THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Patrick M. Cronin
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CNA's Total Force Utilization Study was chartered to support development of a Total Force Master Plan for the Navy. This research memorandum provides essential historical background for such a plan by examining how the Total Force policy, particularly as it relates to active and reserve Naval forces, has evolved since its inception nearly two decades ago.
MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION LIST

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Encl: (1) CNA Research Memorandum 87-78, "The Total Force Policy in Historical Perspective," by Patrick M. Cronin, June 1987

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded as a matter of possible interest.

2. This Research Memorandum examines the evolution of the total force concept, which envisions an all-volunteer active force supplemented by reservists and civilians, since Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird suggested the idea in 1970. Special emphasis is given to the Navy's total force. The record of Congressional testimony indicates that economic and political considerations have been the principal impetus behind the development of the total force. Moreover, the record reflects no systematic or sustained attempt to analyze the validity of this concept in the light of prevailing politico-military and demographic conditions. These facts should be considered when assessing the mix of active and reserve naval forces or the role of the Naval Reserve in the maritime strategy.

Robert F. Lockman
Director
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SNCL</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A1</td>
<td>ASSTSECNAV MRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF38</td>
<td>USNA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF42</td>
<td>NAVFGSCOL</td>
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<tr>
<td>FF44</td>
<td>NAVWARCOL</td>
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<tr>
<td>FF67</td>
<td>NAVFITWEPSCOL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FJAI</td>
<td>COMMNAV MILPERSCOM</td>
</tr>
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<td>NAVPERSRANDCEN</td>
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<td>OP-01R</td>
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<td>OP-12</td>
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<td>OP-13</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP-60</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Patrick M. Cronin

Naval Planning, Manpower, and Logistics Division
ABSTRACT

CNA's Total Force Utilization Study was chartered to support development of a Total Force Master Plan for the Navy. This research memorandum provides essential historical background for such a plan by examining how the Total Force policy, particularly as it relates to active and reserve Naval forces, has evolved since its inception nearly two decades ago.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The Origin of the Total Force Policy</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vietnam as a Manpower Quandary</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Laird Memorandum</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Schlesinger and the Total Force Policy</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Dismantling the Total Force</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Post-Vietnam Demobilization</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How Many Naval Reservists?</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Looking for Creative Solutions</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Legacy of Retrenchment</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Rethinking Manpower Requirements</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discerning Manpower Requirements</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'Studying the Problem to Death'</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Manpower Mobilization System</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Manning the 600-Ship Navy</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Force-Manning and Force Structure</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Naval Reserve</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Horizontal Integration</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Building 'One Navy'</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Institutionalizing the Total Force</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Congress Lays Down the Law</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Navy's Total Force Advocate</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mobilizing the Navy's Total Force</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Historical Lessons of the Total Force Debate</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Number of Naval Selected Reservists</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Navy SELRES Studies</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Petty Officer Shortfall (E4-E9)</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Comparison of NAMMOS Requirements and Proposed Selected Reservists</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Naval Selected-Reserve Strengths</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Planned Introduction of Fighter-Attack Aircraft into the Naval Reserves</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Naval Reserve Personnel Requests</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Naval SELRES Projections</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Since the advent of the All-Volunteer Force in 1973, defense policymakers have embraced a Total Force policy chiefly designed to shift missions and hardware from the active forces to reserve components. Rooted more in domestic considerations than in strategic concepts, the principal impetus of this policy has been to maintain affordable armed forces based on inducement rather than induction. In the early 1970's, the twin effects of decreasing military budgets and increasing manpower costs focused attention on the problem of how to fulfill America's worldwide military commitments with fewer soldiers and sailors. The solution, called the Total Force policy, envisioned placing increasing reliance upon reserve forces relative to active forces.

While the rhetoric of the Total Force policy has often outstripped its implementation, the military's growing dependence upon reserves is readily documented. Indeed, in 1984, Congress passed legislation requiring the three military services to produce an annual report "outlining in detail" concrete steps being taken to further integrate active and reserve forces. Moreover, under the 'Total Force' rubric, the standard formula for determining the optimum balance between active and inactive forces has been to place units in the Selected Reserve whenever feasible "to maintain as small an active component peacetime force as national security policy and military strategy permit." Even the Navy, with its unique requirement of maintaining perpetual and global forward deployments, has over the past fifteen years significantly increased its reliance upon part-time and inactive personnel. This trend shows no sign of abating.

The notion of relying upon a relatively small active force during peacetime dates back to the earliest days of the Republic. Echoing this idea, General George C. Marshall remarked at the close of World War II:

What then must we do to remain strong and still not bankrupt ourselves on Military expenditures to maintain a prohibitively expensive professional Army

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2. Statement by Lawrence J. Korb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics, 10 March 1983, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Senate Armed Services Committee, p. 1226.
even if one could be recruited? President Washington answered that question in recommendations to the first Congress to convene under the United States Constitution. He proposed a program for the peacetime training of a citizen Army.¹

In 1912, the War Department's statement of its organizing principle struck a similar theme:

*It is the traditional policy of the United States that the military establishment in time of peace is to be a small, regular Army and that the ultimate war force of the Nation is to be a great Army of citizen-soldiers. This fundamental theory of military organization is sound economically and politically.*²

Hence, the United States historically has relied on part-time militia or reserve forces that could be called up for full-time duty during wartime. The Total Force policy, which also assumes a large mobilization force in time of war, does not differ radically from this tradition. But if the Total Force policy of the past two decades has its roots in U.S. history, it also represents a unique departure from post-World War II practice. The Total Force policy has marked a fundamental shift in the composition of the armed forces because of the degree to which the reserves have been emphasized. In short, it is increasingly evident that there is a correlation between force manning and readiness. The balance between active and reserve forces cannot indefinitely continue to shift toward the reserves without affecting the ability of the United States to respond swiftly and with sufficient military force to crises and wars. Furthermore, it is not clear that Congressional and Defense Department leaders have fully considered the political and psychological implications of having to mobilize the reserves for any large-scale contingency, or whether the United States can count on having sufficient time to mobilize its reserves for general war.³

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3. The idea that placing more missions into the reserves poses a danger to the readiness of U.S. military forces is argued persuasively by James L. Lacy, 'Whither the All-Volunteer Force?' *Yale Law and Policy Review* (Fall 1986). Unfortunately, there is no agreement on a method of measuring what mix of active and inactive forces constitutes an acceptable national risk.
This research memorandum traces the evolution of the Total Force policy from its inception almost two decades ago. The specific purpose is to provide essential historical background for analysts and officials who may be charged with devising a Total Force Master Plan for the Navy. It is hoped that by delving into the historical record of the debate, a broader understanding may be achieved in order to capitalize upon the good, or at least avoid the bad, ideas in the U.S. experience. Because such an undertaking is not without risks, certain caveats should be borne in mind by the reader.

First, by emphasizing the evolution of the Total Force concept, this paper connects unique and diverse issues related to manpower into a single framework that may obscure salient aspects of those issues were they studied independently and in greater depth. In short, the broad focus of this paper, coupled with time and space limitations, requires conciseness in order to draw meaningful conclusions from the historical record. The questions implicitly underlying this study are broad and center upon the character of the Total Force; specifically (1) What is the Total Force concept and why did it emerge when it did?; (2) Where has it been, in terms of issues debated and initiatives attempted?; and (3) Where is it going and how should it get there? While these questions help to exhume critical themes of the past so that they may be applied to the future, they cannot in and of themselves provide finely detailed solutions.

A second limitation of this study concerns the often incomplete or nebulous character of the historical record. For this paper, that record largely comprises unclassified manpower reports, as well as unclassified Congressional testimony by a variety of Defense Department and Navy officials since the current Total Force debate began in 1970. Documents such as Congressional hearings are accessible and finite; they also have a tendency, however, to obfuscate or mislead the researcher because officials speaking for the public record sometime resort to euphemism, or, occasionally, to outright omission. Thus, even though the purpose of this study is to present the true 'historical record' in order to assist better long-range planning, it is prudent to remember that the record itself is not without uncertainty.

Third, because this study attempts to separate the events related to the Naval Reserve from the other components of the Navy, while separating the Navy from the other military services, it produces unavoidable artificialities. It is beyond the scope of this study to settle the methodological problem of determining cause from effect. This study has a built-in bias because it is principally concerned with the better integration of active, reserve, and civilian forces of the Navy. As such, it does not address the integration of the Navy with other military services, the Coast Guard, and allied forces. While these are important aspects of any true total force, they must await another study.
CHAPTER 2

THE ORIGIN OF THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY

This chapter traces the development of the Total Force concept from its origin in 1970, when then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird first broached the notion in a memorandum, through 1973, when Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger codified the concept into policy.

Vietnam as a Manpower Quandary

Many authors have examined the Vietnam war as a precipitator of political, social, and economic problems in the United States. Less obvious, however, are the ramifications of the Vietnam war for military manpower issues. The quandary caused by Vietnam led directly to the decision to terminate the draft and to initiate the All-Volunteer Force. Faced with waning political support for the war, as well as economic and civil unrest at home, the Nixon administration was confronted in 1970 with three distinct problems: first, the need to demobilize, to wind down the war in Vietnam and ‘bring the boys back home'; second, the need to end the burdensome political liability of conscription; and third, the need for greater economy, especially with regard to the military.

It is difficult to pinpoint the precise relationship between the peculiar economic and political pressures of the late 1960s and early 1970s and the advent of the Total Force concept. It is clear, however, that the original Total Force concept was much broader in scope than the subsequent Total Force policy of the 1980s. Thus, it is worth recalling that Total Force issues originally were symptomatic of a larger phenomenon involving the demobilization of America's military might and, ultimately, the loss of a President's political power. It is no coincidence, for example, that almost simultaneously with the announcement of a Total Force concept, President Nixon unveiled his strategic doctrine of 'sufficiency,' which dovetailed with the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and placed costly offensive and defensive systems in abeyance. The Total Force concept, in essence, meant that the fiscal stringency being applied to strategic systems was also to be applied to the fastest growing portion of the defense budget: manpower. These were the prevailing conditions in which the Total Force concept originated.

President Nixon entered office committed to ending the draft, and in March 1969 he created a commission to examine the prospects for a voluntary military system. Chaired by former Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates, the 'Gates Commission' issued its findings in a February 1970 report that confirmed the viability of an All-Volunteer Force. Shortly thereafter, on 21 August 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird dispatched a memorandum in which he first applied the phrase 'Total Force.' This memorandum, which inaugurated a new concern for the reserves, stressed the need to capitalize on all available forces:

Within the Department of Defense, these economies will require reductions in overall strengths and capabilities of the active forces, and increased reliance on the combat and combat support units of the Guard and Reserves... Emphasis will be given to concurrent considerations of the total forces, active and reserve, to determine the most advantageous mix to support national strategy and meet the threat. A total force concept will be applied in all aspects of planning, programming, manning, equipping and employing Guard and Reserve forces.

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 1971, Laird explained the Nixon administration's new guiding concept:

In defense planning, the Strategy of Realistic Deterrence emphasizes our need to plan for optimum use of all military and related resources available to meet the requirements of Free World security. These Free World military and related resources—which we call 'Total Force'—include both active and reserve components of the U.S., those of our allies, and the additional military capabilities of our allies and friends that will be made available through local efforts, or through provision of appropriate security assistance programs [emphasis added].

The origin of this 'Total Force' policy was thus rooted in the political and economic realities of the time. As conceived by Laird, it applied equally to U.S. forces, active and reserve, and NATO and other allied forces, as well as to South Vietnamese forces that were to assume greater responsibility for the defense of their country under the Nixon policy of 'Vietnamization.' Because resources—and the political will to spend those resources—were scarce, U.S. defense planners attempted a greater economy of Western defense assets than had been achieved during the height of the Vietnam war. According to the tenets of the Total Force concept, America's NATO allies would be required to share a larger portion of the burden of defending the European continent; South Vietnamese soldiers would be forced to fight the war in Southeast Asia without the assistance of U.S. ground troops; and less expensive U.S. reserve forces would be expected to assume more missions previously assigned to America's active forces. In addition, the Laird Memorandum emphasized that the reserves were to be the "initial and primary source of augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of the active forces." More recently, the Total Force policy has come to be associated almost exclusively with the integration of the reserve components into the active military services. But the original intent of the Total Force concept was much more sweeping. At the same time, the reserves gradually have been transformed from a primary augmentation force to a 'force-in-being,' a development quite beyond the intentions of the original Laird Memorandum.

The prevailing conditions of the early 1970s not only affected the administration's division of scarce defense resources, they also altered the way in which administration officials needed to approach the Legislative branch of government. The Total Force policy was created with both of these concerns in mind. Defense Department officials attempted to demonstrate to Congress that they were sincere about trimming the Pentagon's budget, while avoiding the dismantlement of the politically popular Guard and Reserve forces. Accordingly, defense officials used the Total Force policy to forestall additional Congressional cuts in defense spending. A persistent pattern of Congressional concern can be traced back to the inception of the Total Force concept, when the number of military personnel and Naval ships began a steady decline from their 1968 peak. But abstract concepts lacking tangible support—in terms of allocating defense resources—could buy only so much time from Congress; eventually House and Senate leaders demanded concrete deeds and not mere words.

Among Congressional concerns of the time, the notion of preventing future 'Vietnams' may have been preeminent. One means of effecting that kind of constraint was to harness the President's ability to mobilize

forces for war. It followed that if enough hardware and missions could be transferred into the reserves, any President contemplating U.S. military intervention without Congressional support would have to think twice, because large-scale conflict would probably require mobilizing the reserves. Thus, while military officials might invoke the Total Force concept essentially as a means of offsetting a drastic reduction in military capability, key Congressional leaders would use the Total Force concept to compel the Navy and other services to alter the balance of active and reserve forces. Congress could thereby make it almost structurally impossible for the military services to engage in a conflict on the scale of the Vietnam war without a lengthy and perhaps politically arduous mobilization process approved by both the President and the Congress. Such contentious policies go to the heart of the American Constitution and the balance of powers between the Executive and Legislative branches of government.

But the Defense Department, and consequently the Navy, was much less interested in shifting the balance of active and reserve military forces in favor of the reserves than was Congress, a point that proved to be an enduring source of tension. Throughout the early 1970s, at the time of the introduction of the All-Volunteer Force, the Defense Department consistently sought to reduce reserve-manpower requirements, particularly those of the Navy. There seemed to be an inverse relationship between the Defense Department’s willingness to promote a Total Force concept and its desire to bolster the end strength of the reserves. Senator John C. Stennis, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services committee, commented on this contradiction during hearings in March 1972: "I am concerned with the mission of the Reserves. After all, just how willing are we to use the Reserves? I think one of the most effective things you can do is call out the Reserves, but I don’t know how we are coming out on it." One explanation for this variance was that Defense Department officials, while possibly hoping to shore up the reserves, were forced to contend with post-Vietnam demobilization and

1. Apart from the early months of the Korean War, U.S. reservists have been called into action on only five occasions: the Berlin crisis (1961); the Cuban missile crisis (1962); the Pueblo affair (1968); the limited Vietnam build-up (1968); and the New York City area postal strike (1970). Each of these met with very limited success, and it is significant that there has not been a single involuntary activation of reserve forces since the Total Force policy was set in motion. See James Lacy, "Naval Reserve Forces: The Historical Experience with Involuntary Recalls," CNA Research Memorandum 86-76, April 1986.


declining defense budgets. In such a hostile funding environment, active-force programs—representing stronger institutional interests—were given a higher priority than the reserves. Hence, partly in order to head off serious Congressional opposition, Defense Department officials chose to embrace, in theory, the notion of upgrading reserve missions and forces. But as Congressional support of the reserves became more intense, the Defense Department found it increasingly necessary to make the Total Force concept first a full-fledged policy and, ultimately, a reality.

Schlesinger and the Total Force Policy

The next significant change in the Defense Department’s adoption of the Total Force concept occurred during James Schlesinger’s tenure as Secretary of Defense. In a follow-on memorandum to that written by Secretary Laird in 1970, Secretary Schlesinger on 23 August 1973 codified the Total Force concept into an official administration policy. While the distinction remained more imaginary than real, the shift solidified the concept of Total Force in such as way as to shape the manpower debate for the next decade and a half. The Schlesinger Memorandum stated emphatically that the the “Total Force is no longer a 'concept.' It is now the Total Force Policy which integrates the Active, Guard and Reserve forces into a homogenous whole.” Echoing the Laird Memorandum, Secretary Schlesinger added: “It must be clearly understood that implicit in the Total Force Policy, as emphasized by Presidential and National Security Council documents, the Congress and Secretary of Defense policy, is the fact that the Guard and Reserve forces will be used as the initial and primary augmentation of the active forces.” As before, however, the Nixon administration was officially touting the reserves as a means of coping with a confluence of pressures, such as soaring manpower costs (from 42 percent of total defense outlays in fiscal year 1968 to 56 percent in fiscal year 1973), largely due to the advent of the All-Volunteer Force, and declining retention and quality. And yet, as before, the reserves were in practice on a consistent, seemingly irreversible decline.

2. For example, the selected reserve end strength for all services fell from 925,000 in FY 1972 to 823,000 in FY 1976, an overall decline of 10 percent. Although active-force end strength all fell about 10 percent during the same period—from 2.3 million in FY 1972 to less than 2.1 million in FY 1976—the Navy’s selected reservists experienced a reduction far worse than the reserves as a whole. Naval selected reservists numbered only 97,000 in FY 1976, compared with 124,000 four years earlier. See U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1987, (February 5, 1987).
Some officials charged with reserve affairs were not averse to speaking out about this chasm between rhetoric and policy. In 1972, during authorization hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Theodore C. Marrs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, noted that there had been "strong efforts in the past to eliminate the militia" and that only "Congress, in its wisdom" had argued that the reserves be "prepared for usefulness." According to Assistant Secretary Marrs, the Total Force concept was created by Defense Secretary Laird to make the reserves a more credible part of the deterrent force:

Over a five year period ending in Fiscal Year 1969, the net combat serviceable equipment assets of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve were reduced by $72 million. Deliberate strength reductions and force structure reductions would without doubt have followed the equipment starvation had not the Congress enforced statutory floors under the personnel strengths. The result was an Army National Guard and Army Reserve structure with a mass of members and a minimum of equipment....

This 'shell' was a surprise and a challenge to me. It was also a challenge to Secretary Laird and to Assistant Secretary Roger Kelley who quickly saw the trend of rising manpower costs of active duty manpower and the need for a practicable and attainable solution.

From this mutual recognition of the challenge, the 'Laird Memorandum' was signed in August 1970. That document, which has been expanded and clarified in the Defense Report recently presented to Congress by the Secretary, was intended to be the basis for providing bone and sinew to the mass of flesh that had been the reserves of the Army and Navy. It was intended to match equipment to people and make possible the training required to produce timely responsiveness in the Guard and Reserve--to make them a visible and credible part of the deterrent force.

Although the Total Force policy was designed to provide, as Secretary Marrs put it, "bone and sinew to the mass of flesh that had been the reserves," a lengthy lag continued to exist between administrations' rhetorical commitment to strengthening the reserves and their tangible monetary and policy commitment. It is surprising how far the

declaratory policy of Total Force was able to outstrip the action policy of Total Force; despite the transformation of Total Force from a vague concept to an officially embraced policy, the Guard and Reserve forces, especially the Naval Reserve, remained on a steep decline. This degradation of the reserves, like that of the active forces, involved both numbers of personnel and material.

Indeed, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Lt. Gen. Robert Taber, apparently confused declaratory policy with fact when he told the Senate Armed Services Committee in June 1973 that the Reserve role had evolved into a "full-fledged factor in structuring the Total Force" over the last four years. The meaning of 'full-fledged factor' was left ambiguous. The Selected Reserve (SELRES), he pointed out, now made up 30 percent of the Total Force personnel, but this fraction actually represented little change in the mix of active and reserve forces and remained insignificant in and of itself. Most importantly, General Taber glossed over the fact that the Defense Department was simultaneously pressuring the Navy to scale down dramatically its reserve requirements. Thus, Vice Admiral David Bagley, Chief of Naval Personnel, told the same committee that his staff had determined Naval reserve requirements to be well below the 129,000 figure posited in the preceding year. That hardly seemed the best means of adding "bone and sinew to the mass of flesh."

One of the most striking elements of the Total Force debate is its ambivalent relationship to U.S. military and maritime strategy. As mentioned before, strategic problems did not figure prominently in the debate over the Total Force policy. Nonetheless, strategic and manpower decisions are interwoven. For example, if the United States were unable to muster the political nerve to mobilize its reserves during a delicate crisis, or if American leaders failed to see unambiguous signals of hostility during such a crisis, the consequences of an inability to mobilize the reserves could be disastrous for U.S. military strategy. Those consequences are magnified when the ostensibly discrete 'manpower' decision is made to rely more upon reserve forces for front-line missions in the early days of a general war. To the extent strategic considerations were of importance in the Total Force policy debate, moreover, they reflected a tendency to be driven by manpower decisions rather than vice versa. The rationale for cutting Naval Reserve manpower mobilization requirements was linked to a new strategy based on a quick, decisive military campaign—rather than a long, drawn-out war.

2. Ibid., p. 5269.
like World War II, that would tolerate slow mobilization.¹ In hindsight, it is ironic that military officials would be pushing a short, intensive, and presumably nuclear war scenario, which precluded the need for large reserves because of the lack of mobilization time, at the same time that the Soviet Union was achieving official nuclear parity with the United States. But it took at least five more years before the U.S. Navy began to discuss in public a new maritime strategy that pivoted around the ability to fight a protracted conventional war. Such a strategy required a substantial infrastructure, implicitly including more, and more stalwart, reserves. In an era of retrenching defense budgets—a 'decade of neglect,' as some have come to refer to the 1970s—it may have been that strategy had to be crafted to fit available resources; and resources did not then seem to allow a significant overhaul of reserve forces without unleashing a commensurate decline in active military might. That struggle for resources in turn ensured that the Total Force policy remained ephemeral, more real in spirit than in substance, for at least another five years.

In summary, the Total Force concept was conceived in the fall of 1970, at a time when the administration was hard-pressed politically and economically to reduce its defense obligations. The relative scarcity of resources, in turn, required a greater economy of effort with respect to all U.S. and allied defense assets. Partly as a result of Congressional agitation to do more to hasten the transfer of missions, equipment, and personnel from active to reserve forces, the Defense Department's commitment to 'Total Force' evolved from a concept to a policy in 1973. The policy remained substantially hollow, however, regardless of the desires of many to strengthen the reserves. This was so not least because it was institutionally infeasible for the reserves to gain ground while the active forces were faced with sharp budgetary cutbacks in Congress.

¹. For example, VAdm. David Bagley, Chief of Naval Personnel, employed this 'come-as-you-are-war' rationale for justifying reductions in the number of Naval selected reservists. He said that the strategic probability of a quick war made it essential for the reserves to be more hardware- than labor-intensive. See his statement of 11 June 1973, in Hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, FY 1974, Part 8, p. 5269.
CHAPTER 3

DISMANTLING THE TOTAL FORCE

This chapter examines the widening gap between the policy and rhetoric of Total Force and the fact that the steady post-Vietnam demobilization forced major reductions within the Naval Reserves. Those reductions during the early- and mid-1970s created a legacy that would inspire a decade of rancorous debate and lengthy study, especially regarding the wartime mobilization requirements of Selected Reservists.1

Post-Vietnam Demobilization

The tension between Congress and the Department of Defense over selected reserve end strength was heightened in the mid-1970s. Increasingly, members of Congress were publicly questioning the Defense Department's commitment to a Total Force policy. How is it, asked Representative O.C. Fisher, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Military Personnel, that "having eliminated induction authority, and thus placed greater reliance on the Reserve forces," that the Defense Department was now planning to reduce the size of the reserve forces? Representative Fisher concluded that such a policy could only reflect a "lack of support at the Department of Defense level for the Reserve program."2 This type of Congressional concern over the reserves was particularly piqued with regard to the Navy, which was undergoing a period of turmoil and open indecision over its legitimate wartime requirements for Selected Reservists.

Conversely, Congress wanted to know why the Navy was not decreasing active forces by even greater numbers. For fiscal year 1975, for instance, the Navy requested a $5.8 billion manpower budget, $90 million more than in fiscal year 1974. More importantly, the Navy's planned reduction of some 10,700 billets fell short of what seemed to be justified by the rapidity of ship demobilization. When queried about this apparent incongruity, Vice Admiral David Bagley, the Chief of Navy Personnel, explained that active end strength was a function of ship

1. Reservists are classified according to three broad categories of readiness and availability: Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve. The Ready Reserve, which is the largest, is further divided into three groups: Selected Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), and Inactive National Guard (ING). The Selected Reserve is composed mainly of organized units whose members drill periodically and are paid. The individual ready reservists (IRR and ING) are not members of units and generally do not train or get paid.

type rather than numbers. He said that the newer ships, although fewer in number, tended to be larger, more sophisticated, and required larger crews. For example: an aircraft carrier being retired (the CVA-19) had a notional crew of almost 2,000 men, whereas the complement of a new carrier (the CVAN-68) was nearly 3,100; and an old destroyer (the DD-692) had a complement of 280 sailors, compared with 390 on a new guided-missile destroyer (a DDG). 1

VAdm. Bagley also observed that the active-duty request represented barely more than 66,000 officers, the fewest in a quarter of a century and a reduction of over 20,000 since 1969. Thirty flag positions alone had been erased between fiscal years 1973 and 1975, and a further reduction of ten was planned for fiscal year 1976. One implication of this new Navy of higher technology and larger ships was crucial for the future of the Naval Reserve: if the smaller active fleet would not permit a significant reduction in active billets and would actually entail increases in active personnel costs, where would Congress find the money simultaneously to increase the reserve personnel budget? Furthermore, if the smaller fleet were expected to maintain a global, forward deployment at all times— and America’s commitments, despite the withdrawal from Southeast Asia, were hardly in retreat—it was difficult to see how many missions the Navy could shift from the active to the reserve forces. Thus, the evolving character of the fleet, with its emphasis upon advanced technology and a leaner force structure, could pose an additional impediment to the implementation of a concerted Total Force policy.

Another problem that hampered a buildup of the Naval Reserves was the rising cost of attracting reserve personnel. While the reserves remained, at least relatively, a ‘defense bargain,’ there could be little doubt that the advent of the All-Volunteer Force placed increasing demands on recruitment; and the early years of adjustment to the fledgling All-Volunteer Force proved to be most arduous. Accordingly, the Navy informed Congress that more financial and education incentives would have to be forthcoming if the Navy were to attract personnel with the necessary skills for an upgraded reserve force. The requirement for more incentives, ranging from special bonuses for high-priority billets to education benefits, meant that more money would have to be shaved either from procurement and other areas of the defense budget or other federal programs. The simplest solution to this dilemma was to consolidate the existing reserve forces by spending more money on the same number of reservists, rather than attempting to increase the number of reservists at a time of shrinking defense budgets. This type of consolidation, in turn, would slow the turnover rate within the reserves and thereby ensure greater retention. The best way to consolidate was

2. Ibid., p. 227.
to lower, rather than raise, the requirement for reserve end strength. As VAdm. Bagley contended, the All-Voluntary Force could only fulfill military manpower requirements at a higher price than did conscription. Thus, the Total Force policy not only would have to wait for active force priorities; it would also have to forgo a large quantitative surge in order to forestall an exodus from the reserves of increasingly valuable pretrained personnel.

How Many Naval Reservists?

Perhaps no manpower issue incited as much debate in Congress during the mid-1970s as did the requests to lower requirements for the Navy's Selected Reserve end strength. Only swift Congressional action could turn around "an ominous plunge of Navy's Selected Reserve strength and with it, its readiness capability," warned Col. John T. Carlton, the Executive Director of the Reserve Officers Association of the United States. Addressing a Senate Armed Services Subcommittee in April 1975, Col. Carlton said that the Defense Department's proposed reduction of 35,000 drill spaces, from 129,000 to 94,000 over a three-year period, "must be the most dramatic--and suspicious--plan to be perpetrated on Reserve forces in all time!" Even discounting hyperbolic claims of conspiracy, the decrease was dramatic, especially given the existence of a Total Force policy that was supposed to shore up the reserves.

A critical problem, once again, was that mobilization requirements hinged on the war scenario that U.S. Naval forces were expected to fight; so long as any war with the Soviet Union was expected to be quick and decisive, a reduction in the number of reserves was not unthinkable. The number of SELRES requested indicated that the Navy was apparently not expected to wage a war lasting for 90 days, to say nothing about a multi-year conflict. But the higher reserve end strength numbers validated by a number of mobilization requirements studies during the 1970s indicate that there was a good deal of disagreement over the

1. Ibid., p. 250.
3. Ironically, it was during the mid- to late-1970s that Soviet military doctrine was downgrading nuclear options in favor of conventional ones, thereby implying that any future East-West war could be protracted. The turning point in Soviet doctrine toward a conventional orientation has been traced to Leonid Brezhnev's 1977 speech in Tula. And even though Soviet doctrine did not avowedly make the transition to full-fledged conventional warfare as the basic option until 1981, it was clear well before that that Soviet planners were not fixated on having to wage a blitzkrieg war. See James M. McConnell, "Shifts in Soviet Views on the Proper Focus of Military Development," World Politics, Vol. XXXVII, No. 3 (April 1985), pp. 317-343.
likely nature of a future war. Summing up the Navy’s failure to agree on mobilization requirements, Col. Carlton noted that Navy and Defense Department studies had shown that any war lasting at least 90 days necessitated far more, not fewer, Naval reservists:

We have watched as a mind-boggling series of Navy and Department of Defense studies have kept Navy’s Selected Reserve in a constant state of reorganization and upheaval. And we have heard the oft-repeated statement that Navy is not sure of its true mobilization requirements. But now, the most important study of all, Navy’s long awaited Mobilization Requirements Study has emerged, and we understand that the true, fully validated bare-bones Reserve requirements are 112,900 and that this number may be further reduced within the Navy to 106,323 by removal of Construction Battalion requirements. This requirement we are told, is to cover the period for 90 days after mobilization day only. The source of a sustaining force of skilled manpower after 90 days for replacements and additional requirements is not addressed by Navy as it has been by other Services. Against this requirement, Navy is seeking only a 94,000 average strength for FY 1976 and further subsequent reduction to 92,000.

Mr. Chairman, we submit that Navy’s newly produced mobilization requirements now make the requested 94,000 strength figure wholly inadequate to ‘do the job’ on mobilization. Further, we are concerned that in forcing an arbitrary [cut] of 12,000 skilled personnel in FY 1976 to meet a ‘negotiated’ strength authorization of 94,000, Navy may find these skills not available should the decision be made to seek for FY 1977 a safer and higher authorization and one more in consonance with the true requirements.

...We all know the Navy is running a risk on fleet strength until the new ships start arriving 2 or 3 years hence, but deactivation of reserve manpower is something else. Reserve manpower in all the services cannot be turned off and on like a spigot. ROA believes the Navy is steaming into manpower rocks and shoals which are still avoidable [Emphasis added].

Whether the Navy was truly "steaming into manpower rocks and shoals" depended upon future requirements, about which there was little

1. Ibid., pp. 2584-2585.
consensus. But Navy officials conceded that the request for only 94,000 Naval selected reservists reflected a compromise reached between the Navy and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and not a decision based on the strategic requirements. The Navy's true desire, officials said, was to meet the stated requirement of 113,000 Naval selected reservists.

In a similar vein, Capt. Morton Leavitt, a retired Naval Reservist and National President of the Naval Reserve Association, told the same Senate subcommittee that there was a notable difference between the Total Force policy and a true commitment toward the reserves: "Our defense officials have been stating their support for total force policies, but, in fact, the services have not...taken full advantage of Reserve Force potentialities." He added:

[Last budgets have seriously eroded support for the Navy Reserve. And there is still lacking a clear definition of Naval Reserve mobilization requirements. This lack of resolve and support by defense and Navy officials has badly hurt the Naval Reserve in recent years, and this year's proposals compound the process, reduce the Naval Reserve to token levels of capability, and are most unwise steps backwards from our necessary defense posture.]

Captain Leavitt concluded that Naval Reservists were being shunted to "secondary type jobs," despite the fact that "the Reserves want to be associated...in the total force policy and stand shoulder-to-shoulder with active duty personnel."

With the advent of the All-Volunteer Force, military services theoretically should find it prudent to shift as many missions as possible to civilian personnel. But for the Navy in particular, with its requirements of forward deployment and meeting global commitments, there were finite limits as to what roles could be assumed by reserve forces and also by civilians. Indeed Navy attempts to investigate the possibility of increased use of civilians, for example on some noncombatant vessels, were limited, if not half-hearted. There was, for example, the case of the oiler Taluga, which the Navy had found it could operate at $3.6 million per year with a civilian crew, as opposed to $5.4 million per year when manned by active Navy personnel. But VADM. Bagley warned against excessive 'civilianization' of ships, noting that there was a tradeoff between Navy-manned ships and self-defense capability. The civilian-manned oilers, that is, might be sufficient for peacetime requirements, but their vulnerability in wartime vitiated

much of their potential utility. In the view of VAdm. James Watkins, Chief of Naval Personnel and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, the Navy had already exhausted the usefulness of a shift toward greater reliance upon civilian personnel: "We feel that in the past we have exhausted the possibility of large-scale civilianization actions. For the future we must consider all our requirements ashore in terms of who can best perform the functions involved at the least cost."

The ongoing debate over the Naval Reserve manpower requirements heated up during fiscal year 1977 hearings because of the Navy's request to halve the number of selected reservists. What is more, the Navy requested 544,000 active duty personnel (up 11,000 over fiscal year 1976), but only 52,000 selected reservists (a decrease of 54,000 SELRES from the previous fiscal year). The increase in active-duty personnel represented a turning point, the end of the post-Vietnam demobilization. But how did a decrease in the number of Naval selected reservists correspond with the Total Force policy of fully integrating reserve forces? Congress approached the proposals with skepticism.

The Navy defended its budget request, despite its implications for inactive Naval forces. During testimony in February 1976 before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs noted that the steady decline in active personnel would finally be reversed. Throughout the 1960s, according to the Secretary, the Navy fleet comprised over 800 ships, peaking at 976 in 1968. In that year Navy active forces numbered 777,000. Both ships and active forces had declined steadily since 1969, to a low of 480 ships and 524,600 personnel in fiscal year 1976. Thus, the Navy's total manpower had declined 33 percent, ships nearly 50 percent, and aircraft 31 percent from fiscal years 1968 to 1976. This request would turn about that trend, but it was by no means certain that Navy recruiters, who for the first time since the end of conscription would be faced with increasing the force level, could achieve the loftier goal. The planned increase was pegged to a rise in the number of ships in the fleet, as well as to improvements in ship-manning levels. The latter was considered essential because ship readiness ratings had fallen to unacceptably low ratings (more than one-third of all active ships and half of all Navy aircraft were marginally ready or unready, C-3 and C-4 ratings).

Meanwhile, the Navy's budget request called for decreasing the number of selected reservists from 101,100 in fiscal year 1976 to 52,000 in fiscal year 1977. To the extent that this proposed reduction was predicated on certain strategic requirements, those requirements were highly suspect. In particular, the Navy argued that 40,000 selected reservists should be shifted to the Individual Ready Reserve, because their mobilization responsibilities in the event of war could be adequately handled without the monthly drills required of selected reservists. In addition, construction battalions would be cut by nearly 10,000 selected reserve billets. According to this logic, the Total Force goal of shifting more active missions toward inactive forces was not to be taken seriously, at least in the case of the Navy. Instead, Defense Department officials in essence were arguing that the readiness of Naval reserves mattered little when it came to serious crises and conflicts. The implication of suddenly changing the requirements for Naval selected reservists angered many Congressional leaders. Navy officials were asked to explain. In a display of candor rare for public officials testifying before Congress, the Chief of Naval Personnel, VAdm. Watkins, conceded that the Navy's inability to reach a consensus on its selected-reserve requirements reflected a "management deficiency in our manpower planning." Moreover, VAdm. Watkins added, the Air Force had been more successful than the Navy at determining its requirements.

Looking for Creative Solutions

With these admissions in hand, Congressional leaders could proceed to order an about-face of the Navy's proposals for increasing active forces while at the same time decreasing inactive forces. Senator Sam Nunn said there would have to be a tradeoff between the Navy's modernization program and its requests for more active manpower. After all, Senator Nunn said, it was bad enough that ships had declined 50 percent since 1969 while active manpower had shrunk only 30 percent; but how could the Navy also justify a drastic cut in the number of Naval selected reservists? Addressing VAdm. Watkins, Senator Nunn suggested that the Navy needs to approach its manpower problems more imaginatively:

Admiral, there is a big void here. I was told recently it costs about the same thing for one active duty person as for five Reserve people, and yet, we are phasing out 40,000 from at least the Selective Reserve category, and some from the Reserve altogether. With all this we still have a tremendous maintenance problem in our fleet.

Of course, we want to build new ships. I am 100 percent in favor of a strong Navy, and I think our Navy has deteriorated vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. No one has to convince me of that, but it seems to me that we ought to be able to come up with some kind of bold new program to utilize the Reserves, perhaps to help maintain and get in shape the fleet we have that cannot operate right now.

...Is there not somebody that can match these dilemmas and come up with a way the Reserves can be used, and at the same time get the ships in order?  

Whereas Senator Nunn urged the Navy to find a creative solution, VAdm. Watkins claimed the Navy was "using a lot of imagination." Trying to resolve the problem faced in ship maintenance with less expensive selected reservists, according to Vise Admiral Watkins, was like trying to put a square peg in a round hole. Senator Nunn remained unpersuaded:

Well, I will give you an example. The Air Force came up here with almost exactly the same situation 2 years ago--10,000 to 12,000 new active duty people and not using the Reserve. Now, they are using the Reserve; they are going to get the job done. It is going to save $100 million a year which they can put in planes, they are tickled pink, but they came up here they fought and they fought because they wanted active duty people.

In the House of Representatives, Congressman William Chappell said that he was "absolutely mystified" by the Navy's request to reduce its number of selected reservists. Despite "the all-volunteer environment [and] the supposed total force concept," Representative Chappell observed, since 1974 the Navy recommended reductions in the size of the Naval Reserve from 129,000 to 92,000. He added:

Each year Congress has resisted your recommended reductions and last year, in the fiscal year 1976 program, provided funds to support a 102,000 end strength. This year you are proposing a reduction in the Naval Reserve of about 50 percent or down to a level of 52,000. What must the Congress do to get our message across?

1. Ibid., p. 3991.
2. Ibid., p. 3992.
3. Ibid.
Both the Navy and the Defense Department attempted to allay Representative Chappell's concern by contending that the proposed reduction in selected reservists represented only a modest decrease in the absolute number of Inactive forces. The real reduction, they said, only amounted to eliminating 10,000 Navy selected reservists; another 40,000 selected reservists were simply to have their status switched to the Individual Ready Reserve. The 40,000 selected-reserve billets to be transferred to the Individual Ready Reserve were considered to be non-essential support positions that gained little by drilling more than once a year for a two-week refresher course. The loss of 10,000 reservists was to be effected by abolishing 3,000 billets and by a 50 percent reduction in the Navy Seabee Reserve Forces. The proposed reduction of nine Seabee battalions was viewed as consistent with "DOD and JCS perceptions of what construction is likely to be required in the most probable type of conflict." William K. Brehm, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, assured Congress that the remaining 52,000-strong Navy SELRES would be "sufficient to accomplish the missions with which the Naval Reserve is tasked." 1 Once again, however, those missions depended upon the type of conflict foreseen, and that conflict apparently hedged more towards a short rather than a long duration.

Secretary Brehm admitted that the pressure to trim the number of personnel emanated from concern over rising manpower costs: "...while we were absorbing these increases in personnel costs, at the same time we have been in effect absorbing part of that increase by reducing the number of people on the payroll. There have been incremental reductions over the last several years, primarily as a result of budgetary pressure, in trying to shrink down the number of full-time people we have to an absolute minimum." 2 As a percentage of the total Defense Department budget, manpower costs rose from less than 50 percent in fiscal year 1964 to more than 60 percent a decade later. Upon mobilization seashore rotation would be terminated and reassignment of personnel in peacetime-only billets (which numbered approximately 5,000) would be undertaken. When asked about the proposed reduction of Naval Reserve construction battalions, Secretary Brehm's office contended that the request was consonant with the Total Force policy:

The reductions are consistent with the Total Force. Part of the Total Force guidance produced by the Total Force study furnished to Congress in September of 1975 provided in part that: (1) better management of reserve forces and their key supporting

2. Ibid., p. 65.
programs such as the Individual Ready Reserve, providing greater capability for the money spent, and (2) increased recognition that useful reserves are essential, but nonessential or ineffective reserves are an unaffordable luxury. Reserve units and individuals not required in the force structure should either be converted to higher priority missions or eliminated.¹

One of the legislative tools that Congress would revert to again and again was that of imposed end-strength ceilings on active, civilian, or reserve forces. Not satisfied with the results achieved by funding specific numbers of personnel, Congress increasingly came to rely upon legally mandated controls. For instance, in fiscal year 1976, Congress enacted a ceiling covering all Defense Department civilians, thus preventing any military service from increasing its civilian end strength without reducing another service’s civilian personnel. Similar controls on active forces, however, continued to be made individually for each military service, a practice that the Defense Department opposed as too rigid. According to Secretary Brehm:

Our efforts to achieve better utilization of active military manpower would be facilitated by having a single Congressional ceiling for active military manpower, as we now have for civilian manpower.... This would allow the Secretary of Defense flexibility to make necessary adjustments among the Services as missions, technology and requirements change.²

Regarding controls on the Selected Reserves, Secretary Brehm noted an inequity in the fact that Congress authorized active military and civilian manpower on the basis of end strengths at the end of the fiscal year, although for several years it had authorized SELRES manpower by mandating average-strength floors. At the same time, the Appropriation Act established average-strength ceilings through the number of man-years it funded. Secretary Brehm asked that:

Congressional authorizations for Reserve paid-drill manpower for FY 1977 and beyond be expressed in terms of end fiscal year strengths, thus putting Reserve Component manpower on the same basis as active military and civilian manpower. There is no longer a need to mandate average strength floors for the Reserve Components; DoD Total Force actions indicate clearly that we in DoD are treating our Selected

¹. Ibid., pp. 122-123.
Reserve manpower as an integral part of the overall DoD manpower program.

The Legacy of Retrenchment

There could be little doubt that the active forces, having reached their nadir in the mid-1970s, were now viewed with renewed hope for personnel and force-structure growth. But whether the Defense Department was genuinely interested in upgrading the reserves remained an open question. The legacy of this period of retrenchment, at least for the Navy, was essentially twofold: on the one hand, the absence of substantive improvement in the Naval Reserve meant that greater pressure could be brought to bear in the future upon the Navy to upgrade its reserves; and, paradoxically, active-force demobilization during the first half of the 1970s ensured that active forces would be given the higher priority in active-reserve debates during the latter half of the 1970s. Hence, the Total Force policy continued to mature slowly, official claims to the contrary notwithstanding.

The gap between declaratory policy and action policy was never as wide as it was during these early years of the Total Force policy. Despite official statements, there remained little substance in remarks such as those by Secretary Brehm, who said:

The Total Force is essential to achieving our national strategy, for unless we take into account all of our resources, and those of our Allies, we cannot assure an adequate defense posture. Total Force planning is proving to be a powerful management tool for analyzing defense alternatives.

There are two primary areas of application: among our Allies, and--within the Department--among the active forces and Reserve Components. We are endeavoring to make progress in each area....

Five years later, Representative William Chappell still expressed dismay over this approach to the Total Force policy:

There have been repeated statements by the Secretary of the Navy, by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), and by other senior Navy Department officials espousing solid support for the Naval Reserve Program and dedication to the Total Force Concept. In discussing these commitments to strengthen and improve the Reserve, various Navy

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., p. 31.
spokesmen have claimed that the degree and extent of
this backing by the Navy's present civilian and mili-
tary leadership is without modern precedent. This
being the case, I would expect to see tangible
evidence—convincing evidence of their sincerity—in
terms of equipment and dollars.

I have looked for this evidence in vain.
Instead, I see a general decline, in the quantity,
modernity, and condition of Naval Reserve aircraft,
ships, and equipment, and an apparent disregard of
funding requirements....

I also gather that we cannot look forward, with
much optimism about the Navy's plans for the Naval
Reserve's immediate future. For example, in assessing
POM-82 [the 1982 Program Objective Memorandum] I com-
pared the Reserve Program's Total Obligation Authority
(TOA) as a percent of the total Navy TOA. The Naval
Reserve TOA decreases every year from 2.5 percent in
fiscal year 1979 to 1.6 percent in 1985.

Despite the gulf between official rhetoric and policy implemen-
tation, this period of retrenchment did produce some positive results
for the reserves. For one thing, the Defense Department was compelled
to make some organizational and procedural changes that would later
provide the reserves greater leverage against active-force priorities.
Hence, Secretary Brehm pointed to "a series of forward-looking initia-
tives to make the Reserve Components better able to accept heavier
responsibilities." Many of these new initiatives were based on the
Defense Department's Study of Guard and the Reserve in the Total Force,
which had been published in the summer of 1975. Some of the initiatives
included:

- Integrating reserve units into the war plans
- Variable manning of reserve units, depending on when they
  would be scheduled to deploy
- Upgrading reserve force equipment
- Total Force restructuring, so that the Reserve and
  National Guard would be able to deploy more rapidly.

1. Hearings before the House Appropriations Committee, Defense
Some of these initiatives took hold relatively quickly, such as increased flight training for Naval Reserve carrier air squadrons, as well as testing the capability of those units to operate from carriers within two weeks after mobilization. Both would eventually lead to the further integration of Navy active and reserve forces, but the results would be slow to materialize.

In summary, the mid-1970s witnessed the growing gap between the policy and reality of Total Force. The Naval Reserve faced dramatic reductions in end-strength requirements, as well as a general period of neglect. While the active forces were also facing tremendous pressures and reductions, the decreased emphasis on the reserves flouted the alleged intent of the Total Force policy. The irony of this gap between policy and reality concerned the strategic rationale: Navy and Defense Department officials put forward a scenario for a lightning, presumably nuclear, war that precluded the need for large reserves and obviated the requirements for a vast and rapid mobilization. Such a strategy was more an expedient during a time of fiscal constraint than a logical posture, given that the U.S. had just officially sanctioned a policy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and legitimized Soviet nuclear parity with the United States. Just as it was strategically imprudent to assume that any future war would remain conventional, it was unwise to assume that a future conflict would inevitably become nuclear from the beginning. Yet that was the implication of the the Navy's de-emphasis of the Naval Reserve during a time of Total Force policy. This inconsistency eventually was resolved by a number of internal Defense Department studies, all of which would validate the need for a larger Naval Reserve force.
CHAPTER 4

RETHINKING MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

This chapter examines the Navy and Defense Department studies that were undertaken in the mid- to late-1970's because of widespread disagreement concerning the number of Naval Reserve personnel required for wartime mobilization. The studies of this decade culminated in the Navy Manpower Mobilization System (NAMMOS), which provided a more systematic means of determining mobilization-manpower requirements and thereby helped to form a consensus, within both the Navy and the Defense Department, of the need for a bigger and better Naval Reserve.

Discerning Manpower Requirements

Intelligent long-range planning, be it for defense or other purposes, requires some ability to forecast the future, an element of predictability. It was this very element that was lacking throughout most of the 1970s in the area of Naval Reserve manpower requirements. Estimates of the number of Naval selected reservists required for mobilization varied radically during this period, a fact that adversely affected both morale and planning and set back attempts to implement the Total Force policy. At the very time that additional missions and more modern equipment were supposed to be flowing into the reserves, the Naval Reserves were marked by turbulence because of proposed cutbacks. The struggle to resolve this conflict over Naval Reserve requirements occurred in two arenas: the political, in which numbers were tossed about like the proverbial 'hot potato;' and the bureaucratic, in which one study after another highlighted the need for increasing the number of Naval selected reservists.

In the political arena, the fight over the optimum number of Naval selected reservists can be told largely in terms of numbers: the number recommended by the Navy, the number put forth by the Secretary of Defense in the President's budget, and the numbers authorized and funded by Congress. The Navy, recognizing that its selected-reserve force was still over-inflated in the early-1970s because of the Vietnam war, proposed gradual reductions, from 129,000 in fiscal year 1974, to 113,000 in fiscal year 1975, 95,000 in fiscal year 1976, and 93,000 in fiscal year 1977. The Defense Department and the White House, however, submitted budget requests that further slashed the Naval selected reserve force. Indeed, the White House proposed a reduction from 129,000 in fiscal year 1973 to 52,000 in fiscal year 1977. Each year, however, Congress proceeded to authorize more personnel than were in either the original Navy submission to the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the President's budget. In any event, the authorized number of Naval selected reservists fell or remained stagnant every year between fiscal years 1973 and 1980 (table 1).
TABLE 1

NUMBER OF NAVAL SELECTED RESERVISTS

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<th>FY</th>
<th>Navy submission</th>
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This consistent build-down of the Navy’s reserve forces proved extremely frustrating for those officials charged with implementing the Total Force policy or simply interested in bolstering the reserves. This pent-up feeling, furthermore, was reflected in testimony before Congress. Perhaps the most vigorous of this testimony was provided by RAdm. Philip W. Smith, USNR, the President of the Naval Reserve Association. Speaking before the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee in June 1980, RAdm. Smith expressed his deep concern over the state of the Naval Reserve. "Our sincere evaluation," he began, "is that we have first-rate people in a second-class operation. The potential is there to have the finest outfit in the world if only we could all tune in on the same frequency..."

But achieving harmony over the size of the Naval Reserves had been especially elusive in recent years. One reason this was so, according to RAdm. Smith, related to the methodology employed to determine the optimum number of reservists. In particular, too often analysts had attempted to rely too much on narrow cost-benefit analyses to the exclusion of strategic questions. While it was relatively simple to show that reserves were expendable in peacetime, it was quite another matter to risk having no depth from which to provide for wartime needs. RAdm. Smith summarized the battle over Naval SELRES strength in this manner:

The Naval Reserve has been in a turmoil since 1973 when the strength was 129,000 and had been for several years. Then the OSD analysts from the

Comptroller and Systems Analysis shops decided to take large chunks out of the Naval Reserve strength. The motive was to try it on one of the Reserve Components, the one least appreciated by its own service, and if successful in this effort, to go to work on the rest of the Reserve Components. When one Administration finally decided to stop the Naval Reserve strength reductions as a result of a comprehensive study, a new Administration promptly took up the axe again. The fight went on for almost six years with the Congress grudgingly giving ground and then finally, stopping the decline in FY 1978.¹

According to RAdm. Smith, the 1970’s had been not merely a period of benign neglect, but a time of “malignant neglect.” The only “ray of sunshine in an otherwise bleak Naval Reserve world,” he added, was the recent arrival of Adm. Thomas Hayward as Chief of Naval Operations. But even Adm. Hayward, a staunch ally of the Naval Reserve, first would have to overcome “built-in generations of neglect and anti-reserve bias.”²

Even such vocal exponents of the Naval Reserve as RAdm. Smith conceded that the prevailing anti-reserve bias had some well-founded justifications. The Vietnam war, for example, had badly tarnished the reputation of the reserves. RAdm. Smith argued that historically, however, the reserves remained America’s best means of supplementing active forces during times of national emergency: “We broke with history during the Vietnamese conflict when the political decision was made to use draftees instead of the Reserve and Guard to fight the war. This placed inductees with a minimum of training on the firing line.” He added that the bulk of these individuals were people who were not able to “swing some kind of a deferment,” which in turn made the reserves one of the principal “draft havens.” RAdm. Smith said, “The end result of course was a growing demand that our Armed Forces be made an All-Volunteer Force, quickly followed by political action which did just that.” The All-Volunteer Force duplicated the inequalities that existed during the Vietnam war, according to RAdm. Smith. By and large the U.S. Armed Services are “made up of the same people who couldn’t get out of the draft before--the minorities, the disadvantaged, the low mental groups. It means that if we go off to war now, the casualty lists are going to cause the same hue and cry that drove us into the All-Volunteer Force in the first place.”³

In the future, as before the Vietnam war, RAdm. Smith proposed, the Reserve and Guard forces should be used as the principal augmentation force for active units. While this idea corresponded with the

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1. Ibid., pp. 442-443.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 445.
spirit of the Total Force policy, Rear Admiral Smith recognized that there were obstacles to be overcome. Most important, the reserves first would have to reinforce their wobbly institutional foundation:

The obvious glitches in the OSD organization are many, but two of the most obvious ones come to mind immediately. First, the top-ranking Reserve advocate in the Pentagon is only a Deputy Assistant Secretary who may see the SecDef on business once a year. He has no clout in the organization. Second, the billets which control military manpower, including Reservists, have been filled with analysts rather than managers. These analysts are basically statisticians with little consideration for individuals. This is no doubt why they keep calling the All-Volunteer Force a success in the face of overwhelming problems which prove otherwise. They, the manpower analysts, do not understand that when it comes to recruiting in the Guard and Reserve, that the faucet cannot be turned on and off with every whim, because it takes of lot of priming to start the line flowing again.1

RAdm. Smith argued that in the final analysis, absent conscription, the only way to supply the country with an adequate number of "trained qualified personnel immediately available if the balloon goes up" was via the reserves. Moreover, the way to discern the necessary number of selected reservists was to determine the number of pretrained personnel required to augment the active forces in a general war. That number, in RAdm. Smith's mind, had already been settled by previous studies regarding Navy SELRES requirements. According to Rear Admiral Smith, therefore, the next logical step was to "commence to build up the Guard and Reserve with the intention of using them in an emergency."2

'Studying the Problem to Death'

Unfortunately, the problem concerning the correct number of Naval selected reservists required almost a full decade of debate and analysis to resolve. Hence, with only slight hyperbole RAdm. Smith could state that "the term 'studied to death' almost applied literally to the Naval Reserve."3 Between 1972 and 1980, in fact, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Navy completed six major studies in an attempt to determine Naval Reserve requirements. In retrospect, the studies indicate that the Navy and the Office of the Secretary of Defense started with drastically different requirements and then, over the course of seven years, gradually produced a consensus. Whereas the Navy's 1972

1. Ibid., p. 447.
2. Ibid., p.435.
3. Ibid.
Surface Reserve Study recommended a SELRES force of 117,000, an OSD study finished two years later stated that the Navy needed only 92,000 selected reservists. Then the Navy lowered its estimate to 102,000 in a 1975 study for the Navy's Mobilization Objectives and Capabilities Branch (OP-605); meanwhile the Office of the Secretary of Defense raised its recommended number to nearly 96,000 in the 1977 Navy Mission Study and to 110,000 in the 1978 Review of the Guard and Reserve (ROGAR). This tussle culminated in a bureaucratic meeting of the minds with the Navy Manpower Mobilization Study undertaken by Mary Snavely Dixon, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower, from 1978 to 1980 (table 2).

TABLE 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Recommended SELRES</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surface Reserve</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>117,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Force</td>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>92,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>OP-605</td>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>102,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Mission</td>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>95,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROGAR</td>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>110,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAMMOS</td>
<td>1978-80</td>
<td>Navy-OSD</td>
<td>106,000</td>
</tr>
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</table>

The Review of the Guard and Reserve: A Framework for Action, or ROGAR, was a landmark study because for the first time since the Vietnam war the Office of the Secretary of Defense endorsed the need to raise the number of Naval selected reservists over the threshold of 100,000. The entire thrust of the study indicated that the era of a relatively small Naval Reserve had reached its nadir. The study began by quoting President Jimmy Carter on the importance of shifting more missions into the reserves under the Total Force policy. "Under the total force concept," President Carter said, "Reserve forces would perform critical missions in any future conflict. My administration is committed to ensuring that these vital forces are fully manned, well trained, well equipped and capable of rapid mobilization and integration into the active force in time of national emergency." The report then elaborated on its basic premise, namely that the United States would have to increase its dependence upon reserve forces in the decade ahead:

The US defense posture of the 1980's will emphasize increased reliance on the Reserve Forces (RF). The viability of this posture depends upon the Nation's ability and willingness to support the required number of Reserve Component units and indivi-


-30-
Reserve units must be manned, equipped, and trained properly and be capable of mobilizing and employing rapidly in time of need. The authors of the ROGAR study apparently did not foresee any upper limit on how many active-force missions could be shifted into the reserves before having a detrimental effect on military preparedness. The report noted that the U.S. "active duty forces are not configured to wage war without a mobilization" of the reserves, because more than half of U.S. combat capability and two-thirds of U.S. support capability were maintained in reserve forces. But even though the report did not contemplate the strategic implications of shifting an ever-growing list of missions into the reserves, it did recognize the paramount importance of being able to mobilize those reserves rapidly in time of emergency: "The most demanding requirement placed on RF [Reserve Forces] is the ability to participate in a major conventional war in Europe that begins with little or no warning and is of such high intensity that many RF must be capable of deployment and employment within the first 30 days [emphasis added]." The ROGAR study further remarked that the reserves could help "maintain order" should the continental United States suffer a nuclear attack.

The Navy, too, had to be ready to mobilize its reserves for war, the ROGAR study found. The requirements of a NATO scenario demanded the "commitment of Navy Reserve manpower and material" to provide the surge capability necessary for "prompt and sustained combat operations at sea, and to ensure adequate protection of sea lines of communication and commerce." According to the study, this requirement was aptly demonstrated in January 1968, when a limited mobilization of the Navy's selected reserve was undertaken following the USS Pueblo incident. And although wartime manpower requirements had decreased significantly during the early 1970s (primarily because of decreases in the number of ships and aircraft), available manpower had declined even more sharply.

Despite this apparent endorsement of the Naval Reserve, the ROGAR study's appraisal of selected reserve requirements remained qualified. In fact, the current level of Naval Reserve surface elements was judged capable of meeting wartime needs. But the report added, significantly, that the Naval selected-reservist program had undergone three major reorganizations since 1972, during which time the authorized strength of the Navy's SELRES had fallen from 129,000 to 87,000. "While manpower programs and policies must be responsive to changing requirements," the

1. Ibid., p. 126.
2. Ibid., p. 126.
3. Ibid.
report stated, "a degree of stability is necessary to meet overall strength objectives and maintain individual proficiency."

If ROGAR was a step in the right direction, it did not answer all of the outstanding questions regarding the Naval Reserve. The problem concerning selected-reserve requirements remained a key point. During 1978 testimony, on the heels of the ROGAR study, serious debate ensued over the legitimacy of the Navy's selected reserve requirements. One Congressman questioned whether the Navy actually supported the proposed decline in selected reservists offered in the fiscal year 1979 administration budget:

You are at 87,000, you want to go down to 48,700 Selected Reserves. I do not believe you want to go down. The powers that be who are playing games with the budget have made that decision for you, because in the fiscal years 1977, 1978, and 1979 DOD budgets where the same proposed reduction was proposed each year, the Congress rejected it and put back the numbers and the money. I believe it is the DOD or OMB [the Office of Management and Budget] that feels that it can underfund the Naval Reserve by $80 million and that the Congress is going to put it back. We keep playing this game. We have played this game now for three or four years.... We will see if we can get OMB to cooperate in the budget process so we do not have to play these games.

Representative Robert Sikes also voiced concern over the proposed reserve budget for fiscal year 1979. That budget was "obviously" inadequate in view of "the increasing capability of our enemies, notably the Soviet Union." Representative Sikes pointed out that in the previous year the reserves had made up a third of the total force structure but only 6 percent of the budget. Furthermore, for fiscal year 1979, the reserve budget represented only 5 percent of the total Department of Defense authorization. An incredulous Representative Sikes questioned Harold Chase, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs:

Mr. Sikes. Would you say that when the Department of Defense established priorities for the fiscal '79 budget that the same consideration was given to the Reserve components as was given to the active forces?

Mr. Chase. Yes, sir.

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., p. 515.
Mr. Sikes. You think so?

Mr. Chase. Yes, sir.

Mr. Sikes. There is no question in your mind?

Mr. Chase. There is no question in my mind.

Mr. Sikes. What system is currently used to measure the readiness and capability of Reserve components? You have some studies, but 'studies' is a bad word up here. It means a way not to do what really ought to be done, just put it off. Now how long are we going to be prevented by studies and more studies from getting down to basics in all of this problem?

In response to such criticism, the Navy and Defense Department had devised a general set of criteria by which to judge the Total Force. As enumerated by VAdm. James D. Watkins, Chief of Naval Personnel and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, the Navy adhered to three principles that applied when addressing Total Force manpower issues:

The first principle deals with establishing an active military peacetime force at an optimum level to meet national security objectives. The second principle provides for reliance on the private sector for required goods and services to the maximum extent possible. The third principle is that the services should operate in the most cost effective manner possible. The Department of Defense has issued guidelines to ensure that the peacetime force, both military and civilian, is developed in conformance with these three principles.1

The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics was more specific about the Navy's goal with regard to the Total Force policy. Edward Hidalgo spoke of the need to build "one cohesive human resource." Such a movement required changes in organizational structure, he added:

In order to strengthen our Total Force policy and facilitate the integration of our human resource management, we have made or are in the process of

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2. Hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for FY 1979, Part 4, p. 2766.
making several organizational changes... We are consolidating functions and are establishing the position of Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel and Training with responsibility for the integrated planning and programming of the total manpower, personnel and training functions within the concept of the Total Force. This 'life cycle' approach to human resource management is an important and significant move.

Further organizational changes were advocated by the Salzer Study on Manpower and Personnel Management. In that study, the Navy recommended the creation of a Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel and Training, which would consolidate the functions of personnel planning, programming, and training under one hat. The study noted that during fiscal year 1977 the decision was made to place responsibility for civilian manpower management under the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower) at the earliest practicable date. This was necessary for the move from a decentralized civilian manpower management program to an integrated program designed to support the Total Force concept.

But organizational changes alone could not solve the country's reliance upon mobilization. In this regard, the Salzer Study argued that peacetime and wartime manpower needs had to be more closely integrated. Although the need for such integration had been recognized conceptually for some time, "the urgency and practical need to do so has only gradually developed," the study added. According to the Salzer Study, the Naval Reserve would need at least six months to mobilize completely in support of the active forces:

For 1979, the mobilization manpower requirement at the mobilization day plus six months point is 808,000 Navy military billets and 454,000 Navy civilian positions.... The military billet requirements have decreased significantly over the past eight years, primarily due to the decreased number of ships and aircraft, the consolidation of support activities, base closures, and civilianization efforts, but the primary sources of mobilization personnel have decreased even faster. The military mobilization picture...indicates that we will have a shortage of personnel approaching 180,000 after our three primary sources of military personnel are applied. The three primary sources, as shown, are the active duty forces, the Selected Reserve, and the Individual Ready Reserve.

1. Ibid., pp. 2766-2767.
To fill this gap will require mobilizing the Fleet Reserve, retired USN and USNR personnel, and the Standby Reserve. In addition, it will be necessary to run our training facilities at full wartime capacity. By these actions we would hope to meet our quantitative requirements by 180 days after mobilization...

The Manpower Mobilization System

The ROGAR study laid the groundwork for greater harmony between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Navy over Naval Reserve requirements. The study that finally provided the elusive commodity of accord was known by a rather self-effacing acronym: NAMMOS (Navy Manpower Mobilization System). For some officials, it was clear from the beginning of the NAMMOS study that consensus was desperately needed. As Edward Hidalgo, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics, made clear during 1978 testimony:

I am keenly aware of the recent differences between the Congress and the Department of Defense in determining the strength requirements of our Navy Selected Reserve. It is important that this issue, and these differences be resolved, otherwise the turbulence and uncertainties within our Naval Reserve community will continue to grow. We have directed the most extensive and broadly based study in recent years of our total force mobilization needs. I cannot predict the outcome of this effort, but I am confident the Reserve community, the Chief of Naval Operations, and both Navy and Defense Secretaries, working together, will produce better dialogue and agreement on this vital and integral part of our Total Force.

NAMMOS lived up to its original expectations. For the first time, the Navy had a means of systematically assessing manpower requirements for mobilization, related to a specific scenario, and identifying which billets should be held by selected reservists. As one future Assistant

1. Ibid.
2. Statement by Edward Hidalgo, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics), Hearings before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Defense Subcommittee, FY 1979.
Secretary of the Navy said, NAMMOS was "[w]ithout a doubt, the most significant Naval Reserve personnel-related innovation."

In summary, the question of whether the Naval Reserves would be increased or diminished in size was the subject of great persistent official scrutiny during the mid- and late-1970s. In general, these studies validated a need for a larger Naval Reserve. These studies culminated in the Navy Manpower Mobilization System, which finally achieved a workable consensus between the Defense Department and Congress on the requisite number of Naval selected reservists. At the same time, these studies were accompanied by shifts in the strategic outlook. Greater receptivity toward the defense budget would soon allow defense modernization programs to forge ahead. Thus, discussion about the 600-ship Navy foreshadowed the return to a protracted conventional war scenario, which required an increased quantity of reserves in order to provide sustainability.

CHAPTER 5
MANNING THE 600-SHIP NAVY

This chapter addresses the new manpower requirements that emerged in the early 1980s as a result of modernizing and expanding the Navy fleet to 600 ships. One of the central themes of this period was the enhanced emphasis placed upon acquiring force structure faster than numbers of personnel; in the Naval Reserve, this emphasis was manifested in the Navy's policy of 'Horizontal Integration,' a policy designed to provide the reserves with top-flight equipment similar to that used by active forces. Despite this initial stress upon hardware modernization, however, it was clear early in the Reagan administration that upgrading the equipment of the Naval Reserves went hand-in-hand with increasing the number of reservists. Hence, the Naval Reserves, relatively stable after years of decline, were now ready to be expanded for the first time since the Vietnam war.

Force Manning and Force Structure

From the moment the Reagan administration assumed office in 1981, the White House was intent on greatly expanding the major force-modernization program begun during the twilight of the Carter regime. Although the modernization was to cover all services and to encompass both strategic nuclear and conventional forces, the naval buildup formed a distinctive part of the program. Secretary of the Navy John Lehman articulated a new 'Maritime Strategy' and prevailed in his argument for a 600-ship Navy comprising 15 carrier battle groups. With expensive force-structure modernization planned, however, a few members of Congress and the Defense Department voiced concern about the implications for manpower. Fear of increasing future manning requirements at a time when the country would be in a 'demographic depression,' and concern about the cost of paying for both more hardware and more people, provoked renewed interest in the Total Force policy. At the same time that President Reagan took office, the Reserve Forces Policy Board issued a critical review of the Total Force policy. Despite the fact that Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger had announced the Total Force policy eight years ago, the report said there had been a lack of progress toward the goal of a fully integrated military force: "The total force policy between the Active and Reserve components envisions three things -- compatibility, sustainability, and reliability. These characteristics are not present in our total force today to the degree and level required." This report provided the first salvo in the

1. The term, which is Martin Binkin's, refers to the declining cohort of men available for military service because of changing demographic trends in the U.S. during the late-1980's and early-1990's.
struggle that would ensue over force manning and force modernization, particularly as it related to the 600-ship Navy.

Plans for building a 600-ship Navy actually began well before Secretary Lehman assumed the job as the Navy's chief civilian. In 1975, the question of a 600-ship Navy was publicly debated during Congressional hearings. Having frozen many military-modernization programs during the post-Vietnam demobilization era, the military services were eager to embark on new building programs. Hence, in April 1975, RAdm. Staser Holcomb went before Congress to "elaborate on the thinking which leads the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations to speak in terms of building toward an active fleet of about 600 ships by the mid-1980s." RAdm. Holcomb described the process by which the Navy's force structure had dwindled to 500 ships:

By capitalizing on the large inventory of ships built during World War II, the Congress was able to maintain an active fleet of 800 to 900 ships--peaking at 976 in 1968--through the 1960's. During the past 10 years, an average of 19 new ships has been authorized for construction each year--procurement sufficient to maintain an active fleet of about 510 ships, under steady state conditions and nominal ship life assumptions. Today, most of our World War II ships have been retired and we have, in fact, a 500-ship active fleet.

RAdm. Holcomb observed that at the same time the U.S. Navy had been busy dismantling its ships, the maritime threat had been expanding. Thus, the time had come to decide "how large a Navy is required in the context of present world conditions and the increased effectiveness of modern weapons." Navies, he continued, could not be built overnight: "It is not possible to adjust the Navy's mission capabilities nearly as rapidly as the governments of potential adversaries can change their intentions." And the U.S. Navy's force-level requirements hinged on the forces needed for a potential conflict with the Soviet Union, which increasingly was acquiring a blue-water Navy. "Using a kind of shorthand to describe the number of ships," RAdm. Holcomb concluded that the Navy needed to reach a goal of 600 ships by the mid-1980s. Reserve ships would remain fairly constant. Although the political situation was not yet ripe for Congress to contemplate building a 600-ship Navy.

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., pp. 2545-2546.
4. Ibid., p. 2549.
the rationale had been advanced and the way had been paved for such a program in a future administration.

Six years after RAdm. Holcomb's testimony, John Lehman became the Secretary of the Navy, and the dream of a 600-ship Navy became a realistic objective. The energetic Lehman, widely acclaimed to be the most active Secretary of the Navy since James Forrestal, established the 600-ship number as a benchmark; that number of active ships, including 15 carrier battle groups, represented a minimum force required to maintain control of the seas in a war with the Soviet Union. Secretary Lehman specifically linked the number of ships to the Navy's new 'Maritime Strategy,' which provided a general guide as to how the Navy would prefer to bring its superiority at sea to bear in a confrontation with the Soviet Union. Given the decline of the Navy's force structure in the previous decade, few could have predicted the effectiveness with which Secretary Lehman would harness political support for the Navy's goal. But times had changed: if the 'Vietnam Syndrome' still lingered to discourage American military intervention abroad, the mood of the country seemed highly supportive of President Reagan's vow to shore up the military. One of the most distinctive features of that buildup was the resurgence of U.S. seapower. According to Under Secretary of the Navy Robert Murray, the nascent support for the military sprang not only from the fact that military force was considered a more palatable instrument of international relations than it had been in the 1970s; but, in addition, seapower was widely held to be especially germane to America's geostrategic role in the world:

...[T]he atmosphere in the 1980s is certainly better than the atmosphere was in the 1970s. The American people now see that the Navy's mission and the Marine Corps' mission are important; that American responsibility around the world is still going to continue in the 1980s; that the Navy and the Marine Corps are the services that have to cover the bulk of those global responsibilities; and that we cannot put armies and air forces on other people's territory except in very special cases like Germany, Korea, and the United Kingdom....

Enthusiasm for a renaissance of American naval power notwithstanding, immense difficulties were posed by the rapid expansion of the Navy's force structure and the accompanying escalation of force-manning requirements. As Under Secretary Murray cautioned:

The task that we have now before us is complicated and made more difficult because we have just lived through a decade of relative neglect. The fleet has been shrinking for over a decade. We went from approximately 1000 ships to about 500 ships, cutting ship numbers in half, resulting in a Navy that is smaller now than at any time since Pearl Harbor.

One of the biggest problems in the quest for a 600-ship Navy pertained to personnel requirements. Under Secretary Murray surely did not exaggerate the challenge facing the Navy when he told Congress in 1981 that the task of manning 600 ships would be "exceedingly demanding." First, the Navy proposed to man more than 100 new ships, many of which would require crews who were increasingly well educated. Second, the Navy proposed to improve ship-manning levels in order to enhance the readiness of the active fleet. Third, these first two problems were compounded by the fact that the Navy was already under manned to begin with, particularly in the crucial area of chief petty officers. Together, these challenges added up to a very tall order for the Navy (table 3).

### TABLE 3

PETTY OFFICER SHORTFALL (E4-E9)

(In thousands)

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<tr>
<th>FY</th>
<th>Authorized</th>
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<td>378.2</td>
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<td>71</td>
<td>346.2</td>
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<td>81</td>
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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. In fact, the Navy would have to add 50,000 more people over the next five years, about half of whom would be petty officers. In addition to an existing shortfall of 22,000 'top-six' (grades E4-E9) petty officers, the Navy needed about 28,000 more petty officers for the 600-ship Navy by 1990. The Navy had been plagued with a serious deficiency of top-grade petty officers since the early-1970's. Ambitious Navy plans in the early 1980s called for gradually eliminating the shortfall by 1990.
Further complicating the Navy's plans for 600 ships was the question of the Naval Reserve and the Total Force policy. How would these be dealt with at a time of wholesale modernization of the active fleet? The Naval Reserve, already well beneath the end strength validated by the Navy Manpower Mobilization System, now would have to grow at an even more accelerated rate to keep pace with the expanding Navy force structure. NAHMOs had defined the Navy's selected-reservist requirements as roughly 111,000 and 113,000 for fiscal years 1981 and 1982, respectively. But in 1981 the Navy was simply trying to maintain its current level of 87,000 selected reservists. According to fiscal year 1982 mobilization plans, one-fourth of the Navy's wartime force would come from the reserves. Selected reservists were scheduled to make up 11 percent of the Navy's total strength in the event of mobilization, and the Individual Ready Reserve was slated to fill the remaining 14 percent. But the Naval Reserve was not well poised to handle that much responsibility in the event of mobilization. Either the reserves had to be enlarged, or the missions had to be more narrowly defined.

Despite the emphasis on active-force modernization, it was obvious that the reserves would play a major role under Secretary Lehman, an aviator in the Naval Reserve. VAdm. Lando W. Zech, Jr., Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel and Training and Chief of Naval Personnel, propounded the Navy's objective with regard to the Total Force policy:

Our objective in planning, programming and budgeting for our Total Force manpower requirements is to obtain the best possible mix of military and civilian personnel to efficiently and effectively accomplish our mission. The result is development of an optimum manpower base to enable our naval forces to meet our national security objectives.

Providing and maintaining a well trained, active naval force...forms the heart of my responsibilities. Equally important is the requirement to provide a reserve force which forms an adequate base for mobilization in case of emergency.

2. Statement by VAdm. Lando W. Zech, Jr., Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel, Hearings before the Senate Appropriations Committee...Part 2, p. 140.
Reiterating this same theme, John Herrington, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, stated confidently that a "strong Reserve is the most important manpower area that we must focus on today." The assistant secretary added that the Navy's objective was to "integrate our Reserves into the 'Total Force' concept and place more reliance on their capabilities in order to achieve naval superiority." Accordingly, Assistant Secretary Herrington said the Navy would attempt to achieve 94,000 selected reservists in fiscal year 1982. This represented the first significant increase since the numbers had stabilized at about 87,000 in the late-1970's.

A major portion of the Navy's selected-reserve growth was to come largely as a result of expanding the number of active-duty reservists responsible for the Training and Administration of Reserve personnel (TARs). This rapidly expanding category of 'reservists' was required because of growing reliance upon the reserves in general, and because of the planned expansion of the Naval Reserve frigate program in particular. Because Congress had endorsed the concept of the Naval Reserve fulfilling the convoy escort mission in wartime, the Naval Reserve had been directed to reach an inventory of 24 Knox and Perry class frigates. These frigates were to be manned with roughly 50 percent selected reservists and 50 percent full-time TARs. Thus, as the active fleet expanded from 514 ships in fiscal year 1982 to 535 in fiscal year 1988, the Naval Reserve was also expanding its fleet. To accommodate this planned growth in the Naval Reserve surface forces, the Navy requested 93,240 SELRES for fiscal year 1983, as well as more than 12,000 TARs.

Thus, even though the Naval Reserve was still well under its mobilization requirement, the reserves were definitely on the upswing. RAdm. Frederick Palmer, Chief of the Naval Reserve, said the reason that the growth of the Naval Reserve could not quickly match NAMMOS requirements was not a matter of money, but capability. "We are trying to grow 8 percent this year," he said, but "the requirement numbers are going up more rapidly than we are growing." RAdm. Palmer said the Naval Reserve would continue to grow, but "the out-year requirements are increasing faster than I think it is possible to grow."

2. Ibid., p. 1616.
3. Ibid., p. 1617.
4. Ibid., p. 1624.
One of the Navy's new phrases to underscore its commitment to the Total Force was "mutual support." A principal Naval Reserve innovation in support of this theme was the Weekend Away Training (WET) program, the purpose of which was to provide periodic hands-on training for Naval Reserve augment units at either the command they would report to in the event of mobilization or a similar active-duty location. According to RAdm. Palmer, "The WET program is one of the more tangible demonstrations of the increasing interaction between the Navy's active duty and Reserve units. An important by-product of this training and the annual two week active duty training periods performed by our units is the direct support we are able to provide to the active duty units of the Navy. We have adopted the phrase 'Mutual Support' to describe those Naval Reserve training evolutions which also provide direct assistance to active duty units in the performance of their mission." The concept of increased training of selected reservists with their wartime commands was already working well with intelligence units and air squadrons.

Not everyone was satisfied with the progress being made by the reserves under the Total Force policy. The President of the Naval Reserve Association, Capt. Curtin R. Coleman, II, USN (Ret.), lambasted the Reagan administration for not living up to its promises with regard to bolstering reserve strength. Capt. Coleman complained that the Reagan administration budget does "very little" to build up the reserves. This was particularly disappointing, he added, in light of President Reagan's staunch rhetorical support for the reserves. Observed Capt. Coleman: "Words which lavishly and profusely pour forth in support of the Reserve and Guard do not cost money, while people, equipment and training do." But even Capt. Coleman agreed that the persistent debate over Naval Reserve selected-reserve requirements appeared to have dissipated:

The strength of the Naval Reserve Force has been a controversial issue since the first successful foray by the OSD budget analysts chopped over 12,000 billets from the Navy's recommended strength of 129,000 for fiscal year 1974. The OSD meat axe approach continued, cutting the Naval Reserve authorized strength to 87,000 in fiscal year 1978, until stemmed through counteractions by the Congress, NRA and other Naval Reserve supporters.

It appears now that through these counter efforts, the Navy Selected Reserve strength is

commencing a gradual rise back toward the wartime requirements of 120,931 by fiscal year 1986. Although the new Administration has not authored any initiatives to increase the NR strength to any appreciable degree, the Congress seems quite willing to support the Navy's wartime requirements for its Reserve Force. This was evidenced by the affirmative actions taken by the Appropriations Committees, in approving the funding for a 92,000 NR in fiscal year 1981 and for 94,000 in fiscal year 1982. Additionally, the House Armed Services Committee raised the NR strength to 90,000 from the 87,000 submitted in the fiscal year 1982 budget (later dropped out of the Authorization Conference) and directed that a report be submitted by OSD, with Navy input, stating its acceptance or non-acceptance by OSD of... [NAMMOS]. 1

Table 4 presents a comparison of NAMMOS and selected reservist requirements.

TABLE 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY</th>
<th>NAMMOS</th>
<th>Navy Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>112,400</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
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<td>124,825</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Although Naval Reserve requirements apparently had bottomed out, critics like Capt. Coleman took exception to the concept of "attainability," which some defense planners cited as hampering a more rapid influx of selected reservists. Captain Coleman said he saw no convincing evidence that there cannot be a significant increase in the NR strength to NAMMOS numbers. To the contrary, it is believed that a continued phased climb to the requirement is feasible and very desirable if the stated OSD/Navy wartime mobilization requirements are valid. He added that anything less than an attempt to meet wartime mobilization requirements by 1986 appeared to be "unwise and contrary to the national defense effort." 2 Recent history of the Selected NR strength is shown in Table 5.

1. Ibid., pp. 1938-9.
2. Ibid.
### TABLE 5

**NAVAL SELECTED-RESERVE STRENGTHS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY</th>
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**Horizontal Integration**

John Herrington, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, said, "With this budget [FY1983] the Naval Air Reserve begins a new chapter of integration with the active units.... Reserve squadrons will be established for all of our front-line fleet aircraft beginning with the first active F-18 squadron in 1984."\(^1\)

In the fiscal year 1986 posture statement, Secretary Lehman reaffirmed Horizontal Integration. "Four years ago the Department of the Navy undertook a major reorganization of Reserve components to move from a vertical to a horizontal relationship with the Active Forces. That means essentially that the Reserves must provide immediate augmentation to the active force in time of emergency across the entire spectrum of warfare. It means also that, in peacetime, we rely on Selected Reserves to provide real-time fleet support across their mission areas."

Similarly, James H. Webb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, said:

Real progress has been made toward the modernization and integration of the Naval Reserve as a

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\(^1\) *Hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Department of Defense Appropriations, FY 1983*, p. 1610.
full-fledged partner in the Total Force. Implementation of Total Force and Horizontal Equipment Integration policies is now providing the Naval Reserve with equipment compatible with that of the active Navy.

Previous concepts and policies...were based on the theory that the active component alone must carry the initial responsibility for wartime operations. As a result, the reserve components were recipients of older equipment and were given low budget priority as the active components tried to keep pace with an increasing global threat in a fiscally constrained environment. With the advent of the Total Force policy in the 1970's, the situation began to change. The policy adopted by this administration to give equipment priority to those units that will be 'first to fight' whether Active, Guard, or Reserve has furthered this trend and is resulting in significant increases in modern equipment for the reserve forces.

The Naval Air Reserve is one example of where horizontal integration has been and continues to be advanced. The Naval Air Reserve plans to equip its squadrons with the same aircraft flown by active-duty units, increasing the number of F/A-18s and F-14s and phasing out A-7Es and F-4s. The last F-4 is scheduled to leave the Reserve inventory in early 1988. The addition of A-6Es in late 1988 will give the Reserves a medium-attack, all-weather capability. Table 6 shows the planned increases for the Naval Air Reserve fighter and attack aircraft.

**TABLE 6**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Fighter-Attack</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>116</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Building 'One Navy'

From the inception of the Total Force policy, economics was a key factor in the Congressional push for further integration of the inactive
and active forces. Congressmen based their strong support for the reserves on the fact that, as "a rule of thumb, reserve component forces require 20 to 50 percent of the funds required for similar active units." This factor would become more important as the need to halt the nettlesome deficit problem grew throughout the 1980s. And many Congressmen considered it wiser to cut manpower than to slow down modernization and procurement.

Countering the economic argument was the concern that the wholesale transfer of missions into the reserves would produce more ills than it cured. As Secretary Lawrence Korb admonished:

Most important...whatever is done in this area, there's a great need for deliberate planning. I urge you not to make decisions about the force mix for several reasons: First, although you may gain a good appreciation of the differences in operating costs between types of active and reserve units, you can't fully appreciate the savings or expense until you've examined facility needs or a specific unit at a specific location.

Second, you cannot estimate the potential for recruiting a new reserve unit until one decides on a specific location.

Third, if you direct a transfer of a unit from the active to the reserve force, we will either spend a lot of money in the near term or we will have a gap in capability....

In summary, I believe this administration is taking a balanced, rational approach to the total force structure. We have and will continue to enhance the Reserve components. Keep in mind that decisions involve more than costs. And our changes in mix must be deliberate to avoid negative impact on readiness or unplanned changes in strategy.

It took a decade to make the Total Force policy reality under this administration, and we have to be careful that we don't respond to any special interest that might harm that progress, the special interest

2. Ibid., p. 1184.
from the active reserve components or the often neglected civilian component of our total force.\(^1\)

In 1982, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Reserve Affairs, Red Davidson III, testified before Congress about the "vigorous" but "sensitive" course upon which the Navy had embarked. He said, "It is our intention to make sure that the Navy and the Marine Corps Reserve programs do, in fact, blend or complement the total force concept. We will assimilate these forces on to the greatest extent possible."\(^2\) This assimilation took the form mostly of horizontal integration of equipment. Deputy Assistant Secretary Davidson said the recent accomplishments to this effect had been the following:

- Boosting naval reserve size to 94,000 selected reservists
- Pursuing the lease and/or purchase of used DC-9 aircraft as replacements for aging C-118s being phased out
- Shifting from a "Vertical Integration" of aircraft to a "Horizontal Integration" within Naval Reserve air units by placing front-line aircraft into the reserves
- Establishing Navy and Marine Corps units in Puerto Rico to tap available prior-service manpower resources
- Placing new Knox Class frigates into the Naval Reserve
- Taking steps to provide adequate Navy medical support both in peacetime and upon mobilization.

RAdm. F. F. Palmer, Director of the Naval Reserve, noted that the Navy's fiscal year 1983 budget marked something of a watershed, the "real beginning of our phased growth and modernization which is essential to improve the Naval Reserve's ability to support an expanding U.S. Navy. Just as the Naval Reserve was reduced in size at the same time as the active duty Navy during the seventies, the Naval Reserve must grow to meet its expanded responsibilities in the eighties."\(^3\)

In summary, discussion of the 600-ship Navy permitted a new outlook in U.S. maritime strategy. With more resources, the Navy could

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3. Ibid., p. 116.
4. Ibid., p. 142.
once again contemplate waging a protracted conventional war. This policy shift also roughly corresponded to increasing indications amongst Soviet military theoreticians that a protracted conventional war between the superpowers was a theoretical possibility, and that any war between the two would not necessarily escalate to the strategic nuclear level. This shift in resources and strategy required a true Total Force, first, because Congress would not pay for both modernization and more active manpower simultaneously; and, secondly, because a strategy of protracted conventional war required sustainability and endurance that only a strong reserve force could provide.
CHAPTER 6

INSTITUTIONALIZING THE TOTAL FORCE

This chapter deals with the Total Force debate since 1984, when the Navy and other military services were first required to provide annual reports to Congress regarding the integration of active, reserve, and civilian forces. That requirement, in turn, proved to be the precursor to a wide range of steps taken by the Navy to institutionalize the concept of the Total Force as a means of truly building 'One Navy.'

Congress Lays Down the Law

With major force-structure modernization in all the services, Congress acted quickly to prevent a surge in manpower costs. If the Reagan administration wished to keep much of its hardware modernization program intact, it would have to realize that Congress would not also pay for large increases in active personnel. In the Defense Department Authorization Act of fiscal year 1983, the House Armed Services Committee stipulated that the Defense Department's plans to increase active-force strength by 10,000 personnel over the next five years would have to be met in part by increased reliance upon the reserves: "Although increases in force structure may be necessary in the near future, the committee is not convinced that additional active force personnel are the only means of manning this new force structure." In view of this, as well as because of the upgraded status of the selected reserve and the limited cohort of qualified personnel available, the Committee continued,

...[R]eserve personnel should be seriously considered as a means of manning any force structure increases proposed for fiscal year 1984 and beyond. In fact, it is the committee's position that the Department of Defense should program the use of reserve personnel for new force structure initiatives unless some persuasive evidence exists, developed on a case-by-case basis, that active personnel must be used."

The Committee requested a report from the Secretary of Defense by late 1982 outlining proposed force-structure increases programmed for the next five years that would require more active personnel; the report

2. Ibid. [Emphasis added.]
was to include analysis of the missions and an explanation as to why reserves could not be substituted.

Similarly, the Senate Appropriations Committee Department of Defense Appropriation Bill for fiscal year 1983 stressed that it was better and cheaper to rely on reserve forces: "The Committee is convinced that by augmenting the strength and capabilities of the Guard and Reserve forces, the military readiness of the Armed Forces can be maintained at a lower cost with no degradation to combat effectiveness." Without supporting the claim with illustrations or evidence, the Committee also claimed, "that for less cost the Reserve components can perform certain missions as well as, or better than, Active Force counterparts." In short, the Senate was arguing that readiness was not the issue when dealing with the mix of active and reserve forces; both components could be equally ready to preserve America's military commitments. The issue, instead, centered on cost, and the Congress was unwilling to countenance steep, inexorable increases in the manpower portion of the defense budget. And many argued that the best way to keep costs to a minimum, especially during a time of fleet modernization, was to shift more responsibilities to reserve personnel.

The following year, in 1983, Congress reaffirmed its notion that there was a trade-off between hardware modernization and increased active end strength. It was clearly a question of one or the other but not both. The House Armed Services Committee, in its Department of Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1984, observed that the "Administration's budget calls for increases in active forces of approximately 160,000 over the next four years. This increase would come on top of the already-approved increases of 78,000 since the enactment of the fiscal year 1980 defense authorization...." That climb in active end strength was just too much, the Committee argued:

The committee agrees with the Department of Defense that additional personnel will be required to support this modernization program; however, the committee recommends that the reserve forces be utilized as part of this effort, thus making major increases in the more expensive active forces unnecessary.

Increased utilization of reserve forces in first line missions normally assigned active force units will not be an easy adjustment for defense planners. Defending the nation without the necessary modern equipment would be much harder, and it is to provide

funds for needed modernization that the committee has made this recommendation.


The House conferees, in denying proposed active force increases for fiscal year 1984, were intent on ensuring that the military service make greater utilization of the reserve components. The Senate conferees concurred with the House conferees' concerns but were unwilling to freeze active force strengths.

Providing active force increases of more than 10,000, the conferees agreed that some increase was appropriate for fiscal year 1984. The conferees also determined that, while the Navy has shown the least initiative and commitment in the use of its reserve forces, it was also the service that offered the most justification for an end strength increase, due primarily to the large number of vessels to be commissioned in fiscal year 1984. ...[T]o deny any increase to the Navy could result in 'punishing' innocent sailors who would be required to perform additional sea duty, even though the conferees believe that other missions or redefinition of existing missions, at least in the long run, could minimize the impact. On the other hand, the conferees decided that to exempt the Navy alone from the freeze on end strengths would send the wrong message. The conferees place the four services on notice that fiscal year 1984 is the final year in which the conferees are prepared to rely on statement of managers language for conveying their concerns that the Guard and Reserves have a greater role in the defense program of this Nation.

Beginning with the fiscal year 1985 authorization process, the services are directed to provide the armed services committees...with an annual report outlining in detail what changes will be accomplished in that fiscal year to provide the Guard and Reserve with: new missions; more modern equipment; and

greater integration with the active forces in keeping with the Total Force concept.

The report accompanying the fiscal year 1985 authorization request and the degree to which there is evidence that more is being accomplished in the utilization of the reserves will be key elements in the consideration of end strengths for fiscal year 1985—particularly in the Navy. The conferees are fully prepared to deny further active duty personnel strength increases if the services fail to comply with this direction [emphasis added].

This united Congressional front against increases in active-force end strength would prove to be a turning point with regard to the Navy. From this point on, the Navy, to a greater extent than any other time since the Total Force concept was first broached in 1970, began to bridge the gap between its declaratory and action Total Force policies. The early- to mid-1980’s were a time of unprecedented emphasis upon integrating the reserves and truly building ‘One Navy.’

Punctuating the debate over which active missions ought to be supported or fulfilled by the reserves was the realistic argument that innovation was not always inexpensive. Although Congress’s main impetus for greater reliance upon the reserves was to keep down rising manpower costs at a time of increased force modernization, the notion that the reserves were always cheaper than the active forces was a generalization that was subject to exceptions. Moreover, if the Navy were to attempt some truly creative restructuring of missions, as Senator Nunn and other Congressmen had sought in the 1970s, that innovation could only succeed at a price: trial and error might be necessary, and starting major new initiatives meant increased outlays in the early years of a program. “There are a lot of ways of building a Reserve community...as part of the total force,” observed Capt. John H. Bell, USNR (Ret.), a legislative consultant to the Naval Reserve Association. “[B]ut you can’t realize a lot of money savings immediately. It has got to be over the long term.” This theme was repeated time and again during the early- and mid-1980’s; the commitment having been made by, if not forced onto, the Navy to further integrate the reserves, voices of moderation and reason now prevailed to argue that growth ought to be deliberate and planned, not a helter-skelter transfer of whole missions in order to effect immediate savings.

One such wholesale transfer that stirred great debate in Congress concerned the financially tempting desire to move one or more carrier
The driving force behind such a move was strictly economics, rather than strategic requirements or reserve capabilities to man more ships. As Capt. Bell testified before Congress regarding the Congressional Budget Office's idea of placing some 20 ships, including all four battleships, into the reserves, "We are not here to change national strategy; we are here to try to come up with ideas of implementing national strategy." The problem with the Navy's reserve mission planning is that it had been excessively ad hoc. Capt. Bell said, "The assignment of tasks and responsibilities to the Naval Reserve has been anything but planned in the past. Seemingly, more often than not, the transfer of assets and or responsibilities from the active forces to the Naval Reserve was by default. Either the hardware was no longer needed by the Active Forces or the priority of the mission did not qualify for force funding." That practice, however, was not something that could be quickly changed.

Nevertheless, Capt. Bell agreed with the overwhelming sentiment of Congressional leaders that the reserves had been neglected and that only Congress was equipped to alter that practice. As Capt. Bell stated:

During the past years, regardless of the Administration (Democrat or Republican) the built-in, institutional, bias of the bureaucracy has precluded a truly honest assessment of the Reserve potential. When efforts to expand the Reserve role have been made by the legislative branch, the defense bureaucracy has gone to 'General Quarters' to head off any meaningful modifications to the reserve [and] active mix. The Congress has, for the most part, backed off of any substantive changes in the mix because of the doubts cast by Defense Department representatives.

Thus, just because the Naval Reserves were not ready for all four battleships, Captain Bell maintained that the reserves were not incapable of handling more ships in the Naval Reserve Force. Citing the controversial analyst and 'whistle-blower' Franklin C. Spinney, Captain Bell told the Congress that the Navy was budgeting for six new ships in fiscal year 1984. In order for the Navy to afford those new ships, however, it was planning to place into mothballs 22 older ships, many of which had been recently overhauled. For the same reason, the Navy was reducing the sailing time of its ships by 10 percent from 1982 to 1984. Capt. Bell quoted Spinney: "'With a net loss of 16 ships, the Navy would appear to be sailing full speed astern in its effort to build a 600 ship fleet....'" Hence Capt. Bell said that the Navy ought to take a "closer look at the possibility of taking 13 destroyers out of

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., p. 332.
3. Ibid., p. 328.
mothball status and putting them into a more ready status, with a cadre of TARs and a full reserve crew assigned to man them in a mobilization situation. ¹

There were many other officials cautioning against the rapid transfer of active missions into the reserves for the sole reason of saving money. Senator Roger W. Jepsen, a member of the Armed Services Committee, noted during hearings in 1984 that "there has been a recognition that we should and must place greater reliance upon our Reserve Forces." But he added that such transfers must consider readiness, not just cost. ² Similarly, Lawrence J. Korb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Installations, and Logistics, said that while the Defense Department was committed to the Total Force policy, there were impediments to quickly shifting missions into the reserves. "There is no higher priority we have than to make the total force a reality," said Korb. "The policy of the Department with regard to the mix of active and reserve forces is to achieve the most cost-effective mix of active duty, reserve, civilian and contract personnel consistent with peacetime deployment requirements and responsiveness to war. Further, all new forces will be assigned to the Reserve Components unless reasons of overseas stationing, operations, or responsiveness preclude it." But he observed that the reserves had been already growing at a fast clip. "By the end of FY 1985 the Selected Reserve...will have grown almost a quarter of a million people from the level inherited by this Administration." For example, he said, "At the end of FY 1980 the Selected Reserve was 42 percent of the size of the active force. By end FY 1989 it will be 54 percent of the active force size."³

As a result of this emphasis upon the reserves in recent years, Secretary Korb said, there were several reasons to be more cautious about rapidly shifting missions from active to reserve forces. First, significant shifts in the mix to a smaller active force would shrink the size of the prior-service cohort and drive up training costs for reserves. Second, before adding more reserves, current reserve forces would need more equipment to become truly capable of handling active missions. Third, each unit is unique, because the location of that reserve unit affects the need and potential for the construction of facilities, recruiting and retention, and economies of scale. Concluded Korb, "We will continue to expand and enhance the role of the Reserve components, but we have not identified areas where large-scale transfers from active to reserve are feasible or desirable."⁴

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1. Ibid., p. 339.
3. Ibid., pp. 2433-2434.
4. Ibid., pp. 2247-2248.
The 1983 Conference Report of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees directed each service to submit a 1985 budget report on the introduction of new missions into the reserves. The Navy's effort was prepared under the direction of OP-090 (Navy Program Planning), by the Total Force Advisory Group headquartered at the Center for Naval Analyses. RAdm. Bruce Newell, as Special Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations for Total Force Integration, led ten full-time naval officers who formed the nucleus of the Advisory Group. The first annual study, A Report to the Congress on the Navy's Total Force, was delivered to Congress in February 1984, in time to shape the fiscal year 1985 funding debate.

Suggesting a series of recommendations, the report was based on crucial assumptions. The most important, as RAdm. Cecil Kempf admonished Congress, is that the "study is predicated on our ability to attract and retain the personnel we need to do it. I think that is going to be the most difficult part." But assuming that the Navy could continue to attract sufficient qualified personnel, the report outlined three new mission areas, two of which would be using existing Naval Reserve forces: (1) assignment of continental Maritime Defense Zone responsibilities; (2) role of a major force element in the Gulf-Caribbean SLOCs protection mission; and, the new mission, (3) providing organic land-based tanker capability, which would require procurement of four B-707 type aircraft.

The report also discussed the importance of equipment modernization, the Navy's effort to integrate equipment horizontally. Two major initiatives were cited: (1) modernize and assign Reserve Carrier Airwings for the 15th and 16th carrier battle groups and (2) upgrade the P-3 Naval Reserve aircraft by means of the TACNAVMOD program.

In addition, the report outlined ten new force initiatives to achieve greater integration with the active force. These included: (1) increasing the number of amphibious ships in the Naval Reserve Force (NRF)—one LSD, one LPD and one additional LST when force levels would permit (1990s); (2) transferring some P-3C ASW training missions to the reserves by forming 72 P-3C crews; (3) increasing integration of the reserves in mine countermeasures; (4) allocating a portion of aerial minesweeping mission for reserve participation; (5) adding more support

3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
ships to the NRF; (6) establishing reserve augment units for air cushion vehicle amphibious craft; (7) establishing two augmentation units to support carrier on-board delivery and other aircraft in VR-30 and VRC-40; (8) manning a hospital ship in the fiscal year 1984 budget request with some SELRES personnel; (9) establishing an afloat mobile reserve intermediate maintenance capability; and (10) retaining two ARS-38 class salvage ships in the NRF.

Support for these initiatives was mixed. But Chapman B. Cox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, made clear the Navy's new enthusiasm for the Total Force policy:

My final general point about the total force initiatives is that the phrase 'more effective utilization of the Reserves' is susceptible to various interpretations. Our interpretation and intention is to use the Reserves to make the total force more effective and more efficient in peacetime, during crisis, and on mobilization. This is not the same as the approach of those who might interpret the phrase...to mean expansion of an old men's club or to mean the development of a total force which is less ready to deploy in response to our national security objectives.

The Director of Naval Reserve, RAdm. Kempf, also voiced strong support for the Total Force initiatives recommended by the Newell report. On the one hand, he recognized that Naval Reserve growth "will be more difficult in the future" because of an improving economy, a shrinking pool of eligible manpower, and increased competition from both the public and private sectors. Despite these factors, the Navy requested a significant increase in selected reservists, from 122,000 in fiscal year 1986 to 138,000 in fiscal year 1990 (refer to table 7).

1. Ibid.
2. Statement by Chapman B. Cox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, House Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization and Oversight Hearings, FY 1985, pp. 151-152.

-57-
TABLE 7

NAVAL RESERVE PERSONNEL REQUESTS

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</table>

a. TEMAC is the acronym for Temporary Active Duty.

On the other hand, RAdm. Kempf stated that the Naval Reserve was "rapidly evolving from a force in reserve to a force in being." Although this was contrary to the original intent of the Total Force policy, as adumbrated by Secretaries of Defense Laird and Schlesinger, it certainly reflected the contemporary sentiment of Congress. Indeed, the Total Force policy was well on its way to making itself a permanent fixture in the Navy bureaucracy, in large measure because of the creation of a Total Force Advocate billet filled by a flag officer. As RAdm. Kempf said, the Navy had "institutionalized the process by establishing a permanent organization within the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations, headed by a flag officer, to assess on a continuing basis the Navy's performance in structuring the optimum mix of active and reserve forces required to fight and win a war at sea."

Reflecting on the progress made by the Navy in implementing the recommendations of the Newell report, RAdm. Kempf noted in 1985 that "almost all of the initiatives from last year's report are now a part of the Navy's program." The Naval Reserve role in protecting the Gulf of Mexico sea lines of communication had been subsumed within the Maritime Defense Zone (MDZ) mission. Maritime Defense Zones Atlantic and Pacific had been established, and Navy and Coast Guard reservists were slated to play a large role in their operation. The following additional initiatives from the 1984 report were also now included in the Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP):

- Modernizing Reserve maritime patrol air squadrons (VP) through TACNAVMOD and other upgrading programs

1. Ibid., p. 81.
2. Ibid., p. 88.
3. Ibid.
• Transferring additional amphibious ships (LST, LPD, LSD) to the Naval Reserve and establishing Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) augment units

• Consolidating Patrol Squadron Augment Units into Master Augment Units and making P-3C aircraft and weapon systems trainers available for Reserve use

• Increasing the Reserve role in the airborne mine countermeasures mission (AMCM)

• Transferring AO-177 class fleet oilers to the Naval Reserve Force, starting in fiscal year 1989, contingent upon achieving planned TAO-187 procurement and maintaining required active force levels

• Establishing two Reserve augment units to support carrier on-board delivery (COD) squadrons

• Executing Reserve augmentation plans for the Navy's new hospital ships

• Doubling the number of salvage ships (ARSs) in the Naval Reserve Force.

RAdm. Kempf said the 1985 report to Congress included several additional initiatives to be considered during update of the Five-Year Program and development of the fiscal year 1987 budget request. These included:

• Forming two supersonic adversary aircraft squadrons within the Naval Air Reserve Force

• Equipping one of the light attack squadrons in each Reserve Tactical Air Wing with medium attack (A-6E) aircraft

• Moving up the transition to P-3C aircraft to fiscal year 1988

• Consolidating the Light Attack Helicopter (HAL) and Combat Search and Rescue Helicopter Squadrons (HC) into two new Helicopter Combat Support squadrons (HCS), equipped with H-60 aircraft

• Establishing two airborne Mine Countermeasure Helicopter (AMCM) squadrons with five RH-53D aircraft each, starting

1. Ibid.
in fiscal year 1987, and procuring two merchant ship
mobile van complexes to support them at sea.1

The Navy's second report to Congress also received broad
acclaim. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, for example, singled
out the Navy in his Annual Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 1986: "Under
the Total Force Policy, the Naval Reserve is continuing its most ambi-
tious expansion since World War II. The Navy's reserve structure is
being simultaneously enlarged and modernized, to meet the needs of a
600-ship fleet and to strengthen the contribution of Reserve forces
across the entire spectrum of warfare."2

VAdm. William P. Lawrence, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Manpower, Personnel and Training, and Chief of Naval Personnel,
explained the Navy's plans with regard to the Total Force policy:

The crux of our plan to increase overall Navy
military manpower levels was to achieve modest
increases each year to both man our new ships and
squadrons as they came on-line, and simultaneously
increase our base of experienced petty officers in
order to man and support a substantially larger Navy
by the end of the decade.3

VAdm. Lawrence added that the "primary concern in setting the
proper mix of Active and Reserve forces is the maintenance of the level
of readiness necessary to meet peacetime commitments and war plan
requirements...our maritime strategy has been one of forward
deployment...."4

The Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. James D. Watkins, emphasized
that:

The Navy's total manpower needs result directly
from requirements of the maritime strategy.... We
have moved forward aggressively to integrate and
maximize Reserve contributions while ensuring that no
missions are transferred to the Reserves which either
result in a net degradation of readiness, cannot be
supported by available reserve manpower, or are

1. Ibid., pp. 88-89.
2. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Annual Report to the
3. Statement by VAdm. William P. Lawrence, Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Manpower, Personnel and Training, and Chief of Naval
Personnel, House Armed Services Committee, Defense Department
Authorization and Oversight Hearings, Part 6, p. 155.
4. Ibid., p. 169.
costlier than leaving them with the active forces. "The focus of this process is 'horizontal integration.' Front-line ships and aircraft now compose a high percentage of the Reserve inventory...."

But Adm. Watkins cautioned that "there are limits on our reliance on the naval reserve which relate to availability during periods of crisis." He said that the President's 100,000 call-up authority was "insufficient" to provide the Navy the requisite augmentation, in both size and type, during a period short of war. "Because of this," he added, "reserve integration becomes more difficult and must be approached with caution to ensure readiness to meet reasonably foreseeable requirements is maintained."

In April 1986, VAdm. Kempf informed Congress that "the Navy Reserve is integrated fully into the Navy's force structure and plans for fulfilling the Maritime Strategy." But like Adm. Watkins, VAdm. Kempf said, "there are finite limits on how many Naval Reservists we can attract and retain and how large a portion of the Navy's force structure can or should be in the Naval Reserve. These limitations are, in large part, determined by forces outside the Navy, such as demographics and the National Command Authority's force level requirements to meet peacetime commitments." But he said that "the Navy is committed to strengthening the Naval Reserve as rapidly as feasible and expanding the Reserve portion of our total force as much as is prudent." Table 8 reflects the Navy's commitment to expand the reserve force.

**TABLE 8**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>FY</th>
<th>NAANOS</th>
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<td>90</td>
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</table>

2. Ibid., p. 52.
The Navy's third Total Force Report to Congress emphasized the progress made in the growth, modernization, and integration of the Naval reserve into the Navy's force structure. The report also highlighted plans for manning fleet hospitals and deployable medical systems with reserves. It stressed the Naval Reserve's expanding role in mine warfare and renewed the Navy's commitment to assign all appropriate missions to the Naval Reserve as well as provide the training and modern equipment necessary for the Reserves to do its job.

**Mobilizing the Navy's Total Force**

As the Reagan administration institutionalized the Total Force policy, more and more questions were raised concerning how a greater reliance on reserves would affect the national military strategy. What were the means of determining the manpower force levels justified by strategic considerations? According to Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, "The sizes of the forces to deter aggression must be determined by the threat to our national interest and by the defense strategy, by fiscal constraints, and our capability to mobilize and deploy forces in the event of war." While it was difficult to disagree with these criteria, they simply did not go far enough toward answering how to determine the optimum trade-off, for example, between mobilization capability and cost. In particular, how much money would be saved by relying on a strategy that depended on mobilization for its initial implementation, to say nothing of its ultimate success? Was this a false economy? Without addressing these questions specifically, Secretary Ikle obviously felt that greater reliance upon a mobilization strategy--i.e., greater reliance upon the reserves--was an acceptable risk for U.S. national security:

In addressing Reserve manpower, it is important to recognize its integral role in our total force policy. In decisions relating to the manpower mix necessary to accomplish defense missions, our policy is to maintain as small an active peacetime force as our global security requirements and our overseas commitments permit. We have substantially increased our reliance on reserves wherever our analyses show it warranted.

Cloaked beneath these criteria were certain assumptions that could prove crucial to the nation's successful defense in wartime. Just as national military strategy assumed an ability to mobilize in times of

1. Ibid., p. 769.
3. Ibid., p. 1161.
crisis, the Navy's Maritime Strategy centered on the assumption that it would have time to mobilize and deploy in strategic forward locations prior to the outbreak of general war with the Soviet Union. Indeed, one of the important assumptions made in that strategy is that there will be a preliminary crisis and conventional phase before any future general war. The Maritime Strategy implicitly assumes that the political leadership will be willing to make difficult decisions early in a tense international situation: decisions as to how far forward the Navy ought to deploy, and when, if at all, the Navy might commence an anti-SSBN campaign. The corollary to this for the Naval Reserves centered on the Navy's policy of "Horizontal Integration." Two observations are relevant: a country does not place front-line ships and aircraft into the reserves unless it plans to use them in a general war; and limited resources compel any country to ensure that it can use its best assets in time of need. Together, these observations point to the growing risk of creating a reserve force-in-being rather than the primary augmentation force originally envisioned by the founders of the Total Force policy. The Reagan administration argued that in keeping with the Total Force policy it was essential to upgrade the long-neglected material side of the reserves. Through a Horizontal Integration of modern equipment and platforms, the reserves were supposed to be better trained and more capable of working side-by-side with active forces in combat. The assumption of this policy, to reiterate, was that there would be time to mobilize these forces so that they mattered in wartime. But if a war were going to be strictly "come-as-you-are," there might not be time to mobilize the reserves. National and maritime strategy, however, envisioned the likelihood of a protracted conventional war, hence the assumption that the United States would mobilize its superior industrial base and vast reserve structure.

Thus, the Reagan administration argued, the "strong, well-equipped, combat ready forces of all of the Reserve Components are essential to our success if we are forced to engage in any form of serious sustained combat now and for the foreseeable future." This remark, by Edward Philbin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, summarized the administration's position. "I acknowledge," Assistant Secretary Philbin continued,

that one could hypothesize a quick, short-warning, and a devastating nuclear exchange which would preclude commitment of the bulk of these Guard and Reserve forces but, excluding that eventuality, the nation must be prepared for the possible outbreak of hostilities in a number of locales, perhaps simultaneously. If deterrence fails, deployed elements of the U.S. Armed Forces can be expected to be hard pressed, and heavy casualties and equipment losses must be viewed as probable and perhaps unavoidable. If we do not possess the necessary depth of military capability to counter such hostile activities, replace
our losses and, militarily strengthen the arena of conflict as well as other threatened areas, we could be faced with the alternative of losing the war or employing weapons of such a nature that the conflict would be escalated to a worldwide conflagration. Properly manned and trained Reserve Components provide this necessary depth. I should add that the very existence of militarily sound Reserve Components is also a visible expression of our national resolve to defend our own interests and those of the rest of the free world. 

Assistant Secretary Philbin said that the nation’s historic reliance upon citizen soldiers, as well as military and economic imperatives, “have prompted Congress and the Defense Department in recent years to place far greater emphasis and reliance on the Reserve forces than ever before. As a consequence, the Guard and Reserve of today are a far more viable force than any peacetime reserves forces we have known in the past.” He continued:

I am not committed to the continued existence of the Reserve Components for their own sake. If this country had a sufficient number of people and enough money to maintain an adequate 100 percent active duty force to protect our interests, I believe that it would represent the best means of achieving our national security purposes. But, I am convinced that it is impractical to hope for such a solution. I firmly believe that we as a nation cannot afford a standing force of the required magnitude and necessary technical complexity to meet the current perceived threat. In my opinion a mixture of combat ready Reserve Components and Active Component forces are the only militarily and economically feasible alternative. In short, we must continue to devote sufficient national resources to realize the full potential inherent in the Total Force Policy of Secretary of Defense Schlesinger which was first introduced by Secretary of Defense Laird.2

According to Assistant Secretary Philbin, the term “weekend warrior” was no longer applicable to the reserve forces. Diverging from the original concept of the Total Force, under which the reserves were the primary augmentation force for active units, Assistant Secretary

2. Ibid.
Philbin said that "today's Reserve Forces are no longer forces in reserve. They are adjunct forces, fully professional, totally integrated and completely involved with the defense of this country along with their active duty counterparts." But if the reserves made up nearly 40 percent of the nation's Total Force of 3.4 million military personnel, they were still badly equipped. As one commentator has observed, "To be so committed in war...we must be so committed in peace since the warning time cannot be guaranteed."

In summary, the mid-1980s finally saw the implementation of the Total Force policy. Naval Reserve requirements increased steadily, and the Navy complied with Congressional wishes to grant more missions to the Naval Reserves. The Lehman policy of Horizontal Integration, moreover, reduced some of the inequities and incompatibilities between active and reserve force equipment and hardware. As budgets once again became constrained, however, it remained to be seen whether the Navy could continue its course of integrating the reserves while simultaneously delaying any further growth in active forces.

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1. Ibid., p. 5.
CHAPTER 7

HISTORICAL LESSONS OF THE TOTAL FORCE DEBATE

This final chapter presents lessons drawn from the historical record of the Total Force debate that would be applicable to future planning and management of the Total Force.

It is possible to draw some useful generalizations from the 20-year debate over the Total Force policy. If the foregoing analysis is correct, the past record strongly suggests an impending period of significant change with regard to the Total Force policy. In general, there is a high probability that the incremental bolstering of the reserves that has occurred under the Total Force policy may have reached its saturation point. With regard to the Navy, this study portends reduced Congressional pressure over the next five years on the Navy's implementation of the Total Force policy. Furthermore, a new debate over the optimum mix of active and reserve forces, as well as over the required number of selected reservists, may be in the offing. Although it is difficult to project the intentions of a new administration, it is not unreasonable to expect a rollback of some of the gains made by the reserves in recent years under the Total Force policy. At the very least, there are some fundamental differences between the Total Force debate of the early-1970s and the that of the late-1980s.

First, the Total Force debate is more narrowly circumscribed today than it was at its inception. As this paper has shown, the original Total Force concept, initiated by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, referred to the more effective utilization of all Western defense assets: NATO and other allied defenses, more 'jointness' among America's military services, and additional integration of U.S. active and inactive forces. As during most of the 1980s, however, the current discussion has been decoupled from the issues of allied burden-sharing and inter-service cooperation. While these issues remain topical in other circles, they are no longer part of the Total Force debate, which now focuses almost exclusively on the integration of active and reserve forces. It is questionable whether categorizing the issues makes for prudent defense planning. Indeed, it might be argued that this decoupling diverts the attention of Navy Total Force planners from potential options, an understanding of which could be critical for addressing the most effective utilization of the Navy's Total Force.

Second, also contrary to the original Total Force concept, which emphasized that the role of the reserves was as a primary augmentation force for active units, the Total Force policy gradually has evolved into supporting reserve forces for first-line active missions. While it is debatable whether or not this is desirable from a strategic perspective, it is clearly different from what the founders of Total Force policy intended. Both Secretaries Laird and Schlesinger stressed in their key memoranda the augmentation role of the reserves. Today.
however, the reserves frequently are referred to not as a force in reserve but rather as a force in being. The problem, however, is that the reserves by their very nature cannot be forces-in-being. They must be mobilized, which in turn requires two critical components of any nation's ability to wage war: time and political will. Thus, because such an evolution implies a much greater role for the reserves in active missions from the start of a major national emergency, a larger reserve force poses some tough new questions for U.S. strategy.

Third, the historical record indicates that reserve force priorities tend to be lowered vis-à-vis active-force priorities at times when the defense budget is more constrained. This is significant, given the probability that the defense budgets of the post-Gr姆-Budman Congress will proceed on a downward trend. Because defense expenditures are unlikely to grow beyond the rate of inflation over the next five years, the planned expansion of the Naval Reserves under the Total Force policy may have already reached its apogee. This is so despite the fact that the Naval Reserves are in a far more advantageous institutional position today than they have been at any point during the past two decades. The lessons of the past Total Force debate suggest that the new-found powers of reserve forces may be superseded by Congressional and Defense Department concerns for the well-being of the active forces. This is intuitively plausible, as it would be untenable to spend billions of dollars on a 600-ship Navy only to use those advanced platforms on a part-time basis by inactive forces.

Fourth, there is a fundamental difference in the Total Force debate today because the mood of Congressional leaders seems to be much different. On the one hand, Congress generally remains in favor of a strong reserve, if only because it gives that branch of government greater control over where and how much America uses its military might. On the other hand, Congress seems to be satisfied with recent progress toward integrating reserve forces into active ones. In particular, Congress appears to have accepted the Navy's progress toward horizontal integration of new weapons into the reserves, and the Navy's institutionalization of a flag officer as Total Force Advocate. Hence, to the extent that it is possible to generalize about Congress, the feeling seems to be that it is not so much a question of adding new missions to the Naval Reserves—a question that went to the heart of much of the debate in the late 1970s and early 1980s—as it is a matter of consolidating gains made by the reserves. That means the continuation of horizontal integration and more emphasis upon realistic training for the reserves, as well as the need to ensure that active forces also cease to expand. Barring a major conflict, Congressional support for maintaining the current number of active personnel in all services is likely to wane; nonetheless, any attempts to cut Navy active end strength will have to be measured against the increased size in force structure, namely the 600-ship Navy that is still coming on line. That fact, in conjunction with changes in the Total Force debate today, should protect the Navy's active force from the severe kinds of personnel setbacks it faced during the 1970s.
Fifth, the delicate consensus over mobilization requirements for selected reservists, including the Naval Reserve, may be starting to crumble. Regardless of the causes of the vacillation and indecision about these requirements during the 1970s, the fact remains that a lack of a mutually acceptable standard for measuring SELRES requirements badly hurt the Naval Reserve. The achievement of a consensus, manifested in the Navy Manpower Mobilization System (NAMMOS), brought a period of stability in the late 1970's that laid the groundwork for the ultimate decision to increase the Navy SELRES end strength. But political and strategic decisions could change the entire way in which the Navy estimates its number of required selected reservists. If the administration or Congress decides to rely less upon a large reserve infrastructure, the reserves could be cut back regardless of how many may be needed for mobilization. NAMMOS would not be invalid, just irrelevant. Additional stability, it seems, might be derived from the completion of a Total Force Master Plan for all Navy personnel. Such a plan would seem to be the next logical step toward the goal of truly 'One Navy.' But even such a plan would be subject to such external constraints as changes in fundamental national strategic assumptions.

The Navy, like the other services, remains moored to the prevailing national strategy, and national strategy is subject to changes in the White House. The shift from a short, intense war strategy in the 1970s, to an ability to wage a protracted, conventional war--as contemplated in the Maritime Strategy--once again required an increase in the numbers of reservists. The notion of a protracted, conventional war has been easier to argue given the current administration's commitment to a larger defense budget, but such a strategy may make less sense in an environment of greater fiscal constraint. Moreover, while a protracted conventional war capability also seems to tie into recent Soviet military doctrine, there is nothing to prevent that doctrine from once again changing course to emphasize more nuclear warfighting capability.

Finally, as stated above, shifting more missions and hardware from active to reserve forces makes the United States more dependent on mobilization. The strategic implications of this shift are likely to be more hotly contested in the future as the Total Force policy continues to be implemented. The tendency of Congress to determine the preferred balance of active and inactive forces less on strategic grounds than on cost considerations will be especially controversial. Indeed, if one introduces the strategic concept of surprise, with its implication that the United States may be unable (because of time) or unwilling (because of fear of provoking war) to mobilize for war, then a criterion of cost becomes a dangerous measure of effectiveness. The Total Force policy, if carried to an extreme, actually could weaken deterrence by reducing America's ability to respond swiftly and effectively to crises. A major adversary, perceiving this to be the case, might rationally conclude that pre-emptive action would be greatly in his interest. This issue is likely to play an increasingly important role in future debate.