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AD-A195 585

COMMAND, CONTROL AND LEADERSHIP:  
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE EMPLOYING TWO CASE STUDIES

BY

COLONEL NOBLE H. SEVIER II, DE

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| REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |                       | READ INSTRUCTIONS<br>BEFORE COMPLETING FORM                                                |
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| 1. REPORT NUMBER                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. | 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER                                                              |
| 4. TITLE (and Subtitle)<br>Command, Control and Leadership: A Historical<br>Perspective Employing Two Case Studies                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |                       | 5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED<br>Individual Study Project<br>Intended for Publication |
| 7. AUTHOR(s)<br>Colonel Noble H. Sevier II                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |                       | 6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER                                                           |
| 9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS<br>US Army War College<br>Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |                       | 8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)                                                             |
| 11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS<br>Same                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |                       | 10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK<br>AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS                             |
| 14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |                       | 12. REPORT DATE<br>29 March 1988                                                           |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |                       | 13. NUMBER OF PAGES<br>31                                                                  |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |                       | 15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)<br>Unclassified                                       |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |                       | 15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING<br>SCHEDULE                                              |
| 16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)<br>Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |                       |                                                                                            |
| 17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |                       |                                                                                            |
| 18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |                       |                                                                                            |
| 19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |                       |                                                                                            |
| 20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)<br>Command, control and leadership play an integral role in all military operations. This study looks at the components and characteristics of C2 and leadership as well as the strengths and weaknesses of each by using two case studies. The first case study is the battle of King's Mountain fought over 200 years ago by a force of American militia against a supposedly better equipped, lead, and trained British force. The American force was victorious, partly as a result of superb leadership. The second case study is the<br>continued |                       |                                                                                            |

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Grenada Rescue Operation. This operation was conducted on extremely short notice by a joint task force which had numerous C2 problems. Again, these problems were overcome by superb leadership. Success of our current and future military leaders will depend on a thorough understanding of the relationship of command, control, and leadership. This challenge exists today as it did over 200 years ago during the founding of our nation.

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

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COMMAND, CONTROL AND LEADERSHIP:  
A Historical Perspective Employing Two Case Studies

An Individual Study Project  
Intended for Publication

by

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US Army War College  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013  
29 March 1988

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| Availability Codes |                                     |
| Dist               | Avail and/or special                |
| A-1                |                                     |

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Noble H. Sevier, II, Col, DE

TITLE: COMMAND, CONTROL, AND LEADERSHIP: A Historical Perspective  
Employing Two Case Studies

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 29 March 1988      PAGES: 25      CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

→ Command, control and leadership play an integral role in all military operations. This study looks at the components and characteristics of C2 and leadership as well as the strengths and weaknesses of each by using two case studies. The first case study is the battle of King's Mountain fought over 200 years ago by a force of American militia against a supposedly better equipped, lead, and trained British force. The American force was victorious, partly as a result of superb leadership. The second case study is the Grenada Rescue Operation. This operation was conducted on extremely short notice by a joint task force which had numerous C2 problems. Again, these problems were overcome by superb leadership. Success of our current and future military leaders will depend on a thorough understanding of the relationship of command, control, and leadership. This challenge exists today as it did over 200 years ago during the founding of our nation. SDC

## Purpose

This essay examines the relationship of command, control, and leadership from a historical perspective by incorporating two case studies, one from the American Revolution and one from the most recent U.S. military action, the Grenada Rescue Operation. A review of current literature was conducted in order to provide a context for the discussion of command, control, and leadership. Each term is defined and the functions and activities associated with each term is discussed. The strengths and problems of command, control, and leadership are addressed in analyzing their respective components.

Success on the Airland battlefield depends on a thorough understanding by all commanders of the relationships of command, control, and leadership. This challenge exists today as it did over 200 years ago during the founding of our nation. A truism spoken by one of our great military leaders demonstrated his understanding of the challenge. Gen Patton said, "Wars may be fought by weapons, but they are won by men. It is the spirit of the men who follow and the man who leads that gains victory."<sup>1</sup>

## Introduction

Command is defined in JCS Pub 1 as the authority that an individual in the military service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using all

available resources organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.

"Command is the primary means whereby the vision is imparted to the organization. Command is the world of perspective and timely action. Its characteristics are:

- \* Well formed vision and clearly communicated intent.
- \* Clearly understood goals and objectives.
- \* Quality, low-volume communications throughout the command.
- \* Concept expression of tasks.
- \* Emphasis on success and rewards.
- \* Focus on the future.
- \* Timely involvement to ensure results."<sup>2</sup>

"Command is the principle ingredient of and the foundation for successful organization performance--for mission accomplishment. Together with its component structure--the chain of command--it provides specific task assignments, a precise line of control and communication, and a clearly identifiable audit trail of responsibility and performance."<sup>3</sup>

In contrast, control is a process used to establish limits and provide structure. Control provides the commander the means by which to reduce risk by dealing with the uncertainties inherent in organization operations. "The control process is characterized by:

- \* High-volume, routine communications.
- \* Coordination activities between elements internal and

external to a unit having related responsibilities.

\* Structure, which limits uncertainty.

\* Emphasis on efficiency as a goal."<sup>4</sup>

"Control is defined in JCS Pub 1 as the process by which commanders and staffs ensure that activities of subordinate and supporting units are consistent with the will and intent of the commander. Control is normally accomplished as feedback to the command process through situation and status reporting by subordinates."<sup>5</sup>

Not only does JCS Pub 1 define command and control separately but it also defines them in combination. This is the proper perspective as command and control go hand-in-hand. Command works downward while control responds upward. Together they are the process whereby commanders apply military leadership to employ and sustain combat power as we will see in the first case study.

Command and Control is defined in JCS Pub 1 as "the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed thru an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission."

It has been said that the ultimate aims of a command and control system is to effectively direct one's forces against an enemy, imposing the commander's will on the opposing command structure and winning the battle.<sup>6</sup> The commander through this

system will be able to communicate with his subordinates and superiors thereby enabling him to evaluate the progress or lack thereof not only friendly forces but also the enemy. Two tenets of Air-Land Battle are initiative and synchronization. When one speaks of these tenets the issue becomes one of control, initiative, innovation, flexibility and responsiveness. While centralized control encompasses synchronization at division and above, decentralized control encompasses initiative at brigade and below. This results in the maximum use of available combat power at the right time and right place.

"The more fluid the battlefield, the more important and difficult it will be to identify decisive points and to focus combat power there. Under such conditions, it is imperative that the overall commander's intent and concept of operations be understood throughout the force. Communications will be intercepted by enemy action at critical times and units will frequently have to fight while out of contact with higher headquarters and adjacent units. Subordinate leaders will be expected to act on their own initiative within the framework of the commander's intent."<sup>7</sup> The command and control system must facilitate freedom to operate, delegation of authority, and leadership from any critical point on the battlefield as we will see in the two case studies.

One important aspect of current military thought concerning command and control is that mission orders should only specify what must be done without dictating how it must be done. This was emphasized repeatedly by VADM Joseph Metcalf III, Commander of Joint task Force 120 for the Grenada operation

during an interview conducted on 2 Dec 87 at the US Army War College.

As noted earlier, command and control is a complex endeavor, consisting of a number of individual elements. Command and control, like the military missions it supports, is concerned, primarily, with the conduct of war, which can be simulated in peacetime. Therefore, the command and control system must stress standardized training to ensure complete understanding between leaders and units.

The National defense University of Command and Control Research Program dated June 1986 further defines this area:

"The central element in any command and control endeavor is the human element. Volumes of information have been written about leadership styles; less has been researched and written concerning the influence of cognitive style of the decision-making process. Individuals assimilate and evaluate information in different ways, influenced by both internalized objectives and external environment. The capability of the human mind to absorb, evaluate, and use information can have significant impact upon the decision process. The command and control system can involve a substantial number of people, each with individual objectives and ways of using information. The sum and structure of the human element comprises the organization for command and control. The presumption has been that the command and control organization is structured to meet the requirements of the mission, however

defined."<sup>8</sup>

The command and control system supporting a Corps land combat operation extends across the entire set of Corps units. Yet each individual unit has its own requirement for processing information and making decisions as determined by its own commander. The Corps commander decides on an operation based upon the information known to him. His headquarters prepares and distributes plans and orders. Stimulated by the Corps directives, enemy action, and his own capabilities, Division commanders come to decisions as to how to accomplish the directed tasks. Both Corps and Division assets are feeding information to Corps and Division headquarters. Internal to each headquarters a series of smaller individual decision processes occurs, ie, a staff officer decides to portray information in a certain way. The overall command and control process has many aspects which must be considered individually and as a whole if one is to understand and influence the process.

Probably the most significant impact upon the command and control process has been modern technology. Technology has provided a capability to overwhelm the command and control system with information. There remains a need to provide the most effective means by providing decision-makers with information which is relevant to the decisions required and nature of the decision-maker. The time-frame available for assessing a situation, evaluating options, and selecting courses of actions has been dramatically reduced, making the effective management of information an even more critical task.

FM 100-5 provides us with the appropriate transition

point from command and control to leadership which is the last term to be defined in this opening discussion. One of the ten imperatives of Airland Battle is--Ensure Unity of Effort. "The fundamental prerequisite for unity of effort within army organizations is an effective system of command which relies on leadership to provide purpose, direction, and motivation; emphasizes well-understood common doctrine, tactics, and techniques as well as sound unit operating procedures (SOPs); and takes effective measures to limit the effects of friction. Leaders set the example, communicate their intent clearly, build teamwork, promote sound values, accept risks. Command and control systems emphasize implicit coordination measures. Missions are clear and concise. Plans are simple. Control mechanisms are easy to apply, understand, and communicate. Liaison among units must be automatic and effective."<sup>9</sup>

Its interesting to note that leadership is not defined in JCS Pub 1, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated terms, dated 1 June 1987. One cannot help but wonder why leadership was not defined for military scholars have studied this tract for centuries.

Central to any discussion of senior leadership and command is the concern with the relationship between leading and managing. If those in senior leadership positions are to foster creative, innovative, risk-taking leaders among their subordinates, they must resolve the conflict of leadership and management by balancing their use appropriately. We need management skills for efficiency. We need warrior skills to win. Just as command and control have their place, so do leadership and management.<sup>10</sup>

Obviously the discussion of this relationship between leadership and management has come about in recent years due to our more complex organizations, and the view by the American people that commanders are responsible not only for all personnel under their command, but also for all resources required to accomplish the mission. In today's Army, management and leadership are almost never employed separately. Leadership is an influence process and refers to motivational relationships between the leader and the led, while management is resource control. Organizational success is an outcome of many activities, processes, and influences, one of which is leadership.

FM 100-5 states that the most essential element of combat power is competent and confident leadership. The commander influences his combat power down through the chain of command to maximize the maneuver, firepower and protection of his unit. All leaders must be dedicated to being the best in their field, to know and understand their soldiers and to know their enemy. They must act with courage, candor, commitment and competence.

Leadership is truly a complex process and is more than a list of characteristics. It is the art of influencing and motivating. There has not been found a single set of abilities or traits characteristic of all successful leaders, although the personal characteristics of individual leaders are certainly important. In his leadership role the modern commander strives to accomplish four tasks; provide the vision of what the organization should look like; design interdependencies between subordinate elements of the organization; articulate the Army ethic and individual values which form the organization's cul-

ture; establish effective information systems.<sup>11</sup>

FM 100-6 states that "leadership is the glue that binds all the elements of operational design into a coherent whole. Successful leadership results in understanding and commitment from subordinates for the purpose of accomplishing goals and objectives beyond that which is possible through the use of authority alone. A leader at the operational level of war must possess direct and indirect organizational skills. Their skills include:

- \* The ability to create policies and principles of operation that establish a positive command climate and cohesion throughout the organization.
- \* The ability to properly resource organizations and understand the long-term implications of this.
- \* The ability to mentor and coach subordinates.
- \* The ability to maintain effective lateral relationships with leaders and organizations when no authority exists or when different nationalities and cultures are involved.
- \* The ability to represent his organization to other government agencies and in fact the U.S. government when called upon to do so.
- \* The ability to effectively gain concensus in the decision process particularly as it applies to joint and combined operations."<sup>12</sup>

In the War Office's recently declassified 1950 publication, Conduct of War, it was stated that all commanders must have qualities of leadership, ie, "The will to dominate, together with the character that inspires confidence."<sup>13</sup> It's intere-

sting to note that the fifty-seven page publication only devoted 2 lines to the subject of leadership. Why? Is leadership so difficult to deal with? Can we not define it? Three recent articles have discussed the importance of leadership.

"Recently, military leadership studies have degenerated into the memorization of various management theories with heavy doses of communication feedback principles interwoven with counseling techniques." This is the opening sentence of Dr Don Chipman's article.<sup>14</sup> Dr Chipman strongly disagrees with this philosophy and examines leadership from the perspective of perhaps history's foremost military theoretician and practitioner! According to Clausewitz, command leadership was embodied in the nature of the military genius. This genius possessed two very distinct features. First was the embedment of a strong mind, termed character. Second was that only strong and intense individuals possessed the strength of will to sustain the troops in their effort to defeat the enemy. Clausewitz believed a great commander must be well educated, possess an imaginative and reflective intellect, a willingness to face powerful psychological pressures, make a decision and accept the responsibility for the actions.<sup>15</sup> Good leadership, therefore, was a product of certain aptitudes, intense emotions and must include life-long study, according to Dr Chipman.

Gen Don A Starry, USA Ret, in his article "Running Things," Parameters, September, 1987, states that military leaders in running things involve four fundamental factors that determine what is done and how it gets done: vision, strategy, operations and tactics. He also states the lesson for leaders is clear and

and unequivocal: to win it is necessary to seize the initiative, and the person running things is responsible for taking the initiative. He also notes the importance of training excellence. "Wars are won by the courage of soldiers, the quality of leadership they are provided, and the excellence of the training the soldiers, leaders and units have been through the battle."<sup>16</sup>

LTC Walter F. Ulmer Jr in his discussion of the Army's new senior leadership doctrine brings in a new term: organizational climate which is defined as the shared feeling, a perception among members of a unit about what life is like. He feels there are three causes of the phenomenon of erratic uneven leadership. One, leaders that do not care; second, leaders that can't perform at the executive level (Peter Principle); last, a lack of finely honed skills in diagnosing, creating, and maintaining the necessary climate for sustained excellence.<sup>17</sup>

This introduction has defined command, control and leadership. The characteristics of each term has also been discussed. Before this opening discussion is concluded, two final points need to be brought in. First, the style of leadership individual commanders possess is based on their personality traits coupled with their character, knowledge, and experience. This is directly related to their command and control style also. For if our senior leaders understand their style of leadership they will understand why they lead and command the way they do. DA Pamphlet 600-69, Unit Climate Profile Commander's Handbook (1986) emphasizes this point. Our senior leaders need to be instructed on the tendencies for themselves and others to respond in somewhat predictable ways given their measurable personality make-

up and their position in the hierarchy.

The Army has started using personality assessment tests in leadership courses to assist officers better understand why they react the way they do to stressful and nonstressful situations within their command. The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator is one of the major assessment instruments which determines four indices of personality: Extroversion-Introversion, whether one prefers the external reinforcement or internal reinforcement; Sensing-Intuition, whether one prefers hard facts or imagination and all possibilities of a situation; Thinking-Feeling, whether one uses impersonal logic or emotions when processing information; Judging-Perceiving, whether one tends to analyze and categorize or responds to it flexibly and spontaneously.

A commander who is sensing and judging deals best with hard facts, tends to analyze all data, and may over control his unit. A feeling-perceiving commander is emotional, flexible, and runs a somewhat loose unit-without excessive controls. In both cases it would definitely help the command relationship if these personality traits of the commander were known by all members of commander's staff.

The second point is the relationship between command, control and leadership. Martin van Crevald states that command has two distinct elements: motivation and coordination.<sup>18</sup> Another perspective would be to substitute leadership for motivation and control for coordination. Command would still have two distinct elements and van Crevald's definition would still be valid. Command and control is the enabling process thru which commanders apply leadership to accomplish assigned missions.

Gen Joseph Stilwell commented once that the commander is conscious always of the responsibility on his shoulders of the relatives of the soldiers trusted to him, and of their feelings. He must act so that he can face those fathers and mothers without shame or remorse. How? By constant care, by meticulous thought and preparation, by worry, by insistence, on high standards in everything, by reward and punishment, by impartiality, by an example of calm and confidence.

#### Discussion/Case Studies

The first case study analyzing command, control and leadership involves the battle of King's Mountain during the American Revolution. King's Mountain was a battle of ultimate simplicity. (Map 1) King's Mountain is a mountainous ridge in Gaston county, North Carolina, and York Country, South Carolina. About 1.5 miles South of the line between the states, where the ridge is about 60 ft above the surrounding country and very narrow at the top, the battle of King's Mountain was fought on 7 October, 1780. The British forces consisted of about 100 Provincial Rangers and about 1,000 Loyalist militia under Maj Patrick Ferguson. The American force which was victorious, consisted of about 1,000 frontier militiamen under Cols William Campbell, Benjamin Cleveland, Isaac Shelby, John Sevier (5th Great Grandfather of author) and James Williams. The British loss is stated as 119 killed (including the commander), 123 wounded and 664 prisoners; the American loss was 28 killed (including Col Williams) and 62 wounded.<sup>19</sup>

In order to set the stage for this battle one must go back to September when Maj Patrick Ferguson, the British commanding

officer serving within this region of the Carolinas, sent the following message to the local people that "If they did not desist from their opposition to the British arms, he would march his army over the mountains, hang their leaders, and lay waste the country with fire and sword." When this reached Col Shelby he rode to Col Sevier's farm and they decided the only response was to appeal for volunteers and attack the British force first. No money was available to outfit all volunteers, approximately 250 men, so Col John Sevier went to the country entry-taker and asked him to advance funds he had collected for the sale of lands. The amount advanced was over \$12,000.<sup>20</sup> Col Sevier purchased the necessary supplies to outfit the men and proceeded to raise additional men since he did not know the size of the British force. Col Campbell was raising troops for another destination at the time, but after a second appeal, he agreed to join the expedition. With nearly 1000 men including 400 of Campbell's and 250 each of Sevier's and Shelby's assembled on 25 September, they marched eastward in search of the Tories. They were joined along the way by other North Carolina units until they had at least eight colonels, each with independent commands all from North Carolina except Campbell. At Shelby's proposal the officers elected Col Campbell as temporary commander on Oct 1. They took this step to avoid any thorny problems of seniority or jealousy among the North Carolina officers and also recognition of the fact that Campbell had brought the most men.<sup>21</sup>

Major Ferguson's observing eye was attracted to King's Mountain and regarded it an excellent camping place. Major Ferguson stated, that "he was on King's Mountain, that he was king of

that mountain, and God Almighty could not drive him from it."<sup>21</sup> His infatuation for military glory is the only explanation that can be given for Ferguson's conduct in remaining at King's Mountain in such an exposed position.

As the militiamen neared King's Mountain they met a woman who had just returned from the Tories camp. She gave a description that helped a great deal in forming the line of battle. Col Shelby advised his men "When we encounter the enemy, don't wait for the word of command. Let each one of you be your own officer, and do the very best you can, taking every care you can of yourselves. . ."<sup>22</sup> Here the commander's intent is fully explained. The battle plan was to surround the mountain thereby preventing the Tories from escaping. They reached King's Mountain the afternoon of 7 Oct 1780. They welcomed the rugged terrain as the trees and rocks would provide cover for their ascent and the open crest would expose their enemy to the deadly aim of the long rifles. They were truly at home among woods and ledges as most of Campbell's men had fought in the Indian Wars.

They approached the mountain in two large columns. Each column then subdivided into two small columns with the center columns commencing the battle with a tremendous shout. (A rallying cry and a form of individual leadership.) Their approach was so rapid that Ferguson was caught by surprise. The first shots were fired by Tories who had sighted Shelby's approaching column. The Tories were mostly riflemen and the whole lot of them shot too high as a result of trying not to expose themselves to return fire. After three charges, Col Sevier and his men ascended the Western slope and reached the summit. The inventor

of the Ferguson rifle, the man who was one of the finest mark-  
man in the British Army had no choice but to defend King's Moun-  
tain with the bayonet rather than the musket!<sup>24</sup> But the bayonet  
proved disastrous. Major Ferguson seemed to be everywhere  
blowing his whistle and rallying Tory militia to resist and  
give battle. Cutting and slashing with his sword in a last  
desperate assault to break through the patriots lines, his sword  
broke just as he faced Sevier's column. Along the mountains a  
shot rang out and Major Ferguson dropped from his horse.

The battle continued as the patriots tightened their en-  
circlement. But without Ferguson's encouragement the Tories  
panicked. White flags of surrender fluttered among the smoke  
and confusion. When the Tories mounted a flag carrier on a  
gray horse who rode towards the Americans in a token of surrend-  
er, he was quickly shot down. A second attempt at surrender  
resulted in the same outcome. The third escaped unhurt due to  
the American officers using their endeavors to stop the men from  
firing.<sup>25</sup> Col Campbell's men were still engaged in battle about  
one quarter of a mile away and word was sent that the Tories  
had surrendered. The battle lasted slightly over one hour which  
is surprising considering the Tories advantage of high ground  
and superior rifles.

One additional aftermath of the battle needs to be discus-  
sed. On the second night after the battle, a courtmartial was  
held to try some notorious Tories (prisoners) for horse steal-  
ing, burning and numerous other crimes. Thirty-nine men were  
condemed to be hung. The executions commenced forthwith. The  
lamentations and shrieks of the condemed were horrifying.<sup>26</sup> Cols

Shelby and Sevier went to Col Campbell who was superintending the execution and told him of their determination to stop the hangings as they were sick of the sight of human misery. He opposed it but finally conceded after the ninth man was hung.

This battle provides us with an interesting case study for command, control, and leadership. The American force was composed of at least eight separate commands or units. The individual commanders recognized the coordination problems this could cause in combat and early on appointed one overall commander, Col Campbell. Each unit still fought as a unit thereby keeping their integrity as a fighting force and increasing their will to win. The battle plan was simple: surround King's Mountain and fight until the Tory force was defeated. The objective being to attain the crest of the mountain and prevent any Tories from escaping. Even Col Sevier's willingness to put up his own money for supplies demonstrated his will and determination not to submit to British control or suppression. One could state the strategic objective was to assert American will to resist British domination.

With the advantage clearly in favor of the British such as the high ground, prepared defensive positions, and superior number of forces, I feel the strength of the American forces clearly rests with the leadership of the American officers. Their will and determination coupled with their ability to motivate/lead enabled the Americans to overcome the stronger British force. Another strength was the willingness of the American force to continue the fight even though they had tried to ascend the mountain twice and were driven back each time only to try

again and on the third try they were successful. Upon reaching the top, they were again pinned down but responded with such intensity the British force surrendered.

At King's Mountain the militia's unique features were brought into full use and translated in assets for the patriots: their minimum organization with maximum individual responsibility; ability to attack from ambush; quick maneuverability. Their leaders exemplified much of the natural authority, unhesitating militancy, and tactical skill shown by ancient chieftains. They kindled the spirit, initiated the plans, and gave commands as to equals. Because these orders appealed to the men as being wise and practical, they gave unquestioned loyalty, obedience, and trust.

As regards the means of control, there were no drums, trumpets, or flags. Only messengers were available to communicate with other units. The officers not only had problems preventing their soldiers from shooting the Tories when they tried to surrender, but also after the battle when a courtmartial resulted in the hanging of prisoners which was covered earlier in this paper. Fortunately Cols Sevier and Shelby intervened in both instances and stopped their soldiers.<sup>27</sup> Overall, control during the battle did not appear as a problem until the end.

As I stated on page seventeen, I feel the leadership demonstrated by the officers was in keeping with the best of the military leadership at the time. Here men are asked to defend their young country without adequate supplies, money, personnel, and even training in how to fight in organized units. But time and time again during this period the will and determination

of the American forces kept the battle going until the British were overcome.

The British command, control and leadership system at King's Mountain was quite different than the American forces. Major Ferguson was in total control. His conduct was that of a hero and he did all he could to avert the impending disaster. His voice, his presence, and his whistle everywhere animated his men, either to renew their bayonet charges, or maintain a firm stand. But ultimately the position chosen by Ferguson and his unconquerable spirit not to flee or surrender led to his defeat. When Ferguson was shot and his centralized direction lost, his whole corps was thrown into total confusion; no effort was made after this event to resist the enemy's advance. Captain Depeyster, the next in command, immediately hoisted the white flag.

It is now appropriate to proceed to the next case study: Grenada, "Operation Urgent Fury." From a simplistic battle fought by militiamen without the leadership of professional officers, during the founding of our nation some 200 years ago we come to a modern complex operation. Probably the most significant change is in the technology and equipment employed by our armed forces today. As will be discussed even in today's armed conflicts command, control, and leadership play an integral role in the outcome of any battle. I will only provide an overview of the Grenada operation as this will suffice for the subject in this essay.

In the early morning hours of October 25, 1983, elements of a combined U.S.-Caribbean security force landed on the beaches south of Pearls Airport and parachuted into the Point Salines

Airport on the island of Grenada. Included were units from the United States, Barbados, Jamaica, and four member states on the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. U.S. forces provided airlift, sea and mechanized support for the operation.<sup>28</sup>

In order to understand the complexity of this operation one must look at the mix of units and services involved.

Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III was appointed commander of Joint Task Force 120 and designated to lead the Grenada operation 39 hours prior to H-hour. The actual planning went on for 11 days, including a Joint Chiefs of Staff warning order issued five days prior to D-day, to the appropriate commands. U.S. forces used during this operation consisted of a Marine Amphibious unit (battalion size), two Ranger Battalions (-), some Special Forces, and a brigade from the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division which deployed during the 25-27 October period. An additional brigade of the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division closed Grenada on the 28<sup>th</sup> to participate in mop-up operations which lasted another three days.<sup>29</sup> From the top down Adm Metcalf emphasized he wanted participation by all services with a minimum of bureaucratic intervention and interservice wrangling.

The combined forces were under strict order to minimize casualties on all sides. U.S. casualties totaled 18 killed in action and 116 wounded in action. Grenadian casualties were 45 killed and 337 wounded. Of the Grenadian dead, 24 were civilians, including 21 killed in the accidental bombing of a mental hospital located next to an anti-aircraft installation. Among the roughly 800 Cubans on the island, 24 were killed in action and another 59 wounded. Five hundred ninety-nine American citizens

were safely evacuated at their request.<sup>30</sup>

The island of Grenada is essentially an oval, 20 miles long and 12 miles wide (see Map 20). The Marines were to assault the northern end of the island, specifically Pearls airport, while responsibility for the lower, southern half was assigned to the Army, specifically the Salines airport. The Cubans obtained a foothold in Grenada by agreeing and beginning to build the Salines airport, a modern 10,000 foot long runway and associated facilities.<sup>31</sup> The Army area also contained St. Georges, the principal town, the seat of government and economic activity.

The Pearls airport is a very short strip, located at the opposite end of the island, away from the principal city and tourist facilities.

The Army had expected to control the Salines airport area in the initial hours of the invasion. As it turned out, however, the Army did not have the area fully under control until well into the next day. Another aspect of the operation, which went awry almost immediately, was the rescue of Governor-General Schoon. The United States needed to deal with a legitimate government in Grenada, and the Governor-General was a key figure to its accomplishment. The defenders appeared to have had intelligence, because the rescue helicopters were met and repulsed by Cubans and Grenadians. A number of Navy SEALs did get into the Governor-General's house, but they were pinned down. Determining the enemy force was being directed from Fort Frederick, an old English fort set on high grounds overlooking the town, Fort Frederick was destroyed. This in essence destroyed the Cuban nerve center and was the psychological defeat that ended the Cubans will to fight. So,

in summary, by the end of the first day the American forces had rescued the university students and secured the airstrips in the south and north and had a force in the Governor-General's house.

On the second day the Marines continued moving south into the town of St Georges. Next was to rescue some students located in Grand Anse Beach area. Cubans were blocking the way so a combined arms force of Marine helicopters, Rangers, Navy air, and Navy gunfire support and artillery were used to accomplish the mission. Five hours later the students were boarding helicopters which took only 26 minutes for the trip to the Salines airport.

In only four days the island of Grenada was fully secured and the mission was complete. The Rangers left on the third day and the press arrived on the fourth.

This operation although complex and planned in an extremely short time frame went exceptionally well and represents a well coordinated, combined arms operation with excellent leadership top to bottom.

Looking at the command, control, and leadership of the Grenada operation reveals the complexity of combined operations. Leadership was not a problem at any level as all officers and NCO's were superb in carrying out their orders, and in leading their units into combat. Admiral Metcalf set the stage and set the example-- "take charge"--and he did. No one doubted from the beginning who was in control. If one thing overcame the problems of planning, organizing, and accomplishing the military mission it was leadership, which takes us back to the opening statement by Gen Patton that "Wars may be fought by weapons, but they are won by men. It

is the spirit of the men who follow and the man who leads that gain victory."

Another strength of this operation was that forces were assigned tasks that closely paralleled service training. It was the tactical key to the success of the operation. One of the most essential lessons that emerged from this operation was to reaffirm the old lesson that units should fight as they have been trained to fight.

There were problems in the command and control aspect of the Grenada operation. The Commander Task Force 120, Vice Admiral Metcalf selected his staff from the Second Fleet organization without Army representation, although, he later added augmentees from the Air Force, Army, Central Intelligence Agency, and the State Department. Early on the Army expressed mild consternation about the lack of Army representation because there were significant Army forces involved, both Rangers and the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne. To allay their own uneasiness, they sent one of their top division commanders, Major General Norm Schwarzkopf to serve as a "liaison officer." Eventually he became the deputy commander of CJTF 120. A single U.S. ground force commander would have further improved C<sup>2</sup> but was not appointed.

Operational Security (OPSEC) was a huge problem early on and was the cause of many of the C<sup>2</sup> coordination problems. Only a small number of commanders and staff officers were "cleared" to plan the Grenada Operation. Many officers were not briefed in the details and were left in a void. Numerous officers had to educate themselves which resulted in C<sup>2</sup> problems for the joint forces. Planning would have been improved if a representative joint staff

had been assembled to plan this joint contingency operation.

Obviously, the command and control structure was critical. Admiral Metcalf established from the start that he would coordinate forces and would tell commanders "what" to do rather than "how" to do it. He did expect each commander to brief him personally how he was going to carry out his assignment. This briefing also provided all participants the opportunity to understand how Adm. Metcalf would react, how they would react and most important to establish who was in charge. Adm. Metcalf also made a decision to allow free communications by service commanders to their bases. This created trust and credibility in the face of any conflicting reports from other sources.<sup>32</sup>

There were also numerous communication problems throughout the operation. Specifically there were problems with interoperability between the Army and Navy. Forces did not exchange frequencies, call signs, and recognition signals for any of the linkups, nor did they coordinate linkup points and maneuver. Excellent discipline and command at the small-unit level prevented friendly fire casualties.


One final point. This operation validated the necessity for common SOP's and common training for similar forces.

VADM Metcalf described how he spent his time during the first two days of the operation. The first day he spent 40% of his time answering questions from his superiors and 60% of his time working with the units in combat. The second day he spent 80% of his time answering questions from his superiors and only 20% with the units in combat due to the success of his task force and its limited objectives.


## SUMMARY

As discussed in both case studies, command, control, and leadership all play an integral role in any military operation. We have found that strong leadership has helped overcome problems in command and control even in this era of high tech. In analyzing the components of C<sup>2</sup> and leadership the strengths and problems associated with each case study have been discussed and form a reference for continued discussion. The comparisons of C<sup>2</sup> and leadership in those two case studies may seem like comparing apples and oranges but history does provide lessons from which all may learn. Times have changed but soldiers still follow orders and leaders still lead and neither will ever be replaced by technology.


Command, control, and leadership are separate components but are inseparable. Commanders must understand their relationship to their subordinates and soldiers must understand their relationship to their commanders. Strong leadership up and down the chain-of-command can overcome inherent C<sup>2</sup> weaknesses as demonstrated by the two case studies. The men and women serving in today's Army are members of a proud profession long in history and rich in heritage and tradition. Military service, over the long sweep of time, has been profoundly affected by great changes in human and scientific affairs. While technical skills of soldiers have changed, the essential leadership traits required of the military professional are the same today as those in the days of the founding of our nation over 200 years ago. The recognition of this linkage is vital in this day and age. In essence, understanding command, control, and leadership forms the basic foundation of command.



**POSITIONS AT TIME OF SURRENDER**



**OCTOBER 7, 1780  
BATTLE OF KINGS MOUNTAIN**



Map 2

ENDNOTES

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