THE IMPACT OF THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION. (U) ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA M I OSKAM 31 JAN 88
THE IMPACT OF THE GOLDFWATER-NICHOLS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1986 ON THE WOMAN LINE NAVAL OFFICER

BY

COMMANDER MARGARETHA I. OSKAM, USN

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

31 JANUARY 1988

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA  17013-5050
This paper reviews the history of women in the Navy through experience and law. It looks at the events and trends that lead to passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the provisions concerning joint officer management contained therein. Also included is a review of the implementing guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations. The final chapter summarizes progress to date in implementing the law and the competition for

billets resulting. The conclusion must be that women need fear no negative impact from the law. Rather the concern should be whether the conservatism of the Navy's leadership which has needed specific guidance from Congress in the past to more fully integrate women into the personnel structure will result in inequitable implementation of the law. It is important that both external and internal pressure continue to be applied to ensure that the essential "woman" power is retained and utilized.
THE IMPACT OF THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1986 ON THE WOMAN LINE NAVAL OFFICER

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Commander Margaretha I. Oskam, USN
Commander Samuel W. Taylor, USN
Project Advisor

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
31 January 1988
This paper reviews the history of women in the Navy through experience and law. It looks at the events and trends that lead to passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the provisions concerning joint officer management contained therein. Also included is a review of the implementing guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations. The final chapter summarizes progress to date in implementing the law and the competition for billets resulting. The conclusion must be that women need fear no negative impact from the law. Rather the concern should be whether the conservatism of the Navy's leadership which has needed specific guidance from Congress in the past to more fully integrate women into the personnel structure will result in inequitable implementation of the law. It is important that both external and internal pressure continue to be applied to ensure that the essential "womanpower is retained and utilized."
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To properly address the issue of women in the Navy today requires a look back to the legislation and events of the past. The presence of female sailors and officers in a peacetime military does not raise any eyebrows in 1988, but getting to that point was not without its challenges, both lost and overcome. For many years in this nation's history, women could level the firearm at any property threatening wild animal, both four-legged and two-legged, but service in a formal defense organization, when such organization was necessary, was a man's job. Only in times of great need were women actively recruited, and even then it was to release the men for the "real" tasks of fighting and winning. No more. Women now serve in virtually every phase of military endeavor. Their participation is the result of an ongoing evolutionary, sometimes revolutionary, process which has shown varying degrees of momentum.

This paper briefly reviews that process, citing both experiental and legal milestones. The focus is on the most recent legislative initiative, Public Law 99-433, better known as the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Effective on 1 October 1986, through it Congress mandated a "new and improved" Defense Department. Provisions include stronger civilian oversight; new authority and responsibilities for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the unified and specified commanders; realignment of functions to ensure better utilization of resources; and specific personnel management parameters for officers trained for and/or serving in joint billets. The stated goal is "to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and
improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense.

That section of the law affecting women in the Navy is Title IV—
Joint Officer Management. It addresses the selection, training, assign-
ment, and promotion of joint specialty officers. According to Congress,
service implementation of the rules set forth will result in senior
officers who have had the education and experience essential to ensure
quality planning and execution of joint military operations. Women
line naval officers currently serve in a wide variety of positions in
which they have opportunities to contribute to joint operations. The
question under consideration is the impact of the Reorganization Act
on these women. Will they be groomed through education and experience
for nomination as joint specialty officers so that they can continue
to make those contributions? Or, will they be pushed out of the way to
allow the male warfare officers to "punch the tickets" they need to be
"qualified" for selection to flag rank? What is today's degree of
momentum?

ENDNOTES

1. U. S. Congress, The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reor-
CHAPTER 1

The history of women in the United States military is popularly considered to date from World War I. The Navy and Marine Corps alone had 13,000 women in their employ. However, women served with distinction in military conflicts throughout the history of mankind. Most were camp followers who cooked, cleaned, sewed, and bandaged wounds while providing other services as well. But there are three ladies who deserve special mention for their singular participation in American wars.

Deborah Sampson of Massachusetts wanted to be a part of the American Revolution. Disguising herself as a man and adopting the name of Robert Shurtleff, she served three years in the Army from 1778 to 1781. During that time she was wounded twice and received an honorable discharge without her identity being discovered. A fellow Bay Stater, Lucy Brewer, called herself George Baker and served as a Marine on the USS Constitution for three years during the War of 1812.

In the Civil War, the South had an equally committed chameleon in its Army. With the knowledge of her husband, Loreta Velasquez called herself LT Harry T. Buford and assumed command of an infantry unit. After fighting in the first Battle of Bull Run in July 1861, she conducted an independent intelligence foray into Washington, D. C. but, unfortunately, was unable to learn anything not already known by southern commanders. On duty at Fort Donelson when Grant launched an attack, she was able to escape undetected. Shortly thereafter she was injured, went to New Orleans to recover, but was unmasked. Undaunted, she reenlisted as an infantryman and rejoined the war. Having grown accustomed to the officer's life, she did not like being an enlisted man and applied
to the state of Tennessee for a commission. When this was granted, she resumed her leadership role. Wounded a second time, she was again discovered to be a woman. This ended her military career.

Contemporary history for women in the Navy is led by the nursing profession. During the Civil War, four nuns served aboard a hospital ship; at the end of the nineteenth century, contract nurses served with the Navy during the Spanish-American War. Throughout the following decade, attempts were made to legislate the establishment of a Navy Nurse Corps. The first efforts (1902-1904) failed, but in 1908, enabling legislation was passed. All too soon the wisdom of that decision was borne out through the service of Navy nurses during World War I.

And, as mentioned earlier, other women served with distinction as translators, draftsmen, fingerprint experts, camouflage designers, and recruiters. In 1917, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels used some creative legal interpretations to enlist over 11,000 women as yeomen to free up men filling clerical billets. The women were immediately discharged upon the war’s end, but their performance and that of their colleagues were the foundation for reenlistments in World War II and the ultimate fuller integration of women into the naval personnel structure.

The milestone legislation was the Women’s Armed Forces Integration Act of 1948. This law effectively overrode the term WAVES (Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service) though it was popularly used for another thirty years, and set the numerical parameters of officers and enlisted personnel. It was not a total capitulation on the part of Congress, however, as the Act did not allow for command billets for women unless they involved supervision over other women or for permanent rank above
commander. At the same time another law was enacted which specifically prohibited service by naval women in combat aircraft or vessels. Even so, this was a vast improvement over H.R. 3897 of July 1942 which, in establishing the women's component of the Naval Reserve, called for one Lieutenant Commander and 35 lieutenants, with no limits on O-2s and O-1s as long as lieutenants (junior grade) did not exceed one-third of the total number of officers. The reality was that women had served in 38 different ratings during World War II, and by the end of the fighting encompassed thirteen percent of the naval shore establishment. Therefore, despite the fact that most were discharged back to civilian life and more "traditional" roles, the impetus for a permanent female presence in the Navy was irrevocably underway.

In 1967, Public Law 90-130 eliminated the numerical limits of the 1948 law, established reasonable promotion opportunities through the rank of Captain and authorized appointment of women to flag rank. Most of these provisions appeared little more than paperwork until 1972 when two factors proved significant—the implementation of the All-Volunteer Force and the initiatives of Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., Chief of Naval Operations.

The draft might have gone away; the threat had not. The end strength requirements were still there, but no one could be certain that men, without the hammer of the draft, would still enlist in sufficient numbers. Plus, even though the Navy was a seagoing outfit, not all jobs were at sea and certainly many could be filled by women without destroying a viable sea/shore rotation system for the men. In addition, the Equal Rights Amendment was being considered for ratification by the states and
Admiral Zumwalt felt its passage was imminent. This feeling, plus the strong support of Captain Robin Quigley, then the Navy's "senior woman," lead to the issuance of Z-116, "Equal Rights and Opportunities for Women in the Navy." This message called for a series of immediate actions as well as preparations for future opportunities. The stated goal was to "more equitably include women in our one-Navy concept." The provisions included new career opportunities for women in both restricted line and staff corps communities, opened the Chaplain and Civil Engineer Corps to women, broadened command ashore possibilities, eliminated the only-women-assign-women rule, directed detail of women to a wider spectrum of positions, allowed for the enrollment of women in NROTC programs, and indicated women could be considered for assignment as students to the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Admiral Zumwalt, seeing sea duty for women as an ultimate objective, also directed the immediate assignment of officer and enlisted women to the ship's company of the hospital ship USS Sanctuary.

Even though the CNO's anticipation of passage of the Equal Rights Amendment was wrong, the forward momentum was not to be stopped. During the next ten years, more and more breakthroughs occurred for women officers in the Navy as they were progressively integrated into the total service recruitment, training, assignment, and promotion systems. Today women receive commissions from NROTC programs, officer candidate schools, and the Naval Academy. They are both instructors and students in aviation and surface warfare commands. A woman wears the stars of an admiral and over five thousand women serve on ships located at all points of the globe. Like men, women can seek warrant and limited duty
officer commissions.

On the surface, this sounds as if women naval officers have fought the good fight and it is won. This is not the case. Women today still encounter obstacles which prevent them from achieving their full potential as members of the uniformed defense establishment. One particular stumbling block is the existing propensity of the Navy's senior leadership to interpret the law very conservatively. Unlike Josephus Daniels who used the absence of the restricting word "male" in the law to override his staff's objections to enlisting women during World War I, recent Secretaries of the Navy and Chiefs of Naval Operations have resisted pressures from women and the Congress to further expand opportunities for women. The centerpiece of the debate is Title 10, USC 6015.

That law was initially passed at the same time as the Women's Armed Forces Integration Act of 1948. It stated that the Secretary of the Navy was responsible for the training and assignment of women in the Navy and Marine Corps. However, he was strictly prohibited from assigning women to "aircraft...engaged in combat missions" or "on vessels...other than hospital ships and transports." In the mid 1970s, several Navy women challenged the constitutionality of this restriction in a lawsuit. U. S. District Judge John J. Sirica found the statute to be too broadly worded and ruled in favor of the women. Unfortunately for the "victorious" women, this decision did not presage an unrestricted assignment policy for women. Instead, the wording of Section 6015 became the issue. It still is today.

Some progress has been made. Congress had asked the Department of Defense to submit a definition of the term "combat" along with recom-
recommendations on the utilization of women in the military and any legislative changes that might be needed to implement the recommendations.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense, C. W. Duncan, Jr., replied that "combat" meant a combat/hostile fire zone as designated by the Secretary of Defense or any other specific circumstance or event so designated by him. In view of the fact that this traditional usage was so broad, Duncan said that he felt combat did not provide "a useful basis for expanding the opportunities for women in the service." He pointed out that the Navy had already increased assignments for women to the maximum extent allowed by the law and urged some immediate relief to allow for meaningful summer cruises for female midshipmen.

At the same time, Secretary Duncan indicated that the appropriate long-term solution was total repeal of Section 6015. That would put responsibility for assignment of women at the service Secretaries level where he felt it belonged. The Secretary of the Navy, W. Graham Claytor, said he did not object to the repeal proposal but it was not what was needed at the moment. With the passage of the 1979 DoD Authorization Bill in October 1978, the amended language was enacted.

It continued the prohibition on assignment of women to aircraft or vessels engaged in combat missions but did approve permanent assignment to certain auxiliary and support ships and temporary duty on any ship not expected to be involved in a combat mission during the period of temporary duty. The Navy had sent the proposed amendment to Congress in 1977, but no action was taken until after Judge Sirica's ruling.

The Navy immediately initiated the Women in Ships Program and women were reporting for shipboard duty before the end of the year. The Su-
face Warfare and Special Operations communities were opened. Within one year fifteen ships had both officer and enlisted women assigned as permanent crew members.

Then a setback occurred. Admiral Thomas B. Hayward had become the Chief of Naval Operations after the Navy and Defense Department discussion with Congress concerning the eventual repeal of Section 6015. In December 1979 he wrote a memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy strongly objecting to such action. Obviously upset that his opinion had not been solicited, he wanted to go on record with his position clearly outlined. He stated five reasons why repeal of Section 6015 was neither desirable nor necessary: sufficient manpower existed for wartime combatant ship configurations; it would be misleading to women in the Navy to imply that the Navy might be willing to use them in combat; utilization of women in the military was a Congressional responsibility, not the service secretary's; men were better suited for combat than women; and finally, even if the section were repealed, he personally was against further expansion of roles for women in the Navy. 13

This effectively divided the men and women of the Navy into several camps. Some felt the Navy's official assignment policies for women already exceeded the limits of the existing law and opened the service up for public and Congressional censure if a woman were killed as a consequence of her assignment. These individuals pointed out that the issue of the role of women in the Navy was a societal one, not a military one, and should be resolved by Congress, not the Navy. A second group felt the existing law reflected contemporary society and, therefore, it was not appropriate to push for further legislative chang-
es at that time. Others said the Navy should have been more aggressive concerning total repeal of the law when Judge Sirica initially promulgated his ruling.  

In the meantime, no action concerning further amendment or repeal of Section 6015 was occurring. Rather an old debate was renewed--assignment of women to sea duty within the parameters of the law. The issue revolved around assignment of women to Mobile Logistics Support Force (MLSF) ships. In November 1983, Vice Admiral Lawrence, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel and Training, said "MLSF ships are regarded as combatants, since they are sometimes even more vulnerable in the battle group than men-of-war. They are under 6015, legally and operationally." He did not include any recommendation for amendment or repeal of Section 6015 in his testimony. Less than three months later Admiral Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations, told the House Armed Services Committee that the Navy would "support repeal of 10 Sec 6015 if this were the will of the American people and such legislation was initiated and passed by Congress." He also said that the law as presently written did permit expansion of assignment of women to Navy ships and that included MLSF ships. Significantly, he did not say if that would actually happen. It did not, and it has not. What has happened is a change of the name of MLSF ships to Combat Logistics Force Ships and continued denial of such assignments to women.

So the situation now, almost forty years after that milestone legislation of 1948, vibrates with tension. The presence of women in the Navy is not an issue, nor is their ability. The issue is what they are allowed to do. What started as sterling examples of devotion to the
ideals of independence, sovereignty, and democracy, as well as the courage to act in support of those ideals, has become frustration. The women are frustrated because they see so much more they can do. The Navy's leadership is frustrated because they see challenges to long-standing traditions. The Congress is frustrated because they see inefficiencies in military administration and operation. In their view, the reluctance to offer greater opportunities to women is indicative of the services' overall failure to properly address those structural and management problems. Their solution—the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

ENDNOTES


2. Following brief biographies taken from John Laffin's *Women in Battle* which tells the stories of women throughout history who have not watched but participated in wars both openly as women and disguised as men.

3. Arbogast, pp. 34-60.

4. Ibid., p. 43.


6. NAVOP (Z-116), CNO msg 071115Z Aug 72.

7. Ibid.

8. Title 10, United States Code, Section 6015, 1948.


10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. W. Graham Claytor, Jr., U. S. Secretary of the Navy, memorandum for the General Counsel, Department of Defense, 15 May 1978.


17. Ibid.
"The experience of World War II in which the deficiencies of prewar training were manifested in a high rate of relief from command of senior officers led to an interest in career management. The services would try to guide an officer into a series of assignments which would serve to 'round' him in the sense that he would experience command, staff, student, and instructor duties whenever possible. In addition, for those officers who were strictly specialist, career patterns would be prescribed which would ensure that their interest in a specialty did not isolate them from the very service they were to help."  

"...(P)romotions were based on how well officers had handled these Interservice/Intraservice assignments. Under this policy the ablest Army and Air Force officers sought joint duty to further their future careers. During Korea, able officers began avoiding joint duty as a threat to their careers. Their services would punish them by denying them choice assignments and promotions if, in the name of national good, they took an action contrary to parochial service interest."  

In April 1980, a joint service operation to rescue the hostages in Iran was undertaken. It failed. In October 1983, a joint service operation to rescue American medical students in Grenada was undertaken. It succeeded. Despite the opposite results there was a recurrent theme—real joint operations did not occur. There was some incidental interservice interaction, but the planning and the execution of either effort did not come from the same book. Congress had already been mulling over changes in the Defense Department, but the two rescue missions, as well as other indicators of problems in the American defense structure, pushed a number of people on the Hill to support and pass the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Congress intended this major revision to Title 10 of the United States Code to, inter alia, "enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve management and administration of the Department of Defense...."  

Title IV of the Act addresses Joint Officer Management, the focus
It was clearly the intent of Congress to improve joint military operations by ensuring that the services into a total reorientation regarding joint duty. And to ensure that the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps are particularly trained in joint duty, Congress directed the Joint Staff to establish a joint specialty officer program. These officers, who are particularly trained in joint duty, are not "specialists" in any narrow sense of the term, but rather in the broad sense of being able to work effectively in all services. This is achieved through a combination of education, experience, and training.

The program is designed to develop joint specialty officers who can work effectively in joint military operations. It is based on the premise that all officers should have the same basic military education and training, but that joint specialty officers need additional training in specific areas.

Joint specialty officers are trained in joint operations and are responsible for ensuring that joint operations are conducted effectively. They are also responsible for ensuring that joint operations are conducted in a manner consistent with joint military strategy.

In summary, joint specialty officers are an important component of the joint military force. They are trained to work effectively in joint military operations and are responsible for ensuring that joint operations are conducted effectively. They play a critical role in ensuring that joint military operations are conducted in a manner consistent with joint military strategy.
Corps comply with this legislated management of officer personnel, annual reports with detailed statistics are required by Congress for each fiscal year through 1991.

The outcries of anguish from the services upon passage of the law were immediate and loud. Vigorous work began on proposals to amend; less vigorous work began to implement. As a result, fourteen months into the law's life, Congress had lots of advice about changes but no "detailed" report on implementation. The Navy's portion of the first report, not yet forwarded to the Chief of Naval Operations for his review, contained mostly zeroes.

Congress was noticeably unhappy about the limited progress being made to implement the Reorganization Act. While members listened politely to the services' recommended changes, their amendments, signed into law by President Reagan on 4 December 1987, were more restrictive, rather than less so. Additionally, the reporting requirements were nearly doubled.

On the sidelines, women in the Navy were watching with interest. Aware the law did not specifically address them, there was concern that the turbulence of this policy change would result in new obstacles for future opportunities. The implementing guidance from the chain-of-command was carefully scrutinized.

ENDNOTES

3. F.S. Congress, The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorg-

4. Ibid.
CHAPTER 3

The Joint Chiefs of Staff published their guidance concerning implementation of Title IV of the Act just over a month after the law was enacted. The tone set was positive, indicating that Congress' intent was "to foster a meaningful joint assignment program." At the same time the services were encouraged to identify provisions in the law that might need revision. The guidance also made a first cut at the definition of a joint duty assignment (JDA) as it was clear that a blanket policy of saying any billet in a multi-service command would be a JDA would not be acceptable. That initial working definition is still being used:

JDA is an assignment to a designated position in a multi-service or multi-national command or activity that is involved in the integrated employment or support of the land, sea and air forces of at least two of the three military departments. Such involvement includes, but is not limited to, matters relating to national military strategy, joint doctrine and policy, strategic planning, contingency planning, and command and control of combat operations under a unified command.

Identification of these designated positions would be the responsibility of the unified commands and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with input from the services. The number of "critical" billets, those that had to be filled by joint specialty officers, was arbitrarily set at 1,000. Identification of those joint specialty officers was left to the services. On the subject of promotion of joint officers, the Joint Chiefs pointed out that the law was not saying promote officers in joint billets, but put officers in joint billets who are promotable. Recognizing that this was a significant change in assignment practices, statistical monitoring baselines started after enactment of the law, not before.

17
Education and training as well as average tour length requirements were of obvious concern to the Joint Chiefs as they urged careful analyses of both areas to determine whether the law's provisions could be met. Finally, the guidance concluded with some specific comments on how to propose changes to the Act.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense issued his policies and procedures on 22 July 1987. They included specific guidelines on selection of the initial cadre of joint specialty officers, identification of critical occupational specialties whose incumbents are only required to serve JNAAs of two years, minimum processing times for JNA nominations, designation of joint professional military education programs, career monitoring requirements, and specific reports to be submitted.

At the same time the Chief of Naval Operations was distributing guidance within the Navy Department, spelling out how the Act would be implemented. The Navy's share of joint billets identified to date was indicated as 1714, of which 190 were labelled "critical," meaning joint specialty officers were required. Assignment of officers to any JNA was to utilize minimum tour length criteria as stated in the law. Those individuals holding surface, subsurface, aviation, SEAL, and special operations designators qualified as critical occupational specialists and were only required to meet the two-year rule provided the follow-on assignment was to an operational, board-screened billet. The CNO also said that minimum tour length requirements did not apply to overseas assignments, nor to officers who left joint duty jobs because of retirement, separation, or cause. The ultimate goal (with no time frame set) was to have either designated or nominated joint specialty officers fill-
ling half of the Navy's JDAs. The quality cut was to be established by sending officers who would equal promotion statistics at either those serving in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations or Navy-wide, depending on the category. No deviation from Congressionally mandated joint professional military education was indicated and one office was specifically tasked to ensure that a joint specialty officer was assigned, with JCS approval, to every applicable selection board and that the concept to the board included a statement concerning joint duty. Selection of selection board results to the Secretary of the Navy via the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was also spelled out. Another office was assigned the responsibility of preparing twice yearly reports of progress on compliance with the law.

What has the Navy actually done so far to implement the law? The first board to identify those naval officers to be nominated to the Secretary of Defense as joint specialty officers (JSPOs) was created on 11 September 1987. In line with the transition criteria called for in the Act, five categories of individuals were considered: (1) those who had completed a resident joint professional military education in 1983 and served in a joint tour for 3½ years, (2) those who had served in a 3½ year tour prior to completing the requisite education program, (3) those who met the education requirements but had only a two year joint tour, (4) those who had completed a two year joint assignment and then gone on to a joint professional military education program, and (5) those who did not have any joint professional military education but who had completed a 3½ year assignment in a joint billet. Approximately 5,000 records were screened and 5,000 were selected; there was no quality dist-
The joint duty assignment billet list has not been officially approved but is being used by assignment officers. The list includes fifty-six flag officer billets, 372 0-6 billets, 732 0-5 billets, and 540 0-4 billets. Of the 190 "critical" billets, 105 are for Captains and 45 are for Commanders; none are for flag officers or Lieutenant Commanders. Using the standard of needing three people for every one "critical" billet to ensure that a qualified individual is always available to roll into the assignment, it is necessary to have 570 joint specialty officers to fill the 190 "critical" billets. That means even if every individual on the list from the September board were approved by the Secretary of Defense, the Navy has an immediate shortfall of joint specialty officers. It is also estimated that the Navy needs to produce about 190 new joint specialty officers each year to ensure a pool of sufficient officers to achieve the long range goal of filling half of the JDAs with JSPECs; that includes the "critical" billets.

In the area of joint professional military education, Navy officials are working with the other services to expand the number of programs that qualify. A significant difficulty is the implied criteria that the faculty of a joint professional military education program must include one-third sea service representation. In an environment where getting and retaining the requisite number of officers to man the ships
and aircraft of the Navy is a daily challenge, what appear to be extraneous out-of-service requirements are competing with mission essential in-service requirements. The Navy's failure to immediately embrace all the administrative and organizational changes needed to meet the letter and spirit of the 1980 Reorganization Act could be viewed as footdragging rather than a manifestation of those painful trade-offs by those who look for reasons to criticize.

Where does this leave the woman line naval officer? First, a look at the numbers of women concerned. As of 30 September 1987, there were just under 7,500 women officers in the Navy. Forty-one percent of these women are unrestricted line officers—2,257 in the general unrestricted line and 437 in the surface, aviation, and SEAL warfare communities. This latter group falls within the critical occupational specialties so their management under the joint specialty officer program follows the two-year rule for joint duty assignments. The general unrestricted line community is the only unrestricted line designator excluded from the critical occupational specialties policy and eighty percent of its membership is female.

General unrestricted line (GURL) officers are normally assigned to billets either requiring no warfare specialty or open to any warfare specialty. These billets are coded as 1000 and 1050 respectively. There are 757 1000/1050 JDAs available on the current unofficial list, nearly half of the total Navy allocation. Thirty-nine are for flag officers of which the GURL community has one. As a result of the September board, there are fifty-five general unrestricted line officers tentatively selected as joint specialty officers. Using the eighty percent
membership rule, at least forty-four are women. A cursory review would appear to indicate a wide variety of billets available to the woman line naval officer. However, as is the usual policy for allocation of 1000/1050 billets, the 1000/1050 JDAs have been distributed among the surface, submarine, aviation, and general unrestricted line assignment officers.

**PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF 1000/1050 JDAs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0-6</th>
<th>0-5</th>
<th>0-4</th>
<th>0-3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>surface</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>submarine</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aviation</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GURL</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>78.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NUMERICAL DISTRIBUTION OF 1000/1050 JDAs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0-6</th>
<th>0-5</th>
<th>0-4</th>
<th>0-3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>surface</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>submarine</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aviation</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GURL</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again, a quick look says the general unrestricted line officers have a disproportionate share for paygrades 0-3 through 0-6 with twenty-three percent of the billets even though they are less than ten percent of the officer corps. Adding in those billets reserved for the specific warfare communities, however, changes that perception as the surface officers have 138 other billets, the submariners 52, and the aviators 22.
209. This reduces the share for the general unrestricted line community to fifteen percent. The joint specialty officer program is statistically neither a positive nor a negative for the woman line naval officer.

ENDNOTES

1. Vice Admiral P. F. Carter, Jr., Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), 3 November 1986.


CONCLUSION

The real issue for women in the Navy is not Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: it is whether the historically varying momentum toward integration of women into the total personnel structure is slowing down, or even stopping.

Two points can be made without qualification—women have always accepted the responsibilities of citizenship and wanted to contribute their share to the national defense, and women have undeniably demonstrated the ability to do the jobs assigned. Today some may even argue that they perform better than men, are less likely to be involved in alcohol or drug abuse, and are more likely to be at work each day. Should some of these factors relate more to the consistently tighter recruiting standards that excessive supply permit or to physiological or psychological characteristics is for another project to evaluate. The point here is that the professional competence of women in the Navy is not an issue.

But women in the Navy are part of an historically conservative, predominantly male organization. Each time real progress was made in increasing their participation, in numbers and in particular skills, the catalyst was not a natural evolutionary process but a result of significant, even traumatic, external events. Some had short-term impact, such as World War I, after which the women were sent home, the reason for their utilization having expired. Others had far-reaching effect, such as the decision to implement the All-Volunteer Force, a concept which simply cannot succeed without women participating. Recent history has been devoid of dramatic stimuli to maintain the momentum.
of integration. That means further progress must come through evolution.

Herein lies the challenge. The leadership of the Navy, both civilian and military, is still both conservative and male. In 1979 Admiral Hayward said that utilization of women in the Navy was a societal question to be resolved by Congress. In 1984 Admiral Watkins said the same thing. Neither man was contradicted by his boss. In 1986 the Navy relabeled Mobile Logistics Support Force ships as Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ships to reinforce the position that in a battle group every ship is engaged in a combat mission and therefore women may not be assigned to underway replenishment ships. Yet women are serving on Military Sealift Command ships which provide support to the combatants in a similar manner as CLF ships. Congress, taking up the gauntlet of acting on the societal issue of utilization of women, has questioned the logic of the argument with such limited success that both Senator Proxmire of Wisconsin and Senator Cohen of Maine have introduced formal legislation directing the Navy to open CLF shipboard assignments to women. In addition, Representative Byron of Maryland has drafted a bill calling for expanded opportunities for women in all the armed forces. These lawmakers are countering the historical trend (at least in the Navy) during which if a law does not specifically address how women will be affected, that part of the equation is addressed only peripherally, if at all.

The most recent example of this is the laconic attention of the Navy's senior leadership to questions concerning opportunities for women in the joint arena as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. As noted above, the billet structure appears more than adequate, but that
is only part of the story. The law requires joint professional military education as well as experience to qualify as a joint specialty officer. School seats are not apportioned to specific communities which means there is not a set number of education billets reserved for women. As a result, there is no built-in mechanism to ensure that women receive a "fair share" (however that is defined) of the requisite education available. When those tasked with implementing the bill are asked about such issues, the response is a shrug of the shoulders and comments that that is "too far down in the grass."

And yet, there appear to be moments during which the conservative men at the top recognize the essential presence of women in the Navy and the importance of their professional and personal satisfaction. Following reports of several incidents in the Pacific Fleet which surfaced indications of problems relating to utilization and career opportunities for women, the Secretary of the Navy directed the Chief of Naval Operations convene a study group. The members were tasked to review policy development and implementation and to make recommendations which would be used to develop future policies affecting women in the Navy. However, while the board has completed its work and reported its findings to senior naval officials, including the Secretary, no discernible action has been taken to implement any of the recommendations. In fact, even though Mr. Webb had initially stated, in response to the report, that he would authorize assignment of women to ELF ships as well as to fleet air reconnaissance squadrons,1 active lobbying is underway to get him to retreat from that position.

For women in the Navy this situation is a microcosm of what has
gone before. And the conflict continues—what women can do against what they are allowed to do. The leadership of the Navy must be prodded off its historical conservatism, not because of any inalienable right of women to be in the Navy, but because the Navy cannot fulfill its commitments without women in its ranks. Those women must have the opportunity to reach their full potential to contribute to that level essential for successful national defense.

ENDNOTES

1. ALNAV 173/87, SECNAV msg 1821572 Dec 87.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. ALNAV 173/87, SFCNAV res 1-21577 Nov 87.


   13. NAVFAC 07110, "No. res 0711157 Apr 72.


