THE CITIZEN IN UNIFORM: REFORM AND ITS CRITICS IN THE BUNDESWEHR

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The West German armed forces face special constraints in their civil-military relations quite different from American experience. When the West German armed forces were created in the mid-1950s, the new officer corps had to refashion traditional concepts of military service. This necessity for reform sparked an ongoing debate in the officer corps about the purpose of military service. One of the outstanding concepts associated with this reform is Innere Führung, term that cannot be fully translated into English. This study analyzes important phases in the internal debate about the efficacy of military reform in the West German armed forces.
The foundation of the West German armed forces in 1955-56 was without precedent. Never before in German history had a democracy created its own army; nor had there been an armed force within a German democracy based upon conscription and integrated in a supranational alliance. Despite the innovations of the Bundeswehr, the men who founded the West German military in the 1950s cast their glance not forward to a nuclear-armed and missile-laden world of the superpowers, but backward to the political misfortunes of German liberalism, social democracy, and the military in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. If one wants to understand the West German soldier as he sees himself, one must begin with the burden of the past on the professional German soldier. Foreign observers of the West German military often overlook this aspect in their eagerness to discuss such issues as NATO strategy, operations, defense budgets, and procurement. The relationship between the West German soldier and Germany’s military past stood foremost among the obstacles facing the organizers of the new army. Neither questions of nuclear strategy nor issues of conventional military doctrine aroused nearly as much political concern among West Germans as the perennial problem of the soldier in the state or, as one
expert described it in 1959, "the danger to freedom from its defenders."Germany’s defeat in two world war and the role of professional soldiers in the Weimar Republic and Third Reich made the step towards a West German contribution to Atlantic defense a bold and difficult one. The arming of the Federal Republic could only occur with the reform of the future soldier’s political self-image and his position in state and society. In effect, the creators of the new army had to reconstruct from the nation’s military past those traditions and symbols not fully destroyed by the Nazis; at the same time, they had to fashion new institutions and practices that would assure the loyalty of the new army to the Bonn democracy. The promise of reform ran into formidable political and social obstacles that have made the Bundeswehr a source of constant debate during its more than three decades. The present essay identifies some key episodes from this exchange to illustrate the political, social, ethical, and moral aspects of the West German soldier generally unknown or misunderstood by Americans. It argues for the serious and genuine intent of the military reformers, whose relative success in the face of great difficulty has distinguished the history of the Bundeswehr.

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The West German military reform is best known for its two particular ideas: the "citizen in uniform" (Staatsbuerger in Uniform) and Innere Fuehrung, a concept that defies easy translation. Perhaps the phrase "leadership and participation" best conveys what the Bundeswehr means by Innere Fuehrung. On the
one hand, Innere Fuehrung represents a conscious attempt to foster what the leadership of the Bundeswehr describes as a "German military tradition of training for initiative" in command. On the other hand, the ideal of participation insures that the citizens in uniform take part in the democratic way of life of the Federal Republic even while in military service.

But this definition is only a beginning and requires an historical explanation of military reform in the West German army. The long and at times bitter debate about the meaning of Innere Fuehrung might serve as the story of the political consolidation of the Bundeswehr itself. A modest pamphlet given out to English-speaking members of the seminars held at the Center for Innere Fuehrung in Koblenz—the site of an on-going exchange on the political, social, and ethical aspects of the military—offers a convenient point of departure for a better understanding of the ideal of the "citizen in uniform." The document enumerates the ten "Principles of Innere Fuehrung" (described in English as "Principles on Leadership and Civic Education"). The first of these principles includes the statement that "the soldier is to be a citizen in uniform who consciously makes use of his rights," who "with equal consciousness" fulfills the duties linked to these rights. Innere Fuehrung aims to balance "the citizen's demand for freedom in a liberal democracy with the soldier's duties in an organization devoted to the highest degree of military efficiency." In other words, the West German citizen in uniform must defend his freedoms as a "citizen in arms," recognizing his duty to join in the common defense.
This paradigm is to be found in the military ideas of German liberalism and social democracy of the nineteenth century, in the ideals of the French Revolution, and in Machiavelli’s concept for a Florentine militia based upon the army of Republican Rome.\(^7\) While in uniform, the West German citizen is also to enjoy as many of his civil rights as possible: "Military service shall not lead to any basic break with the soldier’s life as a citizen." If he experiences his constitutional rights while in uniform, the "citizen in uniform" will possess the conviction to defend them with his life. This fundamental idea has antecedents in the era of Prussian reform in the early nineteenth century, when the men who sought to strengthen Prussia after its defeat at the hands of Napoleon reformed the social structure of the Prussian army. The founders of the West German military wanted to banish the barracks-square drill and spit and polish of the old armies, which had long been the object of protest from liberal, middle class, and socialist forces. The second of the ten principles insists that the soldier of the Bundeswehr is "to realize and accept that political leadership prevails over military leadership."\(^8\)

The additional paragraphs include statements about the mutual loyalty between state and the soldier; the duty of military superiors to take account of the needs of their subordinates; the imperative to lead subordinates according to the principles of "mission-type orders"; and the mandate that soldiers "shall take over and pass on proved soldier-like virtues and experiences."\(^9\) Such phrases initially leave a favorable
impression upon the reader; there is no echo here of the cadence of marching boots on the barracks square or visions of spit and polished men in blue tunics and spiked helmets. But on further reflection these winged-words suggest a number of questions. In the German past and present is there not a certain tension in such terms as "citizen in uniform," "the needs of subordinates," "mission-type orders," "military efficiency," and the passing on of "soldier-like virtues and experiences." By what means could soldiers trained in the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht adapt the new military to an altered political setting of a liberal democracy? How does one insure that "political leadership" shall prevail over "military leadership," given the nature of war and the conflict between the civil and military spheres of statecraft? By what means does one balance the imperative to uphold the citizen's rights against the requirements of military efficiency? The historical record of the attempts by liberal forces to subject the military to civilian control from the mid-19th century to the early 20th century did not augur well for the success of military reform. The role of the professional soldier in the crimes of National Socialism made the problem greater still.

The question of the soldier and the state confronted West Germans from the moment of the army's conception at the height of the Cold War. Above all else, the Federal Republic had to reconcile the professional military with social groups whose earlier demands for liberty, equality, and fraternity took them to the barricades, where they were confronted with soldiers,
The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 came a little more than five years after the total defeat of Nazi Germany. The beginning of a shooting war in Asia, only thirteen months after the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany, plunged Europe into a "great fear" about coming Soviet aggression. The dramatic heightening of the Cold War led the Western allies to accelerate the arming of the new Federal Republic, a move which had been discussed in semi-secrecy since the experience of the Berlin Blockade. Konrad Adenauer and his military advisors responded to the toscin of the Allied High Commissioners. The Germans prepared first for a West German force associated with NATO, then shifted their plans to a German contingent in a European army. Only after August 1954 did work at last begin on the military
force that was finally christened "Bundeswehr" in April 1956, a few months after its soldiers had first shouldered their weapons. The West Germans leaders felt the imperative to break with Germany's militaristic and outdated past, much as the advocates of reform in Prussia had tried to do after 1806, and as the Weimar Republic had more fatefully failed to do with the Reichswehr of the 1920s. The political and social conditions of the 1950s, however, were considerably more complex.

No one in authority wanted to revive the Wehrmacht as it had existed before 1945. The close identification of the military with the Nazi past, the traumatic effect on professional soldiers of the Twentieth of July 1944 attempt on Hitler's life (organized in large part by dissident officers), and the popular disgust with all things military in the wake of defeat prevented Adenauer's government from simply restoring traditional military institutions. The chancellor and his military advisors had to take stock of earlier civil-military problems and integrate the new army into the transformed setting of a nascent pluralistic democracy. Added to such political and intellectual challenges were the realities of postwar life that worked against the arming of the Federal Republic: cities filled with rubble; the leaders of the Wehrmacht on trial as criminals, with thousands of former officers imprisoned in East and West; and the popular response to Adenauer's call to arms of "count me out." For the majority of West Germans, the sudden shift from total disarmament to rearmament, from defeated country to ally of the West, came too soon and too fast. With these obstacles before them, Adenauer and
his advisors laid plans for the new army in the autumn of 1950.

Adenauer summoned a handful of former Wehrmacht officers to draft a secret planning document for the new armed forces that would simultaneously be the basis for further negotiations with the Allies. The group—including Hans Speidel, Adolf Heusinger, Friedrich Ruge, Johann Adolf Count von Kielmansegg, and Wolf Count von Baudissin—met in the Abbey Himmerod in the Eifel mountains during the first days of October. Described years later by Adenauer's first security advisor as the "Magna Carta of the Bundeswehr," the Himmerod Memorandum contained the chief political, strategical, operational, and ethical issues confronting a future West German contingent for Western defense.\(^{11}\)

The final draft of the meeting, prepared by Kielmansegg, called for an "end to the defamation of the professional soldier" and a "declaration of honor" for the German soldier to be given by prominent figures in the Western alliance and the West German government.\(^{12}\) Professional German soldiers were divided in their support for Adenauer's policy. Many former leading officers, freshly released from their jail cells, spoke out against the arming of the Federal Republic.\(^{13}\) These demands by the Himmerod group were to refute such criticism. In addressing the "inner structure" of the new force, that is, the sum of political, social, and ethical institutions and practices that assure the morale of an army in peace and war, the authors wanted to follow a new path. The group at Himmerod recognized that the profoundly altered conditions of postwar Europe required the creation of
"something fundamentally new, without any borrowings from the forms of the old armed forces." The officers insisted that the new army must avoid becoming a "state within a state" and it must fully embrace the democratic principles of the Federal Republic. The new army should also help to integrate young Germans into a united Europe. The West German government would have to select its key military personnel with great care to exclude the anti-democratically minded. The principles of this "new beginning" were to be set down at the outset and adhered to for the duration.

The memorandum contained many of the ideas that later were realized in the concept of Innere Fuehrung. Here also appeared for the first time in the pre-history of the Bundeswehr what advocates of reform later described as the "citizen in uniform," a term that symbolized the willingness of the Himmerod group to refashion the image of the German soldier. But the document included other statements that betrayed uncertainties about the means of reaching the goal of reform and suggested that the path to reform would not be an easy one. The West German contribution to European defense, in the view of the Himmerod group, must find a compromise between the need for "a new meaning" in military life and "less rigid forms and rituals," while still respecting peoples' wishes for a more traditional image of the soldier and the state. Elsewhere the authors spoke of the need to launch a wide-spread propaganda campaign to strengthen the "will to arms" and of the need to suppress the opponents of the Bonn democracy. The tone of these demands seemed very much like an ultimatum to
Adenauer--talk of propaganda and suppressing opponents recalled the recent past.

The proposals at Himmerod about the political and ethical aspects of the future soldier contained obvious contradictions. Granted the conditions of the new beginning, one could hardly have expected the men at Himmerod to have worked out the full details of reform of the German soldier in society after only a few days. Indeed, aside from the realization that a fairly drastic reform was necessary, they had very little idea of how to integrate the new soldier into the Bonn democracy. Nor did they seem to know how to resolve the perennial conflict between the professional soldier and parliamentary government in German life. These tasks remained to be done over the course of the 1950s and 1960s. That such contradictions existed in the document should not seem surprising, when one considers that the authors of inner structure section of the document included, among others, General Hermann Foertsch and Major Count Wolf von Baudissin. Foertsch (whose brother would become Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr) had been closely associated with the ideological training of the Wehrmacht; he later served in the brutal campaigns in the Balkans. In contrast, Baudissin quickly became known over the next ten years as an outspoken advocate of reform in the Bundeswehr.16 Despite its contradictions, however, the Himmerod document marked the beginning of the planning for reform in the Bundeswehr and the birth of the "citizen in uniform."

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The debate about the spirit of the future soldier spread steadily in West German political circles during the years of preparation for the European army, much as the divergent opinion about the NATO Intermediate Force Deployments were to do some three decades later. Until August 1954, the planning for reform proceeded within the framework of the European Defense Community (EDC), the joint armed forces of France, the BENELUX, Italy, and West Germany that were to be integrated into NATO. The planning for the West German contribution took place in Bonn and Paris under Theodor Blank, a former reserve officer, trade unionist, and parliamentarian, whom Adenauer chose to oversee what became his shadow defense ministry--the Amt Blank. By its very nature, the program of military reform in the Adenauer government was a liberal "anti-traditional concept" intended to banish from the future army authoritarian, anti-democratic, and militarist practices of the past. The promise of reform signified Adenauer's effort to win the cooperation of those in society who distrusted or opposed the military.

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The effort to transform this general desire for reform into specific measures had gotten under way in early 1951 with the arrival of Count Baudissin in the Amt Blank. Baudissin's planning for future military legislation and the inner structure of the forces included meetings and seminars with a wide variety of political and social organizations. Although others worked on the reforms--including such parliamentarians as Fritz Erler and
Richard Jaeger, jurists like Eberhard Barth and such former officers as Kielmansegg, Ulrich De Maizièrè and Heinz Karst--Baudissin became the best known public spokesman on the political and moral aspects of arming the Federal Republic, the individual the average West German most clearly identified with the ideal of the "citizen in uniform." Baudissin gave hundreds of talks throughout West Germany about a future soldier who would serve out of a sense of democratic conviction and who would experience his civil rights while in uniform. The West German soldier was to be freed from the senseless spit and polish and mindless heel-clicking of the past. Baudissin hoped that the new soldier of the Federal Republic would spread a democratic ethos through the ranks of a conscription army, much as the Prussian military reformers had tried to do a century and a half earlier. This ideal of a democratic avant-garde, however, was received skeptically by those unwilling to allow the military an elite role in West German society.

The concept of the "citizen in uniform" provoked opposition among those reluctant to admit the political failings of the professional military in the twentieth century and its culpability under National Socialism. Baudissin's opponents responded that the German soldier had held most of the world at bay for nearly ten years during two world wars. In view of this fighting power, the critics argued, one need change neither the soldier's concept of discipline and obedience nor his ethical outlook. The profession of soldiering, in the view of Baudissin's critics, was *sui generis*, unchanging in its basic nature and thus
not in need of reform. But these voices in favor of "authentic soldierhood" and a "warrior caste" were fairly isolated; they found little following among the broad mass of West Germans in the 1950s. Such opposition came generally from the ranks of the veterans organizations, whose political importance in the Bonn democracy never approached the influence wielded by similar organizations in the Weimar Republic. The anger of the veterans, however, was really the least of Baudissin's problems.

The reform effort in the years before 1955-56 existed in staff planning papers and on green felt conference tables in Bonn and Paris. The planners drafted proposals for the European army negotiations and the military amendments to the West German Basic Law. This enterprise was carried out under conditions of political uncertainty, scarce resources, and international frictions. Until 1955, the planners had no firm idea whether the new army would ever get off the ground; the diplomatic ramifications and domestic political opposition seemed far too great. As time passed, the planning for reform, as with so many other strategical, operational, and logistical aspects of the new army, fell victim to too little time, limited political authority, and official confusion. Since West Germany was not yet a sovereign country, Adenauer had to keep military planning under very tight control. He especially wanted to avoid the appearance of the secret rearmament of the "black Reichswehr" in the Weimar Republic. He forbade his military staff from taking any concrete steps until the allies gave their assent. Vagueness about the specifics of reform and intense bureaucratic disputes about the
procedures to be followed further undermined the work of the planners, who fell into episodes of bureaucratic squabbling. This friction strengthened the hand of those who saw little need to alter the image and outlook of the future German soldier. These difficulties multiplied when the French National Assembly refused to consider the EDC treaty on 30 August 1954, thus killing off the supra-national army and making a national West German army a necessity. Under pressure from the Americans and British, the planners had to tear up their previous work and draft new proposals, for a West German force that was to be integrated into NATO.

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The military reform remained the centerpiece of public interest as West Germans addressed the spirit and civilian control of the new army in parliament during 1955-56. The leading political parties all agreed that the arming of the Federal Republic could only take place with legislative assurances of democratic control of the military. Although Socialists and Christian Democrats in parliament disagreed intensely over the details of Western integration of the Federal Republic into Atlantic defense, a broad consensus existed among the parties on the need to subordinate the military to the control of the legislative and executive branches. As the concept of reform emerged during the great debate in parliament of 1955-56 on the military legislation, the German soldier was supposed to re-examine all military traditions, to retain those of value,
and to discard the rest. The changing nature of warfare in the mid-1950s, with its emphasis on mechanization, small unit engagements, the emerging role of nuclear weapons, and the importance of ideology, underscored the need for a soldier capable of operational initiative and ideological conviction. The answer to this stipulation was the "citizen in uniform," whose democratic beliefs and functional military skills would allow him to survive on the modern battlefield.

The blind obedience and barracks-square drill depicted in Hans Helmmuth Kirst's popular novel, 08/15, were to be a thing of the past. Political education of the future soldier would assume equal status with military training, for the ideas of Innere Fuehrung addressed the ideological aspects of the Cold War no less than the integration of the soldier into society.

Parliament, working with the planners in the Amt Blank, institutionalized a number of the key reforms in the military amendments to the Basic Law of 1955/7. The legislation was to make the ideal of the "citizen in uniform" into the law of the land; in fact the laws best exemplify the principles of Innere Fuehrung. The authors of the legislation stipulated that the Minister of Defense would be the supreme commander of the military in peacetime, thus assuring the primacy of politics over purely military concerns. The Soldier's Law guaranteed the basic rights of the West German soldier as never before, at the same time setting certain limits on the soldier's constitutional rights because of the needs of defense. The Soldier's Law also required professional soldiers to swear an oath to defend the
republic, while draftees only need make a "ceremonial obligation." The authors of the laws gave the Defense Committee of the Bundestag special investigative powers and established the post of parliamentary defense commissioner (Wehrbeauftragter) to oversee the implementation of Innere Fuehrung in the ranks. Soldiers could turn to the commissioner (based on a Swedish institution) with their complaints, which would then be investigated by the legislative branch.

The laws provided for the establishment of a personnel screening committee as an independent organ of government. The committee was to select future colonels and generals whose political attitude and experience would be acceptable to the Bonn democracy. The personnel screening committee eventually proved to be an exceptionally important component in the reform of the Bundeswehr. Its twenty or so members, some identified with the anti-Nazi resistance, were to decide in secret on the qualifications of the top officers. The committee not only opened the way for the first generation of senior Bundeswehr officers, but also blocked those whose past attitude and behavior might have disgraced the new army. The Bundeswehr was probably unique in its strict personnel policies, unlike other leading professions that suffered embarrassing revelations about the Nazi past of certain figures.

Yet another of the reforms of 1955/6--the creation of the Armed Forces Administration (Bundeswehrverwaltung)--separated many of the administrative functions of the military forces from the combat branches and placed them in civilian hands. Issues of
pay, clothing, equipment, and liaison with the local civilian government were now to be done by some 170,000 civilian employees of the military. This division of responsibilities reflected a conscious attempt to enforce civilian control upon the new army by taking personnel, materiel, and money out of the hands of men in uniform. The soundness of the idea behind this decision notwithstanding, certain German civilians of the time found it difficult to adapt Anglo-Saxon ideas of "civilian control of the military" without going all the way to zivile Kontrolle, where career civil servants were to give all the orders to professional soldiers. Although this reform exacerbated the bureaucratic struggles that dogged the Bundeswehr during much of its first two decades, the framers of the military laws saw the institution of a civilian military administration as a necessary assurance of a balanced civil-military relationship.

The further course of the military legislation of the mid-1950s shaped the character of the new army. After much vocal opposition led by the SPD, parliament adopted conscription for the Bundeswehr, making the new army the first to be based on the Wehrpflicht in a German democracy. The advent of the defense legislation marked a victory for military reform, but one which would remain hollow unless the soldiers themselves would accept the ideal of the "citizen in uniform" in the ranks.

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The military reforms proved to be a success in the Federal Republic after a period of consolidation that lasted from the
mid-1950s to the early 1970s. The triumph of reform in the Bundeswehr, however, came about at a price. Given the political and ethical burdens of the birth of the Bundeswehr, the details of reform were often controversial among professional soldiers. Critics of Innere Fuehrung claimed that the reforms hampered their ability to carry out their mission on the battlefield and symbolized the "institutionalized mistrust" of West German society regarding the army.²⁷ Such resistance, sub rosa in the first years of the Bundeswehr, asserted itself openly during a brief period of conflict about military reform and West German society during 1967-1971. It would be a mistake to see this opposition to reform as a militarist, anti-democratic revival of the professional military caste that had existed up until the collapse of the Third Reich. The criticism of reform was a natural and unavoidable consequence of what one West German general (himself a product of the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht) described as the "need to digest all the new things, from fighting an atomic war to Innere Fuehrung."²⁸ The West German soldier had to adapt earlier ideas, practices, and customs to a variety of new political, strategical, and ethical circumstances. This radical change would have vexed professional soldiers with a far happier past than that of the Germans.

Observers of the ethical debates within the Bundeswehr, anxious about a militarist revival, began after 1951 to describe soldiers of the future West German military as either "reformists" or "traditionalists." Even as the first soldiers were mustered into the military in 1956, the new Chief of Staff,
General Adolf Heusinger, worried aloud that with the rapid tempo of arming the Federal Republic the new army would become a battleground between men adhering to traditional ideas and the advocates of reform. The apparent cleavage in the officer corps, much commented upon in the press in the 1950s and 1960s, never grew as serious as the political divisions between professional officers in Weimar Republic or in the Third Reich. From the perspective of the late nineteen eighties, it seems fairly plain that this typology of two camps in the officer corps was somewhat exaggerated. The so-called "traditionalists" never dreamed of political opposition to the democratic government; no general emerged in the nineteen fifties to lead a putsch in Bonn. But there was much debate among professional soldiers about "the purpose of soldierly existence" in an age of multinational alliances, nuclear weapons, and pluralistic society. The effort to adapt prevailing images of the German soldier to an altered political world was accompanied by much debate and friction about nearly all aspects of the new army. Adherents of traditional ideas about the image of war and the soldier often clashed with proponents of a new image of a war of high technology. German soldiers debated whether weapons of mass destruction were to play a more prominent role in the future army than the maneuver warfare of Moltke, Schlieffen, and Guderian.

The resistance to reform was greatly aided by the international political conditions surrounding the activation of the Bundeswehr in the mid-1950s. The West German military, conceived in the wake of the the outbreak of the Korean War, was
finally activated in 1955-56 amid yet another crisis associated with the advent of a kind of detente in Europe and hints of an Anglo-American withdrawal from the continent. The possibility in 1955 that the Western allies might redraw the map of Europe at the expense of West Germany threatened the efficacy of Adenauer’s policy of western integration of the Federal Republic. In view of this second crisis, Adenauer needed soldiers right away; he threw out previous plans for the phased activation of the new army over six years. His decision to rush ahead at breakneck speed handicapped the inner consolidation of the Bundeswehr and greatly compromised the effort to make the reforms into a smoothly functioning reality. There followed a series of organizational and structural scandals that seemed to indicate to critics of the Bundeswehr in the late 1950s that the traditional organizational genius of the German general staff had vanished. The NATO allies worried that the West German military, crippled by its birth pains, would fail on the battlefield. The political imperative to get troop units formed rapidly collided with shortages of company grade officers and NCOs as well as a lack of uniforms, barracks, and training facilities. There were also some glaring problems with modern weapons. The combination of these difficulties forced Blank to resign; his successor was Franz-Josef Strauss.

In a ministerial report commenting on the status of Innere Fuehrung in late 1956, Baudissin warned that neither the material nor personnel basis for the reforms existed among the troops. Quarters, clothing, pay, and benefits were so inadequate that the
principles of Innere Fuehrung did not seem credible to the troops. Baudissin concluded that Innere Fuehrung had not kept pace with other aspects of rearmament; neither officers nor men fully grasped the tasks of the reforms. In response, troop instructors schooled in the Wehrmacht resurrected the spit and polish and barracks-square drill of the 1936 regulations. This development, Baudissin observed, signified a growing movement in favor of restoration within the ranks. Certain veterans of the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht dismissed the reforms as militarily unnecessary, reducing the combat power of the armed forces, and intellectually beyond the level of most recruits. Critics of Baudissin and the reforms argued that the combat effectiveness of the Wehrmacht against the Red Army justified harsh military training and iron discipline in the ranks of the Bundeswehr. Another aspect of the build-up of the Bundeswehr complicated matters even further. Many West Germans soldiers were trained by American, French, and British instructors, whose adherence to traditional military customs and discipline was complete; in certain cases, the contact between German and NATO ally reimbined into West Germany the harsh discipline that the reforms sought to banish.

The conditions described in Baudissin’s report notwithstanding, the most important period of resistance and debate about Innere Fuehrung came not in the first years of the new army, but in the late 1960s. While the Bundeswehr remained a subject of controversy for much of the late 1950s and 1960s, the conjuncture of political and social upheaval from 1966 to 1969
brought strikingly into the open old civil-military tensions among certain professional soldiers about the ideal of the "citizen in uniform." This period of intense conflict about military reform marked the true end of the build-up of the Bundeswehr and the climax in the development of the "citizen in uniform." This era also offers the clearest opportunity to understand the internal military challenge to Innere Fuehrung. One must proceed from Baudissin's report of late 1956 to the political turbulence surrounding the end of the Adenauer era and the beginning of the Social Liberal coalition.

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In the years after 1966 the founding fathers of the Bonn republic left the national scene; the political and economic calm of West German life gave way to a period of upheaval and dissent during 1967-1972. The effects of this era remain present in the West German society of the 1980s. The combination of detente between the great powers, economic stagnation, and the rise of political radicalism on the right and left undermined the tenets of political life in the Federal Republic. New voices in West German politics took to the streets. Such organizations as Socialist Students Association and the Extraparliamentary Opposition opposed the Cold War compromise about international relations, politics, and society upon which the founding fathers had built the young republic. The spirit of iconoclasm against all traditions, the opposition against "the mustiness of a thousand years," challenged the Bundeswehr as it did few other
institutions of West German life. Critics of state and society assaulted the army as being the authoritarian embodiment of all they deplored in West Germany. The number of men refusing military service rose quickly; NCOs and company grade officers found ever greater resistance to their orders among the draftees.37 Such tensions exacerbated old disagreements about the efficacy of military reform, moving critics of Innere Fuehrung to new boldness in questioning the "citizen in uniform" as a "taboo" of West German military life.38

Before describing the shape of this debate about the military reform, one should say that the themes of the "citizen in uniform" and Innere Fuehrung stood in the shadow of greater questions of the Federal Republic of the late nineteen sixties: the Grand Coalition, the student unrest, the anti-Vietnam protest, and the beginnings of Ostpolitik. The last great debate about the meaning of Innere Fuehrung was very much an internal problem of the Bundeswehr, but it took place simultaneously with these other events in the Federal Republic. This phase of intense criticism about the development of Innere Fuehrung reflected the internal difficulties of a segment of the officer corps. Nonetheless, an analysis of the intensity of their criticism and the way in which it was offered contributes to a fuller understanding of military reform in the Federal Republic.

Faced with growing political and social protest among young West Germans during 1967-69, a group of officers in the leadership of the German Army, anxious about the efficiency of their forces on the battlefield, argued that the military had to
respond to the political and social challenges to their profession. The "counter-reformation" among the leaders of the army came out into the open during the spring of 1969. In mid-March, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, Major General Hans-Hellmuth Grashey assaulted the institutions of reform in a speech in Hamburg. Speaking before a group of general staff officers at the Command and Staff College, Grashey criticized the most recent report to the Bundestag by the parliamentary commissioner. Grashey described the ills of the Bundeswehr as stemming from three aspects of the reforms: the parliamentary commissioner, the oversized civilian military administration, and the concept of Innere Fuehrung itself. His most disturbing assertion was that the program of military reform had been little other than a "mask." In reality, Innere Fuehrung stood for nothing more than the care which a military superior showed towards his subordinates. Such customs had always been in the German military, but the founders of the new army had sold the reforms as new in order to win the support of the Socialists for rearmament. Now that political opposition to the military was on the rise, one could take the mask from one's face and say that Innere Fuehrung had always existed. This assertion about the reforms had been made thousands of times in officers clubs since the early 1950s, but Grashey's description of Innere Fuehrung failed to recognize that the "citizen in uniform" represented an innovation in German history. The reforms assured the civil rights of soldier and the say of parliament in the forces as never before. Once fragments of the speech became public, the
words of the Vice Chief of Staff seemed to indicate that the military had duped parliament and was awaiting the return to pre-democratic military traditions.

Shortly after the Grashey speech, Chancellor Kurt-Georg Kiesinger made headlines with his own comments on military reform.42 Before a group of military men in Godesberg in June 1969, he called Innere Fuehrung and the "citizen in uniform" "old clichés," which had become worn out over time. The chancellor then praised the army for transforming boys into men. Military life had a positive effect on young draftees, which made the Bundeswehr, in his view, "a school of the nation for the European idea." This unintentional reference to "the school of the nation," seemed to recall the anti-socialist, anti-catholic, and anti-Semitic political education of the Germany army of the Empire. Although he later denied that he intended his comments to do so, Kiesinger's words seemed to signal that the opponents of the "citizen in uniform" could now open fire on the reforms.43

Quite independent on the chancellor's speech, the leadership in the Ministry of Defense had begun to ponder the effects of current political and social unrest upon the ideal of the "citizen in uniform." Minister of Defense Gerhard Schroeder (CDU) requested that the service chiefs provide draft comments on possible revisions to the military reforms. While those from the air force and navy staffs were short and uncontroversial, the study prepared by the staff of Army Chief of Staff General Albert Schnez was drastic indeed.44

The authors of the study, while professing their adherence
to the principles of the "citizen in uniform," insisted that Innere Fuehrung must be adapted to the present political and social challenges to democracy in West Germany. In the eyes of critics, however, the army leadership seemed intent on weakening the reform spirit in detail. Much of the study contained specific suggestions to enable the army better to fulfill its tasks on the battlefield. Rather than highlighting the integration of the soldier in a democratic state, the authors maintained that the combat power of the army should be the chief concern. "This assignment must be clear to every soldier. He is not there solely to deter, but to fight in case deterrence fails. He can only contribute to deterrence by achieving this fighting power. Therefore, being a soldier is an assignment *sui generis* and not a 'profession like any other.'" Elsewhere the authors demanded amendments to the military legislation of the 1950s that appeared to weaken the rights of the "citizen in uniform" and increase the authority of the officer corps over draftees. But the most controversial passage in the document came in its conclusion, where the authors seemed to hint that the leadership of the army wanted to shake off civilian control and regenerate West German society in its own image: "Every attempt to cure symptoms promises as little effective success as the removal of individual deficiencies. Only a reform that has the goal of going after the illness at its roots, at the 'heads and limbs' of the Bundeswehr and society, can decisively raise the fighting power of the army." The Schnez Study became the manifesto of the internal
military challenge to the reforms that escalated in the months from late 1969 to early 1971; in a certain sense the document retained this role into the decade of the 1980s. The concern of its authors with the combat power of the army within the highly charged political environment of the time collided with a major shift in West German politics. The study was published soon after the fall of the CDU/SPD Grand Coalition government and the arrival of Helmut Schmidt (SPD) as Minister of Defense in the cabinet of Willy Brandt. Schmidt had long been a member of the parliamentary defense committee and a reserve officer in the Bundeswehr. Many Bundeswehr officers regarded him as the ideal man to handle the job. He had to tackle the Innere Fuehrung problem immediately after taking office; in the eyes of some critics, anxious about a Socialist defense minister for the first time since Gustav Noske, Schmidt faced a difficult assignment. Nor did the advent of Brandt’s Ostpolitik make Schmidt’s task any easier; the West German opening to the east tended to undermine support for a high state of military readiness among draftees. Nonetheless, Schmidt was effective in dampening the opposition to the reforms. With the aid of Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Ulrich de Maizière and Brigadier General Eberhard Wagemann, Schmidt heard out the complaints of the officer corps and represented their interests before parliament. He described the Schnez study as being in part “worthy of discussion and in need of discussion,” but he did not use the document as an excuse to cashier its authors. He wisely avoided a confrontation with the officer corps at the difficult moment in which the social-liberal
coalition had to win the faith of the military. Grashey was allowed to retire early, while Schmidt defended Schnez before the public as having been given the task to comment critically on the state of the army, which the report had done.

* * * *

The counter-reformation of the military leadership faded quickly after its height in the early 1970s; the movement never enjoyed political popularity outside the ranks and reflected the painful attempt of a segment of the officer corps to come to grips with the stormy changes in West German society and politics. Schmidt carried out improvements in the military personnel structure and educational system. Outstanding among these reforms was the foundation of the two Bundeswehr universities in 1972.

At roughly the same time, many of the leading military critics of the "citizen in uniform" retired from the ranks. The debate about Innere Fuehrung lost much of its vehemence as the Bundeswehr increasingly came to be officered by men from the "white years," that is officers too young to have served in the Wehrmacht. These men had been exposed to the ideal of the "citizen in uniform" continually from the time they joined the ranks in 1956.

The era of open debate about the "citizen in uniform" was in turn followed by what some observers have described as a "technocratic phase" in the evolution of the Bundeswehr, wherein the growing bureaucratization of military life--by no means a
phenomenon unique to the West German army—became a subject of controversy and debate. The cult of high technology and the official enchantment with management techniques came to play an ever greater role in the spirit of the armed forces. Perhaps this trend was an unintended consequence of the open debate about the purpose of soldierly existence that had preceded the 1970s. Professional soldiers, unable openly to discuss the needs of their profession in a pluralistic, technological society, retreated ever more into a sterile world of flow charts and computers. General Werner von Scheven, a leading officer connected with Innere Fuehrung in the 1970s and 1980s, pointed to the danger of this trend in numerous speeches and writings. He spoke repeatedly of the need for society to accept the profession of soldiering.

The return of the great power confrontation to Europe in the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, renewed aspects of the old debate about the "citizen in uniform." The debate in the very recent past focused on the problem of the maintenance of military tradition in the Bundeswehr. This issue, however, was really a symptom of the political crisis surrounding the deployment of the Intermediate Nuclear Missiles and the decline of the social-liberal coalition of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. This latter debate, outside the scope of this essay, revived many of the questions about the soldier in the state advanced in earlier decades; in fact, the questions of the 1950s about the loyalty of the soldier to West German democracy had been answered.

The exchange of over three decades about the ideal of the
"citizen in uniform" reveals how the West German military has mirrored developments in the state and society that created the new military. The founders of the Bundeswehr established the force with the promise of reform, which they found difficult to fulfill because of a variety of political, social, and indeed psychological causes. Looking back in the mid-1980s, Baudissin believed that the ideal of the "citizen in uniform" has failed to live up to the original design. Grashey and those like him dismissed Innere Fuehrung as nothing more than a political mask and a hindrance to military efficiency. From the perspective of one who has both served with the Bundeswehr and studied its history from the sources, it seems fairly plain that though Baudissin's wishes of the 1950s may have gone unfulfilled, he is overly pessimistic in his judgment, while Grashey and his sympathizers are simply wrong. The reforms have been flawed in detail and often the victim of political and social circumstance, but despite its many problems, Innere Fuehrung has given the Bundeswehr a quality of political, social, and intellectual sophistication that the armed forces of countries with a longer democratic tradition might well aspire to in their civil-military relations.

In their attempt to perfect the "citizen in uniform," the founders of the Bundeswehr sought honestly to come to grips with the burden of German history while balancing the demands of society with those of the soldier. The imperative to compromise in formation of the self-image of the Bundeswehr led many critics to assert that the Federal Republic missed its opportunity to
create truly democratic soldiers in the 1950s; Adenauer should have made no use of soldiers from the armies of the Empire, the Reichswehr, or the Wehrmacht. But this kind of statement serves more the needs of contemporary politics more than those of scholarship. Many of the strongest advocates of military reform were themselves veterans of the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht who adapted to the changed political circumstances of West Germany in the 1950s. The reforms fell victim to the political imperative to create the army virtually overnight as well as to the inherent problem of quickly altering traditional patterns of human behavior and experience.

The changes in world politics, strategy, and technology; the dictates of personnel; and the need to integrate the soldier into society have all had their effect on the Bundeswehr from its inception to the present. If one seeks to understand the spirit of the Bundeswehr, one must begin with this insight or fail to comprehend the institution as its members understand it. That the Bundeswehr could have done better with its soldiers and the fashioning of their self-image is probably true; that the military has done much better than its predecessors in the twentieth century seems fairly well substantiated by events. This success of the Bundeswehr, when measured against the fears of the 1950s about a new military state with a state, should be measured against the practical rather than the ideal. More than thirty years of an army in a democracy integrated within an alliance has substantiated the ideal of the "citizen in uniform" and should today provide the Bundeswehr with its greatest military tradition.
Notes

1 I would like to thank the Research Foundation of the Naval Postgraduate School for their support in preparation of this paper. The views expressed herein are the author's own and do not represent the position of the Department of the Navy or the United States government.

I should like to thank Major General Werner von Scheven of the West German Ministry of Defense and Professor Hans-Adolf Jacobsen for their thoughtful criticism of this work. This historical analysis is indebted to the work of Hans-Juergen Rautenberg, "Die Bundeswehr von der Gruendung bis zu ihrer Konsolidierung (1955/56-1962): Thesen und Anmerkungen," in Wiederbewaffnung in Deutschland nach 1945, ed. Alexander Fischer (Berlin, 1986), pp. 129-130; a fuller discussion of this issue is to be found in this writer's Bundeswehr and Tradition: The Search for the Valid Heritage of the West German Soldier, forthcoming from Princeton University Press. There is no general history of the Bundeswehr in English; historical scholarship on the Bundeswehr is chiefly done by the authors of Military Historical Research Office (MGFA) in Freiburg, whose aid to this writer has been invaluable. See the MGFA's Verteidigung im Buendnis; Planung, Auseinandersetzung und Bewehrung der Bundeswehr, 1950-1972 (Muenchen, 1975); a highly useful collection of documents on the West German military from 1948 to 1956 is in Von Himmerod bis Andernach: Dokumente zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Bundeswehr in

2 Still the standard work on civil-military relations in German history is Gordon A. Craig, *Politics of the Prussian Army*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1964).


4 The English translations of this term are as varied as its definitions in German. It has been called "inner command," "inner leadership," "moral leadership," "moral education," and "civic education." It has been left untranslated to avoid any of these inadequate terms. Among the many works on Innere Fuehrung are *Handbuch Innere Fuehrung: Hilfen fuer Klaerung der Begriffe*, ed. Bundesministerium fuer Verteidigung (BMvg), Fuehrungsstab der Bundeswehr (Fue B) I 6 (Bonn, 1957); *Zentrale Dienstvorschrift (ZDv) 10/1, Hilfen fuer die Innere Fuehrung*, ed. BMvg, Fue S I (Bonn 1972); Wolf Graf von Baudissin, *Soldat fuer den Frieden: Entwuerfe fuer eine zeitgemaesse Bundeswehr* (Muenchen, 1969); Heinz Karst, *Das Bild des Soldaten: Versuch eines Umrisses* (Boppard, 1964); Carl-Gero von Ilsemann, *Die Bundeswehr in der Demokratie: Die Zeit der Inneren Fuehrung* (Hamburg, 1971); Ulrich de Maiziere, *Fuehren im Frieden: 20 Jahre Dienst fuer Bundeswehr und Staat* (Muenchen, 1974); Gerd Schmueckle, *Kommiss a.D.* (Stuttgart, 1970); Ulrich Simon, *Die Integration der Bundeswehr in die Gesellschaft: Das Ringen um die Innere Fuehrung* (Heidelberg, 1980); Peter Wullich, *Die Konzeption der Inneren*


6 ZIF, "Principles," p. 3.


8 ZIF, "Principles," p. 3.

9 ibid., pp. 3-6.

10 The best account of this development is in volume I of the encyclopedic Anfaenge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik: Von

11 See the definitive work of Hans-Jürgen Rautenberg and Norbert Wiggershaus, Himmeroder Denkschrift vom Oktober 1950, 2nd ed. (Karlsruhe, 1985). The full text of this document was not declassified until 1977. The sections of the document dealt with questions of grand strategy, operations and tactics, force structure, logistics, and the morale and self-image of the soldier.

12 Rautenberg and Wiggershaus, Himmeroder Memorandum, p. 37.

13 See, for example, the pamphlet of Heinz Guderian of 1951, So Geht Es Nicht!: Ein Beitrag zur Frage der Haltung Westdeutschlands (Heidelberg, 1951).

14 Rautenberg and Wiggershaus, Himmeroder Memorandum, p. 53.

15 ibid.

16 For more on Baudissin, see his Soldat fuer den Frieden and Ulrich Simon, Die Integration der Bundeswehr in die Gesellschaft, pp. 32-40.

17 For more on the EDC, see the excellent collection of essays in Die Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft: Stand und Probleme der Forschung, ed. MGFA (Boppard, 1985); and Wilhelm

18 For an example of this point of view, see Werner Picht, Vom Wesen des Krieges und vom Kriegswesen der Deutschen (Pfullingen, 1951); see also Ulrich Simon, Die Integration der Bundeswehr in die Gesellschaft, pp. 56-60 for an analysis of these ideas.


20 See Genschel, Wehrreform und Reaktion.

21 Extracts of these debates are reprinted in Die parlamentarischen Vaeter der Bundeswehr in Schriftenreihe Innere Führungs, ed. BMvg (1985).


23 ibid., pp. 28ff.


25 Vom künftigen deutschen Soldaten, pp. 35ff.

The best overview of the political debate about Innere Fuehrung is in Simon, Die Integration der Bundeswehr in die Gesellschaft, pp. 24-159; also see Abenheim, Bundeswehr and Tradition.


See Simon, Die Integration der Bundeswehr in die Gesellschaft, pp. 243-244.

"IVB 1831/56 'Zustandsbericht ueber die Innere Fuehrung,'" cited in Peter Wullich, Die Konzeption der Inneren Fuehrung der Bundeswehr als Grundlage der allgemeinen

34 The problem of what the Germans call Kommiss (barracks-square discipline and spit and polish) is interpreted in Simon, Die Integration der Bundeswehr in die Gesellschaft, pp. 229-248.

35 There were of course controversies about Innere Fuehrung before 1967-69--e.g., the scandal about paratroop training at Nagold near Stuttgart in 1963/4 and the publication in a leading magazine of the so called "Heye Report" of 1964--but the chief emphasis in this essay is on the period after 1966. For the earlier difficulties of Innere Fuehrung during 1957-1965, see Verteidigung im Buendnis, pp. 117-127; 193-201; Simon, Die Integration der Bundeswehr in die Gesellschaft, pp. 97-110.


37 Verteidigung im Buendnis, p. 258.

38 The phrase "taboo" is taken from the highly critical work of Friedrich Doepner, Bundeswehr und Armeereform: ein Tabu (Dorheim, 1969); also see Hans-Georg Studnitz, Rettet die Bundeswehr! (Stuttgart, 1967); an overview of the debate of 1969-1972 is in Simon, Die Integration der Bundeswehr in die
Gesellschaft, pp. 111-19 to which this section is indebted.


40 The phrase is taken from Simon, Die Integration der Bundeswehr in die Gesellschaft, p. 113.

41 Ulrich de Maizière, Fuehren im Frieden: 20 Jahre Dienst fuer Bundeswehr und Staat (Bonn, 1974), pp. 139-40; Simon, Die Integration der Bundeswehr in die Gesellschaft, pp. 64-65.


43 Simon, Die Integration der Bundeswehr in die Gesellschaft, p. 105.

44 The text of the document appeared in public in late 1969; it is reprinted in Klaus Hessler, Aktuelle Dokumente: Militaer-Gehorsam-Meinung. Dokumente zur Diskussion in der Bundeswehr (Berlin, 1971) pp. 50-91; quotations below are from the original copy of the study in the archives of Zentrum Innere Fuehrung in Koblenz.

45 Zentrum Innere Fuehrung, Koblenz, Zentrales
Unterrichtsarchiv, 0.2.1.2., "Fuehrungsstab des Heeres, 'Studie: Gedanken zur Verbesserung der inneren Ordnung des Heeres,'" June 1969, p. 4.

46 ibid., p. 67.

47 See the discussion in Simon, Die Integration der Bundeswehr in die Gesellschaft, pp. 120-135; and the critical and informed essay of Peter Balke, "Die Grenzen von Buerokratie und Technokratie in den Streitkraeften" in De Officio: Zu den Ethischen Herausforderungen des Offizierberufs, (Hannover, 1985) pp. 284-295.

48 The events of 1976-1986 are addressed in this writer’s Bundeswehr and Tradition, forthcoming from Princeton University Press.
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