THE EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT OF THE FULL-TIME SUPPORT PROGRAMS
IN THE ARMY RESERVE - 1920-1987

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

GENE V. STANGLE, CPT, USAR
B.S., University of Texas at El Paso, 1976

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1988

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Each program is examined in detail based on available historical documents. The following questions were answered: (1) when and why the Full-Time Support (FTS) programs started, (2) what events took place that caused them to change, (3) who was responsible for their development.

Some conclusions drawn from this investigation include: (1) the readiness posture of the Army Reserve is directly linked to the number of FTS personnel it employs; (2) the civilian technician union threatens the command and control of the Army Reserve; (3) personnel force reductions in the Active Army negatively impacts on the Army Advisor program; (4) the AGR program provides versatility, military management and command and control to the reserve commander.

This study also concludes that improved management of the FTS programs will determine their future development. The conflict between the AGR and civilian technician programs weakens their ability to provide effective support to the Reserve commander.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency.
ABSTRACT


This study is a historical analysis of the three full-time support programs of the United States Army Reserve: Active Army Advisor, Civilian Technician, and the Active/Guard Reserve program.

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GENE V. STANGLE
CPT USAR AGR
CGSC 1988
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Purpose

This thesis provides a comprehensive history of the full-time support programs in the Army Reserve. They include the Active Guard/Reserve (AGR), Civilian Technician (CT), and the Active Army Advisor programs. The thesis will inform interested military professionals about the evolutionary development of the programs, why they exist, when they were formed, and who was responsible for their development.

Background

Traditionally, the United States has relied on its state militias to protect its land borders. The idea of a large standing regular army was never popular with the American public because it was too expensive. The public also felt that the Navy was more important to the national defense of American borders. Therefore, the personnel strength of the Regular Army before World War I historically stayed at about 28,000 men. This size force was just large enough to form a cadre (or skeleton force) upon which state militias and draftees could be organized during war.
Employment of full-time support personnel began after the passage of the National Defense Act of 1916. Congress later amended the Act in 1920 to improve some of its provisions.

Further clarification on full-time support came in 1921. The War Department published Special Regulation No. 46, *General Policies and Regulations for the Organized Reserves*, to govern their organization, administration, training, and mobilization. Regular Army personnel were assigned to Reserve organizations in accordance with territorial responsibilities. Territorial responsibilities were defined as Departments and Corps areas. Departments were United States possessions outside the Continental United States. Corps areas were territorial commands inside the United States. According to Special Regulation No. 46:

"The quota in the Organized Reserves normally allotted to each corps area will include three Infantry divisions and a proper proportion of corps, army (including Cavalry), auxiliary, and special troops."°

Selected commissioned and enlisted personnel of the Regular Army were allotted to each department and corps area. Their duties were of a "continuing nature," the kind that the reservists could not complete before the next unit training assembly (drill). These administrative duties dealt with training, maintenance and logistical support. If the Active Army personnel could not provide
this support, they went to the Adjutant General of the Army for assistance. The Adjutant General had the authority to bring consenting reservists on active duty to perform these duties.

The Active Army provided full-time support to the Army Reserve until the end of World War II. At that time, the Army realized that additional full-time support would be required to manage the growth of the Army Reserve program. In 1950, the Civilian Technician Program was developed from the existing Civil Service Commission. Although the Regular Army recommended using consenting Army Reservists, the initial program employed junior Department of the Army civilians, called unit aides. These aides soon replaced the Active Army personnel who previously performed these duties.

As the Army Reserve grew and expanded, so did the Civilian Technician Program. At every level in the chain-of-command, civilian technicians represented the unit commander or primary staff officer. However, none of them were required to join the reserves or take part in reserve activities. As such, they were not considered mobilization assets.

In 1960, the first memorandum of understanding between the Department of the Army and United States Civil Service Commission gave civilian technicians the option of joining the Army Reserve to make them mobilization assets.
This would not interfere with their full-time civilian technician duties. These civilian technicians became known as "dual-status" because they occupied civilian and military positions with the Reserve. In 1970, the first memorandum was renegotiated, requiring dual status as a condition of employment. This supposedly improved the mobilization readiness of the unit but the effects were minimal. All of the initial civil service technicians employed prior to 1970 were exempt from the dual status clause and were allowed to remain as full-time civil service employees until they decided to quit or retire.

If dual status technicians lost their military status because of involuntary actions (like forced retirement from the reserves or medical disability), they retained their jobs and continued serving the Army Reserve as "status-quo" technicians. The status quo technicians thus kept their jobs until they were eligible for civil service retirement.

The Active Army's increased reliance on the Army Reserve began with the advent of the Total Force and the One Army concept in 1978. These two concepts were designed to create a strong deterrence through alliances with other countries and through affiliation programs between the Active Army and the Reserve. Together, they provided the flexible response necessary for the United States to meet its commitments anywhere in the world.
In 1979, the United States discovered that it did not have the means to deter the Soviet Union from expanding into countries like Afghanistan. This is not to say that the United States was impotent. Instead, the preponderance of logistical support for battlefield sustainment came from the Army Reserve units, which were not combat ready.

The successful implementation of the Total Force Policy hinged on the Army Reserve's ability to perform to active duty standards. After Afghanistan, the Army conducted a wide-spread examination of the civilian technician program and its ability to train the type of reserve force required by the Army.

These studies culminated with the introduction of the civilian technician conversion program. It started as an experimental program by FORSCOM but, after the first year, was considered a success with more conversions programmed for the future.

FORSCOM intended to replace all civilian technicians with full-time active duty reservists. These active duty reservists were later organized and managed under the title of the Full-Time Manning (FTM) Program. In the early 1980's, the FTM evolved into the Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) Program. FORSCOM started large scale conversions of civilian technician positions to AGR. Before it could complete all of the conversions, a successful lobbying campaign by the Civilian Technician Union stopped it.
The civilian technician program gained favor with Congress following the technician conversion test. The technician union is mostly responsible for this development. Today, the technician program is scheduled for additional growth to help operate high priority units.

**SIGNIFICANCE**

The significance of this thesis is three-fold: (1) It informs the reader on the types of full-time support programs in the Army Reserve. (2) It identifies full-time support responsibilities and characteristics. (3) It also outlines their importance to the successful development of the Army Reserve.

This thesis describes the Army Reserve efforts to make its full-time support programs efficient and cost-effective. It also identifies the Army's growing dependence on the Army Reserve and the flexibility provided by the full-time support programs. Flexibility within the various full-time support programs allows the Army Reserve to absorb additional missions from the Active Army.

**Delimitations**

This thesis only covers the evolutionary development of three United States Army Reserve full-time support programs: (1) the Active Guard Reserve (AGR); (2) the Civilian/Military Technician; and (3) Active Army Component.
This study will not include the full-time support programs of other services or of the National Guard. Also it will not include civilian employees who do not occupy dual-status positions. The Active Army Affiliation programs were not considered as full-time support and therefore, were not reviewed.

**Methodology**

This thesis examines the historical development of the full-time support programs in the United States Army Reserve from 1920-1987. Periodicals, books, and professional military studies obtained from the Fort Leavenworth Combined Arms Research Library (CARL), as well as the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR) provided background for this study.

In order to establish a comprehensive and verifiable study, primary source documents authenticated the information found in secondary sources. For example, extracts from the Constitution of the United States and the National Defense Act (as amended by the Act of June 4, 1920) verified information gathered by Eilene Galloway. Information extracted from her study on the "History of the United States Military Policy on Reserve Forces, 1775-1957" and Special Regulations Number 46 (General Policies and Regulations for the Organized Reserves-1921) established when the Organized Reserve was formed. It also documented who provided the first full-time support to the
Army Reserve. Other primary sources used later in this thesis verified claims made about the mismanagement of the Civilian Technician and AGR support programs. This information was found in statements provided by Mr. John T. Hunter, President of the Association of Civilian Technicians Union, before the House of Representatives, April 29, 1986. Government documents verified the responsibilities of the different full-time support programs. Newspaper interviews with important military leaders, on the subject of full-time support programs, established the current and future needs of the Army.

**Organization**

This thesis presents the history of the full-time support programs in the Army Reserve in chronological sequence. Chapter I identifies the purpose, background, significance, delimitations, methodology, and organization of this thesis. Chapter II reviews the evolution of the Active Army Advisor Program. Chapter III discusses development of the Civilian Technician Program. Chapter IV addresses the development and the conflicting issues surrounding the Active Guard/Reserve Program. Chapter V compares the positive and negative characteristics of the three full-time support programs. Finally, chapter VI provides the conclusions and recommendations developed from this thesis.
Statement of Gender

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used both men and women are included.
CHAPTER 1 ENDNOTES


2Ibid., p. 7.

3Ibid., p. 9.


7Crossland and Currie, p. 218.

8Ibid., p. 220.

CHAPTER II

EVOLUTION OF THE ARMY ADVISOR PROGRAM

At the end of WWI the United States Army reduced its personnel strength from 2,608,218 enlisted men and 128,436 officers to a total strength of 130,000 soldiers. This reduction in 1920 devastated the Regular Army's ability to effectively support the Organized Reserve.

From 1920 to 1940 the Organized Reserve was undertrained and unsupported. A general lack of financial support from the federal government caused this dilemma. Army Reserve members were lucky to attend Annual Training once every four or five years during the 1920's. By 1930, only one out of every four reservists received active duty training. Since active training was not available through normal arrangements with the Regular Army, the War Department decided to use Organized Reserve officers instead of Regular Army officers as instructors at the Civilian Military Training Camps (CMTC), and Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC).

In 1940, the Organized Reserve had 104,228 officers and 3,233 enlisted personnel available for "call-up" in the event of a declared war. However, these personnel had not been molded into combat-ready units. The enlisted personnel offered little militarily because they were so widely
dispersed around the nation. Also, many of the field grade officers were too old for their grade. Company grade officers of the Organized Reserve had no problem with joining the ranks of the Regular Army. Over 90% of the company grade officers on active duty during WWII came from the Organized Reserves.

After WWII to the beginning of the Korean War the Active Army experienced large force reductions. The atomic bomb created a false sense of security in the American people and President Truman. President Truman's economic military policy, called the "remainder method," reduced the Regular Army to below combat readiness. The "remainder method" meant that the military was financed on funds remaining in the budget after all other government programs were funded. In June 1950 the United States entered the Korean War not combat ready. The civilian technician program also started that year to provide full-time support to the Reserves mobilization efforts. In July 1953, six months after President Eisenhower assumed the Presidency, the Korean War Armistice was signed.

President Eisenhower's administration strongly advocated a large Reserve Force. His administration argued that the cost of one full-time soldier was equivalent to ten reservists. Despite this, Congress would not fund the 5,100 required full-time civilian technician positions.
Instead, the Department of the Army could only authorize the fill of 3,046 civilian technician positions.  

Directed by President Eisenhower, the Defense Department from 1953-1956 studied the Reserve's readiness posture. They discovered that only 700,000 from a total of 2.5 million reservists (National Guard and Army Reserve) actually trained with units. Because of this dilemma, Congress assumed the responsibility of increasing the number of participating reservists in units.

In 1956, Congress reformed the National Guard and Army Reserve by enacting the Reserve Forces Act of 1956. This Act raised the personnel strength to 2.9 million. This increase allowed more men to enlist directly into the Reserves. This law, for the first time, offered individual reenlistment options. For example, there were many ways for an individual to complete his eight year service obligation. For one, he could enlist directly into the Active Army for two years and then serve three years with a reserve unit. Second, the individual could enlist directly into a unit, spend three to six months on active duty for training, and then serve out the rest of his obligation in a Reserve unit.

Between 1956 and 1957, the Army Reserve experienced the largest personnel gains in history because of the six month active duty training program. In 1956 alone, there
were 34,072 enlistments. By 1960, nearly one million reservists were on the payroll of the Army Reserve.

The Active Army, on the other hand, experienced a severe reduction in total force. Their ability to provide adequate support to the Army Reserve became increasingly difficult.

Full-time advisors to the Reserve Component were assigned to units down to the battalion level. Regular Army (RA) officers however, did not consider these assignments career enhancing. Therefore, RA officers avoided advisor assignments. Instead these assignments were specifically saved for RA officers on their terminal assignments.

The Continental Army Command (CONARC) served as the Active Army agency responsible for providing advisor support to the Army Reserve. In 1973 CONARC separated into two distinct commands--Forces Command (FORSCOM) and Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

With this split came the development of nine Readiness Assistance Regions (RAR's) that managed the training and development of the Army Reserve. In July 1973, the RAR's were renamed Army Readiness Regions (ARR's). These regions further subdivided into numerous Readiness Groups. The functions of the ARR's included:

1. Advisors at Major United States Army Command (MUSARCS), Divisions, and Brigades.

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2. Readiness Groups with mobile assistance teams to assist reserve units within their geographical area of responsibility.

3. Readiness Coordinators who acted as the ARR staff.

The Groups were manned by qualified full-time Active Duty Advisors. They were responsible for improving the Army Reserve by administering "hands-on" training to reserve units."

**THE ACTIVE ARMY ADVISOR**

In 1975, Major General M. G. Roseborough, the commander of Readiness Region I, published the *Reserve Component Advisor Guide* reinforcing the need for qualified advisors.

"It is DA policy that the best qualified personnel available will be selected for assignment to ARR, RC, and unit advisor duty and that such assignments will be equated with the best branch assignments when comparing personnel of similar grades in connection with personnel actions."

The success of the Active Army Advisor depended on the advisor's understanding of the Army Reserve. The advisor's ultimate goals centered on mutual understanding, cooperation, and teamwork to the degree that the National Guard, Army Reserve and Active Army present a "united front" in peacetime. Therefore, the advisor's number one priority involved establishing a solid and harmonious rapport with the reserve commander.

As advisors, they observed, advised, and assisted their reserve commanders by developing a relationship of
trust and understanding. Any information shared by the reserve commander and the advisor was held in the strictest confidence. Only under extreme circumstances, where an intolerable situation existed between the advisor and the commander, would a matter be brought to the attention of the Army Readiness Region Commander. Under such circumstances, the Readiness Region Commander could then reassign the Active Army Advisor, or recommend corrective action to the Reserve Component chain of command.7

The advisor formed a link between the active and reserve component commanders. He did this by providing advice on current Army policies and procedures. The advisor also gave assistance in matters deemed appropriate by the reserve commander.

The principle objective of the advisor was to help improve the training program of the reserve unit he served with. He worked to improve their operating efficiency and mobilization readiness by developing effective training programs.

The advisor's duties and responsibilities varied depending upon the type of assignment he received. One thing never changed. Regardless of the level of command at which the advisor served, his first loyalty was to his counterpart - the reserve commander. After that, the advisor's loyalties were to the Reserve Component and Army Readiness Region chains of command.
Some of the more common duties and responsibilities for advisors included the following:

1. Provide advice to the Army Reserve Commanders on organizational, administrative, operations and training, personnel, logistics, and mobilization readiness.
2. Provide advice on current Army regulations and directives.
3. Advise commanders on tactical and technical fundamentals being violated (for example, the misuse of government property).
4. Report to commanders on the duty performance of reserve soldiers and civilian technicians.
5. Report deficiencies not corrected by RC commanders to the senior advisor (especially if the deficiencies inhibit unit progress).
6. Attend training assemblies of supported unit.
7. Attend annual training (AT).
8. Serve as a member of the Reserve Component annual training evaluation teams (except for the unit they support).
9. Monitor status of personnel, training, logistics, and mobilization readiness of supported units.

One of the advisors other primary functions was to develop a working relationship with the civilian technicians. However, the advisor had to be careful not to
interfere with the technician's duties and responsibilities to the reserve commander.

**Summary**

The Active Army's commitment to the professional development of the Army Reserve fostered the expansion and evolutionary development of the Army Advisor Program. Only officers on their terminal assignments received advisor duty with the Reserves. The Continental Army Command (CONARC) soon detected the problem and took steps to ensure the assignment of quality professional soldiers to advisor positions.

CONARC split into two separate commands in 1973 - FORSCOM and TRADOC. With this split came the development of Readiness Regions and Readiness Groups with trained active army advisors. These advisors became the professional link between the active army and the reserve commander.
CHAPTER II ENDNOTES


2Ibid., p. 40.

3Ibid., p. 42.

4Ibid., p. 64.


6Crossland and Currie, p. 65.


9Crossland and Currie, p. 128-129.


11Millett and Maslowski, p. 529.

12Crossland and Currie, p. 222.

13Ibid., p. 224.

14Ibid., p. 225.


16Ibid., (Forward) p. 1.

17Ibid., (Forward) p. 2.

18Ibid., (Chapter 3) p. 6.
Ibid., (Chapter 3) p. 3.

Ibid., (Chapter 3) pp. 4-5.
Chapter III

EVILOUTION OF THE CIVILIAN TECHNICIAN PROGRAM

The Civilian Technician Program began in 1950 to fill an initial requirement for full-time personnel support to the Army Reserve after WWII.

Men and women of the Civil Service Commission filled the first civilian technician positions. They had to attend monthly training assemblies of the reserve unit they supported.

Between training assemblies these technicians drew supplies, maintained vehicles and equipment and prepared payrolls and attendance records. They also arranged for the use of training aids and facilities, coordinated operational plans for support of civil authorities, responded to queries and requirements bearing short suspense dates, and performed other duties as required by the unit commander.

As the program expanded during the 1950's and 1960's, it became embodied in the reserve system. At all levels of the reserve command structure, civilian technicians performed some type of full-time support. These included the Staff Administrative Assistant (SAA), the Staff Training Assistant (STA), one or more Staff Administrative Specialists (SAS) (depending upon the type, level and responsibilities of the headquarters), and at the
battalion level, a Staff Supply Assistant (SSA). The company, battery, or detachment formed the lowest unit level authorized a technician - the Administrative Supply Technician (AST).

The SAA was also known as the Senior Staff Administrative Assistant (SSAA). In either title, he performed the same functions for the commander. Normally, the SAA existed on a coequal basis with the chief of staff or the executive officer of the Reserve headquarters.

The technicians assisted the commander in the daily operational functions of the command. The senior technician exercised administrative and technical supervision over all other technicians employed within the command.²

The STA was the full-time representative of the G3 or S3 of the command and worked under the general supervision of the SAA/SSAA. His primary responsibilities included the training functions of the command. This included the coordination of training sites and equipment, and ensuring they were available during the training assembly. The STA also assumed the responsibilities of the SSAA during his absence.

The SAS was normally a clerical assistant to the SSAA. The SAS was responsible for processing correspondence, maintaining suspense files, and other clerical duties in connection with staff administration.
The SSA, normally found at the battalion level of command, performed supply functions associated with the daily operational management of the army supply system. Since he was the senior supply specialist, the SSA had the additional responsibility to monitor training of the supply personnel in the command.

The AST was found at the company, battery or detachment level and was referred to as the "backbone of the technician program." Their responsibilities centered on the administrative areas of personnel, supply, and training. The number of ASTs in a unit depended on the military strength of that unit.³

**Dual Status Technicians**

In 1960, the Office of Personnel Management of the Department of the Army and the Civil Service Commission composed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). This MOU established the conditions of employment of civilian technicians under the Army Reserve Technician Program. The basic document provided for dual status technicians. And though desirable, dual status was not mandatory. The fact that the MOU didn't require the civilian technicians to be members of the Army Reserve as a condition of employment became one of the major flaws in the program.

The MOU was refined in 1970. The revised agreement provided for mandatory unit membership as a condition of employment. However, the new MOU also allowed technicians
employed earlier to continue in their jobs even after involuntary separation from the reserves. The 1970 MOU specifically states:

"No technician employed prior to 1 September 1970, who is not in a dual civilian military status on that date will be involuntarily reassigned or removed from his position for failure to comply with the dual status requirement."

The Defense Manpower Commission was ordered by the President in 1975 to conduct a study on the Civilian Technician Program. In its study, the commission stated that the Army Reserve would be better off with full-time support from reserve personnel on active duty because the Civilian Technician Program had too many management problems.

The study identified problems with conflicting laws and rules concerning civilian employment and military service. These problems made the technician program difficult to manage effectively. Other cited problem areas included:

1. The lack of technician management at HQDA.
2. The inadequate technician support at company and battalion levels of command.
3. Questionable requirements determination process.
5. Misassignment.

"referred to conditions in which technicians held a civilian position with one unit and a military assignment with another. These conditions resulted in technicians not being mobilization
assets because they could not deploy with their units.

6. Grade inversion.
   "was a condition adversely impacting weekday operations and unit readiness due to the assignment of individuals to positions greatly disparate in the military rank and civilian grade. For example, a technician in the rank of major sometimes experienced difficulty functioning as a GS-5 during the week. Most of the problems identified remain unsolved to this day."

7. To develop management techniques outside the normal constraints of the 1970 MOU.

Further revision of the MOU in 1980 added three more conditions of employment. The first was an Appendix to the Priority Placement Program. This aided in the placement of civilian technicians who lost their USAR membership. Then it became mandatory for civilian technicians to have comparable military designations and grades for their USAR technician positions. Finally, it became mandatory that status quo technicians accept other jobs in any geographical area necessary to achieve placement within one year. The military requirement of dual-status was added.

According to Army Regulation 140-315 dual status enhanced readiness of the Army Reserve units by:

1. Assuring the civilian technicians are available for drill in military positions equal to their civilian technician positions.
2. Assuring technicians are mobilized with their units.
3. Improving the supervisory effectiveness of the
civilian technicians.

4. Enhancing the stability and maintenance of technicians positions requiring technical skills.

5. Promoting esprit de corps of technicians. 

TECHNICIAN MANAGEMENT

In 1968, Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA), conducted a study on the management of the technician program because of the problems it had with budgets, policy funds, force structure and plans. To correct these management problems, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) (August 1973) sent a memorandum to the Chiefs of the National Guard and the Army Reserve directing them to manage these areas. FORSCOM became the single manager for the Civilian Technician Program. FORSCOM and the Department of Defense (DoD) struggled with the way the Civilian Technician Program should be managed. FORSCOM wanted to manage them as civilian personnel. DoD wanted them managed as a military entity, keeping the military character of the technician program paramount. The struggle continued as FORSCOM proceeded to manage the technician program as civilian personnel. 

From 1973 to 1984 FORSCOM made numerous studies and recommendations to improve the management of the Civilian Technician Program. In 1973, with the implementation of the Army's "Steadfast Program", more full-time reservists
were being hired than civilian technicians. It was the first major expansion of the "265 program", or Section 265, Chapter 11, Title 10 US Code authorizing reservists to serve on active duty, other than for training. These personnel prepared and administered policies and regulations affecting the Army Reserve. Two hundred (200) reserve officers and 1,030 enlisted personnel were activated under this program from 1972-1977. In 1978, an additional 78 enlisted training managers were activated to fill traditionally occupied civilian positions.¹⁰

MG Milnor A. Roberts (Chief, Army Reserve in 1975), tried to establish an office of Technician Personnel at OCAR (10 spaces) and an additional seventh space augmentation to the Civilian Personnel office at FORSCOM. The purpose of MG Roberts' efforts was to establish civilian technician representation at the various command levels within DA to improve management of the technician program. Although FORSCOM concurred, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel (ODCSPER) disapproved the proposal with a recommendation that the technician program be studied. ODCSPER expressed concern over the question of General Staff vs Special Staff jurisdiction. In a second attempt, OCAR changed its proposal to include one space in ODCSPER, nine in OCAR and seven in FORSCOM. When the Vice-Chief of Staff of the Army finally approved the proposal, ODCSPER received two spaces, FORSCOM seven, and OCAR none.
Despite these changes, management problems continued to plague the Civilian Technical Program. FORSCOM was cited with unsatisfactory development and maintenance of the Army Reserve Technician (ART) program.

In 1975, LTC Charles M. Pullou prepared a study on The Military Union Threat to the United States Army. He reported that in October 1975 the Army Reserve personnel strength was 226,000, of which 8,500 were dual-status technicians, and 50-60 percent of them were union members. He also stated that the original role of the civilian technician was to provide full-time support to the Army Reserve. Over the years however, the roles reversed and the part-time citizen soldier worked for the full-time technician. In order to correct this reversal of roles and the possible loss of command and control to union leaders, LTC Pullou recommended a full-time support program of active duty reservists to supplant the current technician program. His plan eventually called for a total military support program by converting civilian technician positions.

In 1976, MG Henry Mohr, the new Chief, Army Reserve (CAR) tried, with the help of the Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel (DCSPER), to create a technician management element of seven spaces at HQDA. This would have created a management structure for the technician program. At the same time, the Defense Manpower Commission in its April
1976 report to the President, recommended the replacement of technicians with full-time Guard and Reserve personnel. One year later, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) disapproved MG Mohr's recommendation.

By 1978, the technician management problem hadn't improved. The Deputy Secretary for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics, John P. White, stated that the Army Reserve had the least effective full-time support force of all the services. The memorandum specifically addressed the Civilian Technician Program. It criticized the management of the technician program and the number of status-quo technicians still carried as nonmobilization assets. White insisted that readiness was directly linked to the number of full-time personnel in the reserve unit. He recommended an increase in the number of full-time support personnel for the Army Reserve, but not with civilian technicians. He wanted reservists on active duty, justifying his recommendation with the fact that the Army Reserve was a military organization requiring full-time military support. Regardless of the expense, the military implications of the job were paramount.13

Stroud concluded from his 1977 Study of the Full-Time Personnel Requirements of the Reserve Components that the Army Reserve suffered from insufficient full-time support personnel. In his recommendations, he warned
against augmenting the Civilian Technician Program with active duty personnel.

The Gerard Study, conducted in June 1978, determined the full-time force that would best satisfy mobilization requirements, meet cost criteria, and improve management. The study recommended five courses of action:

1. Stop converting technician positions to AGR.
2. Stop technician union membership.
3. Pursue accepted civil service (civil service employees who are not managed under the provisions of OPM's Memorandum of Understanding).
4. Increase the number of technicians.
5. Establish a technician office at DA.

In June 1978, the House Appropriations Committee recommended a study to determine whether Guard and Reserve members could be attracted to serve in full-time military positions (HAC report 95-1398). The purpose of the study was to overcome the problems with status-quo technicians, unionization, management, and grade stagnation. The outcome of the test produced 1,439 conversions of technician positions to AGR from 1979-1981.

In June 1980, FORSCOM continued the conversion process under the Sills Study, which recommended a transition to an all military support force. This would be accomplished by converting technician positions to
military, establishing a central management system, and determining the support requirements. It also established a FTS career program, and left the Area Maintenance Support Activity (AMSA) technicians as civilians but not dual-status. That December the Army concluded that conversions would continue while civilian technicians were attrited from the system. The plan intended to convert at least 3,000 technician positions to AGR over a three year period (1981-1983). 17

From September-December 1980, three separate studies conducted by various government agencies recommended stopping the technician conversions.

2. Evaluation of the Reserve Components Technician Positions Conversion Test OASD-RA.
3. Test Conversion of Civilian Technicians OSD report to Congress. 18

The conversion process finally slowed down so that only 1,540 out of the projected 3,000 technician positions had been converted by the end of 1982. 18 Congressman Joseph Addabbo, Chairman of the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, called the Army's management of its full-time support program a classic
example of how not to initiate change in the Department of the Army.

By 1983, Congress, with increased pressure from the Civilian Technician Union, stopped the technician conversions. Since then, Congress acted as the executive agent in charge of resolving future conflicts between the Army and its technician work force. They used provisions in appropriation acts to achieve their desired results. The following provisions currently apply:

1. Prohibiting conversion of technician positions to AGR.
2. Prohibiting shifts of technician positions from troop Program Units (TPU) to support activities.
3. Prohibiting change of job descriptions of technicians when AGR soldiers are brought into units.
4. Establishing an annual strength floor level for technicians.

Congress became very critical of the way FORSCOM managed the technician program. In 1983, they recommended that ODCSPER relinquish its responsibilities to OCAR. This was agreeable to OCAR because they received five additional personnel spaces for the new mission.

In 1984, MG William R. Berkman, Chief, Army Reserve (CAR), wrote a memorandum proposing a Field Operating
Agency under OCAR including the transfer of various functional responsibilities such as, the Military Technician (MT), Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) and the USAR portion of the AGR program. At the same time, the House Appropriations Committee Defense Subcommittee expressed an interest in increasing the CAR role in the management of the USAR. This stimulated a response from ODCSPER on 11 December 1984 to initiate an action memorandum to transfer management of the MT program to OCAR. The following year (1985) OCAR was reorganized and formed the Army Reserve Support Operations Center (ARSOC).²⁰

By the end of 1984, the Technician Management Functions split into two separate programs; Administration and Execution. The following chart provides additional details about the programs.²¹ (next page)
**TECHNICIAN MANAGEMENT FUNCTION**

**Program Administration Responsibilities**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Department of the Army</th>
<th>Army Reserve Support</th>
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<td>ARSQC</td>
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<td>Operational Maintenance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exceptions to Policy</td>
<td>Budget</td>
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<tr>
<td>Advisor to CAR</td>
<td>(OMB)/Congressional Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Program Defense</td>
<td>Proponent for Military</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legislative Proposals</td>
<td>Technician Management</td>
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<td>Planning</td>
<td>Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>Career Development</td>
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**Program Execution Responsibilities**

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<th>MUSARCS</th>
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<td>Trng Support</td>
<td>Personnel Management</td>
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**COMUSA**

**USARRUR**

**APPERCEN**

**VISTCOM**

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Summary

The need for additional full-time support to the Army Reserve came at the end of World War II. At the same time the Active Army's strength declined. This created a need for another full-time support program for the Army Reserve - the Civilian Technician Program.

The Civilian Technician Program evolved into a strong working force handling the day-to-day administrative work for the drilling reservists. In 1970, the Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of the Army and the Civil Service Commission made it mandatory for all new technicians hired after 1970 to be dual-status.

As the readiness posture of the Army Reserve became an issue in the mid 1970's, the nonmobilization status of the civilian technicians became more apparent. In 1979, a civilian technician conversion test program was implemented by FORSCOM with the approval of Congress. The conversion of civilian technicians created the start of a new full-time program called the Active Guard/Reserve program.
Endnotes Chapter III


2 Ibid., p. 2.

3 Ibid., p. 3.


7 Ibid., p. F-1.

8 Army Regulation 140-315, Appendix A, p. 6.


14 Crossland and Currie, p. 219.


16 Ibid., p. K-1.

17 Crossland and Currie, p. 220.

18 Military Technician Task Force, pp. D-4 - D-5.

19 Crossland and Currie, p. 220.


-36-
Ibid., p. Tab C.
CHAPTER IV

ACTIVG GUARD RESRV SR (AGR) PROGRAM

The AGR program became the latest full-time support program developed to increase the readiness of the Army Reserve. It started when the Civilian Technician Program was determined to be an ineffective support program. Implemented in 1979, the AGR program grew from 2,480 to an authorized end strength of 12,407 for FY 1987. They now comprise the majority of all full-time support provided to the Army Reserve.

The authorized duties of AGR personnel are performed in NTOB/TDA positions for the purposes of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the Reserve Components of the Army or the National Guard. These duties and assignments are based on law (title 10 US Code 265 and 672).

AGR personnel are assigned or attached to government headquarters responsible for Reserve Affairs, on the Army General Staff, and at the National Guard Bureau (NGB) or OCAR. These personnel serve in a federal status.

AGR personnel are assigned to positions at all levels related to organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the Reserve Components of the Army. They also serve in a federal status.
The USAR AGR soldier possesses a rare combination of features. He is on active duty just like his counterpart in the Regular Army. They both carry green ID cards, come under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and can retire after 20 years. One difference is that the USAR AGR soldiers are not counted in the strength of the Active Army. Their salary is paid for out of Reserve funds and there are legal limits on the way they can be used. Another difference is the AGR officer must retire after 20 years of Active Federal Service (AFS). The mandatory retirement law prohibits upward mobility. Career AGR officers and NCO's are prohibited from command, first sergeant, and command sergeant major positions unless special authorization is given by the FORSCOM commander. Therefore, AGR officers and NCO's must rotate among staff, functional, and school assignments.

The first step into the AGR is application for selection by a HQDA AGR board. The applicant is then placed on an order of merit list (OML) at ARPERCEN. Major USAR command (MUSARC) boards were held to select an applicant to an initial fill (a specific position vacancy within their command). If the MUSARC boards could not fill the position after 90 days the position was given to ARPERCEN for fill. ARPERCEN completes the next step when they publish the orders for active duty. A soldier does not achieve AGR status until ARPERCEN publishes the orders.
for active duty. Therefore, the OML list itself does not guarantee entry nor does it place the individual on AGR status. According to ARPERCEN Pamphlet 140-61:

"When a position (other than a new FTM one) is vacant, ARPERCEN looks for a fill among current AGR soldiers. If no one qualified is available, the highest ranked (lowest sequenced number) qualified and available person on the OML is selected."

Prior to 1987, a tour in the AGR normally lasted three years with a possible extension of one year, for a total of four years. Since FY 1987, the normal tour length increased to four years with a possible one year extension, for a total of five years.

**AGR Management**

From February 1979 through March 1984, the US Army Reserve Component Personnel and Administration Center (RCPAC) in St. Louis, Missouri managed AGR personnel. A long tour management office was established with minimal guidance from the Department of the Army. ARPERCEN Pamphlet 140-61 stated:

"The first members were actually reservists already on active duty under one of several different programs which had been started at different times under various authorities."

In March 1984, MG William R. Berkman, Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR), activated the new Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN). ARPERCEN received the mission of supporting the Army's Active Guard/Reserve and Full-Time Manning Programs. According to Secretary of the Army, John O. Marsh, Jr., the Army's new goal of a total Army of -40-
Excellence depends on the full-time support programs of the Army Reserve. ARPERCEN's March 1984 issue of the USAR AGR Management Program Information Paper stated:

"Perhaps the most significant improvement to the readiness of the Army Reserve is the Full Time Unit Support Personnel, highly trained Army Reserve soldiers serving on active duty in the USAR AGR Management Program. The Total Army - An Army of Excellence - depends on the Army Reserve more than ever before, and will even more in the future."

The Office, Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel (ODCSPER) is the proponent for the Army AGR program in the Headquarters of the Department of the Army (HQDA). Their management of the USAR AGR program is in the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, (OCAR). OCAR gives direction and policy, planning, and program guidance to the principal operator, which is ARPERCEN. At ARPERCEN, the AGR Management Directorate handles AGR personnel management and personnel actions.

The AGR Management Directorate consisted of 72 military and civilian personnel in 1984. Expansion plans are to increase its membership to over 230 personnel by 1989. The projected increase was planned to manage the expected growth of the USAR AGR program, which will exceed 28,000 personnel by the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 1989.

The Directorate separated into three functional personnel divisions: (1) the Full-Time Support Program Division (formally entitled the Administration Division),
The Officer Management Division, and (3) the Enlisted Management Division.

Additional support initiatives planned in 1984 included:

1. The addition of increased Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Support Systems equipment.
2. A formal requisition process utilizing DA Form 872 for units requesting personnel and validating position vacancies.

From 1984-1986 career advisors controlled individual personnel management. They worked in each division to support AGR personnel according to their rank for officers and the last two digits of the soldier's social security number for enlisted soldiers. The designated career advisor provided guidance on career progression for AGR personnel.

Since 1986, the term Personnel Management Officer (PMO) described the individual at ARPERCE who monitored the career and professional development of all reserve officers. Like the advisor, the PMO maintained the career management individual file (CMIF), approved personnel actions, recommended assignments, and identified officers for specialized training or professional development.

Enlisted management was organized around six separate functions of personnel management:

1. Entry into the AGR program.
2. Release from active duty.
3. Reenlistment.
4. Assignment and transfer within the program.
5. Professional development.

The reassignment of officer and enlisted AGR soldiers depends on many factors. The following general considerations apply to officer and enlisted personnel (although the priority sequence may not be the same):

1. The needs of the Army and of the AGR program.
2. Compassionate and hardship requests.
3. Reassignment of personnel misaligned with respect to personnel class and grade.
4. Joint domicile of AGR members married to each other.
5. Priority of movement to personnel who have served longest in their current positions.
6. Personal preference or individual request.

The Conflict

In 1986 the Military Technician Task Force stated that:

"The arbitrary mix of AGR and technician personnel in the same unit often led to conflicts due to overlapping job descriptions, lines of authority and differences in pay, benefits and leave."

In April 1986, John T. Hunter, President of the Association of Civilian Technicians, accused the AGR program of being mismanaged, too expensive to operate, and
demoralizing to civilian technicians that had to work with them. He refuted claims made by the 1976 Defense Manpower Commission that recommended AGR personnel replace civilian technicians because they were more economical and efficient. To back up his accusation, Hunter cited four subsequent investigations and reports that disputed the 1976 Defense Manpower study.

2. The report by the Surveys and Investigations Staff of the House Appropriations Committee (S&I) of June 1983.

These studies determined that the average pay and benefits (including retirement accrual) for an AGR soldier was $42,000. These figures were obtained from DoD figures and substantiated by the Congressional Budget Office in its study on the Reserves, dated November 1985. The average cost for a civilian technician was only $30,000. This figure included military pay for reserve service based on DoD Cost Benefit Analysis for the Reserve Component Full-Time Support Program. The Congressional Budget Office said
that, "The difference resulted from the higher average entry pay for AGR personnel joining the reserves."

The Army's goal in 1985 included a full-time force equal to 15 percent of the selected reserve strength. At that time, the full-time strength was 9.3 percent of the selected reserve personnel strength. Because of the high cost associated with the AGR program the 15 percent goal became questionable. There were several factors that weighed against the 15 percent goal:

1. There was no clear evidence that reaching the 15 percent goal would affect reserve readiness.
2. The need for future increases may no longer be as urgent as it was before the AGR support program began in 1979.
3. Successful affiliation programs perform the same functions as the AGR program.
4. Additional time spent at the National Training Center (the Army's warfare training center where large-scale combat operations may be conducted with assistance from active-duty personnel) or with active units participating in realistic exercises.

The Congressional Budget Office also stated that:

"Separating the effects of different approaches to improving reserve training will always be difficult. For example, early-deploying units are affiliated with their active divisions for training purposes and thereby receive high priority for equipment and active duty training support. But these units also have full-time AGR personnel. Determining which factor yields larger benefits, and
at what cost, has not yet been addressed by analysis."12

The AGR program also displaced many drilling reservists when FORSCOM decided that the practice of "double-slotting" would no longer continue after 1983. According to FORSCOM, this practice also proved wasteful in terms of personnel costs and it complicated the unit chain of command. All unit commanders were instructed to take the following actions to eliminate double-slotting.

1. Carry the Reservist in an excess status for no more that one year from the day the FTUS soldier reported for duty.

2. Use one of the following options to remove the Reservist from the excess status:
   a. Move the excess soldier to a vacant unit position for which he is otherwise qualified.
   b. Immediately cross train soldiers for purposes of moving them to other unit positions.
   c. Transfer him to the IRR. At the soldier's option this may include participation in the IMA program or attachment back to the unit on a retirement points earning basis.
   d. Transfer him to another local USAR unit.
   e. For authorized units, carry the excess individual in an authorized overstrength status.
   f. Take other actions that comply with accepted personnel assignment procedures."
By the end of 1983, some of the converted technicians finished their initial AGR tours and sought reemployment under the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS). This was not always possible. Those that separated (terminated) from civil service to enter active duty would be covered by Social Security when they returned. In March 1986, ARPERCEH provided the following guidance:

"Therefore, all employees who returned from active duty and requested restoration to a civilian position under the provisions of FPM Chapter 353 after 1 January 1984 would be given the opportunity to have their separation (termination) action changed to furlough. The decision to change the action to furlough must be made voluntarily by the employee."

This did not guarantee that the individual's entitlements for continued coverage under CSRS would be continued. If any funds were withdrawn from the CSRS account, OPM could require that the money be paid back with interest. The Association of Civilian Technicians Union also suggested that converted technicians, now on AGR status with the National Guard, should be exempt from rehiring rights. According to union officials, the National Guard made some erroneous interpretation of title 32 and 38, U.S.C. 502(f) and 101 (21)(A). The National Guard interpreted "active duty for training" the same as "active duty in the armed forces" as specified in title 10 of the Uniform Service Code."
AGR/Technician Force Mix

On 8 July 1985, Secretary of the Army, John O. Marsh, Jr. directed the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) to prepare plans to accommodate the realignment of the Reserve Component Military Technician and Active Guard/Reserve forces. The guidelines included the following:

1. Assign AGR personnel to positions at various levels within the Reserve Component structure and within the Active Component structure to positions that support the Reserve Components.
2. Assign Military Technicians within the Reserve Component structure to state and major U.S. Army Reserve Command Headquarters and other full-time support positions as determined by the National Guard Bureau, the U.S. Army Forces Command and other agencies such as the Organization Maintenance Shops and Army Aviation Support Facilities.
3. AGR and MTs should not perform the same day-to-day duties below general officer command level.
4. Accomplish realignment over a period of time through normal attrition. Therefore, no military technician position will be transferred or abolished to accomplish this realignment.
In 1987, OCAR identified its full-time support force as a team depicted by four distinct categories; Active Component soldiers, Active Guard/Reserve (AGR), Army Reserve Civilian Technicians, and Department of the Army civilians. In its report to Congress, OCAR stated:

"Each of these groups provides its particular strengths to the Army Reserve's Full-Time Support Program. The Active Army soldiers provide current doctrine, and training techniques; AGR soldiers provide Reserve Component expertise and training and assignment flexibility; civilian technicians provide continuity, institutional memory and ties with the local civilian community; the Department of the Army civilians provide the clerical skills that support all levels of Army Reserve administrative operations."

The cost of the full-time reserve soldier equated to that of the full-time Active Component soldier. However, the reserve expertise and professional experience that they bring enables the Army Reserve to accomplish an Active Component mission at a fraction of the Active Component cost.

In September 1987, General Joseph Palastra, FORSCOM Commander, commented that the Army Reserve had made great strides in improving its readiness posture over the past five years. However, the Army Reserve will require post mobilization training to bring it up to Active Army standards. The readiness of the Army Reserve will depend on the number of full-time support personnel in the unit. At the time of General Palastra's statement, Reserve Component units comprised over half of his command. In his
estimation, the Army's portion for the defense of the United States was an equally shared responsibility between the Active and Reserve Component. For this reason, Congress should continue to support the AGR program.

AGR personnel are responsible for preparing the Army Reserve for its wartime mission. They accomplish this task during the 11 months prior to the unit reporting for Annual Training (AT). The Active Army will eventually play a smaller role in the development of the Army Reserve because of Congressional reductions in the size of the Active Component. In an interview with the Army Times, General Palastra stated:

"The best solution, the one that makes the most sense to me, is to leave the active-duty soldier where he is, doing a job, and use the AGR's in the Reserves."

Under General Palastra's guidance, FORSCOM and OCAR developed the Command Support Center (CSC) to eliminate some of the conflicts between the AGR and Civilian Technician Programs.

The CSC plan is shelved until Congress releases funds for a feasibility test planned for 1988. Congress has not made its intentions clear about when it intends to fund the test, except to say that it is too early to start now.

Under the proposed CSC program, unit administration and technical support would be centralized in technical and administrative cells. These cells would
perform mobilization and post mobilization planning for all of the reserve units in the reserve centers. Other full-time support personnel would be retained to plan and conduct peacetime and wartime training.

The CSC plan will eliminate unnecessary layers of supervision and improve the AGR and civilian technician relationship. The key element of the program is the alignment of civil service skills to the CSC plan. This alignment would give the civilian technicians broader career progression and opportunities.20

**SUMMARY**

The ineffective management of the Civilian Technician Program, coupled with the Active Army's reliance on the Army Reserve as part of the Total Force, created a need for the AGR program. It's evolutionary development quickly gained support from the Active Army because it provided increased readiness to the Reserve and a separate pool of full time soldiers.

The conversion of civilian technicians to AGR created a debate between the Civilian Technician Union and the Department of the Army as to the real effectiveness of the AGR program. The debate continues today even after numerous studies and reports have been conducted to resolve the issue. The latest solutions have come from the Secretary of the Army, OCAR, and FORSCOM. They recommended
separate areas of responsibility for the AGR and Civilian Technicians.

The evolutionary development of the full-time support programs will continue as long as they managed efficiently and Congress continues to convert active army missions to army reserve.
CHAPTER IV ENDNOTES


*Ibid., p. 2-1.


*Ibid., p. 1-


*Ibid., p. 3-3.


***Ibid., p. 379.

****The Department of the Army, FORSCOM Regulation 135-1, Army National Guard and Army Reserve - Full-Time Unit Support Program, (Fort McPherson, Georgia: , Headquarters, United States Army Forces Command, 1 May 1983). p. 4.


*******Ibid., p. 429.


3"Ibid., pp. 14 and 46.

CHAPTER V

Evaluation of the FTS Programs

This chapter evaluates the positive and negative characteristics of the three full-time support programs: the Army Advisor Program, the Civilian Technician Program, and the Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) Program.

Active Army Advisor Program

The Army Advisor program contains two positive characteristics essential to developing the Army Reserve - knowledge of current Army doctrine and expertise on modern equipment. The Active Army Advisor is the human link that develops cohesion and consistency between the Active and Reserve forces. This results in an Army of unity and standardization.

Reserve officers and noncommissioned officers receive instruction on current army doctrine and gain knowledge on the Army's newest equipment from interaction with Active Army Advisors. The reserve officers and NCOs then pass this information to unit members during drills. A positive result is increased cohesion between the active army and the reserve; and it starts with the company commander.

The reserve company commander requests Active Army Advisor assistance through the MUSARC Senior Army Advisor.
in his reserve chain of command. The request is forwarded to the Active Army Readiness Group Commander. The supporting Advisor then contacts the reserve unit to establish final coordination. Unsupportable requests by the Readiness Groups are sent back to the Active Army Advisors at the Major Army Reserve Commands (MUSARC) who then make other arrangements to assist the unit commander.

The MUSARC Active Army Advisor is a positive asset to the MUSARC commander. He contributes to the successful development of the MUSARC’s Yearly Training Programs (YTP) and other support functions during the training year. The YTP becomes the unit commander’s working document; outlining the critical training events for that year. If the unit commander fails to coordinate Advisor Assistance early in the training year (October and November), he may not receive assistance. This will definitely have a negative effect on the unit’s YTP.

These are other negative characteristics that prevent the Active Army Advisor from supporting the Army Reserve:

1. Readiness Group and Regional Advisors average 110 days per year visiting multiple reserve units. The actual number of reserve units vary by geographical area of responsibility.

2. Readiness Group and Regional Advisors are not always available for unplanned training events.
3. Current force reductions in the Active Army could limit the number of Active Army personnel available to serve in the Advisor Program.

**Civilian Technicians**

The Civilian Technician Program has both positive and negative characteristics.

Two of the positive attributes of the program include institutional memory and continuity. Institutional memory accrues during the many years of service that senior civilian technicians have with their reserve unit. They are usually dual status technicians who live and work in the same community as the reservists they support. The technician program provides daily administrative and technical support to the Army Reserve. This eventually builds continuity within the framework of the reserve unit and supports the development of the reserve organization.

Additional positive traits of the technician program include:

1. The Civilian Technician Program has historically been less expensive than full-time military support because it employs junior grade civilian technicians.

2. Junior grade civilian technicians hired after 1970 are dual status (mobilization assets).

For over 30 years the civilian technicians formed the backbone of the Army Reserve, providing continuous
full-time support. As they developed and grew in membership, their influence over the Army Reserve expanded. They also formed unions to represent their interests at the higher levels of government - Congress.

Unions have played an important role in the successful development of the Civilian Technician Program. In 1978, when FORSCOM and Congress implemented the Technician Conversion Test, it was the technician unions that lobbied against it and had it stopped.

The technician unions continue to petition Congress and the military hierarchy for additional technician positions at various levels of the military command. Their recommendations include:

1. Establishing national consultation meetings with the Chief, Army Reserve (CAR) to review proposed actions and programs impacting on the technician program, and to present feedback to the CAR.
2. Establishing a DoD Military Technician Advisory Council including technician and union representatives at the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense-Reserve Affairs (OASD-RA).
Although the technician unions made these recommendations to improve the Civilian Technician Program, they could be interpreted as another way to increase union influence over the technicians.

The negative characteristics of the Civilian Technician Program includes: unionization, status-quo, grade inversion and misassignment.

Unionization is prohibited in the United States Army and the Army Reserve. The main reason is command and control. The battlefield is no place to hold arbitration meetings or strike for better working conditions. Therefore, the traditional attitude toward unions in the Army has been negative. Yet civilian technicians, who claim to be a military entity and insist on being managed as such, defend their right, as civilian employees, to join unions. This creates a dichotomy of interest that negatively affects OCAR and FORSCOM's ability to effectively manage the technician program.

Had the conversion test of 1978 been fully implemented, it would have eliminated the problem of status quo technicians. As stated in early chapters of this study, the status quo technician is not a mobilization asset. This has a negative effect on the readiness posture of the Army Reserve. Action was taken in 1970 and 1980 when the Department of the Army and the Civil Service Commission agreed to make all future technician positions
dual status. Technicians employed before the 1970 MOU were exempt from the dual status requirement, allowing them to remain employed as civilian technicians. The development of the dual status technician partially solved the readiness problem but at the same time created the grade inversion problem.

Grade inversion became a negative factor when it created command and control problems for the reserve chain of command. Dual status civilian technicians and the reserve chain of command found it difficult, for example, to have a senior technician (SSAA) with a military enlisted rank working for a junior officer during drill who was also the AST. The problem did not go away when the drill was over. The AST (officer) now worked for the SSAA (NCO), but in a civilian capacity under the civilian chain of command.

There are other situations where grade inversion threatens the military chain of command, especially with the AGR soldiers. The two support programs don't mix well because the AGR soldier, like his Active Army counterpart, is used to being managed as a military entity where military rank determines seniority. Additionally, some unit commanders also had technicians that were misassigned. This meant they were not reserve members of the unit for which they provided full-time support.

Misassigned technicians were not mobilization assets for the units for which they provided full-time support.
Although this had a negative effect on mobilization it was not that great of a problem. The majority of misassigned technicians worked full-time for Area Maintenance Support Activities (AMSA's) which did not mobilize. The problem of misassigned technicians was overcome when the 1970 MOU was activated. The 1970 MOU required the technicians to serve in the unit they supported.

**Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) Program**

The AGR program started in 1979 and currently remains the largest full-time support program in the Army Reserve with over 12,000 members.

Some of the more positive characteristics of the program include: centralized management under ARPERCEN, versatility, and command and control.

Today OCAR and ARPERCEN centrally manage the AGR program through command and control. They manage individual professional development and career assignments for all AGR personnel. Individual career managers at ARPERCEN support AGR personnel that are assigned to Troop Program Units (TPU). Individual career development is kept current in accordance with Army Regulations.

AGR Officers and NCO's perform a variety of duties for the reserve unit commander. As training officers and NCOs, they plan and conduct common and technical task training at various levels of expertise. They also ensure that training areas and equipment are available for unit
training assemblies. AGR soldiers coordinate Active Army Advisor assistance teams and maintain the unit's mobilization book. In other areas, such as maintenance and supply, AGR personnel fix, fuel, transport, protect and man the organizational equipment in their units. As supervisors in these areas, they also plan and conduct individual and section training.

AGR personnel have only one chain of command - the reserve chain of command. Their loyalties are to the unit's missions and to the unit commander. They are assigned to authorized TOE positions previously designated by the commander on the unit's FTS model. The FTS model identifies positions on the TOE to be filled by AGR or AC soldiers. The FTS model, however, exempts reserve positions held by civilian technicians.

The negative aspects of the AGR program include: Congressional budgetary constraints, involuntary separation, limited command opportunities, and double slotting.

Congress controls the AGR budget. Therefore, Congress is the final approving authority for any expansion of the AGR program. In 1984, when ARPERCEN was activated, the AGR program expected to exceed 28,000 personnel by 1989. At the end of fiscal year 1987 there were only 12,407 personnel in the AGR program with additional personnel scheduled for 1988. Despite these gains the
28,000 projected figure will not be reached by 1989. Therefore, AGR support may not be available for all who need it.

Future legislation by Congress that negatively affects the AGR program hurts the Army Reserve's efforts as a full partner in the total defense of the United States.

Major General William F. Ward reported to Congress in 1988:

"The Army Reserve is working hard to further refine its Full Time Support Program to make it more efficient and cost-effective. It is the effectiveness of this program that has allowed the Army's leadership to confidently assign an unprecedented proportion of the Total Army mission to the Reserve Components."

Involuntary separation after 20 years of Active Federal Service (APS) negatively effects the career progression of AGR officers and enlisted personnel. The negative effects of involuntary separation include:

1. Experienced personnel being replaced by inexperienced personnel.
2. No upward mobility for experienced junior grade officers and NCO's already in the AGR program.
3. The AGR program never fully matures.

Another negative effect on the AGR program is the limited number of command positions available for AGR officers. Without special authorization from FORSCOM, the AGR officer must rotate between staff, functional (recruiting) and school assignments. Senior AGR NCO's
experience similar restrictions because they are not eligible for first sergeant and command sergeant major positions. This could have negative effects on drilling reservists because it potentially creates double slotting.

Double slotting negatively affects the reserve personnel by displacing unit personnel with AGR soldiers. The morale of the entire command is affected negatively if the transition is not planned out in advance. Maximum consideration must be given to the displaced personnel. If properly planned, the commander can start a retraining program before the AGR soldier joins the unit. This way he limits the negative effects of double slotting. Today, double slotting only occurs when unit TOE positions are added to the FTS model, which is governed by the number of AGR positions authorized by Congress for funding.

SUMMARY

The Army Advisor program provides the Army Reserve with the latest warfighting doctrine and training techniques. The Program requires prior planning by the reserve component commander. This ensures that assistance is provided in a timely manner.

The Civilian Technician Program has served the Army Reserve for the past 30 years and has been plagued with mismanagement problems. The civilian technician union tried to solve these problems through active participation with OCAR on all decisions affecting the future of the
civilian technician program. Today they want consultation rights with the Chief, Army Reserve and other senior governmental agencies that have an effect on the Civilian Technician Program.

The AGR is a military force that provides full-time support to the Army Reserve. In 1984, ARPERCEN was activated to centrally manage the AGR program and eliminate management problems. Today's, AGR force is the largest full-time support program in the Army Reserve, but it is less than half of its 1989 projected strength of 28,000.

In its 1988 report to Congress, OCAR stated:

"Given adequate levels of full-time support, Army Reserve readiness will continue to improve as a result of enhanced unit training, administration, and equipment maintenance. AGR soldiers and the flexibility they provide the commander through their availability for special assignments, schooling, and extended work hours are the key to this improvement. Expansion of the AGR program has to be supported to ensure sustainment of an effective full-time support force mix."

The future of the FTS programs in the Army Reserve will depend on OCAR's and FORSCOM's ability to efficiently and effectively manage their development over the next decade.
CHAPTER V ENDNOTES


CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

Today's Active Army depends on the United States Army Reserve to train and equip reserve units for mobilization. The Army Reserve in turn relies upon its full-time support personnel to support this effort. Therefore, the following full-time support programs evolved: the Active Army Advisor, the Civilian Technician and the Active/Guard Reserve Program. I conclude that the evolutionary development of these programs was a reactionary sequence of events to military reform. The reform was slow and subtle in the beginning but intensified as the Active Army's reliance on the Army Reserve grew.

The concept of full-time support started with the advent of the Organized Reserve in 1920. The Army realized that the Organized Reserve would need full-time assistance with administration, training, maintenance and supply to maximize the limited training time they were allocated. This was initially provided by the Active Army when the Organized Reserve was a cadre force. Full-time support at the company level was not needed until 1948 when large
amounts of military equipment from the Active Army transferred to the Army Reserve storage sites and reserve centers. The additional equipment was more than the reserve units could properly maintain themselves. Therefore, the Department of the Army and the Civil Service Commission agreed to employ junior grade civilians with Army Reserve units. This started the Civilian Technician program.

The Civilian Technician Program developed slowly for the first ten years (1948 - 1958) during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. Both administrations favored a large reserve force because it was more economical. Also conventional warfare was presumed obsolete with the employment of the atomic bomb at the end of World War II. The Korean War and later the Viet Nam conflict proved that trained conventional forces were not obsolete and even more importantly that the United States was not prepared for conventional warfare. Around 1960, the Civilian Technician Program grew and became an intrinsic part of the Army Reserve. Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) between the Department of the Army and the Civil Service Commission were developed in 1960, 1970, and 1980 to improve the Civilian Technician Program. Two types of technicians evolved as the program grew - the status quo and dual status.
The dual status requirement was part of the 1970 MOU, which "grandfathered" previously hired technicians. The "grandfathered" technicians became known as status quo because they were not mobilization assets and any technician hired after 1970 was classified as dual status. Dual status technicians were mobilization assets and in 1980 were required to be reserve members of the units they supported. FORSCOM decided in 1978, after the Russians invaded Afghanistan, that the readiness status of the Army Reserve was not up to Active Army standards. FORSCOM thought that if they converted all of the civilian technicians to active duty reservists it could improve mobilization readiness of the Reserves. Improvement would come because the status quo technicians would be eliminated or converted.

The conversion test lasted approximately four years until it was stopped by the civilian technician union. The technician union was able to save roughly 1600 technician positions from the conversion test, but they were not successful in eliminating the AGR program.

The AGR program started in 1979 shortly after the beginning of the technician conversion test. Approximately 1200 reservists on extended active duty tours with the Army Reserve were grouped under the new AGR full-time support program. The program continued to grow under the management of ARPERCEN, OCAR, and FORSCOM. Although,
projected to grow to approximately 28,000 soldiers by 1989. Congress decided to slow its growth because of budgetary cuts. The technician union was partly responsible for Congress' actions. It effectively lobbied against the AGR program and negative governmental reports about the Civilian Technician Program.

Today the union is actively pursuing ways to improve the management of the Civilian Technician Program as is OCAR and FORSCOM. The union has recommended scheduled consultation meetings with OCAR, an advisory council with the Department of Defense and DA. In March 1988, OCAR and FORSCOM developed a plan for a Command Support Center (CSC), which Congress has not funded for testing. The CSC plan was created to eliminate some of the conflicts that currently exist between the AGR and Civilian Technician programs.

As the full-time support programs evolved they developed positive and negative characteristics. From these characteristics the following conclusions have been drawn:

1. The Army Advisor program evaluates and assists the MUSARC commander in training his reserve units to Active Army standards.
2. Essential knowledge on current Army doctrine and modern army equipment is obtained from the Army Advisors.
3. The personnel, time and budgetary constraints prohibit the Advisor's participation with every unit requesting assistance.

4. The Civilian Technician Program was mismanaged by FORSCOM.

5. The employment of junior grade technicians makes the civilian technician program less expensive than active military programs.

6. The technician union has effectively represented the civilian technicians before Congress.

7. The technician union could be detrimental to order and discipline in the military command.

8. The establishment of national consultation meetings between OCAR, DA, and DoD and the civilian technician union threatens military sovereignty of the technician program.

9. Grade inversion creates command and control problems in the reserve chain of command.

10. The AGR program provides versatility, military management and command and control to the reserve commander.

11. The AGR program provides little opportunity for career progression due to mandatory retirement, slow promotions and restricted assignments.
RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations take into consideration the needs of the Army, the Army Reserve, and the characteristics of each full-time support program.

I recommend that the Army Readiness Groups remain as they are with projected strength increases for the future.

Second, the AGR and Civilian Technician Programs are not compatible in their present mix. I would eliminate the civilian chain of command. Job descriptions for each position should be rewritten to support the senior military member or reservist in that section or command. For example, the STA would not work for the SSAA. Instead he would work for the full-time training officer or reserve training officer.

The civilian workforce as a whole should augment the military chain of command. The full-time military personnel should be rated in accordance with the Reserve rating scheme. The senior full-time military person should represent the commander in his absence, if he is not the commander.

Command positions should be opened to full-time officers and NCO's on a rotating basis established by the XUSARC commander. For example, commanders should rotate after each tour of three or four years depending on the current policy at the time. However, the first sergeant and
company commander positions should not be occupied by two full-time personnel at the same time.

I would petition Congress to eliminate the 20 year Active Federal Service (AFS) mandatory retirement policy. This would allow experienced, qualified, full-time officers the same upward mobility already extended to other reserve officers.

Congress should approve testing the CSC program prepared by OCAR and FORSCOM.

**Recommended Areas for Further Study**

1. What would be the effects of eliminating the dual status requirement for civilian technicians?
2. Why are AGR officers restricted from commanding USAR units and what effect would it have on Army Reserve Readiness if they did command reserve units?
3. What is the best way to manage the Civilian Technician Program - military or civilian entity?
4. How many FTS personnel are needed to adequately train the Army Reserve and what effects would it have on our current FTS programs?
5. If AGR officers are not allowed to command during peace-time will they command during the next war or conflict? If not, what will they do?
APPENDIX A

Definitions

Active Army consists of members of the Regular Army on active duty.

Active Army Advisor Regular Army (RA) personnel assigned to Army Readiness Groups/Regions and Major United States Army Reserve Commands (MUSARCS).

Active Duty refers to all members of the Active Army and Reserve Component of the Army ordered to duty under Title 10, US Code other than for training.

Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) is a name for Reservists on active duty to improve mobilization readiness by organizing, administering, recruiting, and instructing the Reserves. In this study "AGR" refers only to the United States Army Reserve Active Guard/Reserve (USAR AGR) program.

Civilian Technician/Military Technician refers to civil service employees working for the Army Reserve. This includes "status quo" and "dual status" civilians. They must maintain membership in the Selected Reserve as a condition of employment.

Dual Status refers to civilian employees serving concurrently as civilians and as members of the Selected Reserve.

Full-Time Manning (FTM) describes active duty reservists on three and four year tours from 1979 and 1980.
In 1981 the program was renamed Active Guard Reserve (AGR). The FTM program is a sub-program of the FTUS umbrella.

Full-Time Unit Support Program (FTUS) encompasses personnel assigned on a full-time basis for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the Army Reserve. This includes civilian personnel, members of the Active Army and the Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) personnel.

Military Technician Position is a position which requires membership in the Selected Reserve.

One Army Concept describes the close working relationship between the Regular Army, the National Guard and the Army Reserve. The US Army Reserve is a co-equal component of the United States Army.

Regular Army and Active Army are synonymous. They refer to individual members of the Active Army Component of the United States. Active Army is the preferred term in this thesis.

Reserve Components of the Army include the Army National Guard of the United States and the U.S. Army Reserve.

Selected Reserve is part of the Ready Reserve of each Reserve Component consisting of units and individuals who participate actively in paid training periods and serve on paid active duty for training each year.
Status Quo (SQ) Technician is a federal civilian employee of the U.S. Army Reserve, serving in a military technician position, who does not possess U.S. Army Reserve military status required for the position.

The United States Army Reserve (USAR) was originally named the Organized Reserve consisting of the Officer Reserve and Enlisted Corps. For this thesis the term Army Reserve will include the officer and enlisted personnel in the United States Army Reserve.

Total Army is an outgrowth of the earlier "One Army" concept which was intended to form closer ties between the Regular Army, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve.

Total Force Concept describes the combined efforts the United States and her Allies. It connotes unity of effort with a common cause.

Troop Program Unit (TPU) is a TOE or TDA unit of the USAR organization which serves as a unit on mobilization or one that is assigned a mobilization mission.

Unit is a Company, Battery, Troop or similar size organization.
APPENDIX B
ACRONYMS

AC
Active Component
AD
Active Duty
ADT
Active Duty for Training
AGR
Active Guard and Reserve
AMSA
Area Maintenance Support Activity
ARCOM
Army Command Medal; Army Reserve Command
ARFPC
Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee
ARNG
Army National Guard
ARPERCEN
US Army Reserve Personnel Center
ARR
Army Readiness Region
ARSOC
Army Reserve Support Operations Center
ART
Army Reserve Technician
ARRTC
US Army Reserve Training Center
ARTEP
Army Training and Evaluation Program
AUS
Army of the United States
CAR
Chief, Army Reserve
CG
Commanding General
C&GSC
US Army Command and General Staff College
CMF
Career Management Field
CMH
Center of Military History (Army)
COL
Colonel
CONARC
US Army Continental Army Command
CONUS
Continental United States
CONUSA
Continental United States Army
CPMOS
Career Progression Military Occupational Specialty
CPO
Civilian Personnel Office
DA
Department of the Army
DAAR-PE
Department of the Army, Army Reserve - Personnel
DoD
Department of Defense
ERC
Enlisted Reserve Corps
FORSCOM
US Army Forces Command
FTM
Full Time Manning
FY
Fiscal Year
GAO
General Accounting Office
GOCOM
General Officer Command
GPO
Government Printing Office
HQDA
Headquarters Department of the Army
H.R.
House of Representatives
IADT
Individual Active Duty Training
IDT
Inactive Duty Training (drill)
IMA
Individual Mobilization Augmentee
IRR
Individual Ready Reserve
JCS
Joint Chiefs of Staff
LTC
Lieutenant Colonel
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LTG</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Major</td>
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<td>MILPO</td>
<td>Military Personnel Office</td>
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<td>MG</td>
<td>Major General</td>
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<tr>
<td>M-Day</td>
<td>Mobilization Day</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOBDES</td>
<td>Mobilization Designee</td>
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<td>MOBEX</td>
<td>Mobilization Exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOS</td>
<td>Military Occupational Specialty</td>
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<td>MSP</td>
<td>Mutual Support Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTMIS</td>
<td>Military Technician Management Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTOE</td>
<td>Modified Table of Organization and Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUSARC</td>
<td>Major United States Army Reserve Command</td>
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<td>NG</td>
<td>National Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>OASD</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCAR</td>
<td>Office of the Chief, Army Reserve</td>
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<td>OCONUS</td>
<td>Outside the Continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OER</td>
<td>Officer Evaluation Report</td>
</tr>
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<td>OMA</td>
<td>Operations and Maintenance, Army</td>
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<td>OMAR</td>
<td>Operation and Maintenance, Army Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMB</td>
<td>Operation and Maintenance, Budget</td>
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<tr>
<td>OR</td>
<td>Organized Reserve</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCS</td>
<td>Permanent Change of Station</td>
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<td>POM</td>
<td>Program Objective Memorandum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA</td>
<td>Regular Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Reserve Component</td>
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<td>RCPAC</td>
<td>US Army Reserve Component Personnel and Administration Center</td>
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<td>RDF-A</td>
<td>Rapid Deployment Force - Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDJTF</td>
<td>Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFA</td>
<td>Reserve Forces Act of 1955</td>
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<td>RG</td>
<td>Readiness Group</td>
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<td>ROA</td>
<td>Reserve Officers Association</td>
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<td>Reserve Officers Personnel Act of 1954</td>
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<td>Reserve Personnel, Army</td>
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<td>SA</td>
<td>Secretary of the Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSAA</td>
<td>Senior Staff Administrative Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOE</td>
<td>Table of Organization and Equipment</td>
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<td>USAR</td>
<td>United States Army Reserve</td>
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<td>USAREC</td>
<td>United States Army Recruiting Command</td>
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<td>United States Army Europe</td>
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<td>WESTCOM</td>
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