THE ROLE OF AIRPOWER
IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATION

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THE ROLE OF AIRPOWER
IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATION

by

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ABSTRACT

This is a historical study of the contribution of airpower in counterinsurgency operations. The study begins from the development of insurgency movement to achievement of their final objectives: total replacement of the incumbent regime by political and military means. This endeavor will pose a potential threat to the incumbent regime. By viewing this threat, the incumbent regime will act swiftly to effectively counter an insurgency. The basic formula of a counterinsurgency operation is socio-political reform and political-military campaign. The problems of political and military campaigns will arise because of location, strength and mobility of insurgents, and internal and external support from local populace and foreign countries. These problems will challenge the role of airpower in counterinsurgency operations. It has already been demonstrated that joint military operation is required to counter an insurgency movement. Airpower with its flexibility, mobility, and range of action is a most valuable tool in implementing integrated operations.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Colonel Achid Muchlas began his military career in 1961 when he entered the Indonesian Air Force Academy. After graduation in 1964, he served as a military transport pilot with seventeen years experience in various operational assignments in his country and abroad. Most of his career is devoted in joint military operation to counter communist and separatist insurgency. In 1981, Colonel Achid was designated as an Air Attaché in Bangkok, Thailand. Colonel Achid is a graduate of the Air War College, Class of 1988.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Forces of change will profoundly alter the international order, causing regional and internal instability in particular developing countries within the next decade. The most drastic change will usually take place in the developing nations which are strongly influenced by three principal actor groups the West, the Communist East, and the internal instability. It is assumed that the fundamental incompatibility between the ideology of the West and the Communist East will mutually tend to invite conflict or active competition and rivalry between member states of the two blocks. The impact of ideological conflict and rivalry for influence and interest between the West and the Communist East will affect internal and regional instability. In contrast, the internal situation particularly in developing countries is conducive to their becoming the battle-ground for such conflict. In pursuing their international goals, these external actors may supplement conventional diplomatic, military and economic aid with subversive, unconventional offensive politico-military operations. The principal vehicle for these operations will most likely be insurgency warfare.

Since World War II, the Communist East have made most of their territorial gains through the sponsorship of internal insurgency warfare in particular developing
countries. The term insurgency warfare as used in this paper refers to the composite conflict phenomenon which can be defined as

"a cellular development of resistance against an incumbent political regime and which expands from an initial stage of infiltration-subversion through the intermediate stage of overt resistance by small armed bands and insurrection to final fruition in civil war." (4:5)

These stages of insurgency are designed to replace an existing socio-political order with a new order which has a different value system. The path of recent history has been heavily marked by insurgency war—not all of them successful. Take for example what happened in Indonesia. The Indonesian fighter had great success in pursuing and maintaining independence against Dutch colonialism. On the contrary, the communist, Moslem extremist, and separatist insurgency has totally failed to replace the existing Indonesian government. Nevertheless, the number of communist sponsored, communist controlled insurgency operation is significant to be continued conscientiously, because the mode of communist offensive actions pose a potential threat in the international arena.

In fact the insurgent forces are assumed to be a potential threat to the incumbent regime. By viewing this threat, the incumbent regime has to respond and swiftly act to effectively counter the insurgent. The implementation
of an effective counterinsurgency program is not associated with any single purpose strategy, but rather with the adoption of a flexible policy that coordinates and integrates a variety of countermeasures in different areas, depending on the nature of the threat.

The significant factors for a counterinsurgency campaign are socio-economic and political campaigns, and joint military operation that can be employed to achieve counterinsurgency objectives. The basic problem that most probably will arise during the execution of joint military operations occur because the insurgents establish and develop inaccessible bases, the insurgents employ their forces in mobile warfare over an extended: shifting and indefinite front; and the insurgents receive sanctuary from and are equipped with sophisticated weapons by a foreign country. These problems pose challenges to the role of airpower in counterinsurgency operation. Airpower with its flexibility, mobility, and range of action is a most valuable tool in implementing integrated operations.

The Purpose and Assumptions.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the nature of insurgency in general, and to propose an effective counterinsurgency campaign using airpower in integrated operations. This paper is based on the assumption that (1) the insurgent forces pose a potential threat in particular
developing countries, (2) the ideological conflict, rivalry of influence and interest of external powers will affect internal and regional instability, (3) the insurgents receive sanctuary and military equipment from a foreign country.

Definitions.

Several terms that will be used in this paper require definitions. I will use JCS Pub 1, January 1986 to define the following:

**Guerrilla warfare.** "Military and paramilitary operation conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces."

**Insurgency.** "An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict."

**Subversion.** "Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, political strength or morale of a regime."

**Infiltration.** "The movement through or into an area or territory occupied by either friendly or enemy troops or organization."

**Counterinsurgency.** "Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic action taken by a government to defeat insurgency."
CHAPTER II
THE ANALYSIS OF INSURGENCY

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.

Sun Tsu

Marxism does not tie the movement to any particular combat method. It recognizes the possibility that struggle may assume the most variegated forms. For that matter, Marxism does not invent those forms of struggle. It merely organizes to tactic of strife and render them suitable for general use.

Lenin

In guerrilla warfare select the tactic of seeming to come from east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision.

Mao Tse-tung

Insurgency warfare is often thought to be essentially an internal or local political phenomenon, as a cellular development of resistance against an incumbent regime. The occurrence of insurgency warfare in particular developing countries seem to be related to three principal factors. The first is conflicting ideology, which has both an internal and external dimension. It is internal, that is it reflects the intensity of the political-ideological conflict between indigenous insurgent forces and the incumbent regime. It is external, in that it often reflects the intensity of the international cold war. The second factor is an external dimension, which is simply the nuclear deterrence stalemate between the East and the West. The
more stable the strategic situation the more likely will be the initiation of insurgencies (communist sponsored and heavily supported by Moscow or Beijing). The third factor is internal instability, which is a complex composite of many factors. The greater the socio-political instability within a developing country, the more probably will be the use of force by local insurgents for their own ends. By viewing the insurgency warfare in the general perspective, the incumbent regime can understand and counter it more successfully. (4:183-184)

The Evolution of Communist Theory of Insurgency Warfare.

Antecedents to communist insurgency warfare can be found throughout the pages of ancient and modern history. Infiltration and subversion are described in the Bible and in ancient Greek history. Two classic examples before the birth of Christ can be found in the "Trojan Horse" (1000 BC) and "Seven Against Thebes" (Peloponnesian Wars, 431-404 BC) episode. (4:22) The heart of insurgency warfare as it has evolved during the modern period is the complete politicization of military combat. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that it first significant appearance in the military-theoretical literature is in Book VI of Clausewitz's On War:

. . . . the author enumerates five general conditions for the successful pursuit of guerrilla warfare: (1) operation must be conducted in the interior of a country, (2) war cannot hinge on a
single battle, (3) the theater of war must be extensive, (4) the national character must support the war, and (5) the country must have irregular, difficult, and inaccessible terrain feature. (4:22-24)

T. E. Lawrence contributes the additional dimension of strategic offensive in guerrilla warfare. For Lawrence the first principle of guerrilla warfare is one of detachment from the enemy. He will contain the enemy by posing the silent threat of selective tactical strikes from every point on the compass. A corollary of this principle is perfect intelligence of the enemy's movement and strength. This intelligence has to come from a friendly or at least an apathetic populace. His second principle is to destroy the enemy's most vulnerable source of strength. (4:24) The work of Lawrence, despite its success, has been appreciated more in Russia and China than among his own people. Accepting Clausewitz's dictum that "war is a continuation of politics by other means," the communist emphasize the political facet of guerrilla war and then graft socio-economic and ideological concepts to Lawrence's military tactics.

The most important Russian contributor to the theory of insurgency is Lenin. His endorsement of the tactic of infiltration and subversion is found in most of his major writing. Not so well known, however, is his endorsement that this tactic is fundamental to the conduct of guerrilla war. Lenin sees a somewhat limited set of
objectives for the pursuit of this type of warfare. His first stated objective is assassination of officials, and the second is the confiscation of money from the government and the well-endowed private person. The assassinations are to spread terror into the ranks of the government. The money is to be the principle source of funds for the purchase of arms and for other expenditures related to the preparation for the eventual uprising.

Lenin's successor was Stalin, a professional insurgent of the highest caliber. During the Stalin regime, a doctrine for guerrilla warfare was published entitled simply the "Russian Partisan Directive of 1933." A special theory of guerrilla warfare emerge from Soviet endeavor to implement this doctrine after the German occupation of western USSR. This theory stated that, to be effective, Soviet guerrillas operating behind the enemy line will have to completely harass the occupation forces and inflict maximum damage on communication and logistic installation. This is a military and economic mission. Hence the idea of a guerrilla being more than a military instrument is registered in Soviet communist theory on warfare. (4:27-28)

Undoubtedly the one individual who contributed most to the development of the theory of modern communist insurgency warfare is the Chinese patriarch, Mao Tse-tung. Mao's major writings, which contain the crux of this
theory, reflect the contribution made by fellow communists --Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin--and by such non-communist as the ancient military theorist Sun Tzu and the modern theorist Clausewitz and Lawrence. His writings also reflect the results of resistance practical experimentation in the problems of resistance and insurgency operation initiated by an "inferior" force in a vast underdeveloped area against modern-equipped but reactionary foreign and indigenous armies. (4:28) Mao describes the three stages of growth and prescribes that an insurgency movement to insure victory have to pass through all three stages. The first stage is the strategic defensive, which is characterized by the initiation of insurgency by small armed forces who then make a gradual but heroic retreat before the massive retaliation from the incumbent's modern army. This retreat results in a loss of space but a gaining of time. During this stage the insurgent should never permit or submit to position warfare. Their primary objective is survival over time, thus the enemy's frustrations will multiply because they have been denied significant victories. The first stage then slips into the second stage, stalemate. Survival is still the primary objective, and the guerrilla tactic of quick strike and quick retreat is the principal mode of military operation for the insurgents. The sense of futility among the incumbent's troops, the casualties and expenses of the military effort have a generally dilapidating effect upon the morale of the
entire incumbent camp. The war actually reaches a state of equilibrium with the insurgent controlling little land but still maintaining a position of tactical initiative. As the incumbents' morale declines, that of the insurgents rises, and a program of expansion of forces and an increase in operation begins. The third stage is the strategic offensive; which begins as the regular insurgent army units grow in size and positional warfare begins to dominate the conflict. Guerrilla warfare becomes supplementary. The regular insurgent army assisted by the guerrillas, then pursues the war to a successful termination. (4:31-32)

Because guerrilla warfare dominates the first two stages of Maoist insurgency, it also remains an important supplement to regular army operation in stage three. Mao devotes much of his writing to this type of military activity. Most important is his exposition of the six strategic principles "which are essential for the conservation and development of our strength and the destruction of the army" during the three-stage development of the insurgency: (1) on our initiative, with flexibility and according to plan, carry out offensives in a defensive war, battle of quick decision in a protracted war, and exterior-line operation within interior-line operations, (2) coordination with regular warfare, (3) the establishment of base areas, (4) strategic defensive and strategic
offensive in guerrilla warfare, (5) development into mobile warfare, and (6) relationship of command. (4:32)

In elaborating on the first principle, Mao's discussion of its strategic value rapidly spill into the area tactics. Mao emphasizes the importance of speed, surprise and maintaining the offensive:

In every war the opponent strive with each other for the initiative, since it means freedom of action for an army. The initiative results from correct estimation of the situation (both the enemy and ourselves) as well as correct military and political dispositions. (44:32)

Mao's concluding comment in his discussion of the first principle emphasizes the importance of careful and detailed planning for all guerrilla operations. He makes the strong point that each planned battle must be viewed as a part of the entire campaign, a part of the organic whole.

In the second principle, Mao elaborates that there are three types of cooperation or coordination of guerrillas with regular forces—"strategic, tactical, and battle." Guerrilla action that supports a regional commander and his operations is tactical. Mao emphasizes the importance of close coordination and cooperation at the "battle level." He prescribes that guerrilla warfare should disrupt enemy transport and serve as intelligence collectors.
The third principle, the establishment of base areas is considered especially important by Mao:

A guerrilla base may be defined as an area strategically located, in which the guerrillas can carry out their duties of training, self-preservation and development. Mao categorizes base areas according to their terrain features: mountain, plains, river, lake, and bay bases. After pointing out the advantages of mountain bases, he notes that even though plains bases are generally unfavorable, small temporary bases can be formed if the populace is friendly." (4:34)

The fourth principle, strategic defensive and strategic offensive, has already been discussed in the context of the stages of the development of a Maoist insurgency war. The fifth principle, development into mobile warfare, has also been discussed briefly in the same context. Mao considered the development of mobile warfare, absolutely essential. The strategy is that a regular force has been created and trained so that it can be employed in mobile warfare over an extended, shifting and indefinite front. Success for this strategy depends on a high degree of mobility and flexibility and features swift attack and withdrawal and swift concentration and dispersal. Mao essentially prescribes the regularization and expansion of guerrilla units and the continued maintenance of the tactical principles of guerrilla warfare. This condition is to persist until the regular forces are strong enough to
wage positional war on local fronts where the tactical situation favors such disposition and action.

The sixth and final principle is relation of commands. Mao reemphasizes the requirements for coordination of "independent" guerrilla unit operations at a zone level in order to insure the effectiveness of these operations as they pertain to the activities of other guerrilla units and also to regular troop units operating within a particular zone.

General Giap was the military commander in chief of the Vietnam insurgency forces which fought against the French Army in post-World War II in Indochina; he obviously accepted the three-stage theory, but he was apparently troubled by his inability to discern clear lines of demarcation between the different stages. Giap expands Mao's theory of revolutionary stages as it is explicitly concerned with the transition from the second to the third stage. He establishes three preconditions for entry into the last stage: superiority of revolutionary forces, a favorable world situation and a noticeable weakening of the enemy's resolve. Repeating some of the preconditions in another form, General Giap elaborates on Mao's third stage even further by specifying four subphases within that stage itself: (1) gaining absolute morale superiority over the enemy, (2) regularization and modernization of the
army, (3) the occurrence of an international situation that tends to weaken the enemy or directly aid the communist insurgency, and (4) the gaining of a momentum that expresses itself in stronger and more purposeful direction of the war effort by the communist leadership with a corresponding decrease in command and control by the enemy. (4:43-44) In these two elaborative amendments to Mao's thoughts on the transition from the second to the third stage, Giap obviously emphasizes the importance of the international political scene upon the conduct of insurgency warfare. It is the author's contention that Giap's greatest contribution to the body of communist insurgency warfare theory is precisely this relation of macroscopic politics to microscopic internal war. (4:44)

The theories of Major Guevara, a leader of the Cuban revolution against the Batista regime, are essentially a "copy" of Mao Tse-tung's work on insurgency warfare. Concerning base areas, Guevara is more rigid than Mao or Giap. The latter two military theorist and tacticians, while they have extremely high regard for permanent base areas, advocate a popular base that can absorb the guerrillas after an engagement. Guevara also relies heavily upon a popular mass base for logistic support and intelligence, but after engagement returns to a permanent base in the mountains for regroupment, training, resupply and rest prior to another strike. Guevara has
paid more attention to the importance of urban sabotage units to a guerrilla movement than his mentor Mao or colleague Giap. The Cuban rebel leader specifies in great detail the organization, equipment and mission of urban sabotage units. He emphasizes the operational concept of complete subordination of the urban units to the general headquarters of the rurally based guerrilla movement. It was believed that Guevara’s principle contribution to communist insurgency warfare theory is his expositions and postulations of the nature of the initiatory phase of insurgency warfare, and most important his addition of the urban dimension of guerrilla warfare. This latter point has particularly dangerous implications in Latin America, where most cities are plagued by masses of unemployed. The potential dangers in the marriage of discontented rural peasants with the discontented newly urbanized and unemployed former peasants through a revolutionary ideology are overwhelming. (4:44-49)

In this chapter insurgency warfare was placed in its proper historical perspective and an outline of the principal theoretical postulations of communist writers on the subject was presented. The philosophical core of communist theory of insurgency warfare, as first proclaimed by Mao Tse-tung and then revised slightly by Vo Nguyen Giap and Ernesto Guevara, is the concept of finding weakness in strength and strength in weakness. (4:50) The fundamental
strategic prescription stemming from this concept is the complete politicization of insurgency warfare via the ideological mobilization of the masses in support of the insurgency. Mao Tse-tung has been described here as being as much a modifier of previous theory as an originator of new theory, but it must be appreciated that his amalgam of the old, the revised and the original forms the basis for communist insurgency warfare as it has been practiced in the past decade. The most significant addition to the body of this theory to be made in the post-World War II period are Giap's international dimension and Guevara's urban dimension as a subordinate operational element of the rurally dominated guerrilla effort.

A Theory of Cellular Development.

Communist insurgency warfare can be viewed as a cellular development that normally proceeds through the phase of infiltration-subversion, overt armed resistance by small bands, insurrection by large scale units using guerrilla tactics and finally fruition via civil war. (4:52)

Phase One: Infiltration-Subversion. The critical element in the initiatory phase is the acquisition of insurgency leadership. This leadership generally is derived from disenchanted but highly nationalistic intellectuals. After receiving communist indoctrination, this element seeks to discredit the existing government and social system. It then endeavors to crystallize the discontent of the masses and the intelligentsia in certain
segments of the groups, and finally, compel the forces of change to follow a predetermined communist pattern. In doing so, it poses an immediate psychological threat to the incumbent regime. At the same time, it secretly prepares for guerrilla warfare should this be necessary in phase two. (4:185)

Phase Two: Overt armed resistance by small guerrilla bands. Crystallization of the masses' discontent that occurred in the first phase is translated into insurgent military capability in the second phase. The rural villages, and some urban centers, have formed within then small armed bands and complimentary logistics and intelligence support units. These guerrilla forces, without the benefit of meaningful unitary operational control, launch armed raids against the government aimed at alienating the people from the existing incumbent regime. Finally, through these military and psychological operations, the guerrilla warfare expands into the insurgency-affected areas and prepare the physical battlefield for the succeeding stage. (4:185)

Phase Three: Insurrection by large scale units using guerrilla tactics. This phase is characterized by the establishment of a large, secure base area in which the insurgent organization actually replaces the control of the incumbent regime with its own administrative apparatus. It
Phase Two: Phase One is marked by an almost feverish pitch of activity to stockpile supplies obtained from local resources. Recruitment is dramatically stepped up, regular force units are created, or guerrilla forces are organized and these forces begin their training preparatory to their entry into the next phase as conventional units. Finally, the military activities consist of large scale and well-coordinated guerrilla operations in which sophisticated tactics are used and military consideration seem to predominate over political considerations in the selection of target. Phase Three is essentially an expansive guerrilla-type preparation of the final victory phase, civil war. (4:186-187)

Phase Four: Civil War. Total replacement of the incumbent regime by the insurgent forces is the objective of this fourth and final phase. Its most noticeable characteristic is the transformation of the military conflict from guerrilla warfare to conventional limited war. (4:186)

This fourth phase, cellular development thesis can be viewed as a model for the growth of a typical communist insurgency particularly in developing countries; the sequential processes of crystallization, organization and militarization can be considered as the emerging elements that give the insurgency expanded and directed development from phase to phase.
CHAPTER III
COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN

The militant challenge to freedom includes the threat of war in various forms, and actual combat action in many cases. We and our allies can meet the thermonuclear threat. We are building a greater collective "conventional" deterrent and capability. It remains for us to add still another military dimension: The ability to combat the threat known as "guerrilla warfare."

President John F. Kennedy

We must not only meet the threat of major and limited wars, but also face the challenge of counterinsurgency.

Sec. of Defense R. S. McNamara

This Chapter will represent an original proposal regarding concept, strategy and tactic designed to defeat insurgency threat. The incumbent regime has to respond to the insurgent movement as soon as possible. This response should be a counterinsurgency campaign to achieve three principle objectives: expansion of control over as great as possible number of the populace, weakening and physical exposure of the insurgent forces and engagement and defeat of the insurgent units in military combat. The implementation of a counterinsurgency campaign will be based on the contention of the insurgency, it must include socio-political reform and political-military campaign. The resultant amalgam will focus primarily on the employment of military forces to defeat this political, military, socio-
psychological phenomenon at each phase of cellular development.

The first objective must be gaining or regaining control over the bulk of the national population. This will remain important consideration throughout the counterinsurgency campaign. The first step in achieving this objective is the non-military psycho-political task of recasting the social myth associated with the incumbent regime so that it will reflect the changed value of the populace as a whole. Second, discernable socio-economic reform that have an immediate impact must be instituted as evidence of the government's security in alleviating grievance and meeting rising expectation of the masses. The aims of these reform activities and the follow-up measures are the psycho-political mobilization of the populace. It is absolutely essential that all the government's psycho-political counterinsurgency operations in the initiatory period and throughout the war be oriented in a positive and constructive manner.

The strength of an insurgent military force is derived to a great extent from an exploitation of its supporters, the uncommitted masses and the loyal citizens who cannot be protected from the guerrilla bands. Either through choice or coercion these people supply the insurgent units with such essentials as intelligence,
personnel, food and clothing. In addition, the external power will probably supply military equipment, arms, clothing and food. The first step in achieving the second objective of the counterinsurgency campaign, is to isolate the insurgent's influence and control over the populace by promoting resettlement program. The aim of these operations is to cut off the supply from the populace, and the next step is to cut off external aid (which is brought in via overland routes, seacoast and air) by joint military operation and diplomatic offensive measures. In the latter action, the task of the incumbent regime, regardless of the mode of external supply to the insurgents, is the harnessing of all possible diplomatic pressure and bringing it to bear on the involved states to force them to terminate their illicit activities.

The most fundamental principle to be applied to a counterinsurgency campaign during phase two or phase three of communist insurgency, is the gaining and retention of the initiative. Partial achievement of the goal in expanding control over a greater portion of the populace and weakening and exposing the enemy will give the incumbent forces the capability and the opportunity to take the offensive. Thus the government will be in position to take action leading to the achievement of the third objective of the counterinsurgency operation—the defeat of the enemy's field forces, the insurgent units. With greater numbers of
troops to be employed for offensive strikes, with an increasing capability for the mobility of forces, and with improved intelligence on the enemy, the counterinsurgent commander has to know how to employ the force strength in the most effective way against the insurgents.

Socio-Political Campaign.

The history of past counterinsurgency wars shows that in most cases an incumbent regime has been late in responding to the insurgency threat. Thus an insurgency will be well along into phase two or perhaps phase three before the incumbent regime recognizes the gravity of the threat and reacts with determination. It goes without saying that the response at this latter stage will be more costly and more disruptive of economic development than concerted actions of the incumbent regime to counter insurgency activities in an earlier phase, most likely by a socio-political campaign. The objectives of this campaign are to: (1) protect the loyal populace and uncommitted masses under the influence from insurgent's ideological indoctrination and economical coercion to support the insurgent units, (2) change the way of thinking and the way of life of the insurgents and their supporters to achieve a peaceful life.

It should be remembered that this objective is also advanced by the insurgency as a primary goal in the first
phase of their operation and as a secondary goal in the last phase. Insurgents and incumbents, therefore, will be competing for the same objective—expanded control over the greatest possible number of the populace. It is obviously understood that control of the populace is essential for the success of a counterinsurgency campaign, as well as insurgency warfare. It is absolutely essential that all the government's socio-economic and political campaigns in the initiatory period and throughout the war must be oriented in a positive and constructive manner. This counterinsurgency should be under the Internal Security Operation Command (ISOC) which is responsible for coordinating military and civil program in insurgency areas. (7:855) The various agencies such as the Defense Ministry, the Interior Ministry, Agriculture and Education Ministry are integrated together especially at the provincial level in doing such a program.

The most important part in the socio-political campaign will be implementation of a resettlement program. The positive dimension of this program is socio-economic and political development within the newly established resettlement communities. (4:100) The resettlement plan is directed to separate land-hungry peasants insurgents from true communist insurgents, as well as to separate insurgents from the masses. Resettlement must be used in a cautious manner because the removal of peasants from their
home site and the destruction of their dwelling automatically cause these people to experience serious social and physical stresses. The main goals of a resettlement program are to increase opportunity for socio-economic and political development, to provide physical protection of individual and his property, to accommodate the fleeing people threatened by insurgents, to form static self-defense villages and finally, to separate the insurgents from the masses. The creation of such resettlement villages will effectively deny the insurgents contact with previously accessible and exploitable people. (4:103) The insurgent units will be weakened by the consequent diminution of personnel, logistic and informational support from these sources.

The objective of expanding the number of people coming under the control of the incumbent regime and diminishing the number of people under insurgent control, continues to be a central consideration of the counter-insurgency campaigns. The incumbent regime must continue to demonstrate its sincerity in meeting the aspirations of the people instituting additional quick-impact and some long-term programs for socio-economic reforms and political development. Furthermore, reforms at the local level can bring more people directly into the political activities relevant to the pursuit of counterinsurgency campaign.
Political and Military Campaigns.

The result of the socio-political campaign, especially in the solution of the population control problem increases the number of people who will pledge their allegiance to the government. After the get brief training in weapon handling and in basic tactics of perimeter defense, they form defense villages and relieve regular army troops who have been assigned static-defense duties at the strategic sites. The establishment of defense villages increases political support for the counterinsurgency campaign, and the armed insurgents will be isolated from their sympathizers through propaganda and political campaign. The most important part of the political campaign is the government's executive order which requires a more integrated approach to the insurgency. This executive order should promise amnesty to those insurgents who would lay down their arms and pledge not to engage in armed struggle against government. It also should require that military operations be supported by a development program which could be implemented in secured areas. The response to such an executive order has been extraordinary. In Thailand for example, thousand of insurgents and their supporters defected to the government including some of the highest ranking CPT leaders. (7:856)

The strength of insurgents usually can be characterized by the amount of direct external support or through
link-up with insurgents from neighbor countries. They seek sanctuary from neighboring countries and use border area to establish their bases. If the neighboring countries have realized that those insurgents are a common threat, it is not difficult to establish a combined counterinsurgency campaign. Both governments may set up a General Border Committee (GBC) including Commander in Chiefs of the Armed Forces from both countries. During the annual meeting, the GBC should design the policy making process for the execution of the counterinsurgency campaign. At the field level, a Regional Border Committee Office (RBCO) is formed directly under GBC to execute the combined counterinsurgency campaign. The members of RBCO includes an expert in military intelligence, logistic and psychological warfare. They should normally meet at least twice a year, especially for intelligence exchange and report on operations progress. The main task of the RBCO is to provide intelligence and the operations plan to the troops who take part in joint military operations in their own territory. But if the neighboring country is in fact supporting internal insurgency, intentionally, the only way to harness all possible diplomatic pressure and bring it to bear on the involved country is an attempt to force it to terminate its illicit activities.
Joint Military Operation.

The partial achievement of the goal of expanding control over greater part of the populace and the weakening and exposing of the enemy will give the incumbent forces the capability and the opportunity to take the offensive. Thus the government will be in a position to take action leading to the achievement of the defeat of the enemy's field forces, the insurgent units. With an increasing capability for high mobility supported by improved intelligence, the counterinsurgent commander must decide how to effectively employ his strength against the insurgent operational field units. The basic tactics of this operation are encirclement, sweeping and hunter-killer operations by small effective armed units.

Much of the literature on insurgency warfare, contains numerous endorsements of encirclement as the most effective tactic. In order to effectively encircle a large area, it is necessary to have many well-trained troops and an excellent mobility capability to permit the rapid and instantaneous deployment of these forces from their bases to the points of the encirclement line. An analysis of this against a typical condition in a particular developing country suggests that encirclement will not meet with equal success when applied in some areas. First, the military establishment in particular developing countries will not normally contain a sufficient number of well-trained troops
to effectively carry out this maneuver. Second, these establishments will not normally possess an adequate mobility capability necessary for such operations if they are to be efficiently executed. Third, the very nature of the terrain occupied by insurgents in these countries precludes effective combing of the area as the circles closed. Fourth, the insurgents, especially in their specific base area, enjoy the capability of being able to transform themselves quickly into peaceful peasants.

(4:111-112)

Sweeping is even less effective than large-scale encirclement and search maneuvers. It consists of launching one or more waves of troops in a direct-combing exercise that will cover a prescribed area in the shortest possible time. The insurgents are usually able to avoid the sweepers by either drawing out of their path or advancing beyond the terminal points, because of generally good local intelligence in their base area. After the sweep is completed, the government forces return to their base exhausted with little in the way of successful engagement to compensate for their expenditure of energy and materials. The insurgents return confident that they will be free from molestation for some time to come.

The small effective armed units are established to permit the counterinsurgency forces maximum flexibility,
surprise and the ability to seize the initiative by offensive attacks. These operations can be carried out principally by hunter-killer units operating out of fixed, fortified bases dispersed throughout insurgent-affected areas. Such an operation may involve a direct attack on an encampment of insurgency forces or a semi-permanent supply center, or it may call for the ambush of an insurgent column. The central aims of this action are to surprise the insurgents, force them to engage the unit under the latter's own terms, annihilate by highly disciplined and massed fire as many insurgents as possible and to confiscate or destroy all captured material. (4:113-114) This last point should not be overlooked, for, depending on the phase of development of the insurgency, the confiscation or destruction of weapons may be more significant than the destruction of insurgent personnel.

A final analysis of the tactic available to counterinsurgent commanders who have the capability of assuming the offense indicates that small effective armed units have more direct application to solving the problem of engaging and defeating insurgency forces than do large scale actions. By providing the counterinsurgent forces with a high degree of mobility and a continual capability for surprise attack, they permit the counterinsurgent forces to gain and retain the initiative, to restrict the maneuvering area of the
insurgent units, and to compel these units to fight under the terms prescribed by government forces.

In many cases of modern insurgency, the ground operations discussed above may well be the only action that an incumbent regime may be able or perhaps willing to take to defeat insurgent forces. In other cases the capability of the government for achieving the three principal objectives of counterinsurgency warfare may be enhanced by the addition of more advanced sea power to the regime's military establishment. More importantly, ground operations may be supplemented in a decisive fashion through the employment of airpower. This concept of operations is most likely to include joint military operation of army, navy, air force, police and defense villages (militia).

The concept of joint military operation in a counterinsurgency operation is a total forces concept which uses small effective armed units as the core of the whole force. These forces would be organized in a joint operation command while its subordinates consist of the task force units of army, navy, air force and police. The commander of this command should be appointed and directly responsible to the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The establishment of this command is required to defeat the insurgent forces who probably receive more sophisticated military equipment from foreign countries, because the
insurgents establish inaccessible bases, and the insurgents employ forces in mobile warfare over an extended, shifting, and indefinite front. The force structure of this command also reflects the role of airpower with its flexibility, mobility and range of action in counterinsurgency operations.
CHAPTER IV
THE ROLE OF AIRPOWER

Keep in mind the known uses and great potentialities of airpower in counterinsurgency operations. And also remember these two facts: (1) general war poses the primary military threat to the security of the Free World, and (2) it is under the umbrella of strategic superiority that the United States has freedom of maneuver in the lesser forms of conflict. (2:1)

Gen. Curtis E. LeMay

I am utterly convinced that the outstanding and vital lesson of the last war is that airpower is the dominant factor, in this modern world and that, though the methods of exercising it will change, it will remain the dominant factor so long as power determines the fate of nations. (6:123)

Lord Tedder

The implementation of airpower in joint operations to defeat insurgent forces can indeed be decisive and instrumental in the achievement of the goals of a counterinsurgency operation. Though the use of aircraft, troop and equipment deployment to the objective area can be quickly accomplished. The proper utilization of airpower by government beset with insurgency can significantly assist incumbent forces to attain the three principal objectives of counterinsurgency warfare. Airpower properly coordinated with ground power plus highly coordinated military and civil agency operations can insure the defeat of the insurgent forces in initiatory phase of combat.
As the battleground for counterinsurgency operation will be centered in developing areas, it can be assumed that the affected regions will probably lack modern airfields to support air operations. Hence, the air weapon system selected should be of the STOL (short take off and landing) type aircraft. It should be easy to maintain so that the limited technical expertise of the local national air force will be sufficient to permit sustained operation of these aircraft without excessive assistance from foreign technicians. (4:118-119) Since the absence of significant enemy airpower, the selected aircraft only need to have a minimum capability for dealing with a counter-air threat. This will permit the aircraft to be optimized for its main task of reconnaissance, close air support and interdiction.

The counterinsurgency air force commander will do well to keep these criteria in mind when selecting specific air weapon systems. He should remember that air power will be in great demand in its support role for airlift assault missions, that is its role of delivering troops and logistic support. The greatest problem in employing air-power in counterinsurgency operation is the probability that the insurgents are defended by aircraft, ground to air missile and an anti-aircraft artillery supplied from foreign countries. The discussion about the operations and
aircraft requirements, the insurgent's airpower threat and the degree of foreign assistance should be followed by the question "what doctrine can be applied to airpower in counterinsurgency operation?" The two sources of doctrine that has worked in the practice of counterinsurgency operations are AFM 2-5 Tactical Air Operations Tactical Air Operations-Special Air Warfare and AFM3-5 Special Air Warfare Tactics. Even though, neither has been revised recently, these two manuals should be the bible on what the Air Force should be doing if it is to participate in counterinsurgency operations. (1:111) AFM 2-5 lists a wide range of responsibility and describes the role of airpower for special operations in counterinsurgency including tactical air reconnaissance, close air support, interdiction, airlift, combat SAR (search and rescue) and psychological warfare.

**Tactical Air Reconnaissance.**

Tactical air reconnaissance is one activity of intelligence functions which collects data for the commander of counterinsurgency operations. The primary purpose of this activity is to provide photography for strike and information from which the intelligence expert can detect insurgent activities. This effort is extremely important to strike aircraft for target selection and target damage assessment and for the air supply missions.
The most challenging mission for tactical air reconnaissance in counterinsurgency operations is to obtain intelligence on the movement and location of small mobile insurgent units. By using advanced technology such as infrared and combining it with ground assessments of insurgents' movement, the intelligence expert can provide the most probable movement and location of the enemy faster than other sources.

The air task force commander is responsible for tactical air reconnaissance in counterinsurgency operations. As in other operations, tactical air reconnaissance is intended to provide the friendly ground, navy and air force with current information concerning the enemy. This information is collected by all available means, including normal categories such as visual, optic, photographic, electronic and infrared. (2:24) Finally, a new technique of tactical air reconnaissance with infrared photography, is adding a much needed capability for night reconnaissance to air operations. This technique has been able to detect enemy bases by picking up heat from camp fires.

Air Strike.

The main task of preplanned and immediate air strike in counterinsurgency operations are flown to harass the insurgents, to destroy their camps and food and to kill
as many as possible whenever the insurgents can be found. The role of counter air in counterinsurgency operation should be very flexible, depending on the strength of the enemy's air defence. In some cases, the role of counter air is still important because the insurgents may be supported by aircraft from a foreign country. On the other hand, in the absence of significant enemy airpower, the friendly aircraft need have only a minimum capability for counter-air operation. This will permit the aircraft to be optimized for the main tasks of close air support, tactical air reconnaissance and interdiction.

The basic purpose of air interdiction is to prevent or hinder the enemy's use of an area or route. In counterinsurgency operations, interdiction is unique operation because of the lack of fixed battle lines and positions and the overall nature of the insurgency movement. By living off the land, fighting when he chooses and establishing operational bases in inaccessible terrain, the insurgent can effectively control the initiative in entire areas within the sphere of operations. As a result, interdiction missions in a counterinsurgency environment are generally conducted against targets which reduce enemy capability to assemble and launch offensive actions. The major categories of interdiction targets are the transportation and
communication lines, supply, storage, repair, modification and manufacturing facilities and staging bases.

As in other tactical air support operations, close air support is air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly ground forces. It normally calls for detailed integration with the fire and the maneuver of the supported ground forces. Close air support in counterinsurgency operations fulfills two purposes. One is the classic support of military troops; the other is the support of the civilian populace. In close air support, the aircraft operate according to basic doctrines governing the management of tactical air forces; (1) use of fixed wing suppressive firepower is particularly effective during military operations, such as an airborne drop and the landing phase of a helicopter assault, after the interdiction or prestrike missions have neutralized an area, (2) the employment of close air support to assist directly in population defence is a common feature of counterinsurgency operations. A government fighting against an insurgency may establish fortified areas or hamlets to protect its citizens. They are frequently manned by a militia of boys and old men from the local area, supported by other para-military units. These outposts, forts and hamlets are most frequently attacked at night. The air task force aircraft responding to such attacks use various specified techniques.
and control measures. Very often, they are called upon to deliver ordinance within yards of the fortified area.

Airborne Assault Operations.

This aspect of airpower is generally accepted as being the most important in counterinsurgency operations. Quick reaction and rapid air delivery will preclude the insurgent from gaining intelligence possible with traditional relatively slow movement. Airborne assault in counterinsurgency operations will be used for rapid exploitation of target intelligence and for rescue and assistance operations for reinforcement of ground units in a tactically untenable position. In either case an integrated alert force consisting of troop units and transport aircraft is needed, either fixed-wing or helicopter. Both air assault systems have their strengths and weaknesses. In this case, the air task force commander has to know how to optimize the maximum strengths and to minimize the weaknesses and limitations of each.

It can be seen that the role of airpower can indeed make a significant and substantial contribution toward an incumbent government's achievement of its three strategic objectives. The contribution of airpower in counterinsurgency operations can be viewed in the following aspects: (1) It can provide the government forces with improved
intelligence when combined with all other sources. (2) It can deny the enemy the effective utilization of his abundant information sources relating to counterinsurgency force movement. (3) It can provide quick reaction to all sort of emergency assistance requests from the front lines and villages. (4) It can project the government's presence and its military strength to the far corners of the country whenever needed. (5) It can restore a balance in terms of the capability for surprise and thus provide the counterinsurgents the mobility and flexibility needed to assume the offensive. In total, airpower can provide an incumbent regime with a substantial and even decisive supporting contribution toward victory against active insurgent forces.

**Lift Operation.**

In counterinsurgency operations, airlift is the key to mobility and staying power providing rapid and timely movement of fighting force and sustaining logistic. In joint military operations, the tactical resupply task is conducted according to priorities established by the joint forces commander, and the air task force commander exercises centralized control of airlift forces through his established command and control structure, which is the focal point for actions and decisions necessary for performing the following airlift functions: (1) translating
requirement and established airlift priorities into specific airlift commitments, (2) directing specific commitments to the tactical force and monitoring mission execution, (3) maintaining the status of the force.

Thus airlift operation have taken on new dimensions in supporting counterinsurgency. First, there is the direct airlift mission which accomplishes the fast deployment of troops, resupply and internal transportation. The second, airlift mission is long-range or strategic airlift, for example from the United States to Vietnam which is vital for rapid movement of high priority cargo and personnel. In counterinsurgency operations, airlift performs the following specific missions: Airlift can be employed for airborne assault as mentioned above, airdrop or airland operations, to provide logistic support, to bring special weapons for organic assignment to hunter-killer units and to accomplish medical evacuation for wounded soldiers. Helicopter units, in the air task force joint operations command, also play an important role in the mobility and rapid deployment of troops and logistics support to certain areas. They can also be used for combat rescue to the soldiers or aircrew missing in action, and the medical evacuation of wounded soldiers from the battlefield for special treatment. This service can save
lives, and thus create high morale within the deployed forces.

Psychological Operation.

Insurgents, despite their heavy and continuing diet of political-ideological indoctrination and training, are still quite susceptible to psychological warfare. It has been mentioned that he must often retreat, he must continually avoid pitched battles with a stronger enemy, he lives under great physical and psychological strain and finally he seldom has the opportunity to evaluate realistically the success of his efforts. (4:105) These conditions tend to cause rapid changes in his morale. The counterinsurgent forces have to take advantage of such vulnerable conditions by continuous psychological operations. This effort should be followed by an inducement campaign that offers amnesty, resettlement and rehabilitation of the insurgent. Defectors will, in fact, be very effective in direct personal appeals to their former comrades.

Psychological operations are designed to disrupt the unity and motivation of the enemy, to demoralize him by creating defeatism and distrust and to influence friendly or neutral groups to support the friendly government. The counterinsurgent commander is responsible for planning, directing and coordinating assigned air force in support of
psychological operations to attain these objectives. The application of airpower to counterinsurgency operation in itself constitutes a form of psychological warfare. Surprise airborne assaults against insurgent concentrations, whether the direct killing effect is significant or not, also obviously have a psychological impact upon insurgents who find themselves defenseless against such air attack. (4:122)

A more direct way of employing airpower in psychological warfare is the distribution of leaflets throughout areas under insurgent control. Another direct technique is the "voice flight." In such operations, aircraft are equipped with loud-speaker transmitting equipment and are flown directly over known insurgent camps. These aircraft orbit target sites and, by means of tape or live broadcasts, flood the area with audible psychological warfare messages. Insurgent leaders can partially counter the impact of leaflet drops in area by threatening punishment to anyone found reading them, but there is no apparent insurgent defense against "voice flight" activities. Successful British experience with this operation in Kenya and Malaya suggest it should be included in the counter-insurgency force's psychological warfare program. (4:123)
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

Insurgency is an internal or local phenomenon, a cellular development of resistance against an incumbent regime. The occurrence of insurgency warfare seems to be related to three principal factors: conflicting ideologies, strategic nuclear deterrence stalemate and internal instability. The theory of insurgency warfare has been developed by military theorists throughout the pages of ancient and modern history. The heart of insurgency warfare as it has evolved during the modern period is the complete politicization of military combat. Its first significant appearance in the military-theoretical literature was in Clausewitz's *On War* which listed five general conditions for the successful pursuit of guerrilla warfare. The additional dimension of the strategic offensive was contributed by T. E. Lawrence. For Lawrence the principle of guerrilla warfare is one of detaching the enemy and destroying the enemy's most vulnerable source of strength.

The most important Russian contributor to the theory of insurgency was Lenin. His endorsement of the tactic of infiltration and subversion is fundamental to the conduct of guerrilla warfare. Lenin saw a somewhat limited set of objectives for the pursuit of this type of warfare;
assassination of officials and the confiscation of money from government and well-endowed private persons. Undoubtedly the one individual who contributed most to the development of the theory of modern communist insurgency warfare is the Chinese patriarch, Mao Tse-tung. His theory reflects the contribution made by fellow communists Marx, Lenin, and Stalin and by such non-communists as the ancient military theorist Sun Tzu and the more modern theorists Clausewitz and Lawrence. Mao describes the three stages of growth of insurgency movement to insure victory, strategic defensive, stalemate and strategic offensive. Furthermore, Mao Tse-tung has been described as being as much a modifier of previous theory as an originator of new theory, but it must be appreciated that his amalgam of the old, the revised, and the new form the basis for communist insurgency warfare as it has been practiced during the past three decades. The most recent significant additions to this theory are Giap's international dimension and Guevara's urban dimension as a subordinate operational element of the traditional rurally dominated insurgency movement.

Communist insurgency warfare can be viewed as a cellular development that normally proceeds through the phase of infiltration-subversion, overt armed resistance by small bands, insurrection by large scale units using guerrilla tactics, and finally fruition via civil war.
This four-phase, cellular development thesis can be viewed as a model for the growth of a typical communist insurgency; the sequential processes of crystallization, organization and militarization can be considered as the energizing elements that give the insurgency expanded and directed development from phase to phase. By viewing insurgency warfare in this general perspective, the incumbent regime can understand and counter it more successfully.

The incumbent regime has to respond to the insurgency movement as soon as possible. The response of incumbent regime in the latter stages will be more complex, costly and disruptive of economic development than a concerted response would have been in an earlier phase. This response should be a counterinsurgency campaign to achieve three principal objectives: expansion of control over as great as possible number of the populace, weakening and physical exposure of the insurgent forces, and engagement and defeat of the insurgent units in military combat. The implementation of a counterinsurgency campaign will be based on the contention of the insurgency, it must include socio-political reform to prevent the insurgent activities in early phases and a political-military campaign to counter insurgency activities in phase two or perhaps in phase three.
The most important part of the socio-political campaign will be implementation of a resettlement program. The main goals of a resettlement program are to increase the opportunity for socio-economic and political development, to ensure physical protection of individuals and property, to accommodate fleeing people threatened by insurgents, to develop static self defense villages and finally, to separate the insurgents from the masses. This effort will directly impact the control of the populace and weaken and physically expose the insurgent forces. It can then be followed further by a step of political-military campaign. The most important part of a political campaign is the government's executive order that promises amnesty to those insurgents who would lay down their arms and pledge not to engage in armed struggle against the government. In dealing with foreign support, the government may set up a combined counterinsurgency campaign with the neighboring countries, and employ diplomatic offensive to force the sponsoring countries to terminate their illicit activities. A political campaign must be followed by an integrated military operation to achieve the third principal objective, the engagement and defeat of the insurgent units in military combat.

In many cases of modern insurgency warfare, the ground forces must be enhanced by the addition of a more
advanced form of seapower, and more importantly must be supplemented in a decisive fashion through the employment of airpower. This will permit joint military operations of army, navy, air force, police and defence villagers. The concept of joint military operations in counterinsurgency operation is a total force concept, using small effective armed units as the core of the whole force.

The implementation of airpower in joint military operation to defeat the insurgent forces can indeed be decisive and instrumental in the achievement of the three principal objectives of counterinsurgency operation. Airpower with its flexibility, mobility and range of action is a most valuable tool and reflects its role in implementing integrated operations. During these operations, airpower will be organized into the air task force units or components, directly under the joint operations command, and it will be required to contribute to specific missions: (1) Tactical air reconnaissance provides timely intelligence function in collecting data for the commander of counterinsurgency operation. (2) Preplanned and immediate air strike can harass the insurgents, destroy their camp and food sites, and kill as many as possible whenever the insurgents can be found. (3) Airborne assault rapidly exploit target intelligence, for direct attack or reinforcement and rescue of ground units in a tactical untenable position.
(4) Airlift operation is the key to mobility and staying power, providing rapid and timely movement of fighting force and sustaining logistic support. The medical evacuation of the wounded soldiers from the battlefield for special treatment is also an important aspect of airlift operations; this service can save lives and create high morale within the deployed forces. (5) Finally, psychological operations are necessary to disrupt the unity and motivation of the enemy, to demoralize him by creating defeatism and distrust and to influence friendly or neutral groups to support the friendly government. A more direct way of employing air power in psychological operations is the distribution of leaflets by airdrop and "voice flights" throughout all areas under insurgents control.

Finally, airpower with its flexibility, mobility and range of action is a most valuable tool in implementing integrated operations. The role of airpower in counter-insurgency operation can indeed make a significant and substantial contribution toward an incumbent government's achievement of its three strategic objectives. It can provide a substantial and even decisive supporting contribution toward victory against active insurgent forces.
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