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RESEARCH REPORT

OPERATIONAL LEVEL CAMPAIGN PLANNING

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AIR UNIVERSITY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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OPERATIONAL LEVEL CAMPAIGN PLANNING

by
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A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH
REQUIREMENT

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AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: Operational Level Campaign Planning

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Remarks on historical aspects of campaign planning introduce a discussion of the key elements and functions required of a campaign plan. A description of considerations and procedures for operational planners follows, and provides a backdrop to the author's views on the interface required for successful implementation of the strategic guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the tactical commanders charged with executing the campaign. The lack of clear guidance is considered a major drawback for planners at the operational level. A check list to guide efforts is provided.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Anthony N. Kuykendall (M.A.A.
Central Michigan University) has been interested in campaign
planning since he was stationed at the Center for Army
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in South Korea, Japan, South Vietnam, Federal Republic of
Germany and Austria. He served in the First Cavalry
Division in South Vietnam as a rotary wing pilot in 1969-70
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

During the last few years, senior commanders and their staffs have found themselves increasingly confronted by questions concerning the establishment of operational objectives and campaign planning. The questions include: movement, employment, support, and command and control of large formations and the sychronization of battlefield activities up to theater level. These are questions which the Army has not addressed in any depth since the late 1950's, either in its educational institutions or in the field. Until the Army adopted AirLand Battle Doctrine in 1982 and renewed its interest in the operational level of war, defined as the act of manipulating tactical events to achieve a strategic military objective in a theater of war, operational level campaign planning was conspicuous by its absence.

The establishment of unified commands to conduct peacetime planning in geographical theaters is a post-World War II phenomenon. Today, in time of peace, theater staffs must plan initial and subsequent campaigns in their regions, with each plan based on different assumptions regarding the situation and objectives. (1:24)

Campaign planning was found to be a very valuable tool during past wars. Campaign plans were the medium by which the theater commander could communicate, to superiors and subordinates alike, his vision of how his military forces would be employed during a given time period to achieve theater objectives. (13:20) JCS Pub I defines a campaign plan as: "a plan for a series of related military operations aimed to accomplish a common objective, normally within a given time and space." (7:60) Properly prepared, such plans should be of equal value in future conflicts requiring the use of large formations.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND

The Planning Process

Vital to design methodology is understanding where the campaign plan fits in the overall planning process. Also, essential to the process is remembering that "war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means." (2:69) The initial source of all military plans can eventually be traced back to national-level decisions made within the National Security Council. These decisions result in military strategy, guidance on priorities, forces, timing and other planning assumptions. These decisions may be amplified by the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff further develops these decisions through the use of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), which provides guidance to the unified and specified commanders (CINCs). The CINC must decide how operations will be conducted within his command or theater in order to respond to the guidance included in the JSCP. This decision then becomes the basis for the development of the Operational Plans tasked by the JSCP and the development of a campaign plan for the theater. The JSCP-derived Operations Plans serve to schedule the timely arrival of resources or deployment plans. (13:20-21)

For employment planning the CINC explains his operational concept, including a statement of how the operation will be conducted once resources arrive. These two elements provide the commander's guidance for the campaign plan. It describes theater objectives, the general conduct of operations within the theater, and the time window available. It will also include all detailed directions for those operations which the commander can clearly visualize. Because of their duration and complexity, these plans are normally time-phased. Initial actions of Phase I where requisite information is available will be detailed. In later phases where information is sketchy or unknown, only a general outline will be provided. (13:21-22) The directions do not tell subordinate commanders how to achieve their missions that is left to their discretion but rather what he expects them to achieve.

Levels of War

Field Manual 100-5, _Operations_, establishes three levels of war: Military strategy, operational art, and tactics. (9:2-9) Planning must take place at all three levels.

Strategic Level of War

The strategic level of war is concerned with achieving national goals and objectives. To achieve or preserve national interests may require the projection of a

military force or a demonstration of the willingness to project that force. Strategy is, in simple terms, how to attain an objective and the means employed. Strategic perspective is worldwide and long range. The strategic planner deals with objectives, resources, capabilities, threats, limitations and force postures. He recommends priorities for resource allocation and time windows for mission accomplishment. Inter-service and allied cooperation to produce unity of effort is vital to the success of any strategy. Finally, strategic planning is not solely or predominantly a responsibility of the military. It typically involves the National Security Council, civilian advisors to the President, several civilian agencies, and senior military officers from the Joint Staff and the military departments. (5:2)

The Operational Level of War

The operational art of war is practiced by large units, involves all services, and is normally commanded by a full general or admiral. This level of war involves joint, combined, and coalition forces that maneuver in order to defeat the enemy and to achieve strategic objectives. Defeat of the enemy can be achieved by making the enemy believe he cannot win, forcing him to withdraw, or by destroying his forces and equipment. Usually a combination of these methods is employed. The operational level planner

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is primarily concerned with the planning and execution of campaigns. The operational commander is focused on his theater and the contending forces therein. He must also have a command and control apparatus to orchestrate the large and most likely multiservice forces in his command. Operations at this level take the form of large scale penetrations, envelopments, double envelopments, frontal attacks, naval blockades, air interdiction, turning movements, amphibious landings, and airborne assaults. At the operational level, maneuver may be purely the timely movement of forces to the critical place in order to gain the initiative. (5:2-3)

The Tactical Level of War

The tactical commander's perspective is one of a battle or engagement where he executes a plan by fire and maneuver to achieve specific tactical objectives. His purpose is the detailed destruction of enemy forces or preventing him from obtaining his objectives. (5:3)

How do strategic level plans from the Joint Operations Planning System link to plans and orders of the tactical level? The bridge between these levels is the operational level of war. The medium used to transmit the commander's vision of how the strategic objectives will be achieved is the campaign plan. The campaign also provides the basis for tactical plans/orders. If properly designed,

the plan insures that there is proper synchronization and
unity of effort among the various subordinate commands
within the theater. (13:22)

Strategic Guidance

The strategic guidance incorporated into the JCSP-
derived operations plan will include as a minimum the
following elements: strategic aims, limiting factors, and
resources.

Strategic Aims

Clausewitz tells us that "the government establishes
the political purpose, the military provides the means for
achieving the political end and the people provide the
will." (3:42)

Political objectives are translated into strategic
aims towards which all operations are directed. In many
cases the military aims/objectives, while important, may be
only one aspect of a much broader strategy encompassing
diplomatic, economic and psychological activities.
Strategic aims frequently change as operations progress and
strategic decision makers recalculate the costs, risks and
anticipated benefits of military operations. Aims that are
vague or altered unexpectedly can seriously endanger
effective military operations and, in extreme cases, risk
outright defeat. While the military commander is bound in
the end to pursue the strategic aims promulgated by

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political authorities, he is also obligated to make clear the associated risks. Where aims are unclear, he must make known his best interpretation of the conditions to be achieved by military operations and then seek clarification. At the same time, he must attempt to anticipate changes in strategic aims, advise political authorities of the probable military consequences, and try to retain sufficient operational freedom of action to accommodate such changes should they occur. (10:1-3)

Limiting Factors

Limiting factors are the second element of consideration in operational design. Restrictions and constraints are the two major divisions of limiting factors. Restrictions are the specific actions or categories of action prohibited to the operational commander. Some of these factors are embodied in the laws and treaties of the United States, such as restrictions on the treatment of noncombatants imposed by the Geneva Convention. Others will be unique to the circumstances and location of the particular conflict. In the past, such limiting factors have prohibited the use of certain weapons, precluded operations in certain geographical areas, and limited certain tactical methods. Such a restriction was placed on General MacArthur during the Korean Conflict by President Truman. In this war of limited objectives, MacArthur was

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restricted from establishing a naval blockade of the Chinese coast and attacking of Chinese targets by air. Truman wanted to insure that the war did not escalate into an Asian continental conflict. MacArthur's unwillingness to accept this limitation led to his ultimate relief from command. Such limitations obviously influence the achievement of strategic aims and could prevent their attainment altogether. Constraints, on the other hand, denote actions which the commander must take or methods he must employ. These may include seizure of objectives unrelated to theater military aims, but which have inherent strategic significance. Such a constraint was imposed on the US Third Army in August 1944 when General Patton was forced to divert forces and critical supplies from pursuit of the retreating Germans to liberate Paris. Frequently, constraints require retaining or protecting areas that are deemed politically or psychologically important but operationally insignificant. Verdun, in 1916, constituted such a constraint on French operations, resulting in the death of nearly a million men. (10:1-5)

Resources

Resources are the third vital element of operational design provided by strategic guidance. Tangible resources include military forces made available to the commander and may include non-military assets such as civilian host nation

support and civilian or reserve transportation assets.
Intangible resources include the commander's authority over
forces not under his direct command, authority over certain
nonmilitary aspects of theater operations, and public or
political support of military operations. In conjunction
with strategic aims, the resources available to the
commander largely determine the risks associated with
contemplated operations. The commander must recognize,
however, that when resources are inadequate he must either
seek additional support or modify his aims. Resources, like
aims, are subject to change. Both strategic and operational
contingencies may abruptly redirect resources previously
available to a commander. Those responsible for the design
of operational campaigns and major operations must be
prepared and anticipate possible change by developing
contingencies so as to accommodate significant
reallocations. (10:1-4)

JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),
lists the general factors which determine force structure:

- Responsibilities, missions, and tasks assigned
  to the commander

- Nature and scope of the operations

- The forces available or to be made available

- Geography of the area of responsibility

- Enemy forces in theater

- Time available

The operational commander's first and greatest challenge, especially in time of peace, is to develop realistic guidance under which he will operate in war. A continuous dialogue between the operational commander and his superiors is required to refine their common understanding of the relationship between military operations and the strategic aims they intend to further. (10:1-5)

The actual organization of the command is based primarily on the manner in which the commander decides to fulfill the mission and the characteristics and service identity of the forces assigned. (8:3-4)

Together with aims, limiting factors and resources, the enemy threat and geography of an area of operations define the parameters within which military operations must be conducted. If these parameters are known and their potential effects clearly understood, the design of operational plans is more likely to be effective and achievable.   One must remember that," US Forces at the operational level traditionally exist only in cadre form in peacetime." (6:18) Thus, the team building required to execute such a complex and multifaceted plan will be the commander's second largest challenge.

The Commander's Role

Operational art involves fundamental command decisions about when and where to fight and whether to accept or decline battle. Its key is the identification of the enemy's operational center of gravity, defined as his source of strength or balance. Once identified, the commander must concentrate a superior force against that point to achieve a decisive success. But before a commander decides when and where to fight, he must answer the following three questions:

(1) What military conditions must be produced in the theater to achieve directed strategic goals?

(2) What sequence of actions is most likely to produce those conditions?

(3) How should the resources of the force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? (9:10)

Clausewitz argued that "No one starts a war, or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so, without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it." The former is its political purpose; the latter its operational objective. (3:42) The strategic and operational commanders must agree, however, on the conditions that constitute success. Such an

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agreement ensures that any change reflects a well-thought-out strategic decision. (2:113)

Operational Objectives

The operational commander must first define or outline the military conditions necessary to achieve the strategic aims. In a mid-to high-intensity war, these conditions usually involve the destruction or surrender of enemy forces or the evacuation or control of enemy territory. In low-intensity conflict, success is less easily defined. Military success in an internal defense campaign, for example, might be defined as a reduction of insurgent capabilities to the point where local authorities can deal effectively with the remaining force. (10:3-2)

In a multitheater conflict, not all theaters require the defeat of committed enemy forces and territorial control. The selected strategy will decide the priority of operations in different theaters. In a secondary theater, operational success may be limited to protecting certain key friendly forces and facilities or retaining control over limited geographic areas. In many cases, the appropriate strategy in a secondary theater may be an economy of force action. (10:3-2)

Clarity of the commander's intent is important to insure synchronization of effort, particularly among joint or combined forces. Unless subordinate commanders

understand the conditions that constitute success, they will not be able to judge what risks are acceptable or what enemy forces or areas are considered critical and when. (10:3-2)

Sequence of Operations

Once a clear definition of the conditions of success has been established, the commander's next task is to visualize the sequence of operations most likely to achieve those conditions. Identifying the enemy's center(s) of gravity is central to this process. (9:179) The operational center(s) of gravity rarely remains constant. Circumstances such as shifts in enemy or friendly objectives, replacement of a key commander, or changes in force composition may alter the center of gravity. The more fluid the operational situation, the more likely such changes become. Identification, therefore, is a dynamic ongoing process.

Because centers of gravity are usually protected, direct attack and defeat in a single operation is rarely possible. Therefore, commanders should consider an indirect approach to induce the enemy to expose his center of gravity prior to operating directly against it. (10:1-8)

The commander who attacks the enemy's center of gravity without taking steps to protect his own exposes himself to surprise and defeat. He must, therefore, insure that his own center of gravity is protected. Where

resources are limited, operations may have to be sequenced
to ensure that friendly assets are protected before those of
the enemy attacked. (10:3-3)

The second consideration in sequencing operations is
culmination. This is achieved when the strength of the
attacker no longer significantly exceeds that of the
defender, and beyond which to continue offensive operations
would risk over-extension, counter attack and ultimately
defeat. (9:181) For the attacker, attrition of combat
power and extension of lines of communication may eventually
reduce offensive momentum so that a pause is necessary to
consolidate and reconstitute. For the defender, a point may
come when to attack is no longer possible--the opportunity
to do so has been lost. Either situation requires a radical
reorientation of operations. Properly designed, a campaign
or major operations plan addresses culminating points.
(10:3-3)

There are numerous historical examples of
operational offensives which reached culminating points
before achieving their objectives. More often than not,
this was because planners were unable to forecast accurately
the drain on resources of extended battle to depth. Classic
examples in World War II were Rommel's drive into Egypt
which culminated at El Alamein, the Japanese drive from
Burma into India which culminated at Imphal-Kohima, and

Patton's rapid advance across France which bogged down for lack of supplies in Lorraine. (9:182)

Operational planners must anticipate enemy culminating points so that plans to seize the initiative can be made and resources allocated to meet subordinate commander's needs. The planner must also set the tempo so as to prevent friendly units from culminating before achieving their final objectives.

Sequels

Actions after battle or sequels are also an important means of anticipating the possible outcomes and accelerating the decision cycle. The three possibilities are: victory, defeat or stalemate. Sequels establish general dispositions, objectives, and missions for subordinate units after the battle. They can be amended as necessary and ordered into effect. Transition to exploitation, counter offensive, withdrawal, retreat, or reorientation of the main effort should be addressed as possible sequels to the planned battle. All depend on timely execution and can be carried out effectively if planned in advance. Each also requires retention of an operational reserve. (9:31)

Branches

Campaign plans must also provide for the operation underway and for the period that will follow the coming

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battle. These "branches" to the plan, provide for changing disposition, orientation, or direction of movement while accepting or declining battle. They help preserve the commander's freedom of action and provide the flexibility needed to anticipate the enemy's likely actions, giving the commander a method of responding quickly. Often expressed as contingency plans, such branches from the plan can be vital to staying inside the enemy's decision cycle. (9:31)

Application of Resources

After considering the military conditions to be produced, the most promising sequence of events to produce them, sequels, and major branches, the operational commander should address the specific employment of resources. Several considerations are pertinent. He should first ensure that no resources are wasted or overlooked. Nature, uncertainty and the enemy impose sufficient risks without incurring more by not efficiently using what is available. In most cases, merely employing all the assets available is not enough. Combat power is increased by the synergistic effect of several arms and weapons systems employed in concert. At the tactical level, such combined arms operations are well understood. At the operational level, forces must not be used in isolation, forfeiting the synergy which results from simultaneous employment. Such employment requires an understanding of the capabilities and

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limitations of each component of the friendly force, mastery of time-and-space relationships, and considerable ingenuity on the part of planners. Most important, it requires that the value and risks associated with the proposed employment be measured in terms of the overall operations of the force rather than in the narrow context of capability alone. (10:3-6)

Finally, as with the conditions to be achieved and the sequence of events most likely to achieve them, resources available to the operational commander are not always predictable. Enemy actions, natural disaster, or the needs of his superiors elsewhere may suddenly deprive the commander of key combat or logistical resources. This may force him to alter radically the tempo or the overall character of his operations. At such moments, carefully conceived and well-understood branches to the plan can make the difference between a smooth reorientation of the force and dangerous confusion. (10:3-7)

CHAPTER III

PLANNING ELEMENTS

Operational level campaign planning begins with strategic guidance to a theater commander or with his recognition of a mission. The commander and his staff use the estimate of the situation and planning process described in FM 101-5. (9:28)

The commander must understand the interest of US policy makers in his region, the political and popular support for a US Military Force presence and combined military operations. (1:25)

Objectives

The plan should carefully describe theater objectives so that subordinate commanders clearly understand them. These objectives serve to focus the planning and operational execution of subordinates, to better synchronize their separate activities as a part of the overall theater effort. Through his objectives, the operational commander provides the framework required for immediate action, should his subordinate commanders need to respond without specific guidance. (10:4,6-7)

Assumptions

As with all plans, assumptions are key to effective campaign planning. Through assumptions, planners shape the

future by addressing the unknown. Through deduction, they determine the most likely enemy course of action, estimate the amount of participation by allied forces, and consider the possibility of enemy use of nuclear and chemical weapons. Assumptions should depict the commander's best estimate of reality at the time of execution. (13:23)

Missions

Missions for large units are normally expressed in broad terms and cover an extended time period, leaving the details to be filled in by subordinate commanders. This technique ensures maximum flexibility and freedom of action. (13:23) For all levels within the force, the emphasis is on maximizing subordinate independence by flexible statements of intent and delegation of decision making to the lowest levels. The operational commander expects, in the absence of guidance, continued subordinate action in accordance with mission and intent. He will assign a minimum of operational controls as it tends to inhibit initiative and restricts flexibility. The commander must accomplish his mission through selection of broad objectives, disposition of forces and sustainment of the force. (4:79)

Commander's intent

Commanders must clearly express their intent to subordinate commanders, both in the written campaign plan and in briefings or discussions. The commander's intent

represents a concept that encompasses both the mission and
concept of operations and expresses clearly the aim of the
entire campaign. (10:4-7)

Phasing

Campaign plans present a long-term view of
operations and, as such, should envision a series of
sequential actions. Each series of actions constitutes a
potential phase or phases of the overall campaign plan.
Identified phases provide sequential segments within the
campaign plan that focuses efforts over time and space.
Planning for the early phases will contain more specific
guidance and details than those later in the plan. Planners
establish phases by identifying transition points between
different kinds of operations by identifying changes in
tempo, or by shifting responsibilities among organizations
for a particular operation. (13:23-24)

Maneuver

Maneuver is an essential element of combat power.
It contributes to sustaining the initiative, exploitation,
freedom of action, and reduced vulnerability. The object of
maneuver is to secure or retain the positional advantage at
the least cost in resources. (9:12) Effective execution
requires not only fire and movement but also protection from
enemy air power. Keeping the enemy off balance and at a
disadvantage also protects the force. (9:175)

At the operational level, maneuver is the means by which the commander sets the terms of battle. It requires flexibility of thought, plans and operations. (9:175) In each phase of the campaign, the operational commander must anticipate the battle by general type (envelopment, turning movement, infiltration, penetration, or frontal attack) and dispose his forces accordingly. (9:111) This distribution of forces is the backbone of the campaign plan. Based on an assessment of the enemy's strengths and weaknesses, the commander concentrates his forces in areas where the enemy is least prepared and most exposed. He then disposes the minimal essential force in those areas where he does not wish to conduct major operations. In doing so, he avoids head-on encounters and focuses on attacks of the flanks of enemy formations and rear areas. The campaign plan should task-organize forces for each phase of the plan to include those held in depth as reserves. (13:24)

Fire Support

Operational fire support includes all conventional, chemical and nuclear munitions employed by ground, air and naval forces. Apportionment of these resources and establishing priority for their use are important parts of the campaign plan and should be clearly designated by phase. Fire support and maneuver are integral parts of the campaign and their integrated, coordinated use should characterize

every phase. Control measures or graphic symbols used on
maps and overlays to control fires and maneuver are used to
coordinate the effort. There are two categories:
restrictive and permissive. Restrictive measures prohibit
the use of fires without coordination with the establishing
headquarters. A good example is the restrictive fire line,
which prohibits fires or the effects of fires across the
line without coordination. Permissive measures, on the
other hand, expedite the delivery of fires without
coordination. The coordinated fire line is a good example.
It is defined as a line beyond which surface-to-surface
fires may be delivered at any time without coordination with
the establishing headquarters. When using these control
measures, careful attention should be given to the terrain,
capabilities and limitations of friendly units, as well as
to enemy capabilities and lines of communications. These
measures must be well thought out so as to facilitate the
desired outcome rather than restrict flexibility of
subordinates. (13:24)

Logistics

Availability of logistic support may well regulate the pace of operations in a campaign. A primary concern of the operational level will be management of support requirements. The campaign must allot sufficient time for logistical buildup prior to the initiation of operations. The plan must also designate subordinate priorities by phase while ensuring the development, establishment, and protection of lines of communications. Without adequate logistics support along relatively secure lines of communications campaign tempo will be lost. (13:24)

Command and Control

Command and control are separate and distinct processes but operationally interrelated. Command relates to making decisions and providing direction. Control is the means of following up on a decision or direction. Command is the process of infusing the commander's will and intent among subordinates. Control is the procedure or process used to minimize deviation from that will and intent. (12:22)

The theater commander places special emphasis on command and control arrangements. The assignment of missions, operational areas, and resources, plus the establishment of command relationships, are critical elements of the command and control system. He takes

special care to insure that command relationships are simple, consistent with the organization of his forces, and as simple as the circumstances permit. During the actual execution of the plan, he influences the campaign through the use of intelligence, employment of reserves, fires, sustainment, and personal leadership. (10:4-10,11)

CHAPTER IV

MAJOR OPERATIONAL DESIGN FUNCTIONS

Operational commanders direct very few changes during the actual conduct of operations. Most command decisions are made before the first battle begins. For once a campaign or major operation involving large units is under way, to redirect, reorient or change the disposition of forces is very time consuming. The consequences for success or failure are significant. Intelligence, maneuver, fires, sustainment, deception, and leadership are means or functions by which the operational commander can directly influence the outcome of the operation. These influences must be addressed in the campaign plan.

Intelligence at the Operational Level of War

Intelligence is vital to successful operational planning. The tactical commander can react quickly to unanticipated shifts in the flow of battle with maneuver forces reserved for that purpose and with changes in the priority of fires. The operational commander, however, must determine his method of operations far in advance. Once major forces are committed to the operation, they cannot be changed easily or quickly without penalty to the commitment. (10:3-8)

Although intelligence at the operational level of war is more critical than at the tactical level, it is also more difficult to obtain. It must also project further into the future, in the face of an enemy exercising free will. Intelligence at the operational level of war is also uncertain and uniquely vulnerable to deliberate enemy deception. At this level, deception is likely to be most effective, a fact underscored by the centralization of Soviet deception efforts at Front and higher levels. Intelligence at the operational level must probe the decision cycle of the enemy commander. The enemy's decisions will shape the future phases of the campaign. Operational level intelligence, therefore, requires information broader than that normally associated with the tactical level. Political, economic, and technological factors could materially affect the enemy's decision at the operational level. The operational commander, therefore, requires access to information normally obtainable only through strategic and national collective means. (10:3-8,9)

The sheer volume of strategic intelligence can easily overwhelm the operational commander and his staff. The operational commander must establish a system that will alert him to changes in the strategic environment which could alter the established pattern of enemy decision making. The most important element in this connection is

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the nature of the enemy's command and control structure and
the operational decision mechanism. In the Soviet Forces,
this initiative is reserved for relatively high levels of
command. A vital operational intelligence task is to
discover who commands in each given situation. Israeli
intelligence failed to diagnose key changes in the enemy's
command structure after the Egyptian defeat in 1967. That
failure may have contributed to the operational surprise
inflicted on Israeli forces along the Suez Canal in October
1973. (10:3-9,10)

When making estimates, the commander should not
limit his examination of enemy courses of action to just
reactions from friendly actions. Rather, his examination
must allow an opponent to pursue his own objectives. The
better the operational commander and his staff are able to
see the battlefield through his enemy's eyes, the more
reliable his forecast of likely actions will be. (10:3-10)

There are five tasks which must be accomplished to
produce operational level intelligence. They are:
situational development, target development, electronic
warfare, security and deception, and indication or warning.

Situational Development

Intelligence preparation of the battlefield must
start well before combat operations begin. It is a
continuous, integrated, and comprehensive analysis of the

effect of enemy capabilities, terrain, and weather on operations. (10:3-11)

Theater area evaluation looks at the many countries within a theater and their political alignment. This evaluation results in the identification of the theater commander's area of interests. (10:3-11,12)

Analysis of the theater's area óf operation should highlight the geographic features of the theater, assess popular political support for U.S. strategic goals, and estimate the impact of neutral nations on military operations. (10:3-11,12)

Theater evaluation considers morale, political reliability of military allies, mechanics of nuclear release, and force-to-space ratios. The evaluation also includes a doctrinal assessment of the composition, disposition, and initial deployment patterns of threat operational forces. Integration of all these functional aspects allows the planner to determine the enemy and friendly center(s) of gravity. (10:3-11,12)

Target Development

Target development provides direct and correlated targeting information to meet command target selection criteria. It is oriented primarily on the identification of special enemy weapons systems, including the NBC system, command and control systems, and other high-value targets

with accuracy. (11:3-8) This is a vital process using the templating of significant events and activities, military-strategic and political issues, alliance relationships, and the operational style of an enemy commander to locate and destroy targets which expose his centers of gravity to attack. (10:3-12)

Electronic Warfare (EW) .

EW is military actions employing a full range of technologically advanced equipment to reduce or prevent enemy exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum. (11:3-8) The operational commander must direct his EW efforts toward those targets that are vulnerable to identification, have high payoff, and are within his capability to attack. (10:3-12)

Security and Deception

Security is action taken to deny the enemy information about friendly units and their operations. Deception, on the other hand, is action taken to create a false picture of friendly activities, preparations, and operations to support the commander's objectives (11:3-8,9) These actions include those taken to identify friendly center(s) of gravity. This process also serves to determine measures needed to protect those friendly center(s). Additionally potential targets of operational level deception are also identified. (10:3-12)

Indication and Warning

The process provides the commander with evaluated information as to the intentions of the enemy. It is designed to give forewarning of enemy hostilities or attack. (11:3-8) Operational level staffs use it to develop and refine indicator lists of enemy activities. Staff planners should look for change in the political, military, or economic behavior of a potential adversary that could possibly lead to hostile activity. (10:3-12)

Operational Maneuver

Doctrine defines maneuver as "the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage." (9:12) Although we normally think of operational maneuver as involving the movement of large forces over great distances, scale is not the essence of maneuver. Rather, the significance of maneuver is derived from its basic purpose of creating operational advantage. Forces maneuver to secure the advantage of position before battle is joined and to exploit tactical success. Both contribute to strategic results. To paraphrase Clausewitz, the essence of victory lies not in the winning of a battle but in the exploitation of a battle won. Operational maneuver is linked to identification of the center(s) of gravity of the enemy. At its simplest, it consists of moving forces from their base or bases of operations by the

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most direct route to their point of concentration. The ensuring battle having been won, forces pursue until the enemy has either been destroyed or has made whatever concessions are demanded of him. (10:3-12)

Operational Fires

Fires are considered operational when their application has a decisive effect on the conduct of a campaign or major operation. Operational fires are thus distinguished from tactical fire support both in the way they are planned and in the effect they are intended to achieve. (10:3-13)

Fire support includes the whole range of land, air and naval capabilities. Apportionment of and priorities for these resources should be delineated in the campaign plan, for each phase. Fire and maneuver are integral parts of the campaign. Fire should create opportunities for maneuver, and maneuver should expose enemy forces to the concentration of fires. (13:24)

Today, operational fires are largely the province of theater air forces. However, the increasing range, improved accuracy, and greater lethality of future surface delivery systems, promises a corresponding increase in operational employment. In a nuclear war, both air and land fires could become a predominant operation instrument. Soviet doctrine is based on that conviction. Such a condition was

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foreshadowed in World War I when the ability to concentrate

fires so overwhelmed the ability to concentrate forces that

maneuver on the battlefield ceased. That condition could he

brought about again without nuclear weapons, as the current

conflict in Iran-Iraq would suggest. (10:3-13,14)

Operational fires focus on one or more of these

three general tasks: facilitating maneuver to operational

depths by the creation of an exploitable gap in the tactical

defense; isolating the battlefield by the interdiction of

uncommitted enemy forces and their corresponding logistical

tail; and destroying critical communications functions and

facilities having operational level significance. Perhaps

the clearest example of operational fires was the carpet

bombing that preceded the breakout of American Forces from

the Normandy beachhead. Planned as a separate operation,

conducted by strategic as well as tactical air units and

synchronized at Army Group level, the carpet bombing blasted

a three-mile wide hole in the German defenses opposite VII

Corps. Despite friendly casualties, and the creation of

unanticipated obstacles, the attack ruptured the German

defenses beyond repair. The exploitation was so rapid that

German forces were unable to react effectively. The

resulting offensive momentum carried allied forces to the

German border before logistical shortages forced them to

halt. The bombing was a self-contained operation designed to achieve a single operationally significant objective. It was planned and synchronized at the level of command exercising operational control. Further, its complete failure would almost certainly have resulted in a major, if not decisive, check of allied breakout efforts. (10:3-14,15)

To be operationally significant, interdiction, whether by air or by surface fires, must be combined with other operations. While interdiction attrites enemy forces, its primary contribution to the campaign is to curtail the enemy's freedom of movement. This reduction in freedom of maneuver is valuable only if friendly forces exploit this success by other means. Interdiction can slow the response of enemy reserves and obstruct lateral movement of forces from other sectors. Interdiction can also limit the enemy's ability to mass his forces or the rate of march for follow-on attack echelons. This action makes the enemy vulnerable to piecemeal counterattack. Of course, any interdiction of the enemy's lines of communication can disrupt his operations and hasten his collapse.

Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI) is apportioned and planned as part of the theater air interdiction plan. Close Air Support (CAS) and surface-to-surface systems involved in operational fire support are normally planned at

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corps or above. Tactical fires are planned bottom up and operational fires, top down. Objectives are established and targets designated by the operational commander, then passed to subordinate units for actual execution. (10:3-16,17)

Operational Sustainment

As the theater commander develops his concept of operation, he must concurrently develop a concept for logistical sustainment of that operation. He and his staff must consider a myriad of logistical factors that may affect the ability of the combat forces to conduct operations. In campaign planning, operational level sustainment can be the dominate factor in determining the nature and pace of operations. Sustainment plans provide the means to execute the operational concept. By determining the capability to meet supply, transportation, maintenance, construction, medical, personnel, and related requirements, feasible courses of action can be determined for the campaign. This essential analysis also allows for maximum adaptability within the concept of the plan. Sustainment capabilities often limit the courses of action available to maneuver at the operational level. As operations progress, the commander and staff must constantly balance current consumption rates with the requirement to build up a support base for future operations. (10:3-18)

The campaign plan must allot time for logistical buildup prior to the initiation of major operations. It must also designate priorities among subordinate units and provide for the establishment, development, and protection of lines of communication within the theater. Without adequate lines of communication, an aggressive campaign is not possible. (13:24)

To determine the supportability of a proposed campaign, estimated requirements are compared with anticipated capabilities. The comparisons allow for evaluation of the degree of risk that sustainment imposes on the campaign or a particular phase of the plan. Adjustments require trade-offs such as slowing the deployment of forces into the theater to allow an increase in logistics capability, reconstituting units for future operations at the expense of current operations, or if time permits, improving the sustainment base while slowing the operational tempo. (10:3-19)

Operational Deception

Given the quantities of military resources involved in a campaign, deception is a necessity in order to conceal the true intentions, capabilities, objectives, and locations of vulnerabilities with the theater. The campaign plan should direct the use of every available resource within the theater in order to project a plausible deception that

conceals upcoming operations from the enemy. This will necessarily involve the use of some combat forces to make it convincing. Combat support units and reserve units are well suited to accomplish deception measures. (13:24) The keys to an effective deception are operational security of friendly units and a clear understanding of the enemy's intelligence processes. To succeed, deception must be targeted against the enemy commander with the authority and resources to bring about the desired actions. Determining the target requires an accurate knowledge of the enemy's order of battle. The enemy's intelligence collection ability is far greater at the operational level than at the tactical. Because of the scale of effort required to assimilate the order of battle, the theater commander will require careful coordination with national and alliance strategic intelligence and counter intelligence agencies. Thus, the planner must insure that operational deception is woven into the very fabric of the campaign plan. (10:3,19-22)

Leadership

Leadership is the glue that binds all the elements of operational planning into a coherent whole. A leader at the operational level must possess exceptional organizational skills, including the ability to establish a positive, cohesive command climate throughout the

organization; the ability to anticipate enemy actions; to visualize the resource needs and organization required for the long term; and the ability to mentor and to coach. He must also be able to maintain effective relationships with leaders of other organizations where no lines of authority exist. Always capable of adjusting to the demands of different cultures, he must maintain the ability to represent his organization, service, and government to outside agencies if required and the ability to gain consensus in the decision process for joint and combined operations. (10:3-23)

Deployment

The operational commander must anticipate that conditions will change and accommodate these changes by developing branches that address unlikely but possible enemy reactions. Similarly, plans should include sequels ranked in priority, based on probability of occurrence. These sequels may have a major effect on initial force disposition; they, therefore, deserve special attention in the campaign plan. Deployment has traditionally been viewed as a strategic rather than an operational problem. For a nation with worldwide interests but limited forces based forward in peacetime, deployment may be among the most acute operational problems. An error in initial disposition may be difficult, if not impossible, to correct. A good

historical example is the Battle of France in 1940. French
forces were deployed along the Maginot Line to the East.
When the Germans attacked out of occupied Netherlands and
Belgium to the North, French forces could not be disengaged
and redeployed quickly enough to prevent the seizure of
Paris. (10:3-5)

Too often, deployment plans are designed solely to
place forces on the battlefield quickly without regard to
what they will have to do when they arrive. Moreover, when
deployment is conditioned by expected operational
requirements, they are often expressed solely in terms of
the opening engagements rather than the sequence of battle
or the campaign as a whole. (10:3-5)

Just as it is essential to visualize the military
conditions necessary to achieve success before committing
forces to battle, it is equally essential to visualize the
sequence of activities with branches and sequels of the
overall plan before designing deployment plans as a phase of
the overall campaign plan. Frequently, examination of
sequels to anticipated opening engagements suggests a
deployment scheme that differs from those made if only the
problem of opening engagements is considered. (10:3-5)

Failure to balance immediate and long-term
operational requirements will result in an eventual
imbalance in combat and sustaining resources that may force

the campaign to culminate at the worst possible time. Such

a forced phase in allied operations in late 1944 permitted

the German Army to recover from its defeat in France and

fight on for another year. Commanders must avoid

unnecessary problems that arise because he or his staff

failed to consider the campaign in its entirety before

deciding what and how to commit forces.

Reserves

The operational commander may exert major influence

on the campaign through careful employment of reserves.

These reserves may take the form of military forces,

chemical or nuclear weapons. These assets may be available

at the start of hostilities or they may arrive during the

execution of the campaign. The campaign planner must

capitalize on every opportunity that can be anticipated or

created to use his reserves in anticipation of delivering a

blow to the enemy which will throw him off balance. The

scarcity of resources of this type, however, may require

that some portions of the theater conduct an economy-of-

force operation. This will allow adequate reserves to be

created and positioned in anticipation of their use.

Reserves should be identified for each phase and their use

clearly delineated. (13:24)

CHAPTER V

FORMAT

There is no standard or required format for a campaign plan. The traditional five paragraph field or operational order addresses all of the essential elements of a campaign. Appendix A, Field Manual 100-6, Large Unit Operations (Coordinating Draft) contains a good sample format. The plan must be clear and contain sufficient detail to ensure full understanding of the commander's intent and campaign design. (10:A-1)

A checklist for the operational level planner is enclosed at Chapter VII. This checklist is not all inclusive but provides a good starting point from which to incorporate situational dependent requirements.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Campaign planning has become somewhat of a lost art since tne end of World War II. In recent years, however, increasing emphasis has been placed on the importance of campaign planning in the conduct of large unit operations. The operational level commander and staff planner must go beyond basic definitions in order to promulgate a greater understanding and application of the campaign plan. The campaign plan serves as a bridge between the strategic concept derived from the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and the tactical plans developed by subordinate units within a theater. Thus, not only does the campaign plan tie together the two levels, but it also enables the commander to communicate to his subordinates his decisions, priorities, and views of the sequential and simultaneous operations necessary for the theater objectives to be attained. The utility of the campaign plan in allowing the entire force to understand thoroughly the commander's intent is clearly evident. It is through his understanding that subordinate commanders can maximize the basic tenets of AirLand battle: initiative, depth, agility and synchronization. (13:25)

CHAPTER VII

CAMPAIGN PLANNING CHECKLIST

1. Have strategic aims been interpreted to clearly set military conditions to be achieved?

2. Are the restrictions included in the strategic guidance clearly stated for subordinate commanders?

3. Are constraints from strategic guidance clearly embodied in the commander's concept.

4. Do assumptions address all key unknowns?

5. Does the enemy situation clearly identify center(s) of gravity and anticipated changes?

6. Has the sequence of actions required to produce these military conditions been clearly stated?

7. Will the planned sequence of actions expose the enemy's center(s) of gravity to attack?

8. Has the time window for anticipated public support been considered?

9. Are missions expressed in broad general terms so as not to inhibit or restrict subordinate commanders?

10. Have subordinate commanders been given sufficient resources to accomplish their assigned responsibilities, missions, and tasks?

11. Does organizational structure facilitate centralized planning and decentralized execution?

12. Does the plan take into account immediate and long-term operational requirements?

13. Have sequels to each battle been planned?

14. Have all likely contingencies been planned for through branches?

15. Does plan allocate adequate resources for branches and sequels?

16. Is the plan phased by operational sequence?

17. Is the commander's intent conceptual, encompassing both missions and concept of operations by phase?

18. Does the deployment schedule support the phased concept of operations?

19. Does the disposition of forces support the commander's concept and intent?

20. Are areas of risk clearly delineated?

21. Have committed and reserve forces been clearly delineated by phase?

22. Does the plan capitalize on opportunities to employ reserves?

23. Have steps been taken to protect friendly center(s) of gravity?

24. Does the plan concentrate resources at the critical times and places?

25. Have the enemy's culminating points been anticipated?

26. Will the concept of the operations take advantage of this culmination and seize the initiative?

27. Is the space allocated to subordinate commanders adequate for maneuver?

28. Is the planned logistical base sufficient to sustain the force?

29. Has sufficient time been allocated by phase for logistical buildup?

30. Has plan provided for the protection of friendly lines of communication?

31. Have all available operational fires been incorporated and integrated into every phase of the plan?

32. Do operational fires facilitate maneuver to operational depth and isolate the battlefield?

33. Is target criteria clearly stated?

34. Are electronic warfare (EW) targets high payoff and within capability to attack?

35. Are early warning systems planned and resourced?

36. Are targets of deception reasonable, believable and supportable?

37. Is the deception plan adequately resourced?

38. Does the plan incorporate operational security?

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