ARMS CONTROL: THE COMMON DENOMINATOR IN SUPERPOWER RELATIONS

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by

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The purpose of this paper is to highlight arms control as a mutually shared interest in superpower relations. Chapter I addresses US foreign policy vis-a-vis the USSR and vice versa, and focuses on current superpower national interests. Today, the USSR is preoccupied with economic development and is providing the US with unique opportunities in arms control concessions. The US is concerned with stimulating its economy as well and in reducing federal budget deficits.

Chapter II focuses on the specifics of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty. A review of the background since 1977 leading up to the treaty is presented followed by specific terms of the treaty to include the types of missile systems, timetables and methods of elimination, and the mutual verification scenario. Personnel requirements to implement the treaty are also presented.

Chapter III addresses the impact of the INF treaty on NATO doctrine and force employment. Current criticisms of the treaty that relate to the resulting military balance in Europe and US commitment to NATO are presented. US/NATO and Soviet/Warsaw Pact thinking on such areas as defense sufficiency, modernization, and future arms control agreements is also covered.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas J. Drobot, USAF, was born in Johnson City, New York in 1949. He received an Associate Degree in Engineering Science from Broome Technical Community College in 1969 and a Bachelor of Science Degree in Aerospace Engineering from the State University of New York at Buffalo in 1971. Commissioned through OTS in 1971, he attended navigator-bombardier training through May 1973. From 1973 to 1978, he served as a B-52 navigator/radar navigator in the Strategic Air Command, 416th Bombardment Wing, Griffiss AFB, NY. Assigned to the Air Force Institute of Technology as a student in May 1978, he graduated in Sep 1979 with a Master of Science Degree in Systems Management. From Sep 1979 to Jun 1982, he was assigned to the Air Force Avionics Laboratory, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH where he served as Logistics Support Cost Program Manager and Chief, Hardware and System Design Group.

Lt Col Drobot graduated in residence from the ACSC class of 1983 and was reassigned to Griffiss AFB in several flight operations positions to include Chief, Operations Division. His last duty assignment prior to Air War College was as the 416th Bombardment Wing, Assistant Deputy Commander for Resource Management at Griffiss.
CHAPTER I

UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

vis-a-vis

the UNION of the SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

Background

Considering the recent past, US/Soviet relations can be characterized as cautious confrontations. They can be viewed as a bipolar equilibrium between two totally different ideologies maintained by the upward spiraling threat of nuclear war, the realities of military forces in NATO and Warsaw Pact countries ready to inflict war on Europe, and the mutual desire for deterrence and peace. At the highest levels, Soviet national interests consisted of world domination under the communist ideology, while US national interests consisted of self-determination and growth of free and independent nations throughout the world. Even today, these general superpower national interests have not changed but national policies to achieve those national interests may be changing.

The Soviet Union appears to be changing from a closed, dark, rigid, and oppressive system. Driven by failures in their economy, the Soviet system appears to be open-
ing to the West and the international community of nations for assistance. The United States faces alarming trade deficits and a wavering yet strong economy sensitive to the pressures and realities of budget deficit reductions. Not because of enlightened planning and effective management but just because of the dynamics of the international environment, the opportunities exist today for substantive changes in US/Soviet national security policies that could be the beginning of the road to world peace.

The purpose of this chapter is to propose specific US policies to achieve national security objectives vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. I will first cover Soviet domestic and international security objectives to frame the evolving threat and then define the environment in the Soviet Union. Subsequently, I will outline US national security policies to accomplish desired objectives in that environment.

**USSR National Security Interests**

The continuing global Soviet national objective is communist world domination via military and economic superiority. This Soviet objective has its roots in the invasion and subjugation of Russia by the Mongol hordes of Genghis Khan early in the 13th century. Since the Mongols, Russia has suffered defeat by the Turkish, Swedish, Polish-Lithuanians, French, and Japanese. Russia was defeated by all, according to Stalin, because of military, economic, and political shortcomings. Since World War II, the
Soviet leaders have vowed that Russia would conquer all her enemies (the world) by continually pushing for military and economic superiority through technological growth. This seemingly unyielding and inevitable national objective has produced a consistent and straightforward set of foreign policy/national security policy objectives:

1. to establish/maintain the power and control of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) over the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR)

2. to guarantee the security of the USSR

3. to promote the economic development of the USSR

4. to undermine western influence internationally

Today, nothing has really changed or has had time to change in the Soviet Union. However, given such trends as decreasing economic growth rates, stifled innovation and initiative, and high defense costs to counter US military modernization and growth, the top Soviet leadership has made economic reform their top priority. Without economic reform, the Soviet system will continue to slip as a world economic power - a condemnation of their socialist ideology. Pragmatically Soviet national security policy has been subjugated to the achievement of economic goals. As a result, while the initial set of national Soviet security policy objectives is still valid, a new subset has evolved:

1. tranquility at home and abroad

2. reduction of the flow of resources to the military
3. **global economic interdependence as a Soviet self-interest**

This new subset of objectives, aimed at Soviet economic growth, has changed the way the Soviets act in the domestic and international environment. Domestically, through "glasnost" (openness) and "perestroika" (restructuring), General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has launched campaigns aimed at bureaucratic corruption, alcoholism, democratization, and economic reform. Internationally, the Soviets have literally opened their "arms" in willingness to negotiate on major arms control and reduction agreements as a means to reallocate resources (both rubles and manpower) to the economic sector. The Soviets have come to realize that substantive and lasting changes in their economic system will require major changes in Soviet resource allocation decisions. They also realize that a continuing quantitative arms race combined with required qualitative technological improvements can only exacerbate the Soviet economic resource allocation problem. The Soviets also see in the moderation of the arms race a way to improve relations with the modern, technologically advanced nations of the West. Improved relations should create an international economic environment conducive to change in the Soviet Union; an environment not filled with confrontation requiring military solutions and resources; an environment in which the Soviets can take advantage of US and Western technology and education.
With the apparent changes, some think that nothing has really changed in the Soviet Union; that the changes we see are only superficial. I believe that we are seeing small but real changes in the Soviet system. It is most important now, that the United States grasp the opportunity to fan the spark of change in the Soviet Union by meaningful changes in US national security policy.

**US National Security Interests**

The United States' national objective has been commitment to the goals of world freedom, peace, and prosperity. As with the Soviets, the US national objective has produced a consistent and straightforward set of foreign policy/national security policy objectives vis-a-vis the Soviet Union:

1. to guarantee the security of the US and its allies
2. to promote US economic development in a growing world economy
3. to deter nuclear war
4. to stop Soviet world expansionism via containment

As with the Soviets, our basic national security policy objectives have not changed. However, unlike the Soviets, the US as an economically strong world power, has the option, not the necessity, to maintain current policies or to implement new national security policies that will further US global national objectives of freedom, peace, and prosperity. Given the evolving situation in the Soviet Union, the United States should concentrate on new US national security policy
objectives:

1. to pursue viable arms control and reduction agreements

2. to foster personal, intellectual, cultural, and economic (trade) exchanges with the USSR

3. to encourage change in the nature and behavior of the Soviets

Realistically, the Soviet objective of world hegemony is still central in Soviet ideology. US national security policy will always have to counter Soviet hegemony until that objective is modified to fit into a world designed for international peace and cooperation among nations that go beyond national boundaries and strive for more than nationalism (globalism). By taking advantage of the openness of current and changing Soviet policy the US can have an impact on the future.

The first of two US policy options to counter Soviet hegemony that is being proposed by some in the highest levels of the National Security Council is to do nothing; to sit back and watch and wait; to maintain the status quo. This policy would continue the current approach of direct confrontation of Soviet moves based on US military might, economic power, and political resolve.

Since the ability of the Soviets to project themselves anywhere in the world is essentially dependent on its military power, the adoption of this policy by the US would
mean continuing increases in US defense spending and military buildup. Given today's military balance, the pressures on defense spending as a result of the budget deficit, and US reaction to Soviet expansion over the last decade, this option is seemingly unrealistic and too late. Over the past three decades, US policies of cold war and detente have failed to preserve any military balance between the US and the USSR. In fact, the Soviets have engaged in the world's greatest buildup of military power while US investments in forces and weapons have continued to decline.

The Soviets enjoy an overwhelming quantitative military superiority and are making qualitative improvements with each new weapon system. For the US to continue an arms race with the Soviets to regain military superiority would, in my opinion, be a total failure. The importance of reducing the rate of growth of the federal budget and the difficulties caused by reductions in domestic programs would run counter to the requirement for massive increases in defense spending. Besides, Soviet response would likely be to increase their efforts in defense further aggravating their economic, industrial, and agricultural problems. This might very well drive the Soviets into a very narrow window of opportunity where they would come out fighting with nuclear weapons. While I feel US policy must become more forceful in dealing with Soviet expansion, the policy should never increase the possibility of nuclear war.
Instead of an unrealistic arms race that drains both sides of resources, the US should adopt a policy of meaningful arms control/reduction efforts combined with continued defense spending to maintain mutual stability and mutually credible deterrent forces at reduced levels of effort. At the same time, US policy must capitalize on the current environment and major problems in the Soviet society to ultimately halt Soviet expansionism.

A second US policy option to counter Soviet expansion is to embroil the Soviets in a complex web of international interdependence. This US policy toward the Soviets should be aimed at extending as far into the future the expected attainment of the Soviet national objectives of world dominance and technological superiority. In the meantime, the US should encourage the development and continuance of a more benign environment in the Soviet Union; an environment that will, over time, erode the focus and commitment of modern Soviet leaders from their current paranoid goals; an environment that will foster the goal to improve standards of living for the Soviet people. This US policy option would be facilitated by both the current environment and current problems within the Soviet Union. Since the period of detente (1972-1980s), Soviet society has become more susceptible than ever before to Western influence. Soviet scholars schooled and traveled in the West, and the prevalence of Western literature and music are clear signs of foreign influences on
the Soviet society. Also significant are the growing expectations of Soviet youth brought about by new conditions of life and Western capitalist influences.

The Soviet economy, like Soviet society, has also changed and is no longer self-sufficient. The Soviets desperately need Western technology to modernize its industrial base, to exploit natural resources in Siberia, and to increase its agricultural production. In fact, current trends in the Soviet Union indicate a growing dependence upon external sources for critical natural resources and agricultural products. US policy then should continue to exploit the current state of Soviet affairs significantly intertwining the Soviet society and economy with the capitalist system. Hopefully, these actions will delay the possible attainment of Soviet world goals allowing the US to exploit the Soviet problem of leadership succession.

Ultimately, as the US continues to resist Soviet world domination, the objective of US policy should be to modify Soviet objectives to those that would be more in consonance with absolute world goals of peace and brotherhood. With the death of Brezhnev, it was felt that this US policy action could begin by exploiting a collective caretaker body of younger, more idealistic leaders who would be more responsive to the Soviet people and therefore more receptive to changes in national objectives and policies. Since 1982, over the tenure of both General Secretaries Andropov and
Chernenko, and since March 12, 1985, in his rise and consolidation of power as General Secretary, Mikhail S. Gorbachev has been involved initially as a protege and now as the leader of significant reform in the Soviet Union. With the emergence of Gorbachev as the first of a new cast of Soviet General Secretary, US national security policy will have its time to be effective. Just as the Soviets appreciate time, the beauty of this US policy is that it has time on its side.

Since 1945, the United States and the Soviet Union have proliferated nuclear weapons to a dangerous state of affairs. Fortunately, the superpowers, spurred on by internal financial and economic concerns, have entered into serious arms control and reduction agreements as a means to reversing that dangerous trend. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty, as the first in what may be a series of agreements, should start an era that will see a reduction in the threat of the use of nuclear weapons and the peaceful interdependence of nations. The following two chapters will look into the specifics of the INF Treaty and its impact on NATO doctrine, strategy, and force deployment.
CHAPTER II

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCE (INF) TREATY

Background

On December 8, 1987, President Reagan of the United States of America and General Secretary Gorbachev of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic signed what is likely to be the most salient and historic arms control agreement to date between the superpowers, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty. The INF treaty is especially important for a number of reasons. It is the first US-Soviet arms agreement that actually reduces the number of nuclear warheads and associated delivery vehicles over an entire class of missile systems. It is also the first US-Soviet arms agreement that includes a verification scheme that calls for extensive and intrusive on-site inspections by both countries.

As such, this chapter will begin with a review of the historical background leading up to the current INF treaty. It will then go on to present the most significant terms of the treaty to include types of weapon systems, timetables and methods of elimination, and the mutual verification scheme. The impact on personnel required to effect the treaty will
also be covered.

Given the history of nuclear arms races and today's general proliferation of weapons throughout the world, where, and how, and why did the thoughts emerge that led to the December 1987 INF Treaty? It all began in 1977 as a US reaction during the Carter administration, to the Soviet deployment of a new class of nuclear missiles that had been arrayed against Western Europe. Designated by NATO as the SS-20, each Soviet missile was mounted on a mobile launcher, armed with three highly accurate warheads, and had a range of nearly 3100 miles. Countering that missile threat was up to the Carter administration who in concert with NATO allies committed the US to the "dual track" decision in 1979. The dual track idea was simple. First the US proposed to counter SS-20 deployment by deploying a new generation of Tomahawk ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe. At the same time, the US would enter into negotiations with the Soviets that would strive for a reduction of the intermediate-range missiles on both sides. The Carter administration was asking the Soviets to give up real weapons in return for the US' deployment of fewer weapons. (14:19)

In 1980, the Reagan administration inherited this salient arms control problem. Many administration arms control experts supported the dual track idea but the plan was apparently not good enough for the President. The situation
gave rise to the simple and now famous "zero option" - zero American missiles in exchange for zero SS-20s. The zero option was embodied in a speech given by President Reagan on November 18, 1981: "the United States is prepared to cancel its deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles if the Soviets will dismantle their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles." Now the Reagan administration was asking the Soviets to give up real deployed weapons in return for the US' deployment of no missiles. This was an unrealistic plan at best but one that satisfied both US and NATO officials. NATO was once again convinced of the US commitment to Europe's security and the US sparked NATO's support for the deployment of US missiles on Western European soil. Deployment of US intermediate-range missiles began on schedule in late 1983. (14:20)

With the deployment of US missiles in Western Europe the Soviets felt they had no alternative but to walk out of the INF arms control talks in Geneva. However, they were still committed to removing intermediate range US missiles that threatened their territory and to keeping them out of Western Europe. It wasn't until January 1985, that Secretary of State George Schultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko met in Geneva and agreed to get the negotiations off "ground zero". When the two nations met for the first round of new talks in March 1985, the Soviet's position had not changed and now they presented even more demands for arms re-
ductions. The Soviets demanded linkage between INF, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Their position was that there could be no deal on INF or START without concessions on SDI.

One day prior to the renewed talks in Geneva, a historic event occurred in the Soviet Union that would turn the tide of superpower negotiations - the selection of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary. For the next two years, negotiation terms sparked by Gorbachev delinked and relinked INF from START and SDI several times. Soviet terms also included consideration of non-global reductions of SS-20s, Soviet compensation for French and British independent nuclear arsenals, and numerous proposals on the types and percentages of US and Soviet missile systems to be eliminated. In the end, it was Gorbachev's proposal that once and for all decoupled the INF agreement from START and SDI. (14:20-30)

What began in 1979 as a US proposal responding to Soviet deployment of SS-20s that threatened Western Europe has returned as a Soviet reincarnation responding to US deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles that threatened the Soviet homeland. As in any arms control agreement both sides must feel like they achieved their objectives. Such is the case in reviewing the specifics of the INF treaty.

Specific Terms of the INF Treaty

The terms of the INF treaty cover both
intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear missiles. Intermediate-range missiles are those having a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500 kilometers (@600-3400 miles). Shorter-range missiles are those having a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers (@300-600 miles).

The Soviets will eliminate 470 deployed and 356 non-deployed intermediate-range missiles consisting of all SS-20, SS-4, SS-5, and SSC-X-4 missiles; the US will eliminate 429 deployed and 260 non-deployed missiles consisting of Pershing II and GLCMs/PGM-109. Likewise, the Soviets will eliminate 387 deployed and 539 non-deployed shorter-range missiles consisting of SS-12 and SS-23 missiles; with none deployed, the US will eliminate 170 non-deployed missiles consisting of Pershing 1A and Pershing 1B. In total, the Soviets will be eliminating 1,752 missiles compared to 859 US missiles; approximately a 2 to 1 reduction advantage in favor of the US. This represents world wide elimination of all US and Soviet intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. While the Soviets are eliminating more missiles than the United States, they are also eliminating even more warheads. Of the ten missile systems covered under the terms of the INF treaty, only one carries more than one warhead per missile. The Soviets' SS-20 missile carries a maximum of three warheads; 405 deployed SS-20s at 48 launch
sites, and 245 non-deployed SS-20s will be eliminated. Based on a three warhead SS-20, the Soviets will be eliminating 3052 warheads compared to 859 for the United States; approximately a 4 to 1 reduction advantage again in favor of the United States. (18:3-70)

In light of the number of US and Soviet missiles and warheads to be eliminated, why have each side agreed to the apparent disparity in favor of the US? For the US, the treaty meets or exceeds US goals in INF negotiations. The Reagan administration's zero option as proposed in 1981 addressed only Soviet SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles while the INF treaty in addition eliminates the SSC-X-4 missile system. The US sought to constrain shorter-range INF missiles to prevent the buildup of Soviet shorter-range missiles that could threaten NATO (the US had none deployed). The INF treaty went beyond US hopes completely eliminating all Soviet and US shorter-range missiles. The INF treaty also eliminates all INF and shorter-range missiles in concert with the US goal that reductions on missiles must be global to prevent transfer of the threat from Europe to Asia. Finally, the treaty satisfies the US demand that US-Soviet agreements not affect the respective forces of US allies. (6)

Of historical and deep rooted significance to the Soviets, the INF treaty has completely eliminated the only US non-strategic nuclear systems capable of impacting on the Soviet homeland. And the treaty hasn't really changed the
NATO/Warsaw Pact military balance to include conventional and battlefield nuclear weapons (a subject covered later in this paper). Perhaps most important to the Soviets, the INF treaty, embodied in its hopes for continuing negotiations, provides in the short term, an environment not filled with confrontation requiring military solutions and resources. In the long term, beyond the INF treaty, the Soviets hope for a peaceful political and military environment to permit and encourage their economic development. The December 1987 Reagan-Gorbachev Summit and the INF treaty laid the groundwork in words and principles for future even more significant negotiations. To build the mutual trust required for success on the road to world peace, both nations must show good faith in the weapons elimination and verification terms of the INF treaty.

**Elimination Protocol**

The protocol on procedures governing the elimination of the missiles systems subject to the INF treaty is very detailed and specific. The most significant elimination items to be covered in this section include the specific missile systems and associated equipment to be eliminated, timelines for elimination, and specific destruction procedures.

Deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles (Pershing II, GLCM, SS-20, SS-4, SS-5, SSC-X-4), launchers, support structures, and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers are to be eliminated by each
party in a two phased approach. The end of the first and second phases occur no later than 29 and 36 months respectively after entry into force of the treaty. Reductions will be implemented by the end of the first phase so that the number of deployed launchers and deployed missiles will not exceed those capable of carrying 171 warheads (the aggregate of deployed and non-deployed launchers and missiles will not exceed those capable of carrying 200 warheads). This represents significant reductions from the US and Soviet intermediate-range warhead counts of 689 and 2126 respectively. By the end of the second phase all launchers, missiles, and support structures and support equipment will be eliminated and thereafter none will be possessed by either party. (15:Art IV)

Deployed and non-deployed shorter-range missiles (Pershing 1A/1B, SS-12, SS-23), launchers, and all support equipment associated with such missiles are to be eliminated no later than 18 months after the treaty goes into force. Thereafter none will be possessed by either party, globally. Even more stringent provisions are placed on shorter-range missile and launcher removals. After the treaty goes into force, all deployed missiles and all deployed and non-deployed launchers are to be removed to elimination facilities within 90 days; all non-deployed missiles are to be removed to elimination facilities within 12 months. Further provisions provide that once missiles or launchers are re-
moved to elimination facilities, they will be retained there until eliminated and that missiles and launchers will be eliminated at separate facilities separated by no less than 1000 kilometers. (15:Art V)

While specific procedures for the elimination of the items of missile systems are listed in the treaty by missile type, some generalizations as to destruction methods can be made. First of all, prior to a missile's arrival at an elimination facility its nuclear warhead and guidance elements may be removed and will be removed by both the US and the Soviets. For the most part, missile stages will be eliminated by explosive demolition or burning, with items not destroyed in this process being crushed or flattened. Exceptions to this are US and Soviet ground launched cruise missiles (GLCM/PGM-109 and SSC-X-4) which will be cut longitudinally into two pieces and then again several times at non-assembly joints. The SS-4 and SS-5 liquid propellant missiles will also be cut into pieces. The front section of all missiles, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, will be crushed or flattened. (16:II)

Other items of missile systems to be eliminated include launchers, and missile transporter vehicles (Soviet only). For the most part, these items will be disassembled and again cut into pieces at non-assembly joints. Deployment areas, missile operating bases, and missile support facilities will also be eliminated once their associated mis-
sile systems have been removed and/or eliminated. (16:II)

Missiles may also be eliminated by means of launching. Such missiles will be launched from designated elimination facilities to existing impact areas with launches occurring one at a time with no less than six hours between launches. Restrictions on such launches provide that no missile will be used as a target vehicle for ballistic missile intercept. Further restrictions ban each party from transmitting or recovering data from launched missiles except for unencrypted data used for range safety purposes. (16:III)

Within 3 years after the INF treaty goes into force, the detailed and difficult job of elimination will be completed. What will be occurring simultaneously and what will remain for a total of 13 years, as perhaps a tougher job, is verification.

**Verification Protocol**

The INF treaty contains the most stringent verification provisions in the history of arms control. This happened because of President Reagan’s insistence that it would be better to have no arms control agreements than agreements that cannot be verified. The President has said that a treaty cannot be based on trust, it must be based on mutually supported and effective verification.

The protocol regarding inspections relating to the INF treaty is also very detailed and specific. The most significant procedures to be addressed in this section include
data exchanges, and inspections to include timelines, on-site inspections, and inspections by technical means. The impact of the treaty on personnel requirements will also be addressed.

In addition to the INF treaty document, a memorandum of understanding has also already been written that contains categories of data and lists of types and items of missile systems possessed by the US and Soviets as of November 1, 1987. Examples of categories of data include missile and launcher characteristics, and numbers of missiles, launchers, and support structures and equipment by deployment area and operating base. After the treaty goes into force, the initial list of types and items of missile systems will be updated. Within 30 days, each party will provide the other with updated data as of the date of entry into force of the treaty. Subsequently, within 30 days after the end of each six-month period, each party will provide updated data reflecting changes, completed and in progress, and the net effect of those exchanges. (15:Art IX)

For the purposes of verification, inspections can be conducted at missile operating bases, missile support facilities, production facilities, and elimination facilities. The first on-site inspections can occur within 30 to 90 days after the treaty goes into force. These inspections will be conducted at missile operating bases, support facilities, and elimination facilities. The purpose of these inspections is
to verify the number of types and items of missile systems as of the date the treaty goes into force. This will establish the missile system data base for elimination. (15:Art XI)

Overall, subsequent on-site inspections can be conducted for 13 years with 20 such inspections per calendar year during the first 3 years, 15 such inspections per calendar year during the subsequent 5 years, and 10 such inspections per calendar year during the last 5 years. These inspections, which can begin 90 days after the treaty goes into force, will be conducted at missile operating bases and support facilities only to ascertain (re-verify) the number of types and items of missile systems. These inspections can also be conducted at former missile operating bases and support facilities previously eliminated provided they are carried out within 60 days after the scheduled elimination of that facility. (15:Art XI)

Continuous monitoring of production facilities can begin 30 days after the treaty goes into force and lasts for 13 years. While specific provisions are included in the INF treaty, the US and Soviets have specified one production facility each to be inspected: for the US, the Hercules Plant Number 1, at Magna, Utah; for the Soviet Union, the Votinsk Machine Building Plant, at Udmurt. Finally, the US and Soviet Union will also conduct on-site inspections of elimination facilities to both verify the process of elimination, to include elimination by means of launching, and to confirm the
completion of elimination. (15:Art XI)

In addition to on-site inspections, and to further ensure compliance, both superpowers will use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law. As such, both parties have agreed not to interfere in operations or use concealment means which impede verification by national technical means. To enhance observation by national technical means, both parties have also agreed to the implementation of cooperative measures at deployment bases that operate missiles (with ranges greater than 3400 miles) not covered under the INF treaty. At the request of either party, limited to six per calendar, the other will display all missiles and launchers in the open to permit observation. These requests for cooperative measures are limited to three years or until a treaty between the US and Soviet Union reducing and limiting strategic nuclear weapons enters into force. (15:Art XII)

To ensure compliance with the INF treaty, the US has established a new On-Site Inspection Agency. The new agency has been placed at the Pentagon under the Department of Defense settling the State Department's claim that the agency should be part of the State's Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Tasked to carry out the extensive verification provisions in the Soviet Union, the agency will also be responsible for the destruction of US intermediate-range and
shorter-range missiles subject to the INF treaty, and for managing Soviet inspection and verification teams in the US. (10:11)

To effect the process of verification both parties will exchange permanent in-country teams to inspect production facilities. Each party will also each provide for no-notice on-site inspections by transient temporary teams to inspect missile operating bases, missile support facilities, and elimination facilities. As per the INF treaty, each nation can establish up to a 200 person inspection team to be permanently located for continuous monitoring at each other's agreed upon production facility. US inspectors (designated the Red team) will be located at Votinsk where both the SS-20, and the SS-25 strategic missile system have been produced. Their main task there will be to see that components brought into the factory are for SS-25 development only and not for SS-20 development. Up to a 200 person Soviet team will be located outside the perimeter of the Hercules Plant Number 1, where Pershing II missiles were produced. The plant is now involved in the United States' MX missile program. (10:11,7:1)

A second US "red team" of up to 200 people will be based in the US and capable of flying to the Soviet Union for short-notice on-site inspections. A third US "blue team" of up to 200 people will also be formed to escort Soviet permanent and short-notice inspectors in the US and to provide air
crew and transportation support. (10:11,7:1)

While the apparent total of 600 people from each na-
tion may surely vary as the task of verification matures, the
verification task itself should be straightforward and
relatively simple since an entire class of missile system is
to be eliminated. Beyond its own significance, the INF
verification scenario will also serve as a dry run for the
more complex and difficult verification tasks that will hope-
fully emerge as part of strategic nuclear and conventional
arms reductions under START and MBFR agreements. (7:1)

The INF treaty eliminates 1752 Soviet and 859 US
intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear missiles. The
first treaty to reduce nuclear weapons, it is also the first
treaty that provides for intrusive verification procedures
conducted on-site, on each other’s sovereign soil. Hope-
fully, the INF treaty will lead to a better understanding of
each other and the development of trust and respect in each
other’s peaceful national interests. In effect, the INF
treaty takes the two most powerful nations in the world back
to the days of 1977, modified however by the new openness of
their societies and the importance of mutually beneficial
foreign relations. Beyond the ongoing negotiations for a 50%
reduction in strategic nuclear weapons, the next step for the
superpowers and currently the most salient issue for the free
world is the balance of conventional and short-range nuclear
forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
CHAPTER III

INF TREATY IMPACT ON NATO DOCTRINE AND FORCE EMPLOYMENT

Background

As a historic arms control/reduction effort, the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) treaty will have a very objective impact in eliminating over 2500 nuclear capable missiles and almost 4000 nuclear warheads from Europe. It has also laid the foundation and set the precedence for the future utility and employment of general purposes forces between the superpowers. As a result of the 1987 Reagan-Gorbachev Summit and the INF treaty, it is hopeful that substantial cuts will occur across the spectrum of strategic nuclear and conventional weapons.

What remains to be seen is the impact the INF treaty will have on NATO doctrine and strategy and the capability/credibility of US/NATO forces vis-a-vis Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces. It is my contention that beyond the simple yet significant fact that the INF treaty will eliminate a whole category of nuclear weapons in our lifetime, it has also improved the military balance in Europe and will have little to no impact on NATO doctrine and strategy. In addition, its success has sparked the spirit of national-
ism in European states and the hope that through the continued strength and modernization of defenses, real arms controls and reductions can be accomplished to make the world a safer place to live. Deterrence is the key to peace; to deter at the lowest level of effort provides nations opportunities to focus beyond nearsighted military solutions to more salient world relations and foreign policy.

In support of my thesis, this chapter will address current criticisms of the INF treaty that relate to NATO doctrine and strategy as well as the resulting military balance in Europe. It will then continue with a look at the new thinking of military defense sufficiency and provide a roadmap for the continuance of arms control reductions while maintaining a nuclear deterrent.

Criticisms of the INF Treaty

Many critics of the INF agreement have said that it will undercut NATO’s doctrine of flexible response, decouple US defenses from the NATO deterrent, and lead to the denuclearization of Europe. To refute these arguments one only has to look back about ten years to the events surrounding the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles in Europe. The Soviets had always enjoyed a substantial numerical superiority in conventional forces in Europe. Yet in 1977, the Soviets began deploying the SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear missile based on their unyielding objective of military numerical and technological superiority. In turn, in October
1979, the US and NATO countries began deployment of Pershing II and Tomahawk ground launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). US/NATO deployment was not a means to make up for their conventional inferiority; it was simply a response to Soviet deployment. By 1979, NATO had already conceived the strategy of flexible response and had adopted a "first use" policy of short range (less than 300 miles) nuclear missiles and artillery shells. And NATO had the commitment of US strategic nuclear forces targeted on the Soviet Union in defense of Western Europe. While deployment of US/NATO INF missiles apparently provided a nice and neat progression of conflict from conventional to tactical nuclear to theater nuclear to strategic nuclear weapons, its overriding intent was to counter Soviet SS-20 deployment. In retrospect, it worked.

In remarks from a speech to the Center for Defense Studies, Brussels, Belgium, on 25 May 1987, Casper W. Weinberger, US Secretary of Defense said:

To those back in the United States and here in Europe who are saying that an INF agreement would "decouple" America from Europe, or lead to "denuclearization" of Europe, I call their attention to the situation which existed before deployment of our Pershing II and Cruise Missiles. The major concern was the Soviet SS-20s. In fact, had the Soviet Union withdrawn the SS-20s then, the Pershing and Cruise Missiles would have never been deployed, a proposal I made to the President in 1981. The fact that the Soviets are now talking seriously about deep reductions is a measure of our strength and unity and courage in deploying the Pershing II's and Cruise Missiles.

As regards denuclearization, the INF agreement does
not provide for a nuclear-free Europe. And it actually improves the military balance in Europe in favor of NATO forces. Consider again that the INF agreement eliminates 1667 deployed and 1385 non-deployed Soviet warheads, and only 429 deployed and 430 non-deployed US warheads. In October 1987, in an interview, "The Final Steps to an INF Treaty" in Arms Control Today, Paul H. Nitze, Special Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters remarked: "It (the INF Treaty) improves the military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact by removing a class of weapons in which the Soviet Union clearly has a material superiority and which are extremely dangerous to NATO Europe. I can't imagine how that could be to the military disadvantage of NATO." When considering the capabilities NATO will retain after elimination of missiles subject to the INF treaty, Mr. Nitze goes on to address the issue of denuclearization:

In Europe, the United States would retain over 4,000 nuclear warheads for a variety of US and allied delivery vehicles: nuclear-capable aircraft, including F-111s with range greater than the Pershing II, short-range missiles, and nuclear artillery; several hundred SLBM reentry vehicles would also remain dedicated to NATO. British and French systems would remain and modernization programs could proceed as planned. And, of course, US strategic forces would continue to provide a robust foundation for nuclear deterrence. Given the systems remaining in Europe, as well as our extensive conventional contribution to NATO's defense, including over 300,000 US troops deployed in Western Europe, I believe talk of decoupling is unjustified.

The idea that we are somehow or other moving toward the denuclearization of Europe is also false.
We don't intend to move in that direction. We intend to maintain the capabilities necessary to support the NATO doctrine of flexible response.

**Remaining Military Balance**

What weapons remain in Europe after removal of all those subject to the INF agreement reflect the improvements in US/NATO and Soviet/Warsaw Pact military forces since 1977. Yet, today, the Soviets still retain numerical superiority. While the numbers vary slightly between sources, the Warsaw Pact maintains 2.7 times as many tanks as NATO on the central front in Europe; the artillery imbalance is an even greater 3 to 1 advantage in favor of the Eastern bloc. In the combat aircraft category, the Warsaw Pact again has the lead with an over 2 to 1 advantage in both armed helicopters and tactical aircraft. The number of Warsaw Pact short-range nuclear force (SNF) warheads, those ranging less than 300 miles, is hard to estimate; various sources estimate 1,300-1,400 nuclear tipped ballistic missiles and more than 6,000 artillery pieces that can fire nuclear shells. However, in relation to the 4,600 US SNF warheads, NATO's own studies demonstrate that in an equal exchange of battlefield nuclear weapons, the West would lose the war faster than by conventional means alone. (4:32)

**New Thinking on Defense Sufficiency**

Even though the Soviets maintain numerical superiority, their thinking on the utility of overwhelming military
forces is changing. General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev is responsible for the shift in Soviet thought from their old military paranoia and over-insurance to a new concept of "minimal defense". Colonel Serge Chernay, Director of Soviet Studies at the United States Air Force Air War College, has identified two aspects of the shift away from the Soviet's long standing preference for massive armed forces:

For the first time, the Soviets are questioning their old assumption that ... the more weapons the better. Their traditional way of doing things has been to have enough power to overwhelm any adversary. Now they are admitting that to have a very large amount of weapons doesn't necessarily provide you the security. For the first time, the Soviets are seriously exploring the implications of the premise that security cannot be assured by unilateral strength, but can only be attained by mutual restraint. (11:7)

The new Soviet doctrine of minimal defense was used in a proposal made by the Warsaw Pact in May 1987 for talks with NATO on reducing conventional weapons. Similar Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks have been held in Vienna, Austria for the last 15 years but have produced no real results. In the preparatory work for the new negotiations on conventional weapons, the Soviets have signaled their willingness to accept Western demands for asymmetrical cuts in troops and armaments, information exchanges and strict verification--issues that had created the impasse at the MBFR talks. (12:8) According to Ronald Hatchett, the senior Defense Department representative to the renewed negotiations, "Both sides have agreed that one of the objectives
of the new talks will be the elimination of disparities. The Soviets have said that to identify those disparities we must exchange information on those forces and verify that information. This is a 180-degree flip-flop from their position on MBFR."

However, it is directly consistent with the recent precedents set as part of the INF agreement; namely the exchange of detailed weapon system data, 4 to 1 asymmetrical reductions of Soviet nuclear warheads, and intrusive verification procedures to include on-site inspections. Various studies of the military balance in Europe have suggested that asymmetrical Soviet reductions of from 4 to 1, to 7 to 1 in their tanks and artillery will be required to effect a treaty and that the US must be prepared to offer the Soviets some form of conventional arms reduction in return, possibly dual capable aircraft or systems that can deliver both conventional and nuclear arms. (8:10) In any event, another twist in the Soviet conventional arms reduction proposal is their apparent abandonment of the demand that short-range, tactical, battlefield nuclear weapons be included in any conventional arms control agreement. (12:8) This reinforces the US/Soviet resolution to delink agreements on separate classes of weapon systems; a resolution that delinked the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) from the INF treaty.

**Short-Range Nuclear Forces**

While delinked, the subject of short-range nuclear
forces (SNF) has become a separate and significant issue in Europe. Already in a message to West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, East German Communist leader Erich Honecker, on behalf of the Warsaw Pact nations, proposed that both Germanys agree not to modernize short-range nuclear weapons. In a flurry of German nationalism, he also advocated the eventual removal of all nuclear weapons from both East Germany and West Germany. As expected, West German reaction to the proposal varied from desires for total nuclear disarmament to maintaining the status quo to continuing plans for modernization of nuclear forces. (3:1,5:12)

NATO doctrine, on the other hand, maintains that short-range nuclear forces are a necessary deterrent (especially in light of the INF treaty) against attack by Warsaw Pact armored forces and should not be negotiated away until after a satisfactory, equalizing reduction in conventional non-nuclear weapons. And in the wake of the signing of the INF agreement, NATO is already on record as calling for strategic, conventional, and chemical weapons reductions before any other nuclear reductions. (3:1) The Pentagon position is that the INF treaty in eliminating a whole category of nuclear weapons in Europe has made modernization of the remaining short-range nuclear forces even more important. (9:12)

In a 21 December 1987 Newsweek article, Henry Kissengen goes beyond the subject of eliminating all
short-range nuclear forces from Europe saying that:

The Atlantic alliance must not, in the name of arms control, make the world safe for conventional war. Whenever a nuclear accord is in the offing, studies magically emerge "demonstrating" that conventional deterrence is feasible. But history is a more reliable guide than systems analysis. For millennia, conventional armies that on paper were evenly matched—and thus should have been deterred from fighting—went to war because their leaders drew different conclusions from the same data. To be sure, NATO can do much more to improve its conventional defenses. But that is a far cry from relying on them for deterrence. (13:36)

Previously, NATO has planned to modernize SNFs partly to move toward balancing the number of SNFs (especially missiles) maintained by each side, and now partly as a way to make up for the loss of ground launched intermediate-range missile to be eliminated under the INF treaty. Modernization was agreed upon at a NATO meeting in Montebello, Quebec in 1983 and included replacement of the nearly obsolete US Lance ground-launched short-range missile and installation of new, more powerful warheads on other short-range nuclear weapons. Currently, NATO forces have only 88 of the 75 mile range Lance missiles (NATO's only short-range ballistic missile) as opposed to an estimated 1,300-1,400 comparable, yet longer range missiles on the Warsaw Pact side. In early 1987, a Pentagon proposal urged that the Lance should be replaced by as many as 400 modern missiles with a range up to 300 miles. Proposals also include more powerful replacements for the nuclear-tipped shells designed for the 155mm and eight-inch
howitzers. While implementation of the modernization scheme has been delayed by funding problems in the US and European indecision, West Germany, on whose soil most of these weapons are based, is now resisting such moves. (9:12)

In light of the INF agreement, US and Soviet commitment to further nuclear reductions, and with the world in an arms reduction mood, any changes in the status of NATO short-range nuclear forces will surely be put off for some time and may be in doubt at all. However, in reviewing the words of Henry Kissenger, it is clear that a conventional balance does not deter war rather the past four decades has shown that the existence of nuclear weapons does. (1:19)

In summary, the INF agreement will eliminate a whole category of intermediate and shorter range (300-3500 miles) nuclear missiles in which the Soviets maintain a 4 to 1 advantage in nuclear warheads. The fact is that it will change the military balance in Europe in favor of NATO while having no real impact on NATO's doctrine of flexible response, first use, and forward defense. With the strategic nuclear commitment of the United States to the NATO alliance and the continued presence and proposed modernization of some 4600 short-range nuclear weapons that serve as a deterrent to conventional attack, NATO has not been decoupled from the US, and Europe will not become denuclearized. The challenge for the nations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact is to move beyond the mutual trust developed within the INF agreement to further
arms control agreements that reduce the number and threat of offensive weapons. The US and NATO countries should move forward on a START agreement that reduces 50% of US and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons and on a separate space treaty that specifically addresses SDI and weapons in space. In addition, agreements that provide for a military balance in conventional and short-range nuclear weapons as result of reductions and modernizations will ensure deterrence. All this can happen based on the credit of each others good deeds as each superpower goes about implementing historic arms reductions and verifications under the INF treaty.
CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

As in the past and the foreseeable future, the threat of Soviet expansion will continue to drive US national security policy. Direct confrontation of Soviet military moves could have worked in the 50s and 60s when the US enjoyed overwhelming military superiority and military clout. However, given today's military balance, the US prospect of limited increases in defense spending, and limited political resolve to engage the Soviet Union in armed conflict, a policy of direct confrontation appears unrealistic. Another US policy option is to involve the Soviets in a complex web of interdependence by exploiting the openness of Soviet society and the problems of the Soviet economy. In the short term, this policy would serve to delay the Soviets expected attainment of world domination. In the long term, a continued US policy should strive to change Soviet objectives from world domination toward world peace. The key to world peace lies in changing current Soviet national objectives.

I have always believed that maintaining the external facade of peace through military strength and mutual deterrence was absolutely necessary given the Soviet mind set.
But I also believe that it is only through internal means that we will ever change (not defeat) the Soviets and their global objectives from ones of world domination of the communist/socialist system through technological and economic superiority to ones of mutual trust and determination of politically and economically diverse nations committed to world peace.

For over forty years, knowingly or unknowingly, the United States has met the challenge of Soviet military/technological superiority and growth while involving the Soviet Union, the 270 million people of the Soviet Union, in the dynamics of the world; in the dynamics of international relations; in the hopes and dreams of free people everywhere. In my minds evaluation, it has paid off in the events that are changing the nature and openness of the Soviet Union almost on a daily basis. Already, Gorbachev has been tagged as the first in a new line of Soviet leaders. Our efforts have paid off. The United States needs to continue its relations with the Soviet Union to the point of mutually beneficial interdependence among nations and people to change today's Soviets and future generations. The current times should not be seen as the ultimate panacea to change in the Soviet Union but they are surely an opportunity in time for the United States to make significant changes in the progress of the development of the Soviet society. It is time to take advantage of Soviet weaknesses in their economic
system and their willingness at arms control concessions, while providing free, democratic, progressive models for the whole of Soviet society to emulate in the future.

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force treaty, as the first treaty to reduce nuclear weapons, has highlighted arms control as a means for the United States and the Soviet Union to achieve both separate and mutual national interests. In pursuing the provisions of the treaty, the US and Soviets will necessarily become more interdependent and will hopefully come to a better understanding of each others responsibilities in the world. The treaty has set a precedent that the threat each nation poses to the other can be reduced. In reducing the threat through arms control, each nation contributes to its own national security. As the two major world superpowers, the US and Soviets also need to cooperate together for more than their own national security and defense. They need to set an example of weapons reductions for the good of the world.

Over the next twenty years, the world may become a multi-polar one as other countries (i.e. China, Japan) become major military powers. Lesser powers also, may acquire advanced weaponry and access to nuclear arsenals diminishing the relative advantages of both US and Soviet forces. And arms agreements, today bilateral and in the future multi-lateral, may have a sizeable impact on nuclear and conventional forces. Deterrence itself may become multi-lateral
and consider a wider range of contingencies and threats. Unless the United States and the Soviet Union are willing to accept the current status quo of political and monetary expense to build more and newer and bigger and better nuclear weapons, something has to change. What they can change is the threat. They can reduce the number of weapons and warheads while modernizing those that remain from the standpoint of effectiveness, survivability, and control. Nuclear deterrence which has served us so well for many years can remain but at a reduced level of effort and with a reduced threat.

Forty years ago, the US had the chance to limit the tension and threat of escalating nuclear weapons arsenals between themselves and the Soviet Union. Instead, a period of cold war and nuclear arms races ensued. Today, a combined US/Soviet effort has a similar chance in relation to the world of nations to limit the numbers and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The United States and the Soviet Union have had time to learn about the deterrent utility of nuclear weapons. They have the knowledge, the heritage, and the means to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons. Hopefully, together they won't make the same mistakes again.
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