THE UNITED STATES NEEDS JOINT WAR-FIGHTING DOCTRINE

BY

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The United States needs joint war-fighting doctrine. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and DoD Directive 5100.1 (Apr 87) clearly direct the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop and publish joint doctrine to guide commanders of joint task forces in the accomplishment of assigned missions. Congress has directed this as the result of our historical failure to publish joint doctrine. Historically, the United States military has conducted joint operations since the Revolutionary War victory at Yorktown. After World War I we made attempts to develop joint doctrine but entered World War II without a single...
joint doctrinal manual. After World War II, Congress gave us our first orders to think joint with the passage of the National Security Act in 1947. This act established the Department of Defense (DoD) and was intended to unify the armed services. It only created a separate Air Force and DoD making a more fragmented military establishment.

Wars in Korea and Vietnam demonstrated again the existence of a joint doctrinal void. Interservice disagreements frequently occurred concerning how to conduct joint operations. These wars did show that all modern conflicts must be fought jointly. Our most recent combat experience in Grenada showed that we lack authoritative joint doctrine, and the void can result in fratricide.

As a result of the Reorganization Act of 1986, the J-7 Directorate of JCS was formed with one of its responsibilities to publish joint doctrine. This office has developed a Joint Doctrine Master Plan that tasks the services and staff directorates to write joint doctrine. This methodology of giving services proponency for joint doctrine misses the mark and should be reevaluated. Joint staff officers at the National Defense University should write joint doctrine!
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THE UNITED STATES NEEDS JOINT WAR-FIGHTING DOCTRINE

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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THE UNITED STATES NEEDS JOINT 
WAR-FIGHTING DOCTRINE

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

For a long time the United States Government and its military leaders have recognized the absolute need to conduct joint military operations. Joint operations have been important in all of our wars since the battle of Yorktown during our revolution. In 1903, after the conclusion of the Spanish-American War, because of demonstrated poor joint capabilities the Army-Navy board was formed. (1) This board was generally inactive and only met twice during World War I. (2) During this period it produced no documentation and provided nothing that could be used as joint doctrine. This early recognition of a problem with joint operations failed to result in the publication of joint doctrine.
Why has there been no production of real joint doctrine? Have inter-service rivalries prevented cooperation or has the lack of education and professional development of joint officers been the problem? Regardless of what the real reason for failure has been, Congress recognized the problem and has tried to legislate corrective action. The Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 dictated some specific requirements on joint experience and education for officers selected for flag rank. As early as 1952 a student at the Army War College, Captain Ralph N. Wilson (USN) wrote; "Much of the controversy between the armed services stems from lack of understanding on the part of members of one armed service of the capabilities and limitations of the other. This weakness can be overcome in time by a program of inter-service education. The assignment of officers for duty on joint staffs early in their careers will aid in bringing about this understanding of the functions and interdependence of the services." (3) It appears that we have again forced ourselves to reinvent the wheel. One part of the recent reorganization that should have a positive impact on the joint doctrine void is the formation of a J-7 staff within the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I will, by necessity, point to numerous failures of our military establishment to produce viable joint military doctrine, and even when such doctrine has been published has not been followed or complied with. There is a void in doctrine for joint operations and clear deviations between the published doctrines of the four armed services of our country. I will document the
past, display the present and provide recommendations for the future.

ENDNOTES

2. Ibid. p. 6.
Joint doctrine is not a new idea that has come to the United States military in the 1980's. As mentioned in the previous chapter we have a history of joint operations as old as our country, and we have made attempts at publishing doctrine throughout this century. Unfortunately we have not been very successful at getting the job done.

Our attempts to coordinate between the services began with the formation of the Army-Navy board, in 1903, composed of the chiefs of each service and their operations deputies. In its first 17 years the Board was only able to publish one manual, the "Joint Army and Navy Action in Coast Defense." (1) This document did little to establish joint doctrine. The Joint Board was re-organized in 1919 and expanded to a larger group and formed a Joint Planning Committee to study problems. The Committee made a major contribution to doctrine in 1927 when it published a document called "Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1927" which basically covered umpiring joint maneuvers. (2)
The Joint Committee did develop a doctrinal publication in 1933 titled "Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935." This document included well defined joint procedures and all effective joint agreements between the services. World War II required joint operations on a scale unimaginined in our military. This war contributed twenty amendments to the 1933 document. This revised document was present and ready to provide a solid starting point, in 1946, for joint doctrine based on actual combat experience.

NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

In July 1947 Congress enacted the National Security Act. This act was revolutionary in that it provided a blueprint for the unification of the armed forces of the United States. There had previously been difficulties obtaining agreement between the Army and Navy on doctrinal matters, and now the country had a third equal military service, the United States Air Force. This situation caused the old Joint Committee to be come obsolete and instead of adding the Air Force, the committee was abolished in 1947.

Another addition as a result of the 1947 act was the establishment of the Department of Defense (DOD) headed by a secretary with cabinet rank. The Department of the Army, Department of the Navy and the newly formed Department of the Air Force all became subordinate to the Department of Defense. As expected in a reorganization of this magnitude the language of Congress was
not fully understood by DOD and in 1949 an amendment to the National Security Act of 1947 was passed into law.

The Department of Defense realized that there were misunderstandings in the individual services as to their roles. Secretary of Defense Forrestal called a special meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at Key West, Florida in March of 1948. The purpose of this meeting was "...to thrash out the whole controversy over missions and to decide who will do what with what."(7) At this meeting the Joint Chiefs of Staff reached agreement and published a paper that stated the functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the primary and secondary functions of each service. Also included was the acknowledgement of the need for doctrine and procedures for joint operations. Responsibilities for development of these doctrines and procedures were assigned.(8)

In 1949 the Joint Chiefs of Staff published an outline for the "Joint Action Armed Forces, (JAAF)", covering basic joint policies and doctrine for employment by the services when engaged in joint operations.(9) To write the JAAF the JCS initiated the Committee for Joint Policies and Procedures (CJPP). The CJPP worked for nearly three years and in 1951 the first "JAAF Papers" were published.(10) This document basically laid out the organizational apparatus and responsibilities of each service in joint operations. The JAAF was the foundation document for today's Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications (JCS PUBS).
After publication of the JAAF the Army proposed formation of Joint Centers to develop doctrine, techniques and the procedures, tactics and equipment needed for effective joint operations. These centers were to be established as executive agents of the JCS. The Navy and Air Force both objected to the centers because the services had been unable to develop the degree of harmony and cooperation needed to make them effective. As expected in a committee type approach the centers were not established and the JCS missed an opportunity to fill the doctrinal void.

As a result of the failure to initiate the Joint Centers for doctrine, the JCS directed each service to develop doctrine to cover their own requirements for joint operations. As one might expect, this was done with little or no coordination and the results were conflicting doctrine. A comparison of Army Field Manual FM 100-5, Operations, Sep, 1954 and Air Force Manual AFM 1-2, Basic Doctrine, 1 Apr, 1954 produced 16 major areas of doctrinal conflict. A few significant examples are:

Utilization of Forces: Army--Command of all air land and sea forces is normally vested in the Army Commander. Air Force--The service with dominant interest has the primary role with the other services in a supporting role.

Land Power, Air Power and Strategy: Army--All wars are finally decided on land and air power is used to support the Army. Air Force--Air power has become the dominant implement of war and traditional surface power (land and sea) are of extremely limited use.
Airborne Operations: Army--The theater commander should establish an airborne unified command to plan and execute airborne operations. He would command all airborne forces in the theater. Air Force--There is no need for special commands or arrangements for airborne operations. The normal theater chain-of-command can properly manage these operations.(15)

As stated the objective of the National Security Act of 1947 was the unification of the Armed Forces of the United States. From the actions of Congress in 1986 it is obvious that the objective has not been reached. Amazingly, the recommendations of three Army War College students, Class of 1952, in their individual studies noted doctrinal problems and suggested changes not unlike the directives in the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The frustrations of many well intentioned leaders can best be explained by the following quote from General George C. Marshall: "Even under the stress of war, agreement has been reached in the Joint Chiefs of Staff at times only by numerous compromises and after long delays, and coordination in material and administrative matters has largely been forced by circumstances arising out of war, and then only incompletely...Current events have reinforced my view that the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not be genuinely effective in peacetime as a coordinating agency..."(16)
KOREAN WAR

When the Korean War was thrust on a surprised United States the National Security Act of 1947 had been in effect for three years. There was still no joint doctrine to direct the over-all efforts of the U.S. military forces. This void was even more critical when the United Nations responded by sending forces which turned a joint operation into a combined force. Neither of these factors were new to the commander, General Douglas MacArthur who had commanded the same types of operations in the Pacific Theater of World War II. We were fortunate to have his experience at the beginning of this war.

The Inchon landing was a true joint operation with the Navy providing the sealift for an Army/Marine amphibious assault under the cover of the Air Force. While no doctrine existed, all of the key leaders had participated in joint amphibious operations in World War II and with MacArthur present there was no question about unity of command and who was in charge. This invasion was one of the most daring and successful of any such joint operation in history. This does not imply that all went smoothly, as there were numerous serious problems. The landing was made by X Corps, a newly formed unit commanded by LTG Edward M. Almond. General Almond was directed by General MacArthur to plan the invasion at Inchon for his Corps of the 1st U.S. Marine Division and the U.S. Army's 7th Infantry Division. This was indeed a Joint Task Force! On his planning staff he had an Air Force representative from General Stratmeyer's Far East Air Force headquarters and a Navy representative from Admiral Joy's Navy headquarters in
Tokyo. When disagreements surfaced, and many did, they had to go to General MacArthur for resolution. (17)

After the short and difficult planning time the Inchon landing was executed. An agreement made during planning prevented General Almond from taking command of forces ashore until half of the landing force was on land. Although he went ashore on the first day he did not receive command until the fifth day when the 50% level was reached. Admiral Doyle, the Amphibious Commander, retained command of the Marine division on the ground for the first five days, delaying the attack toward Seoul. (18)

After assuming command of his corps ashore General Almond's joint problems did not end. He had trouble with the Marine Division Commander, Major General Smith, from the beginning. Every order was questioned on doctrinal differences. While General Smith never openly disobeyed General Almond, he did delay and avoid compliance. On one occasion General Smith refused to allow his amphibious tractors (AMTRAKs) to carry a regiment of the 7th Infantry Division across the Han River because "Those AMTRAKs are U.S. Marine property." General Almond's reply that "they are the property of the U.S. Government" ended the debate. (19)

The Korean War was a prime example of our absolute reliance on joint operations in every military action. There are countless recorded incidents that clearly display that the lack of forceful joint doctrine caused unnecessary problems and on some occasions led to disaster. We should have learned from this conflict but as is too frequently the case, history was recorded but its lessons were not thoroughly incorporated into doctrine.
The war in Vietnam gave us the next opportunity to properly document joint doctrine. "The early U.S. command and control organization for directing and administering American assistance for Vietnam was influenced by World War II and Korean precedents." (20) The initial joint headquarters was organized following the command and control apparatus published in JCS PUB 2. As the war increased in size and U.S. military units became actively engaged in combat, the command and control organization changed at least four times.

In 1962 the CINCPAC directed that the Air Force 315th Air Division in Japan exercise control over all airlift supply assets in the system, and supply a cargo group to do actual airlift in Vietnam. The Air Force placed the required cargo group under the 2nd Air Division, the Vietnam area Air Component Command. This arrangement appeared to solve the airlift problems until the Air Force decided it should control the Army's Caribou aircraft. They declared that CINCPAC had directed them to control and coordinate all airlift assets in Vietnam and demanded control of all Army aviation. (21) This problem was elevated to JCS where, in order to save the majority of its aviation assets for the ground commander, the Army gave the Caribou to the Air Force. (22)
The above is only an example of frequent service disagreements. A good synopsis of the over-all inter-service problems was best written by the BDM Corporation in 1980 when they stated; "Having ignored much of the French experience, many of the initial US counterinsurgency concepts and programs were inappropriate, and that unfortunate situation was compounded by an excess of competition and an insufficiency of coordination and cooperation among US services and agencies."(23) This same document goes on to say; "Awkward and ineffective command and control relationships prevailed throughout the war despite the fact that the ineffectiveness of those command relationships had been pointed out frequently..."(24)

The command and control of U.S. forces became very confused and contributed to the disagreements between services. General Westmoreland, commander of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), had Air Force and Navy component commanders in his sub-unified command. For air and naval operations in South Vietnam he had command and directive authority but for any military operations outside that geographic area, CINCPAC directed the action. Air Force and Navy units under MACV command received many operational orders from CINCPAC.(25)

During most of the war there were seven separate air organizations; U.S. Army aviation, U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Command (TAC) and Strategic Air Command (SAC), U.S. Navy tactical air forces, U.S. Marine tactical aviation, the Vietnamese Air Force and the CIA's Air-America. All of these had their own command and control procedures and decidedly different doc-
trine. (26) This situation led to numerous inter-service battles for control of aviation assets. There never was a solution to the problem.

The formation of the Mobile Riverine Force was yet another example of a doctrinal void. When General Westmoreland proposed the idea he designated the 9th Infantry Division as the ground element. The Navy provided a River Patrol Force, CTF 116. Immediately an argument began over who should command the Joint Task Force. Although this force would constantly operate well inland, the Navy wanted to command the organization. After fruitless attempts to reason with each other a compromise was reached. The Army and Navy units would be commanded separately with the Navy "providing close support through procedures of mutual coordination." (27) This was another case in our long history of relying on mutual understanding and neglecting the principle of unity of command.

Volumes have been written about the inefficiencies of our command and control and operational effectiveness in Vietnam. We entered and departed that war without any definitive joint doctrine.

GRENADA

The rescue/invasion of the island of Grenada was our most recent, joint combat operation. Most factual information on this operation remains classified yet the joint doctrinal void was apparent in this limited conflict. Until the later stages of
the operation there was no Ground Component Commander yet, the major portion of the action was on land. On the ground there were two battalions of U.S. Army Rangers, approximately two brigades from the 82nd Airborne Division, a Marine Battalion Landing Team and assorted special operations forces detachments. All of this and no ground component commander? This situation could have contributed to the fratricide incidents which occurred during the operation.

Not only was the command arrangement contrary to what is published in JCS PUB 2 for the organization of a Joint Task Force, but we experienced the same inability to communicate between services that have existed for decades. Infantry units needing fire support were unable to talk to Navy ships and aircraft receiving nonstandard instructions led to confusion and quite possibly unnecessary casualties. While we accept that there is a void in joint doctrine it should be unacceptable that the little doctrine we have is not followed.

ENDNOTES

2. Ibid. p.7.
3. Ibid. p.8.

5. Picknell, p.8.


8. Ibid. pp. 15-16.


13. Ibid. p. 3.


15. Ibid. pp. 40-42.


18. Ibid. pp. 48-49.

19. Ibid. pp. 54-55.


23. Ibid. p. iii.
24. Ibid.
27. Eckhardt, pp. 78-80.
CHAPTER III
DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT

In 1986 the Congress again passed sweeping legislation that forced the reorganization of the Defense Department. This law, better known as the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, is not as revolutionary as the National Security Act of 1947 but could have equal or greater effect on the defense establishment. It gives much greater authority to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) who now owns the joint staff, requires input and agreement on budgeting from the warfighting CINCs, directs the CJCS to publish joint doctrine and dictates very stringent education and experience criteria for Joint Staff Officers (JSO). Congress has legislated itself to specifically tell the armed services how to do their job.

Such a wide-sweeping change did not just develop from a whim. Numerous studies were conducted seeking more efficient and effective ways to manage the program and budgeting system in DOD. Probably the study that had the greatest influence on this law was, "Defense Organization: The Need to Change", published in
October 1985 by the Senate Armed Services Committee. Some of the major problem areas noted were:

*Too much emphasis on functions instead of missions, which has inhibited the effective integration of service capabilities along mission lines.

*A predominance of service interests over joint interests within DOD, precluding the most efficient allocation of defense resources.

*Inadequate quality of personnel, both in political appointees and joint duty personnel.(1)

These points compared with the major changes noted above go hand-in-hand. We in the armed forces should not have been shocked by this Congressional action. The history of our failure to act on joint doctrine should have indicated that even Congress has a limit on patience. There are many who believe that this is only a beginning and that Congress is not finished and will reform our entire national security process.(2)

**JOINT REQUIREMENTS**

This new law is very specific in detailing requirements for insuring a joint approach to all operations in our armed forces. In a description of the functions of the CJCS the act states; "...develop doctrine for the joint employment of the armed forces..." Congress realized that forcing the services to function together would be ineffective and inefficient without properly established joint doctrine. Based on the detailed list of
his functions the CJCS reorganized his staff and added a J-7 directorate as the "focal point for interoperability with responsibilities for joint doctrine, exercises and operational plans." (3) He also added the J-8 directorate "for analysis of force structure and resources..."(4) With the areas of responsibility for each of these new directorates it is clear that they must work together because changing force structure will usually have great effect on doctrine. If these two do not constantly coordinate there will develop a conflict between their functional areas.

At least every three years the Secretary of Defense is required to submit a report to Congress that addresses, "changes in the nature of threat, unnecessary duplication of effort among the services, and changes in technology that can be effectively applied to warfare." The first such report is due in October 1988 and should be closely scrutinized by Congress because it will be the first such document since the 1949 Key West Paper.(5) This document should provide the foundation for what each service must do in joint operations and therefore demand the development of joint doctrine.

This law should force DOD to reevaluate its method of producing joint doctrine. It directs joint considerations in everything from planning, programming and budgeting to promotions. These requirements, and only a few have been written here, clearly dictate action and the CJCS has taken the first step by establishing the J-7. Time will tell if the J-7 can publish solid doctrine.
JOINT EDUCATION

The requirements for joint education are included in the Joint Officers Personnel Policy portion of the Act. This particular area has received the greatest amount of resistance and requests for changes, relief and delays. All of the services fear this provision will greatly alter their traditional officer professional development methods. The requirement to create a "joint specialty" by itself is not too radical, but the qualifications to receive the specialty are tough. To become a Joint Staff Officer (JSO) an officer must attend one of the National Defense University's courses of instruction and then serve a complete (4 year) tour in a designated Joint Duty Assignment (JDA). The tough point is the stipulation that an officer cannot be selected for promotion to flag officer unless he is a certified JSO. There have of course been exceptions granted to this requirement but there will, according to Congress be no waivers granted after 1990.

The joint service requirements have certainly changed the professional officers perception of joint duty! The preference for attending one of the National Defense University courses instead of your own service staff college or war college has already become evident. The service war colleges are trying to get their curriculums certified for "joint credit" but this is receiving resistance from Congress. Currently Congressman Ike Skelton is studying the military officer education system and is seriously questioning separate service orientation at the war college.
level. Today, if an officer does not attend the Armed Forces Staff College, National War College, or the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, he cannot get qualified as a JSO. This situation calls for either a change to the law or a major over-haul of the Senior Service College system. I do not expect any willingness in Congress to change the law!

ENDNOTES

2. Ibid. p.
3. Ibid. p.
4. Ibid. p.
5. Ibid. p.
CHAPTER IV
CURRENT JOINT DOCTRINE

Listing all of today's existing joint doctrine is a problem because there are basic disagreements as to what is really doctrine. You can find definitions in the dictionary but there is a difference between an English language description and something functional in the military. Some people believe that anything published in a military manual is doctrine. This approach would mean that all the material found in the JCS PUBs is doctrine. A quick look at these publications will quickly show that all that is written cannot be doctrine. JCS PUB 1 is a 405 page "Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms." The definition for doctrine in this manual is; "Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application."(1) This same publication has a separate definition for joint doctrine which says it is, "ratified by all four services and may be promulgated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff."(2) It makes no mention of being authoritative and there is the basic problem. The services have internal doctrine
that must be followed, but joint doctrine is at best an agreement to cooperate toward mission accomplishment.

How is joint doctrine produced? This is an interesting question that is not so easy to answer. The current system is for the organization or service with primary responsibility for an area to write the proposed doctrine. Working drafts are distributed to the services, unified and specified commands and the Joint Staff for review and concurrence. In the event of a non-concurrence the writer tries to resolve the divergent views and if unable to do so, forwards the issues to JCS for resolution. After a decision has been reached and the doctrine is approved, it is published. One important, but infrequently followed, point is that each service is tasked to ensure that its doctrine and procedures are consistent with joint doctrine published by the CJCS.(3)

A close look at these joint doctrinal manuals gives a good picture of how watered down our current system forces them to be. JCS Pub. 8, "Doctrine For Air Defense From Oversea Land Areas"; JCS Pub. 9, "Doctrine For The United Defense Of The United States Against Air Attack"; JCS Pub. 16, "Doctrine For Joint Riverine Operations" all have the same shortcomings. These manuals explain how important it is to save the nation, support national policy, give explanations and definitions of terms and provide explicit information on a variety of possible command arrangements. The problem is they never tell how we are supposed to fight—that is what doctrine should do!
We currently have the CJCS responsible for development of joint doctrine and he executes that responsibility through his J-7. The National Defense University, with three courses of instruction, is responsible for teaching joint doctrine and operations to the senior leaders of our armed forces. Even with close coordination between the two, there is a good chance that the schools are not teaching what the doctrinal writers are working on. As mentioned earlier in this paper, there are many areas of service doctrine that are in direct conflict with each other. Determining if service doctrine conforms with joint doctrine is extremely difficult when the joint publications are so vague and lack directive authority. The bottom line is that the joint schools should be more involved in the production of joint doctrine and reviewing service doctrine for conformity.

U.S. ARMY TRADOC

The U.S. Army currently has a headquarters that is responsible for all of its doctrine. This is the Training And Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The systematic approach to doctrine development in this organization is unique and is worth a closer inspection. This headquarters has all Army service schools (minus the U.S. Army War College and USMA) subordinate to it. Each of the schools is given proponency for doctrinal areas and they either write or review/revise all manuals in their functional areas.
In what is called School Model '83 the schools are staffed with officer instructors to both teach and write doctrine. The theory here is that the person best qualified to produce doctrine is the instructor of the subject. If the instructors are senior, experienced officers this system is sound. Assignment of less qualified individuals or a shortage of personnel can rapidly degrade the quality of doctrine. To guard against these potential quality problems the system has an automatic review process within each school.

For major capstone doctrinal manuals (i.e. FM 100-5) TRADOC has a Doctrinal Review Approval Group (DRAG), composed of the Commander of TRADOC and his DCS Doctrine and the Commandants of all the schools. At the DRAG a proponent school commandant must present a new doctrinal manual and it is approved on a page by page basis. Frequently the proponent is sent home with numerous revisions or complete rewrites. This system ensures at a very high level that the doctrine produced in the Army is sound and executable.

TRADOC has attacked the problem of determining what is doctrine and what is tactics, techniques and procedures. They have directed the proponent schools to separate doctrinal manuals as Field Manuals (FM) and call all others Training Manuals or Circulars. Very definitive guidance was provided to describe what doctrine is and expectations are that less than 10% of existing manuals will end up as FMs. This effort should, over time, end current confusion about what is doctrine.
In TRADOC, the Army has put a four star general in charge of producing valid doctrine. It has worked and is improving the quality of its doctrine every year. By keeping teachers close to new doctrine the schools are sending officers to the field well versed in the latest word. This is a system that the CJCS should consider to execute his responsibility to develop joint doctrine.

JCS J-7

As previously mentioned, the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 caused some important changes in the staff organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A major addition was the J-7 Directorate, the Director for operational Plans and Interoperability. He has a Deputy Director for Interoperability who supervises the Joint Doctrine and Education Division. (Figure 1) This division has a Doctrine Branch which is responsible for executing the requirement of the CJCS to publish joint doctrine. (4) The branch is staffed with six officers, two Army, two Navy and one each from the Marines and Air Force. (5)

The Doctrine Branch has worked against the usual resistance to change but has developed a Joint Doctrine Master Plan and a draft capstone doctrinal manual, JCS Pub. 1-01. (6) The master plan was coordinated with all services and CINCs who provided over 100 recommendations. Through a series of conferences and working groups the methodology for development of joint doctrine was formalized. (7)
Joint doctrine will be written by "lead agents". The lead agent is the proponent for a manual or publication. At a worldwide joint doctrine conference a list of 35 projects was agreed on and lead agents assigned for each. Each service, five CINCs, five JCS directorates, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Defense University have been designated lead agents for various projects. The 35 projects are 11 ongoing or revisions plus 24 new documents. Additionally six areas where each of the services have doctrinal manuals will be incorporated into the JCS PUB system. The projects have been divided into two groups with Category I projects receiving priority to be initiated as soon as possible. Category II projects will not be started until higher priority issues are completed.

The joint doctrine development process remains as previously stated, with lead agents writing the manual and staffing and coordinating with the other services, staffs and CINCs. Unresolvable differences eventually must be decided by the CJCS. This means that a majority of joint doctrine will be written by a single service and not by a joint staff or team. There is no review authority to enforce the requirement for the services doctrine to conform with joint doctrine. The joint doctrine of the future will continue to promulgate service views.

ENDNOTES

2. Ibid. p. 200.


5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

The United States has lived a charmed life during wars, conflicts and joint operations. Historically we have failed to publish joint doctrine that guides and directs the actions of commanders in joint operations. Service rivalries and differences have generally been the cause of this failure. National pride and an honest desire to protect the United States has resulted in excellent coordination and cooperation during times of war.

There is a real need for the development of authoritative joint doctrine that clearly directs the actions of joint operations in peace or war. The Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the subsequent DOD Directive 5100.1 both acknowledge this need and direct the CJCS to develop joint doctrine. The establishment of a J-7 Directorate with a doctrine office initiated a high level attempt to meet the CJCSs responsibilities in this area. The J-7 recognized the need to separate doctrinal manuals from administrative directives and established a new numbering system for JCS publications. The development of a draft capstone
doctrinal manual, JCS Pub. 1-01, written by the J-7 is a great step toward the proper production of joint doctrine.

Unfortunately, a decision has been made to use the lead agent method of assigning proponenty for the 35 identified doctrinal projects. This means that many of the manuals will be written by individual services instead of joint teams and will probably fail to properly address the subject in a non-biased manner. The chance of producing authoritative doctrine has been greatly reduced because of the decision to use the lead agent methodology. There will probably be "joint" doctrinal manuals that closely resemble existing service manuals and will fail to adequately consider and address the capabilities and limitations of the organizations and equipment of the other services. If my predictions here are accurate, we will fail to fill the joint doctrinal void.
I strongly recommend a reevaluation of the current lead agency proponent methodology. Joint doctrine should be written by joint writing teams who can actively coordinate capabilities and limitations of all services. Additionally this approach should help avoid the need to promulgate a service position thus allowing open, unbiased thought.

The logical location for joint writing teams is the campuses of the National Defense University (NDU). This education system should be staffed with experienced Joint Staff Officers (JSOs) in designated joint billets. These officers should also be instructors. This arrangement would insure that instruction on joint doctrine, techniques and procedures is current and technically correct. If the NDU is to be our major source of JSOs we should make it the proponent agent for the majority of joint doctrinal development.

Adopting this recommendation will cause an interservice political storm but is necessary. If we are to learn from our own history we must have the fortitude to face this issue and
make the tough decision. If we believe what we constantly say, that we must fight jointly, then we owe it to our future commanders to provide them with well developed, authoritative doctrine to guide them through the difficulties of joint operations. We need joint war-fighting doctrine!
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