, especially with new ships and aircraft coming on line (gapping some shore billets to meet requirements).

-- Modest growth in AF and MC end-strength is imperative to man new programs.

-- AF, Army, and Navy unit C-ratings gained in 1984; MC down slightly due to personnel shortages.

-- Constrained manpower levels in support forces (Army and MC) severely limit sustainability.

Ship modernization and fleet maintenance will finally get an alarming backlog under control and permit a quantum step forward in naval readiness. We have bought ships but have not put enough munitions and aircraft on them.

Both air services are far short of their standoff munitions goals (c also): need for more and improved TASM and TLAM cruise missiles, Harpoon ASMs, HARMs, Mavericks (IIR and Alt. Warhead variants), boosted GBU-15 glide bomb.
If FYDP reduced to 3 percent increase (with strategic programs fenced), O&M funds would be reduced first (decreased readiness), then munitions and spares procurement would be affected (affecting sustainability).

Other issues:
   -- If short of Captor mines, other mines are used, of which we have a considerable inventory.
   -- Further declines in the Merchant Marine could impact adversely on sustainability.

**c. Major Capability Shortfalls**

**GENERAL**

Modernization priorities: long-range delivery platforms, OTH radar, chemical munitions, ASW weapons, and C3 improvements.

**SPECIFIC ISSUES**

Both air services are far short of their goals in standoff munitions, needed to enhance the survivability of weapon delivery platforms.

I strongly support Navy and AF Over the Horizon Radar programs because they address long-range early warning and broad area surveillance -- capabilities which we currently do not possess (also e).

Air interceptors and a long-range attack capability are equally pressing (see e).

Point defense systems are urgently needed to enhance the survivability of Pacific facilities (also e).

Soviet efforts require continued emphasis on theater intelligence-gathering (esp. real-time).

Without full funding, amphibious lift requirements are in genuine jeopardy.

Every year the ability to detect, localize, and counter Soviet boats is becoming more complex and difficult. If we slacken in the ASW contest, we could threaten our ability to operate throughout the Pacific. The technology gap in sub surveillance has depreciated by about half.
Modernization of retaliatory chemical weapons and defensive chemical warfare equipment— the threat dictates renewed emphasis on reestablishing a credible retaliatory capability. We have permitted a potential adversary to enjoy a lopsided advantage as we have refused a deterrent (e also).

Integration of C3 with acquisition of major weapon systems: E-6A will improve national command authority connectivity to PACOM forces. Improvements are also needed in secure voice and data connectivity in theater (e also). With Trident, we need the reliability of E-6A, and because of the vast distances in the Pacific, we need the range of the new TACAMO aircraft. Only then can we realize the full potential of the new Trident subs (which at present we are not doing) (e also).

Major deficiencies in mine hunting and mine countermeasures, a capability neglected for a few years in the 1970s. We are now beginning to correct that deficiency.

Vast distances put a premium on airlift; we are a long way from our goal of 66 million ton-miles per day (also f).

Our military sealift capability is not sufficient to meet wartime movement requirements. Trend toward containerships in the Merchant Marine has forced DoD to develop ways to use these less militarily applicable ships.

d. Long Term Net Assessments

We must continue the momentum to sustain deterrence in the face of an expanding Soviet capability. The New Zealand/ANZUS dilemma and the Philippine situation (the insurgency is a very definite threat to the government if it continues to grow at its current rate) are two exceptions, but overall, the net balance weighs heavily in our favor.

e. Modifications/Tradeoffs Involving Deployed or Almost-deployed Weapons

GENERAL

Reduction of FYDP while fencing strategic programs would result in stretch-outs or reductions in new weapon procurement, with the result that our fielded equipment would be older, less effective, and more costly.
SPECIFIC ISSUES

Air-to-air missiles: Navy is distressingly short of AIM-9 Sidewinders and Phoenix missiles. Essential that we procure AIM-7s and AIM-9s pending AMRAAM delivery.

Standoff munitions: Short-term stress must be on Maverick and guided CBUs. Other needs: Tomahawk cruise missiles, Harpoon ASMs, HARMs to suppress enemy air defenses, AGM-65 Maverick missiles (IIR and alt. warhead variants), AGM-130 boosted glide bomb, an effective hard structure munition (may be alt. warhead Maverick), binary chemical munitions (155mm, MLRS, Bigeye bomb), and the Durandal cratering munition for use against runways.

Nuclear forces: I strongly support those initiatives that address nuclear modernization.

War reserve stocks: Critical to procure additional artillery ammunition (155mm, Copperhead, 8-inch ICM).

Air defense: I strongly support Navy/AF OTH radar programs and their integrated C3.

Air interceptors/long-range attack: Modern, extended range fighters (F-15E and F-16), complemented with AWACS and KC-135 are necessary. KC-135 engine refit and KC-10 acquisition program are particularly important. The temptation to reduce the budget by delaying these must be resisted.

C3: Replacement of EC-130 with E-6A is noteworthy, helpful with introduction of Trident SSBNs.

Point defense: Chaparral (see f).

f. Design and Deployment of Weapons now on the Drawing Board, with IOCs on the Order of Three to Nine Years in the Future

Point defense: Development and procurement funds for IHawk and Stinger-Post contribute to addressing our urgent need to enhance the survivability of our facilities.

C-17 R&D: I must support every quantum airlift improvement and do not see any substitutes for the C-17.
Standoff munitions: I need an improved torpedo for use against fast, deep-diving subs and those on the surface and in shallow water; a replacement for the SUBROC standoff ASW weapon; a long-range anti-air warfare capability effective vs both aircraft and cruise missiles.

H. FY86 TESTIMONY

General Paul F. Gorman, USA, CINCSOUTH:

1. Overall Views

(Does not think that O&M funds should be the "last cut".) As a CINC, I am naturally concerned with O&M resources and logistic support. But I have need for procurement and construction funds as well.

a. Current Logistics and Operational Shortfalls for Readiness and Sustainability

GENERAL

(Gorman worries mostly about readiness for only high probability activities in his area, which include the following: special operations, intelligence, communications, civic action/PSYOPS, mobility, and logistics support. He has enjoyed some modest success in developing readiness in these activities.)

SPECIFIC ISSUES

-- Special Operations: Great progress; far more ready than two years ago.
-- Civic Action/PSYOPS: Have made a great deal of use of personnel for these missions and readiness has increased proportionately.
-- C3I: Most critical readiness and sustainability shortfalls are mainly in this area.
-- Exercises: Combined exercises with friendly nations increase both U.S. and host nations' readiness (b also).

b. Joint Service and Alliance Interoperability

Joint exercises with Honduras have been invaluable for increasing the interoperability between U.S. and Honduran forces.
c. Major Capability Shortfalls

GENERAL

U.S. combat forces are often poorly designed for low intensity conflict. We need more light land and air forces, more "brown water" naval forces -- all more strategically mobile, and better fitted to support other nations.

Two years ago, the Army Component in Panama was very well-suited to defend the Canal against brawlers and rioters, but ill-suited for supporting regional allies. Consequently, I recommended deactivation of the mechanized infantry battalion there to obtain additional intelligence, communications, aviation, medical and engineer capabilities.

SPECIFIC ISSUES

Intelligence: My own assets are very limited (older, less capable equipment; little DoD R&D funding directed at this problem), so military intelligence remains only marginally efficient. But over the past two years there has been a substantial increase in intelligence means provided to me, and recent research efforts show great promise.

Communications: Two years ago, communications in Latin America were relatively primitive. Our better military communications equipment is often reserved for "major contingencies." Problem has been remedied to some extent; not to my satisfaction yet, but we are getting there. Certainly, military communications have been substantially improved.

Intratheater Lift: C-130s are too large and heavy for most regional airstrips. The old C-7 Caribou aircraft (all in National Guard) are capable of operating from these strips. We are now working to provide that needed capability (e also).

"Brown Water" Capability: Along coasts and rivers, small boats and landing craft would be useful. Navy's brown water capability is at minimal strength and is outdated.

e. Modifications/Tradeoffs Involving Deployed or Almost-deployed Weapons

Intratheater Airlift: C-130s are too large, need the old C-7 Caribou aircraft from the National Guard.

I. FY86 TESTIMONY

General Robert C. Kingston, USA, CINCCENT:
1. Overall Views

In assessing progress in military capability, Congress should look at force structure, force modernization, force readiness, and force sustainability. Our primary concern must be to improve the overall military capability to which readiness is only one of the contributing factors.

Regarding what area to cut first, we should ensure that the readiness of our current forces is funded, then ensure that these forces can be sustained in combat, and then consider modernization and force structure.

But when we look at the specifics, the priorities are not as clear cut. For example, over a 5-yr period, it may prove more cost-effective to replace equipment with new gear than to maintain older equipment, or if shortfalls of equipment degrade combat readiness (e.g., strategic airlift), then new equipment must be purchased. Such trade-offs are considered by the service and OSD staffs, and can best be addressed by them.

a. Current Logistics and Operational Shortfalls for Readiness and Sustainability

GENERAL

My concerns are that strategic lift capabilities, munitions, and readiness programs be funded. Current support forces are not adequate to deploy and sustain combat forces. Lack of logistics infrastructure in potential operating locations further argues vs a reduction in support forces.

Readiness deficiencies dictate across-the-board enhancements in: air defense, land forces, training, communications/electronics, logistics support equipment, and naval forces.

SPECIFIC ISSUES

Previously, funding for WRM was bow-waved, resulting in insufficient petroleum, spares, and munitions to support initial surge. The most serious sustainability shortfall is in war reserve munitions, especially threat-oriented (air-to-air missiles, surface-launched air defense missiles, high tech LOE ammunition (e.g., LGB kits, Copperhead). Adequate stockage levels must be attained due to current deficiencies in production surge capabilities.

Second priority -- aircraft spare parts. Sortie rates (and readiness rates in general) have suffered due to an inadequate amount of spares and jet fuel.
Third priority -- Army WRM stocks, especially major items of equipment (tanks, artillery, trucks, communication equipment).

Fourth priority -- facilities for prepositioning of sustainability supplies, either by warehouse leasing, additional afloat storage, or MILCON. Supplies and equipment are needed to establish a logistics infrastructure to free strategic lift assets for unit deployment.

Fifth priority -- shortfall in medical supplies and equipment.

If more money were appropriated to reduce these shortfalls, one approach would be to allocate it so that related programs grew concurrently or were brought on line with each other.

Other issues:
-- improving command preparedness
-- shrinking manpower pool
-- building of supporting infrastructure within Central Area; would reduce need to transport equipment (limited strategic transportation assets, port capacities)
-- maintenance of currently planned minimums of exercise frequency and magnitude; training and retraining are increasingly important dimensions of employment and maintenance as new technologies appear in weapon systems and their repair processes.

b. Joint Service and Alliance Interoperability

Interoperability with other nations:
-- Foreign Military Sales enhance interoperability with recipient nations.
-- Saudi Arabia would help in defense of region if equipped with interoperable systems (with U.S.)
-- Must encourage standardization and integration of air defense assets of regional states (especially those near Persian Gulf)
-- Must improve communications and electronic capabilities of friendly states with whom we must communicate to coordinate the battle.
-- Standardization of logistics support equipment requires emphasis. The assistance of AID needs to be encouraged.
Service interoperability:

-- Tactical Satellite Communications- CENTCOM has been aware of potential interoperability problems between Army and AF Ground Mobile Force satellite terminals. The Services are taking action to overcome this deficiency.

c. Major Capability Shortfalls

Enhancements to both sea and airlift must be continued:

-- procurement of additional KC-10 refuelers
-- C-17 and C-5B aircraft
-- Auxiliary Lighterage Ship (TALS)
-- MPS, with pre-positioning of off-load equipment and continuation of afloat pre-positioning (MEDNTPS/NTPF) will enhance force closure rates, stronger deterrent.

Increased air-to-air munitions stocks would enhance air superiority capability, allowing F-111 and other tactical aircraft (e.g., new F-15E) to perform vital deep interdiction role. F-16 with LANTIRN will continue to enhance intermediate and CAS capabilities (modernization of tactical fighter force will give sharp increase to interdiction capability).

Need to increase strategic and theater intelligence collection (additional RC-135s, see e).

Need additional medical care within the AOR (see e).

While the binary chemical munition program is required for total modernization, real and immediate requirement to provide U.S. forces with a retaliatory deep strike capability for the air-land battlefield (see f). Problems with chemical weaponry; current equipment next to useless in harsh CENTCOM environment. Up against potential enemies who have reportedly used chemical weapons, and will do so in the future if they feel it to be advantageous.

Paucity of multipurpose minecraft; had to use hydrographic and amphibious ships in Suez last year to conduct MCM operations (see e).

Limited strategic transportation assets requires pre-positioning (see a).

Cuts in exercise program would jeopardize ability to deploy rapidly to Central Area.
Need support for establishment of effective command and control communications system networks.

For land forces, emphasis must be given to enhancing force mobility and firepower.

Sortie rates have suffered due to lack of aircraft spare parts.

Advanced tilt rotor aircraft would greatly improve conventional ground force, search and rescue mobility, and ship-to-shore movement for Marine Corps forces. Further, HH-53s are aging and no medium or long-range replacements are programmed (see f).

e. Modifications/Tradeoffs Involving Deployed or Almost-deployed Weapons

Sea/airlift enhancements: procurement of additional KC-10s, C-17s, C-5Bs, Aux. Lighterage Ship, MPS (see c).

Tacair improvements: F-15E, F-16 with LANTIRN (see c).

Intelligence: Need additional RC-135s, improved ANG RF-4C sensors (c).

Medical care: Need deployable medical systems (hospital ships, air transportable hospitals, etc.).

Special Forces: Procure additional MC-130Hs, increase force structure.

Mine Warfare: New surface mine warfare vessels to be commissioned this year.

C3: Need support for establishment of effective command and control communications system networks.

f. Design and Deployment of Weapons now on the Drawing Board, with IOC's on the Order of Three to Nine Years in the Future

Special Forces: Develop and procure Joint Advanced Rotary Wing Aircraft (JVX). Regarding use of JVX for conventional ground force and search and rescue missions, further study with the Services is required to determine the required numbers.

Advanced tilt rotor aircraft would greatly improve conventional ground force, search and rescue mobility, and ship-to-shore movement for Marine Corps forces. Further, HH-53s are aging and no medium or long-range replacements are programmed (see c).
Chemical weapons: Lack of funding for binary weapons (including BIGEYE bomb) continues to stall the modernization of our national chemical weapons stockpile.

J. FY86 TESTIMONY

Admiral Wesley L. McDonald, USN, CINCLANT:

1. Role in the Process

Any future decisions to reduce the budget should reflect the best that not only the service programmers can present as to what impact that has, but should again come back to the CINC's to participate. In the current DoD budget deliberations, we are viewing what these decisions will do to our day-to-day war-fighting capability.

The danger in reductions after programs or budgets are submitted is that stretch-outs or cuts will be made without realizing what the total downstream impact may be on the war fighters.

We need to participate in those kinds of budgetary considerations. At the present time we are much more in a participatory mode than we were three years ago. I would hope that any substantial reductions would take place with the full knowledge and consideration, or at least with the best articulation of some of the things Adm. Crowe has said are his war-fighting musts. I have similar things that I should be able to articulate before we start chopping off to get to a certain percentage.

2. Overall Views

As a unified commander, I have had an opportunity to participate in the development of the Services' programs. Although we still have significant deficiencies, those programs represent a continuing effort to maintain emphasis on the readiness of existing forces, while improving sustainability and modernization.

Admiral Crowe and I, as unified commanders, the people who are going to fight the battle today or tomorrow, are primarily concerned with readiness and sustainability. Force modernization and force building certainly are built into it because we may not fight today or tomorrow. Therefore, some place down the road, there has to be a place for new systems coming on board. But we feel strongly that readiness and sustainability budgetary initiatives must be maintained to keep up with the new equipment coming in.

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We cannot sacrifice future requirements to satisfy all current needs. (He would not make O&M the last to be cut.)

**a. Current Logistics and Operational Shortfalls for Readiness and Sustainability**

**GENERAL**

Correcting ordnance deficiencies is my number one priority (inadequate stocks, especially maritime and shiploads, over the years).

If out-year funding remains, most ships, although not getting totally well, will be guaranteed of having a magazineful of the systems that I am concerned with (Sidewinder, Phoenix, Harpoon) by about 1988.

Readiness of EC-130 TACAMO aircraft force continues to be a problem with respect to the security of SSBNs. The aircraft are old and rapidly approaching the end of their useful service (c, e also).

**SPECIFIC ISSUES**

-- Personnel: Signs of coming decline in AF retention, worrisome loss of Navy pilots to airlines.

-- Air-to-air munitions: AIM-9s, AIM-7s in short supply.

-- Harpoon: Just coming on line in large numbers, not up to required stock levels.

-- Torpedoes: In short supply.

-- Sonobuoys: We do not have enough to act in peacetime (training) or wartime. Out-year funding will improve the situation (c also).

**b. Joint Service and Alliance Interoperability**

Alliance interoperability:

There is a lack of at-sea communications interoperability with our allies, more in data information systems transmissions than in pure communications systems. The communications systems within NATO are adequate; with continued attention to interoperability, they will improve over the long term, as we are making progress. One of the major problems is bringing on line new technology from some countries that have the
RDT&E capabilities while not overly stressing others that do not. Also, the two-way street is always an issue, though that situation is improving.

Joint service interoperability:

One of the lessons from Grenada was the creation of a watchdog staff placed over interservice communications systems developments to ensure interoperability. The major Grenada shortcomings were in our ability to carry out not only secure communications but other tactical communications within operating units and offshore Navy units.

c. Major Capability Shortfalls

GENERAL

There are not enough forces in the alliance now to accomplish everything in the NATO area. We need to pay more attention to building maritime forces and increasing conventional warfare capability.

SPECIFIC ISSUES

ASW: We must continue to improve our capability against new quieter Soviet subs; the Soviets are closing the quality gap. SLCM threat will increase soon (SS-NX-21); we must maintain a viable detection capability across the entire spectrum (also e).

Subs: The Atlantic Fleet is short of the number of subs required to carry out the forward maritime strategy.

Tacair: We need a fighter (ATF) to meet the anticipated growth and technical sophistication of the Soviet threat. Lack of funding would place at risk our future air superiority against new Soviet systems (f also).

Strategic Connectivity: Early introduction of the E-6A is essential to the maintenance of strategic connectivity with SSBNs (see a, e).

Air defense: Continued modernization of Iceland air defense is essential to the successful accomplishment of CINCLANT missions. Delay or cancellation would result in decreased capability to defend Iceland. OTHR would provide wide-area surveillance and SLOC protection (e also).
Mine Warfare: We are way behind in MCM, and it will take a long time to catch up. There is a lack of the numbers of mine countermeasures ships, though there has been modest improvement recently (e also).

Sonobuoys: Not enough sonobuoys for peacetime or wartime missions (a also).

Sealift: Declining trends in the U.S. flag merchant marine capability in terms of militarily useful ships (e).

Satellites: Capacity of our current strategic and tactical communication satellite systems is not adequate to support requirements. SHF satellite requirements exceed capacity (e also).

Caribbean C3I: Upgrades will increase LANTCOM's ability to support the National Military Command System and will enhance tactical and theater commanders' ability to accomplish their missions (better monitoring, timeliness) (e also).

Waterfront security at naval bases is inadequate.

e. Modifications/Tradeoffs Involving Deployed or Almost-deployed Weapons

Subs: Planned production rate of 688-class is vital to maintaining qualitative edge.

ASW: Need for enhanced undersea surveillance systems. We are trying to continuously upgrade our sensors by making them more sensitive and placing new arrays in more critical areas. We have put tactical towed arrays on surface ships and increased sonobuoy sensitivities (see e).

Strategic Connectivity: Replacement of EC-130 with E-6A is top C3 priority, essential to maintenance of strategic connectivity with SSBNs (a, c also).

Air Defense: Upgrade of Iceland air defense radars is an integral part of the planned improvements in North Atlantic defense. OTHR installation will provide surveillance and SLOC protection in the 1990s. After FY85 RDT&E deletion, funding is needed to place surveillance program back on track (c also).

Mine Warfare: Interruption of Captor program at about 1/2 to 2/3 of what was planned bothers me significantly. Modest improvement in mine shipbuilding and countermeasures in the near time frame (c also).
Sealift: Navy has undertaken numerous sealift enhancement programs in the last five years to offset merchant marine deficiencies (c also).

Satellites: Continued support for the Defense Satellite Communications System, especially the second Atlantic satellite, is required (see c).

Caribbean C3I: Four upgrade programs in budget.

f. Design and Deployment of Weapons now on the Drawing Board, with IOCns on the Order of Three to Nine Years in the Future

Subs: The SSN-21 program is vital to maintaining our qualitative edge, as it is quieter and has more capabilities than the 688-class (c).

Tacair: Vital that we maintain planned tacair procurement rates. The ATF R&D initiative is needed now to ensure introduction by the mid-1990s of a fighter able to meet the threat (c).

K. FY86 TESTIMONY

General Bernard W. Rogers, USA, CINCEUR:

1. Role in the Process

CINCns are responsible for everything that happens or fails to happen in their theater but have no authority to force decisions upon services which will support our capability. It is a question of influence, of discovering problems through exercises and then bringing it to the attention of superiors. If you can get it to a high enough level and get the interest, you sometimes can get a change. We as CINCns have authority to go directly to SecDef. I can go to that well more often than other CINCns because I am also SACEUR. (Under the terms of reference for SACEUR, I can go to heads of government, foreign affairs ministers and defense ministers.) I use that opportunity not only with this minister of defense, but with those of other countries.

Rogers relates that he does not have cognizance over decisions about standard vs advanced munitions, but he does make recommendations about this to the Defense Resources Board.)
The U.S. commitment to have every unit that reaches Europe able to fight at least until D+60 is something that should be argued out with DoD. The appropriateness of that commitment is a judgment that DoD must make.

2. Overall Views

First priority must go to the strategic nuclear umbrella, second to INF. But don't cut O&M. O&M is the guts of our business.

O&M funding is a fairly high priority.

a. Current Logistics and Operational Shortfalls for Readiness and Sustainability

GENERAL

If NATO were attacked conventionally, we would fairly quickly face the decision to authorize release of theater nuclear weapons primarily due to a lack of sustainability with trained manpower, ammunition and war reserve materiel.

Don't cut O&M. It gives us: the funds to train, the opportunity to purchase spare parts, maintenance capability, opportunity to use civilians (cheaper).

The first task is to take proper care of our troops and families, with adequate pay and facilities; providing them with a high level of "psychic compensation" from mission-oriented training; maintaining equipment properly. Much of this is related to adequate O&M funding.

SPECIFIC ISSUES

Readiness deficiencies:
-- Shortages in POMCUS equipment and facilities.
-- Need support facilities for command and control of reinforcing operations in NORTHAG (c also).
-- Inadequate numbers of combat service support personnel to support in-place and reinforcing forces.
Sustainability:

-- Shortages in selected munitions (e.g., air-to-air missiles, certain artillery munitions [155mm]). We are considerably short of some advanced munitions, not even meeting NATO standards.

-- Stockage levels of major end items of Army equipment and AF war reserve kits are too low, though considerable improvement over last five years. The U.S. commitment is for units to be able to fight at least until D+60.

-- Minimum essential facilities at collocated operating bases for reinforcing aircraft is necessary.

-- Wartime capability to provide hospitalization and medical evacuation requires significant improvement.

Other issues:

- A commitment to raise the ammunition stock levels was forthcoming from Defense Ministers last December. There are serious deficiencies in the stockage levels of prepositioned war reserve materiel.

- Special operations forces' sustainability must be enhanced.

- There are several interrelated constraints that prevent the U.S. from deploying ten divisions to NATO by M+10.

- Number of combat support forces is barely adequate for peacetime operations and constitutes maximum acceptable risk for transition to war.

b. Joint Service and Alliance Interoperability

Tactical communications: We often use communications equipment that is several generations old because we are always waiting for the next generation (which is always to be better than the last).

IFF systems: A NATO Identification System has not been selected because of disagreements among NATO nations over cost and operating frequency. The Mark XV IFF is the only acceptable solution to the U.S. due to backward compatibility with our current systems.
c. Major Capability Shortfalls

GENERAL

There are deficiencies in the military capabilities (strategic and non-strategic nuclear, conventional) required to support fully NATO's Flexible Response strategy.

SPECIFIC ISSUES

FOFA: See f.

NATO's major weakness -- conventional leg of the triad. The continually widening gap between NATO and WP conventional capabilities impacts the credibility of deterrence.

We need the modern chemical munitions which will provide a credible retaliatory capability. We have a limited chemical capability today, but it is inadequate, obsolescent and difficult to store and maintain; nor is any usable delivery means available (e also). The northern and southern flanks have essentially no chemical defenses.

Additional steps must be taken to increase our capability to defend against terrorism.

Special Operations: Development of night, adverse weather, infiltration/exfiltration and resupply capabilities and the acquisition of jointly operable, secure communications is needed.

INF: It only remains for the Alliance to continue INF modernization and we will fill the gap in that element of our spectrum of deterrence (e also).

U.S. forces committed to the early reinforcement of NATO cannot meet their required timetables for deployment.

The availability of strategic sea and airlift for CSS units must be increased (lift forces are insufficient to move the POMCUS shortfall). Without adequate support facilities, our ability to command and control reinforcing operations in NORTHAG and to meet the U.S. pledge of ten divisions forward-deployed by M+10 is in question. (Presently, that pledge cannot be fulfilled.)

Major deficiency in combat support capability.

Need more highly mobile and heavily armored forces in NORTHAG.
The necessity to resort to an indirect identification process (IFF issue) results in restrictions in our beyond-visual-range capability that take away one of our major advantages over the WP air forces.

Deficiencies in surveillance, reconnaissance, and target acquisition.

Greek/Turkish dispute affects command and control arrangements in the entire southern region.

Need longer-range artillery-fired atomic projectiles; a Lance follow-on with longer range and increased accuracy; new standoff air-to-surface missile (to enhance penetration of air defense); greater range modern artillery-fired warhead; more conventional replacement for barrier capability of air defense missiles; surface-to-surface or air-to-surface missile accurate enough to attack Soviet ballistic missile sites before they launch (e also).

Not comfortable with NATO's ability to keep the E. Atlantic and English Channel sea lanes open.

There is a requirement for additional mine sweeping capability in Allied Command Europe.

d. Modifications/Tradeoffs Involving Deployed or Almost-deployed Weapons

NATO Airborne Early Warning System: Continued deployment and training on schedule.

Mobility: I solicit continued support for the unfunded portions of the CRAF, stretched C-141, KC-10, C-5B, C-17, and fast sealift programs.

GLCM and PII: Need to continue deployment.

Chemical weapons: Must produce Bigeye bomb and a shorter range with nonpersistent chemical.

Special operations: Needed enhancements include aircraft and communications equipment.

Patriot: Get rid of the Nike-Hercules and replace it with the Patriot.

Need longer-range artillery-fired atomic projectiles; modern 155mm projectiles; Lance follow-on.
Mark XV IFF: Only acceptable solution to IFF problem.

A new non-enhanced radiation 8-inch nuclear artillery shell is available today, planned for deployment in Europe.

FOFA: New or updated aircraft (Tornado or F-16) are being integrated into inventories of all NATO countries.

Need additional manpower for new systems such as TR-1 and MLRS.

f. Design and Deployment of Weapons now on the Drawing Board, with IOC's on the Order of Three to Nine Years in the Future

FOFA:

The most important modernization program for EUCOM in supporting ACE is to improve the ability to attack follow-on forces. This requires: (1) surveillance and target acquisition; (2) fusion, command and control; (3) attack capabilities beyond those that we have traditionally needed for the more generalized and centralized air interdiction program. Significant improvements in technology are at hand which will correct many of the deficiencies in surveillance, reconnaissance and target acquisition: JSTARS, ASARS and PLSS, TR-1 aircraft, JTIDS, etc. We are also making progress working with our allies on joint tactical fusion. To provide the proper mix of direct and indirect attack and standoff weapons systems for a tactical follow-on mission, NATO must exploit its current systems as well as emerging technologies as appropriate for application to the follow-on force attack mission component.

The resultant improvement in our ability to find and strike -- with conventional weapons -- the Warsaw Pact Operational Maneuver Groups, second and third echelons and reserves before they can reach our defensive positions may well determine the measure of success of our conventional defense.

Forces occupying our forward defensive positions must hold against the lead attacking WP echelon. Modernization must improve our ability to reduce to manageable proportions the number of WP forces arriving at our defensive positions. To do this successfully, we need the ability to delay, disrupt and neutralize WP follow-on forces. Being perceived as being able to hold the lead echelon of a WP attack while successfully attacking the follow-on forces will improve the credibility of our deterrence by creating the "reasonable prospect" of frustrating a WP conventional attack.
The systems that are needed to support FOFA are PLSS; JSTARS; JTACMS or variant; improved precision guided munitions and submunitions; and improved intelligence fusion centers with redundant connectivity.

Weapon systems needed to attack follow-on forces without exposing manned aircraft: Standoff air-to-surface missiles and surface-to-surface missiles (e.g., MLRS version).

Other issues:

Chemical weapons: Need an intermediate range weapon, which would come from R&D for MLRS.

Conceptual Military Framework: CMF lays out key missions components, functions that have to be fulfilled to achieve those components, and the capabilities necessary to meet those functions. The CMF gives us a systematic way to decide how to spend our resources more efficiently for conventional defense than we are doing now.

Tactical air-to-surface munition: A new standoff nuclear munition will improve the survivability of both aircraft and munitions.

g. Major New Weapons Developments with IOC Ten or More Years in the Future

Nuclear requirements: We will show the Ministers a report describing our projected nuclear weapons requirements and the preferred composition of the stockpile. If accepted, that report will set the direction for nuclear requirements into the 21st Century.

Long-range standoff missile: NATO has a LRSOM Study Group looking into the technical feasibility aspects of the missile.
APPENDIX C

REMARKS BY
GENERAL ROBERT T. HERRES
CONCERNING THE PPB AND ACQUISITION PROCESSES
The specific functions that have been assigned to me by the Chairman and, subsequently approved by the Secretary, put me in the position to help make interoperability and "jointness" work better -- hopefully much better. These duties fall into five very broad categories: resources management.

In the realm of resource management, there are two key roles -- the planning, programming and budgeting system and the acquisition process. In the PPBS, the Vice Chairman's role is centered around participation in the Defense Resources Board. This meshes extremely well with the assigned duties to oversee the deliberate planning of each CINC's unique operational plans. In doing all of that, I cannot help but be deeply familiar with operational requirements of the CINCs and, in particular, resources shortfalls. The main job here is to be sure that there are resources available to ensure that the plan is executable. However, all of this will be a two-edged sword when resources are limited, as they always are, (and they are likely to be more so in the near future) because to support one requirement will mean another requirement or another project, another effort or endeavor becomes the "bill-payer." The constant game of balance.

I also tend to carve out an indispensable role in supporting the Chairman and the CINCs in the capacities of Vice Chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) and as Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. The JROC, as the Joint Requirements Oversight Council is familiarly called now, is chartered to provide program oversight and monitoring at the front end of the acquisition process to determine joint program feasibility -- the emphasis is on fulfilling the requirements of the CINCs, of course, while ensuring interoperability, reducing parallel and duplicative efforts, and promoting economies of scale. This JROC, which consists of the Vice Chiefs of the Services, is not new; it is a rechartering of what was originally formed on recommendation
of the Defense Science Board as the Joint Requirements and Management Board (the JRMB); and it now has an appropriate broader framework of responsibilities to function as an effective body within the new DoD acquisition arrangements mandated by the new law.

My roles in the JROC, ...and the Defense Acquisition Board provide a connection that did not previously exist between the operational combatant commanders as advocates of requirements and the fora for requirements validation and implementation, respectively. As you know, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition serves as the Chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board while I, as the sole uniformed member, am uniquely postured as its Vice Chairman.

Therefore, I see my role as the central thread of continuity in weaving jointness and interoperability into everything we do on a daily basis, but, in particular, in making that connection from requirements to the implementation process. It is in this way that I intend to link the needs of the CINCs with a judicious and appropriate degree of Service influence. I must find a way to balance the views of the builders of force structure, that is, the Military Departments and their Service Chiefs, with the needs and views of the Combatant Commanders, that is, the CINCs. If I can impose a properly balanced, yet still decisive result of these considerations, then I will have done my duty.
Keynote Address by:
General Robert T. Herres,
Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff at the
Armed Forces Communications and
Electronics Association Convention,
Washington, DC
June 16, 1987 pp. 7-9

My office has been given the chance, by my representation on various boards and
councils, to be a champion of the CINCs....

* * * *

Perhaps of greatest interest to this audience will be my assistance to the Chairman
and to the CINCs in the capacities of Vice Chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board
(DAB) and a Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).... My
presence and involvement can fill a void that has long existed in the requirements end of the
acquisition business. Therefore, I intend to link the needs of the CINCs to the acquisition
world with judicious and appropriate degree of Service influence. I must find a way to
balance the views of the builders of force structure, that is, the Military Department and
their Service Chiefs, with the needs and views of the Combatant Commanders, that is the
CINCs. If I can impose a properly balanced yet still decisive result of those considerations
on the acquisition team in the Department of Defense, then I will have done my duty. As I
see this role, the central threat of continuity is the weaving of jointness and interoperability
into everything we do on a daily basis.

* * * *

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APPENDIX D

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTIVE 5100.1
(EXCERPTS)
SUBJECT: Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components

References: (a) DoD Directive 5100.1, subject as above, April 3, 1987 (hereby canceled)
(b) DoD Directive 5158.1, "Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Relationships with the Office of the Secretary of Defense," May 1, 1985
(c) Public Law 95-452, "Inspector General Act of 1978," as amended
(e) Title 14, United States Code
(f) Title 10, United States Code

A. REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE

This Directive:


2. Promulgates the following statement of the functions of the Department of Defense and its major components.

B. ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

1. All functions in the Department of Defense and its component agencies are performed under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense.

2. The Department of Defense is composed of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments and the Military Services within those Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Joint Staff, the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, the Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities, and such other offices, agencies, activities and commands as may be established or designated by law, or by the President or the Secretary of Defense. The functions of the heads of these offices shall be as assigned by the Secretary of Defense in accordance with existing law.

a. In providing immediate staff assistance and advice to the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, though separately identified and organized, function in full coordination and cooperation in accordance with reference (b).

(1) The Office of the Secretary of Defense includes the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Under Secretaries of Defense, Comptroller of the Department of Defense, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Assistant Secretaries of Defense, Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, General Counsel of the
Department of Defense, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, and such other offices and officials as may be established by law or by the Secretary of Defense.

(2) The Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the functions assigned to them. To the extent it does not impair his independence in the performance of his duties as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, except the Chairman, shall inform the Secretary of his Military Department regarding military advice rendered by members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters affecting his Military Department.

(3) The Inspector General, Department of Defense, provides staff assistance and advice to the Secretary of Defense in accordance with the responsibilities specified in Public Law 95-452 (reference (c)) and DoD Directive 5106.1 (reference (d)).

b. Each Military Department (the Department of the Navy to include the United States Marine Corps, and the United States Coast Guard when transferred in accordance with sections 2, 3, and 145 of 14 U.S.C. (reference (e))) shall be separately organized under its own Secretary and shall function under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense. Orders to the Military Departments shall be issued through the Secretaries of these Departments, or their designees, by the Secretary of Defense or under authority specifically delegated in writing by the Secretary of Defense or as provided by law.

(1) The Secretary of each Military Department, and the civilian employees and members of the Armed Forces under the jurisdiction of the Military Department Secretary, shall cooperate fully with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to achieve efficient administration of the Department of Defense and to carry out effectively the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense.

(2) The Secretary of Defense shall keep the Secretaries of the Military Departments informed with respect to military operations and activities of the Department of Defense that directly affect their respective responsibilities.

c. The Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands are responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for accomplishing the military missions assigned to them and shall exercise command authority over forces assigned to them as directed by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to section 10 U.S.C. 164 reference (f)). The operational chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands. The Chairman, JCS, functions within the chain of command by transmitting to the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands the orders of the President or the Secretary of Defense.

(1) Orders to such commanders shall be issued by the President or the Secretary of Defense or by the Chairman, JCS, with the authority and direction of the President or the Secretary of Defense.
(2) Communications from the President or the Secretary of Defense to the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands shall be transmitted through the Chairman, JCS. Communications from the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands to the President and/or the Secretary of Defense shall be transmitted through the Chairman, JCS.

(3) Communications in matters of joint interest, addressed to the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands by other authority, shall, unless urgent circumstances do not permit, be coordinated with the Chairman, JCS. Information copies of all communications in matters of joint interest between Washington-level offices, agencies, activities and commands and the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands shall be provided to the Chairman, JCS.

(4) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman acts as the spokesman for Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, especially on the operational requirements of their commands and shall be responsible for overseeing the activities of the combatant commands. The President and the Secretary of Defense may assign other duties to the Chairman to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in performing their command functions.

C. FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

As prescribed by higher authority, the Department of Defense shall maintain and employ Armed Forces to:

1. Support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.

2. Ensure, by timely and effective military action, the security of the United States, its possessions, and areas vital to its interest.

3. Uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United States.

D. FUNCTIONS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, consisting of the Chairman; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and supported by the Joint Staff, constitute the immediate military staff of the Secretary of Defense.

1. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman shall be responsible for the following principal functions:

   a. Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense on the preparation of annual policy guidance for the heads of Department of Defense components for the preparation and review of program recommendations and budget proposals.
b. Advise the Secretary of Defense on the preparation of policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans.

c. Assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces, including the direction of operations conducted by the Commanders of Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.

d. Prepare strategic plans, including plans which conform with resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense to be available for the period of time for which the plans are to be effective.

e. Prepare joint logistic and mobility plans to support those strategic plans and recommend the assignment of logistics and mobility responsibilities to the Armed Forces in accordance with those logistic and mobility plans.

f. Prepare military strategy and assessments of the associated risks. These will include the following:

   (1) A military strategy to support national objectives within policy and resource-level guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense. Such strategy shall include broad military options prepared by the Chairman with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.

   (2) Net assessments to determine the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies as compared to those of possible adversaries.

g. Provide for the preparation and review of contingency plans that conform to policy guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense.

h. Prepare joint logistics and mobility plans to support those contingency plans and recommend the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the Armed Forces in accordance with those logistic and mobility plans.

i. Advise the Secretary of Defense on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities (including manpower, logistic, and mobility support) identified during the preparation and review of contingency plans, and assess the effect of such deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security objectives and policy and on strategic plans.

j. After consultation with the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, establish and maintain a uniform system for evaluating the preparedness of each Unified and Specified Combatant Command to carry out missions assigned to the command.

k. Advise the Secretary of Defense on the priorities of the requirements, especially operational requirements, identified by the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.
1. Advise the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of the Military Departments and other components of the Department of Defense conform with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the priorities established for requirements of the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.

m. If deemed necessary, submit to the Secretary of Defense alternative program recommendations and budget proposals within projected resource levels and guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense, to achieve greater conformance with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the priorities for the requirements of the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.

n. In accordance with guidance of the Secretary of Defense, recommend budget proposals for activities of each Unified and Specified Combatant Command, as appropriate. Activities for which funding may be requested include:

- Joint Exercises
- Force Training
- Contingencies
- Selected Operations

o. Advise the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the major programs and policies of the Armed Forces in the area of manpower conform with strategic plans.

p. Assess military requirements for defense acquisition programs.

q. Develop and establish doctrine for all aspects of the joint employment of the Armed Forces.

r. Formulate policies for coordinating the military education and training of members of the Armed Forces.

s. Provide for representation of the United States on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

t. Submit to the Secretary of Defense, not less than once every 3 years, a report containing such recommendations for changes in the assignment of functions (roles and missions) to the Armed Forces as the Chairman considers necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness of the Armed Forces.

u. Prescribe the duties and functions of the Vice Chairman, JCS, subject to approval of the Secretary of Defense.

v. Exercise exclusive direction of the Joint Staff.

w. Subject to the direction of the President, attend and participate in meetings of the National Security Council.
x. Advise and assist the President and the Secretary of Defense on establishing Unified and Specified Combatant Commands to perform military missions and on prescribing the force structure of those commands.

y. Periodically, not less than every 2 years, review the missions, responsibilities (including geographic boundaries), and force structure of each Unified and Specified Combatant Command; and recommend to the President through the Secretary of Defense, any changes to missions, responsibilities, and force structure, as may be necessary.

z. Transmit communications between the President or the Secretary of Defense and the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, as directed by the President.

aa. Perform duties, as assigned by the President or the Secretary of Defense, to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in performing their command function.

bb. Oversee the activities of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.

cc. Advise the Secretary of Defense on whether a Commander of a Unified or Specified Combatant Command has sufficient authority, direction, and control over the commands and forces assigned to the command to exercise effective command of those commands and forces.

dd. Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense on measures to provide for the administration and support of forces assigned to each Unified and Specified Combatant Command.

ee. Advise the Secretary of Defense on whether aspects of the administration and support necessary for the accomplishment of missions should be assigned to the Commander of a Unified or Specified Combatant Command.

ff. Serve as the spokesman for Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, especially on the operational requirements of their commands.

gg. Provide overall supervision of those Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities for which the Chairman, JCS, has been designated by the Secretary of Defense to oversee. Perform such other functions with respect to the Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities as may be assigned by the Secretary of Defense.

hh. Periodically, not less than every 2 years, report to the Secretary of Defense on the responsiveness and readiness of designated combat-support agencies.

ii. Provide for the participation of combat-support agencies in joint training exercises, assess their performance, and take steps to provide for changes to improve their performance.

jj. Develop, in consultation with the director of each combat-support agency, and maintain a uniform readiness reporting system for combat-support agencies.
kk. Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense on the periodic review and revision of the curriculum of each professional military education school to enhance the education and training of officers in joint matters.

11. Review the reports of selection boards that consider for promotion officers serving, or having served, in joint duty assignments in accordance with guidelines furnished by the Secretary of Defense and return the reports with determinations and comments to the Secretary of the appropriate Military Department.

mm. Advise the Secretary of Defense on the establishment of career guidelines for officers with the joint specialty.

nn. Submit to the Secretary of Defense an evaluation of the joint duty performance of officers recommended for an initial appointment to the grade of lieutenant general or vice admiral, or initial appointment as general or admiral.

oo. Promulgate Joint Chiefs of Staff publications (JCS Pubs) to provide military guidance for joint activities of the Armed Forces.

pp. Review the plans and programs of the Commanders of Unified and Specified Combatant Commands to determine their adequacy and feasibility for the performance of assigned missions.

qq. Provide military guidance for use by the Military Departments, the Military Services, and the Defense Agencies in the preparation of their respective detailed plans.

rr. Participate, as directed, in the preparation of combined plans for military action in conjunction with the Armed Forces of other nations.

ss. Determine the headquarters support, such as facilities, personnel, and communications, required by Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, and recommend the assignment to the Military Departments of the responsibilities for providing such support.

tt. Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense, for information and consideration, general strategic guidance for the development of industrial and manpower mobilization programs.

uu. Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense military guidance for use in the development of military aid programs and other actions relating to foreign military forces.

vv. Formulate policies for the joint training of the Armed Forces.

ww. Assess joint military requirements for command, control, and communications; recommend improvements; and provide guidance on aspects that relate to the conduct of joint operations.

xx. Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense, for information and consideration in connection with the preparation of budgets, statements of
military requirements based upon U.S. strategic war plans. These statements of requirements shall include tasks, priority of tasks, force requirements, and general strategic guidance for developing military installations and bases, and for equipping and maintaining military forces.

yy. In carrying out his functions, duties, and responsibilities, the Chairman, JCS, shall, as he considers appropriate, consult with and seek the advice of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.

zz. Perform such other duties as the President or the Secretary of Defense may prescribe.

2. The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense as specified below:

a. A member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may submit to the Chairman advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or in addition to, the advice or opinion presented by the Chairman. If a member submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman shall present that advice or opinion to the President, Secretary of Defense, or National Security Council at the same time that he presents his own advice. The Chairman shall also, as he considers appropriate, inform the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense of the range of military advice and opinion with respect to any matter.

b. The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, individually or collectively, in their capacity as military advisers, shall provide advice to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on a particular matter when the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense requests such advice.

3. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall perform such duties as may be prescribed by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. When there is a vacancy in the Office of the Chairman or in the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases.

E. FUNCTIONS OF THE UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMBATANT COMMANDERS

1. Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, the authority, direction, and control of the Commander of a Unified or Specified Combatant Command with respect to the commands and forces assigned to that command include the command functions of:

a. Giving authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry our missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics;

b. Prescribing the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command;
c. Organizing commands and forces within that command as he considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command;

d. Employing forces within that command as he considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command;

e. Assigning command functions to subordinate commanders;

f. Coordinating and approving those aspects of administration, support (including control of resources and equipment, internal organization, and training), and discipline necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command; and

2. If a commander of a combatant command at any time considers his authority, direction, or control with respect to any of the commands or forces assigned to the command to be insufficient to command effectively, the commander shall promptly inform the Secretary of Defense.

3. Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of the Defense, Commanders of Unified and Specified Combatant Commands exercise authority over subordinate commanders as follows:

   a. Commanders of commands and forces assigned to a Unified or Specified Combatant Command are under the authority, direction, and control of, and are responsible to, the Commander of the Unified or Specified Combatant Command on all matters for which the Commander of the Unified or Specified Combatant Command has been assigned authority under subsection E.1. above;

   b. The commander of a command or force referred to in paragraph E.3.a. above, shall communicate with other elements of the Department of Defense on any matter for which the Commander of the Unified or Specified Combatant Command has been assigned authority under subsection E.1. in accordance with procedures, if any, established by the Commander of the Unified or Specified Combatant Command;

   c. Other elements of the Department of Defense shall communicate, with the commander of a command or force referred to in E.3.a. on any matter for which the Commander of the Unified or Specified Combatant Command has been assigned authority under subsection E.1., above, in accordance with procedures, if any, established by the Commander of the Unified or Specified Combatant Command; and

   d. If directed by the Commander of the Unified or Specified Combatant Command, the commander of a command or force referred to in paragraph E.3.a. shall advise the Commander of the Unified or Specified Combatant Command of all communications to and from other elements of the Department of Defense on any matter for which the Commander of the Unified or Specified Combatant Command has not been assigned authority under subsection E.1.
F. FUNCTIONS OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

1. The chain of command for purposes other than the operational direction of Unified and Specified Combatant Commands runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments to the commanders of Military Service forces.

2. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for, and have the authority necessary to conduct, all affairs of their respective Departments, including the following:
   a. Recruiting
   b. Organizing
   c. Supplying
   d. Equipping (including research and development)
   e. Training
   f. Servicing
   g. Mobilizing
   h. Demobilizing
   i. Administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel)
   j. Maintaining
   k. The construction, outfitting, and repairs of military equipment
   l. The construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities; the acquisition, management and disposal; and the management of real property of natural resources.

3. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the following activities of their respective Departments.
   a. The functioning and efficiency of their Departments;
   b. The formulation of policies and programs that are fully consistent with national security objectives and policies established by the President and the Secretary of Defense;
   c. The effective and timely implementation of policy, program, and budget decisions and instructions of the President or Secretary of Defense relating to the functions of each Military Department;
   d. Carrying out the functions of the Military Departments so as to fulfill (to the maximum extent practicable) the current and future operational requirements of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands;
e. Effective cooperation and coordination between the Military Departments and agencies of the Department of Defense to provide for more effective, efficient, and economical administration and to eliminate duplication;

f. The presentation and justification of the positions of their respective departments on the plans, programs, and policies of the Department of Defense;

g. The effective supervision and control of Military Department intelligence activities; and

h. Such other activities as may be prescribed by law or by the President or Secretary of Defense.

4. Common Functions of the Military Departments. The functions of the Military Departments, under their respective Secretaries, are as follows:

a. To prepare forces and establish reserves of manpower, equipment, and supplies for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war and plan for the expansion of peacetime components to meet the needs of war.

b. To maintain in readiness mobile reserve forces, properly organized, trained, and equipped for employment in emergency.

c. To provide adequate, timely, and reliable intelligence and counterintelligence for the Military Department and other agencies as directed by competent authority.

d. To recruit, organize, train, and equip interoperable forces for assignment to Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.

e. To prepare and submit budgets for their respective departments; justify before the Congress budget requests as approved by the President; and administer the funds made available for maintaining, equipping, and training the forces of their respective departments, including those assigned to Unified and Specified Combatant Commands. The budget submissions to the Secretary of Defense by the Military Departments shall be prepared on the basis, among other things, of the recommendations of CINCs and of Service component commanders of forces assigned to Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.

f. To conduct research; develop tactics, techniques, and organization; and develop and procure weapons, equipment, and supplies essential to the fulfillment of the functions assigned in this Directive.

g. To develop, garrison, supply, equip, and maintain bases and other installations, including lines of communication, and to provide administrative and logistics support for all forces and bases, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.

h. To provide, as directed, such forces, military missions, and detachments for service in foreign countries as may be required to support the national interests of the United States.
i. To assist in training and equipping the military forces of foreign
   nations.

j. To provide, as directed, administrative and logistic support to the
   headquarters of Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, to include direct
   support of the development and acquisition of the command and control systems of
   such headquarters.

k. To assist each other in the accomplishment of their respective
   functions, including the provisions of personnel, intelligence, training,
   facilities, equipment, supplies, and services.

l. To prepare and submit, in coordination with other Military Depart-
   ments, mobilization information to the JCS.

5. Common Service Functions. The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps,
   under their respective Secretaries, are responsible for the following func-
   tions:

   a. Determining Service force requirements and making recommendations
      concerning force requirements to support national security objectives and
      strategy and to meet the operational requirements of the Unified and Specified
      Combatant Commands.

   b. Planning for the use of the intrinsic capabilities of resources of
      the other Services that may be made available.

   c. Recommending to the JCS the assignment and deployment of forces to
      Unified and Specified Combatant Commands established by the President through
      the Secretary of Defense.

   d. Administering Service forces.

   e. Providing logistic support for Service forces, including procure-
      ment, distribution, supply, equipment, and maintenance, unless otherwise
      directed by the Secretary of Defense.

   f. Developing doctrines, procedures, tactics, and techniques employed
      by Service forces.

   g. Conducting operational testing and evaluation.

   h. Providing for training for joint operations and joint exercises
      in support of Unified and Specified Combatant Command operational require-
      ments, including the following:

      (1) Development of Service training, doctrines, procedures,
          tactics, techniques, and methods of organization in accordance with policies
          and procedures established in Service publications.

      (2) Development and preparation of Service publications to support
          the conduct of joint training.

      (3) Determination of Service requirements to enhance the effec-
          tiveness of joint training.
(4) Support of that joint training directed by the Commanders of
the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands and conduct of such additional
joint training as is mutually agreed upon by the Services concerned.

i. Operating organic land vehicles, aircraft, and ships or craft.

j. Consulting and coordinating with the other Services on all matters
   of joint concern.

k. Participating with the other Services in the development of the
doctrines, procedures, tactics, techniques, training, publications, and equip-
ment for such joint operations as are the primary responsibility of one of the
Services.

6. The forces developed and trained to perform the primary functions set
forth hereafter shall be employed to support and supplement the other Military
Service forces in carrying out their primary functions, where and whenever such
participation shall result in increased effectiveness and shall contribute
to the accomplishment of the overall military objectives. As for collateral
functions, while the assignment of such functions may establish further justi-
fication for stated force requirements, such assignment shall not be used as
the sole basis for establishing additional force requirements.
APPENDIX E

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APPENDIX F

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
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<td>AFCENT</td>
<td>Air Forces Central Command</td>
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<td>AFLANT</td>
<td>Air Forces Atlantic Command</td>
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<td>ARCENT</td>
<td>Army Forces Central Command</td>
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<td>ARLANT</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>Anti-submarine Warfare</td>
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<td>ATF</td>
<td>Advanced Tactical Fighter</td>
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<td>Commander Western Command (Army, PACOM)</td>
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<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief</td>
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<td>CINCSOUTH</td>
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<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Center for Strategic and International Studies</td>
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<td>Five Year Defense Program</td>
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<td>IDA</td>
<td>Institute for Defense Analyses</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPL</td>
<td>Integrated Priority List</td>
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<td>JPAM</td>
<td>Joint Program Analysis Memorandum</td>
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<tr>
<td>JRDOD</td>
<td>Joint Research and Development Objectives Document</td>
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<td>Joint Requirements Oversight Council</td>
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<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
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<td>Joint Strategic Objectives Plan</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
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<td>Southern Command</td>
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<td>SPRAA</td>
<td>Strategic Planning and Resources Analysis Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOA</td>
<td>Total Obligational Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAFAF</td>
<td>Unified Action Armed Forces</td>
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<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
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<td>USAFE</td>
<td>United States Air Force, Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAREUR</td>
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<td>USAR SOUTH</td>
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<td>United States Marine Corp</td>
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<td>Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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