US-ROK COMBINED OPERATIONS
A KOREAN PERSPECTIVE

TAEK-HYUNG RHEE

A NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS MONOGRAPH
US-ROK Combined Operations

A Korean Perspective
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FOREWORD

Since World War II, an alliance with the United States has meant security for many nations. In general, the substantial US military contribution to these alliances has meant that strategy, tactics, organization, and equipment tended to be dominated by US preferences. Within the last decade, however, a growing worldwide Soviet capability and increased US security commitments have forced a shift toward greater sharing of both defense responsibility and military capability between the United States and its allies. In some cases, this shift has generated or magnified differences between the United States and its friends.

In this monograph, Brigadier General Taek-Hyung Rhee, ROK Army and a National Defense University International Senior Fellow, details the deficiencies of US-ROK combined operations doctrine. Combined operations are not given sufficient emphasis, he points out, in the war colleges of either nation, forcing officers and troops of both countries to acquire the vital principles of combined operations in an ad hoc fashion. General Rhee offers a framework for correcting doctrinal deficiencies and strengthening deterrence on the Korean peninsula.
The National Defense University is pleased to publish this Korean perspective of alliance burden sharing and combined operations in peace and war.

Richard D. Lawrence
Lieutenant General, US Army
President, National Defense University
US-ROK Combined Operations

A Korean Perspective
1. THE IMPORTANCE OF COMBINED OPERATIONS

This is a brief study of the United States-Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command's (CFC) posture for combat operations in a future war on the Korean peninsula. In the event of major military action, the probability is very high that US forces will engage in combined operations in one form or another. We cannot, therefore, stress too much the importance of the combined operations of US-Republic of Korea (ROK) forces.

The choice of the US-ROK Combined Forces Command as a case study of problems associated with effective combined operations is both interesting and significant. It provides a vehicle to stimulate thinking about general difficulties inherent in combined operations and a way to understand the unique problems for such operations on the Korean peninsula—one of the two strategic pivotal areas on the Eurasian land mass where US ground forces are stationed.

Ineffectiveness of combined operations in a future conflict in the area could lead not only to discord between the US and South Korea but also to a disastrous outcome of the war. Such a result would severely jolt the political and military leadership in the United States, since the senior US commander has responsibility for the defense of South Korea.

The purpose of this study, then, is to analyze problems associated with effective combined operations of the US-ROK Combined Forces Command, created on 7 November 1978 to assume primary responsibility for the defense of South Korea. This paper will briefly discuss problems
arising from the operations of the Korean War in the 1950-1953 period, the distinctive factors that will presumably affect combined operations in a future war on the Korean peninsula, the CFC's posture toward such factors, and some proposals for solving the various problems.

In addition, the modern concept of "RSI"—rationalization, standardization, and interoperability—will be applied to measure the degree of integration of allied forces into one operable system. This concept assumes that the higher the degree of interoperability, the greater will be the effectiveness of combined operations.

From a Korean point of view, combined operations is not a new form of military operation. Historically, Korea has experienced combined operations several times—with China in the 7th century, with the Mongols in the 13th, with the Chinese Ming Dynasty in the 16th, and with the US in the 20th. Of these, the 1950-53 experience is the most relevant, although Korean perceptions are also influenced by the earlier historical events. The Korean War was a modern war and the allied system formed during that conflict still exists. The success of the United Nations Command's (UNC's) efforts to integrate various units into effective combat entities owed much to the common goals and attitudes shared by all Allied participants from combat line commands to logistical support groups to training functions.

Since the inception of US-ROK Combined Forces Command in 1978, at least two forms of such cooperation—the UNC and the CFC—have existed. The senior US military officer now wears at least five different hats: Commander in Chief of Combined Forces Command (CINCCFC); Commander in Chief,
United Nations Command (CINCUNC); Commander in Chief, United States Forces Korea (CINCUSFK); Commander in Chief, Eighth United States Army (CINC EUSA); and CINC Ground Component Command of CFC (Figure 1). This complex arrangement of command and control systems is concentrated in the senior US military officer in Korea—the CINC.

Can the Combined Forces Command effectively and efficiently conduct combined operations with the current arrangement of interoperability in combat in a future war on the Korean peninsula?

Any future war on the Korean peninsula will be a modern war, characterized by an all-out surprise attack from North Korea with few warning signs preceding the attack. Because North Korea has superior military capabilities (Table 1), the war will be a blitzkrieg characterized by shortness of duration, fast movement, and the shock of the enemy’s attack. Such factors combined with the precision, vitality, and severity of combat may lead to chaos among the defenders; the combined efforts of the enemy will surely include commando-type attacks on the C³ system of friendly forces, strikes against civilian targets, and the use of agent saboteurs. Combat reality may dictate that commanders and their troops exert more effort in keeping contact with friendly forces in order to prevent being separated or overcome by psychological shocks.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>KOREA: DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC (NORTH)</strong></th>
<th><strong>KOREA: REPUBLIC OF (SOUTH)</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population: 18,600,000</td>
<td>Population: 39,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military service Army Navy 5 years Air Force 3-4 years</td>
<td>Military service Army Navy Marines 30 months Navy and Air Force 3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total armed forces: 1,744,000</td>
<td>Total armed forces: 622,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong>:</td>
<td><strong>Army</strong>:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200 155mm guns 76mm 106mm 75mm 100mm</td>
<td>540 203mm SP guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 155mm howitzers 300mm rockets</td>
<td>200 8 inch artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 130mm howitzers 155mm howitzers 8 inch artillery 203mm SP guns 300mm rockets</td>
<td>500 8 inch artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong>:</td>
<td><strong>Navy</strong>:</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 1,200 ton coastal patrol craft 2 640 ton coastal patrol craft</td>
<td>13,000 1,200 ton coastal patrol craft 6 640 ton coastal patrol craft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42 240mm coastal mortar 72 110mm coastal mortar</td>
<td>12 1,200 ton coastal patrol craft 2 640 ton coastal patrol craft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 30mm coastal mortar</td>
<td>24 1,200 ton coastal patrol craft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong>:</td>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong>:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,200 aircraft</td>
<td>3,000 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125 60 mm machine guns</td>
<td>100 73 mm machine guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reserves</strong>:</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Army 540,000</td>
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**Table 1. Comparison of North versus South Korean Military Capabilities**

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**Army**:
- 200 155mm guns 76mm 106mm 75mm 100mm
- 30 155mm howitzers 300mm rockets
- 100 130mm howitzers 155mm howitzers 8 inch artillery 203mm SP guns 300mm rockets

**Navy**:
- 16 1,200 ton coastal patrol craft
- 42 240mm coastal mortar
- 12 30mm coastal mortar

**Air Force**:
- 1,200 aircraft
- 125 60 mm machine guns

**Reserves**:
- Army 100,000
- Navy 23,500
- Air Force 2,000
- Total: 123,300

**KOREA: REPUBLIC OF (SOUTH)**

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**Army**:
- 540,000

**Navy**:
- 3,000 aircraft

**Air Force**:
- 3,000 aircraft

**Reserves**:
- Army 540,000
- Navy 1,200,000
- Air Force 3,000
- Total: 3,140,000

### KOREA: DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC (NORTH)

- **Air Force**: 51,000 some 740 combat aircraft
  - 3 F-16 FBA sqns with 70 F-16
  - 13 F-86F with 20 Su-7
  - 9 with some 290 M-19 17
  - 3 with some 100 M-19 25
- **Army**
  - 12 M-51 MI-4 20 Mi-8
  - Trainers inc 20 Yak-11 70 Yak-18 100 Mi-17U 13
  - Some 100 Mi-8 1935

### KOREA: REPUBLIC OF (SOUTH)

- **Marines**: 20,000
  - 2 Cav 1 bde
  - M-A7 wth 40 VTP F
  - 105mm 1 sub 7 corvettes 20 sqns (27 types) 75
  - Harpoon wth 40 VTP F

- **Air Force**: 33,000 some 450 combat ac 10 combat hel
  - 7 combat 2 op wings
  - 18 F-4G sqns 14 with 250 F-5 ABE 4 with 70 F-4E 6 A 10
  - 4 F-4G sqns with 70 F-4D
  - 1 250 sqn with 13 OV-10 34 with 250 F-5 A
  - 1 AV-8 with 10 B 52A
  - 2 sqns F-104G 1 with 10 Hughes 500 MD hel
  - 1 sqn wth 6 UH-1H 20 UH-1H 18 H
  - 30 F-5B wth 10 C-5 A 10 C-130 C-130
  - Anti-Commander: 20 T-28D 40 T-33A 14 F-16C 20 T-41D 35
  - 63 F-5F
  - 40 AIM-9M Sparrow
  - 40 AIM-9L Sparrow

- **Forces Abroad**: 700,000
  - Madagascar 100 Uganda 40
  - Zimbabwe 130

- **Para Military Forces**: Security forces and border guards
  - 38,000 Workers Farmers Youth Red Guard (civilian militia) 780,000 some with small arms some heavy

- **Para Military Forces**: Civilian Defence Corps (age 50+)
  - 4,400 800 Student Home and Defence Corps
  - 3,600 250 Coast guard 35 small craft 9

- **Forces in Tea**: 55,000

- **Forces in Tea**
  - 30 T-28D 40 T-33A 14 F-16C 20 T-41D 35
  - 63 F-5F

- **Forces in Tea**
  - 40 AIM-9M Sparrow
  - 40 AIM-9L Sparrow

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- **Forces in Tea**
  - 55,000
One way of solving the problems of interoperability—that is, the problems associated with dissimilarly equipped forces—in the past was to use the "trial-and-error" method, which requires extended periods of time. LTC Hixson and Dr. Cooling make this point clear in their study of combined operations:

Historically, the problems of interoperability have been solved—when they have been solved at all—primarily through 'trial and error' during the actual conduct of operations over an extended period of time. This is a costly process, in terms of men, materials, and time: they may be lacking in future wars.3

If there will be insufficient time to solve the problems of interoperability within the CFC during, combat in future wars, what should we do in preace time to prepare for the exigencies of blitzkrieg combat? One suggestion is to make command and staff aware of the existence of various problems. Doing so will allow commanders to make plans for their solution, to maintain a spirit of mutual respect, and to develop compatibility in organization, doctrine, and equipment. But this solution won't work unless the commanders where common national interests and common political and strategic objectives; lack of this interaction always impairs optimum effectiveness of any combined operations.
2. COMBINED OPERATIONS AND COMBAT ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

Lessons of the Korean War of 1950-1953

In addition to the ROK forces, the troops of sixteen nations under the command and control of the United Nations Command (UNC) participated in various combined operations against combined Communist forces of the Moscow-Peking-Pyongyang axis. Due to the multiplicity of national forces operating within the UNC, the problems of allied interoperability ranged widely from minor cultural differences to major disagreements on tactics and doctrine. Such difficulties often resulted in insufficient cooperation and ineffective combined operations. Although the UNC quickly recognized the problems inherent in the diverse origins of its troops, it had to rely largely on the trial-and-error method to integrate these forces into a single unified command system. Unfortunately, it had no effective doctrine for dealing with combined operations.

During the integration process, almost all of the non-American troops had to be carefully trained and reoriented by the UNC to ensure compatibility with UNC (US) doctrine. At the initial stage, the UNC assumed that standardization of weapons and ammunition, along with language commonality, would provide the basic framework for allied interoperability. Only after actual integration of non-US/ROK troops had taken place did the UNC begin to realize that other profound problems existed. These included the attitudes and views of commanders and soldiers, mutual misunderstandings, cultural and
religious disparities, and geographical/climatic differences. The combat readiness of UNC troops depended largely on familiarization training offered by UNC, or their organization, equipment, and weaponry and on their ability to integrate US doctrine, procedure, and operating methods with their own. When the UNC employed these troops in combat, it also had to consider the personality and linguistic ability of the commanders in addition to such factors as unit strength, equipment, training, combat experience, leadership quality, limitations on employment imposed by higher headquarters, availability of reserves, and positioning of UN units relative to other forces on the front line.

Developed through trial and error, US methods to turn UN units into one homogeneous body in combat included:

1. attaining organizational uniformity through fitting UN units to US organizational structures in accordance with US TO & E 7-14 (Infantry Battalion) or 7-95 (Infantry Battalion Separated);

2. standardizing equipment by providing US weapons and equipment;

3. simplifying command and control by attaching small UN units to larger US units—i.e., subordinating UN units to the US command and control system;

4. obtaining qualitative uniformity through familiarization training offered by the UN Reception Center (UNRC) and by parent US units (8 and 6 weeks’ training respectively)—i.e., familiarization with US weapons, equipment, doctrine, and tactics;
(5) facilitating inter-allied communications by using dual lines of liaison—one from US organizations to UN units, the other from UN units to US units—by using English as a common language, and by providing US signal corps teams to UN units; and

(6) providing logistic systems that could support units other than US units—such as ROK units and British Commonwealth units. Petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) constituted a major supply requirement in this respect. In short, the US provided all logistic support to UN units.6

Despite the great US effort to improve the effectiveness of combined operations under a single command and control system, there remained a number of unsolved problems such as tactical differences, language barriers, differences of weapons and equipment, diversity of troop morale, and variation in combat support capabilities. In addition, problems often developed between UN and ROK commanders because of negative attitudes fostered by language difficulty and an absence of frequent and candid communications.7

Though these problems were not always minor, combined operations, operations involving US and ROK units, of the UNC during the Korean War are often evaluated as having been successful. General MacArthur's speedy recognition of the necessity for an integrated operations policy quickened the formulation of an adequate forces integration process. The protraction of the conflict provided the time needed for the UNC to replace the trial-and-error method with integration, whereas the cold war psychology prevailing among the UNC members aided in the development of common objectives and
attitudes toward the war. Though the national aspirations of South Korea for the reunification of the country had once served as a barrier to the objectives of the UNC to conclude a truce and had caused major political discord, in the end all UN members but the Indians maintained at least one common objective: to defend South Korea against Communist invasion.

Probably the most important factor that enabled the UNC to conduct effective combined operations was the strong willingness and advanced military capabilities of the US. The US demonstrated a firm commitment to the survival of South Korea to both her allies and her enemies. Massive US troop employment and US logistics supported almost every UN unit except those of the ROK and the British Commonwealth. Such efforts attested to the durability of the US commitment and encouraged the allied forces to fight in unison against their common enemies.

The success of the UNC's combined operations does not always seem so brilliant, however, when seen from the South Korean point of view. Had the US been more willing to use the South's potential to mobilize forces and provide arms for these forces to use, as she had with UN units, or had the US continued to share common objectives with South Korea throughout the war, there would be now, at least, no direct threat from the North to Seoul—the strategic heart of the South. Even if the UN forces had failed to reunify the country completely, the CFC would enjoy a better strategic position in contending with a future military conflict on the Korean peninsula.
During the Korean War, the UNC had often been in conflict with the South Korean government about the strategic and military objectives of the war and about other relevant issues. The president of South Korea, Dr. Syngman Rhee, believed that the war was basically civil; that the primary goal was to attain national unification; and that success or failure was a matter of life or death to the nation. Any retreat of UN troops was, therefore, regarded as a strategic defeat. South Korea also believed that she must have the right to restore civil order in the liberated areas with the use of UN troops and that North Korean POWs should be released. The UNC, on the other hand, seemed to believe that the war was an international conflict in which the primary goal was to restore the pre-war status quo. In addition, UNC believed that civil order in the liberated area should be restored by direct control of the UNC; and that President Rhee's action, releasing the POWs, was very harmful to the attainment of the UNC's war objectives. The basic reason for this misunderstanding was the lack of candid, frequent, and direct communications between the parties at the national command level. Because of ignorance, some US military personnel derided oriental culture and distrusted oriental people, as did a few US diplomats who served as unilateral messengers rather than as bilateral communicators. They forced their views (or Washington's views) on the South Korean government instead of trying to understand South Korean perspectives. Dr. Rhee often had to rely on his personal US advisors in order to express his views to Washington.
Future Combat on the Korean Peninsula and Effective Combined Operations

If war occurs again on the Korean peninsula, it will probably differ from the War of 1950-1953 for several reasons. Even if it remains a limited, regional military action, neither the ideological coherence of the cold-war era nor the material incentives offered by the US can be expected to entice participation by other UN members. In all probability, only the US will send additional ground forces along with substantial combat support units. As it is now, North Korean military ventures continue to be under constraints imposed by the reluctant support of China and the Soviets. But once a war occurs and is recognized as a fait accompli, the Soviets and China will actively support North Korea.

In addition, even though South Korean society is now more Westernized than ever before, the Confucian and Buddhist traditions of South Korea will be a major cultural and religious factor with which US soldiers and commanders should be familiarized. Special attention should also be given to the great differences between South and North Korean society. The perspectives of South and North Koreans have changed so greatly that South Korea no longer enjoys the kind of popular support in the North that had earlier enabled South Korean intelligence agencies to collect information effectively. During the Korean War, many in the North helped the South Korean Army because they felt that the two Koreas comprised the same nation and because they admired the democratic South Korean regime. Today, however, second generation Northerners have accepted the legitimacy of the North Korean government and are thus unlikely to be either friendly or supportive in a future conflict.
Unlike the early 1950s, urbanization in the capital zone of South Korea, accompanied by its economic development, makes it imperative to defend Seoul at all costs, despite the fact that its proximity to the front line makes it impossible to trade space with time in a conventional way to absorb the shocks of enemy attack. Seoul has now about one quarter of the total national population and functions as the political, economic, and cultural center of the nation. An abundance of manpower in the capital zone will promote defense efforts, though the complexity of the urban structure necessitates special measures for civil order and urban fighting.

Allegedly, military factors favor of North Korea. These include geography, topography and climate, and military capabilities. Geographically, North Korea enjoys proximity to China and the Soviet Union. Lines of Communication (LOCs) from China and the Soviet Union are short and secure, while the LOCs from the United States to South Korea are long and open to an enemy’s sea attack (Figure 2).

Topographically, Korea is a mountainous peninsula. Her mountain backbone, the Taiback Mountains, runs alongside the east coast. From this group, numbers of other mountains run westward in parallel until they reach the west coast. Most of the rivers, therefore, run westward. Though these mountains and rivers usually provide good natural obstacles to troop maneuvers, the western half of the peninsula has relatively low mountain slopes and numerous well-developed plains that provide good spaces for massive mechanized troop maneuvers. But, unlike the past war, allied forces cannot enjoy a topographical advantage at the initial stage of a future conflict, since the defense of Seoul becomes a critical task. The terrain between Seoul and the DMZ is
relatively favorable to a North Korean offensive. Although small mountains in the space between Seoul and the DMZ may be used as strong points for the defense of the capital zone, terrain north of Seoul is advantageous for attackers from the north. Most of the southward approaches from the DMZ are directed toward Seoul, whereas northward approaches from the DMZ are scattered. Of the five approaches from the DMZ to Seoul, three (the Musnan, Dongduchon, and Cholwon corridors) are available for combined operations of large scale formations of infantry, armor, and artillery.
Figure 2. Map of Korea
The tactical and strategic doctrine of the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) is built on the key concepts of combined-arms offensive operations, mobility, flexibility, and the integration of conventional and unconventional warfare. The NKPA doctrine stresses that decisive results are obtained only through offensive operations. Firepower and maneuver are considered the basic means of achieving combat power in the offensive. In employing firepower, the NKPA tactics emphasize the principles of mobility, surprise, mass, speed, and security. Smoke, fire, and deception are used to support the offensive. In addition, the North Koreans are capable of employing chemical, biological, and radiological agents. NKPA doctrine on the three objectives of an offensive—destruction of enemy forces, seizure and control of territory, and destruction of the enemy's will to fight—stresses the destruction of the enemy force. The destruction or reduction of the enemy force is considered more important than the acquisition and control of key terrain.

The NKPA is capable of all basic military attack formations but considers envelopment as the best form of maneuver. As in Soviet military tactics, the North Koreans favor penetration tactics in a narrow front to achieve an envelopment. Their penetration tactics favor infiltration to a greater extent than any others.11

Although preparedness in the military posture of the ROK and US alliance is far better than it was, the balance of military capabilities favors North Korea, as it did in the pre-Korean War period. The NKPA is numerically superior to the ROK and US allied forces in firepower and maneuverability as well as in air and naval power, if tactical nuclear weapons are not
considered. Some of the quantitative superiority of the NKPA capabilities will, of course, be offset by the qualitative superiority of the ROK-US forces capabilities, especially in the area of combat aircraft. Because of the numerical advantage of weapons and equipment of the NKPA, however, its superiority over ROK and US forces will not be easily offset without quantitative improvement of ROK and US military capabilities.

Since there is a strategic imbalance between South and North Korean military capabilities, North Korea prefers to achieve the rapid overthrow of the South Korean government by seizing Seoul. This objective can be attained by an all-out surprise attack, combined with conventional and unconventional warfare. All offensive efforts of the NKPA will center on an early occupation of Seoul by destroying major ROK-US defense forces to the north of the capital zone. Main attack forces of the NKPA will advance along one of the three major approaches from the DMZ to Seoul. They will conduct combined arms operations on a formidable scale using artillery, rockets, tanks, and infantry. These will be supported by air strikes and commando-type attacks on C3 facilities of ROK and US forces and assisted by secondary attack forces advancing via other approaches. The NKPA will be able to concentrate perhaps about one-third of its tank and artillery inventory on the main offensive area. In the worst case for the defenders, such a capability may mean that the NKPA’s main offensive forces will be able to concentrate more than 200 tanks in one echelon of attack waves.13

Concurrent with offensive efforts of the NKPA’s mechanized forces to the north of the capital zone on the western front, an assisting effort of light infantry
will probably be exerted on the eastern front to pursue vulnerabilities in the South Korean defense posture.

While the NKPA conducts its front line attack, its air forces, its commando forces, its naval forces, and its sabotage agents would probably concentrate their efforts to destroy major strategic targets in the South Korean rear area. During the initial stage of a surprise attack, such targets would include C³ facilities, anti-air missile systems, aircraft and airfields, major harbor facilities, munition and POL stocks, and transportation networks.¹⁴

Because of the greater accuracy of targeting, greater destructive power, and longer and faster mobility of the current weapons system that will be employed on a large scale by both enemy and friendly forces, combat in a future war on the Korean peninsula will be characterized by severity of fighting, massive firepower, and the shock of fast maneuvers. Better-coordinated defense efforts, which will be required in any future war, will have little time to be developed once hostilities start. Troop units will frequently be in uncoordinated combat situations as they become completely separated from other friendly forces, having been shocked by the overwhelming firepower and fast penetration of enemy forces.¹⁵

In sum, the nature of a future war and the probable characteristics of combat in that war seem to dictate the following efforts to improve the effectiveness of combined operations:

(1) Because of the speed of combat in the future and because of the short time provided for the defense of the capital zone, there will be no time for
allied forces to use the trial-and-error method to improve interoperabilities. Every effort to improve the effectiveness of combined operations should be made during peacetime, prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

(2) Because of the necessity of close cooperation, the US-ROK allies should have common institutional processes at a higher level than the CFC to set and adjust views on the war on a day-to-day basis. Such processes would allow for candid, frequent, and direct communications, thus reducing misunderstandings.

(3) Because of the probable structure of allied forces, the ROK Army will provide the bulk of the ground force, buttressed by some US ground combat and combat support forces. The other UN forces might not take a significant combat role but play, instead, a politically symbolic one. Because it is assumed that the war will be conducted exclusively on the Korean peninsula, with which the ROK forces are already familiar, major efforts for interoperability and familiarization should be exerted to prepare US forces in Korea and any war-time augmentation units. Major efforts for organizational interoperability must be based on combat units of the ROK Army or of the US Second Infantry Division in Korea.

(4) Because combat units of the ROK Army will comprise the major ground force, under CFC operational control (OPCON), all efforts to improve the effectiveness of combined operations through enhancing interoperability should be focused primarily on these combat units. This effort should include improvements in weapons, equipment, doctrine, training, organization, and C3.

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(5) because of the probable combat reality in a future war, the command and control system should be simplified in order to establish a relatively invulnerable communications system, even if the communication system for command and control is duplicated.

(6) Because of the need for early warning and for combined operations, combined intelligence efforts—collecting, processing, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence—should be in the CFC to overcome difficulties in gathering information from the closed society of North Korea.
3. US-ROK COMBINED FORCES COMMAND POSTURE

By and large, the posture of the US-ROK CFC forces seems well fitted to the general character of the Korean situation. However, the following factors—which could undermine the effectiveness of combined operations—should be given close attention by the military planners of the United States and South Korea.

Weapons and Equipment

Weapons and equipment of allied forces in Korea vary in sophistication, ranging from old, conventional small arms—M-1 rifles—to technologically advanced weapons—precision guided missiles (PGMs). The variety of weapons and equipment may necessitate several different efforts—logistical services, efficient tactical use and standardization—for successful combined operations.

Standardization of the weapons and equipment of allied forces is always a difficult task, one that usually requires extensive logistical modifications over prolonged time spans. In general, interoperability of the US-ROK CFC OPCON units, weapons, and equipment is relatively high because the ROK forces are armed largely with US weapons and equipment.

In the process of improving interoperability of the CFC's forces through standardization of weapons and equipment, differences in the phasing-in of newer equipment seems to be a major problem. ROK forces are armed largely with outmoded US weapons and equipment which are no longer familiar to US forces (see Table 2). Even though the South Korean
economy and industrial capabilities have grown during the last decade, South Korea has had to invest very selectively in efforts to improve US-made conventional weapons. Thus the number of indigenous Korean weapons, even if developed under US technological assistance, is minimal. On the other hand, South Korea has successfully developed indigenous equipment—individual instruments, radios, telephones, some combat vehicles—that is interchangeable in civil and military use.

Table 2. Major Combat Weapons and Equipment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Used by US and ROK forces in Korea</th>
<th>Used by ROK forces alone</th>
<th>Used by US forces alone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105mm, 135mm, 175mm, 8&quot; HOW, Vukan, 5mm, 18mm RI</td>
<td>105mm gun MRL, Oerlikon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGM/ROCKET</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawk, Nike, Red-Eye, Sidewinder, TOW, Honest John</td>
<td>Harpoon, STS Rocket, Nike, Convert</td>
<td>Stingers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-4D/E, F-5E</td>
<td>F-80</td>
<td>A-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-48A/5, M-47</td>
<td>ROKII</td>
<td>M-60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24
To avoid problems inherent in a non-standardized weapons system, South Korea chose co-production, with US technological assistance, of some US weapons in selected areas. Because of cost, co-production has been chosen in some areas in which US production was being phased out.

While co-production and technological cooperation is contributing to a standardization of weapons systems, a more integrated logistics posture of the US-ROK CFC could further enhance the interoperability of CFC forces in combat. Because ROK forces are armed mainly with outmoded US weapons systems, available wartime consumption of munitions, parts, and their replacements will depend upon peacetime stocks in US inventories and wartime production in US defense industries.

Detailed planning of the logistics roles to be performed by the US and ROK forces must assume the need for interoperability of equipment. Furthermore, the pre-positioning of spare parts and munitions—like that which occurred in the case of War Reserve Stock for Allies (WRSA)—is vital to the successful repulsion of an invasion by North Korea.

**Tactics of US and ROK Forces**

Although South Korean tactics originated from and developed in parallel with US military doctrine, there are significant differences. The reasons for these differences vary. US tactics have developed from US military tradition, available weapons, military philosophy, and anticipated security threats. Traditionally, US doctrine views massive attrition of war materials to be tolerable—in the past, domestic industries have massively produced war materials—while consumption of manpower, especially as the
result of casualties, is considered to be intolerable. In the US view, a war on the Korean peninsula would be a tactical, not a life-or-death, situation.

In contrast, Korea has neither abundant war materials nor enough space in which to fight while trading space for time. Thus loss of weapons and equipment is often regarded as more intolerable than loss of manpower. And losing even a foot of territory is often regarded as seriously as losing the war. In short, the war itself, if it occurs on the Korean peninsula, is a life-or-death situation for Koreans.

Thus the military organization, unit capabilities, military philosophy, and weapons of the Korean forces have developed unique aspects, even though much has originated from the US doctrine of giving greater weight to the human factor.

**Differences in Tactics**

US military doctrine and tactics are developed to meet various contingencies outside of CONUS, especially for a war on Europe, while South Korean tactics have been developed to meet only the North Korean threat. There are, in fact, a number of areas in which US and South Korean forces use different tactics. These include conventional offensive and defensive tactics, airborne and airmobile tactics, amphibious operations, counter-intelligence operations, and guerrilla warfare.

**Conventional Offense.** Whereas ROK forces provide equal emphasis on the seizure and retention of key terrain (or enemy ground) and on the destruction of enemy forces and their will to fight (as traditional Clausewitzians do), US doctrinal emphasis is oriented toward destruction of the enemy force. In addition, US units, oriented toward fast maneuver operations,
may move in battle by armored vehicles and helicopters, whereas most ROK units, although mechanized divisions do exist, consist of light infantry and will basically move on foot in battle and by truck to battle, while under the protection of friendly forces.

Because of ROK force improvement programs, some ROK infantry divisions have been reorganized on a rectangular rather than a triangular basis, increasing division size from three to four battalions. Thus a fourth battalion can be used for rear security, if circumstances dictate. The US division in Korea, on the other hand, has no such extra regiment or battalion available for rear security. In addition, US forces have no doctrine corresponding to the Korean tactics for mountain attack.

Conventional Defense: The ROK defensive tactics are doctrinally the same as those of the US. The Army categorizes defense tactics as either active or passive; such categories obtained before line defense, area defense or position defense, and mobile defense.

Because the defense of Seoul is so critical, South Korea adopted a forward defense strategy, one that does not allow trading space for time—a view traditional in the active defense doctrine of the US. The forward defense strategy is not, however, based on a single defense option. Rather, it mixes several defense tactics, including position defense at strong points, multi-line defense, which will consist of area defense, and mobile defense of some critical combat forces in reserve.

As a part of an active defense under the forward defense strategy, efforts to extend defense space north of the current front line through a counter-
offensive or a pre-emptive counter-offensive are regarded as valuable options.

_Airborne and Airmobile Tactics:_ Most differences between the airborne tactics of the US and ROK forces revolve around command and control procedures. Since South Korea has no air transport capabilities for heavy vehicles and arms, airmobile units have no armored vehicles. In airmobile tactics, the ROK seldom uses more than a reinforced battalion, while the US engages on a division scale. Because airmobile capabilities are greatly limited, the ROK has not significantly developed airmobile tactics.

_Amphibious Tactics:_ ROK forces have no major assets in amphibious vessels; consequently, they have not significantly developed indigenous amphibious tactics. If circumstances dictate, they might use mobilized civilian junks, in which case, amphibious tactics would be primitive. Except for transport capabilities, however, ROK amphibious tactics are almost the same as those of the US. No significant difference exists.

_Problems in Combined Operations:_ Differences in US and South Korean ground tactics could cause unnecessary loss of life in a renewed conflict. Misunderstanding of the friendly force’s operational processes in combat could easily lead to confusion or misjudgment on the part of combat commanders to such a degree that allied forces might unwittingly be fighting one another.

Yet to reorient one nation’s tactics to that of the other seems inefficient, costly, and unnecessary. Efforts to offset or complement vulnerabilities due to tactical differences must be made. To prevent
confusion or misjudgment of the friendly force's combat activities, allied forces must maintain close communications. Liaison personnel and commanders in this communication channel should be aware of tactical differences between friendly forces. To use allied force's capabilities effectively, its tactics should be given close attention when high commands allocate missions and tasks. It is conceivable, for instance, that units oriented to static defense tactics and counter-infiltration tactics might be deployed in forward positions, while units oriented to active or mobile defense tactics might be operated in reserve positions.

Another way to reduce errors caused by tactical differences is to swap sub-units between US and ROK parent commands. Doing so would provide parent unit commanders an opportunity to use a variety of tactical capabilities and orientations and thus to reduce the chances of confusion or misunderstanding. The experience of such switching during the Korean War was mixed; there were some successes and some failures. The lessons learned during this period, however, can provide some insight into making this solution workable.

In fact, combined operations have been effective, especially since the Team Spirit exercises began in 1976. Held each spring, Team Spirit, as Vreeland points out, has given commanders the chance to practice on the terrain where hostilities will actually take place. Team Spirit 81 involved US forces from all over the world and included a joint US-ROK marine amphibious assault and a practice emergency landing of fighter-bombers and cargo planes on the Seoul-Pusan expressway. Such operations have tangible value in reflecting the US commitment and ability to aid in South Korean defense.
Command and Control

The command and control system of the allied forces in Korea is so complicated that the senior US military officer could not rely on any single command system in exercising command over allied forces. US forces in Korea, UNC units, and ROK forces are not totally integrated into any one, combined command system.

There are two combined commands—the United Nations Command (UNC) and the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC)—which could, in theory, exercise command and control of all allied forces. In addition, there are a number of other command organs through which each UNC nation exercises control of its own forces. These include the ROK Ministry of National Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Headquarters of each service, and the special forces, through which South Korea exercises command control and conducts operational control for counter-infiltration operations, and the Headquarters of USFK and EUSA, through which a senior US military officer exercises command or operational control over US forces in Korea. (See Figure 1.)

Development of the CFC: It was in mid-1976, around the time when some of the voices of the Third World in the United Nations were pressing for the dissolution of the United Nations Command, that the United States and the Republic of Korea agreed to establish a ROK/US combined command system. In previous years, the problems of ROK inexperience in exercising command and control over their own forces were pointed out as a major strategic weakness of the ROK military posture. At the time when the United States adopted a policy of withdrawing its
forces from South Korea in accordance with strategic adjustments dictated by the Nixon Doctrine, operational control over ROK forces had been exclusively exercised by a senior US officer through the UNC for over a quarter of a century. Suddenly, it appeared that the ROK would, in reality, be left almost entirely on its own.

It was some time after the President of the United States decided to withdraw more of the remaining US ground forces from South Korea that the United States and South Korea arrived at a decision to have a ROK/US combined-forces command. Unlike the UNC command system, which had no prescribed relationship with the relevant ROK command channel, the CFC's command system was arranged so as to function as the vital link between the ROK and the US command channels and to have clearly defined relationships. The CFC was officially inaugurated on 7 November 1978 in accordance with Strategic Directive No. 1, issued by the ROK-US Military Committee on 28 July 1978.

CFC's Mission: The stated purpose of the CFC is to dissuade North Korea from renewal of a war by firmly expressing the strong combined wills of the ROK and the US to employ their military forces to defend South Korea, if deterrence fails. Designed to replace the UNC, whose functions might be hampered by the Third World politics in the UN, the CFC gave South Korea a way to participate in the exercise of OPCON over its own forces.

As described in CFC Pamphlet 1 of 1978, the mission and function of the CFC is clear:

a. The mission of CFC is to deter hostile acts of external aggression against the ROK by a combined military effort of the United States of
America and the Republic and, in the event deterrence fails, to defeat an external armed attack against the Republic.

b. To accomplish this mission, CFC performs the following functions:

(1) Receives strategic direction and its mission from the Military Committee.

(2) Exercises operational control over all forces assigned or attached to the command in prosecution of assigned missions.

(3) Makes recommendations to the Military Committee concerning military requirements and other functions aligned with assigned missions.

(4) Plans and conducts joint and combined exercises of those forces assigned or attached to validate operational combat readiness.

(5) Plans for the employment and support of those forces assigned, attached, or designated for assignment in contingencies.

(6) Provides intelligence support for the execution of assigned missions and coordinates combined intelligence activities in Korea to include collection of information on the enemy's conventional and unconventional warfare capabilities, preparation and dissemination of combined intelligence production, and continuous monitoring of indicators of attack.

(7) Makes recommendations for developing, equipping, and supporting assigned and attached military forces.
Complies with armistice affairs directives of the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC).

Supports CINCUNC (with combat forces, if necessary) in response to armistice violations by the opposing side.

(10) Researches, analyzes and develops strategic and tactical concepts.

Command Relationships of CFC: The CFC is basically responsible to the US/ROK Military Committee, which is co-chaired by the US and ROK chairmen of the JCS. Members of the Military Committee are, in addition to the chairmen, the JCS of both countries, US CINCPAC, CINCCFC, and one designated ROK officer. Military Committee meetings have two different sessions: a plenary session with participation by all members is usually held on an annual basis in conjunction with the annual ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting; a permanent session can be held during the periods between plenary sessions at the request of either country. In the absence of the Chairman, JCS, of the United States, CINCCFC or the senior US military officer in Korea may act in his stead. (See Fig. 3.)

The function of the ROK/US Military Committee is to issue appropriate strategic guidance to the CFC for the defense of South Korea. The Military Committee compiles defense guidance and policies that are ratified at defense ministerial meetings. ROK/US defense ministers' meetings are to be held annually or any time one is required. In view of the need to adhere to common views in a war, defense ministerial meetings and Military Committee meetings are highly valuable for effective functioning of the CFC.
Figure 3. Peacetime Command Relationships of the CFC
Defense ministerial meetings may deal with the overall defense posture of both nations as well as with issues related to overall deterrence or to preparations for and conduct of a war. Complying separately with the directions of their national command authority, defense ministers may provide general defense guidelines to the Military Committee, which will then transform them into strategic directives that will be carried out by the CFC.

There is, however, no organization to work out day-to-day problems for the Military Committee or the defense ministers to consider. An ad hoc committee at the working level is usually formed to prepare for and to follow up on the meetings of the ministers and Military Committee. Moreover, there has been no common institutional process to coordinate diplomatic views. Since the lessons from the Korean War show that political discord caused by a lack of candid and frequent diplomatic communications could have resulted in disastrous relations between allies, failure to establish an institutionalized procedure on the foreign ministerial side is lamentable.

Complexity of Command and Control: The command and control systems of the allied forces in Korea are arranged in such a way that the UNC's basic peacetime function is to maintain the terms of the Armistice Agreement, whereas the CFC is oriented to preparing for the military invasion of the ROK. The relationship between the CFC and the UNC, however, is a cooperative and supportive one. The CFC is expected to comply with UNC orders to maintain the terms of the Armistice Agreement and to provide support for UNC efforts if it is requested to do so.
In essence, the command and control systems of the allied forces in Korea are arranged in such a way that the senior US military officer in Korea is responsible to the US National Command Authority (NCA) for keeping the terms of the Armistice Agreement. At the same time, he is responsible for the defense of South Korea to both the US and ROK NCAs through a combined command and control channel.

Not all the authorities of command and control are, however, exercised by CINCCFC. The Minister of National Defense, ROK, possesses the authority of command and control over all South Korean forces, although operational control over major combat forces is mandated to CINCCFC. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Republic of Korea, also assumes the authority of operational control for counter-infiltration operations over all South Korean units in rear areas, over Home Land Reserve Forces, and over police troops.

Although CINCCFC has authority for operational control over major South Korean combat units, he has no authority for operational control over US combat units in Korea, except in peacetime for two alert fighters. If he wants to exercise command and control over USFK and UN units, he must rely on either the good auspices of CINCUSFK or CINCUNC. It is only when the United States establishes Defense Condition III or II that CINCCFC can assume operational control over some US combat units in Korea.

Command relationship of the CFC with the JCS and the Ministry of National defense, South Korea, is an awkward one. JCS/MND, South Korea, can provide guidance or directives for defense policy and strategy to CINCCFC only with the agreement of US
counterparts at the Military Committee meeting or at the Security Consultative meeting of the defense ministers. CINCCFC, as a member of the plenary session and as a co-chairman of the permanent session of the Military Committee meeting, can, of course, participate in formulating strategic guidance or directives, although this is theoretically a function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of both nations. (See Fig. 4.)

The relationship between the CFC and the Headquarters of the ROK services is, however, a cooperative and supportive one. The CFC exercises OPCON over major combat units that are under command and control without operational control of the ROK chiefs of staff.

The complexity of command and control systems now existing in Korea can be summarized as follows:

1. CINCUNC exercises operational control over UN units and some US and ROK units, whose mission is to ensure the enforcement of the terms of the Armistice Agreement.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, ROK, exercise operational control over ROK units for counter-infiltration operations in rear areas, over Home Land Reserve Forces, and over police units.

3. The Minister of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of each service exercise command control, but not operational control, over major combat units that are assigned to CINCCFC. They exercise operational control over some ROK units that are not mandated to CINCCFC.
Figure 4. CFC Command and Control Structure
(4) CINCUSFK exercises command and operational control over all US forces in Korea except for two alert fighters, which are under CINCCFC's operational control.

(5) CINCCFC exercises operational control (not command control) over major combat units of ROK forces and two alert fighter squadrons of US forces. He may assume authority for operational control over US combat units when the United States NCA declares certain defense conditions. CINCCFC is authorized to respond to the requests of CINCUNC for keeping the Armistice Agreement or of JCS/MND for counter-infiltration operations in peacetime. JCS/MND and the Chiefs of Staffs of each service of the ROK Forces may provide rear area security in connection with frontal operations of the CFC.

Problems: It goes without saying that a single unified command system is the most effective way to conduct combined operations. It is practically impossible, however, to integrate all the allied forces into one command system, whether it be the UNC or the CFC. The UNC has not been authorized to integrate non-UN units—the ROK Forces—and the ROK has not been willing to bestow OPCON authority on the UNC, because there is no channel of communications between the UNC and the ROK national command authority. On the other hand, the CFC has no authority for operational control over UN units, because the CFC is basically designed for the combined operations of US and ROK forces. The current dual command and control systems seem, however, an acceptable arrangement to carry out peacekeeping tasks while maintaining a structure capable of conducting combat operations.
The inconsistency between the peacekeeping mission of the UNC and the war-fighting tasks of the CFC seems to pose an odd problem for the effective combined operations of allied forces. Actually, most ROK and US units assigned to peacekeeping tasks while under UNC control will be engaged in combat tasks during wartime under the CFC's operational control. Continuity of the function of Commander-in-Chief can actually exist, because the senior US officer can assume authority over the CINC's of UNC, CFC, and USFK. He may utilize either UNC units, CFC units, or USFK units in accordance with the appropriate command system of each. Units would be controlled through different command staffs, however, when they shift from peacekeeping duties to combat operations.

Unfortunately, there is no staff organization to link the many functions of these various commands. The US senior officer has sole authority to link these command systems. A major problem in our current command system, then, is the fact that one man is burdened with too many tasks in too many commands!

Although most of these organizational problems originated from the complexity of international politics, they were promoted to some degree by differences in US and ROK attitudes toward the defense of South Korea. South Korea wants to defend her territory, without any hesitation and at all cost; US and UN members, on the other hand, prefer to have more options with regard to renewed hostilities on the Korean peninsula.

This difference of attitudes is well expressed in the current arrangement of the CFC operational control system. No single US unit is assigned to the OPCON
of CINCCFC in peacetime, while most combat units of the ROK forces are assigned to the CFC.

This arrangement poses a problem for CINCCFC in his efforts to improve the interoperability of combined forces in peacetime. Because as he controls no single US unit in peacetime, he has no real power to impose his concept of effective combined operations upon US units. Theoretically, he does have the authority to recommend actions to enhance the interoperability capabilities of US units, since many of them will be under his OPCON in wartime. Of course, he may be able to suggest ways to improve the interoperability of US units, not as CINCCFC but as CINCUSFK or as the Senior US Military Officer; but his authority in this case lies only in recommending matters relating solely to US forces, not to the interoperability of US units in combined operations. CINCUSFK is not authorized to deal with the combined operations of the CFC. In practice, however, he may exercise his several command functions at his convenience. But, in theory, he has no structured way to improve the interoperability of US units; ironically, he has authority to recommend proper actions for improvement of interoperability of the ROK units that are under his operational control. If the theoretical limit to CINCCFC's authority is adhered to, then the only way CINCCFC could improve the effectiveness of combined operations would be to develop recommended doctrine for the employment of US and ROK forces in combined operations.

The basic problem seems to stem from a lack of balance in the current make-up of CFC OPCON units, a problem which may cause future discord between the United States and South Korea. South Korea may continue to distrust the reliability of the
US defense commitment, even though she feels satisfied with the symbolic political gesture of the US. CINCCFC's ability to conduct effective combined operations may, however, depend upon whether the United States can assuage South Korean doubts about US intentions regarding the attachment of US combat units to the CFC. Recent developments between the US and South Korea seem to have cleared up South Korean doubts, at least at the political and symbolic levels.

Possible Solutions: No single method seems to be politically viable to solve the problems caused by the complexity of the current command and control systems. Several possible solutions should, however, be given close attention:

(1) The procedures for command and control transfer from one command to another—for instance, from UNC to CFC—should be defined. The OPCON over UN units that would actively participate in war-fighting should be preplanned, even though the plan itself may remain a conceptual one. The UNC's role in war-fighting as opposed to the CFC's role should be clearly delineated.

(2) If it is impractical to release the senior US military officer from his various commands so that he might concentrate his efforts on one unified command, he should have special staffs who will assist him by conducting continuous liaison with his various commands.

(3) US forces in Korea should be under the OPCON of CINCCFC in peacetime. Such an arrangement would give him practical authority to enhance the interoperability of US units in peacetime. If it is impossible to assign US units to CINCCFC, the role
of the ROK Deputy-CINCCFC and of other ROK
staff members within the CFC Headquarters should
be enhanced so that South Koreans feel that they are
participants in OPCON exercises conducted primarily with their own forces.

(4) Techniques for the effective use of differently-
oriented units should be studied and developed in
order to ensure effective combined operations.
Previous combined exercises and individual studies
have pointed out the need for such techniques, but
progress remains at an embryonic stage. To date,
there are no field manuals for CFC's reference.

Organizational Employment of the
Headquarters, CFC

The basic principle for staffing the CFC is to make
cross-national assignments to chiefs or deputy chiefs
in one section. This method allows for efficient day-
to-day communications between US and ROK
officers within the CFC. To communicate effectively
with other command groups, most US staff members
of Headquarters, CFC, should also be assigned to
other staff jobs at the headquarters of other
commands. Such dual assignments would help
communication with Pacific Command (PACOM)
and JCS, thus contributing to the improved
effectiveness of combined operations.

There seems to be no critical problem in the current
method of staff assignments to HQ, CFC. Cross-
national assignment of US and ROK officers and dual
assignment of US officers to CFC and USFK would,
however, enhance mutual understanding and would
improve the weakness of the current command
arrangement.
Most South Korean staff members are assigned as chiefs at combat support sections (Table 3), despite the fact that South Korean forces have little capability in this area. Most US staff members, on the other hand, are assigned as chiefs at command and operational control sections, even though the US has not assigned its combat units to the CFC in peacetime. Such assignment procedures may cause difficulties in the future, although no problem has surfaced up to now.

In staffing the CFC, additional consideration should be given to the military capabilities of both national forces. As a start, one major position of command and operational control—perhaps the planning or operations section—should be allocated to a South Korean officer, and one or more US officers should be assigned as chiefs at combat support sections. Such changes would reduce potential tension arising from the employment of troops of differing nationalities.

In addition to changes in staffing procedures, there are two other significant considerations about the make-up of the CFC Headquarters; these involve the roles of the chiefs of staff and of the CINC himself. The major functions of command and staff devolve upon CINCCFC and the Chief of Staff, CFC, who are of the same nationality. Despite the latter's significant function as chief of staff, CFC, he wears, as CINCCFC does, five hats: Deputy-CINCUNC, Deputy-CINCUSFK, CINC USAFK, Commander Air Component Command, CFC, and Chief of Staff, Ground Component Command, CFC. In contrast to the role of Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff, CFC, who is a South Korean, has no defined function other than that of merely carrying out the directions of his US superior. In short, the allocation of missions and mandate of authority within the headquarters
Table 3. Organization and Operation of Headquarters, CFC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Chief</th>
<th>Deputy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational Command</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Korea</td>
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<td>Chief of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Position</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subtotals</td>
<td></td>
<td>US: 7</td>
<td>US: 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total officers assigned to CFC HQ: 182 Korean; 133 US

1. US officers are mostly assigned to command and operation, and strategic planning positions.
2. Korean officers are mostly assigned to combat support positions.
organization leaves much to be desired from the Korea point of view. Most central functions and staff posts are assigned to US military officers, no matter how heavy the burdens they bear from various other jobs they hold. The Chief of Staff, CFC, for example, a US Air Force Lieutenant General is to assume the position of Chief of Staff, Ground Component Command, CFC (see Figure 4). Such an assignment is virtually incomprehensible to South Koreans, whose criticism focuses on the qualifications of an air force officer to command ground forces operations.

It is also instructive that Deputy-CINCCFC of NATO has been accorded significant authority and responsibility. He is authorized to supervise facility plans, ECM, standardization of equipment, technical manuals, sea and coastal control facilities, performance of C3I, and mine warfare; to review, adjust and control wartime missions and tasks of units; and to coordinate subordinate units in carrying out missions and tasks. But, unlike CINCCFC NATO, the CINCCFC assumes almost every responsibility. His Korean Deputy-Commander, however, is deprived of responsibilities of any comparable importance except to act for his superior in his absence.

In view of the burdens of overlapping duties assigned to the CINC and Chief of Staff, CFC, delegation or tasking of authority and responsibility to their deputies should be taken at the earliest possible date. First, Deputy-CINCCFC should be used to promote allied interoperability by giving him several roles now performed by the CINC alone. This change would release the CINC from some of the burden of his duties. Second, the functions of the Chief of Staff should be shared with his deputy. Third, the Chief of Staff should be released from the
burdens of multiple, overlapping functions, especially those of Chief of Staff, Ground Component Command, CFC, a position that should be given to a South Korean Army officer familiar with the doctrine, tactics, and training of major CFC OPCON units—ROK Ground Forces.

**Staff Member Qualities**

US officers fill the posts of chief at various staff sections of the CFC. They have relatively great authority given them by the US and show flexibility and ease in their staff work through dual assignment. The CINCCFC, having recognized the importance of a competent staff, selects highly qualified US officers and provides them with the appropriate education prior to their assignment to the CFC; contact turnovers are established so that the new officers can become familiar with their jobs before assuming their responsibilities. The management of the careers of CFC staff members has also been given priority over others; as a result, all US officers assigned to the CFC show self-confidence and are proud of being selected.

US CFC staff members have a relatively stronger professional and academic background than other US officers and ROK staff members. In general, they have greater knowledge of and more experience with combined work. Their careers are well managed in accordance with their specialties. South Korean staff members of CFC, on the other hand, have little experience with combined work as well as disrupted careers in their specialties. Instead of early assignment to the CFC, an early transfer to other units is common, resulting in a vacuum in their former CFC staff function. Moreover, they waste time and effort in correcting English while processing
their staff work. Because English is not their native tongue, the language barrier seems to cause them great psychological stress.

In considering the current English proficiency of South Korean officers and the wartime requirements of liaison officers, South Korean forces should exert greater effort to improve their officers' qualifications for combined operations as well as their English proficiency. The CFC should continue to provide language training practice to South Korean staff members.
4. CONCLUSION: IMPROVING US-ROK COMBINED OPERATIONS

In order to improve the interoperability of units, endless effort seems necessary if one attempts to achieve it only through standardization of unit capability—weapons system, doctrine, tactics, and their organization. Unfortunately, there is a deep gap between US and ROK forces in their current status of armaments, military tradition, and socio-economic background.

In addition, it seems inefficient to reorient South Korean tactics to those of the US, because South Korean forces have different arms and tasks. Moreover, the mixture of different tactics would pose difficulties to an enemy in coping with them just as it does friendly forces. It seems more reasonable to find a solution for problems of standardization in better doctrine and techniques for combined operations rather than in uniformity of unit capabilities.

Rationalization does not mean either the Americanization or the Koreanization of the system's operation. It should, however, result in greater effectiveness and efficiency. As opposed to the enormous budget support needed for standardizing of unit capabilities, rationalizing of system operations probably needs more conceptual work and relatively less budgetary funding. Standardization may enhance the integrity of units in a combined force system as it increases their interoperability. But rationalization of the combined force system will increase effectiveness of combined operations without improving the interoperability of units. Each
unit may retain its own characteristics in organization, tactics, doctrine, and logistical support, but each will be able to demonstrate coordinated combat capabilities if the combined force system is rationalized.

Because of the characteristics of a possible future war and of the combined forces' posture on the Korean peninsula, actions for rationalization of system operations seem necessary to ensure the effectiveness of combined operations. These actions include:

(1) developing doctrine and techniques of combined operations using units that have less interoperability;

(2) institutionalizing a routine political review process to compare views on the war on a day-to-day working basis;

(3) defining properly the wartime function of UNC and the peacetime function of CFC in order to ensure consistency of command and control and the transition of units from peacetime to wartime status;

(4) simplifying the command and control procedure for US forces in Korea, perhaps by integrating them into the combined force system in peacetime;

(5) allocating mission and tasks in accordance with military capabilities in such areas as combat capabilities, combat support capabilities, and logistics (a realistic logistical posture is significant in view of the South Korean weapons system, of which the availability of munitions and parts will be dependent upon the availability of US support);
(6) sharing the centralized authority of command and staff functions with the appropriate national assistants in the Headquarters of CFC; and

(7) providing proper training for Korean officers in combined operations procedures and in the use of the English language.

In summary, operations of the Combined Forces Command in Korea must be improved. While US and South Korean combined operations often suffer from differing objectives and doctrine (occasionally aggravated by cultural bias) the North Korean threat has remained vigorous and convincing. Compounding the problem of meeting that threat is the fact that since the Korean War of 1950-1955, our intelligence capability—especially in the area of human intelligence—has decreased as North Korean society has become more indoctrinated and intransigent. Thus, a major outbreak of hostilities may afford little or no warning. Certainly there will be no time to reorganize, to streamline command structures, or to insure responsiveness of command. A heavy North Korean attack could conceivably reach Seoul while UNC/CFC commanders try to sort out responsibilities and reorganize as necessary. Of course the price of failure to make required adjustments before hostilities begin would be terrible—more so since it is a price that is avoidable. These recommendations are by no means all inclusive; however, as we work toward rationalization, standardization, and interoperability in one area, we will see applications in others. Eventually, streamlined, responsive command will become the foundation of our thinking about combat on the Korean peninsula. The result will be a hardened, effective deterrent, a truly combat-ready Combined Forces Command.
ENDNOTES

1. USAF 34-2:Standardization (Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability), 15 May 1979. For definitions and implications for this study, see John Hixson and Benjamin F. Cooling, Combined Operations in Peace and War (Carlisle Barracks: US Military History Institute, 1982); William Fox, Inter-Allied Cooperation During Combat Operations, History of the Korean War, 3 Vols. (Tokyo: Headquarters, Far East Command, Military History Section, 1952); and James M. Simpson, Wartime Interoperability Problems Posed by Differences in South Korean and United States Army Tactics, A Thesis for MA, (Fort Leaventworth: Command and General Staff College, 1980). Also of interest are the following definitions from US Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1 April 1984):

rationalization—Any action that increases the effectiveness of allied forces through more efficient or effective use of defense resources committed to the alliance. Rationalization includes consolidation, reassignment of national priorities to higher allied needs, standardization, specialization, mutual support or improved interoperability, and greater cooperation. Rationalization applies to both weapons and non-weapons military matters.

standardization-The process by which the Department of Defense achieves the closest practicable cooperation among the Services and Defense agencies for the most efficient use of research, development, and production resources, and agrees to adopt on the broadest possible basis the use of: a. common or
compatible operational, administrative, and logistic procedures; b. common or compatible technical procedures and criteria; c. common, compatible, or interchangeable supplies, components, weapons, or equipment; and d. common or compatible tactical doctrine with corresponding organizational compatibility.

**Interoperability**—The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.


5. Ibid.


7. Ibid., pp. 243-251; for the lack of candid communication between US diplomatic people/UNC and the Korean government, see Franchska Rhee, *Diaries During the Korean War series in Joong-Ang Ilbo* (Daily Newspaper, June 1983-March 1984); to promote understanding of US government in Korean situation, President of Republic of Korea, Syngman Rhee, often had to rely on his personal friends who stayed in America—see Robert T. Oliber, *Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea 1942-1945* (Seoul: Panmun Book, 1978).

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.


12. For military balance, see Marks, *North and South Korean OB*.

13. Ibid, pp. 18-20; Simpson, *Wartime Interoperability Problems*, pp. 10-15; the number of tanks here is my calculation, which is based on North Korean tactics and available approaches. It is not confirmed by any official intelligence estimate.


15. This is a presumption about a conventional war in the future. For a nuclear war, see A. A. Sidorenko, *The Offensive*, trans. under auspices of US Air Force (Moscow: 1970; Washington, DC: GPO, 1975), and US Strategic Doctrine: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 97th Congress, December 14, 1982 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1983).


22. Ibid.
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