AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

STUDENT REPORT

PACAF RED SHIRT/FARM CLUB:
A NEW LOOK

MAJOR BENJAMIN W. PHILLIPS, JR. 88-2125

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TITLE PACAF RED SHIRT/FARM CLUB: A NEW LOOK

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR BENJAMIN W. PHILLIPS, JR., USAF

FACULTY ADVISOR LT COL EDWARD R. ELLIS, 3823 STUS/CC

SPONSOR MAJOR LOYD S. UTTERBACK, HQ PACAF/DPROR

Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of requirements for graduation.

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
AIR UNIVERSITY
MAXWELL AFB, AL 36112
The report recommends implementing a four-year controlled tour for new inexperienced fighter pilots going to remote flying locations. The proposal includes one year at a CONUS TAC base for initial training, one year at a remote base, then a return to the original TAC base for the remaining two years. Combat capability at remote flying locations would be given the opportunity to improve with the reduced training requirements while adverse effects on the personnel and training systems would be minimal.
Remote flying locations have always had to contend with adversity. Close proximity to potential threats, extreme weather conditions and high personnel turnover are all factors that affect the unit's ability to maintain combat capability. Aircrew training is the key to combat capability and, at remote locations, the training load is three times that of a CONUS unit. In addition, personnel policy requires that every unit receive its fair share of new UPT/RTU graduates to train. This extra load on remote units results in extensive resources dedicated to initial training of pilots. This project proposes an assignment program that would reduce the amount of Mission Qualification Training at remote locations while providing the opportunity to increase combat capability without adversely affecting the overall assignment system or training program in the tactical air forces. The author would like to thank Maj Chip Utterback for sponsoring the project and providing much of the background information for the study.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major Phillips graduated from the Air Force Academy in 1975 and attended Undergraduate Pilot Training at Reese AFB, Texas. After pilot training, he returned to Reese to be a T-38 Instructor Pilot. In 1980, Major Phillips was assigned to Kadena AB, Japan in the F-15. In 1984, he was assigned to the HQ PACAF Inspector General team. As the F-15 Operations Inspector and later, Chief, Flight Operations Inspection Branch, he was responsible for inspecting all aircrew training programs throughout the command as well as developing employment scenarios for readiness inspections. Major Phillips is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College and has a Master of Science in Administration degree from Central Michigan University.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Part of our College mission is distribution of the students' problem solving products to DOD sponsors and other interested agencies to enhance insight into contemporary, defense related issues. While the College has accepted this product as meeting academic requirements for graduation, the views and opinions expressed or implied are solely those of the author and should not be construed as carrying official sanction.

REPORT NUMBER 88-2125
AUTHOR(S) MAJOR BENJAMIN W. PHILLIPS, JR., USAF
TITLE PACAF RED SHIRT/FARM CLUB: A NEW LOOK

I. Purpose: To determine if a controlled four year assignment program for inexperienced UPT/RTU fighter pilots to remote flying locations would increase unit combat capability without affecting adversely the assignment or training systems in the tactical air forces (TAF).

II. Problem: Combat capability at remote flying locations in Korea is affected adversely by the extensive Mission Qualification Training (MQT) that the unit must accomplish. Current personnel policies are designed to insure equitable training loads and experience levels at all TAF units at the expense of unique requirements at remote flying locations.

III. Data: Remote flying locations are close to sensitive areas, experience extreme weather conditions and are heavily tasked by contingency plans and local exercises. Current personnel regulations recognize the need to assign highly qualified personnel to serve in the unique, remote environment. However, guidance given to TAF rated resource managers requires that all units in the TAF share training requirements equally. Therefore, assignment procedures do not
allow for any special considerations for remote location requirements. The primary factor that influences assignments to remote locations is the experience level at each unit. To maintain the desired experienced/inexperienced ratio, new UPT/RTU graduates are assigned, making up the major portion of the inexperienced side of the equation. Training requirements at remote locations are three times those of a CONUS base. Combat capability is maintained, but so much effort is expended on MQT and upgrade training that very few resources remain for continuation training. New UPT/RTU pilots maintain minimum qualifications because of the heavy training load. Also, with the introduction of the LANTIRN system, F-16 units will have an increase in training requirements. The project proposal would give remote units a limited experience pilot who would return to his initial CONUS base following his remote tour. The proposal is:

- Only B-course graduates would be considered.

- B-course graduates participating in the program would receive a four year assignment which would include one year at a remote flying location.

- After one year, the selected pilot goes to the previously agreed upon remote location.

- After serving one year, the pilot returns to the previous base to serve the remainder of the initial four year tour.

IV. Conclusion: The project proposal is feasible. The effect on the overall assignment system would be minimal, with a slight increase of experienced pilots at remote bases but an overall decrease in the number of assignment actions required. Training programs in TAC would have an increase of one or two UPT/RTU graduates per unit per year to train but there would be quality payback for the training when the pilot returns from his remote tour. Remote locations would have a decrease in the MQT training requirement and an increase in continuation training opportunities, thus enhancing overall combat capability.

V. Recommendation: The project proposal should be implemented as soon as possible. AFMPC and TAC should solicit volunteers from CONUS bases for program participation until the system can begin to get resources from RTU. For the F-16 weapons system, the program must be fully incorporated prior to LANTIRN system introduction to preclude any decrease in unit or pilot combat capability.
Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

PROJECT PROPOSAL

Combat readiness is attained and maintained through a comprehensive and well managed training program. Tactical fighter units are constantly training to respond to any tasking that might require immediate action. Units located overseas, particularly remote locations, are under increased pressure to maintain a high state of readiness because of their proximity to the threat and subsequent reduced reaction time. The major obstacle confronting remote flying locations is the excessive amount of aircrew training required to maintain desired combat capabilities and readiness postures. In extensive travels throughout the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), first as a F-15 pilot at Kadena AB and more recently as an Operations Inspector for the HQ PACAF Inspector General, the author was able to observe first hand how excessive training loads at remote flying locations require an inordinate amount of time to manage successfully without detracting from overall unit capability. To alleviate this burden, the author has proposed a new remote location assignment policy for new, inexperienced pilots.

The purpose of this project is to determine the feasibility of a four year controlled tour for inexperienced fighter pilots. Specifically, the proposal is:

- Only B-course (the upgrade training course given to recent pilot training graduates, pilots without a major weapon system identifier, or pilots that have not flown fighters for an extended period of time) Replacement Training Unit (RTU) inputs would be considered.

- The B-course graduate would receive a four year assignment from RTU which would include one year at a remote flying location.

- After one year Time-On-Station (TOS), the selected pilot would go to the previously agreed upon remote location for one year.
After serving one year remote, the pilot would return to previous base to serve the remainder of the initial four year tour.

The project will consider only Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) graduates on their first assignment in a fighter aircraft for participation in the assignment program. The initial assignment would be to a Tactical Air Command (TAC) base in the Continental United States (CONUS). Only 12 month short tour assignments would apply, 24 month command sponsored tours to remote locations are not eligible. Remote locations must have at least one tactical fighter squadron (TFS) assigned. The test for feasibility will be if the program can improve overall combat readiness at the remote location without adversely effecting the assignment and training systems in the tactical air forces (TAF).

**PROJECT SPONSOR AND BACKGROUND**

The project is sponsored by Major Loyd S. Utterback, HQ PACAF/DPROR. Informal consideration and development of programs similar to this have been on-going for more than three years at HQ PACAF and SAF. At the request of SAF, HQ PACAF/DP made a formal proposal in mid-1986 titled "Red Shirt/Farm Club" and presented it at the October 1986 Rated Review Board for consideration. (11:--) The proposal was deferred for further consideration by HQ TAC and AF/XOO. The most current version of the proposal was submitted by PACAF through TAC to AF/XOO for feasibility analysis.

The results of the computer analysis by AF/XOOTT were briefed at the October 1987 Rated Review Board and studies determined that, 1) PACAF has a legitimate complaint regarding heavy training loads at its remote flying locations, 2) total implementation of the Red Shirt/Farm Club program is not feasible because training equity is not achieved among MAJCOMs, force structure programing would be adversely affected, and opportunity to compete for experienced cockpits would be decreased, and 3) partial program implementation could be possible if Permanent Change of Station (PCS) constraints were addressed, a conscious decision to block cockpits is made, and the TAF is not adverse to creating a "special class" of pilots. (7:--) The "special class" of pilots would be those pilots receiving consecutive operational assignments as opposed to the standard track addressed in Chapter Three. The status of the current proposal is undetermined.
PROJECT ORGANIZATION AND SCOPE

To determine the validity and feasibility of the project proposal, the report will be divided into five major areas. First, Chapter Two will discuss general background information on current remote flying locations. Chapter Three will examine the rated officer assignment process and how it is applied to remote location assignments. In Chapter Four, the project scope will narrow and focus on F-16 training requirements for inexperienced pilots in TAC and PACAF. The effect the project proposal would have on the overall assignment and training systems will be discussed in Chapter Five by reviewing the results of the OCT 87 proposal and comparing them to the project proposal. Finally, the report will conclude with recommendations to MAJCOMs regarding the feasibility of implementing the project proposal.

The project will not cover all areas that could have an effect on the feasibility of implementation. Dependent housing requirements, beddown plans and future force structure are areas that must be considered before implementation, but should not affect the overall feasibility of the project recommendations. The intrinsic benefits of the program, such as stability for dependents and identification with the CONUS base while remote will also not be addressed but should be considered during this period of pilot retention difficulties. The author’s objective is to distribute the completed project to AF/XOO, HQ AFMPC, HQ TAC, and HQ PACAF for consideration and implementation.
Chapter Two

REMOTE FLYING LOCATIONS

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will discuss the location, manning, general tasking, and some characteristics unique to each of the five major TAF remote flying locations. Also, factors that affect training of newly assigned pilots will be briefly addressed. Four of the five remote locations are in Korea, under the command of PACAF, while the fifth location is in Iceland under TAC.

KUNSAN AB, REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)

Kunsan AB, home of the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), is located on the west coast of Korea, just over 100 miles south of Seoul. It is currently the largest remote flying location in the Air Force with two squadrons of F-16s, the 80th and 35th TFSs, each manned with 32 pilots. It is also the only location that does not allow any command sponsored dependents, therefore every pilot assigned is serving a 12 month short tour. PACAF tasking requires Kunsan F-16 pilots to maintain currency in all air-to-ground events and proficiency in air-to-air events. As the Low-Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night (LANTIRN) system is phased into the inventory, Kunsan could be required to attain and maintain weapons system capability.

Conditions at Kunsan are unique. To maintain adequate manning, each squadron receives an average of three new pilots a month. Each pilot must complete a tailored Mission Qualification Training (MQT) program prior to Mission Ready (MR) certification. There are many factors that affect this training. Korean weather is generally hazy and subject to rapid changes in visibility as sea fog rolls on and off the airdrome. Furthermore, located 120 miles from the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), the base experiences almost monthly generation and alert exercises to prepare for contingency operations. The wing is also tasked to participate in many
exercises, such as Team Spirit and Cope Jade in Korea, Cope Thunder in the Philippines, Pitch Black in Australia, and Cobra Gold in Thailand. In any 12 month period, each squadron participates in some type of exercise a total of 10 to 12 weeks. During these exercises, initial MQT is not usually conducted because MR certification is required for exercise participation.

**Osan AB, ROK**

Osan AB is the headquarters for the 51 TFW and is located 60 miles south of Seoul. Although the wing has three squadrons, the 36 TFS is the only one located on Osan. The 36 TFS has 12 F-4Es assigned and manning is 16 pilots and 16 Weapons Systems Officers (WSO). Personnel can be assigned for 24 months if they desire, but dependents are allowed only if they are command sponsored. The 12 month tour selection is slightly more prevalent. Only 80 miles from the DMZ, the 36 TFS is the closest U.S. air superiority squadron to North Korea. In addition to the air-to-air currency requirements, the squadron has a requirement to maintain air-to-ground familiarization currency.

Like Kunsan, new aircrews arrive monthly. An average of two to three pilots/WSOs per month must be upgraded to MR status as quickly as possible to maintain unit combat readiness. Exercises, out of country deployments, in country commitments, weather, and aircraft availability all affect the squadron’s ability to train new crewmembers in a timely manner. Osan aircrews spend slightly less time than Kunsan off station, but training requirements are increased because new aircrews generally arrive with very little operational air-to-air experience.

**Suwon AB, ROK**

Suwon is a geographically separated unit of the 51 TFW located 15 miles north of Osan. The primary tasking for the 25 TFS at Suwon is to provide close air support (CAS) to any ground unit in Korea during a time of conflict. With a full complement of 24 A-10s, Suwon’s 32 pilots are on either 24 or 12 month tours. The squadron receives two to three pilots per month that require some level of training to be certified MR.

Suwon experiences the same weather conditions as other bases in Korea, as well as local exercises to maintain combat readiness. In addition, Suwon is a ROK Air Force base and the squadron is subject to host country restrictions that are
placed on operations. Another factor unique to Suwon is the higher utilization rates in the A-10 which require expert management of resources to maintain MR currencies as well as train newly arrived pilots.

**TAEGU AB, ROK**

Taegu AB, located about 180 miles southeast of Seoul, is the third squadron under the command of the 51 TFW. Home of the 497 TFS, it also has 12 F-4Es assigned with 16 pilots and 16 WSOs. Like the 36 TFS, its primary mission is air superiority with air-to-ground familiarization required. The same tour lengths are available, but more aircrew members elect to serve the 12 month tour due to the more isolated location of the base. (11:--)

Constraints to training the two to three new aircrew members that arrive each month are very similar to both Osan and Suwon. They have the same influx of new aircrews, exercise schedule and alert taskings as Osan, and experience the same difficulties as Suwon in operating on a ROK Air Force base.

**KEFLAVIK NAS, ICELAND**

Keflavik Naval Air Station hosts the 57th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, an 18 aircraft, 24 pilot F-15 unit. The squadron is under the command of TAC. Assignment options are both 24 and 12 month tours with the longer tour very tightly controlled due to the limited dependent support facilities. The squadron is tasked to provide air defense in the North Atlantic and North Sea areas of operations.

Because of the location in the Norwegian Sea, weather conditions can be extremely harsh and unpredictable. In addition, operational missions can be extremely long and demanding. Until very recently, TAC had not permitted any B-course graduates to be assigned to Iceland because of the sensitivity of the mission and the extreme weather conditions. Current policy allows B-course RTU graduates to be assigned to Iceland, but they must have some previous flying experience.

**SUMMARY**

In general, remote flying locations are in proximity to a threat, experience extreme weather conditions, exercise constantly to maintain combat readiness, and experience an extremely high personnel turnover rate. Each unit must train
in a 12 to 18 month period the same number of pilots/WSOs that a CONUS unit would train in three years. If training to MR status is interrupted for any reason, the unit's overall ability to respond promptly to contingency operations could be seriously degraded.
INTRODUCTION

This chapter addresses the rated officer assignment process in relation to remote flying locations and pilot allocation. First, basic policies for short tour assignments will be discussed. Then, the Major Command (MAJCOM) level rated officer resource manager assignment process will be reviewed to determine how pilot assignments are made and if requirements unique to short tour locations are considered in the assignment process.

BASIC POLICY

Basic guidance for officer assignment is contained in AFR 36-20, Officer Personnel, Officer Assignments. The regulation states, "The primary objective of the officer assignment system is to assign Air Force officers to enhance effective and sustained mission accomplishment." (5:9) To do this, Air Force Military Personnel Center (AFMPC) has divided the TAF rated force into three main categories: force, pipeline, and overhead. (8:3)

The first category, the force, consists of those officers assigned to Rated Position Identifiers (RPI) 1 or 2 and fill the operational cockpit requirements. For FY 87 about 42 percent of rated personnel in the TAF were in the force. (8:38) The second category, the pipeline, consists of all pilots in formal training and projected as a TAF resource. Formal training includes Lead-In Fighter Training (LIFT) as well as RTU. Approximately 10 percent of the rated force is in the pipeline at any one time. (8:38) The third category, the overhead, is the pool from which positions that require experienced fighter pilots are filled. These positions include Instructor Pilots (IP) at RTU and LIFT, Forward Air Controllers (FAC), Air Force Institute of Technology students and instructors, and rated staff positions. (8:3) By placing each pilot in one of these categories, AFMPC is able to balance the force structure with requirements, thus sustaining mission accomplishment.
The ability to sustain mission accomplishment depends on officer qualification, particularly in the overseas, remote environment. AFR 36-20 recognizes the unique aspects of a remote assignment and offers guidance to assignment officers. "The sensitivity of overseas missions and the operating environment in any given location requires the assignment of personnel whose qualifications and performance are clearly up to desired standards." (5:80) The regulation also states that "Overseas service in all areas must be shared as equally as possible by all similarly qualified officers." (5:80) The regulation allows for a liberal interpretation of what a qualified officer is.

Qualification. Officers must be qualified to perform duties for which selected or possess the potential for qualification in the AFSC either through experience or additional training. Regardless of volunteer status, the first consideration must be the officer's qualification to fill the requirement. (5:80)

Newly assigned pilots are qualified in the airplane when they leave RTU but, as will be discussed in Chapter Four, they require further training to become certified MR and be considered qualified to accomplish the mission. In addition, it could be argued that the newly assigned pilot has not demonstrated the ability to perform up to desired standards, as required by regulations. It is the time and effort required to train the new pilot and assess his capabilities that detracts from a remote flying location's combat capability.

THE ASSIGNMENT PROCESS

In FY 87, 257 UPT graduates entered the TAF. (10:--) Of the 257, 20 were allocated to Kunsan, 10 to Suwon, and 10 to Osan/Taeug. (11:--) Air Force Regulation 36-20 provides the broad guidance for assigning officers to remote, overseas locations, but it is the MAJCOM rated resource manager who has the responsibility to sustain the proper manning at these locations. To do this he operates under some basic constraints within the assignment structure and has priorities that must be considered before finalizing assignments.

Constraints

The Rated Distribution and Training Management (RDTM) program was established to give each MAJCOM responsibility to ensure that all rated individuals in the command are used
effectively. However, the unique command structure required TAF resources to be allocated to PACAF, United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE), and Alaskan Air Command (AAC) as well as TAC. In 1977, RDTM and TAC agreed to allow TAC to control all assignments at the wing level and lower involving all TAF assets. (8:18) This created a single point manager, located at TAC headquarters, who monitors worldwide TAF capability. For example, if AFMPC selects a TAC resource to go to USAFE, TAC must first release the resource (based on TAC unit manning, experience, C-status and IP manning) before AFMPC begins the assignment process. (8:5-6) This system relegates AFMPC to managing overseas resources on an as available (from TAC) basis.

As stated earlier, the primary role of the officer assignment process is to enhance mission effectiveness and sustainability. Sustainment is "the ability to train and maintain an inventory capable of meeting stated requirements. There are two major factors which determine our ability to do this: size of the inventory and how fast it needs to be replaced." (8:7) Every assignment in the TAF is influenced by the need to maintain the inventory and manage the replacement resources. Sustainability is the key to maintaining total force capability.

**Force Structure Sustainability**

Absorption is the driving force behind sustainability. According to AFMPC, "Absorption is the ability of a given force (weapons system) to accept new inputs without causing adverse impact to the force structure itself." (8:8) Included in the overall force structure are pilots without a major weapons system identifier, such as first assignment IPs in Air Training Command, first assignment FACs in TAC as well as new UPT graduates that enter the system. The three factors that determine the "absorption rate" are experience, stability, and training ability. (8:8)

Experience is vital to any weapons system. A pilot is classified as an experienced resource when he has 500 hours in his Primary Assigned Aircraft (PAA) or 300 hours PAA and 1000 hours First Pilot (FP)/IP time. In 1986-87, the average new pilot required 24 to 30 months to become experienced in his weapons system. The minimum experience level for most operational units to be effective is 40 percent, with a stated goal of 50 percent desired. (8:8) "Maintaining minimum experience levels ensures the required level of leadership, training, and combat management for operational units." (8:8) But the resource manager must allocate enough inexperienced pilots into the system to ensure that overhead requirements for experienced pilots can be filled. As overhead pilots
complete their tours outside their PAA, cockpits must be made available to them so they do not lose their credibility as a TAF resource. The manager is working a fine line. By protecting cockpits for returning experienced pilots, he essentially restricts the rate at which new inputs can be absorbed. (8:8) Inexperienced pilots must be continually entered into the system, but little regard is given to where they will be assigned, except that the desired experience ratio at individual units must be maintained.

The second factor is tour stability. In 1979, the TAF absorbed 600 pilots. At the same time, the average TOS in TAC was only 24 months. (8:8) The low TOS combined with unfavorable economic conditions resulted in many pilots not gaining enough flying time to be experienced while still being assigned to overhead jobs requiring experienced pilots. The pilots had to be moved out of the system to create room for the next new graduate from RTU. "This rapid turnover was detrimental both in terms of readiness and retention. A large portion of squadron capability had to be dedicated to constant mission ready upgrade training." (8:8) As of early 1987, the average TOS in TAC was 2.8 years. (8:8) But, remote assignments are still 12 months and they still experience the rapid turnover, thus requiring constant MR upgrade training.

Training ability is the last factor in determining absorption capability and is an important input into the overall assignment process. "Each aircraft dedicated to training reduces the number of acceptable cockpits which we can experience a pilot." (8:9) This can become an infinite loop if not managed properly. The need to train new inputs is driven by the need to maintain an acceptable experience level. If all resources are dedicated to training, experienced products will not be available in a timely manner.

Resource Manager Considerations

When making the assignment, the resource manager has one overriding consideration,

The primary factor in the assignment process is requirements. It is said to be both the top and bottom lines of all assignment considerations. Your first priority is to meet mission requirements with the best possible man-job match. ... When conflicts of interest exist, your charter must always be to fill Air Force requirements. (8:17)

The key Air Force requirement is to maintain unit manning and experience within prescribed limits for individual weapons systems. (8:21) When assigning new UPT/RTU graduates, other
factors that might normally be considered, such as flying
gates, most eligible for overseas, and TOS are not areas of
concern. (8:17) The primary function of the new UPT/RTU
graduate at remote flying locations is to maintain the desired
experience (or inexperience) level.

The force structure and experience level at the remote
locations is easy to maintain using inexperienced pilots.
Current guidance dictates that each unit receives its fair
share of new inputs. "Although the TAF absorption model
factors in experience requirements, problems arise if new
inexperienced pilots are not distributed on a proportionate fair share basis among units of a given
weapons system." (8:22) If one unit receives more new
inexperienced pilots it must dedicate more resources to the
training of the new resource.

Another factor that affects overseas unit capability is
the control that TAC has on the assignment system. "The
system, as it now exists, sometimes results in delays in
filling requirements outside the CONUS whenever TAC manning
cannot support a release." (8:6) This normally does not affect
the assignment of newly qualified fighter pilots to overseas
locations but it does affect the overall experience level at
the unit level. If TAC delays an assignment of an experienced
pilot for one month, the result is a decline in the overall
experience level of the gaining unit for almost 10% of a short
tour.

Current Structure

Under the current structure if an UPT/RTU graduate's
initial assignment is to a remote location, his next
assignment is to a CONUS unit for three years. He receives a
coveted "ops-to-ops" assignment because his one year at the
remote base did not gain him enough flying time to be an
experienced resource. Once the pilot becomes experienced, he
is subject to assignment out of the weapons system. "Because
of the imbalance in the size [of the overhead category], newly
experienced pilots can expect to be used in overhead positions
upon completing their first operational tour." (8:2) For the
remote returnee, this occurs after his first operational long
tour.

SUMMARY

Air Force Regulation 36-20 recognizes the need for highly
qualified officers to serve in the unique environment of a
remote location. Of the 257 new inputs in the system during
FY 87, approximately 45 were assigned directly to remote
locations. (7:-- ) Current assignment procedures do not
consider a remote unit’s capability to train these new arrivals or their overall ability to meet mission requirements. By using the inexperienced UPT/RTU graduate as a means to manage the experience level on a fair share basis, the remote overseas locations are not given the best possible support to accomplish their mission.
Chapter Four
AIRCREW TRAINING

INTRODUCTION

The single most important objective of any unit commander is to maintain the level of combat capability that is expected and directed by higher headquarters. A key factor in determining the actual level of capability is the MR status of the unit's aircrews. Expeditious training of newly assigned pilots is essential if the unit is to maintain the desired level of combat capability. This chapter reviews current TAC and PACAF MQT guidance, available training time in both commands, and related payback the units receive for this training. Finally, the chapter will conclude with a look at future training requirements for employment of the LANTIRN system. Discussion throughout the chapter will be limited to the requirements in the F-16 community because of the diversified missions assigned to the system and the extensive training required to become fully MR. However, the same training requirements exist, to some degree, at all remote and CONUS bases.

TAC

Each TAC unit in the CONUS receives up to seven UPT/RTU graduates each year. Guidance provided in TACM 51-50, Chapter 6, VOL I, requires that, "Wing/group or IAF Sq commanders (as applicable) will ensure that primary aircrew members are upgraded to MR status within 60 days of their first flight in MQT." The MQT programs are locally developed and consist of programs that include ground and simulator training in conjunction with up to 12 aircraft sorties. The specific program depends on local tasking and training requirements. The programs require the pilots to show proficiency in air-to-ground as well as air-to-air skills before being certified MR.

The major obstacle to expeditious MQT is training time available. Time available is influenced most by the total number of pilots to be trained at any given time. This
affects the sortie distribution for the entire unit. MQT takes precedence over most other upgrade training. If several pilots require MQT, then the time to achieve MR status could become excessive. In addition, sufficient sorties are not available on the daily flying schedule to accommodate both MQT requirements and continuation training required to maintain the unit's overall combat status. CONUS units receive an average of 11 pilots per year (up to seven UPT/RTU graduates) requiring MQT of some degree prior to MR certification. (10:--) As noted earlier, the average TOS for TAC is 2.8 years. During the average tour in TAC, a unit has just over 33 months to train 32 new pilots, 16 to 18 of those being UPT/RTU graduates.

Other factors that can affect MQT progress include local/higher headquarters directed exercises, unit deployments, weather, and maintenance. Most can be forecasted and training tailored to allow timely achievement of MR status within the prescribed limits. Continuation training in specialized weapons, such as IIR Maverick, special weapons delivery, and Air Combat Training (ACBT) is accomplished as necessary to maintain unit requirements and allow for individual progression as a fighter pilot. The payback a unit receives for MQT is very advantageous. For a two month training program, the unit receives up to 34 months of MR service.

PACAF

In the Pacific, each F-16 squadron is allocated 10 UPT/RTU graduates per year. (11:--) PACAF Vol I, Chapter 6 to MCH 51-50 addresses directly MR certification for unaccompanied tours in Korea. "Korean Units. Achieve MR status within 25 training days after arrival." (3:6-6) PACAF Chapter 6 goes on to define training days as "those days normally scheduled for flying training (Mon - Fri) exclusive of weekends, holidays, exercises, scheduled down days, etc." (3:6-6) As in TAC, the MQT programs are locally developed and approved at NAF/MAJCOM levels. The basic MQT program that UPT/RTU graduates receive consists of up to seven flying sorties spanning the spectrum of unit commitments. (2:--) In addition, each new pilot assigned to the squadron must certify for special weapons delivery during his initial upgrade training, normally requiring three to five days of intensive preparation and study. (2:--)

In Korea, time available for training is limited. Unit level exercises occur frequently and, combined with in-country exercises (Team Spirit, Cope Jade, ORIs and ORI support) result in unit involvement in exercise activity about once
each month. Low visibility weather conditions, particularly in the winter months, limit training opportunities for inexperienced pilots because of higher weather minimum requirements. Also, each squadron deploys to Clark AB for a three to five week TDY to participate in Cope Thunder and Combat Sage each year. Only MR aircrews are permitted to participate in most exercises, further reducing the training time available for the new pilots.

With an average TOS of 12 months, the training of new pilots at Kunsan is intense and time critical. Each squadron must train 32 pilots in the 12 month period. Of the 32, 10 are new UPT/RTU graduates and require the complete training program. (2:--) Training requirements for the remaining pilots are not as structured. PACAF, like TAC, allows commanders to use previous qualification as a basis for MR certification.

6-16 c. Tactical Qualification Checks (ref para 2-16 c,d). At the discretion of the wing DO [Deputy Commander for Operations], previously MR aircrews arriving with current qualification checks in PAA aircraft need not be administered another flight evaluation before being certified MR. The following guidelines apply.

(3) Intercommand transfers to squadrons with the same or similar DOC may be certified MR after completion of the asterisked theater indoctrination requirements of PACAFR 51-6, provided they meet level A currency and weapons qualification criteria. (3:6-5)

If the wing DO elects to certify pilots based on previous qualifications, the training load is reduced significantly. The previously certified pilot requires only two to three sorties for theater indoctrination (2:--), allowing more training time for the inexperienced pilots. Of the 32 pilots arriving each year at Kunsan, 19 have experience of some kind in fighters and MQT programs can be tailored for them. (Current experience level at Kunsan is 60% experienced/40% inexperienced. (11:--)) By taking advantage of the regulation, MQT requirements can be managed.

As important as initial MQT is to the unit training program, continuation training is what ensures that pilots remain current and are able to maintain MR status. As in TAC, continuation training allows pilots to hone their combat skills and progress to flight leader, fourship flight leader, and ultimately, instructor pilot. With the continuous, heavy training load at Kunsan, continuation training for the inexperienced pilot often suffers the most. So many sorties
are dedicated to MQT, flight lead, IP, ACBT, special weapons training and 51-50 weapons delivery requirements that few continuation training sorties are available for the inexperienced pilot. The author observed and monitored the training programs at Kunsan for three years and found that as a whole, inexperienced pilots averaged between 10 and 12 sorties per month while the experienced pilots got as many as 16 sorties. The IPs were able to fly as many as 18 or 20 sorties. For the most part, inexperienced pilots were just maintaining their MR status while the experienced pilots flew many sorties involved in upgrade training programs of some type. Instructor pilots were in such demand that almost every mission they flew involved a formal training program of some type, allowing very few opportunities for pure continuation training.

Payback received by Kunsan for the training given to new UPT/RTU graduates is very limited. The new pilot normally requires the full training program, is allowed a 30 day mid-tour leave halfway through his tour, then requires two weeks to outprocess. This gives Kunsan 9 to 10 months of use from the new pilot. (7:--)

Kunsan AB dedicates an enormous amount of training effort to keep ahead of the MQT program. Currently, pilots are achieving MR status within prescribe limits (11:--) but the amount of time and resources dedicated to the MQT program detract significantly from the continuation training program. The units are able to accomplish the required mission. But, as a front line combat unit that must be prepared to react immediately, the minimal continuation training opportunities afforded the new, inexperienced UPT/RTU graduate could detract from the ability of the unit to meet the tasking successfully.

**FUTURE TRAINING REQUIREMENTS: LANTIRN**

The Low-Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night (LANTIRN) system is the most advanced weapons delivery system ever developed. The system will be in the field soon and the first weapons system to receive it will be the F-16. In 1986, Lt Col David Blair concluded a study for the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education titled LANTIRN Operational Training for the F-15E and F-16C/D. The study examined training requirements necessary to maintain combat capability with the system. He examined current training and 51-50 requirements for the F-16 and found that "personnel in the TAF generally recognize that aircrews are already approaching training work-load saturation without the additional work load LANTIRN will impose." (6:21) The work load for the LANTIRN system is significant and will affect the
training programs of any F-16 unit receiving LANTIRN tasking.

The system is complex and extremely demanding. Successful employment will depend on continuity and training. Blair suggests some inducements to attract the "caliber of individual needed for the LANTIRN tasking." (6:77) First he believes that initial assignments should be for five years in the system, then rotated into a non-LANTIRN unit. As the system matures, aircrews should rotate out of LANTIRN flying after three years unless they request an extension for an additional year. His third proposal is, "A minimum tour of three years overseas and four years CONUS should be assured for all LANTIRN personnel." (6:77)

These proposed personnel policies are but a sampling of those possible. They are offered as a means of rewarding a group who will be tasked to perform one of the most demanding missions presently envisioned for the TAF. Aircrews and support personnel will carry the burden while the families of these men and women will have to adapt to an uncomfortable life-style (an extensive night flying schedule requiring a complete restructuring of support activities). By presenting them with a promised exit from this tasking, the burden may be more easily carried. (6:77)

The continuation training program is covered extensively. Present continuation training event requirements for a fully tasked F-16 unit are compared with his proposed LANTIRN training requirements. A fully tasked unit's continuation training requirements, including air-to-air proficiency, capability in night CAS, and ability to deliver guided munitions, conventional, and nuclear weapons, would be increased 37 percent over current requirements. (6:54) As pointed out earlier, Kunsan's continuation training program is limited and any increase in requirements could decrease the overall effectiveness of the program. In addition, to expend the time and resources to train a new UPT/RTU graduate in the LANTIRN system and still rotate him after one year on station would not allow the unit to gain any degree of experience or expertise from the new pilot.

Blair concludes his study by emphasizing the need for MAJCOMs to review tasking and take appropriate steps now if required.

Finally ... the MAJCOMs can review the tasking and training required to support the intended employment of LANTIRN-equipped units. Where theater resources cannot support necessary training or where
Any effort to reduce tasking dilutes the effectiveness of the weapons system. Therefore every effort should be made to maximize resources before resorting to reduced, or partial tasking of LANTIRN units. (6:81)

SUMMARY

Each year, 120 to 130 new pilots enter the F-16 community. (10:--) Training required to certify individual UPT/RTU graduates MR is not extensive but is vital to a unit’s combat readiness. Both TAC and PACAF have MQT programs that are designed to bring the new F-16 fighter pilot up to a level of proficiency that allows him to perform the mission without further training. Both commands are able to accomplish the required training in a timely manner according to their guidance. However, the quantity of MQT that short tour locations must accomplish is three times that of a CONUS unit. By comparing Kunsan’s training requirements to a CONUS base, the long term effects are manifested in the amount of time and resources that Kunsan dedicates to training sorties compared to continuation training. Kunsan units are mission capable, but the inexperienced pilot suffers from fewer continuation training sorties because of the units’ overall training requirements.

Future training requirements will increase as LANTIRN becomes operational. To obtain adequate payback from the training required to be proficient in LANTIRN employment, Blair points out that tours need to be three to five years in length. If Kunsan, or any short tour flying location, receives LANTIRN tasking, the MAJCOM will have to examine unit tasking and explore every possible means to maximize LANTIRN capabilities without reducing the unit’s overall ability to meet other requirements.
Chapter Five

EFFECTS OF IMPLEMENTATION

INTRODUCTION

The effects of implementing the proposed assignment policy would be positive on the overall mission capability of affected units. As a basis for discussing the impact of implementation, the results of AF/XOOTT’s study of the OCT 87 proposal will be reviewed and compared to those related areas in the project proposal. Personnel and training aspects of both programs will be compared and contrasted to establish the effect each program would have on overall mission capability of participating units. First, a review of both proposals.

PROPOSAL REVIEWS

Project Proposal

The project proposal would be limited to remote, short tour assignments. Each location must have at least one TFS assigned. The basic program is:

- Only UPT/RTU B-course inputs will be considered eligible.
- UPT/RTU graduates selected/volunteering for the program would receive a four year assignment which would include one year at a remote flying location.
- After one year TOS, the participating pilot would go to the agreed upon remote location for one year.
- After serving one year, the pilot would return to the original CONUS base and serve the remainder of his four year assignment.

Constraints on the participating pilot might include: he must volunteer for the program, the pilot will not be allowed to extend at either base, exact date of departure for the remote location may vary up to a predetermined time depending on both CONUS and remote unit manning requirements.
and follow-on assignment preference could be considered. One constraint that must be implemented relates to PCS moves. The officer must agree to no government sponsored dependent moves from the CONUS base until the end of the initial four year tour. This concept is very similar to the current Home Basing program which restricts dependent moves during the agreed time. (5:85)

OCT 87 Proposal

The proposal that went from PACAF through TAC to AF/XOOTT for study and analysis was:
- No B-course RTU inputs to remote locations
- B-course grads receive assignments to other overseas MAJCOMs or TAC
- Inexperienced pilots assigned to remote sites on or about 1 yr TOS
- Serve 1 yr remote then PCS back to CONUS for three year tour (7:--)

This proposal would involve a total of at least five years and require as many as three PCS moves for the entire family.

PERSONNEL SYSTEM EFFECTS

OCT 87 Proposal

The impact on the personnel system would be adverse and unacceptable. Because the program would increase the time that the inexperienced pilot is in the cockpit (by at least one year over the current structure), the "ability" to train is reduced. Using FY 87 data, the program reduces experienced cockpits available for overhead pilots returning to the force by 45 per year. (7:--) At the same time, 45 satellite jobs, those filled by pilots from the force going to the overhead, would go unfilled. (7:--) In addition, TAC feels that they are bearing the brunt of retention shortfalls and the loss of 45 satellite fills would only exacerbate the problem. (7:--)

Project Proposal

If the project proposal is implemented, the effect on the personnel system would be minimal. Available cockpits for overhead returnees would not be affected. It is a four year program, therefore the established flow of experienced pilots in the force leaving to fill satellite jobs in the overhead
category, and the corresponding requirement to retrain returning overhead pilots, would not be interrupted. The important difference is that the pilot would be assigned to a CONUS unit for two versus three years. This allows the system to continue to absorb overhead returnees as well as fill overhead vacancies in a timely manner. In addition, TAC and AFMPC could forecast assignments more effectively and reduce the requirement to generate new assignments for those returning from remote tours.

The experience level at the remote base would be affected, but only slightly. As a pilot approaches the end of his tour, he might have accumulated enough flying time to be considered experienced, thus increasing the unit experience level. When he returns to the CONUS base, his remaining time would most likely be as an experienced pilot, thus giving the unit two years of experienced service.

**TRAINING EFFECTS**

**OCT 87 Proposal**

TAC’s major objection to this proposal from the training aspect is, "TAC already receives fair share of B-course grads". The proposal would increase the MQT requirements for TAC in all weapons systems by 40 to 45 pilots per year, thus diluting continuation training programs. However, upon returning to the CONUS, very little training would be required for MR certification. In addition, the returning pilot would be available for three years, providing strong continuity to the overall training program.

Another concern is that the TAC unit providing the MQT resources would receive very little payback for its training efforts. When the new UPT/RTU graduate departs for his remote tour, the unit would have received about 9 to 10 months of MR service. On the other hand, both remote and follow-on assignment locations would receive, at the very least, a Limited Experienced (LIMEX) resource that would require very little training upon arrival. Both units would reap a large payback for their minimum training efforts.

**Project Proposal**

The most beneficial aspect of the project proposal is the increased combat capability at remote locations due to a drastic cut in MQT requirements and an increase in continuation training opportunities. Remote locations would receive a LIMEX resource, previously MR and requiring only theater indoctrination training before wing DO
recertification. The new arrival would still be considered inexperienced by AFMPC standards so the experience/inexperience ratio would not be significantly affected.

The corresponding increase in training load would still be borne by TAC with an increase of one to two more new pilots per squadron per year. The unit giving the MQT would receive payback for its efforts because the pilot would be required to return to his first base. Therefore, the unit giving the MQT would have a vested interest in the quality of training, knowing that the pilot will return after his remote tour. When the pilot does return, he will be close to meeting experience criteria. As with the remote location, the experience level at the CONUS base would not be adversely affected because the returning pilot would be on station only two years.

**SUMMARY**

Both proposals would increase unit combat capabilities at the remote locations. However, the study of the OCT 87 proposal concluded that implementation of the total program was not feasible. (7:--) The major constraints to implementation were training inequities among MAJCOMs and the reduced opportunity to compete for experienced cockpits. However, the study did recognize that PACAF had a legitimate complaint regarding payback versus MQT load. (7:--) The project proposal would not reduce the inequity of training among the MAJCOMs, but it would give the TAC units some payback for the MQT they did accomplish. The payback is two years of experienced service when the pilot returns from his remote assignment. Also, because the proposal does not interrupt the current four year assignment cycle for new UPT/RTU graduates going on remote assignments, the number of cockpits available for returning overhead pilots would not change.

Implementation of the project proposal would have very little effect on the overall officer assignment process. The effect of a slight increase in MQT loads for CONUS units would be offset by the payback the units would receive from pilots returning from their remote assignments.
Chapter Six

RECOMMENDATIONS

This project proposal should be implemented. The four years that the proposed program spans is the factor that allows easy implementation into both the TAF training system and the overall personnel system. The effort and expense of implementation would be small compared to the overall increase in combat capability. With the introduction of the LANTIRN system, actions must be taken now to ensure that future training and employment requirements can be met at remote locations.

The effects on the training program in the TAF would be positive. TAC would absorb a slight increase in MQT, but would gain substantial payback from the remote tour returnees. Mission capabilities at remote locations would increase significantly with the increase in experience (not the experience/inexperience ratio) and the decrease in MQT requirements. Increased continuation training at the remote locations would further enhance combat capability.

The overall personnel assignment structure would not be affected to any significant degree. The four year program falls within the current assignment cycle for a UPT/RTU graduate initially assigned to a remote location. TAC’s concern that cockpits would be blocked is valid if the program spans five years, but a four year program would not affect available cockpits. Experience levels at both remote and CONUS units would not be altered significantly and the number of assignments that must be processed through AFMPC, TAC and PACAF would be reduced because all participants would have follow-on assignments.

Implementation could begin immediately. Initiation would require AFMPC to solicit volunteers from UPT/RTU pilots currently at CONUS bases and select from those the most qualified to go on a one year remote and return to their current base for two years. Simultaneously, new graduates from RTU should be allowed to volunteer for the program, thus beginning total program implementation in one year. Restrictions that might apply to PCS moves would be those that would apply to a Home Base type of assignment already in AFR 36-20.
The time to implement this program is now. During this period of relative calm, there is no compelling factor that requires the use of completely inexperienced pilots at remote locations. The proposal allows for current assignment constraints to be met while combat capability at both remote and CONUS locations has an opportunity to improve. The proposal also offers a chance to reduce PCS moves, reduce the number of assignment actions by AFMPC, and afford some family stability to participants.
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