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NATO WITHOUT INF

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A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
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Research Advisor: Dr. Robert L. Wendzel

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A paper written in the Winter, 1987-1988, during the time of the signing of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) signed in Washington, D.C. on 8 December 1987. The paper was written to look ahead to the implications that the treaty, assuming congressional ratification without major change, would have on NATO. Discussed are the historical background of NATO and U.S. national interests in maintaining a balance of power in Europe. NATO strategies of massive retaliation, mutual assured destruction and flexible response are surveyed with respect to the political and military decisions to deploy, and negotiate the removal of INF from Europe. The paper addresses the dual-track decision and the results leading to the INF treaty. The implications of the treaty are then discussed, with a renewed look at U.S. national interests, and suggestions for future U.S. involvement with NATO are provided.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

On 8 December 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, signed a Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles. This INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces) treaty has evoked reactions on a world wide basis that span the total political spectrum. Some have described the treaty as a first big step toward nuclear disarmament and world peace while others have described it as a tragic mistake that will increase the risk of war. Many North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member's interests are affected by the INF treaty, and NATO will face new challenges--military, economic, and political--as a result of it. This paper will investigate the significance of the treaty, describe its implications to NATO, and provide some conclusions and recommendations for future actions.
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND, 1949-1979

At the end of World War II, the nations of Europe were economically bankrupt and near total collapse. The Soviet Union was expanding from the east like an oil slick on a duck pond, drawing under its influence the governments of Eastern Europe and threatening to bring all of Europe under Communism. The United States had been drawn into two world wars to maintain a balance of power in Europe and believed itself once again faced with the threat of that continent being dominated by one nation. John Spanier, in American Foreign Policy Since World War II, states,

Europe's collapse thus posed a fundamental question for the United States. Is Europe vital to American security? The question was never in doubt: American independence and security required that the United States establish a balance of power in the interior of Europe....Western Europe possessed the largest aggregation of skilled workers, technicians, and managers outside the United States. It maintained the second greatest concentration of industrial power in the world. A healthy and strong Europe could help shore up the balance of power. (25:37)

Since the Western European nations were so weakened, only the United States could take decisive actions to achieve that balance. The containment theory, so well articulated by George Kennan in 1947, became the foundation of U.S. National Security Policy toward the Soviet Union that has existed to the present. This theory argued that the best way to deal with the Soviet Union was to contain it to prevent further expansion. Europe became the first area for the implementation of the containment theory.
There followed a series of economic, political and military actions to meet the Soviet threat to Europe. The Marshall Plan was enacted in late 1947, providing grants of U.S. dollars to support the economic recovery of Western Europe. At U.S. urging, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was established to help unite Western European countries economically through the reduction of trade barriers and tariffs for common recovery. In 1948, the Soviets started the Berlin Blockade and the United States responded with the Berlin airlift. These and other Soviet actions emphasized the need for stronger measures to allow time for the economic recovery measures to work. This led to the establishment of NATO. The Alliance was formed to establish the cooperation of the Western European and North Atlantic nations for common defense. The United States would provide a nuclear umbrella plus air and sea power; the Europeans would provide most of the land forces. The treaty was signed on 4 April 1949.

When the treaty was signed, the United States alone possessed nuclear weapons. However, the uniqueness of the U.S. nuclear capability became history six months later when the Soviet Union demonstrated its own capabilities with the explosion of a nuclear device. This event added a new challenge to the containment theory; the Soviet Union became a nuclear power that apparently could use that strength to further what the West saw as its expansion
toward world revolution for Communism. Additionally, China, the world's most populous nation, "fell" to the Communists, diluting U.S. attention from Europe as the only theater for containment. U.S. attention was further diverted with the onset of the Korean War, which was seen as an additional action supported by the Soviets. It was feared by many in Washington that the aggression by the North Koreans was a diversionary tactic preliminary to a major Soviet attack into Western Europe. This perceived threat led to the establishment of a multinational force structure commanded from the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), headed by an American, General Eisenhower.

The development of the NATO force structure, however, brought to ascendancy the question of the rearmament of West Germany. It was argued by many that the West German military would have to be restored if NATO was to defend effectively Western Europe from Soviet aggression. However, France, who had no little experience with an armed Germany, was anxious about that nation being brought into NATO as an important military power. Paris proposed a plan for a European Defense Community (EDC), which would have provided for a fully integrated European army with a common defense ministry and logistical system. However, negotiations on the plan were extensive and time-consuming, and by the time they reached the ratification process, the Korean War was over and Stalin was dead. The immediate Soviet threat to Western Europe had not materialized, though, and the EDC plan was
withdrawn. The events did solidify the militarization of NATO, however, and eventually led to the rearmament and admission of West Germany into the Alliance as agreed in the Brussels Treaty signed on 23 October 1954 and entered into force on 6 May 1955. Thus, after the first five and a half years, NATO had been formed into the Alliance much as it was to appear for many years. One significant change did come in 1966, however, with withdrawal of French forces from the NATO command structure and the expulsion of NATO facilities from French soil. Otherwise, the United States was coupled to the defense of Western Europe through U.S. forces assigned to NATO under the umbrella of U.S. strategic nuclear power.

The general structure of NATO has remained relatively constant over the years; however, the strategies have changed. In the early years of NATO, the United States with its nuclear monopoly, employed a strategy based on massive retaliation. Conventional forces would act as a "trip wire", while the United States had the option of choosing to retaliate massively with strategic nuclear forces at times and places it so deemed necessary. This sent a message to the Soviet leadership that the Soviet Union itself could be threatened with nuclear destruction should the Soviets invade Western Europe. More specifically, the strategy called for the ground forces of NATO to hold the Soviet advance at the Iron Curtain long enough to allow the
United States time to use the resources of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) time for massive retaliation against the Soviet homeland.

The United States was geographically secure from the Soviet nuclear threat until the Soviets demonstrated an intercontinental delivery capability in the late 1950s. Although the threat of the new Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) at first was overestimated, it clearly signalled a change in the strategic equation and awakened those in the United States to the fact that nuclear war was no longer a one-way street. Soviet ICBMs could reach and destroy U.S. cities. The massive retaliation strategy of NATO then became one of mutual destruction, with the balance of power resting on the strategic forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviets were perceived to be developing their ICBM forces at such a rate that they would tip the balance in their favor. This raised the call for the increased development of U.S. ICBMs, adding a new dimension to the arms race for strategic nuclear superiority.

The strategy of mutual destruction—called MAD in later years, for Mutual Assured Destruction—provided a deterrent against total nuclear war; however, the strategy did little to discourage the Soviet Union from taking actions short of the threshold that would trigger a nuclear response by the United States. Upon taking office the
Kennedy administration adopted the strategy of flexible response. In 1962, Kennedy's Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara stated that both the United States and NATO required a strategy that would allow for a flexible response to aggressive actions by the Soviets, filling the gap inherent in the mutual destruction strategy. Flexible response specified that NATO needed to have the capability "to meet any aggression by direct defense at a level judged to be appropriate to defeat the attack, and to be prepared to escalate the level deliberately, maintaining firm political control, if defense at the level first selected is not effective." (See Appendix B) To be most effective, the flexible response strategy required a build-up of conventional forces of NATO to establish a capability to meet the Soviet threat at all levels of confrontation, with the main targets of the strategy being the Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces instead of Russian cities and industry, as was the case under most forms of the mutual destruction strategy. Some European NATO countries perceived this strategy to imply a reduction in the U.S. commitment to use its nuclear deterrence capability to defend Western Europe, but NATO did adopt flexible response in 1967. It remains the strategy of NATO today. (13:87-94)

At the same time that the strategy was changing, the strategic situation was being altered by arms control measures. In 1960, France exploded a nuclear device, and four years later the China also joined the nuclear club. The
spread of nuclear capabilities was a definite threat to world stability. This threat led to the U.S.-Soviet negotiations for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and technology. The Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed in 1968 and by the early 1970s most of the world's nations were parties to the treaty. Many nations had signed the treaty only after the United States and the Soviet Union promised to enter into negotiations to limit their own nuclear capabilities. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) were initiated between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1969, eventually resulting in the SALT I interim agreement on ballistic missiles and the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in May 1972.

The interim agreement stated that the two nations would limit the number of offensive strategic missiles deployed or under construction for five years. The treaty specified that the two nations would be prohibited from deploying more than two ABM systems, each containing no more than 100 interceptor missiles. This was later modified to one system each. The Soviets deployed their ABM system; the United States, whose ABM strategy was to protect missile launch sites, did not consider one system effective, and converted their pilot ABM site in North Dakota to an early warning component of NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command).

The START I interim agreement was not received by
the NATO allies with much enthusiasm since it limited the West's nuclear umbrella while not addressing the problem of the superiority of the conventional forces of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. This concern led to the initiation of negotiations for Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR). These negotiations, however, were not bilateral—they were multinational, involving the NATO and Warsaw Pact nations—and they were further hindered by the opposing positions of the East and West. The East wanted equivalent reductions while the West wanted asymmetrical reductions to offset the East's numerical superiority. Although some progress has been made, the negotiations have not achieved any meaningful results to date.

The SALT I interim agreement limiting strategic arms also recalled the Allies' fears about the U.S. commitment of the use of those weapons to defend Europe. The fears about the commitment and the decoupling of the United States from NATO would become a leitmotiv—a recurring theme in the discussions and debates about arms control issues. Nevertheless, SALT I was ratified by the Senate in 1972.

Shortly after the ratification, SALT II negotiations were started, and, by November 1974, they had progressed far enough for a meeting between President Gerald Ford and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in Vladivostok. The accord they reached there included a limit of 2,400 strategic delivery vehicles for each side but it also included a
sublimit on those capable of carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). (13:111-112) Additionally, long-range bombers were also to be considered as strategic delivery vehicles. However, after Vladivostok, the Soviets deployed two new nuclear weapons systems that targeted Western Europe—the BACKFIRE bombers and the medium range SS-20 missiles. Though the Soviets maintained these new weapons systems were not strategic, their deployment fueled new levels of debate in the Senate and loud voicing of concerns from the NATO allies.

The U.S.-Soviet relations were on the decline as a result of Soviet interventions in Angola and Ethiopia, and the invasion of Afghanistan became the final straw that induced President Carter to withdraw the treaty from Senate consideration in early 1980. It was never ratified by the United States though both sides did agree informally to observe the limits addressed in the treaty agreements.

The introduction of the SS-20 systems intensified concerns of the NATO allies that this intermediate-range threat would hold Europe hostage, deterring the effective employment of the NATO flexible response strategy. The SS-20s have a range that can cover all of Western Europe from inside the Soviet Union. They could be used to target Western European civil or military targets in response to, or to preclude, NATO's use of tactical nuclear weapons. This again raised the question about the commitment of U.S.
strategic forces in the defense of Europe. If Paris were destroyed by an SS-20, would the United States respond strategically, risking New York? The introduction and the build up of these forces by the Soviet Union focused attention on the NATO response to this new threat, and became the genesis for the negotiations that eventually resulted in the INF treaty that was signed in December 1987.
CHAPTER III
THE INF DEPLOYMENT

The subject of INF has been a volatile one, submersed in layers of politics, public demonstrations, media coverage and differing strategic perspectives that not only threatened the governments of Europe but also placed severe strains on NATO unity. Though not unique to the INF issue, a main contributor to the problems was the lack of a consistent policy by the United States. Every new U.S. Presidential administration enters office with its own ideas about foreign policy and the actions they take often place the NATO allies in a reactive mode as they sought to respond to the new, often contradictory, policies. This was particularly true of the Carter and Reagan administrations. If our allies have trouble understanding and predicting our behavior, the Soviets, with their different mind-sets, get even more confused. Former Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Helmut Schmidt, then a member of the West German Bundestag, in speaking on leadership in the Alliance in 1984, summed up the problem well:

I do blame the Russians for many things, but I find it difficult to blame them when they say that they cannot really read the Americans clearly enough. A couple of days ago, my friend, Secretary of State George Schultz spoke of the U.S. willingness for a thaw....I assume that U.S. intentions are good and clear, but, I ask myself, can the people in the Kremlin see that? And will they believe it? (8:30)

At that time, Soviet-U.S. relations were laboring under the hard-line stance being espoused by the new Reagan administration, and the Soviets, remembering the campaign
rhetoric, definitely had a case for questioning U.S. sincerity.

By the late 1970s, Chancellor Schmidt was worried particularly about the threat of the Soviet deployment of the SS-20s, since West Germany would bear the initial brunt of a Soviet attack on Western Europe. France and England had their own nuclear deterrent forces and would use them only as a last resort. Would the United States commit its strategic forces if a European conflict broke out and the Soviets selectively targeted Western Europe with the SS-20s? The political significance of this military threat underlined that there was a gap in the deterrent strategy, and Chancellor Schmidt wanted a tangible guarantee of the U.S. commitment. (26:30) The United States responded with the suggestion that an upgrade of the Pershing I missile, the Pershing II, could be developed with the range to accurately reach the western Soviet Union from locations in West Germany. Additionally, the United States was developing a long-range cruise missile that could be deployed and reach the Soviet Union from the European NATO countries.

In December 1979, the NATO Council approved the deployment of U.S. intermediate-range missiles (Pershing II IRBMs and ground launched cruise missiles—GLCMs) on Western European soil; missiles capable of striking the Soviet Union. The missiles would not be ready for deployment for three years, and the NATO decision specified that the three
year delay would be used to engage the Soviets in
negotiations to limit, reduce or eliminate these missiles
from both sides. This became known as the dual-track
decision for INF: negotiate, but continue with deployment.
This decision was made during the final year of the Carter
administration, and, as President Carter's National Security
Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski later stated,

> We felt we were responding to the European desire in
> shaping [the decision to proceed with the new missiles
> for NATO], but we were also very conscious of the fact
> that the Europeans were ambivalent. As a result, one
> track of the NATO decision was designed to satisfy
> those Europeans who felt that their insecurity ought
> to be reduced by some offsetting deployments giving
> the West an intermediate [-range] capability of
> matching the Soviets; the other track was designed to
> satisfy those Europeans who felt that it was important
> to match any security efforts by a new arms-control
> initiative. (26:37)

Though the dual-track decision offered the
possibility for some progress in arms control, few policy
makers were optimistic, for several reasons:

1. The Reagan administration was coming into power,
and Reagan's anti-Soviet campaign posture did not portend
effective negotiations.

2. The Soviet Union had a head start on the
deployment of intermediate-range missiles, and would be
bargaining from an "existing strength" against a "threat to
deploy".

3. The threat posed by having nuclear weapons in
their own backyard gave the left-leaning parties of Western
Europe a new and powerful argument.
4. The Soviets were perceptive about the strain that the deployment of these missiles would have on the Western European governments and on NATO itself.

The Reagan administration, in its first months of power, did follow the campaign flow and placed more importance on the deployment of the missiles than on negotiations for their reduction or elimination. The administration perceived also that it would be in a better negotiating position later with missiles deployed or ready to be deployed.

The lack of interest displayed by the United States for negotiation placed the Western European heads of state in the awkward position of defending the missile deployments in the face of growing public demand that the U.S. missiles be banned from Europe. Without progress in the negotiating arena, their political support was eroding. (1:565) Other administration actions added more strains to NATO cohesion. In August 1981, President Reagan, ignoring problems the previous administration had with its NATO allies over enhanced radiation weapons, authorized their production.

Then, in an impromptu response to a question in an October 16, 1981, meeting with out-of-town newspapers editors in which he was asked if there could be a limited exchange of nuclear weapons in Europe or whether any use of nuclear weapons in a European war would inevitably lead to a full-scale nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union, Reagan replied that, "I don't honestly know." And he went on to offer the observation that, "I could see where you could have the exchange of tactical weapons against troops in the
field without it bringing either of the major powers to pushing the button." (1:586)

This was not a confidence building statement for the people of Western Europe because it underscored their fears about the United States' nuclear commitment. Even though the Reagan administration had replaced the term "theater nuclear weapons" with "intermediate nuclear forces" to diffuse the public perception that these weapons implied a theater nuclear war limited to Europe, its actions and statements were accomplishing the opposite. (24:72) This was fertile propaganda ground for the Soviets, who were quick to take advantage of NATO's political difficulties. They understood the strategic link of the intermediate-range missiles, and they were given an exceptional opportunity to use the INF negotiations and deployment debate as a political wedge to drive NATO apart. Fueled by U.S. statements and supported by Soviet propaganda, the peace movements in Europe gained a significance in intensity and influence that had not been seen for thirty years. (4:115) With the Soviets using the INF negotiations in a political power play to disrupt the NATO alliance, little was achieved at the negotiating table.

The public pressure notwithstanding, the credibility of the dual-track decision and the political unity of the Alliance was on the line. On 22 November 1983, the West German Bundestag, despite a public opinion of roughly 60 percent against the missiles (4:123), voted to support the deployment. The deployment of the missiles started within a
week, and the Soviets walked out of the INF negotiations declaring that they would "not negotiate as long as a single Pershing or ground-launch cruise missile is deployed in Western Europe."(4:178) At this time, the INF problem with its dual-track decision had been a major contributing factor in the freezing of East-West relations and diminishing NATO cohesion. Though the initial reason for the deployment of the missiles was a military one, it became overshadowed by political maneuvering and posturing.
CHAPTER IV
THE INF NEGOTIATIONS

Official INF negotiations entered a sixteen-month hiatus after the Soviets walked out in November 1983. They returned to the Geneva negotiating table in March 1985. There were several events that contributed to bringing them back. The Pershing IIs and GLCMs were no longer just "deployment threat"; they were being deployed. President Reagan was elected for a second term, which presented the Soviets with four more years of dealing with a strong, conservative administration. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) that President Reagan introduced on 23 March 1983, had gathered momentum and was perceived by the Soviets as a serious new threat to the strategic parity that they had done so much to achieve. The SDI, with its potential for significant technological achievements, indicated that they would be drawn into a new arms race that they could have no hope of winning. Though militarily strong, the Soviet economy was declining, and increased defense spending in a new arms race would only aggravate the situation.

The Soviet leadership was also dramatically changed with the ascendancy to power of Mikhail Gorbachev on 12 March 1985. From 1982 to 1985, the Soviet Union had three changes in leadership: Brezhnev to Yuri Andropov in November 1982, Andropov to Konstantin Chernenko February 1984, and Chernenko to Gorbachev in March 1985. The Central Committee
election of Gorbachev as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) marked the beginning of new and dynamic leadership that the Soviet Union had not seen since Lenin. At the age of 54, he not only represented a generational change in the leadership, he brought with him a dedication for the restructuring, *perestroika*, of the Soviet system to vitalize the nation's economy and halt the erosion ideological and moral values of the Soviet people. (6:21) To achieve any success in vitalizing the nation's economy, the Soviet Union would have to have better relations with the West to enhance trade, to access new technologies and to relieve the costly pressures inherent in arms races.

In his first year of power, Gorbachev not only initiated dramatic measures at home, he also pursued an active foreign policy. He agreed to hold a summit meeting with President Reagan and offered, "under certain conditions, to cut strategic offensive systems by no less than 50 percent, to strike a separate INF agreement, and to rid the world of nuclear weapons by the year 2000." (9:80) The summit meeting was held at Geneva on 19-20 October 1985, which was the first between the superpowers in six years. The meeting did not result in any new agreements; however, it did at least initiate dialog at the top levels of leadership of the two nations. At the summit, both leaders agreed to pursue negotiations leading to a 50 percent
reduction in strategic arms and an interim INF agreement. Serious negotiations, with direct involvement of the two leaders, continued throughout 1986. Proposals and counter-proposals in areas of arms control of MBFR and START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) as well as INF were presented, not only at the negotiating table, but also via speeches, press announcements and direct communications between the two leaders.

In a letter to Reagan in September 1986, Gorbachev put forth the invitation to a "private working meeting" in Reykjavik or London to prepare for a full-scale summit in the United States. Reagan accepted and 30 September 1986 was announced for the meeting at Reykjavik. The U.S. position on INF at that time included: a global limit of 200 warheads on each side with a sub-ceiling of 100 warheads in Europe, collateral restraints on shorter-range missiles and effective verification including on-site inspection, as necessary. The Soviet proposals included: an interim agreement to limit warheads in Europe to 100, elimination of Pershing IIs and on-site verification as necessary. They also agreed that British and French forces would not be included in any bilateral agreement—an earlier hindrance to INF progress. They would also consider reduction of INF in Asia. (10:58-59)

President Reagan arrived at Reykjavik expecting broad discussions covering arms control, human rights and
regional conflicts. However, General Secretary Gorbachev arrived with a more specific agenda dominated by sweeping and ambitious proposals in arms control. Many of the Soviet proposals dealt with strategic systems and are beyond the scope of this paper. But, before the talks collapsed due to the disagreements about SDI, the two sides reached a number of understandings about INF. These included:

1. Total elimination of all American and Soviet LRINF (Longer-range INF) in Europe.
2. Global ceiling of 100 LRINF for each side.
3. USSR-U.S. agreement would have no bearing on British and French INF.
4. SRINF (Shorter-range INF) would be frozen.

What was not resolved was the U.S. level of SRINF. The United States wanted to build up to the frozen Soviet level. The Soviets did not agree. Also not resolved were specific accords on verification and the term of an interim INF agreement.

Additionally, the Soviets were linking the INF agreements to SDI and START. (23:13) Because of this, the talks collapsed. But, though the Reykjavik talks did not result in any actual agreements, the understandings achieved at Reykjavik paved the way for reaching an agreement for the next Reagan-Gorbachev summit.

In January 1987, the INF negotiations resumed where the Reykjavik talks left off. In February, in an important
about-face, Gorbachev agreed to proceed without first resolving the SDI and START linkages. In April, he agreed to include the shorter-range missiles in the treaty and that they would be eliminated throughout the USSR. With only verification procedures to resolve, the INF treaty came close to a reality. After further talks, the remaining problems were solved, and the treaty was signed at the Washington Summit in December 1987.
CHAPTER V

THE INF TREATY

The INF Treaty specifies the elimination of all United States and Soviet Union intermediate-range missiles and their launchers no later than three years after the treaty ratification. The treaty specifies missiles to be ground-launched ballistic missiles (GLBMs) and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) capable of reaching 500 to 5500 kilometers. They are further classified as short-range missiles (500 to 1000 kilometers) and intermediate-range (1000 to 5500 kilometers). For the United States, the designated intermediate range missiles are the Pershing II GLBMs and the BGM-109G GLCMs. The designated shorter-range missiles are the Pershing IA GLBMs. The Soviet intermediate-range missiles are the SS-20, SS-4 and the SS-5 GLBMs. The Soviet shorter-range missiles are the SS-12 and SS-23 GLBMs.

U.S. missiles are located in nine operating bases in England, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy (Sicily), and West Germany. Missiles are also located at a launcher repair facility and a missile storage facility in West Germany plus 22 missile production, test, repair and storage sites located in the United States. Soviet missiles are located in seven operating bases in East Germany and Czechoslovakia plus 77 operational launch, production, test, repair and storage sites in the Soviet Union. (17:13) According to published reports, there are 2611 U.S. and USSR missiles, both deployed and undeployed, that must be destroyed under
the provisions of the treaty. The United States will destroy 859 missiles and the Soviet Union will destroy 1,752. (16:1,7) This represents an asymmetrical ratio of one to two.

The most dramatic provisions of the INF Treaty are those that specify the on-site inspections to ensure compliance. Article XI of the treaty states, "Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections provided for by the Article both within the territory of the other Party and within the territories of basing countries." (27:13) Article XI states that each party will have the right to inspect, within 30 to 90 days after the treaty goes into force, all missile operating bases and support facilities to verify the number of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment. Additionally, for 13 years after the treaty goes into force, each party will have the right to inspect certain missile production installations by means of continuous monitoring. The treaty also specifies that neither party will interfere with the national technical means of the other. The INF Treaty, therefore, opens for inspection some very sensitive facilities in both countries, which represents a radical change from past agreements. As President Reagan, after the signing of the treaty, stated to General Secretary Gorbachev, "Dovervai no proveryai; trust but verify". (16:6) The INF Treaty does have that capability.

To help with the implementation of the treaty and
the verification process, the Soviets have also agreed to
the unprecedented exchange of secret and sensitive data on
the systems involved. These data include system character-
istics, their numbers and their locations, which have been
obtained by the United States in the past only through
expensive and difficult to achieve intelligence resources.
This exchange of data marks a significant change from the
total secretiveness of past Soviet regimes. A Soviet
Aviation Week and Space Technology it is not; however, it
does have the appearance of the glasnost policy seeping into
the Soviet military arena, and the willingness to exchange
data can have extraordinary significance in future START and
MBFR negotiations.
CHAPTER VI
TREATY IMPLICATIONS TO NATO

The INF Treaty, while unanimously endorsed by the governments of the NATO allies, does, however, accentuate the military, economic and political strains in the Alliance, and may serve as a catalyst for major changes in its strategy and structure.

The treaty recreates Helmut Schmidt's concern about the gap in NATO's flexible response strategy, which led to the initial deployment of INF in Western Europe. In speaking before an international conference on "The Future of NATO and Global Security" in 1984, former Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Dr. Henry A. Kissinger discussed the INF deployment decision, stating that the real justification for the deployment was.

...to prevent the nuclear blackmail of Europe by linking the strategic defense of Europe with that of the United States. With intermediate range U.S. weapons in Europe, the Soviets could not threaten Europe selectively; any nuclear attack and any successful conventional attack would trigger an American counterblow from European installations. The Soviets would have to calculate—even in the case of a conventional attack—that we would use our missiles if they used even conventional weapons in Europe; that in turn would trigger our strategic forces....the Soviets had no difficulty understanding that a "linkage" was thereby established between the defense of Europe and the strategic nuclear forces of the United States." (8:16)

The loss of the linkage with the removal and destruction of the U.S. missiles brings up, again, the decoupling issue, the question of U.S. resolve to use its strategic nuclear forces to defend NATO. However, before INF, the stationing
of U.S. forces in Europe was a to act as a "trip-wire" to ensure the commitment of U.S. strategic forces. A major military attack on U.S. forces in Europe is an act of war that would trigger a strategic response. As long as there are U.S. forces in Europe, the Soviets must still consider that response. Or would they?

As stated earlier, arms control successes often cause reassessment of other arms areas to counter the loss or limits of the negotiated arms. The removal of INF demands more focus on another rung of the flexible response ladder: that of the conventional force posture. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact conventional forces vastly outnumber those of technologically superior NATO. The costs of mounting, maintaining and equipping a large land army the size to match the Warsaw Pact forces would involve magnitudes greater than the costs for nuclear deterrence. With economic strains in both Western Europe and the United States, NATO may be hard-pressed to maintain its existing force levels, let alone increase them.

The question of conventional force build-up as an option to maintain a NATO deterrence capability comes at an inopportune time, for the United States is no longer the world's only economic giant. The rise of Japan and other Far Eastern countries and the economic potential of the European Economic Community (EEC) have created a multipolar world economic system that places the United States in direct
competition with its allies. Additionally, according to Peter Drucker in *The Changed World Economy*, "The American Budget has become a financial "black hole", sucking in liquid funds from all over the world, making the United States the world's major debtor country." (5:59) Domestic pressures for stabilizing the U.S. economy will certainly bring to focus the approximately $50 Billion per year cost for maintaining U.S. forces in Europe. (14:14A)

Though the European NATO countries have a significant economic interrelationship with the United States, they also have different economic interests. The Western European economies must have foreign trade, and they look to the Soviet block countries for potential trade expansion. Though the United States imports little from the East that it cannot get elsewhere, the Western European countries have an important interest in East-West trade relationships. Their need for energy sources--natural gas and oil--have been a divergent factor in U.S.-Western European interests. The closer trade ties not only help to undermine the basis for the Alliance, they also increase the chances for loss of strategic Western technology to the East. The dependence on foreign oil dictates foreign policies and relationships to ensure that oil, and these relationships often are ambivalent to U.S. interests. Additionally, their trade barriers and restrictions, especially in the agricultural area, have long been a thorn
in U.S.-Western European relations.

Politically, the United States and the NATO allies differ on important issues that also will be significant in Alliance thinking in the wake of the INF treaty. Historically, West Europeans and Americans often have had differing perceptions of the Soviet threat. Safe under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, the West Europeans consider the Soviet Union as a status-quo power in Europe, at least to the extent that it will "not on a deliberate and considered basis launch an aggressive attack on Western Europe for the purposes of conquering and holding Western Europe."

(3:79-80) The United States considers the Soviets as only being contained through the threat of force, and once that threat is removed they will continue their expansionist policies by any appropriate means, including military. Gorbachev, however, has changed much of U.S. public opinion to be more similar to that of the Western Europeans. He has also reinforced the Western European perceptions. The Western European and U.S. governments will have a difficult time selling their publics the need for additional NATO support.

The INF Treaty, therefore, places NATO in a difficult position; militarily, economically and politically. NATO today has entered an era that is significantly different from that in which it first came into being. Then, the United States held nuclear dominance. Now, there is
parity. Then, the United States was the world's economic giant. Now, it is only one player in the world's economy. Then, the Soviet Union was led by Joseph Stalin. Now, it is led by Mikhail Gorbachev.
CHAPTER VII
ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This paper has surveyed the origins of NATO, and investigated the intertwining relationships of the Alliance, the strategies, and arms control activities leading up to the signing of the INF treaty. What follows is an assessment of the treaty and recommendations of actions to be taken as a follow-on to the treaty. The basic question from the United States' point of view is "what is vital to the national interests of the United States?" The United States must always consider its own national interests in the development of foreign policy, and NATO is a direct recipient of that policy. The INF treaty and other significant arms control activities call for a review of national interests to validate, or change. U.S. foreign policy toward NATO in the future. In January 1987, President Reagan published The National Security Strategy of the United States, in which he expressed the U.S. national interests. Though the strategy may change, the interests remain valid. They are:

1. The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values and institutions intact.


3. The growth of freedom, democratic institutions, and free market economies throughout the world, linked by a fair and open international trading system.

4. A stable and secure world, free of major threats to U.S. interests.
5. The health and vigor of U.S. alliance relationships. (19:4)

Though the military threat to Western Europe must remain an important consideration for U.S. policy, the world economic problems may become more of a threat to the United States as a free and independent nation than the military threat. Apparently, Gorbachev, with his nation's military parity with the West achieved, has recognized the economic vulnerability of the Soviet Union, and is taking significant actions to address that vulnerability. The United States, also, should look at its own economic problems and weigh the cost effectiveness of continued heavy military expenditures against the Soviet threat.

On 4 February 1988, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) testified on the INF treaty before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. (2:--) Each service chief joined with the Chairman JCS, and independently, confirmed his support for the treaty. In his opening statement, Admiral William Crowe, Jr., Chairman of the JCS, stated, "Successful implementation of this treaty will reverse the 40 year buildup of [nuclear forces] and totally eliminate two classes of weapons." He continued stating that, "asymmetrical reduction is a significant precedent", and that the treaty has little impact on NATO's strategy of flexible response. However, he did caution that the need to continue with the NATO force modernization, both conventional and nuclear. (2:--)

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This need is required, with or without the INF treaty. Admiral Crowe recognized that NATO does have problems and that no time is better than now to address those problems. He stated that as a result of the INF treaty, there are actions that NATO could take for a better military posture. They include: conventional defense improvements, employment of new technologies, deployment of dual-capable systems and the theater redisposition of forces. (2:—)

The Joint Chiefs, in succession, confirmed their support of the treaty and stressed the need for continued modernization of forces. General Alfred Gray Jr., Commandant Marine Corps, noting that the mission of the Marine Corps is on NATO’s flanks, stressed that we must not lose sight in the wake of the INF treaty to “focus on aggregate usefulness of forces” and must maintain the global balance of power. (2:—)

General Gray’s testimony brings up important points; where globally is the United States the strongest but in Europe with a strong NATO? And where is the most probable threat for military confrontation but out-of-area, in the Persian Gulf or the Middle East? Add the problems of Central America and the potential problems in Southeast Asia. In my judgement, the United States no longer has the economic resources to assume the unilateral position of a global power and must reassess its priorities accordingly. As
Admiral Crowe stated that now is the time to address NATO's problems, it may also be the time for a significant change in U.S. involvement in NATO.(2:--)

Apparently, Gorbachev is striving for an extended period of improved relations with the West to concentrate on the economic restructuring of the Soviet Union. With the INF treaty, he has agreed to unprecedented measures: the asymmetrical reductions of INF, the data exchange concerning the development, deployment and storage facilities, and the actual on-site verifications. Further, he has made overtures mentioning asymmetrical reductions in conventional forces and a Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. If General Secretary Gorbachev's rhetoric is supported by actions, now may be the opportune time for NATO reform; to allow the United States to cut the apron strings from Western Europe, to allow the United States to concentrate on global issues and on its own economic problems.

The recommendations of this paper, therefore contain four general initiatives:

1. Continue NATO modernization.
2. Rely more heavily on technology.
3. Link START with MBFR.
4. Devolve the United States from NATO.

Continue NATO modernization. For the near term, the United States cannot allow the force structure of NATO to be
weakened with respect to the Warsaw Pact forces by not continuing with the modernization program. It is critical for the U.S. Congress to support the modernization program, for not to do so would be to send the wrong signal to the Soviets. As proven in the past, the United States must negotiate from strength, and strong support of the NATO modernization program underlies that strength.

Rely more heavily on technology. There is no question that, at the present, the West is far superior to the East in technology, and through that superiority comes a strength that helps to counterbalance inferiority in numbers. In 1986, Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, with Senator Cohen introduced an amendment to a bill in the Senate that was directed toward the problem of translating technological advantages to the conventional battlefield. He referred to this amendment, called the Balanced Technology Initiative (BTI), before the U.S. Defense Marketing Services symposium held in Brussels, Belgium, in April 1987:

The focus of the Balanced Technology Initiative is on establishing a coherent programme of research on ways of exploiting the West's advantage in technology with the specific aim of increasing the rate of obsolescence of Soviet and Warsaw Pact equipment, doctrine, and tactics. . . . What NATO needs to do... is to seek ways of making Soviet tank armies obsolete. (16:5-6)

This technology, along with that gained from the research and development of the SDI, represents the strength of the West. It is militarily important and is an excellent lever
to continue using in arms control negotiations.

Link START with MBFR. Though the technological advantage of the West does offset to a degree the numerical superiority of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact conventional forces, the strategic nuclear umbrella is critical to maintain the deterrent balance in Europe. Therefore, any negotiations on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons must be directly linked to the asymmetrical reduction of conventional forces. A major U.S. objective should be the removal, and demobilization, of all but a token U.S. and Soviet ground force from Europe (U.S. from NATO, Soviets from Warsaw Pact). This approach would provide an excellent indication of Soviet long-range intentions since the Soviets desire to keep more than a token force in its Eastern European neighbors, not only to defend against attack from the West, but also to maintain tight military control over them. This would be a "bell-weather" item in the negotiations that may establish the foundation for the restructuring of NATO and the devolvement of U.S. leadership in the Alliance.

Devolvement of the United States from NATO. Devolvement--the passing on or delegation of a duty or authority to a successor--does not mean the total disengagement of the United States from the Alliance. Because the security of Western Europe does remain a vital U.S. national interest, the United States must remain an
active member of the Alliance; however, that interest must be balanced with U.S. global economic and military interests. The removal of U.S. forces from NATO with an appropriate level of demobilization can help ease the strains on the U.S. economy. Also, the removal will be only achieved through close coordination with the allies and in the multinational MBFR fora.

Couple the removal of U.S. forces with a change of NATO command structure that would place a European as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, (SACEUR), with the first choice being French. This selection is required because the reduction of U.S. forces must be counterbalanced with a return of French forces to NATO to maintain an effective conventional deterrent capability. France has recently shown signs of interests in renewed military involvement in NATO and has proposed a separate Franco-German multiforce. The U.S. strategic nuclear tie to NATO can be continued with U.S. Deputy SACEUR.

When NATO was established, the nations of Western Europe were in grave danger. They were economically bankrupt and threatened by an aggressive and belligerent Soviet Union. The original concept of NATO did not call for a permanent U.S. troop presence in Europe, but the Soviet actions precipitated the need for their presence. Western Europe today is totally different from the Western Europe of 1950, when NATO's multinational force structure was created.
NATO is strong enough today to safeguard its members' interests, and it can do so with a reduced involvement of a United States that would continue to the commitment to the security of Western Europe as an active member of the Alliance. The devolvement of the United States from NATO will undoubtedly cause the leitmotiv of the U.S. commitment to be sung louder than ever before; however, that commitment must be balanced with the economic challenges, and opportunities, of the world situation of today.

It has been said that no alliance lasts forever. NATO, nearly 40 years old, is the oldest existing alliance in the world today. And it can continue to exist to protect the national interests of its member states for many more years. However, NATO must grasp today's opportunities to take steps that will ensure that it will be as successful in the future as it was in the past. A strong and independent Europe is in the national interests of the United States. But so are the U.S. economy and the global balance of power.

The INF treaty marks a watershed for opportunities that can allow for a restructuring of the Alliance that can still maintain a military deterrence yet support economic measures for U.S. and European stabilization. A healthy and strong Europe has shored up the balance of power; that is no longer in question. What remains to pursue is a healthy and growing U.S. economy supporting a secure world with minimized threats to U.S. interests.
APPENDIX A

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
4 April 1949
Washington, D.C.

The Parties of this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

ARTICLE 1

The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

ARTICLE 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective
capacity to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

ARTICLE 5

The Parties agree that armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE 6

For the purposes of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties.

ARTICLE 7

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.
ARTICLE 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third state is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

ARTICLE 9

The Parties hereby establish a council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular, it shall establish immediately a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

ARTICLE 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any state so invited may become a party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

ARTICLE 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the states which have ratified it as soon as the ratification of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other states on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

ARTICLE 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at
any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so request, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

ARTICLE 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other signatories. (13:209-213)
APPENDIX B

STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

The basis of this concept is that NATO should be able to deter, and if necessary, to counter military aggression of varying stages in any region of the NATO area; this can be secured only through a wide range of forces equipped with a well balanced mixture of conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear weapons. The purpose of this balance of forces, while retaining the principle of forward defense, is to permit a flexible range of responses combining two main capabilities: to meet any aggression by direct defense at a level judged to be appropriate to defeat the attack, and to be prepared to escalate the level deliberately, maintaining firm political control, if defense at the level first selected is not effective. An aggressor must be convinced of NATO's readiness to use nuclear weapons if necessary, but he must be uncertain regarding the timing or the circumstances in which they would be used. However, selective use of nuclear weapons could not be deferred until NATO's conventional defenses were completely defeated, since it could then be impossible to maintain a cohesive defense and to exploit the advantage gained by the use of the weapons. A substantial number of conventional and theater nuclear forces must be deployed in forward areas, prepared for adequate response, and capable of timely employment. NATO's readiness posture, and its capacity to mobilize, reinforce and deploy in time of tension and crisis, are the foundations of this policy.

Source: NATO Facts and Figures, NATO Information Service (24:140)
BIBLIOGRAPHY


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Antiballistic Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>BACKFIRE</td>
<td>Soviet multimission (nuclear, conventional, antiship and reconnaissance) bomber with low altitude dash capabilities</td>
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<td>BGM-109G</td>
<td>Ground launched version of the U.S. TOMAHAWK long-range cruise missile</td>
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<td>BTI</td>
<td>Balanced Technology Initiative</td>
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<td>Bundestag</td>
<td>Lower house of the Federal Legislature of West Germany</td>
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<td>CPSU</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Soviet Union</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>European Defense Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
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<td>Glasnost</td>
<td>Russian term for &quot;openness&quot;</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>LRINF</td>
<td>Longer-range Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (1000-5500 kilometers)</td>
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<td>MAD</td>
<td>Mutual Assured Destruction</td>
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<td>MBFR</td>
<td>Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions</td>
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<td>MIRV</td>
<td>Multiple Independently targetable Reentry Vehicle</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>North American Aerospace Defense Command</td>
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NPT  Nonproliferation Treaty
OEEC  Organization of European Economic Cooperation
Perestroika  Russian term for "restructuring"
PERSHING I  Older U.S. LRINF missile
PERSHING II  Newer U.S. LRINF missile
SAC  Strategic Air Command
SACEUR  NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SALT  Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SDI  Strategic Defense Initiative
SHAPE  Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SRINF  Shorter-range Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (500-1000 kilometers)
SS-4  Older, fixed-based single warhead Soviet LRINF missile
SS-5  Soviet LRINF missile
SS-12  Soviet SRINF missile
SS-20  Mobile, multiwarhead Soviet LRINF missile
SS-23  Newer, mobile Soviet SRINF missile
START  Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
TOMAHAWK  U.S. long-range cruise missile with air, sea, and ground launch variants