THESIS

PRAGMATISM IN THE EAST ASIAN POLICY
OF THE UNITED STATES
BY
Richard D. Thompson
December 1987
Thesis Advisor: Claude A. Buss

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## Pragmatism in the East Asian Policy of the United States

**Thompson, Richard D.**

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There is an ongoing debate between political theorists as to whether "realism" or "idealism" should guide the formulation and implementation of America's foreign policy. In general, policymakers have been characterized by one or the other of these labels based upon a loose conception of their overall policy objectives. Such generalities, however, give inadequate weight to the fact that a policymaker's most solemn commitment is to pursue the national interest, regardless of any other personal inclination. It is the hypothesis of this paper that the foreign policy process is a pragmatic one, based on practical assessments of the best and most likely methods of achieving national objectives, rather than adherence to an underlying commitment to realism or idealism. This paper demonstrates this fact in a survey of significant instances in the history of America's relations with Asia where presidents and other senior officials were compelled to make pragmatic foreign policy decisions despite reputations or personal inclinations toward either realism or idealism.
Pragmatism in the East Asian Policy of the United States

by

Richard D. Thompson
Captain, United States Air Force
B.A., McKendree College, 1974

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Author: Richard D. Thompson
Approved by: Claude A. Buss, Claude A. Buss, Thesis Advisor
Edward A. Olsen, Edward A. Olsen, Second Reader
James J. Tritten, Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

James M. Fremgen, Acting Dean of Information and Policy Science
ABSTRACT

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. IDEALISM VERSUS REALISM IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

There is an ongoing argument between political theorists over the basic values which should provide the focus for the formulation of foreign policy. At the center of this question is a debate between "idealists" who call for a greater emphasis on morality in our policies, and "realists" who insist that policy should be guided by material interest.

The idealist position asserts that American foreign policy has historically been, and should continue to be based on principles that recognize equality between nations. According to this view, all nations, large and small, weak and strong are given equal status and endowed with juridical equality, equal sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Historian Frank Tannenbaum maintains these principles are a part of an American tradition tracing back directly more than 200 years - and indirectly much further. He explains that our policy of international cooperation "derives from the assumption that security rests upon cooperation, that cooperation is possible only among equals, that equality eliminates the basic reason for political disruption because those equal politically are coordinate in dignity and in rank." [Ref. 1] To those who might consider such notions
impractical and idealistic, Tannenbaum adds the caution:

"The fact that Germany and Japan have committed national suicide by constant adhesion to the doctrines (of Machiavelli, Richelieu, Bismark and Clemenceau) seems not to dampen the eloquence of those who should persuade us to abandon the beliefs and practices by which we have lived and prospered from the beginning." [Ref. 2]

The realist position has probably been best articulated by Hans Morgenthau in a series of articles and books written in the late 1940's and 1950's. Morgenthau's thesis is that power - primarily industrial and military power - is the means by which nations survive in an essentially competitive world, and that nations which neglect self-interest and national power will ultimately succumb to the influence and intimidation of other states which emphasize them. In his article "The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy: The National Interest vs. Moral Abstractions" [Ref. 3] he argues:

The fundamental error which has thwarted American foreign policy in thought and action is the antithesis of national interest and moral principles. The equation of political moralism with morality and political realism with immorality is itself untenable. The choice is not between moral principles and the national interest devoid of moral dignity, but between one set of moral principles divorced from political reality, and another set of moral principles derived from political reality. The basic fact of international politics is the absence of a society able to protect the existence, and to promote the interests of the individual nations. For the individual nations to take care of their own national interests is, then, a political necessity. There can be no moral duty to
neglect them, for as the international society is at present constituted, the consistent neglect of the national interest can only lead to national suicide.

There is also a third view which sees the debate not as a question of "either/or", but as a problem of political ethics. Here the problem involves a reconciliation of the necessity for protecting the interests of the group which it is the national leader's duty to serve, and the principle of loyalty to a greater set of values such as justice and equality. Reinhold Niebuhr accepts a certain amount of validity in both the realist and idealist points of view, but he suggests the possibility of a middle ground of limited "moral transcendence" over sterile interest. While nations cannot be expected to engage freely in generosity or self-sacrifice, they are capable of what Niebuhr calls "wise self-interest" based on the concurrence of their self-interests and the interests of general welfare. "This concurrence can be approximated only when interest is qualified by a loyalty and sense of justice that are found beyond interest, and when the components of interest which still remain are acknowledged." [Ref. 4]

Henry Kissinger arrives at basically the same conclusion, although approaching it from the opposite direction. In his book American Foreign Policy, he states that "principle, however lofty, must at some point be related to practice... Interest is not necessarily amoral; moral consequences can spring from interested acts." [Ref. 5]
When considering these differing perspectives, it can be seen that the influence of both moral principles and material interests on the formulation of American foreign policy cannot be denied. But in fact, they are much more compatible than the debate would suggest. It is only when one of these is promoted to the total exclusion of the other that a decision-maker betrays his mandate, for he is charged with an overall responsibility to preserve, protect and promote the nation, but to do so within the bounds of those values most basic to its national existence.

The constant interplay between these two factors during the foreign policy process keeps extreme actions within bounds. Moral principles keep the pursuit of material interests from becoming overly self-centered and destructive, while the necessity of looking after self-interest places a healthy perspective on idealism. Though American foreign policy may at times seem inconsistent as it wavers in response to these competing influences, the net result is a continuum of balanced policy reflective of our own national character.

B. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN EAST ASIA

In no other region of the world have American foreign policies based, or apparently based, on morality and idealism been overturned with more frequency for other, more pragmatic approaches than in East Asia. An examination of
the circumstances and the choices which faced policymakers in these instances provides strong evidence that the overriding factors in each policy decision were whether or not the action contemplated was ultimately in the national interest, and recognition of the fact that idealistic principles can be followed only so long as the more basic needs of the national interest are not jeopardized.

The region of East Asia itself is significant for American foreign policy in a number of respects. In the north it includes the point of convergence of what are probably the four greatest powers of the world: the United States, Soviet Union, Japan and China. Historically, this convergence has fostered conflicts of interest between these powers. When one also considers the other nations of the region, economic investment as well as the potential for conflict are also key factors for American policy in the region as we work to try to maintain stability and improve the human condition in the area.

C. PRAGMATISM - THE CONSTANT IN AMERICA'S ASIA POLICY

America’s involvement with these nations is diverse and of long standing. Since the very beginnings of the Republic our interests in and policies toward East Asia have developed in parallel with the evolution of an overall American role in world affairs. And while specific goals of U.S. East Asian policy may have become obscured from time to
time, they were never allowed to stray far from a central theme. In their most simplified terms, these basic foreign policy interests, not only in Asia, but in every other region of the world as well, have been intended to facilitate the creation of a global environment where American trade could take place unencumbered, and where the nation could exist in peace without threat to its security.

In tracing the evolution of American foreign policy in East Asia, we can see that what might have appeared as periodic deviations from the pursuit of the national interest were, in fact, only temporary concessions to the realities of the moment - pragmatic tactics and realignments of priorities to achieve specific objectives, rather than a total abandonment of basic interests. These actions illustrate that there has been a good bit of Theodore Roosevelt's and Henry Kissinger's kind of pragmatism present in virtually every American leader who ever set out to mold a foreign policy for East Asia. The pages that follow detail specific instances where idealism came up short and pragmatic approaches were adopted to settle complex Asian policy problems, supporting the thesis that pragmatism is the temperence of idealism with reality and the ultimate fallback position of every foreign policymaker.
II. ENLIGHTENED SELF INTEREST - U.S. PRAGMATISM IN THE OPENING OF CHINA, JAPAN AND KOREA

A. EARLY RELATIONS WITH CHINA

America's earliest involvement with East Asia sprang from strictly economic factors and the young nation's struggle to find new sources of foreign commerce. Asian policy began as the policy of the China trade, and it was based strictly on enhancing the economic interests of individual Americans rather than establishing an official framework for diplomatic relations. The manner in which the American traders conducted their business, however, influenced to a great extent the policies that developed in later years. And so long as free trade prevailed, neither the merchants nor the government were inclined to press for greater governmental involvement.

By the time the American traders had inched their way around the cape of Africa, past Insular southeast Asia and into Canton, the British were already well established there. The Americans took a thoroughly pragmatic approach to this situation, however, and were perfectly willing to operate in the shadow of the British country ships and the East India Company for a number of reasons. Not the least of these was the fact that the trade was extensive enough to support all, and realistically, the American presence was
minute compared to that of the British. What is more, the Americans were nearly powerless to effect any appreciable influence on British actions due to the lack of any significant U.S. governmental presence in the area until mid-century. Only the occasional commercial consul was in evidence and then with only vaguely defined powers and responsibilities.

China's handling of the western traders as a group also contributed to an enforced sort of cooperation and harmony among the Europeans and Americans. Employing the time-honored Chinese practice of using barbarians against barbarians, the traders were held accountable as a group for any infraction of established practices caused by any single individual or trading company. More wary of the powerful British presence than of the Americans, the Chinese specifically played these two against each other.

A dramatic example of this ploy was the Chinese plan to enlist American support in countering the British during the latter stages of the First Opium War. Juan Yulan, acting Grand Secretary of the Chinese Court, recommended in 1841, "If we treat the American barbarians courteously and abolish their customs duties, and also take the trade of the English barbarians and give it to the American barbarians, then the American barbarians are sure to be grateful for this Heavenly Favor and will energetically oppose the English barbarians ... If the American barbarians are made use of by
us, then other countries will learn of it, and it will not be difficult to break (the English) down."

The governor general of Kiangsu, Kiangsi, and Anhwei, I-li-pu, supported this approach and forwarded it to the Court for official consideration, adding "...if we utilize the strength of the American barbarians to curb the English barbarians, it would seem that the effort would be halved and the result doubled." [Ref. 7]

Because they were less well capitalized than the British, the Americans were much more susceptible to fluctuations in the trading conditions of Canton. Any disturbance meant a relatively greater loss since their reserves were less, and a long term disruption could well mean financial ruin. In addition, the early involvement of the Americans with trading on credit was entirely dependent on the good will of the Chinese Cohong merchants. Together these factors were powerful incentives to strive for harmonious trade relations. Americans could not afford to be particularly self assertive nor to meet Chinese arrogance with an arrogance of their own.

Because of their moderate approach in dealing with both the Chinese and other trading countries, as well as their desire to maintain a peaceful trading environment, the Americans came to occupy a middle position in both the trade and politics of Canton. They eagerly supported the British when it was necessary to insure the continued smooth flow of
trade, but they were also sensitive to the fact that they needed to maintain the good will of the Chinese merchants with whom they worked, and to see that they prospered. According to Tyler Dennet, "Throughout the pre-treaty days in China, these three groups - English, American and Chinese - constituted the only important elements in the situation..." [Ref. 8] In every issue between the foreigners and the Chinese, the important question was whether the Americans would find it most to their advantage to side with the English or with the Chinese. This alignment continued long after the signing of the foreign treaties and underlay American political as well as trade policy for a century. Sometimes the Americans stood with the British for concerted action, but when the action proposed by the British was likely to weaken the Chinese merchants, or when the British adopted policies having a negative effect on American trade, the Americans were disposed to support the Chinese. In the face of British arrogance and aggression, the Americans found it practical to ally themselves with the Chinese. [Ref. 9] When the British extracted the Treaty of Nanking from the Chinese in 1842 and opened an additional five ports to English trade, the American response was far from moral indignation over any kind of British strong arm tactics, but more a straightforward reaction to a change in the conditions of the market place. To preserve their place in the trading arena, they
immediately took steps to insure the Chinese granted the same trading concessions to them as the British had obtained. Commodore Lawrence Kearney, Commander of the American East India Squadron, is due the credit for proposing this historic step and prelude to the Open Door policy. Significantly, this extension of "most favored nation" status to not only the United States, but all the other western trading nations as well, seems to have been the preferred approach of the Chinese themselves - another example of using barbarians against each other. The full impact of this negotiating tactic, however, was not to be in China's interest in later years as the trading nations came to use it with abandon to secure for themselves every privilege possible which had been extorted from China by force, or tricked from her by fraud, but without having to live up to the moral responsibility for the methods by which the concession had been obtained in the first place. [Ref. 10]

During this period, and despite their previous preferences, the American traders in Canton were themselves responsible for the gradual increase of the presence in China of American governmental officials. The increasing American share of the market and the need to keep pace with the changing conditions governing the China trade had created a requirement for official consular representation to safeguard American commercial interests. It was also the traders who had asked for an American naval presence to
protect their ships from coastal pirates while the Chinese authorities were preoccupied with the British during the First Opium War of 1839.

Although direct economic interests such as these were clearly in the forefront during this period, American contempt for imperialism contributed to a commitment to persuade the other trading nations to show respect for China's territorial integrity. This was to an extent the product of America's own revolutionary origins, but was equally a reflection of the effects of recent political and commercial encounters with the British, to include the War of 1812 and Britain's extensive colonization activities from Africa to Asia. In practical terms, however, had the European countries embarked on a policy of territorial acquisition in China to the exclusion of any similar activity by the United States, the American traders feared they might soon find themselves without any markets at all in the Far East. Forgoing territorial concessions thus became an early factor in the East Asian diplomacy of the United States.

As evidence, from 1832 to 1857, American Secretaries of State and other cabinet members made it repeatedly clear to their diplomatic agents in Asia that "we never make conquests, or ask any nation to let us establish ourselves in their countries." [Ref. 11] They stressed that neither the president nor the Congress would support a more
aggressive policy in conjunction with France and Great Britain to force greater concessions from China [Ref. 12], and that the United States does not "seek to enter that empire for any other purpose than those of legal commerce not fail to let it be known to the Chinese authorities that we are not a party to the ... hostilities and have no intention to interfere in their political concerns." [Ref. 13]

That the United States did not shy away from the fruits of such actions taken by others must be attributed to the influences of its other, more pragmatic interest in securing equal commercial opportunity. Not to have done so would have surely edged American traders out of the Asian markets. More importantly, such policies were a matter of practicality. The U.S. was not powerful enough to back up more aggressive policies with the required force. Self denial thus made virtue out of a necessity.

The signing of the Burlingame Treaty on July 28, 1868 gave official expression to "what might already be called the traditional American policy with reference to China; i.e., the sovereignty and integrity of China must be maintained, and the door for equal opportunities in trade must be left open for the free competition of all nations with due regard for the sovereign rights of the (Chinese) Empire." [Ref. 14] These same principles governed America's early relations with Japan and Korea as well.
B. OPENING JAPAN

Commodore Perry's mission in 1854 had been for the purpose of "opening" Japan to trade with America and the West, and to acquire maritime agreements that would support shipping activities in Asia. Unlike the expectations which had arisen with the development of the China trade, however, Japan was not considered to have near the significance as China as a potential market for American commerce. But by being first to establish formal treaty relations, especially when the treaty contained the "most favored nation" clause, insured the American merchants of an equal share in any trade that might develop there at a later date. Just as significantly, perhaps, was the fact that America's westward expansion overland was coming to a halt at the shores of the California coast. The unexplored lands of Asia, are likely to have carried much the same allure of the frontier as had the American West.

For the near term though, the practical aspect of this venture was in its goal of establishing Japan as a support base for the expanding American presence in the Pacific Ocean. New England whaling and the growth of the American Northwest as a major supplier of furs for the China market, brought American clipper ships increasingly closer to the shores of Japan as they followed the great circle route across the Pacific on their way to and from Canton. Safe haven for disabled vessels and a source of supplies along
the route were naturally sought after by the crews of these vessels. And with the introduction of the steamship into the Pacific trade, Japan assumed an additional attractiveness as a potential site for coaling stations.

Japan's location along this route gave it strategic importance, as well, during this new and growing phase of American commerce. Commodore Perry, like the later naval strategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan, envisioned an increasing role for America in the Pacific. Naval power would be a critical element in this role and would need the support of strategically placed bases throughout the Pacific to carry it out. To Perry, then, Japan represented much more than trade and treaties, it was an important first step in the extension of American political and strategic interests to Asia and the Pacific. [Ref. 15]

In accordance with the principles developed in support of the China trade, the treaty with Japan negotiated by American envoy Townsend Harris in 1858 made no attempt to secure any exclusive rights. It was intended only to make sure that American access was achieved and maintained at a level equal to that which might subsequently be obtained by the other Western trading nations. Harris had succeeded in convincing the shogunate authorities that it would be far better to conclude a full commercial treaty with the relatively peaceful and friendly United States than to have to capitulate to even greater demands that might come from
the other European powers.

The modernizations and reforms which accompanied the restoration of the Meiji in 1868, however, were significant factors in moving Japan to embark on a policy of militarism in pursuit of overseas economic interests, and as a means of strengthening itself against anticipated attempts at exploitation by the Western powers. In the terms of the Open Door policy, this transition removed Japan from the category of countries the policy sought to protect and recast it among those which it was designed to inhibit. The kingdoms of Korea and Okinawa were to become early objectives of such Japanese military action.

C. OPENING KOREA

Korea managed to retain a general policy of foreign exclusion until Japan, showing that it had learned its lesson well in its experience with Commodore Perry, forced the signing of the unequal treaty of Kanghwa. In 1875, the Japanese made a show of naval power patterned after the western model used so well against China and, after a brief military engagement, forced the treaty on 27 February 1876. Again, as with China and Japan, America’s basic interests in Korea were fundamentally commercial. Subsequent to an unsuccessful attempt by the American minister to China to initiate relations with Korea in 1871, Commodore R.W. Shufeldt tried first to negotiate a treaty
through Japan, but without success. Later, with the assistance of China’s Li Hung-chang, a successful treaty was negotiated at Tientsin in 1882. Li represented Korea in the negotiations in the hopes of getting her into treaty relations with all the trading nations so that the various commercial activities would create vested interests in Korea’s independence. This was the same tactic China had used in her own dealings with the western powers, and a thoroughly pragmatic one at that. Once again she was employing “barbarians to offset barbarians.”
III. THE OPEN DOOR NOTES AND AMERICA’S RISE TO WORLD POWER - THE PRAGMATISM OF ROOSEVELT AND HAY

A. ROOTS OF EXPANSION

Despite a preoccupation with the Civil War, Reconstruction, industrialization and westward expansion during the last half of the nineteenth century, by 1898 the United States had developed a well defined East Asian policy. And even though it had a definite commercial orientation up until that time, the policy included a number of subtle political aims that were to take on greater importance as Asian policy continued to evolve. For the most part these aims continued to support economic factors, but other significant factors began to be added as well.

At the top of the list of Asian policy goals was the notion that American citizens - primarily merchants and missionaries - should be free to carry out their business in the countries of Asia without undue outside interference. The turn of events at the end of the century, however, suggested that Americans would soon be facing more rather than fewer restrictions on their activities. China’s defeat in the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese War, for example, had left it wide open to a mad scramble by the Western Powers and Japan to carve out spheres of influence and interest. These actions threatened to completely dismember the Middle
Kingdom. From the pragmatic American perspective, such a subdivision into individual colonies or zones of exclusive economic and political control meant that American commercial and missionary interests were likely to be squeezed out of China altogether. Finding ways to make China and the other countries of Asia capable of resisting the pressures of imperialism thus became a key factor in America’s equal access foreign policy.

There were two possible approaches to this goal. The first was to encourage and even assist the Asian countries in strengthening themselves politically and/or militarily so as to be able to deal with the imperialists from a position of strength. The drawback to this approach, however, was that those nations which could be strengthened in such a manner might eventually choose not to engage in trade or diplomatic relations at all. There was also the possibility they might become so powerful as to pose a threat to other, weaker nations in the region, or even to the presence there of the Western Powers themselves. The Japanese pattern of development over the last third of the century certainly seemed to validate the danger of a broad application of such a policy.

The second approach was to induce the competing powers to show self-restraint in their efforts to secure exclusive trade and territorial concessions in Asia. Equal opportunity and access for all nations would thus be
insured. This approach had been generally followed since Americans first entered the Asian scene, and would later be found formally expressed as the Open Door policy.

This equal access policy was a model of the pragmatic approach to Asian policy, especially when compared to the alternative of being excluded from Asia altogether. But there were other, more materialistic influences at work in America which were not entirely compatible with the policy’s "Asia for everybody" theme. It was a time when the momentum of "Manifest Destiny" and westward expansion seemed to be coming up short with the ending of the continental frontier at the Pacific coast. There was considerable pressure to continue the spread of American territory and influence into the Pacific Basin and Asia.

In fact, territorial acquisition had already become somewhat commonplace in the western hemisphere and Pacific. A brief recap of the fifty year period leading up to the Spanish-American War serves to illustrate the frequency and scope of these activities, thereby presenting a better perspective from which to view the events which followed.

1845 - Annexation of Texas.
1846 - Oregon Territory ceded to U.S. by Great Britain.
1848 - California ceded to U.S. by Mexico.
1853 - Gadsden Purchase.
1853 - Commodore Perry's first visit to Japan; also establishes coaling stations on the Bonin Islands and Okinawa.
1854 - Perry concludes maritime treaty with Japan.
1854 - U.S. occupies, then withdraws from Galapagos Islands.
1858 - Treaty concluded with tribal chiefs of the Polynesian island of Raiatea.
1858 - Harris concludes commercial treaty between U.S. and Japan.
1867 - U.S. annexes Midway Island and establishes coaling station there.
1867 - Alaska purchased from Russia.
1871 - First U.S. attempt to secure treaty with Korea.
1875 - Hawaii becomes U.S. quasi-protectorate.
1878 - U.S. acquires naval base rights to harbor at Pago Pago, Samoa.
1882 - Commodore Schufeldt obtains maritime/commercial treaty with Korea.
1890 - U.S. takes possession of western Samoa.
1891 - President Harrison sends Marines to Hawaii to protect Americans from anti-foreign movement led by Queen Liliuokalani.
1893 - Liliuokalani overthrown and Hawaii offered to U.S. for annexation.

It can hardly be called surprising that the expansionism in which the U.S. engaged during this period could have led so easily to the kind of imperialism which would accept, though not without some reluctance, the Philippines, Guam and Puerto Rico as spoils of the 1898 war with Spain. This is especially true when one considers the activities of the European powers and Japan during the same period.
B. AMERICAN EXPANSIONISTS

There was also a "grand strategy" at work which was supported by certain key individuals within governmental circles, and which called for a greater American presence in Asia and the Pacific, including overseas bases, to support expanding U.S. security and economic interests in the region. Perhaps best articulated in the 1880's and 1890's by the widely respected naval strategist, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, and supported by such influential friends as Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, the policy itself, as well as many of the specific actions that were advocated, was not really new. As we have seen, the U.S. had been actively pursuing the same goals, although in a somewhat disconnected fashion, for nearly 50 years. Mahan's contribution was that he was able to combine all the elements into a cohesive Asian-Pacific strategy, and to eloquently champion the wisdom and inevitability of this strategy with great effect. Of equal importance was the fact that among his most vigorous supporters was a group of individuals whose placement within government allowed them to actually put these ideas into practice.

The impact that these men had on the course of subsequent events leading up to the Spanish-American War cannot be overstated. Alone Theodore Roosevelt could have accomplished little, but as a member of a group of men strategically placed to make themselves felt, he became a
leader in the movement to win America her place in the world. (Ref. 16] The membership of this group was small but impressive. It included Roosevelt, Lodge and Mahan, as well as Brooks Adams, Henry Adams, Henry White and Richard Olney - two Secretaries of State, one Secretary of the Navy, one Assistant Secretary of State, and one Assistant Secretary of the Navy. These men literally engineered the nation's entry into the ranks of the world's major powers. Collectively they were known as expansionists, but they had a far greater vision of America's destiny than that of merely increasing the size of its physical territory.

The most striking feature about Roosevelt and the other expansionists was that they were intense nationalists. They were determined that America should assume its rightful role among the leading powers of the world as both a matter of pride through recognition of its growth and development, as well as the more practical necessities for asserting greater control over national security and economic interests. America had developed into a prosperous and powerful nation with what they saw as a duty as much as a right to assure its place among the major powers of the world.

Internally, the U.S. at the end of the century was a nation made stronger and more confident by the bitter experience of the Civil War. The rapid economic and westward territorial expansion that took place in the post-war years spurred on by the development of the continental
railways, developed a momentum of increasing prosperity, strength and expectation of success. In terms of all the prerequisites for national greatness, at least as regards domestic and hemispheric issues, America had come of age.

For Roosevelt there was another reason of equal or greater importance for America to assume a larger role in international affairs. He saw the expansion of the advanced nations of Europe as a process by which the benefits of civilization were being brought to the backwards nations of the world. Specifically, it was the spread of English-speaking people that to Roosevelt meant attainment of world peace and the spread of civilization. It was this belief which dominated his views in foreign policy. English civilization - and by this he meant the common heritage shared by both Great Britain and the United States - referred to industrial development, the power to defend oneself effectively, the ability to provide orderly government, an inherited set of political institutions superior to anyone else, respect for the freedom of individuals and various other freedoms that Western Europeans had won over the centuries. The preservation and extension of this civilization was in his mind the greatest attainable good, even if it had to be extended by force. Roosevelt had no particular concerns for "backward" people when they stood in the way of civilization. [Ref. 17]
In 1894 he wrote that "the object lesson" of expansion is "that peace must be brought about in the world's waste spaces... Peace cannot be had until the civilized nations have expanded in some shape over the barbarous nations." This "means the cooperation of the civilized peoples of the earth to that end, whatever the cost or time." [Ref. 18] To James Bryce, British statesman and scholar, he wrote in 1897 that "England would be doing her duty as a civilized nation if she overthrew the Mahdists and opened the Sudan." [Ref. 19] English rule in Egypt and India had benefitted these countries even greater than had been the benefit to England, but "most of all it...[had] advanced the cause of civilization." [Ref. 20] "It is in the interest of civilization," Roosevelt wrote in 1896, "that the English speaking race should be dominant in South Africa, exactly as it is...that the United States should be dominant in the Western Hemisphere." [Ref. 21]

In an address at the Minnesota State Fair shortly before he became president in 1901, he told his audience, "It is our duty toward the people living in barbarism to see that they are freed from their chains and we can free them only by destroying barbarism itself... Exactly as it is the duty of a civilized power scrupulously to respect the rights of weaker powers...so it is its duty to put down savagery and barbarism." Acknowledging the possibility that injustice might be done in certain instances, he added, "Let
us instantly condemn and rectify such wrong when it occurs... But shame... to us if we are so foolish as to make such occasional wrongdoing an excuse for failing to perform a great and righteous task... Throughout all history, the advance of civilization has been of incalculable benefit to mankind, and those through whom it has advanced deserve the highest honor." (Ref. 22)

Statements such as these might lead one to regard Roosevelt somewhat racist in his views, but it is important to note that there are significant differences in implication between his stated beliefs and the term as it is more generally used now. Roosevelt’s view was in this regard again essentially pragmatic. Backwardness in a culture was a symptom of acquired characteristics and the effects of geographic environment; he did not view backwards people as inherently or permanently inferior, nor did he hold any racial bias toward individuals. The contempt he openly and repeatedly exhibited toward the Chinese, despite full knowledge of their long and rich cultural background, his acquiescence to the Japanese taking control over Korea, and his willingness to retain the Philippines, were not due to the origins of these peoples, but substantially because of their weakness and inability to govern themselves effectively. [Ref. 23]
C. INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES

The external environment in which the expansionists exercised their influence was just as important as were their personal views and national aspirations. Internationally, the newly industrialized nations of Europe had embarked on a wave of economic imperialism sparked by the Industrial Revolution that had resulted in a struggle for power and prestige that was realized through domination of distant parts of the globe. The acquisition of foreign markets and sources of raw materials through exclusive control of foreign territories provided the economic incentives for the new imperialists, while control or annexation visibly demonstrated national power, thereby enhancing a nation’s prestige among its contemporaries. Superficially the new imperialism was a product of industrial rivalry and conflicting economic nationalism being played out across the globe. In reality it was a competition to build national power and prestige in a struggle for world power.

D. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ASIAN POLICY

These then, were the primary determinants of American foreign policy toward Asia in the watershed period immediately prior to the outbreak of the Spanish-American War. Asia had become the central area of world conflict, a microcosm of all that was taking place in other parts of the
globe. The Western Powers were anxiously jockeying for control, forming alliances, and using the Far East as an area where the intracacies of world politics could be either unraveled or further entangled.

The war with Spain was a major turning point in America's conduct of foreign policy and how she viewed herself with respect to the rest of the world. Beginning as a crusade to liberate Cuba and an opportunity to force Spain out of the western hemisphere, the war saw America become a world power and changed forever.

The acquisition of territory was a by-product and not an objective of the war. Regarding the possibility of territorial annexation - in this case, Cuba - Theodore Roosevelt noted pragmatically in 1898, "I am perfectly willing to follow the policy of intervening (in Cuba) without recognizing independence, although I think it a mistake; for I should be very doubtful about annexing Cuba in any event, and should emphatically oppose it unless the Cubans wished it... I don't want it to seem that we are engaged merely in a land-grabbing war." [Ref. 24]

Acquisition of the Philippines was apparently not a part of any well-thought-out Far Eastern policy. None of Roosevelt's group of expansionists seemed to have had their eye on the islands until Mahan found a need for them as he planned the naval strategy for the hoped-for war with Spain. In September, 1897 Roosevelt wrote Lodge: "Our Asiatic
squadron should blockade, and if possible, take Manila."

From then on he worked to put the squadron in shape for that purpose, to include securing the appointment of Dewey - "a fighting man who could act with daring" - as its Commander. [Ref. 25]

Once the war had been won and the Philippines taken, however, there were numerous pragmatic reasons for rationalizing why the Philippines should remain under American control. In 1900, Roosevelt stated: "I wish to see the United States the dominant power on the shores of the Pacific Ocean... If we did not keep the Philippine Islands some other power might take them and with them the capacity to rival us in the Pacific." [Ref. 26] (It is interesting to note that similar explanations had been used earlier to support the acquisition of both Samoa and Hawaii.) Lodge too, felt one of the most important results of the Spanish War was our entry into the Pacific and our gaining a foothold in the Far East. "The Chinese question, which we are only beginning to understand," he wrote in 1899, "is one of infinitely more importance than the disposition we make of the Philippines, except insofar as a position in those islands gives us authority and standing in the East." [Ref. 27]

And finally, there was Roosevelt's belief that America had a moral duty toward the Philippines. Expanding American control over the islands was the same as extending
civilization. "Our duty to the Philippines," he said, is to
govern those islands in the interest of the islanders, not
less in accordance with our own honor and interest. He had

a genuine desire to give the Filipinos good government, and
promised liberty, but with order; a sort of tutorial "under
the American flag". "You cannot introduce to people in one
stage of civilization, the system which has been by slow
degrees evolved by another people..." If we have a right to
establish a stable government, it necessarily follows that
not only right but the duty also exists to support that
government until the natives gradually grow fit to sustain
themselves. [Ref. 28]

With that the United States entered the ranks of the
imperialist nations, complete with a colony from which she
was separated by over six thousand miles, and with all the
attendant rights, responsibilities and anxieties that go
along with such a relationship. True, the U.S. was now
firmly entrenched in the Pacific, but there were many
questions yet to be answered over whether or not the
acquisition would prove, in the end, to have been in the
national interest.

E. THE OPEN DOOR NOTES

The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 provided the spark that
touched off the scramble for Chinese territorial
concessions. As terms of surrender, Japan demanded China
turn over Formosa, the Pescadores Islands, and the Liaotung Peninsula, give up claim to suzerainty over Korea, grant new commercial privileges, and pay a large war indemnity. However, the combined objections of Germany, France and Russia - the Triple Intervention - were so intense that Japan was forced to return the Liaotung peninsula in favor of a larger indemnity.

Nevertheless, the first step had been taken. By 1898, Germany had obtained extensive rights in China’s Shantung province, to include a naval and coaling station at Kiaochou Bay; France demanded and got a lease of Kwangchou Bay on the south China coast and special mining and railroad rights in the three southern provinces; and Russia extracted a 25 year lease on Port Arthur, Dairen and other parts of the Liaotung peninsula - much of the same territory Japan had been forced to return to China just three years before. Great Britain, too, joined in to obtain a lease on the port of Weihaiwei for as long as the Russians should hold Port Arthur, enlargement of her leased territory at Kowloon, and recognition of her peculiar economic interests in the Yangtze Valley. The break-up of China feared by the Americans thus appeared to have begun.

Great Britain's interests would actually have been better served had she been successful in dissuading the other powers from these territorial acquisitions. Britain was experiencing encroachments on her colonial empire around
the world from many sources, and was finding it difficult to defend these interests with limited resources. In Asia, in particular, she was being pressured by France in Indo-China and Russia in Manchuria and along the Indian frontier. In an effort to protect her position in the face of these mounting pressures, she made numerous overtures in search of an ally with which to form a cooperative Asian policy. Approaches to establish alliances or "understandings" had been made to the United States, Russia, Japan, Germany and France. Ultimately these bore fruit in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 and the Entente Cordiale with France in 1904, as well as a less formal, but viable working relationship with the United States throughout the Roosevelt presidency.

The American response to these claims on China's territory in the late 1890's was out of concern for what effect these actions would have on its commercial and missionary interests in China, the same pragmatic concerns which had been the basis for her Asian policy all along. In late 1899, Secretary of State John Hay, with British assistance and support, circulated notes to each of the powers involved in China asking for assurances that, within their respective spheres of influence and interest, they would abide by the principle of equal access and opportunity. Despite the general ambiguity of the majority of responses received, Hay summarily announced to the world
that the provisions contained in these “Open Door notes” had been accepted by all as the governing policy in China. Before any of the powers could fully assess the full impact of this development, the anti-foreign disturbances of the Boxer Rebellion erupted in China and focused the attention of all concerned on the settlement of this situation.

This campaign to rid China of foreigners presented the powers with an easy opportunity to disassociate themselves from the provisions of the Open Door policy. In an attempt to preclude such action, however, the United States issued a follow-on to the first Open Door note which took the policy a step further. Dated 3 July 1900, the second circular declared that the “policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution” of the difficulties in China which would “preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity” and “safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.” It was the reference to the “territorial and administrative entity” of China which made the second Open Door notes significant as the passage ran directly counter to those activities in which the powers had been engaging in China up to that time.

There was little in the way of concrete response to the second round of the Open Door notes as well, as the powers generally ignored this latest initiative of the United States. Despite this fact, however, no claims against
Chinese territory were made by the powers as settlement for putting down the Boxers. Somewhat ironically, however, it was not the Open Door notes that were responsible for the suspension of territorial claims. Other outside events that were taking place in scattered parts of the globe, such as the Boer War and maneuverings by the powers to form coalitions against one another, had simply caused a "political stalemate rather than conversion to principle. No power dared move further for fear of precipitating the universal debacle that was destined to come a decade later." (Ref. 29)

Neither was China entirely spared from the continued erosion of her sovereignty. The indemnity claims of the powers for their expedition against the Boxers were fixed at a total of $333 million, an amount China hardly could afford to pay. The only way she would be able to liquidate such substantial debts was by resorting to additional territorial concessions. Recognition of this development was a major disappointment to Hay and those who had assisted in the writing of the Open Door notes from the beginning.

Essentially a diplomatic tactic, the notes had been in no way legally binding on any of the powers or on the U.S. It was the way in which they were presented that gave them any effect. That is, they were deliberately contrived so as to create the impression of an international commitment and to mobilize public opinion for its support. In February,
1901 Hay was asked by Japan what action the U.S. was prepared to take should Russia, in violation of the Open Door principles, seek to strengthen her economic and political hold on Manchuria? Unable to force the ideals of the Open Door, his response was thoroughly pragmatic. He replied that the United States was not prepared to back up its policy with force, either alone or in concert with other powers. While he was anxious to support a policy that promoted the commonality of interests held between the United States and Great Britain, as well as insuring the American position was upheld in Asia, Hay had to recognize that neither would the Senate accept an alliance or treaty with England and/or Japan, nor would public opinion support a war in defense of the nation’s Far Eastern policies. (Ref. 30) The Japanese question to Secretary Hay proved to be a significant indicator of what was to come, as both she and Russia were clearly on a collision course over control of Manchuria.

F. JAPAN’S INCREASING ROLE

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 had been the answer to England’s search for an ally in Asia. Since Russia was the chief rival of Britain in Southwest Asia and of Japan in the Far East, it was natural that the two should join together in an alliance to check Russian expansion. The terms of the alliance recognized each others’ interests in
China, as well as Japan's special interest in Korea, and, in order to protect those interests, each pledged to remain neutral if the other became involved in a war with a third party and to come to the support of the other should it be attacked by two or more enemies.

Continued Russian encroachments into Manchuria and northern Korea, followed by a failure of negotiations begun in 1903, led to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in February, 1904.

The American position with regard to the war was one of conditional support for the Japanese. President Roosevelt was convinced of the commonality, but not necessarily the identity, of British and American interests in Asia [Ref. 31], and so looked on the alliance as maintaining the balance of power in Asia and resisting further territorial demands on China. Russian expansionism, on the other hand, clearly represented the chief threat to the status quo.

Somewhat surprisingly, however, Japanese successes during the war were greater than had been anticipated. Roosevelt, now faced with a potential Japanese victory and the possibility that one threat (Russia) might merely be replaced by another (Japan), had to reevaluate the extent of American support. Once more thoroughly pragmatic, he came to favor a position that supported dragging out the hostilities as long as possible so as to exhaust both powers, and retaining geographic causes of friction. [Ref. 32]
Such a solution was hoped to keep both countries preoccupied with the threat from each other, decreasing their appetites for further territorial expansion and relieving pressures against Europe from Russia, and against America’s newly acquired territories in the Philippines from Japan.

To secure the resolution of the conflict along lines which would support these objectives, the president sent his envoy, Secretary of War Taft, to Tokyo where a memorandum was completed with Japanese Prime Minister Katsura on 29 July 1905. In that document, the United States took the practical position of agreeing to Japan’s suzerainty over Korea in return for her disavowal of any hostile intent toward the Philippines. Japan’s position in Korea was further certified by Russia’s acceptance of these terms in settlement of the war at Portsmouth later in 1905, the conference being mediated by Roosevelt on the condition that Japan agree to adhere to the maintenance of the Open Door policy in Manchuria and return administrative control of that region to China.

The year 1905 saw Roosevelt’s greatest admiration for the Japanese, even despite any second thoughts he might have had regarding the destabilizing influences that might arise in Asia as a result of her victory over Russia. It was during this time also, that negotiations were going on between Japan and England for renewal of the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance, during which Roosevelt was kept very well informed and participated informally in discussions that eventually resulted in its renewal. Significantly, on 1 January 1905, Roosevelt told John Hay that he favored a suggested naval defense alliance with Japan, and again in May stated that he personally agreed that an alliance with Japan was desirable. Realistically, of course, he admitted such an arrangement was not practicable in light of the Senate's attitude toward treaties in general. [Ref. 33]

During Taft's Discussions with Katsura in July, the Japanese Prime Minister wondered why, "In view of our common interests... some good understanding, or an alliance in practice if not in name, should not be made?" Taft explained that it was difficult for the president to enter even into an informal agreement without the consent of the Senate, but he assured the Japanese that "wherever occasion arose, appropriate action of the government of the United States, in conjunction with Japan and Great Britain for such purposes, could be counted on by them quite as confidently as if the United States were under treaty obligations." Afterwards, Taft cabled the whole agreement to Roosevelt who replied "your conversation with Count Katsura absolutely correct in every respect. Wish you would confirm to Katsura that I confirm every word you have said." [Ref. 34]

Despite these informal assurances and confirmation of parallel interests, Japan's rapid rise to major power status
evoked serious concerns among many quarters in the United States. Her growing presence in Korea and Manchuria obviously ran counter to the Open Door principles, and despite her assurances, the safety of the Philippines was becoming uncertain. Additionally, U.S. immigration restrictions imposed as a result of domestic pressures added to these concerns by further straining relations between the two nations.

Sensing a growing hostility in Tokyo’s representations to Washington, President Roosevelt became convinced of the necessity of making a clear demonstration of American resolve. To fulfill this objective, he dispatched an American naval fleet of 16 battleships on an around the world cruise in 1907. The significance of its first stop being Japan was not lost on anyone. Perhaps not surprisingly, however, the visit by the "Great White Fleet", though temporarily putting a halt to some careless talk of war in Japan, provided the stimulus for the Japanese navy to embark on a naval expansion program of its own.

Subsequently, in a more conciliatory gesture, Roosevelt went on to pursue the lines laid down by Taft and Katsura three years earlier. In an exchange of notes between Secretary of State Root and Japanese Ambassador Takahira on 30 November 1908, the U.S. and Japan "agreed (1) to maintain the status quo in the Pacific and to respect each other’s territorial possessions in that region; (2) to uphold the
Open Door in China; and (3) to support by pacific means the 'independence and integrity of China.'"

Two points regarding this agreement are significant. First, both this and the Taft-Katsura memorandum were executive agreements, binding only on the Roosevelt administration. Neither was ratified by the Senate. Second, that which was left unsaid was perhaps of greater importance than that which was stipulated. That is, the agreement was vague enough to be interpreted in at least two ways. The first, favorable to the American position, was that Japan had promised to support the Open Door policy and territorial integrity of China, although "territorial" integrity was not specified; plus she had renounced aggressive intentions against the Philippines. The second interpretation, favorable to Japan, was that in return for Japan’s pledge to respect the security of the Philippines, the U.S. had given Japan a free hand in Manchuria. The wide latitude between the two views allowed each side to justify the negotiations as having been concluded on terms favorable to its respective position.

Notably, when President Taft assumed office he reasserted the twin principles of the Open Door policy, much to Japan’s chagrin. This reversal of Roosevelt’s earlier position gives evidence to the fact that Roosevelt’s adherence to Taft’s own understanding with Katsura and the later Root-Takahira Agreement had been intentionally
qualified and little more that a temporary expedient to
smooth American-Japanese relations at a time of growing
friction. [Ref. 35]

On 22 December 1910, Roosevelt wrote to Taft, at the
latter's request, concerning America's Asian policy and
relations with Japan:

Our vital interest is to keep the Japanese out of
our country* and at the same time to preserve the good
will of Japan. The vital interest of the Japanese, on
the other hand, is in Manchuria and Korea. It is
therefore peculiarly our interest not to take any steps
as regards Manchuria which will give the Japanese cause
to feel, with or without reason, that we are hostile to
them, or a menace - in however slight a degree - to
their interests. Alliance with China, in view of
China's absolute military helplessness, means of course
not an additional strength to us, but an additional
obligation we assume; and as I utterly disbelieve in
the policy of bluff, in national or international no
less than private affairs, or in any violation of the
old frontiers maxim, "Never draw unless you mean to
shoot!" I do not believe in our taking any position
anywhere unless we can make good; and as regards
Manchuria, if the Japanese choose to follow a course of
conduct to which we are adverse, we cannot stop it
unless we are prepared to go to war, and a successful
war about Manchuria would require a fleet as good as
that of England plus an army as good as that of
Germany. The Open Door policy in China was an
excellent thing, and I hope it will be a good thing in
the future, so far as it can be maintained by general
diplomatic agreement; but, as has been proved by the
whole history of Manchuria, alike under Russia and
under Japan, the "Open Door" policy, as a matter of
fact, completely disappears as soon as a powerful
nation determines to disregard it, and is willing to
run the risk of war rather than forgo its intention.
[Ref. 36]

* That is, to restrict Japanese emigration to the U.S.
Roosevelt's analysis of the situation surrounding the Open Door policy and the realities of the balance of power in Northeast Asia graphically illustrates the pragmatic outlook that characterized his overall approach to foreign policy. But even "the great pragmatist" was not entirely without his own brand of idealism. His vision of America's destiny and feelings of moral responsibility for "civilizing the backward regions of the world" were certainly as idealistic as the majority of his successors.
A. PREWAR YEARS

In the four-year interval between Roosevelt and Wilson, President William H. Taft and his Secretary of State, Philander C. Knox, were giving the Open Door policy a new turn. In 1909, they proposed to the Powers that the railway concessions in Manchuria which had been granted to Japan and Russia be returned to Chinese ownership and that their administration be "neutralized" and placed under the stewardship of a board of supervisors representing all the Powers. Popularly referred to as "Dollar Diplomacy", this new turn in policy was conceived to serve political and economic objectives simultaneously. The new policy encouraged American investment in Manchuria as a means of breaking the development monopoly of Japan and Russia while assisting American business to cash in on the still elusive China trade. A lengthy State Department memorandum dated 30 September 1909 asserted that pragmatic and materially beneficial tactics could serve more idealistic goals:

The nations that finance the great Chinese railways and other enterprises will be foremost in the affairs of China and the participation of American capital in these investments will give the voice of the U.S. more authority in political controversies in that country which will go far toward guaranteeing the preservation of the administrative entity of China...
However, ...

So long as the U.S. holds the Philippines, the domination of China by other nations to our exclusion would be fraught with danger and it is unthinkable that this country should be squeezed out of any combination exercising an influence at Peking. The balancing of power in China is essential to peace in the Orient just as it has been necessary in Turkey to keep Europe quiet. Our interests in Asiatic waters require the prevention of the establishment of predominant interest and influence at Peking on the part of the other powers and that American prestige in China be undiminished. (Ref. 37)

America's growing security interests in Asia and the Pacific were thus demanding an increasingly direct approach in her policy toward the region.

In its final assessment, however, Dollar Diplomacy fell far short of its objectives. Proving to be financially unprofitable, it saw American investments in the Far East drop from $175 million in 1909 to $60 million in 1912. (Ref. 38) In terms of the Open Door policy, it fostered international competition rather than cooperation, and had certainly not managed to save Manchuria for either China or American capitalists. More importantly, instead of dividing Japan and Russia, it had driven the two more closely together in defense of their respective interests in Manchuria and Mongolia. (Ref. 39)

B. WWI IN ASIA

At the outbreak of World War I, China requested American assistance in preventing the spread of hostilities on Chinese soil where many of the belligerents had foreign
settlements and leased territories. Accepting this request, the United States again announced its "desire to preserve the status quo in China." Then, when Japan subsequently entered the war against Germany and demanded the surrender of Germany's leased territory in Shantung, Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan parried with the response that the United States "notes with satisfaction" that the demand had been made "with the purpose of restoring that territory to China, and that Japan is seeking no territorial aggrandizement in China." Bryan also used the opportunity to remind Japan of its pledges to support "the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in China" as contained in the Root-Takahira Agreement of 30 November 1908. [Ref. 40]

Early in 1915, after having secured Shantung from German control, Japan secretly presented China with an ultimatum known as the Twenty One Demands. Peking's acceptance of these would have resulted in the establishment of near total Japanese economic and political supremacy in China. When the nature of the demands were leaked by the Chinese government, a wave of protest swept over China while Great Britain and the United States lodged official protests. Ultimately, the most extreme of these demands were withdrawn, though an agreement on the remainder was pushed through which gave Japan significant economic
concessions in Manchuria and Mongolia, while confirming her newly attained position in Shantung. At this, Secretary Bryan notified both Tokyo and Peking on 11 May 1915, that the United States "cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the Governments of Japan and China, impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the Open Door policy." [Ref. 41]

In view of the pressing events that were occurring in Europe at the time, neither the United States nor the Allies were in any position to oppose Japan's actions toward China more vigorously than this. Bryan's note, therefore, had not been counted on to dissuade Japan from coercing China, but to put on record a reservation "so that any agreement forced upon China at the present time could properly become the subject of discussion in the future when the conditions are more propitious." [Ref. 42] Its effect was to convince the Japanese of the need for a more definite understanding with the United States and, in this regard, led directly to the Lansing-Ishii negotiations of 1917. It was later, when the note was discovered by Secretary Stimson, that it gained fame as the non-recognition doctrine of 1932.

Insofar as the Lansing-Ishii Agreement was intended to moderate the opposing purposes of Japan and the United
States in their respective Asian policies, it was a complete failure. For while Japan agreed to adhere, once again, to the principle of the Open Door and oppose "the acquisition by any government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China," the United States agreed to "recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and consequently, the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous." (Ref. 43) With the subsequent Japanese interpretation of the term "special interests" to imply political influence, it was clear that the agreement's ambiguity and the dichotomy of its content allowed it to be construed by each side as suited its own purposes. For the United States it had been a temporary stopgap, not a compromise, necessitated purely because of the reality of the events in Europe which sapped, for the time being, any ability to deal more strongly with the situation in Asia.

C. OPPOSING THE JAPANESE CHALLENGE

A. Whitney Griswold noted in 1938 that "in 1917, America was preparing for the greatest diplomatic offensive against Japanese expansion in its history. But it was not until the armistice lessened President Wilson's preoccupation with
Germany that he was free to devote much energy to that offensive." [Ref. 44]

1. **Moderation Through Cooperation**

This diplomatic assault was executed in four parts. The first was centered around a plan for the formation of a consortium of English, French, Japanese, and American banks to jointly finance China's development needs. The prime objective of this approach was to try, once again, to secure the administrative integrity and independence of China by preempting unilateral actions aimed at gaining territorial influence or acquisition. This arrangement was not unlike the "neutralization" plan of Secretary Knox in 1909, and it met with equally strong Japanese opposition. Only when the United States agreed to exclude the South Manchurian Railway zone and a number of other specific railway, mining and industrial privileges from the scope of the consortium plan did Japan finally consent to join. The result was considerably short of an ideal solution to the problem, but did represent some degree of success.

2. **Intervention in Siberia**

The second part of the American "offensive" was carried out as part of the 1918 military intervention in Siberia to protect allied military supplies and sustain the White Russian forces in the war against Germany. The American objective there was to resist Japanese penetration of northern Manchuria and Siberia in what amounted to the
application of the Open Door principles to Russia. Conversely, the Japanese objective was to prevent, by whatever means possible, either the establishment of a Far East Soviet Republic or a White Russian victory, thereby reducing potential opposition to future Japanese involvement in the region. [Ref. 45] Notably, American forces stayed on in Siberia well after the armistice and until the complete collapse of any effective White Russian resistance, the last American troops leaving Vladivostok on 1 April 1920. The Japanese, on the other hand, did not evacuate Siberia until November 1922 and northern Sakhalin in 1925.

For her efforts, Japan had overrun northern Manchuria and extended her privileges and influence there. But despite the numerous battles she had fought against the Bolsheviks, she had taken over no Russian territory.

3. The Paris Peace Conference

The third phase took place at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, where Woodrow Wilson fought a losing battle to defend China from Japanese encroachment in the peace treaty negotiation process. Japan came to the conference determined not to repeat her experience following the war with China in 1895 and the forced remission of the Liaotung peninsula. She not only maintained de facto control over Shantung, but was supported by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 and 1911, secret treaties with Great Britain and the other allies which had been concluded.
in 1917 and which agreed to postwar Japanese control over the territory, similar treaties with Russia and China with the same effect, and the ambiguous American "concession" contained in the Lansing-Ishii Agreement.

Wilson vigorously opposed, but did not succeed in preventing either Germany's privileges in Shantung or her Pacific island possessions north of the equator from being ceded to Japan. Faced with an unyielding Japanese position on these points, he had only two choices: outright rejection of Japan's claims with a certainty that her representatives would walk out of the conference if he did so, or accepting them in the hopes of addressing the issue later within the framework of the League of Nations. That he ultimately accepted the latter alternative clearly demonstrates that Woodrow Wilson too, was pragmatic in his approach to foreign affairs, and willing to suspend or adapt his idealistic goals to the situation at hand.

The only hope was to keep the world together, get the League of Nations with Japan in it and then try to secure justice for the Chinese not only as regarding Japan but England, France, Russia, all of whom had concessions in China... He knew his decision would be unpopular in America, that the Chinese would be bitterly disappointed, that the Japanese would feel triumphant, that he would be accused of violating his own principles, but, nevertheless, he must work for world order and organization against anarchy and a return to the old militarism. [Ref. 46]

4. The Washington Naval Conference

Finally, it was left to the Harding administration to pursue the fourth phase in the diplomatic campaign
against Japanese expansionism. There was a large body of American opinion in the post-war years that arms competition had been a primary cause of World War I and that some kind of world disarmament agreement would contribute significantly to preventing future conflicts. This feeling coincided with Great Britain’s unwillingness and inability to compete with the United States in a naval race, as well as a desire to work out some kind of accommodation as regarded the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The result of this convergence of objectives was President Harding’s call, on 11 July 1921, for a conference in Washington of the five Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the limitation of armaments and question relating to the Far East and Pacific Ocean.

Thus, beginning on 12 November 1921 and continuing until 6 February 1922, two concurrent conferences took place to discuss the issues which had been placed before them: the five-power conference on disarmament, attended by the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan; and the nine-power conference on the problems of the Far East made up of the original five plus Portugal, China, the Netherlands and Belgium.

A significant series of treaties emerged from this diplomatic marathon, including the Nine Power Treaty on the Far East and Pacific which epitomized American Far Eastern policy since John Hay, and forged it into international law.
First, the Four Power Pacific Treaty (13 December 1921) among Great Britain, Japan, France and the United States replaced the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and substituted for it an agreement to respect each other’s “rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean,” and for mutual consultations in the event of threat to these territories.

The Sino-Japanese Treaty (4 February 1922), undertaken with considerable British and American assistance just to keep the two countries negotiating, restored Shantung in full sovereignty to China, but according to the terms of the Japanese railway loan, did not alter significantly Japan’s economic and consequent political supremacy in the territory. In addition, a pledge was extracted from Japan to withdraw her troops from Siberia and northern Sakhalin which were the remnants of the allies’ Siberian intervention forces.

The Five Power Naval Treaty (5 February 1922) consummated the disarmament aims of the conference by providing for a reduction and limitation of naval forces in the ratio of $5:5:3:1.75:1.75$ among its signatories, the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy, respectively. In addition, the treaty included a non-fortification agreement which prohibited the construction of new fortifications and naval bases west of Hawaii and east of Singapore.
In the Nine Power Treaty (6 February 1922) the signatories agreed to "respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China; to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government; to use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China; and to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states, and from countenacing action inimical to the security of such States."

Concurrently, a nine-power customs tariff treaty was signed the same date which provided for a rise in Chinese duties. While it was less than the Chinese had wanted and far short of tariff autonomy, it provided for a substantial increase in revenue. [Ref. 47]

Finally, a treaty was signed on 11 February 1922 concerning the status of American interests on the island of Yap. The issue, left unsettled from the Paris Peace conference, arose out of the existence on Yap, a former German possession mandated to Japan at Paris, of important American radio and trans-Pacific cable facilities. In the treaty, the United States consented to Japan’s mandate over
the island, as well as the other islands north of the equator which she had occupied from Germany, in return for which Japan granted American citizens equal cable, radio and residential rights and facilities on the island with Japanese.

D. THE KELLOGG PACT AND STIMSON’S NON-RECOGNITION DOCTRINE

Still searching for peace and world order through international organization, on 27 August 1928 the United States entered into the Kellogg Pact to which over 50 nations ultimately declared their adherence by January 1929. The pact was a renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy and a promise to use only peaceful means in the settlement of disputes between the signatories. Less than a year after the pact was signed, however, Soviet and Chinese conflict over Manchuria presented occasion for Secretary of State Stimson to invoke the Pact’s principles in an attempt to end the hostilities. The loosely structured nature of the Pact and the absence of any organization for its implementation, however, precluded its effectiveness and the controversy was subsequently settled in direct negotiations between the U.S.S.R. and China which restored the status quo.

Japan’s takeover of all Manchuria in 1931-32, its attacks on Shanghai and the ultimate establishment of the state of Manchukuo prompted the U.S. to attempt to end the
hostilities in collaboration with the League of Nations and to restore the situation to the condition which had existed prior to the conflict. The League's failure to take action of sufficient force to attain these objectives, however, led the United States to act independently in the revival of the non-recognition doctrine of Bryan and Lansing which had been used in conjunction with Japan's Twenty-One Demands on China in 1915. On 7 June 1932, Stimson informed Japan and China that the United States could not...

(A)dmit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open-door policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris (Kellogg Pact) of 27 August 1928, to which treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States are parties. [Ref. 48]

Neither collective nor unilateral action short of armed force were able to dissuade Japan from expanding her control over Chinese territory. Diplomatic principle had again fallen victim to the material realities of the situation.
V. INTERESTS IN CONFLICT - THE PRAGMATISM OF FDR

A. DOMESTIC CONCERNS

Despite his internationalist views, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was constrained in his involvement in the conduct of foreign policy by the mandate he had received to bring the country back, economically and socially, from the depths of the Great Depression. This strong orientation of priorities toward domestic issues gave a distinct character to both the substance and the manner in which U.S. Asian policy was implemented during FDR's first term of office. The overall tone of the policy, however, was little changed from that which had been engineered by Hoover and Stimson. FDR was generally sympathetic to the plight of China because of the long ties his family had there, and as a longtime advocate of international cooperation against war and the appointed leader of a nation whose people were asking for disarmament and peace, he felt compelled to condemn the Japanese actions in Manchuria in 1931. (Ref. 49) Therefore, two months before taking office, and after long consultations with Stimson, Roosevelt announced that his administration would continue the doctrine of non-recognition as it pertained to the establishment of Manchukuo.
FDR's overriding commitment to domestic issues during the first term left his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, with nearly complete control of the management of American foreign policy, particularly Asian policy as it was a subject in which Hull had a special interest. He too, felt the U.S. had a "definite interest... in maintaining the independence of China and in preventing Japan from gaining over-lordship of the entire Far East." [Ref. 50]

The Asia policy the administration adopted, however, was not one which needed much in the way of detailed management. At its center was the approach the administration took in its relations with Japan. It was a policy of non-provocation and dedicated efforts to seek a relaxation of tensions, and its primary feature was the cessation of the contentious communication that had been exchanged between the two countries throughout Stimson's tenure. Specifically, the policy's main objective was to avoid all initiatives in the Far East. Stanley K. Hornbeck, Chief of the State Department's Far Eastern Division, stated in May 1934, that "The United States has not much to lose" from further Japanese aggression in China, and "...from the point of view of material interests there is nothing there that is vital to us." [Ref. 51] Such a policy of non-action fit well with the Good Neighbor policy toward Latin America and the Neutrality Acts of 1935-37. It was a matter of
practicality for FDR to put foreign affairs on hold while he concentrated his efforts on solving problems at home.

Simultaneous with this program to maintain a low diplomatic profile in Asia, however, FDR backed a major buildup of the Navy to the treaty limits of the Five Power Treaty of 1922, and ordered the battleship fleet to remain in the Pacific where it had been on maneuver since 1932. As a former Assistant Secretary of the Navy and firm believer in Mahan’s theories of the importance of sea power, Roosevelt felt that a ship building program was essential to get the U.S. Navy “almost up to the ship strength of the Japanese navy,” to which “our navy was, and probably is actually inferior... The further fact that the whole scheme of things in Tokio does not make for an assurance of non-aggression in the future,” he added, made the building program necessary.

There was a domestic economic basis for the naval buildup as well, as it was expected that it could have a significant contribution to national economic recovery. Consequently, the program was further justified on the grounds of being likely to employ workers and use materials from nearly all the states in the Union, and to make labor the recipient of 80 percent of all the shipbuilding expenditures. [Ref. 52]

With the occurrence of the China “incident” between Japanese and Chinese troops at Marco Polo bridge just...
outside of Peiping in July 1937, the confrontation between the two nations took on even more of the character of an all-out war. American reaction to these events clearly demonstrated the unwillingness of the FDR administration to get involved. At first the U.S. took an impartial attitude toward the two belligerents, but later joined with the League of Nations in condemning Japan's hostile actions and violation of the Nine-Power Treaty. In a 5 October 1937 speech in Chicago, the president suggested a "quarantine" of those nations of the world which were engaged in an "epidemic of world lawlessness." There was little question but that this was in reference to Japan's war against China, but without mentioning her by name. Public reaction was so negative to the idea, however, that Roosevelt did not pursue it any further.

The second incident, in December of that year, was the Japanese bombing of the American gunboat Panay while it was escorting American tankers in the Yangtze River. The incident was apparently an act of overzealousness on the part of the pilots involved, but it was impossible to explain away as a mistake. The Japanese government, however, was quick to extend its apologies and offer reparations to the casualties. As a result, American public opinion took the matter rather casually, contrasting sharply with the outcry that had followed the similar incident involving the battleship Maine in 1898.
Widespread opposition to the growing use of aircraft in a bombing role, particularly the Japanese bombing attack on Nanking in September 1937, lead to the application of the so-called "moral-embargo" in mid-1938. Curtailing the shipment of aircraft, aircraft parts and accessories, and aerial bombs to nations guilty of bombing civilian populations, it was the first official achievement of the supporters of economic sanctions against Japan.

B. HARDENING POSITIONS

Japan's declaration of a "New Order for East Asia", followed closely by its seizure of Hainan Island in February 1939 and the Spratley Islands a month later, hardened the Roosevelt administration's attitude toward the developing situation in the Pacific, and led to the announcement, on 26 July 1939, that the 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the two countries would be terminated following the required six month notification period. Once that occurred, on 26 February 1940, the United States was in a position to employ significant economic measures against Japan, and went forward to increasingly restrict the shipment of oil, scrap iron, machinery, machine tools and other war material. Finally, on 26 July 1941, Roosevelt froze all Japanese assets in the U.S., thereby cutting off virtually all trade with Japan. The significance of these acts was much more widespread than just shutting off a major source of materiel
for Japan's war effort - this trade was vital for her civilian industries as well. From Japan's point of view, her national survival was at stake.

The reasons for the President's increasingly stringent actions were many, but unlike earlier instances of friction, trade opportunities were not a significant aspect. There was strong public sentiment and, therefore, idealistic interest over the plight of China that had roots in the American missionary efforts that had been going on there for a century. China was seen as a victim rather than a practitioner of power politics, and she was untainted by imperialism, Communism or fascism. She consistently received high marks as an ally in American public opinion polls during the war, and was popularly regarded as America's natural democratic ally. [Ref. 53] But there were more substantive reasons as well.

Japan's increasing territorial conquests along the Chinese coastal regions and into French Indochina were made in flagrant disregard for innumerable international agreements as well as the broader principles of the Open Door policy. What is more, as Japan was the eastern agent of the Axis Powers, the security of other Allied territories in the Far East, to include the Philippines, were becoming increasingly vulnerable. But the most compelling reason was the scope of the threat which could potentially develop should Japan gain control over all of Asia. Not only would
vital American interests in Asia and the Pacific become endangered, but continental America, as well, could be placed in jeopardy. In the larger terms of global strategy, it was unthinkable that the Axis Powers might gain control of the entire Eastern Hemisphere.

The road to eventual war with Japan was not without substantial efforts at negotiation. The disparity between the terms that each side was willing to accept, however, was too great to overcome since vital national interests were at stake which were mutually incompatible. Japan had offered a "bottom line" proposal as follows: (1) Neither government would send armed forces into the Southeast Asia or South Pacific area, except Indochina; (2) the two governments would cooperate to secure needed commodities from the Netherlands Indies; (3) commercial relations would be restored to their status before the freezing of funds, and the United States would supply Japan "the required quantity of oil"; (4) the United States would not "resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China"; (5) Japan would move its troops in southern Indochina into the northern portion upon the conclusion of this agreement, and withdraw all troops from Indochina upon making peace with China "or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area."
The Roosevelt administration's response, however, was that these conditions were totally unacceptable. Secretary Hull later commented that they "would have placed (Japan) in a commanding position later to acquire control of the entire western Pacific area... It would have meant abject surrender of our position under intimidation..." In addition, the proposal had made no mention of the provisions of the Tripartite Pact (between Japan, Germany and Italy) which would have required Japan to assist either of the other Axis powers if a state of war should develop between either of them and the U.S.; moreover, the reverse was also true. The American counter-proposal was a ten point proposal centering on the withdrawal of all Japanese troops from China and Indochina, and a virtual disavowal of the Tripartite Pact. It was at this point, with no greater agreement than this great chasm, that the negotiations stood when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor.

Although the United States had been supporting China for some time in her war with the Japanese, the attack on Pearl Harbor made the two countries true allies. American policy with regard to China, as defined by Hull, came to be directed toward two goals: to insure China could remain effective in her fight against Japan, and to raise China to great power status so that she might serve as a stabilizing influence in postwar Asia. (Ref. 54)
C. EUROPE FIRST

Even before America officially entered the war, FDR's planners participated heavily in the development of Allied strategy that subordinated the conflict in Asia to that in Europe. It is sometimes suggested that such a decision resulted from a racial bias which favored Europe over Asia. In fact, it was a purely pragmatic decision which sought the defeat of the Axis in Europe before German scientists could develop a superweapon that might prolong the war or turn its tide against the Allies. For Asia, the strategy was to fight a holding action, while providing sufficient materiel support and encouragement to China to maintain her ability as an effective deterrent to Japanese overland advances. The mission of the remaining Allied forces in Asia was to repel Japanese advances where possible and delay elsewhere, relying on what limited resources could be made available to them.

D. SEEKING SOVIET SUPPORT

As the war waged on, both the American and British governments concluded that Russian assistance would be indispensable against Japan if the war in the Far East was to be brought to an early conclusion. Stalin had promised such aid within a period of "two or three months" after the German surrender, but noted there were certain "political questions" that should be answered before Russia entered the
war. These questions became the terms of the Yalta Conference and the price the Allies had to pay for Russian assistance. They were:

1. Preservation of the status quo in Outer Mongolia; i.e., continuance of the Soviet-sponsored Mongolian People’s Republic in an area long claimed by China.

2. Restoration of the “former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904”; namely (a) return to the Soviet Union of southern Sakhalin; (b) internationalizing of the port of Dairen, with safeguards for the “pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union,” and restoration to Russia of the lease of Port Arthur for a naval base; (c) the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian Railroads to be operated by a joint Soviet-Chinese company, with safeguards for the “pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union” and retention of Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria.

3. Cession of the Kurile Islands to the Soviet Union. [Ref. 55]

Roosevelt’s agreement to these terms with Stalin have been harshly criticized as having upset “the whole historic basis of American foreign policy in the Far East... by the virtual invitation to Stalin to take over Japan’s former exclusive and dominant role in Manchuria.” [Ref. 56] The restoration to Russia of these rights and properties, with recognition of her “pre-eminent interest” in Manchuria, it has been said, was a contradiction of American policy since John Hay’s time. Even if there had been no such agreement, however, it is likely that the Soviet Union would still have declared war against Japan. What she might have done with regard to Manchuria as well, however, is open to conjecture. Ambassador Harriman warned the President and Secretary of
State that without the agreement, Stalin might turn Manchuria over to the Chinese Communists rather than the Nationalist government after liberating it from the Japanese. It is also possible that Roosevelt was using the agreement to preempt any potential Soviet grab for territory after the war had been concluded. [Ref. 57] But whatever the reason or combination of reasons for accepting Stalin's terms, the president's conclusion that Russian assistance could likely spare the lives of a million American soldiers, and his decision to accept the stated cost of that cooperation, was probably the most pragmatic, if not the most controversial foreign policy decision of his career.
VI. CONTAINMENT AND BALANCE OF POWER - PRAGMATISM IN AMERICA'S POSTWAR ASIAN POLICY

A. POSTWAR IDEALS

Immediately following World War II, American foreign policy turned to the task of creating a regional environment in East Asia which was the composite of ideals that had been pursued by American statesmen from John Hay to Franklin D. Roosevelt. Plans were made for the reorientation of Japan's political and economic systems so that she could become a peace-loving and prosperous contributor to regional and global stability. In China, the opposing factions were to be reconciled to form an effective coalition government, enabling a strong, united and democratic China to take her place as a major world power and guarantor of Asian stability. Korea, as promised at Cairo, was to become free and independent, "in due course," through national self-determination. In Southeast Asia, the U.S. pressed forward to insure the independence of the Philippines would be carried out on schedule, and was prepared to encourage the colonial powers in the region - Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands - to grant independence to their colonies as she had done with the Philippines.
B. POSTWAR REALITIES

Events were taking place around the world, however, which would have a significant impact on the attainment of these goals. The American military machine which had been responsible for creating the environment where these hopes for transformation could be put to work, was undergoing the most massive demobilization in the nation’s history, while America’s security lines were being redrawn inward to reflect the war-weary attitude of the people and a desire to turn their attentions back to concerns that were more strictly American. Both General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and Secretary of State Dean Acheson would come forward, in 1949 and 1950 respectively, to define America’s defensive perimeters as stopping west of a line running through the Aleutian Islands, Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, and the Philippines. Notably, this line omitted Formosa, to where the Nationalist Chinese government had just retreated after having been driven off the Chinese mainland by the Communists, and Korea, where war was only months away. Acheson went on to add that in a military attack in other areas of the Pacific “the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations..." [Ref. 58] The similarity between this statement of policy and Richard Nixon’s “Guam Doctrine” of 20 years later as it was used to facilitate a similar
reduction of the U.S. military presence in Asia, is
unmistakeable.

Externally, the Soviet Union was exhibiting a renewed
vitality in its belligerent and expansionistic behavior.
There was also the establishment of Communist-controlled
governments in Soviet-occupied Europe, Soviet support for
insurgency in Greece and elsewhere, pressures on Turkey and
Iran, the Berlin blockade in the winter of 1948-49,
detonation of the first Soviet atomic bomb in August 1949,
Communist takeover in China the following October, and the
signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance
and Mutual Assistance in February 1950. All this added up
to a developing picture of a world in conflict, not the
post-war era of cooperation and peace Truman and his
administration had hoped for.

C. THE POLICY OF CONTAINMENT

The failure of the western powers and the Soviet Union
to reach agreement on the four-power administration of
Germany at the Moscow Conference in 1947, was the
culmination of more than two years of unsuccessful efforts
to fulfill the wartime agreements of Cairo, Yalta and
Potsdam. As such, the conference marked a turning point in
relations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., and the beginning
of a new American policy to "contain" the Soviet Union and
other Communist states within their existing borders. The
new policy relied on time and internal strains, rather than
direct and immediate confrontation, to eventually sap the
strength of this new Soviet empire. [Ref. 59]

This policy of "containment," first articulated in
George Kennan's 1947 article, "The Sources of Soviet
Conduct", and later embodied in National Security Council
Memorandum 68, had political, military and economic aspects,
as well as a variety of specific objectives to achieve an
overall effect. There were four primary aspects of
containment which were implemented by the Truman
administration.

1. **The Truman Doctrine**

The Truman Doctrine was a general principle of
foreign policy direction and an integral part of the
containment policy. In articulating the "doctrine" the
President stated, "It must be the policy of the United
States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."
Such support was provided early on to Greece and Turkey to
help defend them against Communist insurgency and Soviet
external pressures.

2. **The Marshall Plan**

The Marshall Plan provided economic aid for the
remainder of Europe. It was conceived from an assumption
that the best protection against the spread of Communism
throughout Western Europe was economic recovery. The plan
enabled the United States to "contribute to world peace and to its own security by assisting in the recovery of sixteen countries* which, like the United States, are devoted to the preservation of free institutions and enduring peace among nations."

3. **Point Four**

The Point Four program extended a similar kind of aid to third world countries "for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas."

4. **Collective Security**

The fourth aspect of containment was collective security, primarily the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In East Asia, the containment policy was implemented through a series of collective security agreements, economic and military aid, and military force deployments to the Asian nations which had been behind America's security lines. The Philippine Treaty (30 August 1951) and the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and United States) Treaty (1 September 1951) were initially intended to serve as U.S. assurance against renewed Japanese aggression, as well as induce those countries into signing

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* The offer for assistance was made to all nations of Europe, Communist and non-Communist alike, but was rejected by the Soviet satellite states, as well as Finland. Spain and Germany, which as yet had no government, did not participate.
the Allied Powers' peace treaty with Japan. The Japanese Treaty (8 September 1951) to "deter armed attack on Japan," was, according to Secretary Acheson, a responsibility we assumed with the defeat and disarmament of that nation, and necessary "both in the interest of our security and, in all honor, in the interest of Japanese security." (Ref. 60)

The security commitments made by America in Asia up to that point, therefore, had a basis independent of both the containment policy and the Korean War. The bilateral security treaties with the Republic of Korea (1 October 1953) and the Republic of China (20 December 1954), however, clearly provided the very foundation for the containment of Communism in Asia. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO, 8 September 1954) completed this framework by bringing Thailand within the U.S. defense perimeter and making South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia potential recipients of U.S. defense assistance. Notably, one significant aspect of the SEATO treaty was the appended protocol where the United States explicitly stated its understanding that the treaty provisions referring to "armed attack" applied only to "communist aggression."

Unfortunately, the treaty itself, because of ambiguities that it contained, diminished the effectiveness of the policy of containment in the region. The treaty's unique provisions for extending protection to non-member parties to the agreement (i.e., South Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia), and the identification of internal (insurgent) threats as within the scope of activities requiring a reaction, clouded U.S. intentions, and reduced the treaty's overall value as a deterrent. (Ref. 61)

D. REWRITING POSTWAR CHINA POLICY

In China, postwar cooperation between the Nationalist and Communist forces deteriorated drastically following Japan's defeat. Despite substantial efforts by the United States at mediation, extremists on both sides prevented compromise or cooperation, and the situation deteriorated into a state of civil war. A report by General Albert C. Wedemeyer who had been sent to investigate the situation in the summer of 1947, concluded large scale "moral, advisory and material support to China," including a military advisory group of 10,000 personnel, would be needed to assist the Nationalists if they were to make the necessary reforms to their military establishment. Wedemeyer also proposed a five-power trusteeship as the only possible solution to preventing Manchuria from becoming a Soviet satellite. (Ref. 62)

But the scope of this required assistance was more than the U.S. government was willing to provide. There were too many other commitments for economic and military aid to Europe, and confidence in Chiang Kai Shek's ability to govern, even with substantial American aid, was extremely
low. As a result, the administration resolved not to become directly involved in the Chinese civil war, and thus not to assume any responsibility for the military or economic underwriting of the Nationalist Chinese Government. (Ref. 63)
The situation was left to run its course, ultimately resulting in the defeat of the Nationalist forces and their withdrawal to Formosa in December 1949.

The extent to which the U.S. had "washed its hands" of the entire situation is illustrated by the fact that, by early 1950, the administration had apparently reconciled itself to a Communist takeover of Formosa as well as the mainland. When congress proposed the U.S. occupy, or at least defend the island, President Truman responded, on 5 January 1950, "that the United States had no intention of establishing bases on Formosa or of providing 'military aid or advice' to the Chinese forces there." (Ref. 64)

These events in China further crystalized America's commitment to the application of the containment policy in Asia. Secretary Acheson announced on 27 July 1949, when Communist victory in China appeared imminent, that "the United States does not intend to permit further extensions of Communist domination on the continent of Asia or in the Southeast Asian area." In directing a thorough review of U.S. East Asian policy he stated further that he wanted the review committee to be certain that "we are neglecting no opportunities that would be within our capabilities to
achieve the purpose of halting the spread of totalitarian communism in Asia." [Ref. 65]

The "loss" of China sparked widespread indignation in the United States and highly vocal criticism in Congress of the administration's conduct of foreign policy. This reaction arose out of a frustration and inability to control events in China, and to rescue a country seen by many as a loyal and faithful ally of the last war. But more deeply, it came from a perception of the complete failure - and perhaps abandonment - of one of America's most basic policy goals in the East Asia when it had seemed to have been so close at hand only a few years before. That is, a strong, democratic and independent China whose territorial and administrative integrity were unencumbered; a China allied with the United States and able to take its place among the great powers of the world and to play a major role in the affairs of Asia and the world. What made things all the worse, however, was that the China which was emerging was one we did not want - a China under Communist control.

In more pragmatic terms, the Communist victory represented a tremendous shift in the Asian balance of power. Less than five years after having concluded a world war, one major effect of which had been to repair a power imbalance upset by an expansionistic and militaristic Japan, the United States found itself again faced with another
Asian giant threatening regional security. China had now become the primary target of the containment policy in Asia.

E. THE KOREAN WAR

Korea had been divided into Russian and American zones for the purpose of accepting the surrender of Japanese troops there after WWII. Once that task had been accomplished, however, neither the Foreign Ministers nor the military commanders of the occupying countries could come to agreement on the type or composition of government to set up for a united Korea. The U.S. referred the question to the United Nations in 1947, and a special commission was set up to oversee elections for a constitutional assembly. Blocked from entering the Russian zone in the north, the commission proceeded to carry out the elections only in the south, where the Republic of Korea was inaugurated in August 1948. The Soviets, in turn, installed in the north the government of a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Subsequently, the Soviets, in 1948, and then the Americans, in 1949, withdrew their occupation military forces from Korea. A year later, on 25 June 1950, the north invaded the south.

Within a matter of hours after being notified of the attack, President Truman requested a meeting of the UN Security Council, which passed - due primarily to the absence of the Soviet delegate - a resolution condemning the attack. Two days later, on 27 June 1950, the Council passed
another resolution recommending U.N. members "furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."

Truman responded quickly to the UN's requests, on 27 June ordering American naval and air forces to support the South Korean government forces. On 30 June he authorized the use of American ground troops as well. In his 27 June announcement, the president stated that it was now evident that "communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war." A successful attack on Formosa by the Chinese Communists under these circumstances would be a threat to the security of the Pacific area, including United States forces on duty there. He had, therefore, "ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa," and had called, as well, on the Nationalist forces on Formosa to cease all attacks on the mainland to remove all excuse for such an attack. He had also instructed the Seventh Fleet to "see that this is done." The president also noted that he was accelerating military assistance to the Philippines and Indochina, the scenes of other armed conflicts with Communist forces." [Ref. 66]

Five months later, after MacArthur and the United Nations forces had turned the fighting around and pushed the battle nearly to North Korea's border with China, Communist
Chinese forces joined the fight. The supply lines for these forces extended back well into Manchuria, but MacArthur was under orders not to interdict them inside Chinese territory, a restriction with which he strongly disagreed. So strong, in fact, were his objections to the prohibition against bombing what he called the "privileged sanctuary" of Manchuria, that his public protests ultimately resulted in his recall.

At issue was the decision to limit the war to Korea rather than taking the battle on into China in an attempt to wipe out Communism in Asia once and for all. The risk, of course, was that such an action might also draw the Soviet Union into the conflict. While MacArthur argued "There is no substitute for victory," Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, General of the Army Omar N. Bradley warned that a full-scale war with China would be "the wrong war at the wrong place, at the wrong time and with the wrong enemy."

It was MacArthur's belief that Asia was the decisive theater in the struggle with communism and that the United States should pursue the battle alone if necessary. Certainly, President Truman would have liked nothing better than to put an end to Chinese Communism, but in the best pragmatist fashion, he realized the U.S. could not afford to become involved in a major confrontation with another nuclear power. The investment in Korea was not significant.
enough as to warrant the potentially disastrous consequences of such a confrontation.

F. CHANGING JAPAN’S ROLE

The pacification process in Japan under the tutelage of General MacArthur was taking place quickly and smoothly as planned when two significant events occurred which caused a change in the American concept for the Japanese role in post-war East Asia. The Communist takeover of mainland China and the Korean war completely scrapped the long held, but idealistic notion that China should assume a leading role in the affairs of Asia, while it accelerated the process of negotiating a final peace treaty with Japan. The cumulative effect of these was the most pragmatic development of the post-war period, the decision to use Japan, the defeated enemy, to replace China in the American scheme for East Asia, and to build her up to serve as the kingpin to overall Asian stability and security.

G. BEGINNINGS OF INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

In Northeast Asia the containment line that had been expanded to include Korea and Formosa proved to be relatively effective, primarily because of the geographic characteristics of the territories it was intended to protect. Both Japan and Taiwan are island nations, and therefore easily defensible, while South Korea is a narrow-waisted peninsula making the frontier short.
Asia, on the other hand, is an entirely different situation. There, neither terrain nor political conditions were suited to a policy of deterrence through containment.

The French experienced considerable difficulty in attempting to regain control over their colonial possessions in Indochina after World War II. The Vietminh organization was already well in control and unwilling to surrender power to the returning French. Initial negotiations between the two parties broke down by the end of 1946, and by 1949 the fighting had turned into a full scale war.

Initially, the goal of U.S. foreign policy with regard to Indochina had been to persuade France to give her colonies their independence, just as the U.S. had done in the Philippines. France, however, was intent on preserving her empire and the economic benefits she could accrue from it to facilitate post-war reconstruction. The U.S. was also, at that time, courting a reluctant France in an effort to put together the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In order to cultivate its N.A.T.O. ally and to relieve some of the pressures she was experiencing in Asia, the U.S. began supplying money and equipment to the French-sponsored State of Vietnam in its battle against the Vietminh.

The American decision to support France was another classic example of foreign policy pragmatism. Efforts to keep France in NATO where she could facilitate collective security and containment in Europe, were clearly more
important to America's global interests than was working against her French ally's stated interests by actively supporting the ideal of independence for colonial territories in Indochina.

What is more, as the Vietminh effort became more closely identified with its communist cadre, it became in itself, a suitable target for the containment policy. Accordingly, it was not surprising when, in the wake of the North Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950, President Truman selected Indochina and the Philippines, "the scenes of other armed conflicts with Communist forces," to receive additional support to aid them in their struggles.

H. DEEPENING INVOLVEMENT

Once the United States had redefined and expanded its Asian security perimeter to support the requirements of containment, it had to put its prestige on the line to defend it. Maintaining the integrity of the perimeter, overall, became just as vital as the safety of the nations behind it. Moreover, all along the line, whether in Japan, Korea or South Vietnam, individual segments came to be so closely identified with the line as a whole, that any break at all was seen as having potentially disastrous consequences for the entire line. (Ref. 67) Like a chain with one weak link, once that link is broken, the chain is no longer capable of fulfilling its function. This
interpretation was subscribed to by each successive president from Eisenhower to Nixon, even though the congress grew increasingly skeptical.

With the evolution of strategic doctrine from "massive retaliation" to "flexible response" came a requirement to meet any challenge to American security commitments, regardless of character, with a visible demonstration of resolve. This was needed so as to preserve the "credibility" of deterrence at greater levels of conflict. Escalation of the American military involvement in Southeast Asia, therefore, came in response to the requirements of both containment and flexible response, the two fundamental elements in the operation of national security policy.

I. NIXON AND KISSINGER: CHINA REGAINED

America's failure to recognize the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations during the 1950's and 1960's, and the uncertainties of the Cultural Revolution in China, kept the focus of the containment policy in Asia on the People's Republic of China and delayed attempts to smooth relations until the initiation of rapprochment by President Nixon in 1972. In the wake of groundwork laid during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, candidate Nixon, as early as October 1967, began to build the foundations for later proposals that would greatly alter American policy toward China and the policy of containment as well.
The approach to foreign policy taken by President Nixon and his National Security Advisor, Dr. Henry Kissinger, was thoroughly pragmatic, especially as it pertains to the bold initiatives that were undertaken in U.S. relations with Asia. In the first six months of his administration, Nixon ordered a re-examination of U.S. policy toward China, announced the beginning of American troop withdrawal from Vietnam, and promulgated his "Guam" Doctrine. This broad sweep of activity signaled an almost complete reversal of previous tactics in the implementation of Asian policy. More notably, it reflected an acknowledgement of the tremendous loss of public support for military involvement on the Asia mainland, as well as a recognition of the enormous costs that would be involved in resolving the Vietnam conflict by conventional military means.

In his first inaugural address, Nixon spoke of a new era of negotiation and a reduced American role in a non-polar world. Accordingly, the Nixon Doctrine, as it came to be called after its formal announcement in 1971, stated that the U.S. would reduce its military presence on the Asian mainland, but would still provide friendly Asian nations with the military and economic support to defend themselves against aggression if so requested. Two initial effects of the new policy were an increase in the pace of "Vietnamization", the assumption of American combat
responsibilities by Vietnamese forces, and the withdrawal of one of the two U.S. ground force divisions then stationed in Korea.

While the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine and the president's subsequent trip to China gave substance to the ending of the containment policy as applied to China, they stirred widespread concern among America's Asian allies who were faced with having to take a closer look at U.S. capabilities to assist in their defense. President Marcos of the Philippines summed up their concerns when he stated on 19 July 1971 that "I am certain that this alteration and change in the policy of the U.S. will mean that every Asian nation and leader must review the basis for all agreements between the U.S. and their respective countries." [Ref. 68]

Normalization of relations with the Peoples Republic of China changed the character of containment in Asia, but it did not eliminate it. With relations between the U.S. and P.R.C. on the mend - Nixon had agreed to open diplomatic relations during his second term, but was short-circuited by Watergate - the Soviet presence in the Far East became the focal point for containment in Asia, while American strategists looked once again to China to take a place in a revised American security perimeter. The anti-hegemony clause of the Shanghai Communique could not have matched traditional American foreign policy goals in East Asia any better.
J. PRAGMATISM IN THE CARTER AND REAGAN PRESIDENCIES

The search for pragmatism was clearly evidenced in the administrations of Presidents Carter and Reagan. Both presidents were acutely aware of the ongoing contradictions between morality and realism, but they approached the problem of compromise from distinctly different points of view.

President Carter was obsessed with the morality issue. He was intensely committed to human rights, yet he had to contend with the reality of the Soviet threat. He said:

I was familiar with the arguments that we had to choose between idealism and realism, between morality and the exertion of power; but I rejected those claims. To me the demonstration of American idealism was a practical and realistic approach to foreign affairs, and moral principles were the best foundation for the exertion of American power and influence.

His National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, expressed the Carter philosophy somewhat differently:

It is not a popular thing to remind people that power is important, that it has to be applied, that sometimes decisions which are not fully compatible with our concepts of what the world ideally ought to be like need to be taken. [Ref. 69]

Not surprisingly, the foreign policy record of President Carter was a mixed bag of success and failure, of achievement and frustration.

It is too soon to anticipate the judgement of history on the Carter administration. His penchant was to favor those who shared his philosophy, but he did not hesitate to take actions in
the name of pragmatism when expedient in the national interest. Human rights issues provided the standard against which President Carter measured his relationships in foreign policy. A satisfactory record in the area of human rights was a prerequisite for a substantial request for American economic or military assistance, while a poor record made assistance difficult. Exceptions were grudgingly granted.

The process of normalizing relations with China was carried through to its logical conclusion when the United States officially established diplomatic relations in January 1979. This was a pragmatic procedure which President Carter hoped would move China to improve its human rights situation. This was not a startling Carter coup, since the groundwork had been completed earlier by President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger. The key to this development was the pragmatism in U.S. policy. Regardless of the morality involved, a solid diplomatic relationship with the most populous nation on earth seemed highly advisable.

The recognition of China was an important step in our evolving relations with the nations of Asia. With normalcy in dealing with China, the United States gained a high-powered, though in many ways constrained, supporter for many of its vital foreign policy goals. China was encouraged to act responsibly in world affairs, and more importantly was changed from a confirmed adversary to a potential collaborator. In a military sense as well, the recognition of China succeeded in reducing pressure on
U.S. forces in the Asia and Pacific region, allowing a percentage of both American and Chinese forces to be reoriented toward the Soviet Union instead of each other. For the Chinese, the reduction of the American threat gave them the increased flexibility needed in dealing with the Soviets and reduced the immediate pressures to seek accommodation with Moscow.

Improved relations with mainland China meant that priorities relating to Taiwan would have to be rearranged so far as American national interests were concerned. Relations between the United States and Taiwan were limited to economic and cultural ties. Yet there was still a very strong commitment to a peaceful resolution of the differences between Beijing and Taipei (which differed little from the American basic interest which opposes the forceful takeover of any friendly nation by another). The continuing importance of such a peaceful settlement was underscored by its inclusion in both the 1972 Shanghai Communique and the January 1979 announcement of the establishment of normal relations. The 1979 statement said:

The United States is confident the people of Taiwan face a peaceful and prosperous future. The United States continues to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and expects that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves.

With regard to the Republic of Korea, Carter was torn between his own desire to increase pressure for improved human rights and his hope to withdraw some of the troops stationed on the Korean peninsula. The desire to withdraw the troops,
however, was by no means tantamount to suggesting that he was willing to abandon Korea or Northeast Asia as was charged by his critics in Korea, Japan and in the United States itself.

Ultimately, the troop withdrawal initiative proved unpopular and unworkable. Carter was unable to reconcile his own vision for Korea with the Korean demand that the Americans remain in place. His original intent to withdraw a portion of U.S. ground troops had strong moralist overtones which were byproducts of his human rights concerns. But the plan was hastily conceived and opposed more vigorously and from more quarters than the president had anticipated, ultimately bringing about his change in course. Pragmatism tipped the scales in favor of continuing the status quo for the maintenance of security for the 40 million citizens of Korea.

President Carter confronted the same policy dilemma in dealing with Marcos in the Philippines. Carter hated the inhumanity of martial law and he bristled against Marcos’ abuses of democracy. Yet he could not turn his back on Marcos because of the need of the United States for the use of Clark Air Base, Subic Bay and other American facilities on Philippine soil. He temporized, resorting to criticisms and grudging extensions of American aid, but he also negotiated a new agreement for the use of the military bases. It was left for President Reagan to "bite the bullet" - to cooperate in the overthrow of Marcos and to assist President Aquino in the restoration of democracy.

In achieving foreign policies that were desirable from a
pragmatic standpoint, President Reagan was not inhibited by considerations of human rights. To him, morality was identified with "democracy" or "anticommunism". He was determined to stress power as the guarantor of security and he was reluctant to accept any measure or compromise which threatened to take any edge off American power.

For as long as President Carter was in office, his difficulties never extinguished his hopes for detente based upon an improved situation for human rights domestically within the Soviet Union. He was never successful in persuading the majority of American citizens to share his faith in peaceful coexistence. Most Americans were distrustful of the Soviets and felt no confidence in any Soviet statements of good intentions. Furthermore, Brezhnev was no Gorbachev. The challenge of the Soviets in the Middle East, the suspicion of Soviet motives there, and the invasion of Afghanistan together with the crowning indignity of the American hostages in Iran helped to propel Carter out of office at the end of his first term.

President Reagan's victory at the polls was largely due to his outspoken, uncompromising stand against the Soviet Union. It was abundantly clear that in his search for a pragmatic foreign policy, he would distance himself from the morality of Carter and lean more heavily toward the side of confrontation and reliance upon military strength.
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Ronald Reagan entered the White House armed, as he saw it, with a mandate from the American people to restore the country to the position of prominence in world affairs from which it had slipped during the Carter administration. The approach was straightforward.

The Reagan administration clearly viewed the Soviet Union as the main source of challenge to America's foreign policy interests, both globally and regionally in East Asia. Speaking on American foreign policy priorities before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on 24 April 1981, Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, prefaced his remarks with what he termed the four basic elements of the Reagan administration's overall foreign policy approach. Two of these four dealt with meeting challenges from the Soviet Union, one with restoration of the domestic economy, and the fourth concerned itself with matters of procedures in negotiating with the communists. The following paragraphs summarize the Reagan - Stoessel philosophy:

We must strengthen our military posture in order to compensate for the tremendous buildup of Soviet military power which has been going on for the past two decades. We must keep in mind the saying that "defense may not be everything, but without it there is nothing."

and,

We are concerned in a very basic way by the worldwide pattern of Soviet adventurism. We seek a greater degree of moderation and restraint as well as
commitment to abide by international law in Soviet behavior, but only the evident strength of our nation and of our friends and allies will serve the quest for stability with the Soviet Union.

Turning to specific American interests in Asia, Mr. Stoessel added,

In recent years, we have recognized that our Asia security policy is related to our larger task of coping with the strategic challenge posed by our principal adversary, the Soviet Union, and by the aggressive actions of nations which receive its backing and act as its proxies, such as Vietnam. The challenge is global in character, and what we do in Asia will be consistent with our efforts elsewhere. (Ref. 70)

The record of the Reagan administration carried out its original promise. Thanks to his supporters in the Congress and the Department of Defense, he built up the American military establishment to unprecedented heights. He closed the window of vulnerability and convinced the world of American capability of deterring Soviet aggression. He was no friend of international agreement on arms control or limitation of armaments. He was too distrustful of any agreement with the "evil empire". Tending to believe that any compromise was an indication of weakness, he was tough in negotiations. It was ironic that at the end of his second term it appeared that the high water mark of his administration would be an arms control agreement which he had so fervently and consistently opposed. This was perhaps the supreme example of his ability to bow to pragmatism no matter how much it went against his dedication to realism.

President Reagan's global policies reflected his consuming anti-communism, anti-Sovietism and his passionate, professed absorption in the cause of universal freedom and democracy. He
often said that he was as dedicated to human rights as his predecessor, but he differed in his priorities. Reagan preferred to resort to quiet diplomacy to support human rights and to be outspoken for freedom. Carter saw human rights as the very essence of freedom. Reagan's rhetoric of defiance spanned the world. It explained his policies in Lebanon (where the Marines died); in Grenada, which he invaded; and in Nicaragua, where he staked his reputation on aid to the Contras. It baffled him in trying to obtain the release of the hostages in the Middle East.

He was warm in his attitudes toward conservative and staunch anti-communist rulers in the rest of the world. He was at one with Margaret Thatcher, Yasu Nakasone, Ferdinand Marcos and Chun Doo Hwan. He hated communist rulers like Castro and was intolerant of neutrals. He could not but be skeptical of smiling communists like Deng Xiaoping. Any deal with a communist nation was a matter of expediency, not of choice.

But even President Reagan had to seek the pragmatic norm in dealing with other nations, in spite of his fierce commitment to the ideology of freedom and democracy. It was difficult for him to desert Marcos, whose anti-communism far outweighed his multitude of sins. It was impossible to take Gorbachev at face value. It was galling to have to make choices in conflicts between friendly nations, as between Argentina and Great Britain in the dispute over the Falkland Islands. It irritated him when allies differed with him on relations with communist nations - for example, the European community and the Soviet pipeline, or
on such military matters as the Japanese share in security costs or the New Zealand pronouncement on the visits of nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed ships. It was not easy to take a stand on one side or the other of an international dispute in which the element of communism or freedom was not the crucial variant.

The Reagan administration faced a multitude of problems in the growing dilemma between security cooperation and economic competition. The American collective defense system in the Asia-Pacific region was subjected to increasing strains due to the spectacular economic growth of Japan, Korea and the newly industrialized countries of Southeast Asia. The huge deficits in the U.S. budget and the international income account made Americans feel that their allies should bear a larger share of the costs of security. The Americans were no longer as supreme economically as they were at the end of World War II, and apparently they had lost a lot of the competitive edge in manufacturing and trade which they had long enjoyed. Americans in the Congress demanded some sort of protection - either tariff legislation or retaliatory measures against such unfair practices as dumping or discriminating against American imports. At heart a free trader and staunchly against higher taxes, Reagan resisted legislative measures that he thought would work against the effectiveness of his Asia-Pacific security arrangements.

Reality forced President Reagan to tilt toward the demands of those American interests which wanted special protection. He bent, without giving in, but he left to his successors a dilemma
that became one of the leading issues of the election of 1988. Reagan wanted the government to stay out of the rivalry between private interests in international trade, but he could not ignore the pressures of public opinion.

President Reagan, like all his predecessors, learned that neither power nor morality can be the sole guide to the determination of the American national interest. Sometimes the one line of policy needs to be emphasized, sometimes the other. Hard as it might be, the pursuit of policy cannot be confined to a single line nor a single set of alternatives. The one element of consistency in the execution of foreign policy is that sometimes ideals must be pushed aside, tactics modified, and convictions relaxed for the sake of finding a pragmatic solution to a diplomatic problem.
VII. CONCLUSION

The process by which American foreign policy is determined is a dynamic one. World conditions are in constant change while centers of policy influence rise and fall in importance in tandem with the nation’s political cycles. Elected and appointed policymakers come and go, bringing with them visions of world order, varying levels of understanding or personal interest in foreign affairs, and plans of action in pursuit of a variety of personal goals and objectives. The mood of the public, media influence, and general tone of the times also have shares in this process which ultimately determines our foreign policy and how the United States will interact with the other nations of the world.

Foreign policy makers thus have much to contend with in their efforts to formulate rational policies to manage the nation’s external affairs, policies which sometimes fall short of their intended purpose. In particular, the idealists among them - the John Hays, Woodrow Wilsons and Jimmy Carters - have had to discover that compromise and negotiation are as much the keys to success in foreign policy as they are in domestic party politics. That is not to say, however, that there is no place for idealism in the practice and policy of foreign affairs. On the contrary,
Ideals are a proven source of direction and provide a standard against which progress can be measured.

On the other hand, the pragmatic approach to foreign affairs, or dealing with circumstances as they really are and not how we would like them to be, is the real guarantor of a successful foreign policy. Without exception, all senior policymakers have had to rely on this approach, regardless of their rhetoric or political platforms. Ultimately what has separated the idealists from the pragmatists has been only the degree to which they resorted to pragmatic alternatives.

There have been blatant pragmatists like Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Kissinger, who conducted foreign policy with the studied calculations of an accountant maintaining his books. But there have also been subtle pragmatists. Idealists such as Woodrow Wilson and Jimmy Carter who clung to "just and moral" causes until the cost of their pursuit jeopardized other, more vital national interests. Woodrow Wilson's personal commitment to the League of Nations and Jimmy Carter's "moral" foreign policy stand out as two good examples. Yet both had solid records of having taken pragmatic actions as "means" to greater "ends." At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, Wilson had accepted Japanese claims to Chinese territories, despite his initial strong opposition, rather than alienate the Japanese from the negotiating process and possibly undermine their ultimate
membership in the League of Nations. In the Carter case, not going through with the 1977 decision to withdraw American troops from Korea proved to be the pragmatic solution to an initially bad policy overweighted by the moral issue of human rights.

In summary, while the foreign policy pragmatism of Roosevelt, Nixon and Kissinger may have been more blatant than most, every leader who ever developed American foreign policy, whether they were basically a realist or an idealist, had to be a pragmatist in the end. Whatever their own particular conviction about the nature of the national interest, each lived up to their oath to support and promote that interest, and gave their all to the accomplishment of national objectives as they perceived them.
END NOTES


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7. Ibid., p. 57.


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17. Ibid., p. 32.
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