The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

INTEROPERABILITY
A CASE STUDY OF THE JOINT FORCE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Commander Steven Verne Fondren, USN

Colonel Daniel L. Whiteside, USA
Project Advisor

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
1 April 1988
The Joint Force Development Process (JFDP) was created to fill a void left by the Joint Chiefs of Staff's (JCS) inability to work together and deal effectively with questions of total force integration. An organization noted for logrolling, compromise, and irrelevant advice, the service chiefs and Joint Staff were unable to dedicate themselves to the greater needs of the national defense over individual service loyalty. To meet this need, an evolution of cooperation between the Army and Air Force developed over the last decade outside the formal structure of the JCS. The JFDP was established as an informal, ad hoc organization chartered to field compatible, cost effective, and complimentary forces that would produce the greatest battlefield power. The 1986 DOD Reorganization Act has legislated many changes to the JCS that will enable them to meet the challenge of jointness. This paper examines the historical background of the JFDP, the process differences between the JCS and the JFDP, past and present, and makes recommendations to improve the future of force interoperability and integration between the services by modifying the JFDP.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>11i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>PROCESS ANALYSIS</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>END NOTES</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>APPENDIX</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"Each of the services formally acknowledges the principal of unity of effort which states that military forces should be integrated into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces."

Congress has stressed the need for all of the military services to work jointly since 1947. Nevertheless, each of the services have been reluctant to develop mutually acceptable doctrine for working in a unified command structure. Retired Army Gen. John H. Cushman has written that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) "have published no 'how to fight' doctrine at all. ...but only guidance on organization and command relationships."

That OJCS has specified the optimal objectives of joint organization and procedures can be demonstrated in a review of the following terms which are defined in JCS pub 1 as:

**Interoperability**—The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.

**Joint**—Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of more than one service of the same nation participate. (When all services are not involved, the participating services shall be identified, e.g. Joint Army-Navy.)

**Joint doctrine**—Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action toward a common objective. It will be promulgated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**Multi-service doctrine**—Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or three Services of the same nation in coordinated action toward a common objective. It is ratified by two or three Services, and is normally promulgated in joint Service publications that identify the participating Services, e.g., Army-Navy doctrine.
While these theoretical concepts of jointness are clearly desirable, actual attainment may be difficult. Complete interoperability, for example, may be expensive. Simple mission specific equipment may be prohibitively overdeveloped when each services requirements are specified for each system. As interoperability increases, service-unique capabilities may decrease as systems become homogeneous. While the right amount of interoperability increases overall force effectiveness, this paper will demonstrate that jointness for jointness sake is probably not in the best interests of the defense of the United States.

Ideal service interoperability would reflect a singular integrated doctrine employing complementary systems and non-redundant missions. We should seek to create a force structure which achieves balance between excessive compatibility, which reduces an individual service's capability, and complementary systems and missions, that multiplies national warfighting power. This will achieve the synergistic rewards of a whole greater than the sum of its parts. The challenge is to accurately judge the correct symmetry and then have the fortitude to apply it. From the inception of the Department of Defense (DOD), effective joint force integration has been the goal of the JCS, but historically this objective has been thwarted as much by the inefficiency, bureaucratic inertia, and snail's pace of the Joint Staff as by the intransigence of the reluctant service chiefs.

The ponderous JCS review process presents a major obstacle to service cooperation but it is not insurmountable. Changes to the JCS organization have been made to improve the process. The
Chairman of the JCS has been given the statutory authority and responsibility for joint doctrine issues that stress interoperability. The real problem lies in the dilemma faced by service chiefs when they sit as a member of the Joint Chiefs. Divided between service interests and the necessity to accommodate joint interests, they usually must make concessions to arrive at consensus. In "the Tank", depending upon the issue -- funds, pursuit of systems, doctrine -- "Servicism" tends to outweigh interoperability on a service chief's list of priorities.

I will examine one revolutionary multi-service attempt between the Army and Air Force to resolve interoperability initiatives called the Joint Force Development Process (JFDP). The scope will include an analysis of the events leading up to the establishment of the JFDP, explain the JFDP's mechanics, and note its conflicts with present day JCS processes. Prior to 1986, the JFDP met the needs of the time, but the concept has now outlived its usefulness in addressing joint initiatives. To comply with the current joint issue atmosphere, I will make recommendations for modifying the JFDP's charter to move the process into the evolving domain of the JCS and its new responsibilities vis-à-vis the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act.
CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
BREAKING NEW GROUND

"It is a simple but seemingly unalterable fact of organizational behavior that large organizations can effectively resist change if they choose to."?

The history of attempts at interoperability within and between the military services contains ample examples of service resistance. Like many legislative enactments, the National Security Act of 1947 was a compromise. Even the preamble of the Act, quoted here, expresses Congressional intent with deliberate and significant ambiguity.

In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies and functions of the Government relating to the national security; to provide three military departments, separately administered, for the operation and administration of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the United States Marine Corp), the Air Force with their assigned combat and service components; to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control of the Secretary of Defense but not to merge them; to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces but not to establish a single Chief of Staff over the armed forces nor an armed forces general staff (but this is not to be interpreted as applying to the Joint Chiefs or Joint Staff.)

This lack of specificity has allowed the defense establishment to develop without substantial change and seek to preserve individual service autonomy and interests. This evolution was not intended to contravene Congressional intent. Instead, it was the result of natural service determination to project the best component fighting force.
The long standing competition for organizational survival and influence has bred a heritage of suspicion, distrust and parochialism. Interservice conflict is caused by budget competition and the force allocation process within.

Generally cited by most critics of DOD, the Air Force has been "...the most innovative service in terms of force modernization and expansion, that is the most procurement intensive, yet the least innovative in exploiting major new technology and devising new doctrine." Army efforts have always been directed towards innovation that would "carve out doctrinally sanctioned domains within which autonomous roles and missions and supporting funding could be assured." The Navy would not deny that it provides the greatest opposition to any centralized control that would limit its overall strategic independence.

In addition, military reformers point with ease to failed operational opportunities to work together that should have been successes. Uncoordinated and redundant individual service air wars in Vietnam, the aborted Desert One rescue effort, and the lack of compatible communication systems for command and control during the Grenada Operation are some recent examples. They reinforce the basic premise that we have increased opportunities to fight jointly; thus, the military needs to improve interoperability.

At the center of the turmoil between services is the service chief and his role in the JCS. Torn between providing the necessary leadership and organizational goals for their separate services (usually income, power, prestige, security, influence and capability) and simultaneously dealing with the incompatible purpose of JCS interservice cooperation, the service chiefs are
forced to be "dual-hatted." Sen. Barry Goldwater reflected "... they are called on to do an almost impossible task: to represent their own Service's viewpoint but, simultaneously, to sacrifice that view to the greater common good of joint considerations."\

Each service chief focuses on his area of responsibility, resisting any doctrinal reform which may redefine his service's force structure potentially resulting in a reduction in resources. Since the 1947 Key West Agreements assigned primary roles and missions, each of the service chiefs have resisted any redistributive cuts in funding that would reflect reduced programs and status.

The only reasonable approach to joint initiatives for a "dual-hatted" service chief has been to guard his service's strategy and compromise the difference created by the JCS. Bilateral loyalties of service chiefs favoring service needs over national defense needs caused a past Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to complain: "Deep seated service traditions are important in fostering a fighting spirit, service pride and heroism, but they may also engender a tendency to look inward and to perpetuate doctrines and thought patterns that do not keep pace with changing requirements." The JCS organization is faulty, so shortcomings are not due to inadequacy of any particular individual.

The JCS system evolved through the 1970's as an ineffective body that could not solve the difficult questions concerning force integration. Attempts at doctrinal innovation by any service produced single service vetos or "lowest common denominator committee decisions reflecting self-serving, service oriented bargains, not sound coherent military judgement."
Congressional and civilian reformers alike agreed the JCS was "a body devoted to logrolling and mutual backscratching, prone to recommendations so sterile they are not objectionable to anyone, and to the development of grandiose plans that ignore the real limits of U.S. military capabilities and military spending." The disputes were not limited to any combination of services in their search for joint effectiveness. Examples can be found in any combination: Army-Air Force (ballistic missile defense); Air Force-Navy (submarine launched ballistic missile, carrier launched nuclear delivery aircraft); Army-Marines (force projection roles); and multi-service concerns for strategic mobility and close air support.

Some argued that the pre-1986 system represented the correct balance between negotiation and compromise — to minimize the great potential for controversy or complete stalemate. Another argument goes like this: "...some issues are extremely involved and deserve a highly deliberative examination stretching over months and even years. In some instances the wisest decision is not to do anything."

In actuality, studying an issue ad nauseam or sidestepping it altogether, causes gaps and duplications in the country's overall defense posture. This process of delay and waffling results in significant reductions in warfighting capability. In addition, to preserve service interests, some redundant and many non-interoperable, a burdensome budgetary structure has evolved.

The very contentious nature of interservice cooperation was articulated very early on when Admiral R. Turner set the tone for JCS unity by telling the Senate Naval Affairs Committee in 1946:
Frankly, I believe the Navy as a whole objects to the so-called unification because under any system the Navy will be a numerical minority and the Army and the Air Force, a military majority (which) will always be in a better political position than the Navy. Because the Navy has had and should retain in the future its position as the first line of military security for the United States, I believe the Navy will never willingly agree to a consolidation of national military forces in any manner that will silence the Navy's voice in military affairs or materially restrict its present responsibilities. 12

Without question, the Army is also affected by the JCS's heavy resistance to joint interoperability issues. Logistical sealift and combat air support are crucial to the Army's deployment, resupply, and battlefield effectiveness. Recognizing early on that progress in the truly four-service joint arena was to be slow going, steps were taken by the Army to avoid a "can't get there from here" position on key doctrinal issues.

To meet the challenge, Army leadership focused on initiatives representing their very basic doctrinal warfighting concerns -- the European Theater. Two Army CINC-doms, U.S. Strike Command (USSTRICOM), in 1963, and then U.S. Readiness Command (USREDCOM), in 1972, formally petitioned the JCS to achieve some standards of operational doctrine by offering themselves as the focal point for joint issues. Each request was denied as contradictory to the spirit and charter of the JCS. Yet, the JCS failed to effectively address these same issues.

Concurrently the Army's strategic doctrine was maturing into "Active Defense", substituting "firepower for manpower, rapid battlefield movement to key points, and the advantage of the tactical defense." 13 The Air Force Tactical Air Command (TAC) and Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) staffs demonstrated resolve dealing with interservice doctrine problems. Interservice cooperation was made on most crucial initiatives.
By 1973, the Arab/Israeli War brought the Army's initial feelings into sharp focus. Israel, armed with seemingly incompatible equipment from numerous countries, was only victorious after making considerable effort solving integration problems. The lesson learned was that battlefield success was directly connected to interoperability.

The formal service staffs were still not comfortable with the direction these doctrinal explorations were taking but skeptical opposition gave way to encouragement. In 1975, the Joint Airland Force Applications Agency (ALFA) was established to specifically deal with Army/Air Force battlefield integration. This culminated in recognizing that "the Army cannot win the land battle without the Air Force."

Identification and resolution of new initiatives began to become major programs in 1976 when cautious surveillance of Army/Air Force issues and requirements were formalized through establishment of the Air-Land Program Office. This office created an environment conducive to seriously studying mutually agreed upon issues. The Army's "Active Defense" was evolving towards "Airland Battle" doctrine and was being shaped into joint "Army/Air Force" strategy.

By 1982, Airland Battle Strategy was institutionally crystallized in Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations. An offensive oriented strategy, the operational concept recognized that the battlefield airspace was "as important a dimension of ground operations as the terrain itself." Air Force cooperation was required to make the doctrine effective. Many new and innovative initiatives surfaced between the Army and Air Force. They were intent on taking full advantage of operational level battlefield
reserves, new technology, and maneuver with deep operations. Common goals were driving them together.

The two services were compelled to seriously debate initiatives each saw as crucial to battlefield success. Cautious optimism was beginning to develop on the joint issue front, even if only two services were considered. These agreements, including the Airland Battle doctrine, were not sanctioned as "joint doctrine" by the JCS, but they were seen as moves toward jointness. What had been diluted in the formal JCS process was coming together in this informal organization.

Seven other significant events in 1982 contributed to the viability of the JFDP concept.

1. USREDCOM made its last and most persuasive request to become the executive agent for the development of joint doctrine for JCS approval. This request was also turned down despite the significant progress made in joint issue identification with accompanying structure to resolve them.

2. The JCS established the Joint Doctrine Pilot Program to test the waters made calm by the Army and Air Force interface. The services perceived that necessary joint issue accommodation was being sidestepped. The charge was valid, since 5 years later only one of the three initial programs had been formalized into a JCS publication.

3. The Navy and Air Force Service Chiefs signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to work on issues of operational activities (Anti-Air, Surveillance and Targeting, C3, Aerial Mine-laying and Refueling). This gave credibility to an external process (to JCS) of defining joint issues and establishing joint doctrine that superficially concerned only the participants.

4. This MOA was followed by a Navy and Army MOA designed to significantly enhance mobility and sustainability by prepositioning war material. The trend of using a bilateral MOA to reach meaningful compromise on joint issues was developing four-service validity.
5. Large scale military maneuvers were conducted in Europe. The Air Force was unable to provide any air support to Army ground forces. This operational failure was not lost on the two services as reformer’s accusations were widespread.19

6. The Army and Air Force signed an MOA to use Airland Battle Doctrine for joint training, tactics, techniques and procedures development. Without JCS objection, the final step was complete in preparing the way for the Army to formalize this evolving joint process.20

7. The book "In Search of Excellence" by Thomas Peters and Robert Waterman was published, a treatise on successful management tools used by the most productive companies. Not referenced by the services per se, the book outlines the structure for the Ad Hoc Task Force or "adhocracy". The previously mentioned MOA’s exemplify the potential of "adhocracy" to open the way for service interoperability. It is my belief that this significant text generated major impact on the military leadership of this country.

Two very dynamic personalities and long standing friends concluded the final step. Their vision for the future saw the next battlefield fought with their services, in harness together, neither one taking the lead. They would jointly cooperate to be effective on the battlefield. On 21 April 1983, the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Gabriel and the Army Chief of Staff, General Meyer, signed an MOA declaring their mutual dedication to working together. Their pledge was to increase integration of training, communications, planning and battlefield programs. They pledged to resolve doctrinal and procedural concerns of the Airland Battle Doctrine. The stage was set for the establishment of the Joint Forces Development Process (JFDP).21

What was new? A unique way of conducting joint business. Not a product of the JCS, this joint solution had a bright future.
CHAPTER III

PROCESS ANALYSIS

"Do it, fix it, try it"

For the Army and Air Force Service Chiefs, the JCS review process now took a back seat in the matter of Airland Battle doctrine issues. A parochial bureaucracy often described as "multi-layered", "indecisive" and "compromising" -- "a process that filtered out jointness to avoid a single service veto" was transformed into a series of pragmatic actions that centered on function, not form. The new management philosophy was definitely not in the traditional military structure and followed the "adhocracy" approach outlined in In Search of Excellence.

The process works like this: Assemble a small group of highly motivated experts who are given carte blanche to communicate with anyone. Make sure they are outside any formal chain of command. Have them report only to the highest level of authority. Advertise to the formal management structure that they have the support to make stick whatever they advise and the executive approves. Discourage "Iron Major" service advocacy and "group think" conformity by stressing "skunk works" heretical thinking, safe from formal criticism and review. Compel the group to focus on specific goals and not to dwell on process. Each initiative should be "brainstormed", and "dogma" type answers avoided. Demand quick results that are "close hold" until implemented by the executive in order to avoid the natural organizational resistance to change and innovation. Brief the
executive frequently for help on defining framework, then transfer oversight responsibility of the initiatives to executing agents or staffs. As soon as possible, free the group from product responsibility. Enable them to monitor progress, but ensure they do not stray away from the front end assessment of issues. The group should keep in mind at all times that a mediocre initiative which gets implemented is always preferable to a debate over concepts and ideals.22

Even before the JFDP emerged, serious doubts concerning "ad hoc" processes were already being aired. A 1983 Defense Science Board (DSB) study examined joint acquisition programs and concluded that "ad hoc organizations used to initiate joint programs were not consistent with sound, stable programs. Past joint program failures could be attributed to an ad hoc selection and management environment, inadequate attention to front end work necessary to baseline programs, and shifts in service priorities and funding caused by changing budgets after program initiation."23 They recommended that a Joint Requirements and Management Board be established to solve acquisition problems. So the practice of "adhocracy" and the use of MOA's contradicted established JCS joint issue research and resolution procedures.

An observation from noted DOD critiques Bill Lynn and Barry Posen point out:

These agreements are admirable examples of good people attempting to work effectively within a bad system. But the necessity of two service chiefs to design ad hoc agreements on such crucial operational matters is evidence of the ineffectiveness of the joint system in developing such arrangements and bringing about needed revisions in the Key West Agreements (1947).24
This was a critical observation but the Army and Air Force were making progress through "adhocracy" by resolving major conflicting service interests of long standing. There was no parallel progress being made in the JCS arena. By August 1983, the draft of the JFDP charter was completed but it was not to be circulated among the Joint Staff or the service staffs. I see the reason as simple. The Army and Air Force Service Chiefs doubted any significant change to the formal process would be forthcoming and exposure would only bring more service conflict and dissension. By late 1983, the final Terms of Reference (TOR) were formalized and briefed to the CINC's. JFDP was a reality.

To give it structure, an USA/USAF officer exchange program established the Joint Assessment and Initiatives Office (JAIO). This provided the necessary organization from which actual joint issue proposals would take form.

The JAIO charter outlined the basic goals upon which agreements between the Army and Air Force would be based. Warfighting capability would be maximized by fielding affordable, nonredundant and compatible joint forces. Cost reductions would be realized by avoiding duplication of systems, increasing commonality of material, restructuring roles and missions to cover gaps and discontinuing overlapping strategies.25

These goals were not new or revolutionary to the JCS. Most JFDP initiatives had been identified before but they were "watered down" when difficult decisions about resources or roles and mission were involved. The House Armed Services Committee reported in 1950:

14
Difficult problems will inevitably continue to exist between the Air Force and the Naval Air arm. ... but the basic reason for this continuing disagreement is a genuine inability for these services to agree, fundamentally and professionally, on the art of warfare.26

The initial list of 31 initiatives produced by the JFDP were truly remarkable success stories of trust and confidence in the search for interoperable forces. Agreed upon by both service chiefs in May 1984, the JAIO had ferreted out potential programs and doctrine enhancements that raised eyebrows outside of the Department of Defense. Many articles and publicity briefings, conducted to advertise this new and revolutionary approach to jointness, were offered to all sectors of government.27 The JFDP reputation for jointness was growing.

The "tiger team" concept of the JAIO, which directly attacked the contentious conflicts of service interests, advertised rapid results. But under close scrutiny, the actual life cycle of an initiative followed closely the JCS process review timeframe. A JFDP initiative fixed a maximum of two years to make a significant impact before abandoning the initiative as "not achievable". The JFDP made a real difference, however, in the time needed to define the initial proposal. The JFDP could decide what to do by avoiding the tendency to staff endless intramural debates to negotiate a mutually acceptable compromised definition of the issue. Extremely effective in seeing the end product, the JFDP could be more flexible than the JCS during development by accommodating changing requirements and directions. So JFDP dramatically cut down on front time for developing proposals and increased the opportunity for agreement before the initiative was tabled as "to difficult".
The JFDP was tailored for specific broad goals, such as "air-ground relations", with clearly defined objectives, such as reduce costs. It was not designed for long term or complex projects such as realignment of roles and missions. Within this charter, it concentrated on the conventional aspects of high intensity warfare against a very formidable and sophisticated adversary. During the next two years the JFDP and its associated action agent, JAIO, set the challenge of identifying Airland Battle initiatives that would enable fielding a more effective warfighting force. Bold action was taken by the Army and Air Force to counter a historical lack of service trust and confidence in the JCS. The meaningful dialogue established between these otherwise conservative and cautious players was monumental by all measures. By avoiding considerable numbers of redundant combat systems, outlining divisions of labor on the battlefield, and saving approximately $1 billion in redundant system costs, the JFDP set joint precedents.

The JFDP "was not designed to implement the Service Chief's decisions nor to manage this permanent joint process." The JFDP initiatives may have lacked four-service emphasis. They probably failed to introduce meaningful changes in roles and missions. Their doctrinal research and staffing may have been shallow. In spite of all their shortcomings the JFDP did provide a vision of jointness never before attained. The JFDP supported CINC's. Over 70% of JFDP initiatives directly addressed CINC concerns. With the Chief’s approval, resources were immediately applied to CINC problems.
By 1985 the majority of the original 31 initiatives were declared either implemented, that is had structure and resources applied or closed, institutionalized and no longer monitored.29 A closed issues inertia, provided by the service chief's endorsement, was now to carry the initiative into firm published doctrine. (see appendix A)

The process rapidly found itself at a crossroads. Its successes were heralded by the Department of Defense and Congress. But even though "adhocracy" was preached by the civilian business sector, it had met its goals. The process faced either disestablishment or institutionalization into joint affairs. In 1985, the JFDP grew in stature and significance when the Navy accepted an invitation to officially join the JAIO as an equal partner. This gave the process a more credible joint focus. The Marine Corps turned down its opportunity for membership but stayed very close to the initiatives through Navy representation. The JFDP also established a computer based teleconferencing discussion group that included ad hoc organizations working similar joint issues. The momentum of success was allowing them to expand their initial charter to include more worldwide, four-service initiatives. From the JFDP perspective, the future looked bright.

During this same period (1984-85), Congress and the JCS became concerned that the formal process was being bypassed in service attempts to address joint issues. Senator Barry Goldwater cited the ongoing problem:
The inability of the military Services to work together effectively has not gone unnoticed. Attempts have been made in the past to correct this problem, but it is still with us. It is still extremely detrimental to our Nation’s ability to adequately defend ourselves. As someone who has devoted his entire life to the military, I am saddened that the Services are still unable to put national interest above parochial interest.30

Over the last 40 years, approximately 15 major studies have criticized the JCS for resisting the joint spirit and intent originally outlined by the 1947 National Security Act.31 Through the Packard Commission careful examination was made of progress thus far achieved by the JCS in meeting the challenge to be integrated. This pressure caused the JCS to recommend that a division be established that would specifically address interoperability. The Chairman agreed proper coordination and integration of present and future joint initiatives would be beneficial, so he established the Joint Initiatives Office (JIO) in the J5 Plans Directorate of the Joint Staff.

The JCS recognized that joint interoperability efforts were interspersed throughout the military structure and that each service had to be tasked to ensure interoperability was given the highest priority. The JIO signaled the JCS intent to be truly joint. Even so the lethargic JCS process persisted. Further, the JCS did not offer the support required to instill service chief confidence throughout the services.

The JIO proved its usefulness to the Chairman, so plans were made to accommodate a new JIO type directorate. This team would expand the emerging joint focus into interoperability. Various members of the Joint Staff were pressing to solve the problems of the JCS process by having JFDP initiatives and processes included
in the new directorate's formal organization. This would enhance
the prestige of the Joint Staff and minimize reworking some JFDP
multi-service issues to include four-service validation.

The Army and Air Force agreed in principle that the Joint
Staff would benefit from the responsiveness of the JFDP, but they
would not endorse moving the JFDP specifically into the Joint
Staff. They believed that the special momentum from the service
chief's personal interest would be weakened, allowing it to fall
into the routine attention category. The two service chiefs
contended it was necessary to be able to pursue commonality of
training, tactics, and equipment acquisition outside the formal
JCS process. So, they wanted to provide an environment to
cultivate initiatives before seeking JCS endorsement or extension
into four-service involvement. The JFDP would be choked and
stifled in the normal staff process, service or joint, and suffer
the same ailment of the JCS, parochialism.

By late 1986, the Congress again echoed the challenges of
1947 and gave very detailed statutory guidance towards enhancing
mutual service interoperability through the Goldwater-Nichols DOD
Reorganization Act of 1986. The act left no doubt that service
efforts to attain the minimum integration necessary were
insufficient. Further resistance was intolerable. To eliminate
such past indiscretions as "service logrolling," "military
conservatism," and "issue stonewalling," the act called for major
changes in how the Chairman and the JCS conducted business. In
addition to requiring that all services consider approved "joint
document" when developing and publishing organic doctrine, the
Chairman was given additional authority and responsibility
concerning joint initiatives. Now the Chairman would:

- Serve as principal military adviser to the President.
- Consult with and seek the advice of the other JCS members and the Unified and Specified Commanders (CINC’s).
- Submit all JCS member’s disagreeing opinions to the President, the NSC, and Secretary of Defense (SECDEF).
- Prepare fiscally constrained strategic plans.
- Perform net assessments that providing for the preparation and review of contingency plans which conform to policy guidance from the President and the SECDEF.
- Identify critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities.
- Evaluate the readiness of the CINC’s.
- Advise to the extent to which the Service’s budget proposals conform with the priorities of strategic plans and the CINC’s.
- Assess military requirements for acquisition programs.
- Develop, validate and distribute joint doctrine.
- Direct the Joint Staff.
- Report every three years to the Secretary of Defense on each Services’ roles and missions.

The services’ joint perceptions immediately and directly affected the JFDP. The Navy, seeing the JCS focus turn to interoperability and not wanting to be in conflict with the intent of Congress, withdrew its support and manning from the JAIO. The Navy’s future joint initiatives would be worked inside the Joint Staff. The joint stature of the JFDP was significantly reduced as it reverted to a multi-service organization.

The Army and Air Force labeled the process transition as premature and still supported the JFDP as a viable forum for them to work cooperatively and enhance their joint (multi-service) warfighting capabilities outside the formal JCS structure.

The Interoperability Directorate of the Joint Staff (J7) was established early in 1987 and started immediately to restructure how the JCS addressed joint issues. Its purpose was to provide a process conducive to managing the same quality of issues that “ad hoc” organizations had developed but include four-service
integration. The JCS answer to "ad hoc" organizational approaches to joint warfighting was thus directed at the source of past contention -- the process. The J7, as the first step in the process, is the interoperability standard bearer and dedicates itself to providing a real framework to correct past failures. Several new management tools have been or are about to be put into service to fulfill the original 1947 joint directive.

**The Joint Doctrine Master Plan.** The plan will identify areas of joint interoperability where past practice and doctrine are detrimental to combat effectiveness. It will establish projects to create, document, validate and distribute four-service approved doctrine. As part of an entire review of published doctrine, it will bring all four-service approved joint doctrine into the JCS Publication System. The Plan will revise the existing JCS Publication System to separate those joint doctrine and procedures publications from other administrative publications. It will then organize them into a systematic hierarchy of publications that clearly links doctrine to procedures under a single capstone manual.

**Memorandum of Procedure 190.** The Reorganization Act of 1986 tasked the Chairman to implement a formal procedure for the systematic development of joint doctrine. This new Joint Staff policy will standardize the coordination for proposed joint doctrine projects. The selection, development, approval, implementation, and periodic review of all joint doctrine submitted to the Joint Staff is now addressed. It recognizes that the Chairman has overall responsibility for joint
interoperability, to include the development of tactics, techniques, procedures, plans, training and material. However, the primary developmental responsibility will be assigned to a CINC, service or other appropriate organization. The procedure has been designed to be responsive to all sources of joint issues. The Joint Staff is tasked to monitor milestones of development and ensure timely products. Finally, all joint doctrine documents will be reviewed and updated every three years.

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). In taking the 1983 Defense Science Board recommendation to establish a Joint Requirements and Management Board (JRMB), an attempt was made to avoid “ad hoc” management acquisition program shortcomings. The JRMB became the instrument by which the requirements and management process could be executed. In 1987, the board was modified and renamed the JROC to accommodate the legislated changes to the acquisition process made by the Reorganization Act of 1986. Chaired by the newly created position of Vice Chairman of the JCS and attended by the Vice Chiefs of each service, it is designed to examine joint military requirements and resolve cross service interoperability issues. To address a significant shortcoming of previous JCS joint initiatives, filled by the JFDP, it will have a CINC focus. Vice Chairman General Robert Herres described the JROC as:

“...fulfilling the requirements of the commanders in chief, of course, while ensuring interoperability, reducing parallel and duplicative efforts and promoting economies of scale.” Issues which cannot be resolved will be referred to the formal JCS
process, but firm milestones have been identified to avoid delaying the initiative's progress towards determination. The primary focus of the JROC will be initial requirements on issues that affect CINCs.

In summary, Congress has once again legislated guidance (DOD Reorganization Act 1986) on service integration. The Chairman has responded by organizing the JCS to address joint issues in a more responsible way. Expectations that he will be successful are very high. Rep. Bill Nichols (D-Ala), Chairman of the Investigations Committee, which handled the reorganization bill, said:

The legislation fulfills the aims of President Eisenhower, who said almost three decades ago, 'Separate ground, sea, and air warfare are gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort...Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands...singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of service.' Congress rejected President Eisenhower's appeals in the 1950's. Today, 36 years later, we can now report: Mission Accomplished.

Interoperability issues must be accurate, comprehensive and complete. "Ad hoc" organizations that compete in the joint arena, without clear and precise guidelines, are prejudicial to the best interests of an effective integrated force. The JFDP, once unique, is not redundant. The JFDP must be modified to become a productive member of the current joint issue development structure.

The longer an "ad hoc" bureaucratic organization is in existence the more resistant it becomes to attempts at reform or closure. It grows stronger every day, as it stands the test of
time. Its tap root into the supporting structure grows deeper making its extraction more difficult. To modify the JFDP, and other joint-oriented, "ad hoc" organizations, will be no small task. Even though logical arguments are presented, it has been identified that "...the highest levels of service leadership can sustain the momentum generated by the 31 initiatives." Only through a conscious dedicated effort by the JCS will the goals of General Eisenhower be realized.
CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

The JCS has in place the structure and organization to effectively deal with all facets of service interoperability. The success or failure of the recent DOD legislation rests with the Chairman's ability to satisfactorily produce results. His challenge has been described as:

The most plausible interpretation of this new power is that the chairman now has full statutory power to decide when a determination of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been reached, both in calling an end to JCS discussions or in prolonging these discussions even after a JCS vote. Given this legal control over the moment when JCS advice moves forward to the Defense Secretary and the President, it seems logical now to conclude that any future complaints about the timeliness of military advice can be laid at the door of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.36

The new OJCS J7 directorate has become the focal point of a high level integrated effort directed at battlefield interoperability. Many critical areas of defense will be reviewed from the new perspective of interoperability: joint/combined doctrine; tactics, techniques, and procedures; readiness; exercises and training. New procedures have been initiated to provide remedial action to correct safety problems identified through lessons-learned and exercise critiques; and doctrine validation and distribution of approved interoperability enhancements. The J7 will leave service unique issues with the services, but they will assist in building public confidence that the joint system is actively working to improve warfighting capability. Their overall concern is to insure that joint interoperability
initiatives are integrated with all service programs, and to
insure that issues are identified and addressed by the appropriate
agencies. In this way the original goals, not the process, of
the JFDP have been formalized into the JCS system.

The establishment of the J7 has superceded the JFDP as an
active player in the development of joint warfighting issues. A
major, but not necessarily crucial setback, was the Navy’s
official withdrawal from the JAIO into the more formal JCS
process. This returned the JFDP to multi-service participation.
This rejection of joint issue "adhocracy" was not so much due to
a disapproval of the process but more a recognition of the
progress and support for the joint focus taken by the JCS.

The JAIO is advertised as working hand in glove with the
joint and service staffs, but in reality the contact is
superficial, used only at the JAIO’s initiative and for its
benefit. Invitations to the roundtable sessions are not
formalized, and most message traffic addressing JFDP initiatives
is carefully screened and distributed to insure limited issue
visibility. This distant "close hold" policy exaggerates an
already negative JCS attitude towards the JAIO.

The JAIO officer exchange program has not been recognized by
the congressionally mandated Title IV policy of identifying and
accrediting occupational joint efforts designated as "joint
specialty". This reduces the JFDP management credibility in
recognizing officers who are trained in and oriented toward joint
matters.

The 1987 disestablishment of USREDCOM orphaned the critical
function of validating JFDP approved initiatives. Only the J7
has volunteered to continue the validation commitment through the
remainder of FY88. Unless an organization is tasked and staffed
to fulfill this mandatory requirement, JFDP effectiveness will
suffer serious degradation in resolving joint issues.

Another obstacle to the survival of the JFDP is an attempt
to further institutionalize the JFDP's position in the joint
arena by expanding its original charter. Its original, predomi-
antly European Theater focus has been modified to include
worldwide applications of operational and strategic level
doctrine that impacts on four-service material, programs, force
structure, doctrine and procedures. Without four-service repre-
sentation, the JFDP risks presenting initiatives that are in
direct conflict with concurrent JCS efforts. JAIO will delib-
erately attempt to filter out four-service initiatives before
they are taken beyond the working stage but I have doubt in their
ability to identify true joint initiatives. The JAIO will tend
to husband such wide scope issues as planning guidance and
doctrine as service strategies are examined to determine key
warfighting capabilities shared by more than one service.

This organizational vision by a multi-service, not joint,
organization is also in direct conflict with guidance given by
the 1986 Reorganization Act. Battlefield issues have histor-
ically been contributed primarily by CINC's through their
involvement with the JFDP. The CINC's joint initiative focus is
now redirected to the Chairman where interoperability issues are
concerned. The bureaucratic struggle to justify the JFDP's
existence will undermine JCS interoperability efforts and result
in confusing messages to the Unified and Specified CINC's in
determining where to put their joint issue emphasis.

Finally, the continued effectiveness of the JFDP is in doubt due to its inability to solve the truly tough joint issues. The JAIO's attempts to solve joint (Army/Air Force) initiatives such as Tactical Missile Development, Rotary Wing Support for Special Operational Forces, Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System, and Joint Warfare Center are still not resolved. Each initiative has to overcome significant hurdles before it can be implemented or resolved. In addition, many of the JFDP initiatives, although solving theater specific conflicts between the Army and Air Force, do not represent true four-service interoperability interpretations or worldwide applications. The process is really incapable of dealing with issues that are truly "joint" or that pose hard and fast multi-service disagreements. So JFDP has practically solved issues between two services where there was room for agreement and cooperation. It has not yet dealt with more complex issues or with intractable parties.

Interoperability still requires much work from every organization with sufficient resources. The original JFDP idea was bold and compelling, requiring top-down management. The future must support the first, a willingness to look at issues with fresh eyes, and foster the second, generate service chief support. The military services can and must be more than the sum of their parts. Unless modified, the current JFDP is on a collision course with the JCS as both struggle to develop joint initiatives. Each time an issue is selfishly nurtured by the JAIO, but found to require four-service participation, the friction between the formal and informal processes will surely grow.
The current trend toward reduced resources will surely weaken the defense establishment unless cooperation becomes the watch word of the JCS. All services have recently enjoyed a profusion of resources and manning. Recent erosion, most dramatically represented by significant enforced officer reductions, demands that steps be taken to focus efforts at the most efficient distribution. General Herres spells out the future of force interoperability when he says:

Jointness is "hot" because as technology makes the world smaller, the division between what were once unique service media, that is air, land and sea, becomes more and more blurred. Consequently, the need for our forces to operate in an integrated fashion becomes more critical and crucial. If we are to utilize our military forces efficiently, then we have to learn to operate together, plan together and acquire equipment in the optimum way. There are drawbacks or, better put, "trade offs" to interoperability. Nevertheless, it is important that we achieve interoperability where it is needed.37

The JFDP "adhocracy" was right for the time. The process filled a management void left by an uncooperative JCS and Joint Staff bureaucracy. The JFDP organization demonstrated very dramatically that the climate of service distrust and suspicion need not be tolerated; it offered a successful MOA systemic alternative. A CINC could receive rapid budget support on theater joint initiatives not provided by the formal JCS system. Gross service warfighting duplication and redundancy was identified and rectified. Cooperation and common-service goals were established that today endures throughout the services. The identification of battlefield initiatives proved invaluable and today they provide the cornerstone of JCS groundwork. Now the issue is how future four-service "joint" initiatives can best be processed and, when appropriate, implemented.
CHAPTER V

RECOMMENDATIONS

The first position the JCS must immediately establish, if they are to gain the high ground on the interoperability front, is to continually reinforce their dedication to addressing and resolving joint issues. Only through direct action can this position be established. Their commitment to interoperability must not be misinterpreted by outside organizations. Also, service chiefs must remain confident of JCS commitment to interoperability.

This can be accomplished by first taking control of the word "joint". Already defined in JCS Pub 1, the definition should be changed to read:

JOINT-Connotes JCS approved activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of more than one service of the same nation participate. (When all services are not involved, the participating services shall be identified, e.g., Joint Army-Navy. Activities, operations organizations, etc., not approved by the JCS will be labeled as multi-service.) See also combined.

The context of the word "joint" will automatically connect with, and reside in, the JCS. Organizations not having a formal relationship with the JCS system must be directed to extract the word "joint" from their name, publications, and initiatives. Organizations like the JFDP should be directed to change their name to more accurately reflect their true multi-service nature, such as Army-Air Force Development Process. They should also be directed not to correspond directly with CINCs under the premise of working joint initiatives in support of world-wide, four-service issues.
Services and CINC's need to communicate about support issues but not on resolving joint issues with multi-service solutions. Any documents not approved by the JCS must be clearly identified as multi-service without having JCS endorsement for joint mandated actions. This will avoid any confusion created when "ad hoc" organizations, who are less than joint, attempt to garner misdirected support.

The next step would be to establish a formal link from the JCS to every "ad hoc" organization that is working on joint or multi-service interoperability issues. It is not the business of the JCS to concern itself with truly multi-service issues that will never be addressed as four-service. Many issues that are being worked by "ad hoc" organizations are superficially resolved between services and later cause undue confusion and conflict when promulgated. This link would require service agencies to submit proposed initiatives to J7 for review thereby ensuring their compliance with JCS directives.

Lastly, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs must show resolve in disciplining the services to address their joint objections in the JCS arena. He is responsible to provide specific direction and, if required, tie breaking guidance on joint interoperability issues. To avoid "lowest-common-denominator" decisions a firm and balanced hand must keep the primary goal of joint progress at the forefront. To overcome the JCS reformer's labels of dilution and ineptitude; to reverse the historical legacy of self serving, service oriented negotiated decisions; and to provide constant critical analysis and military advice will require superior leadership skill.
The Chairman's challenge is to lead the service oriented Chiefs of Staff into designing the country's defenses through true cooperation on material, doctrine, roles and missions. The future tone and frame of reference for working joint issues dealing with interoperability can be stabilized and indelibly impressed on each service chief. Military problems should be solved inside the military. If a lack of jointness remains a stumbling block to interoperability, Congress is waiting in the wings with further micromanagement and joint guidance that will not serve the best interest of the services or provide the best defense for the nation.


4. Ibid., p 259.


17. Ibid., p 48.


35
### APPENDIX A
INITIATIVE STATUS OVERVIEW
As Reported by the JAIO

#### (23) INITIATIVES CLOSED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiative ID</th>
<th>Initiative Description</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#24</td>
<td>Close Air Support</td>
<td>May 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#11</td>
<td>Mobile Weapon System</td>
<td>May 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#18</td>
<td>Joint Tactical Cruise Missile System</td>
<td>Sep 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#30</td>
<td>Intratheater Airlift</td>
<td>Sep 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#5</td>
<td>IFF Systems</td>
<td>Jun 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#6</td>
<td>Rear Area Operations Centers</td>
<td>Jun 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#7</td>
<td>Host Nation Support Security Equipment</td>
<td>Jun 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#14</td>
<td>Precision Locator Strike System</td>
<td>Jun 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#16</td>
<td>Combat Search and Rescue</td>
<td>Jun 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#20</td>
<td>Night Combat</td>
<td>Jun 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#31</td>
<td>POM Priority Lists</td>
<td>Jun 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#35</td>
<td>Center for Low Intensity Conflict</td>
<td>Jun 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#10</td>
<td>Rear Area Close Air Support</td>
<td>Oct 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#22</td>
<td>Joint Attack of Surface Targets</td>
<td>Feb 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#1</td>
<td>Area SAMS/Air Defense Fighters</td>
<td>Mar 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#4</td>
<td>Tactical Missile Threat</td>
<td>Mar 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#8</td>
<td>Air Base Ground Defense</td>
<td>Mar 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#32</td>
<td>Rapid Targeting Capability</td>
<td>Mar 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#34</td>
<td>Validation of JFDP Procedures</td>
<td>Mar 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#15</td>
<td>Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses</td>
<td>Mar 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#27</td>
<td>Joints Surveillance &amp; Targeting Attack Radar Sys.</td>
<td>Apr 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#26</td>
<td>Manned Aircraft Systems</td>
<td>May 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#37 Flag Officer Warfighting Course</td>
<td></td>
<td>May 87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### (8) INITIATIVES IMPLEMENTED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiative ID</th>
<th>Initiative Description</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#13</td>
<td>Airborne Radar Jamming System</td>
<td>Sep 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#28</td>
<td>TR-1 Program</td>
<td>Feb 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#12</td>
<td>Ground Based Electronic Combat Against Enemy A/CF</td>
<td>Apr 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#25</td>
<td>Air Liaison Officer/Forward Air Controller Trng</td>
<td>May 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#9</td>
<td>Air Base Ground Defense Trng</td>
<td>Jul 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#19</td>
<td>Army and Air Force Munitions RDT&amp;E</td>
<td>Sep 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#21</td>
<td>Battlefield Air Interdiction</td>
<td>Jun 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#33</td>
<td>Future CAS</td>
<td>Jun 86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### (6) INITIATIVES ONGOING (+4 years)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiative ID</th>
<th>Initiative Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#2 Point Air Defense</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#3 Counter Heliborne Assault Threat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#17 Rotary Wing Lift Support for Special Operating Forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#23 Theater Interdiction Systems</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#29 Manned Tactical Reconnaissance Systems</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#36 Joint Warfare Center</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>