COHORT: IS READINESS A COST?

BY

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COHORT, the acronym for a unit manning system, grew from a need identified by the studies and experiences of soldiers during the Arab-Israeli Wars. The remedy for the shock of battle and the trauma of the modern battlefield was determined to be the cohesiveness of the units involved. The personnel system that the U.S. Army has used to man the force since prior to World War II is based on Individual Replacements and does not contribute to establishing cohesiveness at unit level. A test of the COHORT or unit manning system began in 1980 with...
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COHORT: IS READINESS A COST?

An Individual Study Project

by

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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
23 March 1988

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ABSTRACT

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COHORT, the acronym for a unit manning system, grew from a need identified by the studies and experiences of soldiers during the Arab-Israeli Wars. The remedy for the shock of battle and the trauma of the modern battlefield was determined to be the cohesiveness of the units involved. The personnel system that the U.S. Army has used to man the force since prior to World War II is based on Individual Replacements and does not contribute to establishing cohesiveness at unit level. A test of the COHORT or unit manning system began in 1980 with COHORT companies and continued through 1986 with the rotation of COHORT Battalions. Prior to the completion of the Battalion Rotation Test, the Chief of Staff of the Army made the decision to go to a unit manning system for the entire Army. The issue of the impact of that decision on readiness was examined based on data gathered by the testing agencies. The evidence does not support a decrease in readiness as a result of the unit manning system. COHORT provides an obvious advantage in psychological readiness for combat, the desired goal, and may provide advantages in collective training, but the available data is not adequate to support or refute that point.
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INTRODUCTION

On the 2nd of October 1986 the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, General John A. Wickham Jr., approved the continuation and expansion of a Unit Manning System (UMS) which is based on the successful COHORT [Cohesion, Operational Readiness and Training] system. This decision to proceed with a package replacement system as a means of manning the force is the culmination of efforts dating back to the Army Cohesiveness and Stability [ARCOST] Study of May 1980 and before. The decision to proceed with a Unit Manning System was made prior to the completion of the COHORT Battalion Rotation Test and despite questions concerning the cost of readiness of COHORT.

The purpose of this study is to review the basic underlying tenets of the COHORT program and how they relate to the factors of combat readiness and to what extent readiness is affected by the COHORT program. Every effort will be made to provide objective data to support arguments, points or issues. It must be noted however, that the author commanded one of the rotating COHORT Battalions and will use personal experiences where pertinent. The personal experience and bias of the author is acknowledged to alert the reader to consider those factors in the event that unintentional bias slips into this report.

EVOLUTION OF COHORT

The Army's most recent efforts to develop and sustain unit cohesiveness and stability date back to the late 1970's. The Army had weathered a series of major traumas during the post Viet Nam conversion to a peace time force. The drug culture, the ra-
cial discord, the leadership and integrity issues and the all-volunteer force all had their impact on the organization and leaders. It is remarkable, considering the pressing issues of the times, that the leadership of the Army had the vision to also look to the future and to consider the impact of technology on the modern battlefield. That vision was eventually translated into the Regimental system and the COHORT [Cohesion Operational Readiness and Training] program.

The impact of technology on the modern battlefield in this regard is by no means a new concept. Colonel Ardant du Picq wrote of this factor in the mid 19th century. 1

"With improvements in weapons, the power of destruction increases, the moral effect of such weapons increases, and courage to face them becomes rarer. Man does not, cannot change. What should increase with the power of material is the strength of organization, the unity of the fighting machine. Yet these are the most neglected."

He goes on to say

"Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare to attack a lion. Four less brave, but knowing each other well, sure of their reliability and consequently of mutual aid, will attack resolutely. There is the science of the organization of armies in a nutshell."

The increased destructiveness and violence of the modern battlefield as a result of technological advancements has a dramatic impact on psychological factors effecting a soldier's will to fight. This is exacerbated by the isolation of individuals and small groups which is also characteristic of the modern battlefield. Studies of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War gave new impetus to the factor of small unit cohesiveness as a combat multiplier.
The high level of casualties suffered by both the Israeli Defense Force and the Arab Forces as a result of "battle shock" during the three weeks of combat in the Yom-Kippur War led to intensive postwar analysis. The single most important factor in combatting the psychological impact and effects of combat was determined to be the cohesiveness of the small units involved.  

"The decisive role of social ties and comradeship in the Six Day War has been sufficiently established by conversations with returning soldiers. On numerous occasions soldiers were asked what sustained them in moments of dire peril, and what had driven them on. Only an insignificant minority gave hatred for the Arab as a motivating factor. Most of the interviewed stressed the need to fulfill their obligation toward their fellow soldiers—"the affiliative motive" as it has been called. In interviews with wounded soldiers in hospitals heard on the Israeli radio, the word haherrah [my buddies] is mentioned with monotonous frequency."  

Cohesiveness was also determined to be critical to the process of returning "battle shock" casualties to a state of effectiveness.  

A number of studies in the late 1970's and early 1980 beginning with the ARCost study alluded to earlier and including the Unit Replacement System Analysis by the U.S. Army Concept Analysis Agency, and the Army System Review by the Inspector General, generated or supported the basic tenets of what would become project COHORT. These tenets were that small unit cohesiveness would increase the soldiers will to fight, would reduce the psychological trauma of the battlefield and would improve training. This cohesiveness is a function of stabilization and would be accomplished by stabilization of leaders, by common
training and group dynamics and by vertical and horizontal bonding. The critical tenet of COHORT was determined to be stabilization.

Based on the conclusions of these studies, the Chief of Staff, General Edward C. Meyer, approved the initiation of project COHORT in April 1981 and the expansion to 80 COHORT companies in July 1982 and to 110 COHORT companies in June 1983. The company level COHORT model was designed to stabilize both deploying and non-deploying company size units for a three year period or life cycle. The success of this program at company level influenced a new Chief of Staff, General John A. Wickham, to expand the concept to Battalion level and to use it as the basis for the new Light Division. This resulted in the formation of four COHORT Battalions as the core for the reorganization of the 7th Infantry Division and four rotating COHORT Battalions. [CSA White Paper on Light Infantry Division, April 1984, CSA decision on Battalion Rotation June 1984] Most recently, the success of the Battalion level test has resulted in the decision to continue to institutionalize and expand the Unit Manning System Armywide [2 October 1986].

COHORT AND READINESS

The progression of the COHORT program through the different levels of the organization, the myriad of Army level decision points, three different Army Chiefs of Staff and scrutiny by numerous government agencies is credible support for the concept that the COHORT program is meeting or exceeding the desired objectives. If the basic tenets of COHORT are being met and the
end result is more cohesive units, then what is the problem? The answer to that question is another question—What is the cost? The Unit Manning System office of DCSPER cites negative aspects of the COHORT program to include costs in terms of readiness, manpower and dollars. Let us examine the "cost" of readiness of the COHORT program in more detail.

The term "readiness" means many things to different people. Most Army leaders would agree with the definition of unit readiness from AR 220-1 "The ability of a unit to perform as designed." Most would also quickly refer to AR 220-1 as the regulation governing the standards of readiness when in fact that is not the true purpose of the regulation. The issue of whether or not the Unit Status Report provides an accurate snapshot of a unit's combat readiness or ability to perform as designed may not gain quick or unanimous consensus. It is not my purpose here to debate readiness reporting however, but to simply use the readiness indicators from the Unit Status Report as a start point.

The commander is required by AR 220-1 to report the status of his unit in terms of personnel readiness, material readiness and training readiness. Personnel readiness is divided into a series of discrete functions that are quantifiable and perhaps even reliable indicators of personnel readiness. Material readiness is reported in terms of availability of required equipment to perform the mission. Training readiness is reported as the commander's subjective analysis of the number of days he perceives his unit would be required to train in order to perform its assigned combat mission. The indicators of personnel readi-
ness include the critical tenet of the COHORT program—personnel stability expressed in terms of turnover. The other factors considered are available strength, senior grade fill and available personnel trained in their military specialty.

How does the "typical" COHORT unit compare with other units in terms of readiness indicators and Unit Status Reporting? During the start-up period of a COHORT unit its readiness posture does not compare favorably with other like type-units. That start-up period varies as a function of many things but a single historical example indicates that 45-60 days is sufficient for a company size unit and 3-6 months is appropriate at Battalion level. During that period of time, the COHORT unit will typically exceed the conventional unit in all personnel indicators. Material readiness may not suffer during this period of time in quantifiable terms but the lack of trained operators and mechanics is a real problem. Training readiness will obviously be at the individual training level and therefore below other units until collective level training is achieved. In the case of the Field Artillery COHORT Battalion the start-up period is compared to the model in the following figure:
<table>
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<th>TIME</th>
<th>MODEL</th>
<th>ACTUAL</th>
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<tr>
<td>-90</td>
<td>LOAD CADRE</td>
<td>COHORT BTRY ROTATES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TRAIN CADRE</td>
<td>REDISTRIBUTE CADRE SHORT-AGES**</td>
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<tr>
<td>0--OCT 84</td>
<td>LOAD ALL 1st TERM SOLDIERS</td>
<td>LOAD 13B10 SOLDIERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+90--DEC 84</td>
<td>LOAD 13F10,13C10</td>
<td>BTRY LEVEL ARTEPS</td>
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<tr>
<td>-----JAN 85</td>
<td>BATTALION FTX</td>
<td>BATTALION ARTEP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+100--MAR 85</td>
<td>NTC ROTATION</td>
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**CADRE FILL NOT COMPLETED UNTIL JANUARY 1985**
The Battalion more than demonstrated its combat capability at the National Training Center in what some have described as the closest thing to a combat environment during peace.

It should be evident from this single example that it is entirely feasible, under less than perfect conditions, to form and train a unit to perform its combat mission in a six month period of time.

That initial period of training or start-up period is indeed a "cost" not evident in a traditional unit. The obvious trade-off is the thirty months of stability of the COHORT unit that is paid for by that cost. During combat, the unit level training would probably take place in-theater and would replace much of the indoctrination and time spent in Replacement Detachments and unit schools. The end result is a cohesive team to be integrated with combat tested cadre rather than frightened individual replacements.

During the final 30 months of a COHORT unit's life cycle it will typically exceed the conventional unit in all reportable areas. The reasons for this are inherent in the "rules" for manning the COHORT unit. Units are filled at or above conventional unit levels for all skill levels. This results in a more favorable strength profile and senior grade profile. Stabilization rules preclude the turbulence and turnover rates of conventional units. Stabilization of equipment operators fosters an attitude of "ownership" which is reflected in higher operational readiness rates. The stabilization of crews and leaders promotes a high level of unit training and teamwork.
EVALUATION OF READINESS

The COHORT program, from its inception until today, has been characterized by a continuing evaluation. This evaluation has been under the staff supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, and has included evaluations by Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, U.S. Army TRADOC, Combined Arms Test Activity and Headquarters, Department of Army Battalion Rotation Team. We will consider the evaluations by the first two agencies only. There is some question to the extent and validity of the third evaluation and issues on rotation may be better addressed by one who was there.

PSYCHOLOGICAL READINESS

Walter Reed Army Institute of Research evaluated the real crux of the COHORT program; the human dimensions that affect psychological readiness for combat. Leadership factors, family support factors and community support factors that impact on psychological readiness for combat were all evaluated. Their evaluation was conducted by the use of both interviews and surveys. WRAIR findings are detailed in five technical reports on the New Manning System Field Evaluation. A summary of those issues pertaining to psychological readiness follows:

"UMS/COHORT FACILITATES DEVELOPMENT OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL READINESS FOR COMBAT
- COHORT units score consistently higher than nonCOHORT units on most dimensions of psychological readiness for combat
- COHORT units are robust; they resist potentially corrosive effects of rotation, leader turbulence, changes in equipment, changes in fighting doctrine, and organizational reconfiguration
- COHORT units enhance the potential for family-unit bonding
USAREUR and CONUS unit leaders agree that COHORT units consistently perform collective tasks and sustain themselves under stress better than conventional units. Leaders view COHORT units as consistently better at movement, maneuver, occupation of position, and communication at small unit levels (platoon, company) than conventional counterparts.

The psychological readiness of personnel is not the easiest subject for most military leaders to come to grips with because of the inability to quantify and to evaluate it against a standard. It is however, the driving force behind the COHORT initiative and should not be relegated to a place behind those things we feel more comfortable with.

TRAINING READINESS

The TRADOC Combined Arms Test Activity [TCATA], by the use of contracted, on-site data collectors have also collected and analyzed data on all COHORT units and selected nonCOHORT units since the inception of the program. Over the past six years a tremendous amount of data has been collected and analyzed. The evaluation has suffered however from a lack of a clearly defined means of evaluating training. It is my observation that the quarterly reports and the data collectors in the field are both vague on the reasons for the selection of the data points used. The approach seems to be one of collection of any and all hard data, then applying computer and statistical analysis to see what falls out. The results have been dramatically inconclusive and in some cases very misleading for a number of reasons:

1. Training at the collective level is not quantifiable. Most collective training is not scored against a
numerical standard. All units "pass" the ARTEP. Units are not compared against each other at the NTC. A battalion is measured against a standard but not in terms that may be compared or contrasted to another unit.

2. Individual training statistics i.e. 45QT, APFT do not necessarily correlate with collective training levels. In fact, basic training units may do very well at many of the individual tasks but will never attain collective level training.

3. Impact of the unit training calendar is not accounted for in the evaluation of discrete events. The evaluation then suffers from the same errors that the young COHORT leaders are accused of; a fixation with events at the expense of life-cycle training. It may be appropriate to expand on this point by again citing an example from one of the rotating battalions. The rotating Field Artillery battalion demonstrated its ability to perform all Mission Essential Tasks in August and September 1985 by undergoing a Battalion level Nuclear ARTEP and its certifying Nuclear Technical Validation Inspection administered by FORSCOM. The battalion then concentrated on REFORGER specific tasks until deployment in January-February 1986 on REFORGER. The recovery period following REFORGER was devoted to pre-rotation maintenance and inventories and preparation for a Division Annual General Inspection in March. That was followed by immediate wheels-up of the advanced party, the rotation, more inventories and a major reorganization of the Battalion from three firing batteries of six howitzers each to three batteries of eight howitzers each. This modernization effort required changes in organization, doc-
trine and training and increased the size of the battalion by more than 30%. The battalion then deployed to the Grafenwoehr training area. At that point in time the Battalion could perform many collective tasks as well as, or better than, any unit in the Army. For example, rail-loading, inventories, maintenance, tactical movement and logistic operations were among the tasks the battalion excelled at. There were other collective tasks that had not been practiced in over a year and not at all by some elements of the Battalion, i.e. artillery live-fire. Evaluation at that point in time would have led to some very faulty conclusions. Each rotating battalion had a different experience but a similar theme and yet examples of performance of collective level tasks by these units are being used to support or refute arguments about the relative merits of COHORT and its effect on training.

4. The evaluation considered all eight rotating battalions as COHORT battalions. Only the four CONUS battalions were in fact filled with COHORT packages and stabilized for a three year life cycle. The European battalions were stabilized for as little as six months prior to the rotation. Data collected from those battalions cannot be considered as representative of a COHORT unit.

5. The nonCOHORT battalions used as a control on one installation were changed midway through the evaluation. One of the two nonCOHORT battalions was a GS [General Support] battalion with the Army's first COHORT MLRS battery. The other battalion was a like type DS [Direct Support] battalion with three
COHORT firing batteries. Neither of these two units would qualify as a nonCOHORT battalion. Therefore, the conclusions drawn about COHORT versus nonCOHORT units must be used with caution if at all.

With all of the inherent problems in the evaluation of training of COHORT units are there conclusions that may be made about training readiness? A review of the quarterly reports may provide an answer by extracting only the subjective comments by leaders at all levels involved in the test. That is, after all, the way the Army reports training readiness on the USR. The following comment extracted from the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research lessons learned typifies leaders opinions: "USAREUR and CONUS unit leaders agree that COHORT units consistently perform collective tasks and sustain themselves under stress better than conventional units."

The training benefit derived from COHORT is purely a side-effect. Most COHORT units were not afforded the opportunity for specialized training of cadre. The building block method of training required in a COHORT unit and the many other lessons learned were alien to many trainers who grew up under the Individual Replacement System. It appears that many of the observable benefits in training of COHORT units were in spite of the techniques used, not as a result.

**READINESS CONCERNS OF LEADERS**

No discussion of readiness would be complete without consideration of the comments and concerns of the senior leadership in the field. A major concern of Division level or
installation level commanders was the impact of start-up of the COHORT units on the nonCOHORT units and the related issue of the nonCOHORT units as "bill-payers" for CAP III [now Enlisted Distribution and Assignment System EDAS] levies, etc. That issue has been analyzed by the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency. A computer model simulation of Armor, Infantry and Field Artillery Battalions and the high density MOS in each was analyzed with the following findings:

"[1] The policies of the Cohort Battalion Movement Plan do permit the maintenance of unit strength profiles in rotating battalions at or above the specified minimum readiness criteria while in the CONUS cycle; however, there are short periods during the OCONUS phase where some strength profiles are below the 90 percent floor.

[2] Extraregimental assignment [ERA] pools are almost always maintained at or above the desired 70 percent strength levels."

The results of the Unit Replacement System Analysis studies indicate that at steady-state there are sufficient soldiers in the MOS's analyzed to meet strength levels required in all battalions and simultaneously fill all other requirements to at least seventy percent. On the surface it would appear that the "bill-payers" would then be all non-TO&E assignments. The problem with this logic is that the non-TO&E assignments, in many cases, have a higher priority for fill i.e. recruiters, drill sergeants, etc. than do TO&E battalions. One fact is certain, however, and that is the limited example of the COHORT Battalion test cannot be used to predict what the entire Army would look like at steady-state. This is a major issue that must be resolved prior to a decision on the method to man the force.
CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this paper was to look at the impact of COHORT on readiness of the force. In those areas that support objective comparison the results strongly favor COHORT or a unit manning system as the means of manning the force. The benefits in terms of combat readiness and psychological readiness for combat certainly would be worth the start-up cost. The start-up cost of a COHORT battalion is also avoidable by reverting to company level COHORT units or a modification of the model similar to that at Appendix A. The "real" cost of COHORT may be the cost of the effort required by the Army Personnel system to make it work. That is supported by a recent article in the Washington Post that stated that the Army Chief, General Carl E. Vuono, is stepping back from the COHORT experiment because managing it proved difficult, especially in Europe..." If we are forfeiting the very real benefits of COHORT and the yet unrealized potential of the system because of management problems then we are doomed to repeat an error recognized as far back as the turn of the century when du Picq stated "There is no army at all without organization, and all organization is defective which neglects any means to strengthen the unity of combatants." Our own history supports the COHORT concept as noted historian Roland G.Ruppenthal points out

"General Joseph W. Stilwell, Commanding General of the Army Ground Forces, proposed that the War Department ship infantry replacements in squad or platoon-size units rather than as individuals, and that it earmark such units for specific divisions before their departure from training centers in the United States. One obvious advantage to such
a scheme was that it facilitated control, discipline, and training during movement through the Replacement System. More important, groups of men who had learned to know each other and had trained as a team could be assigned intact to units."

This comment was made in March 1944. World War II ended in Europe before this plan could be implemented.

The Army Personnel Managers have attempted to manage unit manning under individual replacement rules by making exceptions and going "off-line" as needed. In a COHORT battalion, every personnel action became an exception to be managed "off-line". If unit manning is to be successful for the entire force then the systems, programs and associated software required to manage personnel must all be revised to consider units. We must stop dealing with people like spare parts. The inertia of the individual replacement system and its supporting bureaucracy must be overcome if the Army is to be successful in creating a cohesive force.

The leadership of the Army is currently involved in the decision-making process on how we will man the force. The key to this decision will be to ensure that the system is supportable by the many "personnel systems" during both peacetime and full mobilization. We appear to be leaning toward a package replacement system based on recommendations from the field. The proposed package replacement system calls for all required individual replacements to be consolidated and arrive in a unit every fourth month. These replacements are to be provided in a minimum of 4-6 man packages from the training base. This proposal also eliminates the 3-4 year stabilization period now required under
COHORT and reduces it to a period of one year for deploying units only. It is relatively easy to predict that at steady-state a unit sustained by package replacements would fall between the conventional unit and the true COHORT unit in terms of the critical tenet of COHORT, stability. The proposed package replacement system will isolate turnover to every fourth month. The reduction of the stabilization period for soldiers from 48 months to one year will dramatically increase the turbulence in the unit. The answer then, in terms of Unit Status Reporting, is that a package replacement system is better than individual replacements but below the norm for COHORT units. In terms of cohesion, package replacement may not provide a marked advantage over individual replacement.

Based on our experiences to date with COHORT manning and the intensive management required to make it work we tend to retreat toward the safer ground of the system that we are all familiar with. We overlook the fact that at the peak of the COHORT program only a small minority of units and soldiers in the Army were involved. The personnel system had to treat COHORT as an exception because compared to the rest of the Army that is what it was. We must not lose sight of the fact that there were strong reservations about how we manned the force during and after the past three wars. If General Stillwell was convinced that it was a good idea to implement unit manning during WW II and deemed it feasible to support a 90 Division Army during combat, then should we reject it based on the limited test of the system to date? My response to that is a strong plea to continue
with a unit manning system. A proposed model that would take advantage of the strengths of the company level test, would maximize readiness but would avoid the downtime experienced with rotation is included at Appendix A.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The advantages gained in cohesion and the potential for improvements in training that are as yet unrealized are reason enough to go to a unit manning system for all combat battalions in the Army. The readiness concern about start-up time could be minimized by using a company-level model with staggered start times similar to that discussed at Appendix A. I would propose that the model be used in both FORSCOM and USAREUR, but not in EUSA. The disadvantage to this proposal is that all combat battalions in Europe would always have one "new" company. The advantage, in addition to cohesiveness, is that the battalions would be training on a known, predictable cycle. It is conceivable that losses during combat would require a similar regeneration and, in fact, this system provides a much better way to integrate replacements into a tested battalion. My experience with COHORT soldiers convinces me that a battalion with even a brand new COHORT company and two experienced companies would outperform a traditional battalion. Many leaders with combat experience in Viet Nam will recall that many units during that time had few if any career soldiers in line companies other than the commander and one or two noncommissioned officers. We were not hesitant to fight with those units with their lack of experience and lack of leaders. Why are we reluctant to adopt a
system that has the potential to fix those problems that the individual replacement system contributed to during the past three wars?

The proposed system I recommend would require an exception to be made for Korea. At this time the commander there supports the company level rotation and that in turn requires that selected FORSCOM units be included to support the rotation. I recommend that those units with contingency missions to reinforce that Theater be designated to support that rotation.

The package replacement system is little better than the individual replacement system in many regards and without more specific rules would quickly become a modified individual replacement system. It does have the potential of a unit manning system if aggressively pursued and managed at the battalion level. That is an additional requirement for an overworked staff. Therefore I recommend that this option be pursued only if the automated personnel management systems cannot be redesigned to accommodate the proposal recommended above.

END NOTES


4. Ibid.
5. Charles L. Frame, Richard V. Oehrlein and George Captain; Unit Replacement System Analysis: Infantry/Field Artillery/Armor.


7. Ardant du Picq, p. 137.


APPENDIX A

The models described in this appendix have been extracted from briefing slides or materiel prepared by the Unit Manning System office of Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Department of the Army. The basic COHORT model is represented by figure 1. The deploying unit model is shown on Fig. 2 with proposed changes as described at Figure 3. The initial Battalions to rotate did so after approximately 18 months in CONUS. The original plan would have then refilled the Battalions at the 18 month mark after rotation and rotated again 18 months later.

The package replacement model is represented by Fig. 4 and 5. The model allows for the Commander to decide whether to use the packages as individual replacements or as group fillers. This allegedly provides for decentralized management of personnel. It also makes it much easier for those leaders not familiar with the benefits of unit manning to continue business as usual with individual manning.

The model I would propose as the best of all worlds is represented by Figure 6. This is a company/battery/troop level sustainment model with staggered start-up and sustainment and would be nondeploying. That would mean that at any time, every combat battalion in Europe and FORSCOM would have one new company size unit. That is not a drastic departure from what may be required as a recurring requirement in combat. Each time a unit ends its life cycle there would be remnants of both cadre and first term soldiers that would choose to remain to form the cadre of the new unit. The decrement of strength shown on this Figure represents an Army wide average of unprogrammed losses. I do not believe that this is representative of actual COHORT units but I do believe that even with attrition rates of this magnitude a unit could perform its mission without replacements.
COHORT - THE MODEL

- Soldiers recruited for unit
- Trained as a cohesive group in the same OSUT company/battalion
- Leaders and soldiers remain together for set period of time
- All personnel depart unit at same time
- Unit replaced by a new cohort unit

3 Years

NEW UNIT
THE COHORT UNIT MODEL
(3 YEAR LIFE CYCLE)
UNIT MANNING SYSTEM
REPLACEMENT MODELS

• DEPLOYING UNITS (SHORT AND LONG TOURS)
  — 24/12 KOREA: TRADITIONAL COHORT
    3-YR LIFE CYCLE MODEL
  — 12/24 EUROPE: UNIT FORMS IN FORSCOM
    AND DEPLOYS OCONUS
    AFTER 12 MONTHS.
    NO DISESTABLISHMENT.
    CONVERTS TO PACKAGE
    REPLACEMENT AFTER
    DEPLOYMENT.

• ROTATING COHORT BATTALIONS
  — 36 MONTHS CONUS/36 MONTHS OCONUS

• NON-ROTATING/NON-DEPLOYING COHESIVE UNITS
  — INFANTRY DIVISIONS (LIGHT)
  — PACKAGE REPLACEMENT FOR OTHER CONUS DIVISIONS
    (TO INCLUDE CS/CSS UNITS)
- Maintains C-1 Personnel Status
- No Unit Disestablishment
- Supports Sustainment Training
- Good Cohesion
- Provides Army Common Peace/Wartime System
STAGGERED START-UP

* BASED ON PERCENTAGE OF PROJECTED DISTRIBUTION OF INVENTORY - NOT NECESSARILY OF AUTHORIZATION

10 DEC 1987
BIBLIOGRAPHY


21. U.S. Department of the Army, TRADOC Combined Arms Test

