IN SEARCH OF A UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

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IN SEARCH OF A UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

by

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A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH REQUIREMENT

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AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: In Search of a United States National Security Strategy: Republic of South Africa

AUTHOR: Edward L. White

This research report is an analysis and assessment of the essential characteristics and qualities of U.S. national security policy toward South Africa. The constructive engagement policy strategy of the U.S. does not provide a measurement criteria to determine its impact on apartheid and whether or not policy objectives have been achieved. The extent of current Soviet influence in the southern African region does not warrant the East-West conflict as the dominant factor underlying U.S. policy. U.S. policy has had minimum impact in alleviating regional instability and U.S. economic interests have been adversely affected. The realities of U.S. policy have not significantly advanced the cause of human rights and basic American value concepts. Some U.S. policy modifications are recommended to promote long-term U.S. national interests.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The search for a viable U.S. national security strategy relating to the Republic of South Africa seems to present an uncomfortable dilemma—a choice between national moral values and national interests. Is there a conflict between the two? If so, are these interests vital to the survival of the U.S. as a nation and a superpower? Moral values versus national interests is not the primary focus of this study. However, when there is a significant dichotomy between the two, tension in the formulation and execution of policy is an inevitable consequence. While the paramount concern of this paper is whether or not the long-term national interests of the U.S. are served by its current policy toward South Africa, morality is an undeniable and explicit consideration.

The immediate problem is where to begin the analysis and assessment of current U.S. policy. For purposes of this study, the logical starting point is 1981, the advent of the Reagan administration and its "constructive engagement" policy. It is recognized that constructive engagement as a foreign policy strategy began during the Nixon administration. But there are some distinct differences of content
and execution that are not germane to the current policy focus.

An appraisal of the current U.S.-South African relationship reflects a policy orientation that does not appear to serve the long-term national interests of the U.S. Chapter II examines the U.S. constructive engagement strategy to assess its impact on petty apartheid and grand apartheid. Changes in grand apartheid are not evident. Although some petty apartheid changes are visible, a direct link between U.S. policy and these changes is not obvious. A real concern here is the lack of an apparent objective measurement criteria to assess the policy's impact on petty and grand apartheid.

The next chapter explores security, stability, and Soviet hegemony in the southern African region. Soviet presence in the region is seen as a necessary consideration in the formulation of U.S. policy; however, the adverse impact of Soviet influence receives less emphasis than that given by the U.S. and South Africa.

Chapter IV looks at the extent to which U.S. policy may have diminished U.S. economic interests in South Africa. Declining U.S. economic activity in South Africa is viewed as directly attributable to apartheid or opposition to apartheid and U.S. policy.

The chapter on human rights attempts to evaluate the importance of this element as a policy determinant. Human
rights is viewed as a significant but not a dominant policy consideration. It is also seen as having the potential for domestic disharmony in the U.S.

The final chapter observes that there are limited U.S. options to effectively influence change in South Africa; therefore, until some meaningful changes are initiated, a limited and less cozy relationship is concluded as being more consistent with long-term U.S. interests.
CHAPTER II

CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT ILLUSIONS

As an abstract and theoretical concept, constructive engagement is a well-known foreign policy strategy; it generally means cooperation with South Africa and other countries in the southern African region in an effort to influence events within South Africa and the region. Its practical application is more esoteric. Except for those who advocate total political, economic, and military isolation of South Africa, it is difficult for reasonable individuals to argue against "theoretical constructive engagement." However, it is less difficult for critics to postulate that practical application and results are inconsistent with the long-term protection of U.S. interests in the Republic, in the region, and on the continent as a whole.

Constructive engagement by the Reagan administration, as espoused by Dr. Chester A. Crocker, before and after he became Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in June 1981, seems to recognize the problems of South Africa are both colonial and domestic—colonial in its continued control of Namibia and its relationships with other regional countries and domestic as it relates to the institution of apartheid.
The foundation of constructive engagement was built on the premise that the South Africa Government is amenable to change. In a Scope Paper for Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig on the Secretary's upcoming meeting with South African Foreign Minister Roelof F. Botha on 14 May 1981, Crocker wrote, "We can cooperate with a society undergoing constructive change." (1:107) In June 1981, he testified before Congress indicating the U.S. Government has "observed and remains convinced that there is a process underway [in South Africa] which at the very least we can describe as open-minded . . . toward a society that is not based on racist principles." (1:112)

The South Africa Government and most of its enfranchised citizens have not substantially altered their fundamental attitude toward "race" for the past sixty years, or from 1981 to 1988. Crocker's 1981 observations of a "climate of change" are very interesting when compared to 1928 comments by Raymond Leslie Buell, an American African affairs analyst:

The obstacles to a solution of the race problem in South Africa are formidable almost to the point of despair. While the leaders realize the necessity of a new policy, the great masses of Europeans who control the government and who own the land find it difficult to shake off century old beliefs and to support legislation involving the sacrifice of their immediate interests. Nevertheless there are many signs of a growing appreciation of the problem. . . . The present Prime Minister has shown an intelligence and courage which none of his predecessors has demonstrated. The mere fact that the leader of the Nationalist party has dared to support measures
giving natives a form of representation . . . shows how long a distance South Africa opinion has traveled in the last few years. (cited in 2:7)

Compare the above 1928 and 1981 comments with more recent observations by Secretary of State George P. Shultz during an address before the Business Council for International Understanding in New York City on 29 September 1987:

We Americans are an optimistic people, a people who believe that with hard work, dedication, and energy no problems are insurmountable. When, as an American, I look at the trauma in South Africa, I emphatically reject the fatalistic notion that the country's future has already been written, that it is too late for accommodation. I know that there is hope for the future. (3:9)

In the absence of fundamental changes, hope and optimism have historically characterized American attitudes toward a solution to South Africa's race problem.

Constructive engagement is much more than a strategy concerned with "race" and apartheid in South Africa; it is a policy initiative relating to the whole southern African region. Its regional nature was explicitly set forth in a statement by Princeton Lyman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, before the Subcommittees on Africa and on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 2 December 1982.

Our objectives are pursued through a regional policy of constructive engagement--constructive engagement not only with South Africa but with all the states of the region. The specific components of our regional approach include:

First, internationally recognized independence for Namibia;
Second, internationally supported programs of economic development in all the developing countries of the region;  
Third, a negotiated framework that will permit agreement on the issue of withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola;  
Fourth, detente between South Africa and the other states in the region; and  
Fifth, peaceful, evolutionary change in South Africa itself, away from apartheid and toward a system of government to be defined by South Africans themselves but firmly rooted in the principle of government by consent of the governed. (4:26)

Although constructive engagement is a regional strategy, the premises on which it was based and the repeated statements of Reagan administration officials leave little doubt that the public pronounced intent is to move from apartheid to a system based on "consent of the governed." In a 16 August 1985 address before the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, Crocker clearly stated the goal: "For this Administration, apartheid is abhorrent. A primary goal of our policy is to get rid of apartheid." (6:4)

If elimination of apartheid means political, economic, and social change, and establishment of a democratic and nonracial political process, U.S. strategy has not succeeded nor has it failed. (Aspects of policy other than that concerning apartheid are in subsequent chapters.) With an unlimited time continuum, fail is not the antithesis of succeed. Infallability is a unique feature of the evolutionary nature of constructive engagement. Since there are no timetables accompanying policy objectives, there are no reasonable effectiveness measures, and it all becomes an
illusionary process. Proponents point to minor petty apartheid changes and proclaim success; lack of substantial progress is justified based on a need for more time in the evolution of change.


Repeal of these and other officially required discriminatory provisions represents a modicum of progress, but not to the extent envisioned by the authors of constructive engagement. Furthermore, in the absence of empirical data, there is little evidence to support engagement as the prime change element. There is general recognition of a lack of any real affect at all on grand apartheid. The epilogue to this point was profoundly stated by Crocker in an address before the City University of New York conference on "South
None of these measures have addressed the core of the South African dilemma: the issue of political equality. Sadly, external diplomatic efforts to hasten the pace of evolution away from apartheid and repression and toward a more open, democratic society have achieved only limited success. (8:32)
CHAPTER III
SECURITY, STABILITY, AND SOVIET INFLUENCE REALITIES

The generally perceived threat to U.S. national security interests involving South Africa relates to the fear of Soviet domination of the southern African region, thereby increasing the possibility of direct or indirect Soviet control of sea lanes of communication and the great mineral resources of the region. This threat perception is of genuine concern regardless of one's position on the efficacy of the U.S. national security strategy. There is no way of insulating southern Africa from the actualities of the East-West conflict. However, current Soviet influence realities in the region and the absence of spectacular Soviet successes in other regions of Africa would suggest U.S.-Soviet competition should not be the dominant driving force of U.S. policy.

Generally, Soviet interests and hegemony are enhanced by regional insecurity and instability. Increased Soviet influence generally, though not always, results in diminished U.S. hegemony and a degradation of U.S. interests. Accordingly, regional security and stability are significant elements in the analysis and assessment of Soviet influence. (Although not necessarily the same, "Soviet influence" and
"Communist influence" are used interchangeably except where a distinct difference is noted.

The policy priority established by the Reagan administration for containment of Communist influence in Africa cannot be precisely determined. Available data suggest it was initially at the highest levels. According to the August 1981 special edition of TransAfrica News Report, Crocker, in a meeting with top South African officials, "stressed that top U.S. priority is to stop Soviet encroachment in Africa." (cited in 9:81) Although Crocker has been described as a "global-regionalist," the "globalist" school of thought is more reflective of the overall tendencies of the Reagan administration's African policy. This administration has relied very heavily on an anticommmunist rationale as justification for its constructive engagement strategy.

A realistic view of the regional external and internal Communist influence factor was outlined in a statement by Crocker before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Judiciary Committee on 22 March 1982:

We proceed on the basis that the Soviet Union does not have a grand design for southern Africa, but that it is, in fact, taking advantage of targets of opportunity that present themselves to act counter to Western interests. (10:47)

The absence of an apparent Soviet "grand design" for Africa, but the exploitation of "potential opportunities" in southern Africa was outlined in 1983 by Dr. David E.
Albright, professor of national security affairs at the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Insofar as one can discern, then, there will be no compelling reason for the USSR to refrain from efforts to exploit opportunities that crop up in sub-Saharan Africa during the rest of the 1980s. . . . Yet it would also appear that Soviet leaders will probably tend to be discriminating in approaching these opportunities. This is true not only with respect to which of these they will actually pursue but also with regard to how intensely and by what means they will do so. . . .

At the same time, any expansion of the Soviet role in the region [sub-Saharan Africa] will probably be of a moderate sort. Only in Southern Africa do there appear to be potential opportunities that rival those of which the USSR availed itself in the late 1970s. (11:109)

Another telling observation about post-colonial African Marxism was made in 1983 by Colin Legum, editor of the Africa Contemporary Record:

A remarkable phenomenon of Africa's post-colonial politics is the lack of appeal of Marxist ideology (particularly of the Moscow variety) to the continent's new political class. Marxist parties remain far weaker in Africa than in either Asia or Latin America and, of course, much weaker than in Western Europe. (11:vii)

Under immediate past and current conditions, U.S. policy must consider the quantity and quality of the Marxist influence in the region. Soviet presence in the region provided the Reagan administration with another reason for closer ties with South Africa. "Involving South Africa in regional security, seeing off the Soviet challenge, and seducing Angola and Mozambique from the Marxist oath became consuming obsessions in Washington." (12:217) This observation by Dr. Christopher Coker may appear to some to be a slight
overstatement. However, Portuguese withdrawal from Southern Africa in the mid-1970s and the establishment of Marxist governments in Angola and Mozambique; Cuban troops in Angola; Soviet influence and arms in the region; and the refusal of South Africa to abide by U.N. Security Council Resolution 435 relating to Namibia independence provided the U.S. with significant regional policy challenges.

Withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola is a desirable U.S. policy objective; its linkage with Namibia independence was an understandable strategic error, initially raised by Secretary Alexander Haig, Judge William Clark, and Crocker, and adopted by South Africa. (12:260-261) It has been suggested that linkage was Crocker's "Namibian strategy" to get the White House, Secretary Haig, and other administration officials to place Namibian independence on the foreign policy agenda, and to obtain South Africa's agreement to implement Resolution 435. (13:4) In this case, the good intentions of U.S. policy provided South Africa with an excuse for ignoring the U.N. General Assembly's revocation of South Africa's League of Nations mandate to administer the former German colony of South West Africa.

The U.S. must not close its eyes to the realities of Soviet/Communist influence in southern Africa. However, the response to the regional security and stability challenge must differentiate between African nationalism and communism; between communism and Communist support for African
nationalism; and between Soviet-style Marxism and African Marxism. Soviet support and military and financial aid to the African National Congress (ANC) and the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) do not make them Marxist organizations. (13:30)

Open sea lanes of communication are important to U.S. national interests. On 19 October 1980, Crocker testified before the Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. He emphasized that "the security of the Cape Route is by far the most important Western interest in the African region." (14:23-24)

However, any effort to link "security of the Cape Route" to continuation of minority rule in South Africa lacks validity. There is no plausible evidence that majority rule will choke sea lanes of communication. If vital U.S. interests relating to the Cape route are threatened, then the use of U.S. military power is required. But it is suggested that the possibility of Soviet control of sea lanes of communication has been exaggerated by South Africa and those who wish to see the "current" South Africa continue as a regional power. Soviet influence relating to the Cape of Good Hope was summarized in 1981 by Professor William J. Foltz, Director of the Yale Center for International and Area Studies:

There are over 1000 miles of open water south of the Cape of Good Hope; while Antarctic gales increase the hazards of passage far off shore, hostile submarines would still have to be deployed in massive numbers in order to interdict passage of oil. Their activities
could, of course, raise the cost of such shipment, particularly to Europe, but serious harassment would quickly be regarded as a casus belli by the afflicted nations, thereby transforming the conflict into one which would probably be fought elsewhere. If the Soviet Union were seriously going to interdict shipping from the Persian Gulf, it would do so at the Strait of Hormuz, reachable by airplanes. . . . (15:296)

Professor Foltz's analysis still applies to 1988.
CHAPTER IV
DIMINISHED UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS

The protection and enhancement of U.S. economic interests are a vital element of U.S. national security strategy. One of the Reagan administration's specific national security objectives in support of U.S. interests is: "To promote a strong, prosperous and competitive U.S. economy, in the context of a stable and growing world economy." (16:5)

To what extent has U.S. policy enhanced U.S. economic interests in South Africa?

In a statement before the Subcommittees on Africa and on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 2 December 1982, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Princeton Lyman noted the traditional U.S. support for American private sector trade and investment in South Africa. He further indicated that "while not promoting U.S. trade and investment in South Africa, we [Reagan administration] opposed disinvestment by U.S. firms. . . ." (4:27) He also identified the U.S. as South Africa's leading trade partner, with two-way trade exceeding $5.3 billion in 1981, and that U.S. direct investment in South Africa exceeded $2.5 billion by 1982. Sales of U.S. products to South Africa fell by 50 percent from nearly
$2.2 billion in 1983 and 1984 to about $1.2 billion in 1985. (25:3) Secretary Shultz's address before the International Management and Development Institute on 4 December 1986 emphasized the United States' "consistent commitment to peace with justice" in southern Africa is demonstrated by "strong conviction that American business and investment can play a constructive role in South Africa and the region. . . ."

(17:36)

U.S. economic interests in South Africa are inextricably tied to the issues of economic sanctions; the great mineral resources in the country and region; international conditions; and the economic, political, and social climate within the U.S. and the Republic. Peter C. Nwachukwu and Dr. Mfanya D. Tryman have made the following observations relating to U.S. policy, geopolitics, and economic interests:

The pursuit of Reagan's Constructive Engagement is made within the larger framework of U.S. policy. This larger policy framework is guided by two broad themes: (1) the geo-politics of East-West conflict, and (2) economic self-interest. Deriving from these two themes is the U.S. perception of the White minority government of South Africa as the only reliable force in the region capable of protecting "western interests" in time of trouble. In this sense, western interests become synonymous with White interests at the expense of Black freedom and justice. (18:104)

The evidence seems to indicate American economic interests in South Africa are small to modest and have been relatively stable. Professor Foltz noted that, "Since the end of World War II, South Africa has accounted annually for about 1 percent of U.S. foreign trade and between 1 and 2
percent of U.S. direct investment overseas." (19:32) The Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa (1987) also noted that except for some strategic minerals the "immediate material interests" of the U.S. in South Africa are modest, with less than 1 percent of U.S. foreign trade and less than 1 percent of U.S. direct investment overseas in South Africa. (7:3)

The importance of South Africa and some regional landlocked countries as sources for some strategic minerals used by the U.S. and the western world is highlighted by the table on page 19. Another key element in the mineral debate is the fact that the Soviet Union is the "other source" for some of these minerals.

In writing about "United States Military and Strategic Interests in Africa," Professor Foltz makes a very cogent statement about minerals and the Soviet threat:

The most farfetched worry is the specter of Soviet control over southern Africa which, together with the Soviet Union's own production of these minerals, would give the Kremlin a stranglehold over Western economics. Quite aside from the fact that the United States would have ample other reasons to oppose systematic Soviet control over so great an area, this "resource war" strategy would require a very high degree of control by the Soviet Union--at least as high as that over, say, Bulgaria and higher than that over Rumania. Since such a strategy would deprive local populations and governments of virtually their entire export economy, it would be ruinously expensive. . . . (20:63)

Stockpiling and substitute materials and supply sources are possible alternatives in the unlikely event of a supply disruption.
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<td>10% domestic supply&lt;br&gt;10% imports from Sino-Soviet Bloc countries&lt;br&gt;15% imports from U.K. where source of raw material is South Africa&lt;br&gt;27% imports from Free World Market countries&lt;br&gt;38% imports from South Africa direct</td>
</tr>
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<td>3% imports from Sino-Soviet Bloc countries&lt;br&gt;42% imports from South Africa direct&lt;br&gt;54% imports from Free World Market countries</td>
</tr>
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<td>7. MANGANESE</td>
<td>42% imports from South Africa direct&lt;br&gt;62% imports from Free World Market direct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. VANADIUM</td>
<td>10% imports from Free World Market countries&lt;br&gt;17% imports from South Africa indirect&lt;br&gt;18% imports from South Africa direct&lt;br&gt;46% domestic supply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. ANTIMONY</td>
<td>14% imports from South Africa direct&lt;br&gt;18% imports from Sino-Soviet Bloc countries&lt;br&gt;27% imports from Free World Market countries&lt;br&gt;41% domestic supply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. RUTILE-TITANIUM AND SUBSTITUTES</td>
<td>14% imports from South Africa direct&lt;br&gt;39% imports from Free World Market countries&lt;br&gt;46% domestic supply</td>
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Regardless of the economic importance of South Africa minerals, this issue alone should not be the critical determinant of U.S. policy. Further, there simply is no credible evidence that majority rule in South Africa will adversely affect U.S. continued access to strategic minerals.

Economic sanctions initiated by anti-apartheid forces, institutions, state and local governments, and the Congress; and economic and political conditions in South Africa have forced many U.S. multinational corporations to leave South Africa. On 2 October 1987, in accordance with the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, President Reagan submitted to Congress a report on the act. The report noted the trend toward disinvestment by American firms, and that the value of U.S. direct investment in South Africa has been cut nearly in half by disinvestment—from $2.4 billion in 1982 to approximately $1.3 billion in 1986. "By now [October 1987], it is probably less than $1 billion." (21:37)

It can be concluded that constructive engagement—or, more precisely, the absence of any significant results in eliminating apartheid attributable to this strategy—and the opposition to the policy have substantially diminished U.S. economic interests in South Africa.
CHAPTER V
HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE

Freedom, peace, and prosperity . . . that's what America is all about . . . for ourselves, our friends, and those people across the globe struggling for democracy. --Ronald Reagan (16:i)

A major national security objective in support of U.S. interests promulgated in the National Security Strategy of the United States, published by the Reagan administration, reads as follows:

To defend and advance the cause of democracy, freedom, and human rights throughout the world. A foreign policy that ignored the fate of millions around the world who seek freedom would be a betrayal of our national heritage. Our own freedom, and that of our allies, could never be secure in a world where freedom was threatened everywhere else. (16:5)

Are these hollow words and pronouncements that have no real substance and meaning in the world of "realpolitik"?

Although "human rights" is a rather abstract concept, it is a term that has been widely used in the U.S. in connection with domestic conditions in other countries. As used in this study, the concept requires no specific or definitive definition. It is quite possible to discuss and understand the human rights perspective without a precise academic meaning.

Dr. Coker has described the Carter administration's focus on human rights as the "challenge to constructive
Coker also describes President Carter's inaugural address as an affirmation of his commitment to making human rights the cornerstone of American policy with the solemn pledge, "because we are free, we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere." (12:135) An examination of statements by President Reagan reveals similar words with similar literal meaning. However, the real meaning is determined based on interpreted intent, and actions taken or not taken in support of such high-sounding pronouncements. In his article, "United States Policy Toward South Africa: Is One Possible?," Professor Foltz made a rather telling statement in comparing the Carter and Reagan administrations.

The South African government has not, however, been more responsive to symbolic incentives and quiet pleading than to earlier symbolic deprivations and public harangues. The Reagan administration has been even less successful than the Carter administration in conveying a consistent message to Pretoria. President Reagan himself has undercut his words of concern with statements that South Africans have interpreted as assurances of support for their policies (e.g., CBS News, 1981). (19:45)

U.S. foreign policy is not and should not be based on "human rights" as the dominant or overarching element. On the other hand, American ideals and values would suggest that human rights considerations should be interwoven throughout the fabric of the policy process.

South Africa's "homelands policy," where blacks are deprived of South African citizenship and consigned to "independent" homelands, is a human rights issue. South Africa's continued control of Namibia is a human rights issue.
In addition to being a regional instability factor, South Africa's military incursions into Angola and Mozambique are human rights issues. South Africa's new constitution, which provides no political power for blacks and only carefully limited political participation for Asians and Coloreds, is a human rights issue. South Africa's total domestic apartheid system is a human rights issue.

U.S. policy toward South Africa and any other nation must search for a balance between "real" national interests and human rights. George W. Shepherd, Jr., professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, and an editor of Africa Today, observed that "all recent U.S. administrations have stated their policies toward Africa, especially South Africa, in terms of human rights." (14:15) However, he views these human rights stances as largely "symbolic."

In spite of the comparative analysis made by some Americans and South Africans, the human rights struggle for black freedom and justice in South Africa is not the same as the historic black civil rights movement in the U.S. There are basic and fundamental differences which are not relevant to this study. However, in the event of a fully-blown race war in South Africa, and if there is a widespread perception that the U.S. is on the "wrong side," whether it's the white side or black side, there will be serious implications for racial harmony in the U.S.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The pursuit of a practicable U.S. national security strategy toward South Africa does present an uncomfortable dilemma, but it is not one of choice between national moral values and national interests. The real dilemma is impotency and the lack of viable options to effectively influence change in South Africa.

The proponents of constructive engagement can enumerate numerous petty apartheid changes. However, even President Reagan and Dr. Chester Crocker, the architect of constructive engagement, admit that grand apartheid is alive and well. On 1 October 1987, Crocker said, "Efforts to hasten the pace of evolution away from apartheid and repression and toward a more open and democratic society have achieved only limited success." (8:32) "Limited success" is an optimistic assessment. President Reagan's 17 March 1986 Message to the Congress indicated: "The policies and actions of the Government of South Africa continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy and economy of the United States." (22:47)

On 2 October 1985, Secretary Shultz said: "Americans naturally find apartheid totally reprehensible. It must go.
But how shall it go? Our influence is limited." (23:26)

There are no quick and readily available solutions to the South Africa problem. However, since the U.S. has been unable to develop an effective influence relationship during the past seven years, the U.S. must continue to be "engaged" but at a circumspect distance.

Long-term U.S. national interests would be best served by a policy adopting some ideas set forth in 1984 by Anthony Lake, director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, 1977-1980, and professor of political science at Amherst College. He suggests:

Seek broad agreement among concerned Americans and U.S. allies on measures that are useful and sustainable. Specific sanctions aimed at specific actions may be effective.

Place more emphasis on existing and new programs to shift the focus from South African whites to the non-white majority.

Until real progress is made within South Africa, the U.S. should conduct only a cool and limited official relationship with the country. (24:108-110) [The above are not exact quotations.]

This type of U.S. policy orientation offers the possibility of enhanced credibility by eliminating some current inconsistencies between actions and words.
LIST OF REFERENCES


