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RESEARCH REPORT

ALTERNATIVE FUTURES: UNITED STATES AIR FORCE SECURITY POLICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

LT COL ROBERT E. PIKE

AIR UNIVERSITY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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ALTERNATIVE FUTURES: UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
SECURITY POLICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

by
Robert E. Pike
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

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Research Advisor: Colonel Charles T. Fuller

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This research monograph discusses contemporary issues and proposes alternative futures for the United States Air Force security police—a career field with over 50,000 officer and enlisted personnel on active duty and in the Air Reserve Forces. It examines security police organizational, technological, leadership and operational environments and evaluates their capability to meet the challenges of the 21st century. The monograph addresses the research question, “What policies should today’s Air Force leadership be pursuing to prepare for tomorrow’s combat support and security police roles?” The monograph examines both contemporary issues and alternative futures in an attempt to assess the consequences of their impact on the security police career field. Further, it addresses the capability of the Air Force to respond to its future combat support and security police missions and their integration into the anticipated national security environment of the 21st century. Finally, the monograph offers a conceptual framework to improve the Air Force security police policymaking and decisionmaking processes in order to develop a strategic vision of the future for the organization.
Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Pike (M.S., American University, Washington, D.C.) is a career security police officer who enlisted in the District of Columbia Air National Guard in 1960 and received his direct commission as a Second Lieutenant in 1965. As an Air Guardsman, he was recalled to active duty during the "Berlin Crisis" of 1961-62 and again for the "Pueblo Crisis" in 1968-1969. He remained on active duty in career status and has served tours as a security police officer at bases both in the United States and overseas and as a staff officer both at major command and Air Force headquarters security police organizations. His most recent assignments were as the deputy commander of a combat support group and the commander of a security police squadron in the Federal Republic of Germany. Lieutenant Colonel Pike is qualified as a Master Security Police officer and his decorations include the Bronze Star, four Meritorious Service medals, the Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry and the Republic of Vietnam Honor Medal, First Class. Lieutenant Colonel Pike is a graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's National Academy, the Northwestern University Traffic Institute and he has completed the Squadron Officers School and Air Command and Staff College courses of instruction. A Colonel-select, he is a 1988 graduate of the Air War College.
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PREFACE

The inability to speak with precision and certainty about the future, however, is no excuse for silence.
—Alvin Toffler

"Predicting the future," Isaac Asimov once said, "is a hopeless, thankless task, with ridicule to begin with and, all too often, scorn to end with." Still, I for one have long been willing to suffer the risks of prediction and this research monograph represents the extension and elaboration of a series of essays which I authored earlier in this decade using the nom de plume "R. Ernest."

Written under the masthead "MindReading" those essays were intended to encourage long-range conceptual thought and the development of a strategic vision for the United States Air Force security police. Yet, because there was—and is still true today—no appropriate career field forum to present and discuss such issues in a professional and interdisciplinary manner, the essays remained unpublished. As a result, I believe an opportunity was lost some years ago to address a number of contemporary issues and alternative futures which today continue to face—and continue to perplex—one of the largest Air Force organizations.

It is my hope that the subject of this monograph, as well as other scholarly essays, theses, research reports, "white papers" and attempts at independent thought concerning the security police career field, will one day be offered for review and assessment in a formal Security Police Journal. Perhaps then it will be more possible to
anticipate our alternative futures and not have to react to them in the reality of the present.

To examine the future is both fascinating and challenging. To make such an attempt at this time, in the midst of the change that has characterized the last of this twentieth century, one needs to evaluate the potential of the further transformations which may be in store for the world, our nation and its military forces—particularly as a result of advances yet to come in science and engineering. My own experiences of the past several years, together with a lively curiosity about the future, have led me to accept the challenge to write this monograph and I've enjoyed the task.

While I have deliberately chosen a future perspective, there are still many old ideas and contemporary issues yet to discuss and resolve and I have presented only a few in this monograph as an example of the need for strategic vision. Thus, where I want to be, and where I have tried to put this work, is in the formation of such strategic vision for the future and in my basic premise that the future depends on the realistic and rational decisionmaking of the present. In that context, this monograph is not overly concerned with time scales. Indeed, for the purposes of my inquiry it is unimportant whether the things discussed are possible in ten years or in fifty—my only concern is with how and why, not when. More important to me is that this monograph not be perceived as an exercise in speculation born of mere curiosity; rather, it is an attempt to present the future consequences implied by our present choices.

Many writers have, of course, tried to describe the future, with
varying degrees of success. The problem is finding a person who combines both knowledge with imagination. A generation ago Jules Verne qualified, as did H.G. Wells, and in this generation it is Arthur C. Clarke, Isaac Asimov and, perhaps George Orwell. Having evoked the names of such great writers of science fiction, I do not assert that only readers of science fiction are competent to discuss the possibilities of the future. I do believe, however, that a critical reading of science fiction is essential training for any examination of alternative futures and that anyone with sufficient imagination to assess the future realistically would, inevitably, be attracted to this form of literature. In the words of Arthur Clarke, "The facts of the future can hardly be imagined ab initio by those who are unfamiliar with the fantasies of the past."

It may be impossible to predict the future, as Arthur Clarke also says, but why is it important to try? I believe it is critical to do so today even more than before because both our global society and national security environment are changing so quickly that we can no longer depend upon the value-laden, crisis-reaction policymaking of the present to provide rational and realistic decisions about our alternative futures. Still, this monograph does not try to predict the future, but only to discuss the boundaries within which our possible futures may lie. It is an attempt to survey the challenges of these futures and to assess both their risks and opportunities—for a complete description of the future must remain unknown until it is reality. And, toward this view, I have limited myself to a single aspect of the future—the Air Force combat support doctrine in general and the security police
organization in particular.

At the same time, I recognize that alternative futures will be defined and determined to a large degree by both technology and society in the future even more than it dominates the present. My purpose, then, is not to eliminate uncertainty—comfortable as it may be—but rather to explore its dimensions. The degree to which I succeed is more a heuristic process than a predictive one and the result I am seeking is that of a clarity of perception rather than a certainty of prognostication.

Thus, if this monograph seems completely reasonable and realistic and all of my extrapolations rational and convincing, I will not have succeeded in looking very far ahead. For the one fact about the future of which we can be certain is that it will be uncertain.

All attempts to predict the future in any detail appear ludicrous within a few years. —Arthur C. Clarke
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Men have lost sight of distant horizons. Nobody writes for humanity, for civilization; they write for their country, their set; to amuse their friends or annoy their enemies.

-Norman Douglas

Almost every military member of the armed services, regardless of the length of their service, remembers that one person whose manner of performance or degree of knowledge has left an indelible imprint on their life. In my case, that person was Chief Warrant Officer (W-4) Emerson H. Cashour of the District of Columbia Air National Guard (DCANG). As a seventeen year-old fresh out of high school, Mr. Cashour stopped me as I was leaving the DCANG administration building—just having been rejected for enlistment—and asked if I really could operate an offset printing press as I had said on my application. We went to a small room in the building where I demonstrated my skill on the machine and, within an hour, I was enlisted on that morning of October 22, 1960. I knew not then how that chance meeting with the "Chief" would shape and influence my own "alternative futures."

Mr. Cashour taught me about the "real" Air Force and exhorted me to become the very best airman I could be—he had a "passion for excellence" long before it became fashionable. Later, Mr. Cashour encouraged me to become an officer and it was with his support I received my direct commission in September, 1965. And, it was Mr. Cashour who recommended my appointment as the DCANG Chief of
Security Police which led to an active duty security police career of over 20 years. Taking this opportunity to look back over those years, I certainly have achieved more success in my life than I had ever imagined possible on that Saturday morning almost twenty-eight years ago. A large part of the success I have enjoyed in my career can be attributed directly to the example of leadership, officership, friendship and patriotism of the "most unforgettable person I ever met."

I remained on active duty following our recall for the "Pueblo Crisis" and I lost touch with the "Chief". It was only recently I learned that he had passed away--just about the same time I was penning those original MindReading essays on which this monograph is based. I never really remember having had the opportunity to say "thanks" to Mr. Cashour and so I have dedicated this work in his memory and in appreciation for the time and effort he gave to his nation, to his Air Force, and to one young man in particular.

I am also indebted to a number of people for their support and encouragement in the preparation of this monograph, principally Colonels Larry K. Arnold and Charles K. Fuller and other staff members of the Air War College. I especially appreciate the support and cooperation of Brigadier General Frank K. Martin, Commander of the Air Force Office of Security Police, and the members of his staff both at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, and at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., who were particularly tolerant and understanding in providing concrete and precise answers to a number of rhetorical and imprecise questions.

This monograph was produced using a Macintosh™ 512KE
computer together with Apple's MacWrite™, MacPaint™ and Switcher™ software. The basic text was produced using combinations of the Bodoni font from Fluent Fonts™ by Casady Company and the Palencia font—a dot-matrix letter quality version of the typesetter's Palatino font—designed by Andrew Welch, to whom I dutifully paid a shareware fee. This monograph was printed, time and time again, on a wonderfully rugged Apple Imagewriter™ dot-matrix printer.

Finally, the single most important influence on this monograph was my wife, Sue, who was gracious and considerate to take a year's sabbatical from her career in education to support me in my effort as intellectual partner, research assistant, principal typist, editor and critic. As such, she provided key insights and comments—forcing me to clarify and integrate the concepts upon which this monograph is based—and, to a large measure, this research is as much hers as well as mine.

However, while I acknowledge and appreciate the support and encouragement of everyone involved in the development and production of this work, the responsibility for the monograph remains mine and mine alone.

We should all be concerned about the future because we will have to spend the rest of our lives there.
—Charles Francis Kettering
CHAPTER 1

ALTERNATIVE FUTURES: AN INTRODUCTION

Some people argue it is possible to have knowledge of the past, but never of the future. But that does not prevent us from making accurate statements about what will happen in the future, and thus, in a sense, we 'know' what will happen in the future just as we 'know' what happened in the past. We may make mistakes in our forecasts just as we make mistakes in our recollections, but both forecasts and recollections are part of our 'knowledge.'

If anything is important, it is the future. The past is gone, and the present exists only as a transition until tomorrow. Everything that we think about and act upon today can affect only our future. Indeed, in the words of Edward Cornish of the World Future Society; "it is in the future that we shall spend the rest of our lives."

Because it is but twelve years until the year 2000 and because the future is expected to affect us so forcefully, it should not be ignored; yet, despite the apparent importance of the future, we have traditionally paid little attention to it and only recently has the United States Air Force become seriously interested in long-range planning for the future. Recently, the Air Force Chief of Staff outlined his thoughts on the issue:

The Air Force's role in meeting the major challenges of the future is even more important now than in General Arnold's day. Just as current Air Force capabilities are a credit to the foresight and planning of past leadership, so the future force will be based on today's decisions. The Air Force will continue to keep an important part of our focus far into the future."

Because of such concern for the future, we have seen the publication of several studies in the past few years—Air Force 2000, Forecast II
Destination 1999 and the like—which have attempted to assess current trends and technological efforts and to outline a perspective of the environment which will face us in the twenty-first century. These recent efforts were based upon an ancient and persistent human quest—to attempt to choose from among the best of alternative futures.

Central to such future studies is that they do not present an effort to "predict" the future, but rather they attempt to sketch "alternative futures"—in other words, the likely results of different choices—so that decisionmakers can understand their costs and consequences. The future, as one Air Force general officer said, "is not a world that lies before us quietly awaiting our arrival, but rather a world that we are creating by our daily decisions."

As a result of this interest in long-range planning, a number of Air Force—and, in particular, a few Air Force security police—people have become seriously interested in the future. And some of them, while called long-range planners, are generally self-styled "futurists" who emphasize that a seed of change planted today can become a mighty force in the years ahead. Such people recognize that the crises of today have resulted from past failures both to rationally and realistically resolve contemporary issues and to recognize that the actions and choices of today will determine the environment of the Air Force and its security police in the future. That future will depend, in large measure, on the ability of today's planners to understand its challenges and opportunities before becoming entangled in possible—but avoidable—catastrophes.

Most of the futurists agree the world will change very rapidly
from now through the beginning of the twenty-first century. Whether the pace of change will continue to accelerate or begin to decelerate remains unclear; but, there seems to be no question that the extremely rapid change that has characterized the end of this century will continue for the next several decades. No known force appears remotely capable of bringing it to a halt, though ways may be found to slow it down.¹

Still, many very surprising developments are virtually certain to occur in the final decades of this century and those in the beginning of the next—in fact, the largest "surprise" would be an absence of change in the future. Decades ago, nuclear power, space travel, and electronic computers belonged to the realm of science fiction, yet today they are taken-for-granted realities. Between now and the year 2000, there will probably be many more such fantastic developments as those of the past, which can only be speculated upon today. Still, there are a number of fairly well-defined trends which can provide a basis for thinking about the world of the future.

As a result, there are many good reasons for trying to imagine what the world may be like in the twenty-first century. The most important, of course, is to try to assess future conditions in reasonable detail and to evaluate how these outcomes will depend on the policy choices of the present. The premise is, if this were feasible, that policymakers and decisionmakers could expect—with reasonable reliability—to alter favorably the future through appropriate policy changes today.

Such a premise, of course, has a danger which is addressed by
Isaac Asimov who states that,

of course, there is no doubt that actions taken today can change the future. The problem is that the changes may be unintended, undesirable, and unpredictable. Unfortunately, the uncertainties in any study looking more than five or ten years ahead are usually so great that the simple chain of prediction, policy change, and new prediction is very tenuous indeed.

For this reason, the thrust of many long-range studies today is an effort to chart alternative futures as the determinate condition for policy choices.

Still, the most productive time frame for serious consideration by long-range planners to consider these alternative futures and policy choices is the ten-to-twenty-five year period. The reason for pursuing such a long-term perspective is that, according to Perry Smith,

Any time short of ten years is so near-term that it is hard to conceive of really radical changes of approaches, and most short-term to midterm planning of an innovative nature tends to be threatening to many who are committed to present policies.

Thus, the use of an alternative futures approach appeals to long-term planners because it requires an approach which is a departure from the simple prediction of a "most likely" outcome—an outcome which does nothing more than assign failure to less than accurate predictions.

In this context, the central question forming the basis for this monograph is simply this: "Starting from where we are now, and making reasonable assumptions about our alternative futures, what policy choices and decisions must we consider today to prepare our Air Force and its security police for the opportunities and challenges which logically would be expected in the twenty-first century?" The
best method for assessing such alternative futures, and the one which
is attempted in this monograph, is outlined by Perry Smith who says
we should

ask the question: 'What will the United States
Department of Defense (or the U.S. Air Force) look like in
the year 2010?' From it, a subset of questions
immediately follow: 'What weapon systems will be
deployed; what will be the base structure, both overseas
and stateside; how will we be organized; what missions
will we have retained, what new ones will have been
incorporated, what ones must we give up, and why?'

The issue of alternative futures for the Air Force security police which
is addressed in this monograph has adopted and adapted these
questions and recognizes, as does Arthur Clarke, that "before this year
ends, decisions made by a handful of men will determine the future of
many worlds."

The primary aim, then, is to present these alternative futures so
that responsible and intelligent choice is made possible, not merely
subjective decisionmaking based upon some utopian speculation. Still,
this monograph recognizes that

the field of future studies is far from the dubious ideal
of precise prediction. Scientific inquiry will succeed no
better than crystal gazing at seeing a precisely
predetermined future, for the simple reason that the
future is not precisely predetermined. Nor is the future
so indeterminate that we are free to invent whatever
future we think would be nice. Between the poles of
fully determinate future and a void to be filled by
utopian longings, a range of real possibilities beckons
both our imaginations and our wills, for the future we
will eventually inhabit is largely, though not completely,
a matter of the choices we all make in the present.

Thus, this monograph is intended to produce an outcome which is
central to its primary purpose: to foster increased understanding of the
impacts of the policymaking attempts in the past to resolve security police contemporary issues and to develop an awareness of the potential consequences of a lack of strategic vision regarding security police alternative futures.

Building a Present on Policy and Paradox

Key to any assessment of security police contemporary issues and alternative futures is an understanding that the range of issues, areas of endeavor and arenas of Air Force security police activity have grown increasingly complex. And, unfortunately, the ability of security police planners and decisionmakers both to identify and to resolve them is at times both unresponsive and inadequate.

This conclusion stems from a number of management realities surrounding attempts to decrease security manpower, to reduce security facilities and systems and equipment costs, and to accelerate security research, development and acquisition efforts while, at the same time, trying to provide improved security for present and future weapons systems and critical Air Force resources. Indeed, management realities which must co-exist within the bureaucratic organizational structure created and adapted over the past two decades; management realities which dictate at least a five year procurement response to meet today's needs; management realities which mean, in the event of a change of mind next year regarding what was perceived as necessary last year, that the process begin again; and, management realities which require a constant and consist advocacy to assure only consideration of security police plans and
programs at each level of approval authority from the major command to the Congress.

In the face of this organizational bureaucracy and management realities it does not seem appropriate to continue to plan and program by continuing simply projecting the past into the future. Such a process is grounded on a thesis that current developments—or those of the recent past—are the best predictors of future requirements. While such a process may accidentally be valid, it will not be adequate to resolve the issues which face the security police organization in the twenty-first century. For, in the past, a great deal of security police planning and program development has been based on a "gut" reaction to a subjective assessment of perceived need. And, to determine the validity of this need very little research, evaluation or analysis has been conducted to provide security police decisionmakers both realistic and rational policy choices. This process has resulted in the selection of less than desirable alternative solutions for some very complex requirements and the development of security, law enforcement and air base ground defense concepts along a single-solution orientation.

Such responses have been, and remain to a large degree, "value-laden", a process of paradox which exhorts leaders on the one hand to develop innovative solutions while, on the other hand, seldom embodying any degree of specificity or providing a reward for alternatives outside the limits of preconceived boundaries. It could be argued these value-laden, "gut" reactions have, in fact, represented a form of futurology which has led to program creation founded on a basis of prognostication. Yet, it is quite another task to validate the
successes, or failures, of such responses with any degree of certainty.

Central to this premise is a realization that the philosophical underpinnings of fundamental security police value positions range from the extreme right, the "traditionalists"--who favor the maintenance of the *status quo*--and the extreme left, the "experimenters"--whose sometimes inconsistent direction result in programs of what can be characterized as "disjointed incrementalism." These discordant value preferences have diminished the security police organization's ability to pursue long-range programming with any degree of consistency. Instead, planners and programmers have been forced to develop only "rational approximations" of security police objectives in terms of responding to their roles and missions.

The limitations of this approach are all too obvious. Security police planners and decisionmakers have become "reactive" instead of "proactive" and they have institutionalized the "crisis" response. As a result, they have not pursued integrated program development between the operations and programming staffs at all organizational levels and the policy decisions necessary to implement and perpetuate rational plans and programs have been affected directly by the decisionmaker's position along the continuum between the two fundamental value positions. Consequently, the career field has become characterized by a failure to state accurately its objectives in a manner which allows the development of policies and programs consistent to assure their achievement. Moreover, such a characterization has created a blurring of the distinction between the planning and programming, policymaking and decisionmaking functions.
These two deficiencies alone, perhaps more that anything else, have placed the security police organization in a tenuous position with regard to the resolution of its contemporary issues and the preparation for its alternative futures. In an effort to describe in more detail the extent of these deficiencies outlined in this discussion, the following examples are offered.

A Time For Change. First, several years ago a group of Air Force security police headquarters staff officers produced a "white paper" which they titled "A Time for Change." In it they challenged the wisdom of a standardized approach to weapons systems security, citing its checklist-driven inspection philosophy and a security police commander's propensity to view specified security post and patrol minimums as both the standard and the maximum.

Instead, they argued, basic security policy should be restructured to allow a decentralization of the overall management of the security program. Every security police manager, every security police squadron commander, would be encouraged to review their programs, examine the variables and make the necessary "adjustments" to the standard criteria. Their objective was to suggest less attention to a measure of rote compliance with standards and minimum requirements and, instead, provide more emphasis on decentralized local judgment—a judgment free of subjective assessment by inspectors less familiar with unique local influences and the ground upon which the battle would be fought.

Manpower For The 80s. In the second case, earlier in this decade a similar group of staff personnel at Air Force security police
headquarters produced a study headed "Security Police Manpower for the 1980s" which attempted to assess security police alternative futures in terms of their impact upon the security police force structure. Their projections for potential personnel increases were alarming as one new weapons system after another was expected to become operational in the decade—each requiring substantial security force personnel requirements.

Their study presented a demographic analysis which predicted declining personnel resource availability—the eighteen year old—and decreasing trained personnel retention, both of which pointed to an obvious policy implication: immediate reductions in existing security force structure would be necessary to accommodate these new weapons systems security requirements. They argued, technological advances aside, the common denominator for the security of all new Air Force weapons systems was people—and a lot of them. And, without offsets through reductions in existing requirements, neither the Air Force personnel, recruitment and training structure nor the available resource pool would be capable of supporting these future requirements.

**Policy and Paradox.** It could be argued that the policy implications of these examples of the study of security police alternative futures were implemented to some degree. Indeed, some Air Force security directives were revised to be less restrictive and the major commands have assumed a force structure standard-setting role in the weapon system research, development and acquisition cycle. Still, it remains essentially true that a weapons storage area located
either in North Dakota or Germany, bombers on alert in New York or Texas, or tactical fighters in Korea or England are protected virtually the same—that is, the minimum force requirement to be "tailored" has become both the standard and the maximum.

What this suggests is that the realities of security post priorities and growing nuclear weapon security requirements have, over the years, mitigated any real attempt to "tailor" security system standards to the threat, the location of the installation and the inherent vulnerability of the protected resource. Moreover, the intended implementation of a policy to reduce and eliminate security police manpower requirements has been overcome by a philosophy of "personnel cost-avoidance," where security police reductions resulting from the use of technology—primarily electronic security systems—have been used to offset longstanding unfunded security police requirements.

The paradox of these two examples of security police policy, which represent an attempt to implement two programs simultaneously without strategic vision, is only now becoming apparent. Subsequent to the implementation of the decentralization process, the primary security police functional area most suitable in which to "experiment" with that policy has been, for the most part, the law enforcement specialty. Yet, lacking baseline law enforcement standards, "adjustments" in this functional area have been more the result of a unit's capability to produce and justify personnel authorization requests of more shadow than substance—requests developed from very little real requirements analysis or empirical evaluation of possible alternatives.
At the same time, technology has precipitated some manpower reductions in the security force functional area. Electronic security systems and closed-circuit television assessment systems have eliminated many of the close boundary, close-in and distant support security sentries in alert aircraft and weapons storage areas. As a result, the security police commit a large portion of its enlisted personnel force—almost 12,000, nearly thirty percent of the total active duty security police authorizations—to the law enforcement functions. This represents a twenty-five percent increase over the number authorized just a few years ago. And, this number exceeds the number of security force personnel supporting priority “A”, “B” and “C” aircraft and nuclear weapon storage areas—a security force which has decreased by nearly ten percent over the same period.

Moreover, today there are almost three times as many law enforcement patrols as security response forces for these critical Air Force priority resources and the majority of these patrols are assigned to protect less critical Air Force facilities, non-priority resources and base communities—a population of considerably low criminal risk. As a result, many Air Force installations enjoy a higher per capita level of police service and protection than comparable civilian communities. Finally, one last look at the record indicates the number of authorizations added to a number of major command headquarters in just one year (1984) to support the creation of headquarters “elite guard” functions would have provided all the security post and patrol authorizations which were needed to support the new Space Transportation System security manpower requirements at Vandenberg.
It is not intended, in outlining these two examples, to unduly criticize the only two real attempts in the past several years to examine security police contemporary issues and alternative futures. What is necessary to point out here is that both of these examples of policymaking in the past lacked a sound and rational basis upon which to develop realistic planning and programming choices for Air Force and security police decisionmakers. While it may not have been possible for security police planners to have predicted accurately either in 1977 or 1980 the security police force structure of 1983 and beyond, they should have attempted to develop and assess the potential consequences of their alternative futures in order to present an assortment of rational policy choices. And, that is the real point of this discussion—policy analysis, or the application of empirical methods and assessment of realistic responses to the contemporary issues and alternative futures of the Air Force security police.

The global environment the security police career field will face in the year 2000 will be shaped largely by today's societal trends—economic, political, demographic, technological, and sociological phenomena. Some of these trends are clearly evident today while others are less well-defined. However, if military long-range planners are to take advantage of the opportunities presented by alternative futures and to understand their potential range of adverse developments, they must begin now to anticipate, identify and project the possible impacts of such trends.

It is recognized that as the period of concern is moved further
into the future, uncertainties multiply, confidence recedes, and scientific technique must bend to intuitive judgment. Nevertheless, the Air Force security police must focus on the future—the distant future as well as the immediate—and, it is the development of a strategic vision which will allow them to plan more effectively for their alternative futures.

**Strategic Vision for Alternative Futures**

When decisions are made within the context of a strategic vision and with a full consideration of the long-term consequences of each decision, greater coherency in planning and policymaking results. However, most leaders of governmental organizations are caught up in daily responsibilities and spend little time in creating a strategic plan for their agency or service. In addition, they often fail to encourage the establishment of a long-range planning process that would allow them to deal with various contemporary issues and alternative futures on a systematic and regular basis. Leaders who are captives of an overly full daily schedule fail to plan systematically; they tend to rely on *ad hoc* long-range studies which ignore both the potential consequences of near-term decisions and the adverse impacts of the future.\(^1\)

It is not possible to make decisions, prepare plans, or take action without some idea about what may or may not happen in the future. Assumptions will have to be made about the future; however, they must avoid the possibility that they are made carelessly or unconsciously. In that context, developing a strategic vision for the future goes beyond the mere assumption that the world of the future
will be much like the world of the present or that the future world
will be identical with that of its past. Such a concept of strategic
vision is intended to assist the decisionmaking process by providing
useful analytical models or frameworks for policymaking, by identifying
both challenges and opportunities, by suggesting a variety of
approaches to solving a problem, by assessing alternative policies and
actions, and by enabling people to see the present and its implications
for the future more clearly.17

The purpose of creating a strategic vision for the Air Force
security police and its alternative futures is summed up by Robert
Prehoda who says that

The winds of change portend a transformed world,
and my projected history culminates in a foreseeable
society that is utopian when compared to some alternate
histories of the future. Technological forecasting is a
potent weapon in the age-old conflict of man against an
uncertain future. If it is properly used to shape policy,
then scientific forecasting may at last emancipate us
from our unique capacity for worry, because it will
permit us to use our 'sense of future' not merely to
prognosticate but to design consciously, and then to
deliberately build the kind of future desired by rational
men and women.18

Therefore, the relationship between strategic vision and security police
alternative futures outlined in this monograph represents a somewhat
different perspective in that it is an attempt to define a perceptual
process of policymaking and decisionmaking rather than describe the
unintended consequences of an organizational problem-solving activity.
In this context, it will attempt to determine what lessons may be
learned from a perceptual process which might be of use to planners
and decisionmakers concerned with long-range strategic planning.19
Toward that end, this monograph is written in three parts. Part One consists of Chapters 2 and 3 and outlines both the historical perspectives and the origin and evolution of the Air Force security police so that the reader will have some understanding of the philosophical underpinnings and value references of the career field. Also presented and discussed are several aspects of two security police contemporary issues which have resulted from earlier attempts by security police policymakers at predicting the future, and both of which require continued assessment in terms of their possible resolution.

Part Two, consisting of Chapters 4 and 5, outlines the essential features of what is characterized as a description of the "future war" and the "future cop"—in terms of a global, national and Air Force assessment of alternative futures in the coming decades—and presents a number of policy implications and implementation strategies to both address and prepare for these alternative futures.

In Part Three, Chapter 6 presents a series of conclusions and recommendations which are intended both to resolve some of the ambiguity in dealing with the contemporary issues of the present and to offer a philosophical framework which could provide for the creation of strategic vision for the future of the Air Force and its security police. And, finally, the Epilogue contains an appeal for the security police organization to begin now to develop a conceptual framework which will allow the value-free assessment of both today's and tomorrow's security concepts and objectives.

It is recognized that perhaps none of the alternative futures
described in this monograph are inevitable, and that perhaps some of them are incompatible with current Air Force and security police policy and programs. It is the principal objective of this research monograph—representing the perspective of a futurist—only to offer a conceptual framework for speculation. Clearly, what is presented is far from an exhaustive set of conjectures about every important element of the future and even less is it an attempt to predict any particular aspect of the future.

Rather, what is sought in the development of this monograph is an understanding of that which may be possible and conceivable, if only in abstract thought and not in reality. In this context, its principal purpose is to leave for those security police men and women of the future a greater knowledge of what has gone before them and of what once was thought possible so that they might learn from these experiences.

History is not an exact science. And the historian of the future is as much an artist as scientist or academic. But the futurologist cannot be taken lightly. He bases his conclusions on perceived trends, and his predictions themselves may possibly have some effect on the future—in helping either to prevent his predictions coming true or to realize them.

—General Sir John Hackett
CHAPTER 2
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE AIR FORCE SECURITY POLICE

In the march of history, no less than in the sciences, every new insight into a possible reality, every perception of a new opportunity comes to us only because we have inherited a priceless legacy of knowledge and of method that was accumulated, slowly and after many errors, by the famous and the unknown men and women who worked in the same fields for centuries before us. We would be foolish to ignore that legacy.

The legacy of the Air Force security police organization is one which has generally evolved since the beginnings of military history and which is believed to have originated during the period of the Norman conquest of England when King Charles created his Office of the Provost Marshal to assure peace, security and discipline. The duties of the Provost Marshal were defined in various European armies over several centuries and eventually enumerated in the Articles of War issued by Charles I in 1629:

The Provost must have a horse allowed him and some soldiers to attend him and all the rest commanded to obey and assist or else the Service will suffer; for he is but one man and must correct many and therefore he cannot be beloved.
And he must be riding from one Garrison to another to see his soldiers do no outrage nor seath the country.

The Air Force Security Police Creed, contained at the Appendix, is derived from this early statement of the Provost Marshal’s duties. It represents a tradition of duty and honor to nation which had its origin in the American Colonial Army’s adaptation of the British Army system which led to the establishment by Congress in 1778 of a
Provost Corps. Nearly a century later, during the Civil War, the War Department created the first United States armed forces post of "Provost Marshal General" and its early military police organizational structure. Subsequently, the Army's military police corps was conceived during World War I and, eventually, the Air Force security police organization of today was born out of World War II from the Army Air Forces.

The Army and Air Provost Marshal Organizations

According to historian Joe Webb, the first designation of a "military police" can be traced to the appointment of a military entity by General George McClellan in 1861 to perform the police and discipline function, duties which were traditionally performed by the individual Army commanders. Webb asserts, however, that this period has not been attributed as being the genesis of the military police within the United States Armies. It does not have the one characteristic necessary to make it such—that of being an authorized single unit under the control of a single head and responsible to the War Department. It does have, however, as can be seen in later development, other characteristics which later were incorporated in a Military Police Corps.

Rather, it was the expansion of the United States Army during the Spanish-American War (1898-1900) and the successful performance by the Provost Marshal General organization which led to its eventual placement under single administrative management within the service. Finally, recognizing the need for an organization to perform such expanded police duties, an informal military police corps was created in the latter part of the war.
World War I. During the first World War, the problems of personnel and traffic control, custody of American prisoners and enemy prisoners of war, and other similar duties overwhelmed individual units and their commanders. As a result, under the direction of General John Pershing a provisional military police organization was placed under the responsibility of a Provost Marshal assigned to his staff who created the new Corps structure which was to be used during the conflict.9

This military police corps, as well as its Provost Marshal organization, was disestablished shortly after the war. As a result, the police duties assigned to these military police units during the war, and the remaining military police personnel, were returned to the individual commander. Despite the apparent need for such a corps for peacetime purposes, recommendations for a permanent military police organization were ignored by Congress.10

World War II. Prior to the outbreak of the second World War, events pointed again to the need for a centrally directed, formally organized military police corps in the Army and by the time the United States entered hostilities, the Provost Marshal (appointed in July, 1941) had assumed control of the newly formed military police organizations. Throughout the war, expansions in their organizational structure were made as new functions and duties were added. For historical purposes, the appointment of the "Air Provost Marshal" by General Arnold of the Army Air Corps on March 20, 1943 is viewed as the creation of the first formal "Air Police" organization.11

At the conclusion of World War II, the precedents set in the
Revolutionary War, Civil War, and World War I pointed once again to their dissolution of these wartime military police units. However, this time, because of their outstanding performance and in recognition of the growing global requirements for large occupational military forces during peacetime, the Army was forced to maintain both the Military Police Corps units and the Office of the Provost Marshal General organizational structure.¹²

**Significant Events in the History of Air Force Security and Law Enforcement**

**The National Defense Act of 1947.** On September 18, 1947, the Department of Defense and its separate Air Force were established. The National Defense Act of 1947 and the Joint Army and Air Force Adjustment Regulation 1-1-1 directed the transfer of all military police units attached to the Army Air Corps to the Air Force. Within the space of just one week, all Army military police personnel had been transitioned to the new Air Force.¹³

Along with the creation of the Office of the Inspector General, the Air Provost Marshal's duties were defined and enumerated to include the responsibility to:

(1) to enforce security, including atomic energy security;
(2) to supervise and inspect all air force police; (3) to have jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to their recruiting and training; and (4) to supervise military discipline, including the confinement and rehabilitation of United States Air Force Prisoners.¹⁴

This fledgling Air Police organizational structure paralleled those Army aviation military police companies of World War II which were headed by the Army Provost Marshal General. However, in their
early organization, Air Force air police personnel and units were placed under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. Headquarters, United States Air Force General Order Number 1 (January 2, 1948) changed this by creating the first Air Force Office of Inspector General; and, under it was then placed the new position of "Air Provost Marshal." Likewise, major and intermediate command Provost Marshal organizations were placed under their respective Inspector General; at the unit level, the individual air police squadrons were placed under either the installation commander or the air base group commander.\textsuperscript{15}

In 1949, the Air Provost Marshal structure once again reorganized to more effectively control the variety of functions which had become a part of its organization. This change provided an addition to the three principal divisions—a Plans and Analysis group—which was to begin planning and programming for the large air police forces required because of a growing atomic weapon arsenal and increased base security responsibilities abroad.\textsuperscript{16}

The Korean War Period. In June, 1950, the outbreak of the Korean war resulted in the overrun of several American air bases on the peninsula and the death of a number of air policemen who were the only real "armed force" on these installations. As a result, in 1952 the Air Force directed the Air Provost Marshal to develop an air base defense capability. The first Air Base Defense School was created at Tyndale AFB, Florida which was later was transferred to Parks AFB, California.\textsuperscript{17}

A force of nearly 10,000 in 1950, the air police units grew to
over 40,000 by the next year and, for the next two years, one out of every 20 Air Force recruits would be trained as an air policeman. Toward war's end, reports indicating the threat of ground attack to air bases had diminished led the Air Provost Marshal to direct his forces toward growing resources protection, sabotage and espionage requirements. As a result, concern for air base ground defense decreased during the period of the Korean peace negotiations and eventually the cessation of hostilities once again resulted in a post-war drawdown of the military police forces. 18

The Korean conflict created operational challenges for an air police squadron, many of which could not have been anticipated in advance of the war. A squadron would operate not unlike a base in the United States one week and then suddenly find many of its personnel deployed to a forward operating base where they would perform duties comparable to those of a ground combat unit. Indeed, according to one Air Police squadron commander in the theater,

**Often the Squadron would have details of Air Police in several locations at one time, securing supplies, in transient unloading points, advanced echelon to a forward base and securing the base in the rear. It was often necessary to use other personnel for security duties and I have used Japanese Police, South Korean Civilian Police, ROK Air Police, ROK Infantry and details from other units. On one occasion it was necessary to have all of these people at one time as we had personnel or supplies at Pusan, Sinanju, Inchon, Suwon, Kimpo and Japan.** 19

**Post-Korean War.** Following the Korean War, air police organizations were drawn down considerably as a result of the post-war force reductions, despite growing requirements for the security of nuclear weapons. As a result of these critical security
tasks, those remaining installation air police organizations were forced to become more security force oriented as opposed to that of resources protection. Soon, law enforcement emphasis shifted to owner-user protection and prevention techniques, not patrol or investigation, and large military working dog sections were assigned for the first time, particularly at large overseas units.

Throughout the late 1950s and 1960s, air police security requirements grew as strategic missile systems were deployed in the northern United States, presenting an even greater challenge to security of nuclear weapons. Still, post-war manpower and personnel shortages persisted and more and more of the less important police functions were curtailed and installations were forced to reduce their law enforcement capabilities. In the words of one Air Force security police historian, "It was a very creative period for the Air Police.

Regardless of these changes and increased responsibilities, by 1960 the duties of the Air Provost Marshal and the air police were little different from those of the late 1940s. However, it was recognized by 1962 that the growing responsibility of the air police called for a new structure, if only a new name, to convey their true function. Subsequently, the Air Provost Marshal was redesignated "Air Force Director of Security and Law Enforcement", particularly in view of the post-war environment and the "cold war" events of the early 1960s—principally Cuba and Berlin—which placed greater emphasis on the security of air bases. Still, the degradation of the post-Korean war reductions seriously diminished the air police capability to adequately respond to all its roles and missions. Despite
such degradations in capability,

from 1960-1964, the Air Police had taken significant steps toward the development of a professional military police force. Missile security operations responded to SAC leadership. Standardization was promoted in every aspect of the field from the wear of the new badge to work schedules to new types of equipment to be used for security and resources protection.

The Vietnam Conflict. The Air Force air police organizational structures and contributions during the Vietnam war are catalogued elsewhere in greater detail and the reader is encouraged to explore the references for insight on the history of this period.

Still, it is important to recognize that at the onset of the Vietnam conflict (as early as 1962) air police personnel were assigned to the Republic of Vietnam for ground defense—albeit “temporary” duty—of Air Force cantonment areas and, by 1963, nearly 300 air policemen were officially in the country. By 1964, the worldwide air police forces had grown to over 45,000 in strength—nearly one of every 15 new Air Force recruits—primarily as the result of increasing nuclear bomber and missile forces rather than the increasing involvement in Vietnam.

Another significant event during the winter of 1966 was yet another organizational title and name change for the career field, this time from “Air Police” to “Security Police”, combining the concepts of “security” and “police”. This change was made in recognition of their increased responsibilities for air base security, particularly in view of the Vietnam experiences. Much more important during this period were the sacrifices of many security policemen during the conflict, particularly those events leading up to and including the Tet offensive.
of January 31, 1968, in Vietnam. Indeed, in the words of Marie Shadden,

May of the Silver and Bronze Stars won by Security Policemen came from the Tet offensive. Captain Reginald V. Maisey, Jr., was immortalized in SP legend when he was killed at Bien Hoa AB in defense of Bunker Hill 10. His support rallied the SP's there and they successfully held their vital position. Although only six SP's were killed during the Tet offensive as opposed to thousands of NVA and Viet Cong buried in common graves on the air bases, their deaths had a profound impact on air base defense and security for the future.26

It was during the latter years of the Vietnam conflict that Air base ground defense roles and missions were to be again addressed seriously. Base security units, expected to defend only to the boundaries of the installation, found quickly those forces charged with their protection outside the perimeter fence were not always adequate, or capable, of performing their mission. As a result, a large number of innovative base defense organizations were developed, deployed and evaluated during the conflict and security personnel received a great deal of "combat preparedness" training before deploying to the theater.27

On March 29, 1973, the last of the assigned Air Force security police personnel officially departed the Republic of Vietnam, although a large number would return later to perform in an outstanding manner during the last days of the Republic before its fall to the North Vietnamese forces. The legacy of that conflict remains indelibly etched into the heritage and tradition of the security security police career field and into the hearts of every security policeman who has viewed the evidences of valor on display at the Security Police Museum at

26
Lackland Air Force Base. Indeed, the

air base ground defense lessons learned by blood and sweat in Vietnam were incorporated into the collective Security Police memory through regulations concerning tactics, recollections and war stories, SP legends and a continuing training program which despite cutbacks and economy succeeded in producing combat ready airmen. Security Police leadership committed themselves to insuring that base defenders were never again totally dependent on outsiders for air base ground defense.\textsuperscript{28}

Post-Vietnam Period to the Present. Following the conflict in Vietnam and the subsequent force drawdown, security police professionalism and productivity were emphasized and enhanced through the increased use of electronic security systems. As a result, many of the menial and boring security tasks were eliminated and at the same time increased officer and non-commissioned officer supervision and management of the security police forces was instituted.

In November 1971, the introduction of women in the security police career field and their demonstrated successes in the law enforcement specialty led ultimately to the opening of the security specialty, although almost 15 years later (and after an aborted test program in 1977). By 1974, there were about 200 women on active duty in the security police and, today, security police women are fully integrated throughout the security police officers and enlisted force.\textsuperscript{29}

By the middle of the 1970s, international terrorism had become a global way of life. Security Police were pressed into service as flying “air marshals” throughout the United States and overseas bases were pressed hard to develop effective antiterrorism programs as installation commanders became more aware of the growing threat to
nuclear weapons storage areas and small arms facilities. As a result, substantial security and law enforcement increases were directed to counter the increased threat.\textsuperscript{30}

At the same time, policies and programs were designed to redefine Air Force air base ground defense responsibilities. The lessons learned from the Vietnam experiences, in the mind of security police policymakers, clearly pointed to the need for an assumption of the ground defense role both inside and outside Air Force base boundaries. In their view,

The various attacks on air bases in Vietnam had banished the feeling of security well behind the front lines. With tactical airpower and guerrilla forces, as well as advanced technology available to the enemy, the future capability of the Air Force to perform its mission might well be determined by the readiness of those engaged in air base ground defense. Everyone on the air base had interest in the Installation Commander's air base ground defense program.\textsuperscript{31}

Consequently, the Air Force and its security police embarked on an ambitious program intended to combine the needs of trained personnel to combat both the growing threat of terrorism to nuclear weapons and greater realization of its base defense requirements.\textsuperscript{32}

Still another attempt to make the best use of insufficient security police manpower was the implementation of a ready and deployable force, Security Police Elements for Contingencies (SPECS), which could perform normal security tasks during peacetime as well as augment a threatened unit should the need arise. The SPECS concept provided for the capability to deploy with tactical forces and to establish “bare base” security operations. At the same time, the Air Force “Warskills” program was initiated and, as an attempt to respond to both air base
ground defense needs and the terrorist threat, security police also created specially trained units as elite Emergency Service Teams. All of these attempts to "do more with less" had one thing in common: the personnel to perform these new functions would be employed as regular assigned base security or law enforcement forces when not training for their special roles. Such a force structure was an economic compromise to respond to increasing security requirements in a decreasing personnel environment.\textsuperscript{33}

In May, 1975, Cambodian forces captured the U.S. merchant ship Mayaguez. Security Police operating out of Ubon AB, Thailand, were tasked to conduct an operation to attempt to regain control of the ship. Unfortunately, one of their transport helicopters crashed and resulted in the death of eighteen security police personnel. Each of them later would receive the Bronze star with valor for their sacrifice.

Several years later, in support of the operation "URGENT FURY"—the U.S. government effort to restore order to Grenada—several security police air base ground defense units were deployed both to the island in support of air base security at two airfields, as well as other locations to coordinate security operations for the repatriation of captured prisoners of war. In both cases, as well as a number of other instances which cannot be recorded here, it was evident that the Air Force security police had earned a reputation for being ready and prepared to respond to contingencies worldwide.

And, as the Air Force enters the era of increasing low-intensity conflicts, it is apparent that this aspect of the security police heritage
Organizational Realignment. In the early 1970s, after a successful test program in the Military Airlift Command, headquarters staff functions (to include those of the Air Force Chief of Security Police) were realigned to create a new office of Chief, Security Police which was assigned to the major command Chief of Staff. This lasted only three years at the Air Force level and, in 1978, the Air Force Office of Security Police (AFOSP) became a Special Operating Agency responsible once more to the Air Force Inspector General.

Also during this period many installation Security Police group commanders were reassigned directly to their respective Wing Commander instead of the base combat support group commander. Since 1984, following the lead of the United States Air Forces in Europe, most major command Chiefs of Security Police have resolved the special staff dilemma through their redesignation as separate Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Security, losing forever the functional relationship with their major command Inspector General. Yet, today at Air Force Headquarters the AFOSP organization remains a sub-element of the Air Force Inspector General where the Commander, AFOSP serves as the Deputy Inspector General for Security Police (SAF/IGS).

Throughout these organizational realignments, Air Force security police at every organizational level have assumed even more responsibilities as the result of increased transnational terrorism, the growing need for deployable security forces to respond to contingencies around the world, overwhelming personnel and information security
requirements and the increased security needs for the new and costly Air Force and Department of Defense weapons systems. In addition, a greater number of firstline weapons systems and their active duty support missions have been transferred to the Air Reserve Forces, along with their attendant security requirements. As a result, peacetime security police units and organizations have grown again to over 50,000 personnel, with a potential to reach nearly 60,000 by the end of the 1980s.34

Thus, the past two decades have been characterized by outstanding performance, professionalism, technological innovation and increased roles and missions in the face of challenge and change. With the end of the military draft in 1973, the security police suffered as much as any other agency from a crisis in terms of available personnel from the civilian populace. The Air Force, like the other services, was compelled to recruit competitively from the labor market for the first time in its history, and security police continued to claim the largest share of available manpower for its growing antiterrorism, nuclear security and air base ground defense programs.

Challenged to "do more with less" in the face of a variety of challenges, security police leaders fought for and eventually achieved many technological improvements in equipment, vehicles and clothing in an attempt to increase the efficiency of law enforcement and installation security as well as improve morale, performance, training and retention. Yet, finding answers to the dilemmas of how to do more with less, how to effectively use available manpower and resources, how to conserve time and labor wherever possible, and how
to enhance law enforcement and security force professionalism and morale, has remained an elusive goal in the face of these overwhelming new requirements.\textsuperscript{35}

We have seen the past and it doesn’t work.

-Dwight D. Eisenhower
CHAPTER 3

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES: THE INSOLUBLE PRESENT

The present is the constantly moving boundary between what has happened and what will happen. If the present were only this, we might conclude that it did not truly exist, any more than the future and past. But this paradox appears to arise from the limitations of language. For our purposes, the 'present' is not just the present moment but the brief period of time on both sides of the present moment in which we 'live'; that is, the realm of our experiencing of ourselves and the world, a realm of time that includes both the immediate past and the immediate future.

The present, Edward Cornish goes on to conclude in his book titled *The Study of the Future*, "is the period of time in which we experience and think, when the perceptions and memories of the past are reviewed, decisions are made, and activated to carry them out." In this concept of the "present", the distinction between the immediate past and the immediate future is not entirely clear. By that he suggests that perceptions of the contemporary issues in which an organization finds itself embroiled has a direct relationship with that organization's policies and decisions of its recent past. Consequently, the "present" is defined here as that period of time during which policies and decisions are made and actions are taken which will eventually define the contemporary issues of an organization's alternative futures.

Almost every large organization in today's challenging and complex world faces hundreds of problems and issues, each of which demands more in terms of time and effort than often is possible, much less available. Beleaguered by the urgent issues of the present,
organizations have little patience with those who suggest they should be thinking about the future. How, they say, can you ask us to think about the future when we're trying to deal with a crisis which is occurring right now?

Yet, having to face today's crisis is one of the best reasons for thinking about the future. The reason for this is that, almost always, the crisis has resulted from a failure to deal realistically and rationally with an issue before it reached its present critical state. In retrospect, it is relatively easy to determine how a small amount of strategic vision—if invested earlier—could have prevented or lessened the consequences of the crisis.9

Three decades ago, Joe Webb attempted to describe the future of the security police career field based on his 1958 description of its contemporary issues. He prognosticated that

- the loyalty security program and the censorship program,
- the vulnerability testing program, the security indoctrination program, the special weapons program, the local ground defense program, responsibilities for safeguarding classified information, motor vehicle traffic programs could all very well be vested in the responsible commanders. With these reductions, the need to train air policemen in utilization and equipment would be negative. The Air Police System would exist only in plans and possibly a few security personnel and organizations to be used as a nucleus in future emergencies.4

Webb went on to predict that the majority of air police installation security duties would be returned to the responsible organizational commander. He believed that historical precedents would dictate the reduced need for a military police organization, much less one charged with the responsibility for industrial security and the
safeguarding of classified information.

Moreover, he foresaw a future in which there would be few, if any, remaining functions for the military police to perform. He concluded his assessment with the statement that,

In general, the duties and functions will tend to need less and less air policemen. With the reduction of the functions and duties now assigned, more emphasis would be placed on law enforcement. Hence, there would be a squadron of possibly twenty-five to fifty air policemen assigned to each installation, depending upon the size of the installation, under the command of an installation provost marshal.

Suffering the ultimate risk of prediction, Webb's future did not materialize quite as he thought it would. Indeed, in almost every case, exactly the opposite has occurred as Air Force security police organizations have grown ten-to-twenty times as large as he had foreseen.

The question, then, is whether it is worthwhile to attempt to plan and program for the future if its nature and character will always be so unpredictable. Since the world of the future does not yet exist, it is only possible to study theories about what the world may be like in the future.

And for this reason, in order to begin to understand the future, it is essential that the contemporary issues of the present be examined in an effort to understand the past. For it is the world of the future which will be created, to a large degree, from them; that is, the understanding of alternative futures will be developed from a perception of what the world was like in the past and how it may be changed in the decades to follow.
Security Police Manpower and Organization: Structure, Roles and Missions

Over the past several years, the security police organization has failed to provide clear and consistent policy direction regarding the critical issues affecting its career field. Indeed, since 1984 it has allowed many of the major command security police staffs to develop an independent policymaking and decisionmaking posture with regard to the resolution of contemporary issues and the definition of future roles and missions. As a result, the function of the Air Force Office of Security Police (AFOSP) has been relegated to that of developing "crisis" responses to operational issues and the long-term effects of its value-laden policymaking and subjective decisionmaking have been rarely, if ever, analyzed and assessed.

Organizational Impediments. As an example, security police leadership has consistently presented a manpower structure policy espoused by the rhetoric of "doing more with less"; yet, the record over the past few years reflects entirely the opposite has occurred—the career field, its personnel structure, its definition of roles and missions and the plans and programs to implement them, have grown "topsy-turvy." 

If AFOSP—or more appropriately the Deputy Inspector General for Security Police (SAF/IGS)—is to be effective, and respected, as the titular head of the security police career field, it cannot abdicate to the major commands its legitimate policymaking and decisionmaking responsibilities. Much of the problem in this arena stems from a lack of those individuals who possess a strategic vision of the future: which
has allowed many of the insoluble contemporary issues to persist unresolved.

Moreover, the failure to conduct critical policy analysis—directly attributable to security police organizational impediments, philosophical underpinnings and ideological conflicts—has substantially degraded the security police organization's overall capability to prepare for its alternative futures. All these aspects of the current organizational climate have operated outside of a well-defined body of security police theory and have combined to produce unrealistic planning and programming as well as irrational policymaking along the lines of what can be described as "disjointed incrementalism."

Central to this issue is that the AFOSP organizational structure, as it has evolved since 1979 when it became a separate operating agency and moved to Kirtland Air Force Base, has become inefficient and an impediment to the development of creative, innovative staff personnel necessary for the establishment of good security police policymaking and decision-making. Moreover, the role of SAF/ICS, in terms of its relationship to AFOSP, has further complicated attempts to adapt this organizational structure so as to complement its functional responsibilities with both HQ USAF agencies and the major commands.

Toward this view, it is suggested what is needed is a somewhat different perspective on the issue—that is, the present AFOSP organizational structure is inefficient because it is structured. In this context, it is proposed that AFOSP should not "mirror" the organizational structure and staff personnel alignment similar to that of either the base-level security police units or the major command
security police agencies. Central to this proposal is the recognition that with the advent of the DCS/SP structure at many of the large major commands, AFOSP—as an organization—no longer has a direct functional purpose in terms of career field policymaking and leadership. Nonetheless, it continues to be organized in such a way in order to allow its staff to become “specialized” along the functional lines of responsibility which exist at the base and intermediate levels of security police command.

While it is agreed that such specialization is an essential strategy for managing information, reducing irrelevant data and producing “experts” in a given functional area, such specialization at the higher levels of the organizational structure becomes ineffective and inefficient because it leads—such as at AFOSP—to the “that’s not my area” attitude. Moreover, this type of attitude and structure allows the unimaginative staff member to exist merely by replicating other people’s work.

By this it is suggested that much of this so-called “specialization” simply comes from accumulating data provided by the major commands, assembling it into combined matrix or message format, and transmitting it to HQ USAF agencies. Indeed, nothing would seem to preclude an individual major command, acting as a lead agency for a plan or program, from completing these essential tasks of compilation and forwarding the results directly to SAF/ICS for representation as a consolidated USAF security police position.

If this is the case, the question that clearly arises is, “Why is there a continued need for the AFOSP organization?” Ironically,
several major command security police agencies with bright, clever individuals have recognized the answer to this question and have circumvented—particularly when dealing with controversial and time-consuming issues—any possibility of AFOSP policy and program management input or direction.

**Roles and Missions.** The history of the security police, described previously in Chapter 2, accurately reflects the ebb and flow of the evolution of security police roles and missions since 1947 and the growth of these forces during each major conflict and their substantial reduction which occurs shortly after demobilization. Yet, subsequent to the end of the Vietnamese conflict, this pattern was disrupted as the continued need for large numbers of security police was recognized—primarily for those reasons which have been discussed. Indeed, in virtually every mission support area over the past two decades, security police requirements have been the object of unprecedented growth in response to increased concerns for the theft of nuclear weapons, the threat of terrorism, the protection of classified material.

But, by far during this period, the security police organization have seen substantial increase in those police services which are described as “feel good” functions—that is, services which on their surface have very little effect in terms of contributing to peacetime operations, the “fighting” of crime on Air Force installations, or preparing for wartime missions. Such “feel good” functions are assigned without an objective analysis or empirical evaluation of their value, efficiency, cost effectiveness—or even their actual need. Rather,
they are tasks directed upon the security police under a misconceived perception that in doing so Air Force personnel will "feel good" about their security.

Indeed, institutionalized by years of both faulty rationale and subjective logic, examples of these "feel good" roles and missions abound on Air Forces bases today—accumulated over the years by tradition, decree and direction, and recognition that the security police are one of the few organizations with large numbers of personnel available twenty-four hours a day. Twice each day at virtually every U.S. air base in the world there are two, usually more, security police detailed to conduct reveille and retreat ceremonies where they play the music and raise or lower the flag. In addition, security police provide funds escorts, base school crossing guards, perform duties as school bus monitors, guard command headquarters buildings and stand hour after hour at installation entry gates—many of which possess no critical Air Force resources or are devoid of serious threat. Security police patrol Air Force base officer and enlisted housing areas where they respond to fire alarms, lost child reports and missing bicycle complaints—in communities supported by a unique organizational structure which has at its disposal control forces which exceed that of mere adherence to military and civil law.

Scarcely a week passes when one of these "feel good" roles is either created or denounced. As an example, virtually every base newspaper contains its version of the "Commander's Open Line"—the base "Hot Line"—and the security police are frequently the target of interest either in terms of citizen complaints or requests for police
services. Recently, one such written exchange went as follows:

[Question] Why are cars and trucks allowed to illegally park in the lots around buildings 205, 216 and 403 on [Air Force] base? The vehicles parking illegally belong to the workers in these buildings and are not on temporary delivery runs. They're the same vehicles day after day.

[Answer] I have informed security police flight chiefs to closely monitor the parking in the areas around these buildings. Thank you for your concern.

The reality of this reply is lost on its author—more security police patrols in the parking area will only produce more parking tickets which will require even more personnel to process them through administrative procedure upon administrative procedure. More security police workload equals more patrols, more paperwork equals more administrative personnel—and, today, more computer time. Could not have, one would ask, a single phone call from the base commander to the commander of the parking violators resolved the issue in a more rational and realistic manner?

In a similar vein, recent responses in overseas theaters to increasing acts of terrorism against host nation and U.S. forces have resulted in substantial increases of security police personnel to protect Air Force aerial port terminal buildings and storage areas, billeting facilities, dependent schools, nonpriority resources (such as electrical power and water facilities), military vehicle parking areas, fuel storage tanks—and the list goes on virtually endlessly. Indeed, as each of these primary "targets" are secured and hardened, the threat—and the level of security effort—turns to the softer resources. And, since the threat of terrorism is not expected to subside, these increased roles and missions—and their security police manpower requirements—become
permanent functions never to be reduced or eliminated. As a result, these additional requirements only further exacerbate the already demanding recruitment, training, equipping and ancillary support costs associated with each new security police authorization.

Similarly, as requests for these services proliferate in Air Force base cantonment, housing and dormitory areas, more police calls equate to more police workload which, in turn, results in increased police patrols. All of these increases have occurred without anyone stopping to consider if the sixty- to seventy-five percent of an Air Force base's military population living off the installation enjoys similar levels of service from their civilian police agencies. The point is, of course, that they don't—nor should they, or would they, expect such service. And, except on those installations where the U.S. government has exclusive law enforcement jurisdiction, there simply is no real justification for the level of security police protection provided—except for the reasons of "feel good" and "tradition."

Moreover, security police security forces have not been exempt from this type of "service call" force growth. From headquarters "elite guards" to aircraft security parking area patrols, hundreds of authorizations exist merely because of an expressed concern for someone's unquantifiable desire for "increased security"—which remains, yet today, an immeasurable product of subjective judgment.

Moreover, as these unquantifiable "feel good" roles and missions have increased over the past two decades, so also has the Air Force and security police support and administrative structures necessary to sustain them. Base operating support costs, in terms of manpower and
facilities, are inexorably tied to the number of security police authorizations. Consequently, substantial increases in security police personnel result in increase in other functional areas to support them—and, conversely, substantial reductions in security police forces would result in reductions of these base operating costs.

This discussion is not intended to be as radical in its approach as it may seem or as heretical in its nature as it may appear. Its point is simply that many of the security police roles and missions, as they have been defined and instituted over the past several years, lack sufficient objective justification or empirical validation. And, it is on that basis that it is argued that many, if not all, of these functions need not be performed in the future—and, if it is indeed validated empirically that they are required to be performed, there certainly is the possibility—and high probability—that they need not be performed only by security police personnel.

The question that must be addressed is in terms of resolving the contemporary roles and mission issues is simply this: How can the security police identify its legitimate roles and missions, eliminate the need for "feel good" functions, reduce nonessential service calls and, at the same time, substantially reduce—by perhaps as much as twenty-five percent—security police authorizations? Only when security police leaders, planners and programmers begin to address adequately this question will they prepare the Air Force and the security police career field for its alternative futures which will be faced in the twenty-first century.
Air Force doctrine recognizes that "combat support is the art and science of creating and sustaining combat capability." In this context, combat support is intended as both a peacetime and wartime activity extending from the forward battle edge throughout the theater of operations. The purpose of this combat support structure is to provide an organic air base capability to support air operations; the essential components of this structure are air base operability, survivability and defense.

Yet, despite a recognition since the Korean War that such combat support is essential, the majority of Air Force doctrine has remained largely centered on force employment; indeed, only recently has an attempt been made to define the critical elements of the combat support structure's essential components. Speaking to this issue, one air force senior leader recently observed "that we have been too slow to mentally 'strap on' the complex concept of the air base support system as one of the irreplaceable contributors to sortie generation." Moreover, he goes on to state that the Air Force has yet to appreciate the tactical importance of combat support and concludes that

"We must be prepared to 'fight' the air base. We must be able to protect it from intense air, land and eventually space attacks. Air base protection is a tough assignment. The air base's location is static—not very difficult to find; it is a high value target—worth a significant expenditure of enemy weapons; and its neutralization is the key to any successful conventional war—it will get plenty of early attention."
It was not until 1981 that the Air Force began to identify another "triad" in its combat capability—weapons systems, basing systems and combat support systems—and many management initiatives to define the combat support structure were initiated to recognize its three critical components of operability, survivability and air base defense. It was in that year a General Officer Steering Group was formed to develop an Air Force planning structure to manage the Air Force air base operability programs. However, the operability planning organization has been superimposed on already existing air base survivability and air base defense organizational structures in a manner which fails either to understand the complexity of the operability objectives or to adequately integrate the three essential combat support system components.

**Air Base Ground Defense.** The present Air Force doctrine for air base ground defense, outlined in Air Force Regulation 206-2, *Ground Defense of Main Operating Bases, Installations and Activities* recognizes that

*Air Force commanders will not be as fortunate as they were in Vietnam, Korea and World War II. Technological advances in weapons systems, munitions, communications and intelligence systems have seriously diminished the time, distance and force ratios that previously protected U.S. Air Force bases. Also, those resources that were provided by other services for air base defense have been recommitted to meet the growing ground and air threats to our shipping lanes, and other worldwide contingencies.*

Indeed, speaking to the issues of time and distance, George Ellis believes the Air Force will no longer be able to trade geography for the warning necessary to mobilize the required number of conventional
forces which will be needed to assure an adequate capability for extended combat operations. He concludes that

One critical result of this converging relationship between time and distance is the rapidly increasing vulnerability of our basing support systems. All our forward deployed air bases are now 'reachable' targets. Not only is our support basing infrastructure more reachable, but the reality of technological advances in conventional weaponry now places our air bases at an unprecedented risk.13

And, with regard to the issue of air base ground defense responsibility, such a role and mission for the Air Force has remained obscure because of the lack of firm guidance. As discussed previously in Chapter 2, the U.S. Army intent to accept their responsibility for air base defense has been subject to question on more than one occasion, while, at the same time, there continues to be insufficient justification for the Air Force to provide the manpower to defend its bases and installations. Still, it was not until the Vietnam conflict that the Air Force began to direct its attention to this organic protection of its air bases as it recognized that "dedicated" Army personnel for air base ground defense simply were not available to perform the mission.14

Moreover, while this recognition of a need for an Air Force air base ground defense capability was apparent, it remained contrary to accepted service roles and missions; still, "the Air Force was forced to assume responsibility for internal air base defense when Army units were used offensively instead of being tied down in passive air base defense duties."15 As a result, to meet this growing need, several thousand Air Force active duty and Air Reserve Force security police

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authorizations were provided and an extensive air base ground defense training program was established at the Security Police Academy.

It would not be until 1984 until the Air Force and the Army fully understood this contradiction in their doctrine and operations for the defense of air bases and in May of that year a “Memorandum of Agreement” between the two services was drafted to redefine the air base defense responsibility. According to this Memorandum of Agreement, and the Joint Service Agreement which was produced later to implement its provisions, Army units will provide air base defense outside the perimeter of the base and the air component commander will exercise operational control of the Army units. In addition, all Air Force air base defense manpower spaces exceeding the existing Army capability to perform this mission would be transferred to the Army, along with the responsibility for training all Air Force air base ground defense personnel.

As a result, these agreements expanded Army rear area operations and particularly those of its military police corps who are now responsible for the Army’s formally prescribed air base ground defense role. Essential to this role is the fact that the revised ground defense concept requires the Army forces to be “in place” before the threat forces arrive. Still, the Army’s military police corps capability to respond to this revised concept is not yet clear, nor is the continued capability of the Air Force security police, alone, to “fight the air base” from inside the perimeter.

Air Base Survivability. Since the late 1960s, as a result of its Vietnam experiences—just as the security police—the Air Force civil
The latest conceptual thrust has resulted in greater emphasis on base recovery after attack. The reality that air bases will not be sanctuaries is finally emerging. Further, the conviction that civil engineering forces are a critical link in keeping operational air forces flying comes out loud and clear. It also recognizes the intensity of warfare which will exist on the modern battlefield. And, civil engineers are told to expect the unexpected, to be prepared to deny the enemy access to critical base facilities, and to anticipate operations in an environment laden with unexploded ordnance and chemical munitions.18

Clearly, such a thrust will result in a credible base survivability capability and the Air Force civil engineering community has developed a strategic vision which will prepare its organization for their view of its alternative futures. And, one critical aspect of their strategic vision is a realization that the base’s “combat support forces have never been organized with an integrated focus on warfighting.”19

**Air Base Operability.** Recently, the creation of the Air Base Operability function within the Air Force headquarters Plans and Operations office represented an attempt to organize these combat support forces so as to integrate the concepts of air base operability,
survivability and ground defense. Their effort has resulted in the publication of Air Force Regulation 360-1, Air Base Operability, Planning and Operations, which defines the air base operability planning process not only for the security police and civil engineers, but also the medical, communications, logistics, transportation, fuel operations and explosive ordnance disposal organizations as well. Further, the directive attempts to specify a base's survivability objectives and goals and assigns functional responsibilities.20

Unfortunately, this effort fails to recognize the reality of the organizational structures at both the intermediate command and wing headquarters organizational level. That is, it does not take into consideration the functional relationships between the combat support and wing organizations in terms of integrating the air base operability functions at the base and unit level. Such a belief is not without support, as others also believe there is a "lack of appreciation for the critical interfaces that must exist to optimally deploy an effective fighting force", and that "the Air Force is in a precarious predicament because its combat support structure—its basing and support systems—have not evolved along with its weapons systems."21 And the cause of such a predicament, in the words of one observer, is that the key combat support elements do not report in peacetime to the combat support group commander, nor do they practice deploying and employing as a combat support task force. For example, base communications, ground transportation, and combat medicine are not part of the combat support structure. SALTY DEMO displayed for the first time many of our combat support deficiencies. The combat support group needs to get organized and trained for war because the combat support organization reflects our current unstructured approach to preparing the Air Force for conventional war fighting.22

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In this context, Air Force Manual 1-10, *Combat Support Doctrine* and Air Force Regulation 360-1, *Air Base Operability* appear inadequate to bring about the integration needed to assure an effective air base operability, survivability, and ground defense capability either today or in the future. Central to this issue is that the three Air Force headquarters agencies who share the responsibility for combat support integration—Operations, Logistics and Engineering, and the Inspector General—have not yet developed the integrated operational and organizational structure at the base level which will be able to achieve the air base operability objectives. And, compounding this failure is the lack of an advocate for the combat support group function, and its commander, above the wing level organization.

Consequently, it is suggested the combat support system and its current organizational structure—and, indeed, the need for a continued role and function of the base commander—must be reassessed and reevaluated. The purpose of such an effort is both to ensure Air Force combat support doctrine adequately addresses an integrated concept of combat support capability and to provide the operational policies which will offer sufficient guidance to create the force structure necessary to sustain it.

*If we could first know where we are and whither we are tending, we could then better judge what to do and how to do it.*

—Abraham Lincoln

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CHAPTER 4

ALTERNATIVE FUTURES: TOWARD THE YEAR 2000

In what we call the Western world, we are approaching one of the fascinating rounded numbers: 2000. This already has more than a numerical significance, for by the reckoning of the Christian era it is the second millennium, and such counting by thousands of years is loaded with cultural significance. And beyond those who believe or half-believe in these arbitrary numerical significances, there is the deep habit of using some mark in time—a new year, a birthday, a millennium—to reflect and to look forward, to try to see where we are.

As we approach the end of the twentieth century, in retrospect it appears as one characterized by a deepening global “megacrisis” of population explosions, energy crises, environmental pollution, food shortages, ecological imbalances, a general depletion of the earth’s natural resources, and a variety of international conflict. However, by the year 2024, one observer believes that “technological breakthroughs and various ameliorative reforms” will have provided solutions for each major component of this so-called “megacrisis.” On the other hand, the Global 2000 Report to the President presented a more pessimistic outlook in its assessment for the coming century:

If present trends continue, the world in 2000 will be more crowded, more polluted, less stable ecologically, and more vulnerable to disruption than the world we live in now. Serious stresses involving population, resources, and environment are clearly visible ahead. Despite greater material output, the world’s people will be poorer in many ways than they are today.

Barring revolutionary advances in technology, life for most people on earth will be more precarious in 2000 than it is now unless the nations of the world act decisively to alter current trends.
The *Global 2000* report received considerable national attention as periodicals and newspapers across the country printed front page stories citing the *Global 2000* report as an official government forecast of global disaster.4

Opponents of the report argued that the *Global 2000* study was wrong in both its specific assertions and its general conclusions; they stated that the report contained major factual errors and erroneous assumptions about the nature of the future. Indeed, a number of futurists wrote in their assessment of the report that its language is vague at key points, and features many loaded terms. Many of its arguments are illogical or misleading. It paints an overall picture of global trends that is fundamentally wrong, partly because it relies on non-facts and partly because it misinterprets the facts it does present.5

And, another distinguished group—including Herman Kahn and Isaac Asimov—published a major rebuttal to the *Global 2000* report which suggested the exact opposite of its findings would be a more appropriate assessment of the future. Challenging the pessimistic portrayal of the coming century, the group radically rewrote the report’s conclusions in the following manner:

*Global problems due to physical conditions (as distinguished from those caused by institutional and political conditions) are always possible, but are likely to be less pressing in the future than in the past. Environmental, resource, and population stresses are diminishing, and with the passage of time will have less influence than now upon the quality of human life on our planet. These stresses have in the past always caused many people to suffer from lack of food, shelter, health, and jobs, but the trend is toward less rather than more of such suffering... These trends strongly suggest a progressive improvement and enrichment of the earth’s natural resource base, and of mankind’s lot on earth.*6
Regardless of your perspective on the outlook of the coming decades, both of these arguments represent the extrapolation of present trends into the future. In essence, they depict conditions that are likely to develop in the future if there are no changes in public policies, institutions, rates of technological advance, and no wars or other major global disruptions. And, such a form of general thinking about the future carries with it disadvantages which often lead to the abandonment of any realistic assessment of a range of alternative futures. By that it is suggested that the continuum of what can be rationally predicted—or at least allowed for with some degree of possibility—is often subjectively adapted to agree with the mere extrapolation of present trends. It is as though failure after failure to prepare for the future leads to the abandonment of any attempt of controlling it; this results only in a perpetuation of the “crisis” response to short-term issues and an ignorance of the future.7

In such circumstances, the easiest assumption that can be made about the future is that it will be exactly like the past; that is, things will remain essentially as they are in the present. Such an assumption is one which generally holds that things will change in approximately the same ways they have changed in the past; that is, change, and its relative rate of change that has been observed in the past, will continue into the future.8

Yet, the extrapolation of trends to describe a singular future fails to acknowledge the complexity of the world which faces us in the coming century. Because of this failure, many planners continue to develop abstract and simplified means for examining the future and
view the interpretation of trends to reveal only a predictable, singular future. As a result, the very complexity of external and organizational influences tend to confuse planners into a fixed pessimism in terms of the future and they often are unable to free themselves from what Paul Hawken calls "the rigid lock of a predeterminism that becomes its own prophecy."9

It is more appropriate in a complex and rapidly changing organization that extrapolations and trends be used to define and explore a set of plausible alternative futures. In this context, the twenty-first century will doubtless contain elements from among all of them and, for the purposes of this monograph, it is in the policymaking aspects of such alternative futures—and not their mere prediction—that is its ultimate concern. Thus, having attempted to describe these futures, it is hoped that an opportunity to avert some of those less desirable consequences may present itself in order to comprehend the interrelationships between contemporary issues and the role of present choices in determining future outcomes.

The National Security Environment of the 21st Century: The Future War

As this century comes to a close, the world is becoming interdependent economically, yet fragmented politically, ideologically, and militarily. The industrialized countries are becoming more dependent on underdeveloped countries for access to their raw materials, trade, and strategic lines of communication. Conversely, the underdeveloped countries are more dependent on the industrialized countries for markets, economic and technical aid, and military
assistance. Consequently, the world is shifting from the bipolar world of “East versus West” and many new power centers–alliances, economic cartels, religious groupings–are emerging which complicate even more the international environment and multiply the potential for conflict. And, in terms of the national security climate of the twenty-first century, there are a number of trends as a result of these changes in the international situation.

First, energy will continue to be a critical factor both economically and militarily. Solar power and nuclear fusion continue to offer long-term solutions to the energy problem, but require time-consuming and expensive technological development as well as extensive environmental solutions. In addition to oil, the Western world is increasingly dependent on sources of key raw materials and strategic minerals, such as cobalt, nickel, chrome, magnesium and titanium. While there may be potential long-term solutions to many of these problems in the future, it is expected that Western access to key international supplies will be maintained in the future.

Moreover, it is argued that confrontations between the more developed northern hemisphere states and the lesser developed southern hemisphere states will become more intense in the future as the difference in the standard of living between the two groups widens. According to Duncan Pierce,

Practically all these countries will have access to modern arms, from either the West or the Soviet bloc. Many will even have access to nuclear weapons within the next few years. This, coupled with the fact that many have-not nations are politically unstable, presents widespread dangers for the US and its allies.
Further, it remains clear that the United States will also face increased threats in the future from nationalistic, religious and ideological groups which may employ espionage, sabotage, subversion and terrorism against its diplomatic corps and armed forces, particularly those stationed outside the United States. As a result, security of these personnel will be difficult and transnational terrorism will persist. Pierce concludes that the United States will face potential 'real time' warfare on a 'come as you are' basis from many sources and in many forms. The military force, and its logistics support base, must be responsive to this widening threat. Mobility and flexibility will be vital. Detailed knowledge of foreign operating locations and conditions will be crucial. Increased interdependency of allies will continue. Prepositioning and dispersal may be mandatory along with some efforts to become more self-sufficient.\textsuperscript{13}

Second, demographic trends in the future are expected to have both national and defense implications. For example, all of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines of the year 2000 already have been born; moreover, the available draft pool will have declined from the ten million level of 1970 to less than seven million in 1990 and barely will maintain that level through the end of this century. In addition, the current twenty year-old birth cohort will be forty by the year 2000 and by 2010 will be approaching retirement age. This declining volume of the draft pool immediately poses the question of whether conscription will be inevitable in the future; indeed, there also are strong arguments that the costs of recruiting and retaining the requisite high percentage of those available volunteers may prove prohibitive.\textsuperscript{14}

Also, by 2000 it is expected that the minority population of the
United States will increase from ten to twenty-five percent of the total population. The implications here center around the adoption of the English language by minorities as their primary language as well as their increasing political influence for political intervention in their native homelands. In addition, declines in the quality of United States education over the past two decades have been reported during a period of increasing demand for more technically educated and highly skilled workers—especially in the armed forces as military equipment and its technology grows more complex.¹

In the face of these challenges, the armed forces will face competition from industry and other sectors of the economy, as well as from colleges and universities for the reduced number of quality young people as a result of declining aptitudes and educational achievement levels of each new generation. The potential consequences in the future range from a narrowing of the technology gap between the United States and its adversaries to that of both an increasing difficulty in fulfilling skilled manpower requirements and an increased need for improved training programs within the services.¹⁶ As a result, in the coming decades people will become the most critical resource for the Air Force and this will require rigorous and innovative approaches by its leadership and management. Unfortunately, it would appear that a future struggle seems likely between the realities dictated by the demographic trends of the present and the past assumptions made about the available manpower resource of the future.¹⁷

Last, the armed forces will undoubtably continue to concentrate
its technological resources toward improvements both in the
development of new weapon systems and in the improvement of the
performance of existing ones. Also, as technology increases both the
complexity and cost of these weapons systems, they will become
extremely valuable and fewer in number. Consequently, systems and
equipment will to become even more complex and even more difficult
to support and secure. Since operations and combat support are
expected to become inseparable in the future, our technology in the
future must also be capable of assuring the availability and
survivability of both the operations and combat support structures. 18

Future War. In this context, it has been suggested that in the
coming century we can expect technological revolutions in all aspects
of daily living. And, this technology revolution will be expected to
result in the development a number of military systems which will be
employed in warfare of the future. Indeed, it is anticipated that these
technological revolutions will significantly

affect weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical
and biological; conventional weapons—armoured vehicles,
aircraft, warships, submarines, missiles, artillery, bombs,
anti-personnel weapons, and remotely-piloted vehicles;
and, military doctrine, tactics and strategies—nuclear and
conventional, on land, sea and air. 19

One recent Air Force assessment of these future technologies and
their impact on the future war was conducted by the Air Force
Systems Command. It commissioned a study, Project Forecast II, which
examined a number of the potential technological outcomes in the
coming decades. The study recommended some seventy research and
development initiatives be pursued in order for the United States to
maintain its military capabilities in the future. The Air Force believes these initiatives will "revolutionize the way the Air Force carries out its mission in the 21st century, guaranteeing continued technological supremacy over any potential adversary."

Still, predicting the future of technology in any definite sense may not be entirely possible, for to anticipate the less obvious discoveries and inventions of the decades ahead would require more than prediction alone. To speak predictively of technology more than just a few years ahead the forecaster would need, in the words of Ritchie Calder, "to combine the inventive genius of a Leonardo with the business acumen of a Ford and the moral insight of an Old Testament prophet." However, based on the assessments and technological possibilities for the future, some projections of alternative futures can be made.

Toward that end, in the past several years the technological characteristics of major military weapons systems—armor, aircraft, missiles and warships—have changed considerably from those of just a few decades ago. This rapid pace of technological achievement is expected to continue in the next century and it is anticipated that there will be—at a minimum:

- increased accuracy in guided weapons
- increased use of microelectronics
- composite materials and better armor plate
- efficient fuels and greater engine efficiency
- improved resistance to countermeasures
- smaller, lighter weapons and weapon systems
In addition, technological improvements will continue to occur along the entire spectrum of the battlefield complex—from remote surveillance of borders and battle lines, the identification and location of targets, and the firing and controlling weapons systems.

Such increased capability in the next century will not necessarily mean more personnel will be required to support or operate them in the future conflict—indeed, perhaps it is just the opposite that will be the case. For example, William Clark suggests

> in the air defense artillery, we may see a battery reduced from 1000 to about 20 soldiers equipped with a weapon system that identifies, locks on target, and requires human intervention only for the go/no go decision.

Similar changes are expected to occur in the Air Force as well, as the numbers of forward-based maintenance and support personnel are reduced through greater reliance on microelectronics and depot-reparable components and weapons systems. Moreover, the increased use of remotely piloted vehicles, robotics and artificial intelligence to assume special endurance and high-risk missions will speed information and intelligence automatically through satellite data links. Such capabilities exist today, are being tested today, and will be fielded with the future force; thus, the battlefield of the future will become “more transparent, requiring larger numbers of redundant, consumable computers to manage the mass of data from unit administration to target engagement.”

This version of the automated battlefield was described as long ago as 1969 by General William C. Westmoreland. He predicted that “no more than ten years should separate us from the automated
While the General may not have been entirely correct in the timing of his prognostication, it is clear that technology is driving us closer to a battlefield of the future which will require military organizational structures and operational techniques radically different from those used today. Frank Barnaby, speaking to this concept of the "future war" speculates that

On the battlefield of the future, enemy forces will be located, tracked and targeted almost instantaneously through the use of data links, computer assisted intelligence evaluation, and automated fire control. With first round kill probabilities approaching certainty, and with surveillance devices that can continually track the enemy, the need for large forces to fix the opposition physically will be less important.

Clearly, over the past two decades significant advances have been made in automating warfare on land, in the sea and in air combat. The development of new offensive weapons, particularly lethal guided bombs and missiles, have stimulated the development of sophisticated electronic countermeasures against them which have, in turn, led to the development of counter-counter-measures. Again, Barnaby asserts that "Military technologtical revolutions follow one another with such bewildering rapidity that no one person can hope to keep abreast of all the developments." And, it may be just as certain that neither can one nation.

In addition, the automated battlefield of the future may be filled with sensors sensitive to light, sound, magnetic fields, pressure and infrared radiation, and capable of transmitting information about enemy forces over long distances. It is believed that the weapons used on the automated battlefield of the future will be guided weapons,
primarily surface-to-surface missiles and extremely lethal guided conventional bombs fitted with automatic homing devices so that they can be launched and then autonomously seek out and destroy their targets. And, at the same time swarming overhead will be the remotely piloted vehicles—unmanned aircraft guided by radio or preprogrammed computers. It is anticipated that these vehicles will be used for primarily for reconnaissance, yet it is not inconceivable that in a future war they will be adapted for air-to-air combat and for ground-attack missions. One day in the not too distant future, perhaps, these systems will even put pilots out of air warfare completely.\textsuperscript{39}

In his classic novel of a contemporary nuclear conflict, General Sir John Hackett wrote: "The Third World War was widely expected to be the first nuclear war—and perhaps the last. It turned out to be essentially a war of electronics."\textsuperscript{30} Certainly, electronics are playing a rapidly increasing role in virtually all military activities and on the automated battlefield the electronic order of battle will be decisive. Indeed, the race for countermeasures and counter-countermeasures has stimulated the development of a whole range of electronic warfare equipment to gather and coordinate data regarding the enemy's radar, command, control and communications systems.\textsuperscript{31}

Finally, we do not yet know where the entire continuum of automated warfare will lead. For example, will human beings always be involved in battles, or will future battles be fought mainly with machines over virtually empty terrain? Indeed, while perhaps not in this century, it is not impossible to imagine a concept of warfare in
which both sides

 evacuates a strip of territory on either side of the border. One side might send in automated tanks or aircraft. The other side might counter the invading forces with automated missiles. The defensive missiles might even be moved using robot troops.32

Indeed, in asking the question: “Will there be war or peace in the next twenty years?”, Marvin Cetron suggests

There will be war and peace. Unhappily, there have always been wars. Happily, we do not believe there will be an all-out nuclear war in the next 20 years. We talk about the office of the future where talking machines do some of the work and stenographers and typists are almost a relic of the past. We talk about jobs of the future where new job titles like laser technician and robot technician replace titles like tool and die maker and machinist. We discuss the new and somewhat eerie era of the robot when machines that have eyes and ears and arms and hands take over entire assembly lines. The robots are coming because they don't take coffee breaks, don't ask for raises and don't go on strike. Don't be frightened by these robots. They don't mate—at least not yet.33

Although this kind of “battlefield without people” is essentially today just a theory, we simply cannot rule out the possibility that the military mind of the future will find it acceptable as a practical means of warfare. Therefore, it is not improbable that in the next century this nation may embrace a national defense policy in which these emerging military technologies are used to define a nonnuclear, nonprovocative defensive posture in which the size, armaments, logistics, training and doctrines of the armed forces are arrayed and deployed to provide a credible defense, yet are incapable of an offensive strategy without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons.34

What, then, are the real possibilities? Clearly, on one hand we
can never be sure that the future will only represent just another static condition—a steady state. On the other it is equally possible that change be both neverending and everincreasing and that technology will allow the swift resolution of present and future global problems, contemporary issues and future conflicts in a wiser manner.

To this end, H. G. Wells reminds us:

War in the past was a thing of days and heroisms; battles and campaigns rested in the hand of the great commander.... War in the future will be a question of preparation, of long years of foresight and disciplined imagination [and] it will depend less and less on controlling personalities and driving emotions, and more and more upon the intelligence and personal quality of a great number of skilled men.

And, in a similar vein, Arthur Clarke remarked that “anything that is theoretically possible will be achieved in practice, no matter what the technical difficulties, if it is desired greatly enough. We can never run out of energy or matter,” he wrote, “but we can all too easily run out of brains.”

An Outline of Alternative Futures: The Future Cop

As indicated previously in this chapter, there are a number of assumptions that can be made about the future. And, in terms of organizational change, one of these assumptions is that change in the future will be similar to that of the recent past; such an assumption—described by futurists as the concept of “the center holds”—allows that things will change in approximately the same ways as in the past and at the same relative rates of change in the future. Unfortunately, neither long-range planning nor strategic vision are of
any organizational policymaking use—or consequence—in terms of "the center holds."

A second assumption that can be made about the future is one which suggests that organizational change will be "reactive." In this case, change in the future occurs as a result of outside influences which are unanticipated by the organization—or are anticipated but ignored until such time that they become a "crisis." As a result, the organization "reacts" in response to the unanticipated future, more often than not in a subjective and value-laden manner. Reactive futures are usually near-term and it is perhaps a decade at most before they reach their "crisis" stage.

Long-range planning for reactive futures—the way things will probably be—certainly has merit; however, the planner's dilemma is that the organization usually is already in a "crisis" state and the decisionmaker lacks either the necessary time or the strategic vision—or both—to either comprehend or evaluate—or both—the consequences of the alternative policy choices. As a result, the general outcome is one of benign neglect; that is, caught up in today's undesirable consequences of the "reactive" futures of the past, the decisionmaker is reluctant to attempt to address those of the future that have yet to arrive. And reluctant, also, until it is too late for meaningful policy analysis and corrective action.

Finally, a third assumption that can be made about the future is one in which organizational change is "proactive" in terms of its alternative futures. That is, the organization anticipates—indeed, shapes—the ways things could be in its long-term future and it
attempts to define alternative policy choices in terms of developing rational and realistic plans and programs to respond to them. In such a case, the objective of such planning is to minimize the least desirable outcomes and to encourage a perceptual process on the part of the organization's planners and programmers—and, it demands a commitment to strategic vision on the part of its decisionmakers.

The remainder of this chapter will briefly address security police alternative futures in terms of these three assumptions and their relationship to organizational change. Some conclusions and recommendations about these futures are addressed later in Chapter 6.

The Center Holds. In the situation where change in the future remains much as it has occurred in the past, the mere extrapolation of trends during the past several years would be sufficient to describe the future of the security police organization. As such, it would be anticipated that the security police force structure will approach 60,000 personnel in response to the deployment of new and proposed weapons systems during the next decade.

New security force requirements in support of small intercontinental ballistic and rail-garrisoned "Peacekeeper" (M-X) missiles, B-2 strategic bomber and other advanced tactical aircraft, ground-based space systems command, control and communications facilities, and more law enforcement personnel needs for increased security protection of softer, less critical resources as the result of continued acts of terrorism will continue unabated without rational policy choice. While there will be repeated attempts to plan and program for decreasing or eliminating the need for these additional
forces through technology, many of these developmental efforts will fail to be adequately coordinated or integrated throughout their program management processes—the management "realities" again. And, such realities would result in the deployment of new weapons systems without the requisite number or level of security systems or equipment which could have offset the substantial security personnel increases.

As a result, the lack of objective security requirements analysis will continue to lead to the development of subjective operational concepts and systems security standards. Such concepts and standards simply will fail to achieve success in terms of their operational test and evaluation or validation; hence, they will be unresponsive to the new weapons systems initial operational capability milestone requirements. Follow-on programs to correct operational concepts deficiencies will continue to be subjective and value-laden, and will result in operational inconsistencies leading the program into its "crisis" state.

Additional classification management and personnel security requirements will follow increased concern for the security of advanced technology design information, systems and components. This will result in the need for even more administrative program management and information processing personnel, as well as the need for increased security protection at both contractor design and production facilities and Air Force depot and port installations.

Army and Air Force intransigence in the development of an acceptable concept of air base air and ground defense will result in both Air Force and security police inability to achieve a realistic program of integrated air base operability. As a result, there will be
increased concern among the Air Force operations and logistics and engineering communities to assume direct responsibility for the development of air base ground defense concepts, plans and programs, and force structure integration.

Finally, the persistence of its ideological conflicts and philosophical underpinnings will lead to the security police organization's continued inability to either to resolve its structural impediments or to define its legitimate roles or missions. And, this will result in both organizational paralysis and a hemorrhage of talent from the career field who will depart in favor of more stable job opportunities both within and without the Air Force.

Consequently, "the center holds"—as a viable form of an alternative future—represents an extension and definition of the worse case and the current state of the security police organization in terms of both its legitimate and traditional roles and missions. Yet, it represents a future that is neither "reactive" nor "proactive;" it is, instead, a future wholly conceived without coherent direction or developed of a strategic vision. And, it is a future that is just as certainly possible as it is certainly not preferred.

The Reactive Future. Organizational change in the security police community results often from a realization of its alternative futures too late in the change management process. Security concept and force planning and programming—and the development of their policy choices usually assumes the form of a "reaction;" indeed, a reaction based upon a subjective analysis of problem assessment and the selection of decision alternatives created within a "crisis"
atmospherc—which is both perceived and real.

Certainly, many of the potential futures described above in the concept of “the center holds”—if left unattended—eventually will transform themselves into the “crisis” state and, consequently, they become—for the purpose of discussion in this monograph—“reactive” futures. That is, they reach the point at which they no longer can be ignored and demand immediate resolution, primarily at the direction of influences outside of the security police organization. Moreover, their resolution may sometimes take on the appearance of a rational and organized process; that is, plans and programs will be undertaken, policy alternatives will be assessed, and decisions will be made. Unfortunately, this process is more shadow than substance as the alternative plans and programs, policy choices and decision outcomes are largely predetermined on the basis of value-laden, subjective judgements—judgments made before the plans and programs are evaluated, before the policy choices are assessed and before the decisions need to be made.

For the purpose of describing “reactive” futures in this monograph, only two broad issues from among a number of alternative futures have been selected for discussion. In that regard, they are two possibilities which appear to have the greatest potential to become the contemporary issues of tomorrow—the “reactive” futures—for the Air Force and its security police.

In the first case, as discussed earlier, it should be recognized that the demographic argument no longer can be ignored. Compounding an anticipated decline of the “all-volunteer” recruit
populations will be the anticipated impact of fiscal constraint upon both the Department of Defense and the Air Force throughout the coming decade. These two factors alone would be sufficient in themselves to precipitate a variety of reactive futures and crises. Yet, still another factor to be considered is that of a marked shift in the U.S. national security policy in the 1990s from a concept of “mutual assured destruction” to “mutual assured survival”—as the recognition that the nuclear option is no viable becomes evident.

Thus, as the effects of reduced personnel budgets and the declining demographics become apparent, the initial reaction will be to reduce or eliminate security personnel across all aspects of the career field. Security police force structures will be expected to absorb the first twelve-to-eighteen percent of these manpower reductions through decreased police services, security post priority waivers and reduced organizational and unit staff functions. However, as an additional ten-to-twelve percent reduction in authorizations is mandated, such flexibility will be lost and the potential for a crisis will rise.

As one result, this potential reduction of 6,000 to 13,000 security police personnel will force the abandonment of all active duty air base defense programs. Instead, attempts will be made to transfer these requirements for internal base defense to the Air Reserve Forces. However, Air Force-wide budget reductions will have already resulted in the reallocation of active duty aircraft, resources, equipment and missions to the Air National Guard and the Air Force reserve—together with their requisite security requirements. Finding themselves unable to meet these substantial additional full-time contractor and reserve
technical security responsibilities, the transferred air base defense authorizations will be expected to remain unfunded.

Strategic and tactical ballistic missile reductions during the next several years could result in the elimination of some security force requirements. However, the reductions in theater nuclear security force authorizations will be reallocated to other career fields in order to respond to the anticipated shortages of quality personnel needed to perform the critical maintenance and repair and information processing and assessment functions—shortfalls which will be created by the proliferation of high-technology equipment and components in future weapons systems and their associated command, control, computer, and communications elements.

Similar reductions in strategic offensive arms will also offer potential for reduced security police requirements in the future. Again, however, operational planners—recognizing an opportunity to increase the distances between the fewer remaining ballistic missile launch facilities in order to reduce their vulnerability—would be expected to retain the fewer number of missiles deployed across substantially the same geographical area and supported by the same number of Air Force wings, squadrons and groups; indeed, the realities of local politics may allow no other possible option in strategic force reductions. Consequently, virtually no security force offsets will be possible and, to meet the proposed security force needs in support of rail-garrisoned and mobile missile systems, the security protection of the fixed missile systems ultimately will be contracted with commercial security protection firms.
Finally, nuclear force reductions and growing U.S. involvement in a "low-intensity" conflicts will be expected to direct Air Force attention and security police force employment to "quick-reaction" conventional offensive forces and strategic defensive weapons systems. As a result, it is anticipated the recognition of the critical need for large numbers of deployable active duty Air Force combat support forces to support U.S. involvement in contingencies worldwide will result in the contractor security support of the proposed ground-based space system command, control and communications facilities. Shortly, the inevitable basewide contracting of security and law enforcement support will begin to replace active duty and Air Reserve Forces security police authorizations at all but the most critical Air Force installations in order to assure the availability of sufficient military manpower to support the growing contingency force commitments.

In the second case, the effects of these anticipated security force reductions, increased contractor security support and growing requirements for deployable combat support forces will be expected to create "reactions" in the development of the security police organizational structure in the future. In that regard, the Air Force logistics and engineering community—having taken the lead already in the development of a new combat support doctrine—can be expected to assume greater responsibility for the negotiation, management and oversight of these increasing contractor security support functions. Consequently, its direct involvement in the development of security force requirements and standards ultimately will result in assumption of operational command and control of all Air Force security police
functions and personnel from the Air Force Inspector General. The Air Force Office of Security Police would then be relocated to Florida where it would operate as a coordinating agency under the auspices of the Air Force Civil Engineering Center.

Indeed, reorganized as an element of the base’s engineering and services organization, these new base “engineering and security” squadrons and groups will provide—through contractor operation—the essential installation public safety functions, such as fire and security protection. In addition, these organizations will form a large part of the base’s organic active duty force structure which will provide—together with the creation of logistics defense forces—operational command and control the air base operability, survivability, defense, and deployed combat support functions and forces.

Such “reactions” to alternative futures evolve as the result of an organization’s inability both to adapt to change—intransigence—or to plan and program for its alternative futures. Reactive futures combine the effects of “benign neglect” with a “malignant attention;” that is, alternative outcomes are neglected until their “crisis” stage—at which point they no longer can be ignored and they evoke illogical and irrational policy and program choices borne out of subjective assessment and value-laden judgment. And, as an alternative future, those that are “reactive” are both possible and probable, but again, certainly not preferred.

The Proactive Future. In the face of these pessimistic outlooks in terms of “the center holds” and “reactive” futures, are there any positive alternative outcomes in the future of organizational change for
the Air Force security police? Clearly, all of the possibilities and probabilities discussed in the preceding paragraphs can become preferable ones—and ones with desirable outcomes. And, what fosters an optimistic outlook in organizational change within a concept of "proactive" futures is an environment committed to a strategic vision.

In this context, each of the organization's anticipated alternative futures can be assessed and evaluated in an objective manner and in a non-threatening atmosphere of rational and realistic planning and programming. By that, it is suggested each of the alternative futures could be catalogued and assessed and each of the anticipated policy choices could be evaluated—before these futures are allowed to reach either their "crises" or "reactive" states. Such a perceptual process, described in more detail in the following chapter, would allow for the value-free selection from the possible decision outcomes.

The proactive concept is one which seeks out alternative possible, probable and preferred futures and allows for the development of series of "rational approximations" in terms of the policy choice bifurcations; that is, they anticipate the alternative outcomes of divergent decisions as a result of objective policy design and analysis and provide the organization's decisionmakers with an assessment of decision consequences. Such a process, if it occurs well in advance of the desired decision point, allows for the development of rational and realistic responses to the organizations alternative futures.

What are, then, the proactive futures of the security police organization? They are, in fact, all of those that have been discussed in this chapter and in this monograph. Indeed, any of these concepts
and descriptions of the future national security environment, the future war and the future cop—both the crises of today and the reactions of tomorrow—can be anticipated in the proactive future of the security police.

By that, it is suggested that there may be a reduction of strategic nuclear weapons in the future and, there may not. There may be an increase in “low-intensity” conflict and terrorism in the future and, there may not. There may be a proliferation of space-based weapons systems in the future and, there may not. There may be a single, unified military service in the future and, there may not. There may be a reduced presence of U.S. forces and installations overseas, and there may not. There may be fewer security police personnel in the future and, there may be more. There may be increased contractor support of Air Force security requirements and, there may not. The Air Force logistics and engineering community may assume operational control over all Air Force base public safety functions and, they may not. And, the Air Force security police may cease to exist as an organizational entity and, it may not.

In the world of the future, there will always be alternatives. Proactive futures represent but some of these alternatives—yet, they are the ones which the security police organization will have already examined. And, it will have already prepared—well in advance—its alternative policies, plans and programs, and decisions expected to provide the highest probability of desirable outcomes. Outcomes which would preserve the heritage and tradition of the security police past, outcomes which would preclude the inconsistencies of the security
police today, and outcomes which would prepare the security police for the possibilities of tomorrow.

The future belongs to the few who, like our predecessors, have the courage to seize today and shape it into their vision of the future. Currently, the opportunity for vision could hardly be greater for, I believe, the Air Force has reached another critical historical milestone.

-Major General George E. Ellis
CHAPTER 5

ALTERNATIVE FUTURES: POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES

Only when decision-makers are armed with better forecasts of future events, when by successive approximation we increase the accuracy of forecast, will our attempts to manage change improve perceptibly. For reasonably accurate assumptions about the future are a precondition for understanding the potential consequences of our own actions. And without such understanding, the management of change is impossible.

The single most important objective for long-range planning is to anticipate policy outcomes and alternative futures early enough for effective decisionmaking. Today, decisions are being made that will influence the future of the Air Force security police in the coming decades, just as the policy outcomes of the present were largely decided upon in the environment of at least five years ago. At the same time, the current requirements and their policy choices—in view of the management realities of the present Air Force security police planning and programming environment—will find relatively few desirable outcomes today or in the future.

Consequently, policy implementation in this context requires an assessment of the implications of alternative futures and the various policy choices which would make the desirable outcomes more likely and the undesirable ones more unlikely. The primary aim of such a process is to place policymakers in the optimum position to deal with whatever future actually becomes reality. And, to be able to do this a range of futures must be examined—not to try to affect the likelihood of the various futures by decisions made today, but to develop the plans
and programs capable of responding to potential challenges or opportunities as they materialize.

The difficulty is that today the rapid pace with which change is taking place has reduced the reliability of practical experience—often the "gut-reaction"—as a guide to Air Force and security police policymaking. And, this has diminished the usefulness of subjective judgment in dealing with contemporary issues and alternative futures. Indeed, as Isaac Asimov points out,

Policy-makers in many fields, given so much new information to assimilate, so many new variables to assess, and so little experience directly relevant to the new problems, can no longer be as confident of the applicability of traditional wisdom and can no longer rely as much on the intuitively derived judgments that once seemed adequate to resolve issues and to achieve fairly well-understood goals.²

Not only is it difficult to make decisions about the future from the present, but it is also difficult to draw significant policy choices in the present from the variety of possibilities which will be faced in the future. Yet, clearly it is desirable to have some concept of the alternative futures toward which policies may tend before they are determined. Otherwise, as Asimov continues, "points of no return may be passed without any conscious awareness that the panoply of choices is so great and the future so uncertain."³

It is but twelve years to the twenty-first century. If an organization, such as the security police, is intellectually unprepared for the events of the next decade and beyond, and fails to understand the reality of the policy choices of both its contemporary issues and alternative futures, there is likely to be some very unpleasant
outcomes. Thus, the purpose of discussing the policy implications of alternative futures is to begin to develop an objective body of knowledge to understand the variety of implementation strategies which may lead to desirable outcomes. The ultimate aim is to improve the understanding of both policy implications and the potential consequences of alternative policy choices. And, such an understanding is described as "objective rationality" by Herbert Simon who believes:

The foundation for the theory of objective rationality is the assumption that every actor possesses a utility function that induces a consistent ordering among all alternative choices that the actor faces, and, indeed, that he or she always chooses the alternative with the highest utility.4

The essential assumption here is explicit in that Simon believes plans and programs must be expressed in objective, empirical terms so that rational and realistic policy choices can be made by the appropriate decisionmakers. Yet, while this assumption underlies the stated and desired goals of long-range planning, it remains virtually unattainable in contemporary practice. In that regard, some argue such a view fails to recognize the presence of "fundamental unknowables and uncertainties" in the subjective decisionmaking process which severely delimit the findings and recommendations of objective analysis.5 Still, Simon's concept centers on the belief that

if the choice situation involves uncertainties, the theory (of objective rationality) further assumes that the actor will choose the alternative for which the expected utility is the highest. By expected utility of an alternative is meant the average of the utilities of different possible outcomes, each weighted by the probability that the outcome will ensue if the alternative in question is chosen.6
Thus, Simon suggests that these "fundamental unknowables and uncertainties" are often transformed into qualitative statements of assessment which are erroneously compared subjectively by decisionmakers in their desire to achieve rational policy choice.

The purpose of this discussion is that there are distinct areas of coincidence between the policy choices of the present and those of our alternative futures. Many aspects which have proven useful in assessing today's policy outcomes are applicable to long-range planning and future studies as well. Thus, the understanding of these aspects is essential in the development of a comprehensive conceptual framework for rational and realistic planning and programming for Air Force and security police alternative futures.

**Policy Implications for Alternative Futures: A Perceptual Process**

Strategic long-range planning should be an organizational perceptual process through which the organization understands its environment and the challenges and opportunities which it presents. But, organizational perceptions are made up of the subjective perceptions of the key individuals in the organization; thus, the way the organization understands its issues and its environment derives from the philosophical underpinnings of these individuals.

On an individual level, then, how the organization's planner both assess and address their contemporary issues and alternative futures and how that understanding is transmitted in the form of policy choice to decisionmakers is of great concern. One primary area of concern is
the development of the framework in which the policy implications and implementation strategies regarding these issues and futures are defined. This aspect of policymaking has been addressed by Richard Strauch who argues:

"The way this is done has a major impact on the problem/solution combination which eventually emerges. While the symbolic (verbal and mathematical) characterizations of problem and solution are the most visible artifacts of the process, non-symbolic aspects play major roles as well. These include the past experience of the planners and the decisionmakers whom they serve, and the intuitive gestalt that experience has given them for the planning problems they must address as well as for the organizational environment within which they must address those problems. They also include the "conventional wisdom" surrounding the process, and the unwritten rules about how it should be conducted and why."

In this context, Strauch outlines two important principles of the perceptual process and their relationship to long-range planning in an organizational framework. First, he suggests that the organization or the planner never deals directly with an issue—only a perceptual model of the problem. And, second, many different models of the same issue or problem are possible at the same time. His point is that the perceptual process does not involve a single issue as a single conceptual model and at a single level. Rather, it is a process capable of integrating multiple issues and multiple models at different levels simultaneously. With respect to Air Force and security police long-range planning and the development of strategic vision such a process should be intuitive—unfortunately it often is not.

The Perceptual Process. In terms of the perceptual process and its futures perspective, Strauch asserts, "one of the most important
functions of a strategic planning staff is to create, maintain, and act as the repository of an underlying base of corporate knowledge about the organization, its environment, and the problems it faces in that environment. It is this body of knowledge, he asserts, which provides the basis on which strategic vision for the future in the planning process is developed and enhanced. And, it is essential to the process that it not be lost when a particular planning activity is completed and the policy choices have been made.

From the perspective of a perceptual process toward long-range planning and strategic vision, the planner constructs from this underlying body of knowledge—the past, the present and the future—a conceptual framework of alternative models, or futures, and proceeds to assess the policy choices and their various implementation strategies. As the understanding of the conceptual model grows, and the implications of the policy choices become more apparent, the planner adjusts both the framework and the model to ultimately define the policy alternatives. Thus, when fully matured, these alternatives are produced in an analytic and direct manner, rather than as if predetermined in a subjective, value-laden process.

Key to the understanding of such a perceptual process and its conceptual framework is: first, anticipating the policy implications; second, developing an appropriate set of implementation strategies; and, third, determining rational and realistic assessment criteria for evaluation of each of the alternative outcomes in order to objectively define the policy choices.

In this context, the function of the long-range strategic planning
group is to construct a type of conceptual framework which would be essentially free of the subjective organizational influences and those philosophical underpinnings of the decisionmakers which may lie outside the body of knowledge. On this point, Strauch believes that the logical structure which such a framework should possess is clear—the strategies should follow from the goals and the criteria should follow from the strategies. From a surface perspective it seems to make sense to attempt to organize the planning process in that manner, going first after the goals, then the strategies, and only then, when both of these are well in hand, after the criteria.\textsuperscript{12}

What this suggests is that instead of attempting to develop the conceptual framework in a structured top-down manner, the planners should proceed in an unstructured fashion and approach each issue or alternative future with a great deal of knowledge about the possibilities and constraints on them. Such a process, from a perceptual perspective, may logically require the value-free consideration of both incremental adaptation of present policy choices and the adoption of more radical alternative.\textsuperscript{13}

Much of what is offered and discussed here in terms of the perceptual process should be familiar to those with experience in organizational planning and policymaking processes. What has been attempted here is to array those processes in a way which suggests implications not obvious previously about the nature of Air Force and security police long-range planning and how it should be might be managed and conducted in the future in terms of the development of strategic vision.

\textbf{Successive Approximations.} Fundamentally, long-range planning
and future studies must be a series of "successive approximations" toward reality. It simply is not possible to arrive at absolute certainty with a finite number of alternative policy choice investigations. The objectives of such planning also should approach the perceptual process from a future-oriented perspective. Such a perspective should attempt to accomplish the following objectives:

- stimulate the imagination of the planner
- define the issues and realistic policy choices
- assess alternatives and potential outcomes
- create models and conceptual frameworks
- improve and expand the body of knowledge
- document conclusions and recommendations
- improve the decisionmaking of the policymaker

Moreover, central to this process of future-oriented policy development is the recognition that planners are often inspired by a wish to change existing reality. This almost compulsive desire stands in direct relationship to their inability to influence the requisite behavior to produce a change.

Therefore, first there must be both a pluralism and diversity of planning efforts and, second, there must also be an assurance that the planner is not permitted a final decision in the selection of policy choice. Alfred Kahn recognizes the inherent danger in a centralized long-range planning group usurping all policymaking and decisionmaking functions. He suggests the establishment of a conservative perspective regarding the function to include only policy analysis and the development of policy choices, retaining the right to
choose outside the planning group. What this means in terms of relevance to strategic planning is that some would hold the view assessing the efficacy of long-range policy development and planning is an illusory goal.16

Yet, there is an advantage in recognizing the limitations of long-range planning. Blair Ewing offers one approach to this issue by suggesting the planner adopt a process of "rational incrementalism."17 Such a process, which appears to be another series of "successive approximations" toward long-range planning objective assessment and achievement, avoids the need for broad, unworkable and unrealistic subjective planning. Rather, it allows for—and, indeed, encourages—the development of both intermediate objectives and outcome assessments.

In addition, such a process recognizes the legitimate means to determine the success or failure of an implementation strategy may be difficult to quantify. By this it is suggested that one of the key issues of comprehensive long-range planning is the determination of appropriate outcome measures throughout the continuum of each step in the planning process.

Implementation Strategies: Realistic Policy Outcomes for Alternative Futures

Discontinuities in Air Force and security police policy evolution are not just accidental or random. They occur because the policy choices associated with contemporary issues or alternative futures have been erroneously conceived on the basis of subjective decisionmaking—without a conceptual framework based upon the body of knowledge and derived from a perceptual perspective—or because of
illogically developed implementation strategies. They also occur simply because organizational structural conditions and the long-range planning group do not remain stable over the duration of the planning and implementation process.

Consequently, within a rapidly changing context of both policy choices and decisionmakers and without a concomitantly changing set of implementation strategies, policy asymmetries result. Speaking to this aspect, Bjorn Wittrock observes that rather than reestablish a new set of implementation strategies to match the new situations, more often than not, the old ones are permitted to continue in place—sometimes benignly melting away, occasionally proving counterproductive—with the effect rarely being that which the policymaking bodies had envisioned. Policy drift has effectively replaced vigilance as a response to these systemic asymmetries, even in those cases in which the emerging asymmetries were predictable. Again, this reflects the generally accepted assumption that policy is a stable phenomenon and the policy process a stable one, at least for planning purposes. Searee wonder then that the congruence between policy expectations and policy effects is rarely realized. He goes on to suggest there are two primary steps towards an effective method of policy implementation which combines policy rationality with conceptual realism. First, the development of a conceptual framework which would permit planners to select implementation strategies which would explicitly take “contextual and temporal variabilities” into account. And second, he recommends a process of “adaptive implementation” to recognize those types of program choices which are rational and realistic in terms of their anticipated outcomes. Wittrock’s thesis appears simply to apply the concept of “successive approximation” to the development and
Implementation strategies, then, are particularly critical for two reasons. First, some researchers suggest policy implementation is the crucial connection between policy development and policy choice and that without consistent policy implementation, there can be little significance of the relationship between plans and outcomes. Second, the development of implementation strategies is an arena which seems most amenable to long-range planning, or what Berman calls "programmed implementation" and Majone and Wildavsky term a "planning and control model of implementation."

However the conceptual framework for planning and programming and its implementation of alternative policy choice is defined, it seems clear that the successive approximation approach offers the most promise of realistic and rational decisionmaking in a value-free and objective manner.

Only the supremely wise and abysmally ignorant do not change.

--Confucius
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The time has come for a dramatic reassessment of the directions of change, a reassessment made not by the politicians or the sociologists or the clergy or the elitist revolutionaries, not by technicians or college presidents, but by the people themselves. We need quite literally to 'go to the people' with a question that is almost never asked of them: 'What kind of world do you want ten, twenty, or thirty years from now?' We need to initiate, in short, a continuing plebiscite on the future.¹

In order to create the kind of plebiscite on the future that Paul Dickson is calling for, it must first be recognized that the future will be determined by the long-range plans made both to resolve security police contemporary issues and to prepare for their alternative futures. By their very nature, these long-range plans must resist abandoning their future-oriented perspective simply because the earlier short-range forecasting endeavors have proven inaccurate, a number of which were derived from a value-laden and subjectively assessed "crisis" response.²

Addressing the realization of such deficiencies, Edward Cornish argues that

The disasters caused by failure to deal promptly with emerging problems are clear, but escaping from the treadmill of successive crises often seems difficult or impossible, because the current emergencies pre-empt all the available blood, sweat, and tears, leaving no resources to think about avoiding emergencies yet to come.³

To escape from the crisis mode of operation, Cornish goes on to suggest the planner must recognize two essential facts: first, large scale efforts to solve crises often result in little progress because time
is required; attempting to solve a crisis in a few days or weeks that has developed over a number of months or years may result in a waste of time and effort and little success towards resolving the issue satisfactorily. And second, sometimes the crises resolve themselves with little or no intervention. Therefore, in many cases, the best policy may be one of deliberate inaction—or only token action—because, as in the first case, such effort would be wasteful and possible even harmful to a successful outcome.4

While recognizing the latent urge to abandon the future-oriented perspective in favor of the "crisis-response", the following conclusions and recommendations regarding security police contemporary issues and alternative futures are offered only as an attempt to address today's crises and to develop a strategic vision of those issues which may arise tomorrow. Whether such action is needed, or should purposely not be taken, is left for others to decide—in what is hoped will be a rational and objective manner.

Contemporary Issues

Security Police Organizational Structure. It has been argued here that the present AFOSP organizational structure is inefficient; yet, it remains clear that strategic vision must emanate from the highest level of security police leadership. Because it would appear that such strategic vision does not presently exist, it is suggested the AFOSP organizational framework be recreated and redefined to provide a structural environment conducive to offer creative and innovative planners the necessary freedom to do what they do
best-develop security police policy and program choices for mission requirements from a synthesis of historical perspectives, contemporary issues and alternative futures.

That would appear to be the more important role and function of AFOSP and its senior leadership in the future. Put more simply, such an organization should not be involved directly in the mere day-to-day management of security police affairs; rather, that role should be relegated to, and maintained by, the major commands. Consequently, the proposed AFOSP structural framework lies somewhere outside that which exists today—which is growing more and more inadequate—and approaches that of the outright abolishment of the agency as an organizational entity. While it is recognized that represents quite a large continuum, the following will address what is viewed as some sort of balanced perspective on the issue.

First, it would appear the personnel and information security functions no longer can be supported as a legitimate security police role. The "paper war," created over the years through administrative requirement after administrative requirement, is lost and the functional responsibility for all aspects of the program should be transferred for functional responsibility to another Air Staff agency—most appropriately SAF/AA. Such a realignment would acknowledge that the program has abandoned all logical and rational connectivity and utility with the security police function. As a result, all of the base level personnel and information security functions, to include the security police pass and registration operations, should be transferred wholly to base personnel offices and the newly constituted mission support squadrons
for operational control.

Second, it should be clear the Deputy Inspector General for Security Police—the Commander of AFOSP—must be relocated to sit at the right hand of the SAF/IG at his headquarters in Washington, D.C., so as to take a direct leadership role in both the advocacy of security police plans, programs, personnel and the development of security police policy. By doing so, the revised SAF/IGS structure would be amended to consist of those security police staff personnel presently at AF/IGS, minus its information security staff (and the Air Force Security Classification Office), and an additional 20-30 staff personnel from AFOSP headquarters. It is these personnel who would deal direct in the day-to-day integration of security police plans and programs between the major commands, Air Staff and Department of Defense agencies.

Third, the remaining functions, presently directed at AFOSP headquarters, could either remain at Kirtland AFB—some, such as combat arms and marksmanship, training and other staff agencies, could relocate to the Security Police Academy at Lackland AFB—and would be reorganized to function as the SAF/IGS "Directorate of Security Police Plans and Programs." What is suggested here is that all of the remaining AFOSP staff would be reconstituted within a new organizational framework which would become, in effect, a synthesis of the existing security police studies, plans, programs and operations functions—but divorced from day-to-day functional and specialized responsibilities.

Instead, this Plans and Programs Directorate is where the
organizational planning environment should be established which will attract those creative and innovative individuals charged with the tasks of operational analysis, theoretical study, test and evaluation, integration of future programs and security police requirements and, finally, the development and assessment of policy and program alternatives necessary to implement both near and long-term security objectives supporting the Air Force mission.

Such a structural framework—radical as it may appear on its surface—recognizes the validity of need for some group of Air Force headquarters leadership in the day-to-day involvement and management of security police matters. In doing so, it legitimizes the function of the major command security police staff in dealing directly with HQ USAF agencies through SAF/IGS. At the same time, the new Plans and Programs Directorate is freed of this organizational impediment and is allowed to turn its attention—removed somewhat from the value-laden, subjective influences—to the more important tasks of forecasting, coordinating, integrating, evaluating, developing and assessing the alternative security police futures which are expected in the coming decades.

Roles and Missions. In view of these redefined organizational and structural perspectives, it is suggested the following aspects of contemporary and future security police roles and missions demand immediate consideration.

First, it is inappropriate to pursue the existing doctrinal philosophy concerning weapons systems security and resources protection concepts. Indeed, as security police roles and missions
proliferate as threats and risks increase, initial responses in the past primarily have been attempts to enhance physical security through the use of additional personnel—more often than not without adequate assessment or evaluation—unilaterally as a "crisis-response" developed from a value-laden, subjective judgment.

A case in point is the Muniz Air National Guard base terrorist attack in 1981. Although the result of that incident pointed to a deficiency in the Air National Guard aircraft protection standards, there was no substantive evidence to suggest that a similar deficiency existed, or exists, in the active duty priority "B" and "C" aircraft protection standards. Thus, while the loss of the aircraft at the Muniz base was unfortunate—and a realistic threat analysis may have prevented their loss—there was simply no relationship between the deficiency in the Air National Guard protection standard and that of the active forces dealing with similar resources.

Yet, the outcome of the Muniz air base incident resulted in "across the board" increases in security personnel and equipment for both the Air Reserves Forces and active duty security police units. Such increases were not established upon an empirical basis and were without regard to a realistic and rational assessment of the threat by either the type of resource or its location. By this it is suggested security police planners and policymakers must recognize the inherent risks associated with the protection of Air Force resources and either accept a degree of loss or pursue alternative responses, such as dispersal, hardening, redundancy or the like, rather than purchase additional "insurance" in the form of security force personnel.
Second, it is inappropriate to continue to append new security personnel, systems and equipment requirements to proposed weapons systems programs and then assume these new weapons systems will not be fielded without—or with less than—the required security protection. Instead, planners should begin now to program rational personnel reallocations and to develop appropriate offsets from within existing resources to provide for new security force requirements. Moreover, there is a definite need first to analyze and assess the risks and potential consequences of these actions and then to provide policy options for the decisionmakers which would prescribe alternative security concepts other than simply increasing security police personnel authorizations.

Finally, it is inappropriate to continue the rhetoric of reducing requirements by "doing more with less." Demographics aside, neither the Air Force nor the security police personnel structures will be able to continue to accommodate existing security police roles and missions, much less respond to those which may be possible in the future—nor should they continue to be required to do so. The substantial security force increases proposed to secure each new costly and complex weapons system, to defend air bases around the world from ground attack, and to protect air force personnel and resources from the growing threat of terrorism cannot be supported by continued inaction in the development of an overall Air Force combat support doctrine and security police force structure which reflects the reality of the anticipated capability to support them in the future. Central to this issue is the need to realize that immediate action is necessary to
reduce substantially—and outright eliminate in every possible case—the so-called “feel good” security police roles and missions as well as those which can no longer be empirically proven either effective or efficient.

Air Base Operability. The Air Force combat support system must ensure that the Air Force's warfighting capability can both operate and survive to prevail in combat. Clearly, it is essential that the combat support system structures are sufficiently integrated to ensure a cohesive strategy between the basing system and its operational resources. Central to this point is the development of an integrative approach which recognizes the need for these combat support structures to: focus on a protracted conventional war—or “low-intensity” conflict; orient themselves toward a total base-wide support capability in terms of air base operability tasks; and, pursue realistic and comprehensive training programs.5

Moreover, in addition to the existing and extensive security police and civil engineer combat support warfighting structures, recently there has been a growing recognition of the capability inherent in other base-level organizations to support the air base operability effort. H. Robert Keller addresses this recognition in terms of the development of logistics defense forces for the air base and suggests that,

yet, if war comes, the ability of logistics formations to function not only as combat support elements, but integral combat units as well, may make the difference in preserving lives and vital equipment or surrendering via default to the unpredictability and lethality of interdiction by Soviet ground forces.6

Keller also argues the need for this type of base-wide combat expertise
extends beyond only civil engineers, security police and logistics personnel and recommends all base personnel should possess—and train in—the basic combat skills, to include weapons and tactics training, necessary to protect and defend air bases. He concludes that such trained and equipped personnel could be tasked to provide “full-time general security during periods of advanced readiness” and to augment “the primary defense team during the attack phase” of ground defense operations.7

Unfortunately, there is little understanding among the operational level of the Air Force to recognize the nature and complexity of the air base operability functions and the essential need for their integration at the installation level. And, central to the integration is a realization that the existing combat support organizational structure is inadequate to define and direct a rational concept for the peacetime training of totally integrated base forces to execute wartime operability tasks.

Key to this realization is the acknowledgment that the present combat support functions should no longer operate outside of an air base operability framework established at the installation level. By this it is suggested the combat support group structure is no longer viable in its present form and requires reconstitution as a wholly new entity in terms of a wing-level deputy for air base operability. More than just a name change, it is intended such a structural concept would enable total integration of the critical support components of the air base operability system as well as provide the necessary command structure to allow total mobilization of all base resources in support of
operability objectives. Moreover, those roles and missions which would lie outside this reconstituted operability structure—normally assigned to the "base commander"—should be relegated to the recently constituted base mission support squadrons for operational control.

While not intending to suggest that the Combat Support Group and its "base commander" role are destined to become the "dinosaurs" of the Air Force's future, it would appear such a function and role no longer are justified or warranted in a warfighting organization. Indeed, a single "installation commander", however defined, is sufficient to direct the integration of the air base operability structure—and, that is precisely what is prescribed in the directive setting out operability responsibilities. Consequently, a large degree of the confusion which presently exists concerning the designation of "installation commander", "base commander", "wing commander", and "air component commander" could be resolved and avoided in defining the command and control of operability functions.8

In addition, base level planning must go beyond that outlined in current operability, survivability and air base ground defense directives to include: centralized wing planning which would integrate all of the base's major functional areas into the air base operability mission; increased combat skills training for all military personnel on installation, host and tenant alike, regardless of their primary duty; and, formally assigned secondary skills for all base personnel in support of operability tasks.9

Finally, the challenge to the Air Force air base operability program, and the combat support system—in whatever form it should
eventually evolve—is to begin now to assess the existing concepts, operational doctrine as well as both the new operability and existing combat support organizational structures in an effort to redefine those functions which create and sustain combat capability. For that is the essential objective of combat support—in peace and in war.

**Alternative Futures**

To date, the twentieth century has witnessed over sixteen wars which have each resulted in 300,000 deaths or more and three of these wars each had more than three million fatalities. Indeed, in the words of Arthur Koestler, it would appear true that "The most persistent sound which reverberates through man's history is the beating of war drums." Koestler further notes that "Tribal wars, religious wars, civil wars, dynastic wars, national wars, revolutionary wars, colonial wars, wars of conquest and of liberation, wars to prevent and to end all wars, follow each other in a chain of compulsive repetitiveness as far as man can remember his past." In the coming decades there seems little chance of breaking this chain of events and can only bide our time in order to learn whether the next major war will be either nuclear or nonnuclear.

And, it is also reasonable to assume that the most enduring institutions and characteristics of world societies will continue to endure in the future. Surely also, governments will be overthrown and while both the names and the boundaries of nations will shift, the same languages will continue to be spoken in the same geographic areas. Although society will certainly possess these enduring features,
in terms of its national security it is change that will be the rule rather than the exception. And this irreversible change will be confined largely to a single area: technology and its consequences. Indeed, nowhere will that be more spectacularly obvious than in the field of warfare.\textsuperscript{12}

Thus, it is clear the forces which make this a world of risk will continue to the year 2000 and beyond. In looking toward the future, Arthur Clarke has summed it up best when he says, “We face the threats of major war and nuclear holocaust, and we live with the horrors of terrorism and insurgency.”\textsuperscript{12}

The Future War. The prospective battlefield of the twenty-first century is “more likely to be an urban wilderness of concrete and buildings, the tarmac of an international airport, or the swamps, jungles, and deserts of the Third World than the valleys and sweeping alluvial plains of Europe.”\textsuperscript{14} Moreover, the threat of nuclear war, while always a possibility, appears more remote. As a result, the most plausible conflict scenario for the future is that of a continuous succession of hostage crises, peacekeeping actions, rescue missions, and counterinsurgency efforts—what today is called “low-intensity” warfare.

Assessing the future war, one recent Air Force study concludes:

While a conflict with the USSR in Europe would appear to be the ultimate test (other than an attack on the CONUS) for US military forces, it is not necessarily the most likely confrontation. Conflict affecting US interests appears more probable in other parts of the globe. During the next 20 years, revolutions, civil wars, ethnic hostilities, border wars, and proxy conflicts will be the order of the day. Our experiences in World Wars I and II may offer few guidelines for such situations. The US will require the capability to interject military force wherever necessary to protect its vital interests.\textsuperscript{12}
War in the future, then, is expected to be a war without form or shape—an improvised war that is half counterinsurgency and half conventional. Governments in the developing nations of the world will continue to be challenged by guerrilla insurgencies and the industrialized Western nations will be subjected to continued acts of terrorism. The spectrum of conflict will continue to expand and in the words of one observer, “just as our expansive technology has created new sources of potential conflict, so too has it made the complex, interdependent, industrialized nations of the West more vulnerable to the emerging new conflict patterns of our time.”

And, just as sure, the major technological innovations foreseen in computers, communications, lasers, satellites, space systems, composite materials, cryogenics, microbiology, genetic engineering and other areas are expected to significantly alter the national security environment of the coming century. And, there are serious combat support implications as a result of these expected technological developments. For example, while technological changes are expected to improve systems reliability, their complexity will drive a higher percentage of repair work to the depots. Consequently, both technology security and depot security will become increasingly important.

Moreover, in the coming decades, it is anticipated that expected host nation support for U.S. forces will become even more critical. The increasing trend towards coalition warfare will cause both the U.S. and its allies to examine the degree of support each is willing and able to provide in order to initiate and sustain warfighting capability.
One observer of the future war, recognizing the essence of a shift in this nation's willingness to continue to support and maintain large armed forces overseas in the face of continued opposition—both at home and abroad—or with little host nation support, has pointed out that

The type of war we will fight will depend largely upon the type of war the country—not just the Army can support. It could well be that future military actions will be limited to areas quickly accessible to our most mobile—not our hardest hitting—elements. It may also be true that the same force will be chosen to intervene, protect, or deny—not conquer or defeat. If

Clearly, shifting the emphasis from rigid, fixed alliance structures to fluid "power balancing" of the United State's regional influence will force the development of responsive, mobile weapons systems and force structures to facilitate power projection. As a logical solution to a reduced presence of U.S. standing forces abroad, the creation of such extremely mobile and modular forces, tailored to meet the demands of a particular situation, would provide for their rapid deployment from the continental U.S. according to the need.

Consequently, it would be prudent to expect a substantial shift in the U.S. defense policy in terms of its concept of twenty-first century national security, particularly those aspects of both strategic and conventional forces. As an example, while no one yet expects the elimination of all nuclear weapons, the reduced likelihood of total destruction now seems possible. In that context, recent Intermediate Nuclear Force agreements and the proposed strategic force negotiations with the U.S.S.R. could direct considerable reductions of nuclear arsenals. And, by the end of this century, agreements
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. could be reached which would eliminate all long-range bombers, all land-based long-range missiles and reduce the number of submarine-based missiles by one-third.

If such is a possibility, it would appear that emphasis will be directed to the reconstitution of efficient conventional systems and forces of limited size and improved quality. As a result, the total standing forces could be slowly reduced by as much as fifty percent in numbers of units and personnel. Indeed, by the middle of the next decade the size of the U.S. military forces could be less than one and one-half million men and women and perhaps substantially fewer on entering the next century. Central to such an assessment is a realization that the size of the U.S. forces will decrease in the future as no longer can the demographic argument be ignored.

There are a number of alternatives in order to adjust to these circumstances in order to generate the combat forces needed to respond to threats. First, nonessential activities should be eliminated, or shifted to civilians and the private sector, thereby reducing the requirements for volunteer—or inducted—personnel. A second approach would be to provide incentives for enlistment and reenlistment by strengthening the armed forces' educational programs. Moreover, enhancing educational opportunities would have the additional benefit of recruiting and maintaining a level of "high quality" volunteers to operate and maintain the more sophisticated weapons and operational procedures of the future.

Finally, in terms of a more radical approach, it has been suggested the armed forces may have to accept increasing numbers of
immigrants. While this alternative may prove infeasible in view of the increasingly complex technical requirements needed of future recruits, one observer believes the growing dependency of the United States on service industries in the future will result in greater numbers of immigrant personnel:

Initially attracted to the United States by the tight civilian labor market that we have predicted, immigrants without needed skills may find military wages and benefits more attractive than the lower paying civilian jobs for which they are qualified. Immigrants who now work as migratory farm laborers and domestics might, in ten years time, concentrate in the military.

Regardless of the outcome of the national security posture in the coming decades, the Air Force will be expected to continue its commitment to the sensible exploitation of technology. The development of better propulsion systems, breakthroughs in materials fabrication, advances in robotics and artificial intelligence, and improvements in communications and information processing are just a few areas which will contribute to the reduced need for large standing forces in the future. Indeed, according to the Air Force Chief of Staff, "guided by Project Forecast II a study identifying new technologies for improving future warfighting capabilities, the Air Force will continue an aggressive research and development program to ensure continued technological superiority over any potential adversary." 20

The Future Cop. Conclusions about the future are never direct and straightforward; however, on the basis of these discussions some broad assumptions can be made about what the American defense
community and its Air Force may face at the end of this century. Toward that end, the following conclusions are offered in an attempt to outline the general nature of the alternative national security futures of the Air Force and its security police:

- An unstable world will yet be plagued with numerous small, intensive, open-ended wars, in which guerrillas, terrorists, and surrogate forces will play major roles.
- There will be fewer personnel in the armed forces operating and maintaining sophisticated and virtually autonomous weapons systems.
- There will be extensive civilian and contractor operation of nonessential military functions both at home and abroad.
- There will be a reduction in the number of forces employed in traditional deterrent roles in overseas theaters.
- There will be increased emphasis on employing lightly armored, air-transportable forces to fulfill "low-intensity" conflict and contingency missions.

In this context, certainly this monograph represents—both collectively and in its individual chapters—the substance of a number of appropriate recommendations and conclusions concerning the Air Force security police and its alternative futures. Outlined in the preceding paragraphs are those aspects of the potential national security environment and the "future war" of the coming decades and, in the paragraphs following this section on the "future cop," are recommendations and conclusions regarding the possible policy implications of both the future war and the future cop.

It could be argued that there are cases for continued "benign neglect" of certain security police roles and missions; that is, some of
the aspects of security police operations may be immune both to improvement and the effects of organizational change. Still, in view of the desirability of a proactive concept of alternative futures, even in cases where “the center holds,” the utility—and the futility—of the most sacrosanct of security police functions must be assessed and evaluated.

As discussed later in the Epilogue, it will be essential in the future for the security police to be able to empirically defend both the efficiency and efficacy of its current capabilities, if only to provide the “baselines” from which the proactive excursions on either side—an assessment of alternative futures—may be made. Indeed, the central issue to be resolved in an environment of “the center holds” should be that of validating the organization’s plans, programs, and policies to its public.

From a similar perspective, it is also reasonable to conclude that both “benign neglect” and “malignant attention” will result in the realization of one or more reactive futures outlined in Chapter 4. The quintessential recommendation in such a case, of course, is to adopt a perceptual process in a proactive posture which would prevent the reactive futures from reaching the crisis state. Again, evaluation validation and assessment of alternative futures prior to “decision crisis” clearly is in order.

Such a process requires an extrapolation of current trends and their potential consequences. An example would be that of taking the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) with its major Air Force programs and evaluating the effects of the potential outcomes within twenty-five percent of both sides of the FYDP baseline. Having done that, the next
step in the perceptual process would be to assess the possible policy choices and decision outcomes in order to be prepared to respond to them—objectively, rationally and proactively—as alternative futures. Indeed, such a process should be a required exercise to be accomplished during each two-year budget cycle.

Finally, it should be clear that the thrust of this monograph has been to encourage the security police assessment and evaluation of its alternative futures—however they may evolve and in every possible form in which they may be expected to occur—using this proactive process. In that context, it should be understood that all planning and programming efforts normally are derived from an optimistic and success-oriented perspective; that is, they assume best case approaches, analyses and outcomes. In so doing, such efforts usually fail to acknowledge or to consider the realities of the organizational management process—a process which demands successful outcomes and characterizes anything less as unsuccessful.

The proactive approach need not abandon such an optimistic perspective; however, it is a process that also seeks out the less desirable alternatives—and their pessimistic outcomes—and assumes something less than success-oriented objectives and outcomes. It is an attempt to define and describe in such cases those alternative policy choices which would have the potential to diminish or eliminate the undesirable consequences of other than optimum results.

And, key to the selection of these appropriate policy choices in the perceptual process of shaping the organization's proactive futures is the objective assessment of both their policy implications and their
implementation strategies.

**Policy Implications**

If the Air Force security police are to meet the challenges of the next several years, its leadership must begin now to create a more positive policymaking and programming climate, one founded on a theoretical perspective and grounded on empirical data instead of value-laden, subjective futurology. They need to pursue policies and programs based on relative consensus rather than polarization. They need to establish a clear distinction between the policymaking and decisionmaking functions to allow both the consideration and pursuit of value-free alternatives, assessments and choices. And, finally, they need to establish an environment in which security police decisionmakers can comfortably and rationally respond to negative results as well as justify their cautious acceptance of success. In an age of rapid change—which both the security police and the Air Force are facing—value-laden, subjective futurology will not be dependable and, lacking an alternative process, the expediency of the "crisis-response" will rule.

**The Planners are the Resources.** First and foremost in the establishment of this new planning and programming environment is the identification—in an analytical, objective and rational sense—those individuals in the career field who will shape its future. And, it is essential that these are not the persons who will ultimately manage the future, but are those who are capable of creating both the structural and operational framework within which the security police
will be performing at the end of this century and into the next.

Indeed, such a task requires creative, innovative, perceptive, eloquent, scholarly and distinguished security police men and women—the very best available. The task of finding them, developing them and then trusting them will not be an easy process, but the security police leadership needs to begin their search in this decade if they are to prepare for the next.

What is recommended, then, is the creation of what is tantamount to a "search committee"—no more than 6 to 8 senior security police leaders of demonstrated capability to recognize strategic vision. This group would be charged to seek out the creative and innovative persons in the security police career field and bring them to the new Plans and Programs Directorate where they would begin to identify security police policy choices and to prepare the career field for its alternative futures.

A Conceptual Framework. There are no simplistic, dramatic or novel solutions to the organizational impediments, philosophical underpinnings and ideological conflicts which embrace the security police organization. Nor is there a well developed body of security police theory to outline a comprehensive statement of policymaking and decisionmaking techniques. It simply will not be possible to move in one giant leap from the present state to some sophisticated perceptual process of defining and providing for the security police alternative futures. What is offered, however, is a conceptual framework—a "successive approximation" if you will—which could provide a reconciliation of the past and present in a manner least upsetting to
both the security police "traditionalists" and "experimenters."

First, planners and programmers must identify security, law enforcement and air base ground defense objectives in more concrete and specific mission—not solution-oriented—terms. Objectives which will encourage innovation and competition in the development of alternatives as well as allow the maintenance of a consistent and unrelenting predominant overall direction for their planning and programming actions. Objectives which allow a clear distinction between "fact" and "value" in terms of both their assessment and evaluation.

Second, from these alternatives should evolve the rational and realistic policy guidance necessary for the logical, rational and timely achievement of the desired objective. Policies which outline specific strategies for the implementation of the proposed programs over the long-term to allow the assessment efficiency, effectiveness and impact before a decision has to be made—not after. And, policies which will allow these decisions to be made on the basis of certain knowledge, and not individual subjective judgment, at the moment when action is required.

Third, the security police leadership must begin now to provide for a knowledge building apparatus to develop that body of theory which will institutionalize the development of security police research, test and evaluation. An apparatus which will allow the continuous assessment of the relevance of both objectives and policies and one which will evaluate the effectiveness of the programs developed to achieve them. An apparatus which will provide for the accumulation
of data relevant not only for assessing this achievement, but also one which urges a deliberate search for evidence of unintended consequences and impacts which could either enhance or subvert the policy or program objectives. And, an apparatus which will encourage and provide legitimate feedback in order to allow the self-correction of deficient programs before reaching a "point of no return" or position of policy intransigence.

Finally, security police leadership, planners and programers need urgently to initiate programmatic experimentations which will allow them to evaluate, in an empirical and objective manner, both existing and proposed security and law enforcement concepts and standards—particularly those innovative concepts and standards which would result in a reduction of existing personnel requirements to provide for alternative futures.

By this it is suggested there is already more than a sufficient number of security police personnel to accomplish the legitimate and essential roles of security and law enforcement today—in both an effective and efficient manner—and, that the security police will be capable of accomplishing its mission with even substantially fewer people in the future. It's time, perhaps, for the security police leadership to examine the possibility of such a conclusion.

*If we open a quarrel with the past and the present, we shall find that we have lost the future.*

—Winston Churchill
CHAPTER 7

EPILOGUE: STRATEGIC VISION
FOR ALTERNATIVE FUTURES

It is my hope that one day each of the major departments in our government, each of the military services, and each of our government agencies will have a small long-range planning division manned with carefully chosen creative and energetic individuals with solid operational backgrounds.¹

Looking back over the preceding chapters, certainly there are some apparent inconsistencies and, in other cases, there are clearly acts of omission. As for the former, it should be recognized that this monograph has attempted to explore both controversial and, at times, contradictory possibilities which have unavoidably bordered on the abstract and complex. In the case of the latter, the constraints of both security classification, space and time prevented a fuller examination and extended discussion of other equally valid security police contemporary issues and alternative futures. Unfortunately, for these reasons the research monograph has been forced to pursue a narrower focus than originally intended.

The plan of this final chapter is to attempt to define a strategic vision for the Air Force security police in order to reconcile its contemporary issues with its alternative futures. This ambition would be pretentious if it was intended to propose such a vision from whole cloth. To the contrary, it is intended only to integrate the heritage, tradition, values and visions deeply entrenched in the security police career field and to serve the primary purpose outlined in the Preface to this monograph—the encouragement of scholarly thought on these
complex subjects. Thus, it has not been the purpose of this effort to invent anew; rather, only to recall and refine existing beliefs and to reinterpret their appropriateness within a new conceptual framework, one which both challenges the reality of the present and encourages the development of a strategic vision to prepare for the opportunities of the future.

In this context, it should be apparent that strategic planning is not sufficient alone to prepare for the future. Strategic planners must be completely oriented and committed toward this strategic vision of the future, one with a clarity that is capable of transcending the natural tendencies toward subjective adaptation—the value-laden crisis response—of contemporary issues and the abandonment of long-range planning for alternative futures.

Still, to plan for the distant future does not require that we be tied to dogmatic programs; indeed, using the perceptual process of successive approximations, plans can be made which are both dynamic and subject to occasional revision. Yet, such dynamism need not lead to subjective adaptation and such occasional revision need not mean the abandonment of long-term planning. It means, in the words of Alvin Toffler, “an infusion of the entire society, from top to bottom, with a new socially aware future-consciousness.” What is suggested here is that the Air Force and its security police must adopt a future-oriented perspective and having said that, both need to be concerned with the kind of people who will provide the strategic vision for the future.

Strauch concludes in his analysis of the subject that the
long-range planners themselves are the critical resource. He argues that the conventional view of planning defines the process in terms of a problem and that the methods employed to solve the problem are key to the process—the planners are hardly noticed at all and play a distinctly secondary role. On the other hand, he believes the role of the planner is central to the process, in that they "play a major part in defining the problems and bringing them into meaningful focus as well as in coming to understand them and communicating that understanding to those who need it."

In this respect, the knowledge base which is essential to the development of strategic vision is in minds of the planner; that is, in the education and experience they bring to the process. This suggests that those parts of the knowledge base which are external—studies, files, tests and evaluations, data bases and the like—are made only useful by the knowledge the planners have of it. Thus, it is the planners themselves—both individually and as a group—who are the most important resource in the policymaking process and its ultimate success will depend on how well they are developed and utilized.

Such persons should be encouraged, without penalty, to question and assess present security police policy and procedures, organizational structures, doctrines, resources, and the policymaking aspects of alternative futures. And, according to Perry Smith, these kinds of individuals are going to make people angry on occasion. If they are not self-confident people or if they are ambitious, risk avoidance careerists, they will have little to contribute to the process of long-range planning.
And, Smith also recognizes that identifying and selecting these kinds of individuals is a very important responsibility of the organization's chief policymaker and chief planner.6

What is intended by this discussion, and throughout this monograph, is that there is a need to establish a conceptual framework for both security police leaders and planners which will foster the development of a strategic vision for the future. And, the essential feature within this conceptual framework is the development of a security police studies program—free of organizational influences—which would provide forecasts of alternative futures, evaluations of technological and operational risk, assessments of policymaking alternatives and estimates of their potential impacts.

Central to this framework is a program of realistic policy development to define both challenges and opportunities and, ultimately, produce the necessary policymaking guidelines within which to respond to planning and programming objectives and requirements. This, in turn, requires the establishment of a comprehensive planning and programming environment in order to develop, analyze and evaluate concept proposals and to then offer a variety of policy alternatives—alternatives which will provide both interim solutions to long-term objectives and rational and realistic responses to unforeseen contingencies or cyclical influences.

Finally, such a framework demands a major program for the assessment of security police operational concepts to determine both past and present program effectiveness. In that regard, there is yet to have been accumulated that body of knowledge necessary to provide
for the assessment of sound and rational operational concepts, much less the development of the policies and programs to implement them. Before it is possible to conceive and advocate new and innovative ways of accomplishing operational tasks, it must first be asked, “Have we assessed accurately the efficiency, effectiveness and impact of how we are doing it now?” Research generated baseline data are crucial if that question is to be answered and the lack of adequate, uniform relevant and reliable information will sabotage any planning and programming efforts at their outset.

The efficient use of existing resources must be linked to a consensus that these resources are being used effectively. And, any future attempt to develop a comprehensive security police plan or program will be stalled at its inception—technological advances will become self-inflicted wounds—unless there is a conceptual framework to provide for the accumulation, weighing and exchange of a body of knowledge and unless there is a commitment to apply it to influence and assist our policymaking apparatus.

For years, security police policymakers have assured themselves they cannot measure a “pound” of security—that assurance simply will not be adequate in the coming decades. Now, and in the future, they must seek more actively to understand how they can best use the resources currently possessed. And, they must attempt to identify more precisely than ever before what are the legitimate security police roles and missions of the future.

Today, the security police organization needs strategic vision to develop the perceptual process which will allow the objective
assessment and evaluation of its potential tomorrows. Before the security police can decide which alternative pathways to choose, they must first ascertain those which are both rational and realistic. Consequently, strategic vision is as practical a necessity of the future as conceptual realism—subjectivity—was in the past.

The concept-based framework outlined in this monograph may not provide the needed reconciliation between the history of the past, the reality of the present, and the possibility of the future. Yet, if conscientiously applied and supported—and recognized as only a beginning—it could provide a means by which the Air Force security police may resolve the realities of today and prepare for the infinite possibilities of the twenty-first century.

Every society faces not merely a succession of probable futures, but an array of possible futures, and a conflict over preferable futures. The management of change is the effort to convert certain possibles into probables, in pursuit of agreed-on preferables.

—Alvin Toffler
APPENDIX

THE CREED OF A SECURITY POLICEMAN

I am a security policeman. I hold allegiance to my country, devotion to duty, and personal integrity above all. I wear my badge of authority with dignity and restraint, and promote by example high standards of conduct, appearance, courtesy, and performance. I seek no favor because of my position. I perform my duties in a firm, courteous, and impartial manner, irrespective of a person's color, race, religion, national origin, or sex. I strive to merit the respect of my fellow airmen and all with whom I come in contact.
NOTES

Chapter 1—Introduction


13. The section entitled “Building a Present on Policy and Paradox” contains material and references to Air Force security police
correspondence, studies and publications which were the basis for parts of three of the original unpublished MindReading essays written by the author under the nom de plume "R. Ernest" during the period 1982-1984.

14. The original paper titled "A Time for Change" no longer is contained in the files of the Air Force Office of Security Police as it was either retired or destroyed. The author, in preparing the MindReading essay in which the paper was assessed, used the original as a direct reference and assures the reader that the essential elements of the contents of the paper are correctly and accurately presented here.

15. The same comment contained in the footnote above pertains to the "Manpower for the 80s" study.


17. The members of the World Future Society have led the field of those concerned with the development of alternative futures. See Cornish, Study of the Future, pp. 219-221.

18. Prehoda, Next Fifty Years, pp. 45-46.

19. The concept of the perceptual process and its relationship to long-range planning is outlined and discussed in Ralph Strauch, Strategic Planning as a Perceptual Process (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, March 1961), at 1.

Chapter 2—Historical Perspectives: Origin and Evolution of the Air Force Security Police


6. The "duties of a military police nature at the beginning of
World War I being performed by unit commanders were: (1) to enforce all
police regulations in the theater of operations and in mobilization and
concentration camps; (2) to protect the inhabitants of the country from
pillage and violence and prevent excesses of all kinds; (3) to keep all roads
clear; (4) to arrest all marauders; (5) to collect all stragglers and hand
them over to their organizations; (6) to keep a list of all camp retainers and
followers and watch their conduct; (7) to relieve organizations from the
care of prisoners-of-war with their safe conduct to places where they
are ordered assembled; (8) to police all railroad stations, public houses,
depots, and public buildings, protect telegraph and telephone lines, and
railways from damage; (9) to keep hostile inhabitants in order, carry out
their disarmament, and prevent spying; (10) to keep records of prisoners of
war, and collect and record the flags taken from the enemy dead; and (11)
to hold all classes of military prisoners." See Webb, "Evolution", pp. 70-72

9. This action was taken subsequent to a comprehensive study
that had been made of the staff organization of the military police systems
in the French and British Armies which resulted in a recommendation for a
similar organization within the United States Army. While the formation
of an American military police organization was being discussed, the
provisional police organization of two companies and 208 men was
authorized by the War Department. In July, 1917, General Pershing
appointed Lieutenant Colonel Hanson R. Ely as Provost Marshal of the

10. Webb, "Evolution", pp. 70-72

1-2. During the war, the number of units performing military police
responsibilities reached a total of 150 military police battalions and more
than 900 other military police units. These included military police
organizations for tactical units of the ground and air forces, communications
zones; escort guard companies for handling prisoners of war and prisoner
of war processing companies; and, post, camp, or station military police
companies and criminal investigation detachments. Many detachments
were formed for duty at military installations, patrolling towns and cities,
and maintaining order among personnel on public carriers. On some posts
they were called upon to accompany school buses used by dependent children
of military personnel. Honor guards for ceremonial functions became
common during World War II for the military police units and the escort of
distinguished persons, military and civilian, was made a military police
function. Law enforcement at the various Army installations was vested in
the military police relieving the individual unit commanders of the
responsibility and the control of emergency operations (natural disasters,
disturbances, etc.). See generally History of Corps of Military Police (CAMP
Gordon, Georgia: The Military Police School, 1948), pp. 26-31 and Webb,
"Evolution", at 123-125. The military police corps reached a peak in
strength in June, 1945 of 9,250 officers and 200,000 enlisted personnel. See
Webb, "Evolution", at 103-105. Of note during the period, the earliest
record of Army Air Corps personnel engaged in the ground defense of air
bases was on February 12, 1942 when General George Marshall directed the formation of all black Base Defense Units. Approximately 5250 black soldiers were initially assigned to the Army Aviation Squadrons who also were charged to protect the installations against the threat of riot. See Marie Shadden, "Security Police History, 1947-1982," (USAF Security Police Academy, Lackland AFB, Texas, 1982), at xi.


13. See Security Police Handbook p.1-2, and Shadden, "History" at xiii. Earlier in 1948, Colonel Mitchell Mabardy was charged by General Spaatz, Commander of the Army Air Corps, to develop and refine the Provost Marshal system in preparation for its transfer to the Air Force and its new commands. Later, Colonel Mabardy turned his duty over to the first Air Provost Marshal to Brigadier General J.V. Dillon who would hold the post until 1953. See Shadden, "History," at 1. Functions and duties generally performed by the Provost Marshal General down through to the aviation military police companies were transferred to the Air Force and made the responsibilities of the Air Police. Those responsibilities not given the Air Police included criminal investigations (which was given to the Office of Special Investigations) and the responsibility for prisoners of war (which remained with the Army). Those missions which were new included the determination of security clearances for Air Force military and civilian personnel, censorship, industrial security responsibilities, the atomic energy security responsibilities, and the confinement and retraining of Air Force prisoners. See Webb, "Evolution," pp.188-190.


17. Shadden, "History," pp. 272, and Security Police Handbook pp. 1-5. Despite the Key West Agreement of 1948 which defined Army and Air Force roles in the ground defense of air bases, the air police could not support the mission because of manpower and equipment shortages after the war. Still, the Agreement placed defense of the area within twenty miles of air bases clearly in the hands of the air base commander. See also Shadden, "History," pp.5-6, 32-33.


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21. Shadden, "History," at 48. Reductions in air police manpower placed greater reliance on owner-user personnel for both security and resources protection duties. The Security Education and Motivation program was strictly enforced by Provost Marshals and other owner-user security responsibilities were emphasized, such as the security of funds, small arms and high value supplies and equipment. Alarm systems were installed and central depositories, improved safes and vaults were procured. The first Air Police Auxiliary, forerunner of today's Security Police Explorer organizations, was started by the 405th Air Police Squadron, Langley AFB, Virginia, in September 1955. Yet another enhancement of the Resources Protection program occurred in 1958 when the air police assumed responsibility for base Fish and Wildlife programs. See Shadden, "History," pp. 48-50.


23. Personnel increases to support the transfer of nuclear weapons to Air Force custody during the post Korean War period returned Air Police authorization equal to that of the Korean war. Still, most recruits lacked formal police training and were assigned directly to units. With the Berlin and Cuban Crises of 1961-62, increased analysis on air base security—and their ground defense—was evident and a large number of Air Police forces were sent to Japan and other countries in Southeast Asia, precursor to the events yet to come in that theater. See Shadden, "History," pp. 64-65, 81.


27. Still, the governing DOD Directive (5100.1, Functions of the DOD and its Major Components) directed the ground defense role clearly would belong to the U.S. Army. See Shadden, "History," pp. 90-95.


32. This dual training was established with the introduction of the Combat Skills/Terrorist Threat Training program. See Security Police Handbook p. 1-8, and Shadden, "History," pp. 174-175.

33. Shadden, "History," at 175.


Chapter 3—Contemporary Issues:
The Insoluble Present

2. Cornish, Study of the Future; at 95.

6. During the period 1970-1980 over 5400 new security authorizations were added for nuclear weapon security and between 1981-1985 more than 2000 personnel were added for major command headquarters guards, general officer and "VIP" security, AWACS aircraft, installation entry points and air base ground defense. Between 1986-1990 an additional 3000 new authorizations are programmed and projections for the 1991-1995 time period reflect another 15,000 may be required to support the small ICBM system. During the period FY75-83 there were over 10,000 programmed personnel reductions—or manpower "cost-avoidance" actions, as the authorizations were primarily used for unfilled existing security police requirements. However, over 3600 of these were Air Reserve Forces air base ground defense authorizations which were unfunded and ultimately deleted. Overall, the projected growth from FY74 through FY90 will be approximately 17 percent, not including combat arms and administrative personnel. This information is contained in an unpublished 1988 briefing, "Air Force Office of Security Police Security Police Manpower Review."


Regulation 1-2, *Assignment of Responsibility for the Development of
and, see also Air Force Manual 1-10.

10. George E. Ellis, "In Search of a Better Eagle's Nest," *Air Force


12. U.S. Department of the Air Force, Air Force Regulation 206-2,
*Ground Defense of Main Operating Bases, Installations and Activities,

13. Ellis, "Eagle's Nest," at 7. Indeed, one recent study concludes
"The possibility of having dedicated forces is remote at best." See Mumma
and Riordan, "Key Issues," pp. 4-8.


15. Price T. Bingham, "Fighting From the Air Base," *Air Power
Journal* (Summer 1987), pp. 34-35.


17. Davis, "Initiatives," pp. 120-136. However, the large majority
of the Air Force air base ground defense flights were constituted from
unfunded Air National Guard authorizations. Consequently, although there
were an "excess" of 3700 personnel who would have made up some 80
flights, since they did not yet exist there were no personnel transfers to the
Army.

We Ready? Have We Learned?" *Air Force Journal of Logistics* 11 (Spring
1987), p. 11.


20. See generally U.S. Department of the Air Force, Air Force
Regulation 360-1, *Air Base Operability, Planning and Operations

21. Ellis, "Eagle's Nest," at 9, and see also William T. McDaniel,
of Logistics* 11 (Spring 1987), at 16.

Chapter 4—Alternative Futures:
Toward the Year 2000


2. See Prellod, *Next Fifty Years* at 224, who outlines a number of concepts and programs which could be expected to positively resolve each of the negative effects of the "megacrisis".


Mass poverty, malnutrition and deterioration of the planet's water and atmosphere resources—that's a bleak government prediction that says civilization has perhaps 20 years to act to head off such a world-wide disaster.


8. As an example, if the population of a city is known to be increasing at the rate of two percent a year, it is assumed it will continue to do so in the future. Simple arithmetic is then used to generate a forecast by observing a change through time by projecting (extrapolating) that change into the future. In making such a forecast, the short-term changes, or fluctuations, caused by temporary aberrations in the rate of change are discounted in favor of the more enduring long-range trends. Thus, trend extrapolation is one of the most commonly used ways to generate a forecast of the future. See Cornish, *Study of the Future*, at 108 ff.

10. Such a concept of the “bipolar shift” is described in Prehoda, *Next Fifty Years* pp. 116-117.


23. In the past decade, the devastation of tanks by precision-guided weapons in confrontations in the Middle East also calls their continued military cost-effectiveness into question, particularly as the technology of “smart” weapons improves. In general, it is likely that large, expensive, relatively slow-maneuvering military weapons systems are becoming increasingly obsolete. See Barnaby, *Future War* pp. 56, 137.


27. Barnaby, Future War; at 72.

28. Barnaby, Future War; at 73.

29. Barnaby, Future War; at 74-75, 77. The essential technologies for robotology are well advanced. Japan is the leader in civilian industrial use of robots with their newest automotive assembly lines almost 100 percent automated with multipurpose robots. The United States has converted an F-15 to an RPV for specialized testing. The United States is currently producing about 1,850 robots per year and could have the capability of producing 200,000 a year by 1990. Although the military is not utilizing robotology to a large degree currently, potential military uses include: reconnaissance and surveillance; target destruction; electronic countermeasures; and air-to-air combat. See also Jan David Wald, "Technology Forecast 2000: Artificial Intelligence in 2000 A.D.,” Defense Electronics 17 (July 1985), pp. 111-113, and Reserve Forces Policy Board, "The Reserve Forces in the 1980's," (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, December 1980), pp.15-18.


31. Barnaby, Future War; at 1, and, see generally Wald, “Technology Forecast 2000”.

32. Barnaby, Future War; at 79.


35. Quoted in Asimov, Change! at xiv.

Chapter 5—Alternative Futures: Policy Implications and Implementation Strategies


3. Asimov, *Change*, at 357.


Chapter 6–Conclusions and Recommendations


8. Air Force Regulation 360-1, at 4, 23.


12. Barnaby, Future War, at 114 and see also O'Neill, 2061, at 32-33.

13. Clarke, The View from Serendip at 19.


Chapter 7--Epilogue: Strategic Vision for the Future


2. Toffler, Future Shock at 459. Certainly, many long-range studies are expected to have an impact on current policy choice through their encouragement of intellectual debate. Thus, it is not necessarily the time horizon as it is the way changes are expected to occur over time that is the distinguishing feature of future studies. See deLeon, Future Studies, pp. 10-11.

3. Strauch, Strategic Planning at 28, 30. This view is certainly shared by Perry Smith who also argues that each of the military services should have small long-range planning divisions manned with "carefully chosen creative and energetic individuals with solid operational backgrounds." See also Smith, "Strategic Vision," at 18.


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