ARMING OF AF PERSONNEL IN HIGH-THREAT OVERSEAS AREAS

(U) AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COL\L MAXWELL AFB AL

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STUDENT REPORT

ARMING OF AF PERSONNEL
IN HIGH-THREAT OVERSEAS AREAS

MAJOR PHILLIP L. MC LAURIN 88-1770
MAJOR CLIFTON L. SMITH

"insights into tomorrow"
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REPORT NUMBER  88-1770

TITLE  ARMING OF AF PERSONNEL IN HIGH-THREAT OVERSEAS AREAS

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Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of requirements for graduation.

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
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This research reveals the requirements for additional security measures necessary to improve our war-fighting capability. It identifies the Air Force's present policy on arming of their personnel, the need for arming additional personnel, and its responsibility to protect its own resources during wartime operations. In addition, it includes testimonies from great warriors and results from various studies and analysis conducted by Air Staff members, steering committees and working groups supporting the need for arming additional personnel during hostilities. It also provides recommendations for arming personnel who are presently prohibited from carrying arms.
This research paper reflects the authors' views relating to arming of base personnel in high-threat areas to assist in the Air Base Ground Defense mission. It identifies deficiencies which should support the need to revise present Air Force policies to implement an Air Force-wide selective arming policy. While the present regulation does not specifically prohibit the mass arming of combat support personnel, the spirit and intent of the regulation seeks to unnecessarily minimize the arming of certain personnel in a combatant zone. Incident conclusions and recommendations identified in analyses taken from results of training exercises, actual experiences, interviews with physical security professionals and Air Force and Department of Defense studies/interviews unequivocally support the research thesis. All facts and opinions are realistic without having to use any type of imaginary concepts or courses of action.

The authors received valuable information to support their research and writing of this paper from numerous individuals. Deputate for Air Base Survivability Personnel, Eglin AFB, Florida, provided supportive material and volunteered to assist the authors until the research paper was completed. Major James A. Thomas, Chief, Law Enforcement, Training and Corrections Branch, Headquarters, United States Air Force, Washington, D.C., forwarded an Arming Policy for Mobility Personnel Package with arming policy letters to assist in support of this research paper. Mr. Gene Johnson, Air University Library Security Manager and other library personnel were helpful in assisting the authors locate information supporting their research thesis. Lt Col Pat Evans, ACSC Faculty Advisor, was instrumental in providing the authors with advice and recommending sources of information relevant to their thesis topic.
Major Phillip L. McLaurin is a 1974 Officer Training School graduate with an in-depth amount of military experience including twelve years of enlisted experience. He was selected in the last group of enlisted personnel for commissioning through the Bootstrap Commissioning Program. His previous assignments include three overseas tours and eight stateside assignments. He was assigned executive officer duties for his first three years of commission service. He then cross-trained into the security police career field based on active encouragement by Lieutenant General (retired) Winfield W. Scott who was his Center Commander. The author served four years as Non-Commissioned Officer-in-Charge of Cadet Administration with Air Force Reserve Officers’ Training Corps at Tuskegee Institute, Alabama and Mississippi Valley State University. Major McLaurin has attended numerous security police schools and seminars including the USAF Police Administration Course conducted by the University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California. He has a B.S. in Education from Mississippi Valley State University and is presently pursuing a Master of Science Degree in Criminal Justice from Troy State University, Montgomery, Alabama. Major McLaurin is a 1979 graduate of Squadron Officers’ School. Major McLaurin was the Commander and Chief, 2853rd Security Police Squadron, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia, prior to his arrival at Air Command and Staff College.

Major Clifton L. Smith is a 1975 Reserve Officer Training Corps graduate of San Diego State University. Upon entering active duty in 1976, he was assigned as a base transportation officer. His primary and additional duties required involvement in base contingency plans, where the issue of arming base personnel first surfaced. His transportation assignments at Seymour Johnson AFB and Osan AB in Korea both suggested the policy of arming military personnel required modification. For the next seven and one-half year period, Major Smith worked in the Systems Acquisition and Management career field. From there, he served two years on the Air Force’s Inspector General (IG) staff as an inspector on the Systems Acquisition Management Inspection (SAMI) team. His participation in the Air Base Survivability Inspection required his involvement as the Active Defense chairman, of which Air Base Ground Defense and arming of personnel were a considerable part. This timely assessment of the ABGD mission proved to be a catalyst for selecting the AF Arming Policy as a research topic. Major Smith’s educational accomplishments consist of a 1975 B.A. of History from San Diego State University and a 1984 M.S. in Acquisition Management and Procurement Law from Northrup University.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Part of our College mission is distribution of the students’ problem solving products to DOD sponsors and other interested agencies to enhance insight into contemporary, defense related issues. While the College has accepted this product as meeting academic requirements for graduation, the views and opinions expressed or implied are solely those of the author and should not be construed as carrying official sanction.

REPORT NUMBER 88-1770

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR PHILLIP L. MC LAURIN; MAJOR CLIFTON L. SMITH

TITLE ARMING OF AF PERSONNEL IN HIGH-THREAT OVERSEAS AREAS

I. PURPOSE: This research paper identifies some of the problem areas which affect the arming of all Air Force personnel for supporting Air Base Ground Defense missions in high-threat overseas areas.

II. PROBLEM: The security police presently have the primary responsibility of providing internal and external security for United States Air Force resources or bases. However, their assigned manpower does not allow them to adequately accomplish this mission without compromising the protection of certain resources. In addition, the present policy which governs the arming of personnel does not warrant non-security police personnel to training and qualify with arms unless they are assigned to one of the minority organizations such as Prime Beef, Red Horse, Prime Rib, etc. The total number of valuable resources and personnel requiring security and protection during wartime operations justifies arming additional personnel.
III. DATA: Air Force Regulation 125-26 titled, "Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel," provides the official policy guidance on arming Air Force personnel. Arming as defined by the regulation is "bearing a firearm with live ammunition inserted, attached to the firearm, or within immediate access to the individual." Present Air Force policy is that firearms shall not be issued indiscriminately to base personnel. To ensure adherence to this policy, the Air Force has identified two categories of personnel to bear arms which omit the majority of personnel assigned to a base. It is essential to have the required number of armed personnel to provide adequate security and protection during increased threat conditions and wartime operations. One area that immediately comes to mind is the direct protection of aircraft, which has demonstrated an immense vulnerability to terrorist and guerrilla attack. Again, security police personnel do not have the manpower to eradicate the problem. Non-security police personnel should be prepared to assist in this area and play an armed protection role during critical times.

IV. CONCLUSION: The protection of Air Force bases in high-threat overseas areas remains the responsibility of all Air Force personnel regardless of speciality codes, duty titles and job titles. It is essential to possess the capability to employ a solid ground defense readiness response immediately upon a potential or actual unfriendly force attack. Plans have to be confirmed in advance in order to deny the enemy. If not, he will succeed.

V. RECOMMENDATION: The Air Force should direct all MAJCOMs and tenant organizations to appoint a working group to establish procedures necessary for ensuring all personnel are qualified for arming immediately upon receiving notification of a PCS assignment to a high-threat overseas area [intelligence reports will determine if a base is considered to be categorized as a high-threat area]. The subject of arming Air Force personnel in high-threat overseas areas should be a top priority for discussion at all MAJCOMs Wing/Base Commander's Conferences, Chiefs of Security Police Conferences and Combat Arms Training and Maintenance Conferences to ensure continuity. Arming policy follow-up initiatives and re-evaluations should become an annual subject of concern and discussion by all general and senior officers who hold command positions.
Chapter One

The successful obtainment of American objectives is sometimes dependent upon the nation’s ability to project presence and force around the world. This is especially true when our military arm is being relied upon to obtain our national goals and objectives. The Air Force, as a part of the military establishment is responsible for providing a majority of the aerospace capability.

The Air Force’s mission—albeit an awesome one—is in part to develop and conduct counterair, interdiction, tactical air support operations, and to provide air transport for deployment of Department of Defense (DOD) forces anywhere and anytime during times of peace and combat. (31:4)

To effectively discharge this obligation, the Air Force must rely upon airbases around the world to support their operational and logistical operations. The airbase is essentially a strategic vital “support system” necessary to accomplish the Air Force’s tasked mission. However, the Air Force has historically placed greater emphasis on its airborne performance instead of the effective protection of its airbase support system (14:11). It is the latter issue with which this paper is concerned.

Base defense is defined as “the local military measure, both normal and emergency, required to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a base, so as to insure maximum capability of its facilities is available to US forces” (6:1). The National Security Act of 1947 established that the Air Force “shall be organized, trained, and equipped to perform prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations and be responsible for the security of its own installations” (4:3-1). General Giulio Douhet, the father proponent of military airpower in 1921 theorized, “It is easier and more effective to destroy the enemy’s aerial power by destroying his nests and eggs on the ground than to hunt his flying birds in the air” (2:29).
The lessons of wars and police actions since World War I substantiate that, "as a body, the United States does not pay enough attention to the basic tenets of protecting our valuable base resources because the results of defense investment cannot be immediately quantified and therefore, cannot be easily defended" (14:111).

WORLD WAR ONE

During World War I, the limited use of airpower did not provide significant examples of the significance of destroying an enemy's war-making capability by attacking his airbases. However, it is significant to note the attack on, or capture of, enemy centers of operations were priority objectives then and normally resulted in defeat of the enemy (6:1).

WORLD WAR TWO

World War II provided the US with numerous lessons on the importance of protecting our bases. The new mobile mechanized truck and tank warfare, supported by air attack, made base defense an absolute necessity. German defeat and capture of Royal Air Force bases at Crete and Maleme proved devastating and resulted in numerous aircraft being destroyed on the ground (6:2). The positive correlation between Air Base Ground Defense and Sortie Generation Capability was proved painfully real. A major lesson provided by our allies was the need to patrol off-base and conduct reconnaissance since patrolling within the base perimeter proved grossly inadequate (14:5).

Upon entering World War II, the U.S. Army Air Corps took heed to the above lesson learned from our allied nations and in 1942, General George C. Marshall allocated 53,299 troops to be used as base defense units, although he later abandoned this plan as air superiority was obtained (6:2). "Overall, there is little documentation to indicate the Army Air Corps had significant problems with Air Base Ground Defense similar to those that the British experienced" (14:6). "However, this may have been because the Air Corps belonged to the Army (14:6) which adheres to a policy of 'every person is a combat soldier, capable of bearing arms and defending the base.'" This policy was not implemented by the Air Force since its establishment as a separate service in 1947.
THE KOREAN WAR

"The Korean War illustrated that there was a threat to American bases" (14:6). Employing guerilla warfare tactics, the enemy’s organization and operations routinely went undetected. American and South Korean installations and bases made excellent targets for the enemy (14:6). "The U.S. Air Force security forces had entered into the Korean conflict ill-prepared to combat this type of threat" (14:6). "Instead of much-needed combat skill training for air base protection, training was centered around internal protection of resources and law enforcement functions on the air bases" (6:3).

There are numerous documented cases of aircraft damaged and destroyed by local ground attacks (14:8). The Air Force implemented numerous policies to counter, which proved to be inadequate. "The Korean War continued without a positive answer to the problem of Air Base Ground Defense," (14:7) perhaps in part due to the fact that the air base was not considered an indispensable element of the wartime system (25:52).

THE VIETNAM WAR

"The Vietnam War, unlike previous wars, required the U.S. Air Force to repeatedly fly combat missions from destroyed or disabled air bases" (1:257). "Throughout the War, controversy raged on the question of how these installations were to be protected and by whom. As in the Korean conflict, the question of air base ground defense, and the need for trained forces to fulfill this role, again became a controversial issue" (6:5).

The reason for much of this void in capability was because, for the first three years, the Viet Cong (VC) ignored the air bases. This gave the U.S. officials the misguided opinion that any threat to base security would be the result of internal operations. Consequently, the focus was placed upon internal base security, via the restriction of base personnel. (1:257)

"The key to air base defense during this period depended upon the quality of individual security policemen, many of whom were young, inexperienced, and untrained" (1:262).

US security police were augmented by South Vietnamese forces, "which often proved less than adequate for U.S. Air Force Base Defense requirements. Generally, they were under-trained, ill-equipped and poorly led" (14:8).
These forces regularly failed to perform even routine patrol and reconnaissance missions. "This allowed the Viet Cong to virtually strike the bases at will with rockets, mortars and sapper attacks" (14:8).

In response to USAF attacks on North Vietnamese bases following the Gulf of Tonkin incident, on 1 November 1964 the Viet Cong launched its first attack against Bien Hoa (USAF air base).

Using six 81mm mortars emplaced less than 440 yards outside the base, the VC fired between sixty and eighty rounds into the base and swiftly departed, undetected and unmolested. This attack resulted in the deaths of four American personnel, and the wounding of seventy-two others. Also lost were 5 B-57 Jet bombers totally destroyed and countless others that were damaged. This attack proved to be but the first of many attacks launched against USAF facilities in the dreadful years that followed. (1:257)

The 1968 combined Tet Offensive by North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong guerrillas again showed the vulnerability of USAF air bases. In many instances, entire enemy battalions forming up adjacent to air bases remained undetected until the moment of attack because sufficient off-base patrols were not functioning. Security police confined to the perimeter were, in many cases, unable to adequately counter enemy forces or even to ascertain accurate enemy strength levels. (6:8)

Again in Vietnam, the Air Force failed to acknowledge lessons learned in previous wars pertinent to base defense, and interpreted its base defense responsibilities for defense as the local air base (1:259). Thus it took the position that its responsibility ended at the base boundary, and the local Army commander was responsible for the external base defense in accordance with guidelines laid down by the Joint Chiefs of Staffs. (1:259).

The Vietnam conflict brought increased attention to the vulnerability of the USAF air bases overseas in a high-threat area. The Air Force was again faced with the need to reform. Even as the Air Force began building up its base security, the enemy continued its attacks. "Douhet's theory of attacking one's warfighting capability on the ground was again sustained" (6:5).
Chapter Two

CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ABGD MISSION

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT (MOA)

On 22 May 1984, the Chiefs of Staff, United States Army and Air Force, announced the signing of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) which included provisions for the U.S. Army to assume responsibility for exterior Air Base Ground Defense of Air Force installations (12:2). Initiative Eight of referenced MOA specifically

... tasks the U.S. Army to provide external air base ground defense (ABGD) for the U.S. Air Force. Initiative Nine tasked the Army and the Air Force to execute a Joint Service Agreement (JSA) for the Army to provide initial and follow-on training for Air Force on-site security flights (6:23), ... for which the Air Force will provide appropriate funding.

The capability of both the Army and the Air Force to accomplish these monumental tasks are presently under determination and based upon numerous assumptions (7:2). Initiative Eight states that the Army would provide ABDG outside the base perimeter. "This statement was interpreted initially by Air Force personnel as the assignment of dedicated Army personnel to secure and fight on the external ground around the air base" (7:4). However, "given current peace-time numbers of military police (MP) forward stationed overseas, dedicated support to air bases probably will not be possible" (7:5). Moreover, manpower to fulfill that dedicated ABDG mission are presently forecasted to be filled by time-phased force deployment list (TPFDL) (14:22, 7:9). Presently, MP's scheduled for deployment are assigned a low priority deployment status (7:5). This problem is further compounded considering that much of "previous U.S. Army planning did not factor providing external defense of air bases" (7:18).

To accomplish this monumental task, the US Army plans to maximize the utilization of Host Nation Support to perform assigned AF ABDG missions in lieu of US Army MP.
units (7:29). "This again validates the Army’s intent to respond as quickly as possible, vice dedicating army manpower" (7:30). While the local nationals’ commitment is questioned by some, the Chief of Army Forces has decided not to request additional MP troops in the European theater because of their perceived reliability (7:30).

Initiative Number Nine of the MOA, as previously stated, requires the establishment of a JSA between the Air Force and the Army, tasking the Army to provide initial and follow-on ABGD training to the Air Force. The Air Force’s consideration for receiving this service required them to transfer approximately 3,600 reserve manpower authorizations to the Army (7:7, 14:31), and provide for funding to conduct referenced training. The transfer of personnel authorizations has yet to be accomplished (7:7). Additionally, normal leadtimes required to obtain funding authorization has precluded any substantial transfer of funds from the Air Force to the Army to conduct ABGD training.

Adding additional uncertainty to the issue of who will really provide external perimeter Air Base Ground Defense is the wording of the JSA signed between the Air Force and the Army. The JSA specifically tasks the Army with this responsibility; however, this statement is caveated by the following statement: "The Air Force is tasked with internal protection of their installations. However, until arrival of the US Army, or possible substitution troops, provided in accordance with the Host Nation Support Agreement, the Air Force will be responsible for assuming external base responsibility (12:3).

Additionally compounding this issue is the official determination of where the internal base perimeter ends and where the external area of responsibility starts (10:3). The JSA calls for the negotiation or mutual determination of the boundary between the Air Force and Rear Area Commander. Interviews conducted with Air Force security police personnel stationed in the Republic of Germany during an Air Force Inspector General review by the author revealed the base perimeter line is subjective and varies from base to base. Another near unanimous concern expressed by the same Air Force security police personnel was, "their desire to obtain the responsibility, and authority to accomplish the mission of ABGD for the external base perimeter also" (10:-). Of course, being properly trained and equipped was an acknowledged prerequisite.

Another factor contributing to the Air Force’s pessimism concerning Army desire to perform the external
ABGD role is the Army's historical track record in this area. The Army has always had this responsibility--during World War II, the Korean War and the Vietnam War. However, history is well documented of their changing of priorities during the fog and friction of war, and has resulted in Air Force installations not receiving the perceived necessary base defense when requested and needed. The Army's response again is, their rolling mobile concept of operations (7:5), coupled with their responsibility for the vast rear battle "acreage" will in many times, entail a reasonable response time, prior to engagement of desired enemy forces (7:5). Additionally, their need to prioritize the needs of all requesters, could very reasonably result in a "non-response" to some requirements (7:6). These real-world limiting factors (limfacs) combined with an Air Force perception of the Army viewing their Air Force ABGD responsibility as an "additional duty" legitimizes the concern for the safety and security of Air Force personnel and resources located overseas in high-threat areas (10:--).

The Air Force, and the Army in particular, embarrassingly acknowledge these limfacs and concerns. The 1984 JSA between the service Chiefs of Staff was a serious attempt to resolve this very critical, sensitive subject (7:2). However, there are still many critics that argue "legislation" doesn't fix the specific limfacs and concerns; therefore, the Air Force should be prepared to assume the external ABGD responsibilities of their installations, until the Army arrives, as they are tasked in the previously mentioned Army and Air Force JSA (18:--).

RESULTS OF STUDIES, AUDITS, EXERCISES

Review of Air Force exercises, report of audits, and special studies indicate that the Air Force is possibly unprepared to successfully defend their installations and assets located overseas in high-threat areas. In 1981, in response to the previously mentioned Reagan Administration's request for increased DOD funding, the Congress seriously questioned the military's (in particular the Air Force's) capability to defend its present assets (14:25). In part, an exercise was conducted to determine the Air Force's capability to fly and fight from an air base under attack. This exercise was conducted in Germany at Spangdahlem Air Base and was called Salty Demo. Some significant findings pertinent to ABGD were as follows (13:1): A major problem of detecting and neutralizing enemy intruders and saboteurs existed during night hours (3:IV.) This is significant as known Soviet doctrine favors utilizing specialized teams of
highly trained intruders and saboteurs to attack US bases prior to initiating an attack. "These intruders, known as Spetsnaz, are experts in silent killing and operate in bands of four to fifteen members. Their targets are normally high-priority resources such as aircraft, weapons storage and critical support facilities (21:64). U.S. Army Rangers tasked with assuming the Spetsnaz role during the initial phases of the Salty Demo exercise were extremely successful in accomplishing their objectives (3:10, 13:--). The effectiveness of the Spetsnaz was substantiated by an ABGD Force Effectiveness Analysis conducted in July of 1986. This analysis concluded, among other things: 1) Target detection at night is the number one problem in developing an effective defense against the Spetsnaz teams; 2) One attack by a few Spetsnaz teams could degrade air base sortie generation capability by 10 percent to 40 percent; 3) A fully effective ABGD requires a Spetsnaz kill or capture rate greater than 60 percent (3:1IV).

The initial ABGD results of the Salty Demo required security force personnel to revise their concept of operation (reduce their off-base patrolling) in order to detect and neutralize enemy base penetrators (3:VIII). This, of course, was done at the expense of potential enemy stand-off attacks, which are to be expected (3:33). Also, again the ABGD effectiveness and analysis report concluded:

It does not appear possible for the USAF ground defense forces currently planned to be available for off-base deployment to achieve the close spacing needed for target detection and also satisfy the three to five kilometer defense depth stated in AFR 206-2 titled ABGD. (3:VIII)

While surveys are preliminary as to the manpower required to accomplish this mission, it is estimated by reliable sources at the Office of HQ AF XOORB Personnel that approximately 1,500 security police per installation would be required to accomplish this mission with current capability (15:--).

With known future cuts in military personnel, the prospect of achieving such large increases in personnel is non-existent at best! The utilization of assigned installation combat support personnel [a concept rejected by present Air Force management (17:--) to perform the base defense mission or to incorporate advanced technology to magnify the current forces' capabilities are two realistic, reliable options.
OPERATIONAL READINESS INSPECTION (ORI)

Another indicator as to the Air Force's capability to accomplish their ABGD responsibilities are the limfacs identified by numerous inspectors prior to the start of an Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI). These limfacs are submitted to acknowledge shortcomings in their capability to accomplish their tasked mission. Limfacs range from lack of personnel to equipment shortages (10:6). The review of limfacs in Europe by the Air Force Over the Shoulder Inspectors during 1986 revealed: The existence of identical ABGD limfacs for many installations for approximately three to five inspections in succession. This condition indicated a potential lack of corrective action being implemented to improve the Wing's ABGD capability. Similar trends were also identified in other theaters.

AUDIT REPORTS

The Air Force Audit Agency evaluated the overall effectiveness of the ABGD program and concluded that it needs major strengthening (11:1). The report concluded "opportunities existed to enhance program management by improving the planning and for integrating ground defense forces into combat theaters, by developing more effective training programs, and by strengthening the position management process" (11:2). A sample of several specific fundings are as follows: 1) "Training program design varied significantly between MAJCOMS due to insufficient guidance and lack of program oversight" (11:3). It was rationalized by security police personnel that this additional training put excessive demands on the same personnel conducting the peacetime mission of security, and accomplishing this task would necessitate 12-hour workshifts, resulting in morale problems (11:11). 2) "Security police units at seven PACAF and USAFE locations had not prepared/distributed mission folders to communicate essential operational and intelligence data needed by deploying units to study and execute their ABGD missions" (11:2). Therefore, units were not adequately preparing themselves for the tasks associated with their wartime roles to be assigned upon deployment (11:3).

These authors acknowledge that the facts presented in this chapter may not be totally representative of the Air Force's capability to perform the ABGD mission. However, they are excellent indicators of problems within the
security police career field that warrant solutions to improve our capability to successfully defend our base assets during periods of conflict across the entire spectrum. Recommended solutions, by their complex nature, will, in many instances, be neither simplistic nor inexpensive--just absolutely necessary!!
Chapter Three

PRESENT ARMING POLICY FOR AIR FORCE PERSONNEL

Air Force Regulation 125-26 titled, "Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel", provides the guidance on official policy on arming Air Force personnel. Arming, as defined by the regulation, is "bearing a firearm with live ammunition inserted, attached to the firearm, or within immediate access to the individual" (5:2). "Present Air Force policy is, firearms shall not be indiscriminately issued to base personnel" (5:3). To ensure adherence to this policy, the Air Force has identified two categories of personnel to bear arms which are as follows: Category I--Personnel armed both for daily and peacetime operations, and in time of conflict such as Security Police, Special Investigators (OSI), Red Horse, Prime Beef, etc. Category II--Personnel armed in combat areas in time of war, in a designated hostile fire zone not in time of war, or in training exercises to prepare for these missions (5:4). Additionally, to minimize the available firearms on an Air Force installation the Air Force has sanctioned only six missions where personnel may be armed, and they are as follows (5:3):

(1) Internal Security/Protection (IS/P), normally security police, their augmentees, combat control teams, aircrew members, Prime Beef, Red Horse, etc.

(2) Ground Defense, basic protection of installation.

(3) Mission Defense, security and defense of a single essential operation by organic units, such as combat control teams, etc.

(4) Time Limited Defense (TLD), short-term defense of areas such as communications not normally protected by ground defense or mission defense.

(5) Unit Relocation, military units relocating.

(6) Personal Defense, normally high ranking military and civilians in overseas high-threat areas where intelligence suspects a threat, and isolated from friendly forces.
A prerequisite to arming any of these people requires their adequate arms training and familiarization and appropriate commander authorization (5:3). "While all Air Force personnel are exposed to small arms upon entering the service, the majority lack anything beyond the most basic skills with a rifle or a revolver" (23:5). It is rationalized by many the reasons for minimal arms familiarization is the high price tag of acquiring adequate ammunition and conducting training (23:5). "Air Force Regulation 125-26 was revised in 1978 to incorporate the above, in part, to eliminate the policy of "Mass Arming" and to reduce the number of weapons on the base to only the minimum needed" (9:-). This action stemmed from Vietnam experiences where mass arming was perceived as non-effective due to the lack of prior training and adequately developed plans to accomplish the Air Base Ground Defense mission, problems that can and should be overcome (9:-).

While mass arming may not be a political option, some variation thereof is required to assist in the protection of base personnel and resources against known viable threats.

NEED FOR ARMING

Testimony of past great warriors and results of various studies and analyses substantiates the need and benefit of arming available base personnel in high-threat overseas areas. On 10 December 1965, General Westmoreland sent a letter to the Air Force 2nd Air Division Commander, Lieutenant General George Moore, directing the USAF to protect itself. The letter stated in part:

In order to provide a high level of security to airfields, it would be necessary to deploy a large number of US infantry elements in a defensive role. Obviously, this cannot be done and at the same time, go over to the offensive and destroy the VC. Therefore, I desire that all service units and all forces of whatever service who find themselves operating without infantry protection will be organized, trained and exercised to perform the defense and security functions which I have discussed. I reiterate that your participation in self-defense is not an optional matter but is an urgent necessity. (14:9)

Known Soviet doctrine calls for a relentless effort ranging from groups of SPEESNAZ, Special Forces, etc., to airborne battalions to attack US Air Force installations and disrupt or destroy combat support capabilities in the rear area (23:3). As we recall the extensive damage caused by a small
cadre of trained commandos in sensitive areas, Winston Churchill said, "The defeat of France was caused by an incredibly small number of highly equipped elite commandos, followed by the German Army that took advantage of what had been done" (23:4). These U.S. bases will no longer be a sanctuary for operations as they may have been in past conflicts (23:4). Recognizing their immense value, the Air Force should be prepared to protect and to hold these installations under worst-case scenarios. In addition, there is also a growing concern about aircrew members being able to provide their own protection while in the squadron. As was indicated by an Air Base Ground Defense Force Effectiveness Analysis conducted by the Air Force Weapons Laboratory, one viable way to increase the Air Force's capabilities with respect to the projection of air power would be to:

Consider issuing sidearms to all aircrew members as soon as they report to their squadron buildings for pre-mission planning and briefing. (Current practice is to issue sidearms to the aircrews while they are "suiting up" just prior to proceeding to their aircraft). This action would not conflict with regulations prohibiting mass arming of base personnel, and would serve to provide the aircrews with a means of self-protection. Additionally, consideration should be given to bolstering the owner-user security force at the squadron operations buildings through a combination of increasing the number of armed owner-user guards inside and outside the buildings, establishing foot patrols around the building, and other appropriate measures. (3:51)

In 1955, Field Marshall Lord Bernard Law Montgomery stressed the need for the defense of bases to be by ground airmen (14:6). Likewise, Lieutenant General Leo Marques, USAF/LE, while making the following remarks, advocated the arming and training of combat support personnel for ground defense.

We as members of the profession of arms who specialize in logistics, must be ready to accomplish our duties amidst impossible combat situations and ensure the survivability of people and resources. We should react to the flow of the battlefield, not become its victim (23:7).

The lack of adequate personnel necessary for protection of installations in high-threat overseas areas has been more than once noted. In fact, studies that were conducted of the assignments of security police in Vietnam revealed that
only 12 percent of the total base personnel was actually trained to provide any type of adequate resource or personnel protection (2:112).

The concern for arming of personnel is a continuous concern. In 1987, an Air Staff Arming Policy Steering Committee and Working Group convened to discuss an Air Force-wide arming policy for mobility personnel. The Committee arrived at the following consensus:

Arming of mobility personnel should be based on the supported command needs for Air Base Ground Defense (ABGD). As identified in Salty Demo and subsequent ABDG manpower surveys, there is a large shortfall in personnel qualified to satisfy requirements for the ABDG mission. In actual employment, armed mobility personnel would support ABDG through close-in defense of their duty area. (9:--)

The Committee specifically addressed arming for mobility personnel. However, this requirement exists for all Air Force personnel assigned to high-threat overseas areas. The issues and areas of concern are basically the same except on a larger scale based on the total number of affected personnel. AF/XOX Letter addressed to all MAJCOMs. and AFOSP reflects the Air Staff Arming Policy Steering Committee and Working Group proposals for a standardized arming policy for mobility personnel. This included requirements such as all mobility personnel will receive standardization training to the maximum extent feasible. This practice will provide commanders a flexible pool of resources from which to draw to meet ABDG needs (9:--).

The Committee also acknowledged some specific areas of concern which need to be addressed by the MAJCOMs and AFOSP prior to finalizing a regulation or OPLAN (9:--). The first one related to training, such as additional cost for Security Police Combat Training and Maintenance personnel. Some of the others related to additional weapons, ammunition, and increased ancillary training/lost primary duty time. Qualifications versus familiarization is a valid concern because procedures need to be established which would allow personnel to handle their weapons during times other than for qualification purposes. Additional armories will be needed in order to provide storage for the increase in weapons and ammunition (9:--).

Another finding included the establishment of a training program to provide training guidelines for all individuals not already assigned an armed mission to include
the overview of Level I and II ground threats in a deployed theater. A percentage of the mobility personnel may receive training on the M-60 Machine Gun and M-203 Grenade Launcher in conjunction with the entire mobility team receiving familiarization/qualification training with the M-16 Rifle or .38 Pistol. Familiarization with fire-positions/point- location and defense tactics is also part of the training requirements; a Standard Educational Subject Block (SBSB) would be developed by Air Force Office of Security Police to ensure adequate training in ground defense structures at planned deployment location(s). These mobility personnel will be committed to their primary mission but will be capable of assisting ABGO as circumstances warrant (9:--).

THE AIR FORCE HAS THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT ITS OWN

The Air Force cannot afford to field an army of personnel whose sole duty is Air Base Ground Defense. Instead, we need to follow Winston Churchill’s advice and "make the theater air base the stronghold of fighting airground men, and not the abode of uniformed civilians in the prime of life protected by detachments of soldiers" (2:79). This means like the Army and Marine Corps, every Air Force member—officer and enlisted alike—become competent in the use of weapons. . . . This concept of operation will remove all doubts some may have as to whether the Air Force is a profession or a job.

The following paraphrase is taken from an interview with Major Laurence "Rocky" Lane, Former Commander 2314th Ground Combat Readiness Evaluation Squadron (GCRES, VOLANT SCORPION), MAC SP's Ground Combat Exercise and Evaluation Area, Little Rock AFB, Arkansas:

It is undisputed that the primary responsibility for air base protection should rest with the security police. However, security police specialists knowledgeable in ABGO requirements recommend training and arming all available combat support personnel to assist in providing protection for Air Force personnel and resources. One area that immediately comes to mind is the direct protection of airplanes, which are extremely vulnerable to sabotage. Limited security police manpower does not allow them to provide adequate protection in all areas. Non-security police personnel should be prepared to intervene in this area and to play an armed protection role during critical times. Another area that takes a top priority stance for protection is the aircrew.
alert members. Their safety in getting to the aircraft cannot be taken lightly because if, for no other reason, the airpower missions cannot be accomplished without pilots and crew members to operate the airplanes. It is quite obvious that we build up far too much confidence in flightline fencing and boundary line deterrence which can allow the protection of our resources to lose its top security priority.

Major Lane's experience in the Air Base Ground Defense and Anti-Terrorist Area has qualified him as an expert in evaluating present systems used to protect personnel and resources in high-threat overseas areas. As a result of his first-hand knowledge, he made the following quote:

A moral obligation is also present. Defending a base is comprised of defending it during peace time just as we do during contingencies and emergencies while providing a safe place for its people to live and to work. The limited combat personnel specifically assigned to the base defense mission by the security police may not be unable to adequately protect all priorities simultaneous with firepower. Therefore, they must be relieved of the full responsibility for the protection of providing internal close-in security and be allowed to concentrate more on perimeter security.

"By arming everyone in uniform, commanders would be able to make more effective use of limited security police. Allowing them to use highly trained security police for demanding roles such as patrolling and counter attacks" (25:39). In order to decisively defeat the threat, all air base armed forces will have to be able to fight together as a single integrated unit. Air Force logisticians are beginning to believe "if we are going to be responsible and successful in defeating ground attacks against our air bases, then we must begin thinking, training, and fighting as soliders in addition to being professional airmen (7:22). "To ignore the problem area is to invite disaster in any future conflict involving Air Base Ground Defense" (7:28). Combat support activities are the key to our success in war. Therefore, personnel assigned there should possess the ability to defend themselves, their shops, and resources. This capability will undermine enemy success, contributing to the ultimate expansion of our war-waging capabilities (23:3).

USAF exercises, reports, audits, and special studies reflect that the USAF is possibly unprepared to successfully defend their installations and assets in high-threat overseas areas.
Chapter Four

POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

The potential fixes for Air Force ABGO are many. They range from the utilization of technological equipment to additional personnel arming, training, equipment and manpower authorizations. All of these potential solutions could by themselves, or combined with alternatives prove to be the answer for effective Air Force ABGO. However, each has advantages and disadvantages associated with their utilization and effectiveness.

TECHNOLOGY

The utilization of technological equipment such as sensors, night vision goggles, night rifle scopes and intrusion detection devices have been substantiated. Their use in the Vietnam War, though sparringly, demonstrated their increased effectiveness and led to recommendations that this capability be expanded rapidly (2:105; 8:13, 17, 1). Numerous special studies and ABGO effectiveness and analysis reports concluded generally, incorporating these technological initiatives could prove advantageous to ABGO defenders (3:43; 13:--). One such study titled "The ABGO Effectiveness and Analysis" provided the following guidance on incorporating technology into the ABGO mission:

1) The ABGO mission can be dramatically improved if the defenders are more fully equipped with currently available night vision devices and sights for weapons (3:47); 2) The equipping of fire teams with more than one pair of night vision goggles should improve the Spetsnaz detection rate significantly; 3) One of four conducted case studies concluded "forty-eight sensors, four foliage penetration radars and four ground surveillance radars were substituted effectively for eight mounted fire teams" (3:42). Approimately 32 personnel and appropriate vehicles and equipment performing the detection mission) and maintained an 80 percent detection classification accuracy against personnel at fifty meters (3:42). The successful neutralization of enemy Spetsnaz base infiltrators will require a minimum capture or kill rate of 60 percent (3:4).
The exercise "Salty Demo" again confirmed the advantages of incorporating this concept of operation. An after-action report titled "Salty Demo Implementation Plan" was developed to document improvements the Air Force as a whole should be pursuing (3:14). It further took a dramatic step forward by quantifying the benefits to be received as a result of accomplishing individual recommended tasks. These results are quantified in terms of "increased sortie generation potential" (3:14), an approach recognized by the corporate Air Force as being valid. The Salty Demo Implementation has been briefed and approved by the Air Force General Officer's Panel at the Pentagon and the Vice Chief of Staff, USAF, as an exceptional roadmap to obtaining Air Base Survivability and Operability during actual war (10:1). The portion pertinent to ABGD was as well judged to be valid. Unfortunately, due to secret security classification of the ABGD implementation plan, incorporation of classified specifics in this report is precluded.

The early detection of enemy base intruders utilizing sensors, motion detectors and night sight weaponry are clearly important instruments to be utilized to obtain the necessary base security (3:42). It is recognized they cannot shoot the enemy presently and therefore "are not a total protection instrument in and of itself" (8:20). However, sensors and detectors placed along likely avenues of enemy approach and around key resources such as POL and the base water supply will greatly aid the defenders (8:34). They will permit an economy of force capability to commanders, allowing the proper allocation of force to neutralize a multitude of potential threats, thus proving to be an effective aid to ABGD personnel (8:21).

While sensors and technological equipment are considered to be relatively inexpensive, culminatively they could project the perception of being quite expensive (3:43). With the present fiscal frugality being employed, the likelihood of adequate complete systems, for required Air Force installations being authorized appears slim at best. Based upon a quoted military security police yearly operator and maintenance (O & M) cost of $1 million, per flight (3:43) (approximately 44 men), the previously identified case study of eight fire teams (32 men) replaced by a sensor system saved approximately $750k in cost and produced a higher detection accuracy rate. The previous cited $2M cost for the system initially appears as no savings at all. However, considering the projected life of the system, guessed at approximately eight years, one can readily see the advantages of such a system. This computation factor is called "Life Cycle Cost", and unfortunately, Congress is not
always concerned with this factor, and our corporate leaders do not appear to be advocating its consideration in the author's limited observation of defense appropriation hearings. Thus, it appears funding survival for such a system would be remote at best.

MANPOWER TRAINING

Opting to solve the ABDG problem by increasing manpower authorizations, compounded by training requirements would be extremely costly. The probability of obtaining the required funding for this significant increase of manpower in light of present Congressional and DOD mandates to reduce the overall military manpower authorizations would appear to be remote at best. A survey conducted by HQ AFOSP to ascertain the manpower authorizations needed for ABDG concluded, 435 flights worldwide would be needed to perform the ABDG mission (14:19). This would require roughly 19,140 personnel to perform the Air Force ABDG mission. However, these figures were caveated by the following: Based upon the presently authorized security police flights, only 19 active duty flights (836 personnel) and 80 Air Force Reserve component flights (3,960 personnel) were required to be added to USAF manpower endstretches (14:20). Part of the justification for this small percentage increase in new authorizations, was the utilization of Host Nation Support Troops and projected in Time-Phased Force Deployment Listing (TPFDL) personnel (14:18). Funding for these 19 additional flights ($360 M) was provided by Congress in a 1982 authorization and called for allocation of funds over a five-year period (14:17-18). However, the Air Force's strict interpretation of the Army's responsibility of fulfilling the external ABDG mission, funding and manpower authorizations for equipping and training of Air Force personnel to perform the ABDG mission, funding was withdrawn. (14:30; 7:7).

Airlift

The sequence of events on which the above agreements are based is being relied upon without considering limits and capabilities of all parties--Air Force, Army and the Host Nations--to fulfill their responsibilities. The Air Force tasked with worldwide airlift responsibilities is tasked to transport Reserve and TPFDL forces in theater upon commencement of hostilities (4:3-1). However, in light of present Military Airlift Command's (MAC) limited airlift capability based upon wartime taskings, they can only fulfill a maximum of 50 percent of tasked requirements (14:23). Their airlift capability forecasted into the 1990's based upon
receiving the new C-17 air transporter is forecasted to be only 70 percent. This airlift shortage capability will definitely impact the Army's capability to perform ABGD during the initial critical days of hostilities.

HOST NATION SUPPORT

The response time of the Host Nation Support Troops is considered to pose an additional threat to ABGD. Present plans call for these Host Nation Support Troops to be acquired from Host Nation Air Force Reserve and National Guard pools as well (7:9). It is conservatively estimated that their response time is in the 15-30 day timeframe (14:32). These factors coupled with reports of minimal to no joint ABGD training being accomplished by and between Guard, Reserve, Host Nation and active duty military personnel (11:3) would appear to place American personnel in grave danger, prior to arrival of reinforcements.

The Soviet intent of employing Spetsnaz teams during the initial phase of conflict, capable of inflicting substantial damage is well-known throughout corporate Air Force (21:64). This will necessitate only one solution by commanders assigned to these installations: "sending security police off base, in force, to find and defeat them. This will require their operations there until reinforcements arrive" (14:25). To do this, manning, equipment and training must be made available in order for the security police to provide a credible defense. Performing this task will necessitate reorganizing the security police operation significantly (14:33). Because security police normally represent only approximately 12 percent of total installation population (2:113), their ranks should and must be augmented by available base personnel. To ensure this concept is workable, the Air Force must selectively train and arm a larger percentage of the base population. While present Air Force policy is opposed to mass arming of personnel, present regulation permits mass arming of all personnel at certain threat levels (5:5). The time to organize for war is not during the fog or friction of battle. This approach only results in mass confusion, and adds to the prevailing fiascos exposed by many in the Air Force concerning past arming of personnel. These sad stories however are not recognized by many in the Air Force, for what they truly are. That being, symptoms of not having educated and trained military personnel in a war zone, on the basics of waging war. According to AFM 1-1, training for war is all of the Air Force's responsibility, not just of a few select. "The Air Force has a moral obligation to provide maximum
protection to all combatants in a high threat area" (17:--). The proper education and training of personnel prior to their arrival in a war zone would facilitate their personal arming, if and when the need arrived. The Air Force should certainly not accept the risk of losing personnel and resources during the initial phases of combat merely because Army, IPFOL or host nation security police personnel have not arrived yet. The relative sanctuary of Air Force bases experienced during many past conflicts will most certainly not exist in future wars. This fact is partly because of their known importance to our war waging capability and the increased utilization of technology in today's weapons.
Chapter Five

CONCLUSIONS

The protection of United States personnel and resources located in high-threat overseas areas is an absolute must to ensure accomplishment of American national objectives. The protection of American installations in high-threat overseas areas remains the responsibility of all Air Force personnel, regardless of speciality, codes, duty codes, and job titles. However, our track record from conflicts ranging from World War I through the Vietnam conflict reflects a considerable degree of difficulty with ensuring satisfactory protection. While our military leadership has acknowledged these shortcomings, appropriate corrective action remains to be implemented.

The potential solutions for ensuring the protection of U.S. assets are many. The ones discussed within this analysis are utilization of technology (i.e. sensors, detectors), acquiring additional manpower and the feasibility of training and arming available base personnel. The latter is the preferred and recommended solution. Appropriate training and arming of personnel was the proposed solution of two major studies on the problem of protecting our airbases. The Salty Demo and Scientific Advisory Board both recommend that all personnel be adequately trained and armed to assist in their defense, and the overall ABGO mission.

The Air Force corporate management is aware of concerns pertinent to arming of mass numbers of airmen. Their current attempts to establish policy for mobilizing personnel will address and hopefully resolve the real issues that presently limit the potential training and arming of Air Force personnel in overseas high-threat areas. Additional guidance and direction will emerge from the proposed audit on arming of AF personnel scheduled for completion in September 1988.

RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATION. That HQ AF/OSP determine training required to qualify base personnel to perform the ABGO mission.
RECOMMENDATION. That HQ AF adopt AF-wide, proposed solutions from the Mobility Arming Steering Committee.

RECOMMENDATION. That Senior AF management recognize the need to arm base support personnel in high-threat areas.

RECOMMENDATION. Bases designated as high-threat installations develop base defense concept of operations training programs that involve SPs, designated owner-user personnel, and entire base population for all incoming PCS personnel.

RECOMMENDATION. HQ AF provide direction and guidance to determine specific weapons to be issued to AF personnel based upon their Air Force Speciality Code.

RECOMMENDATION. HQ AF consider revising current AF doctrine to reflect all personnel identified as war-fighting airmen first and technical specialists second.

RECOMMENDATION. HQ AF consider transferring personnel and budgetary authorizations from CONUS gun and rifle firing to overseas high-threat locations to conduct local ABGD concept of operations training.
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