MILITARY/CIVILIAN
POSITION CLASSIFICATION: IN PEACETIME

By
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31 MARCH 1988

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The Department of the Army civilianization program is a fact of life today and it appears to have a future. As the budget shrinks and personnel ceilings are reduced, the active force will be under increased pressure to reduce the number of personnel in uniform.

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ABSTRACT (continued).

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

MILITARY/CIVILIAN
POSITION CLASSIFICATION IN PEACETIME

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

It is almost certain that the Army will be faced with civilianizing or contracting-out more military spaces or functions to accomplish tasks for which in-house military no longer exist. Budget cuts and Congressionally mandated strength reductions will have a significant impact on the authorized military strength of the Army. Cuts in military strength have usually been absorbed or at least had the burden lightened by converting to civilian when dollars and man-years are available as an offset. However, it appears likely that this option can not be counted on in the future. It is possible that the Army's methods for justifying military manpower are inadequate for the task. The fact that the Army has experienced a great amount of civilianization and contracting-out over the past few years is a good indication of a problem. The original intent of civilianization may have been to free military personnel for combat-type duty, but now it seems to be a simple way to economize and reduce the size of the active force. Civilianization may not be the Army's chosen course of action, but it is a reality that must be dealt with in order to justify adequate military manpower requirements.
The Army develops its military force by analyzing mission requirements that support the War Fighting CINCs. Initially, an unconstrained force is determined to which real world fiscal, personnel and materiel constraints are applied producing the force that is funded and actually fielded. Mission analysis determines what portion will be tactical (TOE) or sustaining base (TDA). Combat TOE requirements are based on historical data, doctrine and experience. The non-combat TOE force is determined by applying the staffing standards found in the Manpower Requirements Criteria (MARC) program. The sustaining force, or Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) force is developed through the Manpower Staffing Standards System (MS3), which uses accepted industrial engineering and statistical workload measurements similar to the ones used in MARC. Generally speaking, and with few exceptions, the TOE force must be military and the TDA force can be military, civilian or contractor. There are many factors or issues to consider when determining the total size of the military, and in particular, what portion will be uniformed versus civilian or contractor.

The Army's problems begin with justifying military spaces (as a part of the total force) that are not part of the CINCs requirements to fight the war. A methodology to determine military or civilian identity must be developed that is acceptable by the Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress if what amounts to over one third of the total force is to be justified as military and not be mandated as civilian or contractor.
JUSTIFICATION FOR STUDY

"A fundamental need exists for a simple, consistent and objective method of properly identifying each active Army manpower position for commissioned officer, warrant officer, enlisted or civilian incumbency. The need is predicated upon the overriding demand within the Executive and Legislative branches for equally consistent, understandable, and provable methods of justifying Armed forces manpower—a costly commodity in short supply."²

This quote is the opening statement of a study commissioned by the Department of Army (DA) in 1976 to develop an improved quantitative methodology for establishing positions in the active structure as military (commissioned officer, warrant officer, or enlisted) or civilian. The study was initiated primarily to find a better way to justify military manpower. This idea may have received some impetus from a Chief of Staff memorandum issued in 1976, quoted in part: "The criteria which differentiate positions between commissioned, warrant, enlisted or civilian are key...Review and improve procedures whereby each position is defined as being filled most efficiently by either an officer, enlisted man, or civilian..."³

The study with recommendations was completed in 1981, but it was not adopted for Army implementation. The results are summarized and analyzed in Chapter III of this study.
In 1985 and 1986 Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel, Office of Manpower Policies and Standards submitted a request for study to the Army War College (AWC) to develop explicit criteria to identify positions as military or civilian. This topic was not submitted for 1988, but was included in the 10 August 1987 AWC list of proposed Military Studies Program (MSP) topics.

There has been interest in this issue for many years and it is apparent that the problem has not been solved to date. Justification of military manpower is more critical today than ever. Mandated officer reductions, a 8,600 man cut in total Army strength and a 7.72 billion dollar cut in the fiscal year 89 budget make justification of our most expensive resource a significant challenge. A system that could accomplish the task described in the opening paragraph of this section would make a significant contribution towards justifying military manpower.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Based on the request for study from Department of the Army it appears that Army civilianization is an ongoing program and one that lacks explicit criteria and standards that can ensure appropriate results in terms of the military and civilian mix. This study will evaluate the present system with an aim towards identifying shortfalls and inadequacy and recommend, if appropriate, a proposed solution. Cost effectiveness methodologies for the military/civilian/contractor decision will
not be considered in this study. Issues dealing with the justification of the total force may be discussed, but are not critical to this study. This study will concentrate on finding an acceptable methodology for identifying whether a position should be designated for military or civilian incumbency.
CHAPTER II
PRESENT SYSTEM
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GUIDANCE

Department of Defense Directive 1100.4, dated 20 August 1954 contains the general manpower policies upon which the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower) bases his annual guidance to the Service Secretaries. The stated objective of the manpower program is:

"Accomplish approved national military objectives with a minimum of manpower so organized and employed as to provide maximum effectiveness and combat power. To this end, each Service shall seek optimum personnel performance and morale, and accomplish missions with a minimum number of personnel."

This directive also provides guidance regarding the utilization of military and civilian personnel as follows:

"Civilian personnel will be used in positions which do not require military incumbents for reasons of law, training, security, discipline, rotation, or combat readiness, which do not require a military background for successful performance of the duties involved and which do not entail unusual hours not normally associated or compatible with civilian employment."

Additionally, the directive states that maximum stability of personnel in assignments and minimum rotation or turnover will be maintained to the extent that it is consistent with training, readiness and morale requirements.

DODD 1100.9, dated 8 September 1971 provides guidance regarding position identity for management positions in support activities that can be either military or civilian per the guidance in DODD 1100.4. The principal objective of this guidance is to improve management of support activities using competent
military and civilian personnel who can be afforded reasonable opportunities for career development at all levels. These management positions must be designated as exclusively military or civilian and the career opportunity must be considered in the decision making process.

In his fiscal year 1988 annual report to the Congress Secretary Weinberger stated that "consistent with force structure requirements, we strive to maintain the minimum force necessary to meet our immediate requirements, while relying on our reserve component forces and civilian manpower to support and augment the active forces. We continue to develop and enhance the process we use to measure, review, and validate our requirements for each category of the defense work force." Weinberger, while discussing the use of civilian and contractor personnel stated:

"Our policy is to use civilian employees and contractors wherever operationally possible to free our military forces to perform military functions. This policy not only minimizes the number of men and women required on active duty, it also enables civilians to provide stability and continuity to those functions requiring rotation of uniformed personnel." Apparently this message to Congress is an explicit attempt to paint a picture of minimum overall requirements and, specifically, the absolute minimum number of active military. The guidance to the Service Secretaries and message to Congress leaves little room for interpretation by the services when executing the programs. A brief look at Air Force and Navy regulations will show how the guidance is put into effect. A more detailed analysis of the Army program will follow.
AIR FORCE

The U.S. Air Force system for making the manpower mix decision between military, civilian and contractor is described in detail in Air Force Regulation 26-1. DOD guidance is interpreted to require military personnel only in positions which contribute directly to combat; are required by law, are military by custom or tradition or are needed for overseas rotation. Indirect combat support will be performed by civilian employees or contract services.8

Military essentiality is determined for each position using the Military Essentiality Status (MES) Coding program. The Wartime Critical Military Skills (WCMS) program and the Unsatisfactory Rotation Index (URI) program support the MES and together are the basis for utilizing military manpower.

The MES is composed of specific criteria and codes that identify all Air Force positions as military, civilian or contract service. The coding is accomplished at major command level and annual reviews are required to ensure currency at all installations.

The WCMS is that part of the system which converts vacant civilian authorizations to military in order to avoid or reduce wartime military shortfalls. These conversions can be made as a result of requirements identified during the Air Force annual Wartime Manpower Requirements exercise which matches resources to the requirements derived from Defense Guidance. This program is not as effective as it sounds because there must be a zero balance effort at the major command level and no reduction-in-
force actions can result from conversions. The URI program is
designed to ensure sufficient military authorizations in Conus in
each Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) in order to provide a
rotation and training base for overseas requirements. Rotation
base requirements are calculated each year by considering
overseas military requirements, authorized strength, loss rates
and the following assignment policies:

"1. Afford Airmen at least 24 months duty in Conus
between involuntary overseas tours.
2. Require Airmen to serve no more than two
involuntary short tours during a 20-year career.
3. Require Airmen to serve no more than eight
involuntary years overseas during a 20-year career
(1.5:1 ratio)."

The Air Force has a reasonably credible system for
justifying the military and civilian mix because it has a firm
audit trail from DOD guidance (mission) to the actual number by
type which appear in authorization documents. The Air Force can
point to a specific position on any installation and tell not
only whether it is military or civilian, but the assigned codes
would also indicate exactly why it is military or civilian. The
annual exercises mentioned above also add credibility to the
system by reinforcing and validating requirements following a
thorough review of missions and the status of the active force.

NAVY

THE U.S. Navy system for manpower management is contained
in OPNAVINST 1000.16F. DOD guidance is incorporated in the
following policy statement:

"(1) Manpower requirements shall be defined as military billets if military incumbents are required for reasons of law, training, security, discipline, or combat readiness; if a military background is required for successful performance of the duties involved; or if the requirement entails unusual hours not normally associated or compatible with civilian employment.

(2) Manpower requirements for management shall be defined as military billets if military incumbents are required by law; if the skills and knowledge required are normally acquired primarily through military training and experience; and when experience in the position is essential to enable the officer personnel to assume responsibilities necessary to maintain combat-related support and proper career development.

(3) Manpower requirements which are not included in the above categories and which can normally be performed by civilians shall be defined as civilian positions."10

The Navy has a coding system similar to that used by the Air Force. Coding determination decisions are made at Installations and major commands with consistency and uniformity being ensured through a review process conducted by Department of the Navy. The Navy Military Essentiality Code (MEC) system uses 14 alpha codes that equate to specific categories of positions, i.e., combat readiness is MEC A, and rotation or career progression is MEC N. The categories are almost identical to the Air Force and seem to match what is contained in DOD guidance. The decisions are all subjective in nature as this system does not use any numerical values to determine identity. The criteria to identify officer, warrant officer or enlisted classification is found in this same regulation and it is also subjective rather than numerically scaled. If a position is defined as not military essential (MEC R), it will be coded as civilian unless it is
needed to support the sea/shore rotation goals. The objective is to have a maximum of three years sea duty followed by three years shore duty.\textsuperscript{11}

It appears that over time the Navy may have had less difficulty justifying their military manpower than either the Army or the Air Force. This is probably due to the fact that requirements are tied directly to something tangible, in this case a ship. If a ship is authorized, it takes a specified number of active duty sailors to keep it operational. It takes very little mathematics to come up with the manpower numbers for a "600" ship Navy, to include the associated shore rotation base requirements. The Navy has not had a problem with manpower and has, therefore, not done much work developing fancy models for justifying military manpower.

An interesting article in Defense Management Journal discusses the possibility of using civilian mariners to crew Navy support ships. If this concept were adopted, it is possible that the Navy would then need a more explicit methodology to designate or justify essential military positions on the support ships that had civilian crews.\textsuperscript{12}

\textbf{ARMY}

The Army's manpower management program is primarily contained in AR 570-4, Manpower Management. This regulation, however, cites an additional 52 Army Regulations, 6 Department of Defense Directives, 14 Army Pamphlets and 2 National Guard Bureau Directives for specific guidance needed to administer the
The point is that you can not go to a single source and expect to find answers to all manpower questions. Position identification issues are discussed in this regulation along with manpower standards and requirements. Some of the most significant supporting information is contained in AR 310-49, The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS) and AR 5-20, Commercial Activities Program.

Title V 502 (88 STAT 399), Public Law 93-365, states that it is the intent of Congress for the (DOD) to use the most cost effective form of manpower that is consistent with military requirements. This law requires DOD to consider the advantages of converting from one form of manpower to another when submitting annual requests to the Congress as well as in day-to-day operations. The DOD guidance contained in DODD 1100.4 and 1100.9 is summarized in Army Regulation 570-4 in order to preclude any misunderstanding of the intent to use civilian positions where they are not specifically prohibited. The stated DA policy is to delineate TDA positions as military only if they are required by the DOD guidance. Special categories of requirements for which military position identification is necessary include: rotation base requirements; space imbalanced military occupational specialty (SIMOS) requirements; career progression positions; pretrained personnel for contingencies; no qualified civilian available; unusual hours or working conditions; pretrained personnel for wartime augmentation and no unallocated manpower resources available.
The starting point for military delineation is all positions in deployable (TOE) combat or combat support units. Combat service support positions must be military only if they are necessary to avoid any direct degradation of combat capability. The positions that truly require detailed justification if they are going to be military are those mentioned above as special categories. Rotation base requirements are the most critical and are also the largest single group of positions that merit consideration. When positions are designated military for this purpose they provide MOS related jobs between overseas tours. Current DA policy strives for a minimum of 24 months between involuntary overseas tours.

These requirements as well as those discussed as "special considerations" are managed at the DA level. For example, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Professional Development Division is the proponent for the rotation base requirements. This office uses algorithms and computer models to compute and identify on an annual basis, the total number of spaces by specialty and grade that must be retained as military. Once determined, major commands (MACOMS) are given minimum numbers that can not be converted. In fact, these requirements are so rigid that they can then be used as a basis to retain specific functions in-house when faced with contracting-out decisions under the commercial activities program. SIMOS positions (55 or more percent of Army-wide authorizations are overseas) must be retained as military, therefore, they also impact on the in-house
decision. There are proponents for each of the special consideration categories who are responsible to compute and identify to the major commands the number and type position which must be military. There appears to be a significant shortcoming in AR 310-49 regarding the documentation of position identity. In an Air Force manpower document you would know that if a position is coded A it is military because it has a combat role, and if it were coded I, it would be military because it is required to be so designated by law. The Navy codes are very similar, though fewer, and they also reflect why a position is coded a particular way. Unlike the Navy and Air Force systems, where positions are coded to reflect exactly why they are military or civilian, the Army system merely codes positions as male or female officer/warrant officer, male or female enlisted or civilian. This leads to redundant efforts to justify a specific identity for positions when organizations are faced with funding cuts or reduced manpower authorizations.
In 1984 Major Stewart E. Morthole, USAF, authored a paper titled "An Investigation of the Facets For Converting Military Authorizations For Maintenance Personnel To Civilian Positions". This paper was narrow in scope in that it dealt solely with Air Force maintenance positions. Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn by the author are interesting and could add emphasis to the Army's need to justify military manpower.

The author chose a different approach to this subject than previous AF studies had taken. In the past most AF programs were initiated for two main reasons, cost effectiveness and release of military personnel for combat duties. The studies that produced these programs often did not consider such factors as overseas rotation requirements and shortages of specialty skills. Many times problems developed with productivity, morale, career progression, retention, flexibility of management and labor management relations. Major Morthole looks at the impact human resource factors affected by conversion decisions have on the organization and whether they should be included in any conversion studies.

"Military to civilian conversions are complex actions requiring an in-depth analysis of all the associated factors from cost to morale implications. To rely on cost alone or the release of military personnel for other combat related duties without analyzing the conversion situation may result in decreased unit cohesion and readiness. Nineteen factors were presented by this paper that have an effect on conversions. Two factors, cost and heritage, were considered beyond the scope of this paper while
environment and skill variety were factors considered to have neither an advantage or a disadvantage for conversions. Four factors considered as advantages to conversion actions were continuity of operations, reduced mobility, technology, and training. Eleven factors were determined to be disadvantages including the following: equity, grade comparison, performance appraisals, performance standards, morale, overseas service, unions, career progression, discipline, position/personnel conflicts, and quality-of-working life. The weight of the remaining eleven factors indicated that a military to civilian conversion in the maintenance specialties are detrimental to the Air Force mission.\textsuperscript{15}

He recommends that all of these factors be considered when making conversion (including contracting out) decisions and that cost or the release of military personnel for combat duties not be the sole basis. If the impact on morale is considered significant enough to effect anticipated cost savings this concept would have some merit, at least in principle. However, at the Congressional level, where the dollars are controlled, this will likely be a cost effectiveness decision. Since this paper does not recommend any specific methodologies that might be used to justify a particular type of manpower it is of no specific value to the Army in developing explicit criteria for position identification. Nevertheless, the human resource factors could be considered at the Installation level when Commanders are faced with conversion decisions.

**Department of the Army Contract Study**

This study was originally commissioned in early 1976, in part, as a response to the Chief of Staffs' memorandum referenced earlier that identified a need for criteria to determine whether a position would be officer, enlisted or civilian. General
Research Corporation (GRC) completed the original study in 1979, producing a handbook for publication as an Army Regulation. A two year study and evaluation period followed (which included staffing with DA, major commands and installations) which ended in June of 1981. The Army elected not to adopt the recommendations as presented. A recurring theme in the non-concurrences from the agencies that reviewed the program was that it failed to answer many questions and did not provide any significant improvement over the present system. In most cases changes were made that corrected or reduced the problems enumerated by the reviewers.

The GRC methodology combines decision-logic and quantitative procedures in the position identification process. Only positions, not incumbents, are looked at and considered in the determination process. Basically, the methodology compares the functions required to be performed by a specific position to the usual or acceptable functions performed by commissioned officers, warrant officers, enlisted personnel or civilian personnel. The system then gives the position an unconstrained "Ideal" identity, which can later be modified by real-world constraints such as overseas rotation requirements, budget and end-strength ceilings or other needs by manpower category.

The methodology of this system is fairly simple and logical and follows DA and DOD guidance and directives. A yes/no decision is made when the determination is clear, such as combat unit positions. If the position is in a TDA unit and not clear-cut, subfactors are included to help make the decision. Once the
Military/civilian identity is determined, this system then uses a yes/no or if/then set of questions to determine whether the position should be officer or enlisted. The system also provides a decision table on when to apply the constraints mentioned earlier which would allow for positions categorized as civilian to be changed to military. Tables 3-1 through 3-6 of the GRC proposed handbook are included as appendix A for illustrative purposes. They are fairly easy to read and seem to accomplish the intended purpose in a logical sequence.
CHAPTER IV
Analysis and Alternatives

Several alternatives are available for consideration in trying to resolve the issue of position identity. There is obviously a great deal of difference in justifying a particular type of manpower at the installation level for a specific function compared to the Army's need to justify its' end-strength of uniformed personnel to accomplish broad missions. An Installation Commander might find it difficult to separate himself from personalities when making the manpower mix decisions. He could be so constrained by resources that he really has no choice to make. He would usually consider cost efficiency data, continuity, available talent and the job requirements to make his decision. Department of the Army ties their decision to combat, combat support, combat service support and sustainment base requirements. The Army justifies the requirement for military personnel by designing a force that includes sufficient numbers of the categories mentioned above to accomplish all assigned missions. The real problem is to justify military identity for a sufficient number of spaces to provide a balance of TOE, TDA, overseas and Conus assignments, school requirements, transients, and hospital requirements and guarantee career progression during a 20 or 30 year career.

The positions that fall into the non-combat related categories are the ones that require extensive justification at DOD and Congress. The DA request for study could be perceived as suggesting that there is a need for a methodology to enable
local (installation) commanders to justify the position identity (designation of a position as military or civilian) of each position on his TDA. This might have been the case, but I think the issue will have to be resolved at the major command and DA level. DA must be the level where requests to Congress for bulk military manpower can be justified through application of quantifiable methodologies that are consistently applied at all installations by the major commands. Some method of adding military manpower requirements to those tied directly to combat and combat related missions is certainly needed. The methodology must be one that leaves no doubt at any level, including Congress, that a specified number of Army authorizations must be military and not subject to conversion or deletion unless the mission template changes.

The most basic approach to such a system is to assign a numerical value to as many aspects or characteristics of a position as can be identified. A comparison of the total point value to a predetermined scale would then establish military or civilian identity for each position. Such a simple system might use a numerical score as the point value to justify military identity. Every position would be audited against stated criteria and those with a total score greater than the cut off would be military and all others would be civilian. This same system could be fine-tuned to distinguish between commissioned officer, warrant officer and enlisted.
Alternative I

The most obvious alternative is to use the present system as it currently exists. It appears to be adequate enough to get the job done, in fact it has done so to date. The present systems used by all the services have many similarities and to some degree have credibility with Congress. The yes/no decisions that are made for the bulk of the services' positions have a basis in law or guidance from DOD that is derived from Congressional intent. For example, all combat positions will be military. To these examples you have to add all the positions in non-combat related positions that for one reason or another are required to be military. Overseas rotation, imbalanced military occupational specialties, career progression, pretrained contingency/wartime augmentation are examples. The systems used to justify these requirements are managed at the DA level.

The overseas rotation requirements are determined annually using detailed formulas that incorporate overseas tour length, for both long and short tours, numbers of personnel in a particular specialty and the desired Conus tour length. The required numbers by specialty are given to major commands for retention in installation TDAs. A similar system is in use to account for the SIMOS problems and the other issues already mentioned. This system can continue to function with no change and most likely will continue to produce reasonably acceptable results.
A serious problem exists with our system in justifying and obtaining funds for the required force. While not the central issue for this paper, if that problem were solved, the military identification of the sustainment (TDA) force would be accomplished with little or no problem using the sub-systems described above.

If this issue is not resolved and remains a problem the present system should be changed so that each position is coded to explain exactly why it is designated for a specific incumbency. The requirements should continue to be determined for all specialties at DA and the major commands should be required to annotate, update and reconcile TDAs with installations. Unless there was a significant change in the active force, such as bringing a Division home from Europe or transferring one to the Reserve Components, the annual changes would probably be manageable and not create undue hardships at the installation level.

**Alternative II**

The system that was developed by GRC has a suitable methodology to use for determining position identity. Again, this system does not justify total numbers of spaces for the Army's missions. When the handbook was staffed many issues and points of contention were enumerated. Most were addressed and resolved by GRC in a revised handbook. The non-concurrences indicated a lack of perceived benefit compared to the present (1980) procedures as well as a burden of increased workload to
implement the system. There is some support the GRC response which in essence acknowledges increased workload to initiate the baseline but predicts reduced requirements to maintain the system.

The tests conducted at various installations revealed that the system would accomplish its objective and that it was not too complex for the staff to understand. This system answers the identity question and also determines whether the position should be commissioned officer, warrant officer or enlisted. These capabilities could be merged with the standard grade authorization criteria in AR 611-1, 611-101, 611-201 and various staffing guides to determine an appropriate grade. Implementation of this system would simplify the decision making process when dealing with the commercial activities (CA) procedures prescribed in AR 5-20. This system would clearly identify areas that should be exempted from CA review due to required military staffing. The decision-logic tables in Appendix A can be reviewed to gain an understanding of how clear and straight forward the system is.

One issue not specifically addressed in the handbook is the level of authority where the decisions should be made. The system would work well if rules a-h of table 3-1 and rules a,b and d of table 3-6, were under the perview of an appropriate staff directorate at DA. The remaining rules and other tables should be delegated to the major commands. The major commands should also be responsible for validating codes and updating TDAs. Once the initial coding was done exceptions would be approved or disapproved at the level where the change impacts.
DA would not need to be involved in changes unless there was an impact on force structure matters covered by tables 3-1 and 3-6. The tables should be modified to include the ability to make the determination for male/female or interchangeability status of each position.

**Alternative III**

As stated in Alternative I the most obvious system choice is the present system, either as is, or slightly modified. Another choice is a combination of the other alternatives. The GRC system and the recommended changes in alternative II form the basis for this alternative. Alternative II will not be repeated here, but mention will be made concerning how it would be changed. First, the computations and scoring procedures used in the subfactors of tables 3-2 through 3-5 must be simplified to speed the process. Second, the requirement for a face-to-face interview for position identification should be eliminated. Third, male/female/interchangeable decision should be a yes/no logic table. Fourth, all identity issues that will be decided at the installation should include the human resource factors for consideration, possibly by the commander himself. Fifth, oversight and compliance should be by automated methods accomplished at DA.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS

This paper has explored the issue of civilian and military position identification in TOE and TDA organizations by reviewing the systems presently in use by the Army, Navy and Air Force. Congressional intent for efficient utilization of military manpower and DOD guidance to the Services regarding manpower management was also included. There is no doubt that Congress intends for the DOD to function efficiently and effectively with the absolute minimum number of uniformed personnel needed to accomplish the combat and combat related missions. The result is Congressional oversight for major programs and constrained or inadequate resources.

One aspect of resources critical to accomplishing Service missions is manpower. The right number of personnel requirements are essential for building a force that can fight and sustain itself while accomplishing assigned missions. Just as critical as numbers is the mix of military and civilian incumbents available to do the job. It appears that all the Services, but in particular the Navy, have been reasonably successful in justifying military manpower. The Navy may have been more successful because of the "600" ship Navy that must have a specified number of uniformed personnel. To date, the Army has not had the ability to identify any specific concept or mission that could be used in a similar manner. Possibly "26 Divisions" and "operating tempo" will be of future help in eliminating this problem.
The Army definitely needs a system that will simplify the process for justifying military spaces and negate the increasing demands to civilianize and contract-out. Once the missions are assigned and the combat, combat support and combat service support force structure is built to accomplish those missions, the military strength in the TDA sustainment base needs to be justified. For this reason a more objective, explicit and quantifiable methodology to identify military and civilian requirements is necessary.
CHAPTER VI
RECOMMENDATIONS

As a result of this study, it is recommended that Alternative III be considered for implementation as soon as practical. The GRC study should be reviewed and the handbook should be restaffed looking for improvements prior to implementation. Computer programs should be designed that will put the entire system in one automated package.

This study suggests two recommendations which deal with matters beyond the scope of this paper, but have significant impact and merit consideration for further study. First, more emphasis needs to be placed on how the total number of manpower spaces will be justified. Whether it is workload analysis (military staffing standards system may be the answer) or mission analysis for force requirements determination, does not really matter as long as the results are credible with DOD and Congress. Second, a new regulation should be published that includes all the necessary guidelines, policies and procedures that affect manpower determination and identification. AR 570-4 references 75 other publications that must be consulted in order to have all the required information for manpower issues.
ENDNOTES


10. U.S. Department of the Navy, OPNAVINST 1000.16F, p. 6-1.


15. Stuart E. Morthole, Maj, An Investigation Of The Facets For Converting Military Authorizations For Maintenance Personnel To Civilian Positions, p. VIII.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


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<td>(a)</td>
<td>COMBAT</td>
<td>(b) THROUGH (p) WILL NOT BE APPLIED</td>
<td>MILITARY</td>
<td>TABLE 3-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>COMBAT SUPPORT</td>
<td>(c) THROUGH (p) WILL NOT BE APPLIED</td>
<td>MILITARY</td>
<td>TABLE 3-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT</td>
<td>(d) THROUGH (p) WILL NOT BE APPLIED</td>
<td>MILITARY</td>
<td>TABLE 3-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>PRETRAINED CONTINGENCY/MARITIME AUGMENTATION</td>
<td>(e) THROUGH (p) WILL NOT BE APPLIED</td>
<td>MILITARY</td>
<td>TABLE 3-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e)</td>
<td>MILITARY BY LAW OR TREATY</td>
<td>(f) THROUGH (p) WILL NOT BE APPLIED</td>
<td>MILITARY</td>
<td>TABLE 3-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f)</td>
<td>CIVILIAN BY LAW OR TREATY</td>
<td>(g) THROUGH (p) WILL NOT BE APPLIED</td>
<td>CIVILIAN</td>
<td>DA FORM XXb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g)</td>
<td>EXTERNAL MILITARY REQUIREMENT</td>
<td>(h) THROUGH (p) WILL NOT BE APPLIED</td>
<td>MILITARY</td>
<td>TABLE 3-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(h)</td>
<td>EXTERNAL CIVILIAN REQUIREMENT</td>
<td>(i) THROUGH (p) WILL NOT BE APPLIED</td>
<td>CIVILIAN</td>
<td>DA FORM XXb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>SECURITY</td>
<td>(j) THROUGH (p) MAY ALSO APPLY</td>
<td>NOT YET FINALIZED</td>
<td>TABLE 3-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(j)</td>
<td>INTELLIGENCE</td>
<td>(k) THROUGH (p) MAY ALSO APPLY</td>
<td>NOT YET FINALIZED</td>
<td>TABLE 3-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(k)</td>
<td>CURRENT MILITARY BACKGROUND/ TRAINING REQUIRED</td>
<td>(l) THROUGH (p) MAY ALSO APPLY</td>
<td>NOT YET FINALIZED</td>
<td>TABLE 3-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(l)</td>
<td>MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION (MWR) ACTIVITIES</td>
<td>(m) THROUGH (p) MAY ALSO APPLY</td>
<td>NOT YET FINALIZED</td>
<td>TABLE 3-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(m)</td>
<td>CIVILIAN/MILITARY MIX REQUIRED</td>
<td>(n) THROUGH (p) MAY ALSO APPLY</td>
<td>NOT YET FINALIZED</td>
<td>TABLE 3-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n)</td>
<td>AUTHORITY AND DISCIPLINE</td>
<td>(o) THROUGH (p) MAY ALSO APPLY</td>
<td>NOT YET FINALIZED</td>
<td>TABLE 3-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(o)</td>
<td>TRADITION AND/OR CUSTOM</td>
<td>(p) MAY ALSO APPLY</td>
<td>NOT YET FINALIZED</td>
<td>TABLE 3-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(p)</td>
<td>UNUSUAL HOURS OR WORKING CONDITIONS</td>
<td>(PROCEED TO COLUMN 111)</td>
<td>NOT YET FINALIZED</td>
<td>TABLE 3-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*No further position definition is required for these positions.*
### Table 3-2

**Point Score Identification of Military and Civilian Positions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule</th>
<th>If the Position Fits the Definition of:</th>
<th>Then:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Select the blocks that apply to the position;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- State percent of work time covered by each block you selected;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- And compute the point score for each block you selected.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total for All Blocks Under Rules (1) to (6) May Not Exceed 100%**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>Current Military Background/Training Required</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) Activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>Civilian/Military Mix Required</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**For Rule (a) Entries in All Blocks May Not Exceed 100%**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authority and Discipline</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**For Rule (b) Entries in All Blocks May Not Exceed 100%**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tradition and/or Customs</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**For Rule (c) Entries in Each Block May Not Exceed 100%**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unusual Hours or Working Conditions</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total below military table 3-3</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
<th>Table 3-6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total above military table 3-3</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Table 3-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TABLE 3-3</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IDENTIFY OFFICER AND ENLISTED POSITIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RULE</strong></td>
<td><strong>I. IF THE POSITION:</strong></td>
<td><strong>II. THEN:</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| (a) | FITS THE DEFINITION OF:  
- COMMISSIONED OFFICER BY LAW, TREATY, OR REGULATION  
- COMMAND, PLATOON OR ABOVE (UNIT CONTAINS COMMISSIONED OFFICERS OTHER THAN THE COMMANDER) | RULE (a), (c), (e), AND (f) WILL NOT BE APPLIED | COMMISSIONED OFFICER | NO FURTHER DEFINITION. ENTER IDENTITY ON DA FORM XX |
| (b) | FITS THE DEFINITION OF:  
- WARRANT OFFICER BY LAW, TREATY, OR REGULATION | RULE (d), (g), AND (h) WILL NOT BE APPLIED | WARRANT OFFICER | NO FURTHER DEFINITION. ENTER IDENTITY ON DA FORM XX |
| (c) | FITS THE DEFINITION OF:  
- COMMAND, PLATOON OR ABOVE (UNIT DOES NOT CONTAIN OTHER COMMISSIONED OFFICERS); OR  
- DISCIPLINARY POWERS (UCMS); OR  
- OFFICER BY LAW, TREATY, OR REGULATION | RULE (d) AND (g) WILL NOT BE APPLIED | OFFICER | FURTHER DEFINITION UNDER TABLE 3-5 |
| (d) | FITS THE DEFINITION OF:  
- ENLISTED BY LAW, TREATY, OR REGULATION | RULE (d) WILL NOT BE APPLIED | ENLISTED | NO FURTHER DEFINITION. ENTER IDENTITY ON DA FORM XX |
| (e) | DOES NOT FALL UNDER RULES (a), (b), (c), OR (d) | (PROCEED TO COLUMN III) | NOT YET FINALIZED | FURTHER DEFINITION UNDER TABLE 3-5 |
### TABLE 3-4

**POINT SCORE IDENTIFICATION OF OFFICER AND ENLISTED POSITIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. If the position fits the definition of:</th>
<th>II. Rank the single block with the highest point score that best describes the position:</th>
<th>III. Score for single block</th>
<th>IV. Position in I will be summarized as:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Knowledge of basic 1st language</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Supervisory Control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Judgment and Counselor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Decision-making and Complexity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL: 1F**

**ENLISTED**

**TOTAL: 1F**

**OFFICER**

**TOTAL: 1F**

**ARMED SERVICES BOARD OFFICER**

**TOTAL: 1F**

**ARMED SERVICES BOARD OFFICER**

**TOTAL: 1F**

**ARMED SERVICES BOARD OFFICER**

**TOTAL: 1F**

**ARMED SERVICES BOARD OFFICER**
### TABLE 3-5

**POINT SCORE IDENTIFICATION OF COMMISSIONED OFFICER AND WARRANT OFFICER POSITIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R</th>
<th>REVIEW THE POSITION AND THE DEFINITION OF:</th>
<th>THEN FOR EACH RULE SELECT THE SINGLE BLOCK WITH THE HIGHEST POINT SCORE THAT BEST DESCRIBES THE POSITION:</th>
<th>AND POSITION IDENTIFIED WILL BE ESTABLISHED AS:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>KNOW-HOW</td>
<td>Supervisory Technical Service Activity</td>
<td>Commissioned Officer - Pattern on DA Form XX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Deploy Special Technical Skills, Operate Complex Equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In-Depth Expertise in Nonmilitary Related Technical Skills</td>
<td>Staff or Line Management Planning/Programming/Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>PROBLEM SOLVING</td>
<td>Solve Technical Operating Problems</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Direct Parametric Testing/Analysis Methods</td>
<td>Interpret Policy and Decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluate Consequences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>ACCOUNTABILITY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Responsible for Administrative and Support Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Develop Functional Policies and Advice on Implementation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Control Technical Resources</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL (STEP (3))</th>
<th>TOTAL (STEP (4))</th>
<th>COMMISSIONED OFFICER - PATTERN ON DA FORM XX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>360</td>
<td>390</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160</td>
<td>170</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SELECT THE NOTE WHICH APPLIES

**NOTE (1):** If an appropriate warrant officer MOS exists, the position will be identified for warrant officer incumbency. Proceed directly to DA Form XX.

**NOTE (2):** If an appropriate warrant officer MOS does not exist, proceed to rule (d), table 3-6.
### Table 3-6

**Identify Military Force Structure Position Requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule</th>
<th>If the Position Fits the Definition of:</th>
<th>Then - Position Identity Will Be Established:</th>
<th>III. And Established Identity Will Be Entered In:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>Rotation Base Requirements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>Career Progression Requirements</td>
<td>AS Prescribed in the Governing HQDA Directive, as Amended</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>No Qualified Civilians Available</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>No Warrant Officer Specialty Available</td>
<td>AS Commissioned Officer, and HQDA will be notified*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Notification to HQDA will be prepared and submitted as prescribed in paragraph 2-7 of this Handbook.