DETERRENCE VERSUS REASSURANCE:
IMPLICATIONS OF THE MARITIME STRATEGY FOR NORWAY

A Thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

MAJ ERLING AABAKKEN

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
1987

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

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The purpose of this analysis is to determine the impact on Norwegian security should NATO and the United States apply The Maritime Strategy to operational planning for the Norwegian Sea.

The Maritime Strategy is a global strategy, which in competition for acceptance against the continental-coalition strategy, has to satisfy U.S. needs to counter the Soviet Union. Although much of the "campaign" for The Maritime Strategy has focused on the Norwegian Sea, the goal is global.

The presence of NATO naval forces in the Norwegian Sea has been limited to the STANAVFORLANT and other allied forces during exercises. Recent exercises and force deployment demonstrate that NATO leaders have decided to increase allied presence in northern waters to counter Soviet Naval expansion.

The 600-Ship U.S. Navy, being built as the result of The Maritime Strategy "campaign," gives NATO the possibility to increase NATO presence further and make such an aggressive strategy in this area more credible.

Official Norwegian Security and Defense policy rests on the twin pillars of deterrence and reassurance, and if implemented, The Maritime Strategy has to fit into the constraints made up by these two pillars.

The preference of the Norwegian government seems to be a continuation of the system of previous restraints and confidence building measures to avoid confusion and superpower rivalry in the northern waters.

The study identifies three areas which cause some concern: (1) the horizontal escalation aspect, (2) early strikes against Soviet SSBN's, and (3) peacetime presence within the Norwegian Sea required to assure that The Maritime Strategy, if implemented, will be successful. The study concludes that the Maritime Strategy is suitable and acceptable from a Norwegian perspective. The main reason is that it contributes to deterrence against the Soviet expansion into the Norwegian Sea, and thereby makes Norwegian security policy more credible.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

DETERRENCE VERSUS REASSURANCE: IMPLICATIONS OF THE MARITIME STRATEGY FOR NORWAY by Major Erling Aabakken, Norway, 97 pages.

The purpose of this analysis is to determine the impact on Norwegian security should NATO and the United States apply The Maritime Strategy to operational planning for the Norwegian Sea.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND--

The Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea has been, and still is "a quiet peaceful" area within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) area, but will that continue? The steady growth of the Northern Fleet of the Soviet Navy has in recent years significantly changed Norway's geo-strategical situation for the worse. From a Norwegian perspective, the presence of this considerable force now dominates the naval scene in the Norwegian Sea. Its potential and powers were duly demonstrated during last summer's 1985 exercise in the North Atlantic and adjacent waters. (1)

The strategic importance of Norwegian territory and surrounding waters is widely acknowledged. (2) Therefore, Norwegian harbors and airfields become decisive factors in naval strategy regarding the control of the Norwegian Sea.

This also underlines how dependent Norway is on naval power to defend its interest especially in time of conflict and war. The safe and timely arrival of sea borne reinforcements and resupplies will be of great importance to
Norway's ability to resist aggression and maintain national sovereignty.

Norway lacks suitable naval forces to meet the requirement for balanced sea power capabilities, and Norway, in its naval planning, has to rely on other NATO nations to support missions vital to the interests and security of Norway. For practical purposes, these NATO nations can be divided into two groups:

-- The North American Navies (U.S. and Canada)
-- The Navies of the European NATO countries.

In 1978, in an assessment of the prospects for arms control in Northern Europe, two Finnish analysts concluded that "the key position in any security arrangements in the Nordic area is occupied by Norway." And in his 1981 analysis of Soviet sea power, Michael McGuire concluded:

For the Soviets, this area (the Norwegian Sea) had moved from a being nice-to-have to need-to-have, with all that implies in terms of military resources being allocated to seizing key islands and stretches of Norwegian coast in order to establish command at the outbreak of war. It can be assumed that the Soviets will seek to establish their defense perimeter on the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap (GIUK-gap) and while it would be difficult to resist the initial thrust, it would be much harder for the West to try and fight back once the Soviets were firmly ensconced. (3)

The U.S. Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman, Jr. seemed to agree. In December 1982 he called the Kola Peninsula "the most valuable piece of real estate on earth."
He added that "the Soviet's current strategy is to take Norway very early and operate their submarines out of the Norwegian Fjords." He concluded with, "we hope to be able to gain control of the Norwegian Sea." (4)

At Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), it is officially stated that control of the Norwegian Sea is No. 1 priority, and the battle of the Atlantic must be fought in the Norwegian Sea. (5) The reason behind these statements are the growing Soviet Northern Fleet and its dual function. Firstly, the main threat against NATO's Atlantic sea lines, secondly, the main component of the strategic submarine force (SSBN's) of the USSR, which are of major concern to the U.S. because they are the main threat against the Continental United States (CONUS).

PURPOSE--

The purpose of this study is to analyze The Maritime Strategy applied towards NATO's Northern Flank, and its implication on Norwegian security policy. My intention is to determine if it is a suitable and acceptable strategy to counter the Soviet expansion from a Norwegian perspective within a NATO context.

DELIMITATIONS--

To limit the scope of research, there are different areas I will not discuss.
1. This study will not address whether or not sufficient naval capacity are available to support this strategy. (Feasibility aspect, see page 7-10)

2. Another limitation is that I will not address the force composition of the Northern Fleet of the Soviet Union or any of the NATO nations involved. These overall figures are well known and are easily obtainable from a number of defense publications. (6)

3. The time frame will cover the years up until the year 2000.

4. Another limitation concerns problems related to infrastructure such as harbors, command and control installations, supply facilities, home bases for the ships within the region to support any larger deployment of naval assets within the Norwegian Sea. This will not be addressed.

ASSUMPTIONS--

1. NATO strategy has to be based upon a recognition of a common threat against the members of the Alliance, and the perceptions that membership in NATO will contribute to each of the nation's need for external security.

2. The money devoted to navies within the Alliance will not change significantly within the time frame.

3. France and Spain will not join the military part of NATO.
METHODOLOGY—

The research was conducted in four phases, according to the different chapters the paper consists of. First, I developed a comprehensive background of the important parts of Norwegian security policy related to this specific area. It was important to explain a little of the history behind the decision to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949, because this was a very dramatic change in Norwegian foreign policy, and as always, there are reasons behind which it is important to understand. It is important to have some understanding of the term The Nordic Balance, because that is also a part of the Norwegian Security policy.

The next task was to study The Maritime Strategy, and understand how this strategy might fit into the U.S. Military Strategy. This was necessary because it is a U.S. global strategy to counter the Soviet expansion everywhere, and not a strategy designed for the defense of the Norwegian Sea, although this area has been used in some of the arguments for where the strategy can be implemented. The strategy is developed to support NATO, and other U.S. Allies.

This part of the research took me into the NATO maritime strategy, and thereby also into the focus on NATO's Northern Flank and how The Maritime Strategy is expected to
function in this specific area. To understand where The Maritime Strategy differs from current U.S. strategy towards the Northern Flank, I found it necessary to go back and look at the development of U.S. interest in the Norwegian Sea back to the start of NATO. It is important to be aware of the history of U.S. commitments towards the NATO’s Northern Flank, because as we estimate and try to determine the future, we will always look back and evaluate the trends in the past.

I also found it necessary to research Official Norwegian Statements about The Maritime Strategy, using recent sources, without access to daily Norwegian newspapers. The final task was to determine the effectiveness of The Maritime Strategy from a Norwegian perspective. This chapter ends with some conclusions in regard to how suitable and acceptable The Maritime Strategy is from a Norwegian perspective. The strategic concept was evaluated for effectiveness by using two criteria—suitability and acceptability. Each of these factors is dependent upon the other. The method is described by Colonel William O. Staudenmaier in his special reports on strategic concepts for the 1980’s. Usually the criteria feasibility is also evaluated, but because the force involved is mainly the U.S. Navy, with some support from other NATO navies, Norway cannot control this factor. My assumption is that "the 600-Ship" Navy will be sufficient to
support the strategy, so this criteria will not be addressed.

Col. Staudenmaier explains the method by stating that the first standard, suitability, determines whether the military objective, if achieved, will lead to the desired effect. But the objective sought must also be feasible. This requires that the resources available for the attainment of the objective be compared to the enemy's capacity to prevent its attainment. Finally, if the strategic concept has met the demands of suitability and feasibility, it must yet be determined whether the operation can achieve its military objective at reasonable cost—acceptability. The influence of this factor may require the abandonment of the entire project, if the gains do not justify the costs. (7)

Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles U.S.N. (Ret) has used the same method (8) and he describes the criteria with three questions: suitability—"Will the course of action accomplish the ends that you seek?" feasibility—"Will the course of action be able to provide the right means at the right place at the right time?" acceptability—or consequences to cost—"Do you stand to loose more than you can afford?"

What I am trying to determine in the same context is in regard to suitability; from a Norwegian point of view will The Maritime Strategy contribute to the main goal of
Norwegian Security Policy on NATO Northern Flank, or are they in conflict? If implemented towards the Northern Flank (Norwegian Sea); would Norway's security be enhanced without interfering with today's bases for our security policy; and would The Maritime Strategy be a usable tool in time of crises and war? Acceptability; would The Maritime Strategy change the environment in our home waters to our disadvantage regarding the low level of tension, basing policy and so on? By making a summary in each chapter covering the main points and bringing them with me to the evaluation chapter, where the different points concerning The Maritime Strategy and Norwegian Security policy will be evaluated against the two criteria suitability and acceptability. When you evaluate the different aspects of The Maritime Strategy's influence on Norway's security policy, it will either support, maintain status quo, or be in conflict with our policy.

What I am trying to accomplish in the last chapter of my thesis can be illustrated somewhat like this:
The three blocks in the bottom of the pyramid are the basis for my thesis. These are the different parts you need to understand and take into consideration in the later evaluation of the thesis. To build upon this base you need an assessment regarding The Maritime Strategy towards the Northern Flank and Norwegian officials' Statements regarding The Maritime Strategy. After this you can start to evaluate, which then leads you to the conclusion.

The significance of the study is that The Maritime Strategy will be analyzed from a Norwegian perspective. Most all of the literature written about The Maritime Strategy has been written from a U.S. perspective. As such, this thesis will be a contribution to the theoretical base regarding The Maritime Strategy. As the thesis will show, The Maritime Strategy has been used primarily as a budgeting policy to convince Congress to create a 600-Ship Navy,
thereby building the necessary assets to employ the strategy. It has not been wholeheartedly embraced by JCS, and is not at present synonymous with the U.S. national strategy. It is, however, being aggressively sold by the Navy and is likely to have a significant impact on U.S. strategy in the 1990's.

The study identifies three areas which cause some concern: (1) the horizontal escalation aspect, (2) early strike against Soviet's SSBN's and (3) peacetime presence within the Norwegian Sea required to assure that the Strategy will be successful.

The study concludes that The Maritime Strategy is suitable and acceptable from a Norwegian perspective. The main reason is that it contributes to deterrence of Soviet expansion into the Norwegian Sea, and thereby makes Norwegian security policy more credible, and Norway as such more secure both in peace and war.
ENDNOTES


CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH MATERIAL

THE MARITIME STRATEGY--

The basic resource document used for this chapter was the supplement to the magazine *Proceedings* published by the U.S. Naval Institute in January 1986. (1) This supplement provides the most definitive and authoritative statements of The Maritime Strategy that are available in unclassified form. It also contains a contemporary U.S. Naval Strategy bibliography, put together by Captain Peter M. Swartz, U.S. Navy. This bibliography starts with The Maritime Strategy debates from 1979-1985 as it is explained by civilian and military leaders, (2) and includes criticism of and commentaries on the strategy, as well as items relating "The Maritime Strategy" to the overall national military strategy, and to historical precedents. (3) It is organized topically and--within each topic--chronologically in order to show the development of the strategy as well as its alternatives.

The second part deals with the Soviet's views and strategy. The focus is on how Soviet's view their own strategy as well as the U.S. The next one deals with the
general and historical literature on naval strategy, concentrating on how strategy is made, was made, or should be made; and books that describe earlier strategies—planned or implemented—which are analogous to key aspects of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy today. The fourth—deals with the discussion on Fleet Balance: Atlantic versus Pacific versus Mediterranean, and the last part deals with naval operations: peacetime and crisis. As a whole this supplement is a very valuable compilation of relevant factors and arguments published prior to January 1986.

NATO AND THE SOVIET THREAT--

Excellent background on this topic was gained from The Soviet Threat to NATO's Northern Flank by Marian K. Leighton. It was published in 1979 by National Strategy Information Center, Inc., New York. The book gives a good analysis on this particular problem.

A second book, North Atlantic Security: The Forgotten Flank, by Kenneth A. Meyers, complements Leighton's work. Although they deal with the same problem, Meyers is more recent and therefore more up to date when it comes to the maritime debate.

Jane's 1981-82 Naval Annual, edited by Captain John Moore, RN has some good articles, especially one written by General Sir Peter Whitley, GCB, OBE, RN about Navies and the Northern Flank. He states that the growth of
the Northern Fleet has drawn the Northern region out of its former obscurity and into the forefront of NATO's security problems. (4)

The magazine NATO'S SIXTEEN (FIFTEEN) NATIONS is also an excellent source. This is an official NATO Magazine, and there have been a lot of good articles about the Northern Flank and European naval cooperation. The articles that have been used is listed in the bibliography. Sources sighted in the chapter on Norwegian security policy were also used here because the topics overlap.

NORWEGIAN SECURITY POLICY AND OFFICIAL STATEMENTS--

The basic source for this chapter was a book edited by Gregory Flynn, entitled NATO's Northern Allies. The National Security Policies of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway. It is an Atlantic Institute for International Affairs research volume, published in 1985. The fourth chapter of this volume (Norwegian Security Policy: Defense and Nonprovocation in a Changing Context by Mr. Arne Olav Brundtland) gives a brief but comprehensive analysis of the development of Norwegian security policy from 1905 until 1984. (5) This chapter provides an excellent introduction to the different political parties' influence and impact on Norwegian security policy.

Another Norwegian, Dr. Johan J. Holst, currently Norwegian Minister of Defense, has written chapter
six called, Lilliputs and Gulliver: Small states in a Great-Power Alliance. This chapter gives the reader a better understanding of how smaller nations like Norway view themselves in an alliance with Great-Powers. (6)

New Strategic Factors in the North Atlantic, (1977), edited by Christoph Bertram and Johan J. Holst, consists of several articles based on presentations given at a 1975 conference held in Iceland jointly organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs. All the contributors came from the littoral States of the North Atlantic and discussed the changing security in the area. The book was very useful as a background. Adelphi Paper Number One Hundred and Eighty One (1983)—by Erling Bjøl—is about Nordic Security and gives a good perspective on the Nordic balance. This paper concentrates on the five Nordic countries and their interrelationships.

GENERAL SOURCES—

I have also used some Norwegian sources that discuss problems related to my thesis. The most important ones are:

1. Politikk og Sikkerhet i Norskehavsområdet, by Anders C. Sjaastad and John Kristian Skogan, was edited as early as 1975, but explains the basic security problems that the littoral states of the Norwegian Sea have in common.

3. Internasjonal Politikk, No. 6, 1986, published by the same institution as No. 2.

4. Norwegian magazines, like NORSK MILITAERT TIDSSKRIFT, FORSVARETS FORUM, NORGES FORSVAR and official defense publications FD-informasjon (CURRENT DEFENSE ISSUES), were also of great value.

English language sources which proved useful to my research have been:

1. Britain's Naval Future, by James Cable, published in 1983, which deals with the future defense policies of Britain, NATO and the U.S.


Magazines most frequently used in addition:


5. Proceedings, (ISSN 0041-798X) published by U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, MD 21402
6. Foreign Policy, (ISSN 0015-7228) published quarterly by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

7. NATO REVIEW, published quarterly by NATO.

8. Sea Power, published by Navy League of the United States, 2300 Wilson Blvd, Arlington, VA 22201 (ISSN 0199-1337)


All the articles that have been used from these magazines are listed in the bibliography, and they all gave excellent background for the thesis.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid., p. 41.

3. Ibid., pp. 42-47.


6. Ibid., pp. 258-286.
CHAPTER THREE

THE MARITIME STRATEGY

The goal of the overall Maritime Strategy is to use maritime power, in combination with the effort of our sister services and forces of our allies, to bring about war termination or favorable terms.

(Admiral James D. Watkins, U.S. Navy)

In this chapter the following points will be covered:

1. The Maritime Strategy's place in the internal U.S. discussion, and its main objectives and part of U.S. national strategy, should it become a part of official U.S. military strategy.

2. The deterrence effect of the strategy including the aspect of crisis response, both important to Norway.

3. The warfighting implications of the strategy, including the more offensive aspects, such as the strike against Soviet SSBNs and the horizontal escalation problem, both impacting on Norwegian security.

4. Opposing views will be explored to demonstrate potential weaknesses of the strategy, lastly the critics against the strategy will show some of the different points of view within the U.S.
GENERAL

The role of strategy is to transform the total capabilities of a state into instruments of policy. In its simplest form, it is strategy that must dictate to military planners which capabilities are needed and how they should plan to use those capabilities once they are in hand. (1) The discussion between the group of U.S. strategists -- continentalists -- who argue for the strategic primacy of land power, and the maritime strategists, who regards command of the sea as the key strategic interest for the U.S. increased following the change of administration in January 1981. (2) Although these strategies have different bases, they seemed to agree on four strategic factors (3)

1. The relative power of the United States is in decline.

2. In recent years, the relative power of the Soviet Union has been growing.

3. The growth of Soviet nuclear and conventional military capabilities has been immense.

4. U.S. interests have shifted significantly from the industrialized world to the Third World.

The Maritime Strategy has been used primarily as a budgeting policy to convince Congress to create a 600 Ship Navy, thereby building the necessary assets to employ the strategy. It has not been wholeheartedly embraced by JCS.
and is not at present synonymous with U.S. national strategy. It is, however, being aggressively sold by the Navy and is likely to have a significant impact on U.S. strategy in the 1990's. In this chapter we will focus on The Maritime Strategy, and the critiques of that strategy, but first we need to take a look at naval strategy during the Carter Administration.

The "hot spot" during Carter's administration was the Persian Gulf, and in his doctrine in January 1980, he emphasized the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf both to Europe and Japan. Because the U.S. did not possess enough aircraft carriers to deal with all areas at the same time, they had to come up with a strategy which concentrated on a theater in an early phase, preparing to change to other theaters later on. (4) And by stating that the Gulf area was the "most important" one, it could take some time before forces would be allocated to the Norwegian Sea.

The new profile did not mean that the SLOC across the Atlantic could be ignored. But instead of meeting the Soviets in the Norwegian Sea, the sea barrier was moved south in the Atlantic, away from the main threat area. Carter's "Consolidated Guidance" from April 1978 emphasized sea control south of GIUK-gap. (5) Admiral Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations, stated in 1983 that all U.S. naval assets would concentrate south of the GIUK-gap to protect the SLOC; they could no longer send aircraft carriers into
the Norwegian Sea, nor could they be used for power projection or as support to the ground forces in the north.

(6)

This meant that the USA was at the point of giving up the Norwegian Sea. A spokesman for SACLANT said in 1982 that "it is now our belief that by 1986 there will be circumstances in which our strategy of forward defense at the choke points may not be possible." (7)

Secretary of the Navy, John F. Lehman, Jr., who is one of the men behind The Maritime Strategy, stated the following strategic objectives for the navy: (8)

1. To prevent the seas from becoming a hostile medium of attack against the United States and its allies.

2. To ensure that the U.S. have unimpeded use of the ocean lifelines to the allies, the forward deployed forces, the energy and mineral resources and U.S. trading partners.

3. To be able to project force in support of national security objectives and to support combat ashore, should deterrence fail.

To be able to achieve these objectives, he stated that the U.S. needs a strategy at once global, forward deployed, and superior to the U.S.'s probable opponents. Global, because U.S. interests, allies, and opponents are global; forward deployed, in order to protect those interests and allies, and to deter those opponents, the U.S.
must be where they are; superior, because if deterrence fails, it is better to win than loose.

The Maritime Strategy is the naval component of the National Military Strategy, which is built on the three following pillars:

1. Deterrence.
2. Forward defense.
3. Alliance solidarity.

The National Military Strategy is designed to:

1. Preserve the U.S. political identity, framework and institutions.
2. Protect the U.S. including its foreign assets and allies.
3. Foster the U.S. economic well being.
4. Bolster an international order of support, the vital interest of the U.S., and its allies.

As shown, the United States has global commitments and responsibilities. Because of the magnitude of these responsibilities, the U.S. cannot enjoy the luxury of superiority of forces, and therefore a designed strategy is needed. The Maritime Strategy is the tool to be used in planning global employment of maritime forces across the spectrum of conflict possibilities, reaching from deterrence in peacetime through global war and successful war termination. It is a maritime strategy because it is more than just a naval strategy, and as the naval component of
the National Military Strategy, it is designed to support campaigns in ground theaters of operations both directly and indirectly. Its success depends on the contributions of the sister services and the allies.

DETERRENCE

Deterrence simply means convincing a potential aggressor that the risks involved in aggression are greater than its possible benefits. To ensure deterrence, preparation for global war is needed. Together with peacetime presence and response in time of crisis, these three elements contribute to deterrence and stability. The U.S. faces worldwide challenges, and in the volatility of today's international situation, the U.S. must be ready to employ elements of The Maritime Strategy in some of the world's trouble spots. Local conflicts and crises have been a feature of the international environment since World War II, although mostly in the Third World, they often have global implications with the potential to break into hostilities involving U.S. and allied interests. A fundamental component of U.S. success in deterring war with the Soviet Union depends upon U.S. ability to stabilize and control escalation in Third World crisis. Sea power is relevant across the spectrum of conflict, reaching from routine operations in peacetime to the provision of the most survivable component of U.S. forces in deterring strategic
nuclear war. If we take a look at the spectrum of conflict, it shows that in the lower levels of violence, navies are most often the key actors.

Figure 1: The spectrum of conflict.

The peacetime presence by the Navy throughout the world, enhances deterrence. By forward naval deployments, the U.S. maintains access to oil and other necessary resources, and defends against any attempts of physical denial of sealines of communications (SLOC). It also provides a clear sign of U.S. interests in a given nation or region, and of U.S. commitment to protect its interests.

One key goal of the U.S. peacetime strategy is to further international stability through support of regional balances of power. The more stable the international
environment, the lower the probability that the Soviet will risk war with the West. (9) This includes naval ship visits to foreign ports and training and exercises with foreign naval forces. If war with the Soviet Union ever starts, it will probably be a result from a crisis that escalates out of control. The U.S. ability to contain and control crisis is an important factor in the ability to prevent a global conflict.

Crisis response has and still is the business of the Navy and Marine Corps. Admiral James D. Watkins, U.S. Navy, states six reasons for selecting naval forces as the instrument of choice for crisis management and deterrence. (10) These are:

1. Forward-deployed posture and rapid mobility make naval forces readily available at crisis locations worldwide, providing significant deterring value and reducing the likelihood of ambiguous or short warning.

2. Naval forces maintain consistently high states of readiness because of forward deployments, ensuring operational expertise and day-to-day preparedness.

3. Naval forces increasingly operate with friendly and allied armed forces and sister services.

4. Naval forces can be sustained indefinitely at distant locations, with logistics support relatively independent of foreign basing or overflight rights.
5. Naval forces bring the range of capabilities required for credible deterrence. Capabilities demonstrated in actual crisis includes maintaining presence, conducting surveillance, threatening use of force, conducting naval gun fire or air strikes, landing Marines, evacuating civilians, establishing a blockade or quarantine, and preventing intervention by Soviet or other forces.

6. Naval forces have unique escalation control characteristics that contribute to effective crisis control because they can be intrusive or out of sight, threatening or non-threatening, and easily dispatched or just as easily withdrawn.

Deterrence is often associated with strategic nuclear warfare, but it has a much broader concept. The U.S. must deter threats ranging from terrorism to nuclear war, and this requires credible peacetime and wartime capabilities at the level of conflict that is being deterred. Naval forces are ideally suited for this purpose, and if the Navy's peacetime presence and crisis response tasks are done well, deterrence should not fail; however, the U.S. Navy, of course, has a strategy for a global war should the unlikely happen and deterrence fails.
WARFIGHTING--

Phase I:

It is likely that if war should come, the Soviet Union would prefer to use their ground force advantage against Europe without having to concern themselves with a global conflict or with actions on their flanks. In countering this preferred Soviet strategy, maritime forces have a major role to play.

The Maritime Strategy's contribution consists of three phases: deterrence or the transition to war; seizing the initiative; and carrying the fight to the enemy. There can be no fixed time frame associated with these phases, only a broad outline of what the U.S. wants to accomplish. Deterrence is still a goal, but at the edge of war, preparation for transition to global war is an integral part of the first phase.

A substantial part of the navy is forward deployed in peacetime, but rapid forward deployment of additional forces in crisis is needed. To be able to deter the Soviet Union's battle of the first salvo or deal with it if it comes, the U.S. has to be in position, and this calls for early, quick decisions because it takes approximately 7 days to get from the U.S. East Coast to the Northern Atlantic, or 6 days from the Mediterranean to the Northern Atlantic.
Such early deployment is reversible and not necessarily provocative.

Analysis of the geography of the region reveals an obvious requirement for forward deployment. To deny the Soviet Union the option of a massive, early attempt to interdict the SLOC's is of utmost importance. Moving one Marine amphibious brigade by air to rendezvous with its prepositioned equipment and reinforce Norway provides a convincing signal of alliance solidarity. (11)

Phase II:

If deterrence fails, and war comes, the strategy calls for seizing the initiative as far forward as possible. This means destroying Soviet forces in the forward areas and fighting towards Soviet home waters.

Seizing the initiative is important because:

1. It demonstrates to the U.S. allies its determination to prevail and thus, contributes to Alliance solidarity.

2. History tells us that gaining the initiative is the key to destroying an opponent's forces.

3. Seizing the initiative opens the way to apply direct pressure on the Soviets to end the war on U.S. terms -- which is the new goal of the strategy once deterrence has failed. (12)
It is necessary to defeat Soviet strength in all its dimensions, including their base support. That means Navy tasks like antisubmarine warfare, antisurface warfare, counter command and control, strike operations, antiair warfare, mine warfare, special operations, amphibious operations, and sealift. Each one of these tasks is essential if the strategy is to achieve success. As explained by Admiral Watkins (13) the success in antiair, antisubmarine, and antisurface battles are crucial to effective prosecution of offensive strike warfare. The battle groups are central to defeating Soviet air, submarine, and surface forces. To apply the immense strike capability, the carriers have to be moved into positions where, combined with U.S. Air Force and allied forces, they can bring to bear the added strength which is needed on NATO’s Northern or Southern Flanks or in Northeast Asia.

Phase III:

In this phase, the mission is to carry the fight to the enemy. And the goal is to complete the destruction of all the Soviet fleets which began in Phase II, and in combination with the efforts from the sister services and the allies, to bring about war termination or favorable terms.
In a global war, the objectives are to: (14)

1. Deny the Soviets their kind of war by exerting global pressure, indicating that the conflict will be neither short nor localized.

2. Destroy the Soviet Navy: both important in itself and a necessary step to be able to realize the objectives.

3. Influence the land battle by limiting redeployment of forces, by ensuring reinforcement and resupply, and by direct application of carrier air and amphibious power.

4. Terminate the war on terms acceptable to U.S. and to the allies through measures such as threatening direct attack against the homeland or changing the nuclear correlation of forces (by sinking or disabling Soviet missile firing submarines (SSBN’s)).

CRITIQUE OF THE MARITIME STRATEGY--

Critics of The Maritime Strategy and the U.S. naval build up represent a broad expanse of opinions. They include faculty members of the Army War College, some serving U.S. naval officers and military reformers and certain political theorists. (15)

Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, U.S. Navy (Retired), George Thibault and Jeffrey Record are the main proponents of the argument that a naval foray into the
northern latitudes would be suicidal. They do not deny the need for an increase in the maritime capability, their concerns are concentrated around concerns about U.S. naval power being aggressively thrust into the very teeth of a prepared, effective and unattributed Soviet defense. (16)

Another body of thought is represented by Barry Posen. (17) His main fear is that aggressive NATO naval operations in the North will cause the Soviets to escalate the conflict to the nuclear level. He states that in the "fog of war," the confusion and miscommunication which will be generated, would create significant problems for those seeking to control even a conventional conflict. He thinks that all together would combine to create an unstable and volatile situation on NATO's Northern Flank with the potential for nuclear escalation.

The third and last group of maritime critics orient their critique on the negative impact which a naval campaign may have on the successful defense of Europe. Former Undersecretary of Defense Robert W. Komer, a prominent member of this group, argues that naval supremacy by the Allies did not defeat Germany in the two World Wars and will not defeat the Soviets if there will be a World War III. He states that a war against a land power like the Soviet Union will be won on the continent of Europe, not in its contiguous waters. He believes that the resources used to build the 600-Ship Navy are a fiscal drain on the U.S.
capability to defend U.S. priority interests in Europe and South-west Asia. (18)

Keith A. Dunn and William O. Staudenmaier are two other critics. They subdivide maritime proponents into three schools of thought: (19)

1. The "Official" Lehman view of maritime strategy.

2. The manipulative school, which believes that by concentrating more of U.S. focus on naval forces, the U.S. will force their allies to assume more of the land-fighting burden.

3. The unilateralist school, which examines a brand of neo-isolationism in calling for the abandonment of Alliance commitments in Europe in favor of a military posture based on flexible maritime power.

Like Posen, they find the strategy unsuitable because of the possibility of Soviet nuclear escalation. They also question the feasibility of the strategy, because they doubt that the allies will support a horizontal escalation of a war beyond the area bounded by the Alliance obligations. Lastly they address the issue of acceptability. They argue, as does Komer, that because of budget constraints in the future, the U.S. cannot afford both a continental and a maritime strategy, and as such The Maritime Strategy is not acceptable.
SUMMARY--

It is necessary to underline that The Maritime Strategy is not the current national strategy of the U.S., nor Alliance strategy within NATO. It is a budgeting strategy which has been favorably received in Congress and has been aggressively sold by the Navy. In the remainder of this thesis we will investigate the impact on Norwegian security if the key aspects of the strategy were adopted as U.S. and NATO strategy in the Norwegian Sea. The main points to be remembered are:

1. It is a global strategy, which in competition for acceptance against the continental-coalition strategy, has to satisfy U.S. needs to counter the Soviet Union. It is not a strategy to counter the Soviet Union within the Norwegian Sea.

2. It is a more offensive strategy, using the flexibility of maritime forces to decide the outcome of crises or war. And as such, the reinforcement of NATO's Flanks is an area where the strategy can be implied both in peacetime/crises or war, and at the same time be justified because it fills a gap in NATO defense today.

3. In the warfighting scenario it calls for taking out the Soviet SSBN's in an early phase, thereby making a Soviet escalation to nuclear war seem unfavorable and thus resulting in war termination on favorable U.S. terms. These
SSBN's are deployed in the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea, thereby the strategy will influence Norwegian security significantly.

4. Furthermore, it calls for horizontal escalation, meaning that if the Soviet's start the war some place, another front should be opened by attacking at the place and time chosen by the United States. This might not be in Norway's best interest, depending on where warfighting starts and the reason behind it.

5. Critics of The Maritime Strategy focus on these major issues: 1) Aggressive naval operations towards the Soviet SSBN's might cause the Soviets to escalate to nuclear war. 2) Others point out that like Germany during WWI & II, the Soviet Union being a land-power, cannot be defeated at sea. 3) Others find it unacceptable because of budget constraints in the future, stating that the U.S. cannot afford both a continental and a maritime strategy.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid., p. 3.

3. Ibid., pp. 5-6.


6. Ibid., p. 5.


9. Ibid., pp. 6-8.

10. Ibid., p. 8.


12. Ibid., p. 11.

13. Ibid., p. 12.


CHAPTER FOUR

NATO'S MARITIME STRATEGY AND THE SOVIET THREAT

Geography, alliances, and the Soviet threat combine to dictate the actual numbers of ships—the "size of the Navy"—required to fulfill our commitments in each of our maritime theaters. And this accounting adds up to a 600-ship Navy. (1)

(John F. Lehman, Jr., Secretary of the Navy)

This chapter will address the following points:

1. The Soviet increased naval capacity, especially the Northern Fleet, which has put the most strategic part of Norway behind their naval front lines.

2. NATO's maritime strategy towards the Northern Flank and its response to the build up of the Soviet Northern Fleet.

3. The presence of NATO naval forces in the Norwegian Sea has been limited so far, but has been increasing in recent years and an increased presence is needed both to gain operational experience in these waters, and to counter the Soviet expansion. The 600-ship U.S. navy and an aggressive U.S. "Maritime Strategy" will make this pressure more credible.
The Atlantic is for NATO both a bridge and an obstacle. Geographically it separates the member nations but, at the same time, it also serves as a link and a life line—provided it is fully controlled. The Alliance is formed and held together by the sea, and most of the nations are critically dependent on the sea lines of communications for movement of resources and vital raw materials. At the same time there are very few reasons for the Warsaw Pact countries to use the sea, because their interior lines of communications are adequate to insure the flow of vital supplies. NATO’s maritime strategy is based first on deterrence. Should deterrence fail, the NATO maritime strategy is designed to mount a defense far forward in order to protect and maintain control of vital sea lines of communication to protect the seaborne trade and reinforcements needed in Europe.

Kenneth Hunt, writing on NATO strategy for the next 20 years gives his thoughts on the importance of the Northern Flank:

However, it should be noted that there are strong links between deterrence in the Center and the North. Though the two sectors are to some extent militarily compartmented, they are not strategically separate. The North—and North Norway in particular—has importance for the strategy in Europe, but also for the central strategic balance, because of the concentration of Soviet maritime and strategic forces in the region—Norwegian territory.
is thus very important for NATO naval operations designed to keep open the sea lines across the Atlantic and for maritime operations in the Eastern Atlantic. In turn, NATO naval strength helps Norway and the stronger the North, the stronger the Center.

From a NATO perspective, Norway is a unique theater of operation. Norway has a coastline almost equal to the East Coast of the United States, but the distance from the sea to the inland border is, in most places, less than 100 miles. To NATO, Norway is most important for its control of the adjacent sea and its control of the access to the Kola Peninsula, the Baltic Sea, and the North Atlantic approach to Europe. The principal defenders of this region, --Great Britain and the United States--are maritime nations. The principal adversary--the Soviet Union--is a major continental power, and while NATO has been preparing to meet the Soviet challenge on land, the Soviets have been preparing to defeat the allies at sea. It is therefore correct to say that the Northern Flank is a maritime theater and the meeting ground for the continental and maritime powers.

SOVIET’S THREAT--

The importance of the Northern Flank to the Soviets is demonstrated by the fact that they have built the world’s largest complex of naval bases in the vicinity of Murmansk. This small, ice-free area adjacent to the Soviet-Norwegian
border provides the Soviet Union its only naval and air bases with sure access to the Atlantic. (3) And as a result their forces consist of approximately 130 attack submarines and 70 major surface ships (cruisers, destroyers and frigates), and many naval and tactical air bases are located in that area. The Kola Peninsula is also of major significance in the strategic nuclear war balance, serving as the base for most Soviet SSBN's, long range radars for detection of Western strategic retaliatory forces and many interceptor aircraft. (4) Unfortunately for the USSR, their Kola bases are both too concentrated and too far from primary wartime operating areas. A Soviet occupation of Norwegian bases would make possible a defense in depth of their strategic installations and would greatly improve air cover for their naval forces operating in the Norwegian Sea. Furthermore, capture of northern Norway would also make available many deep-water fjords, providing dispersed naval basing some 750-1000 nautical miles (nm) closer to the Atlantic. Operating out of northern Norway, USSR assets could greatly influence any sea war for the Atlantic. (5)

If we then turn around and look at these "favorable" options, which could be achieved by the Soviet Union, and ask ourselves what NATO would gain from denying USSR these advantages; the answer is very simple--the Soviet Union would have very limited capabilities to win the battle.
of the Atlantic, and thereby influencing the SLOC for the
war on the central front.

Time is the Soviet's greatest ally in any operation
in the Northern Flank. They are hours away; while the
allies are days or weeks away, and because of the Norwegian
basing policy the only way to counter the Soviet maritime
expansion lies in an increased Naval presence. This is
because credible naval forces operating in the Norwegian Sea
not only contribute to deterrence, but demonstrate the
West's determination to deny Soviet efforts at peacetime
domination of the North Atlantic. (6) This naval presence
has to be determined within the Alliance, where the
Norwegian view will be a part of the overall decision.

Having capability is not the same as having
intentions, but Norwegian General Tonne Huitfeldt (former
Chief of the International Military Staff in NATO) defined
the aims for the Soviet naval forces in the North Atlantic
Area: (7)

In peace:

1. To maintain a credible strategic nuclear
deterrent force, based on SSBN;

2. To create and sustain an impression of Soviet
power at sea, to reduce efficiency of NATO
reinforcements and support perceived within
the Alliance.

In war:

1. To assure transit and secure operations of
Soviet Strategic missiles submarines;
2. To counter the strategic nuclear submarines of the United States;
3. To disarm American strike carriers before they launch their aircraft;
4. To ensure control of the fleet areas;
5. To intercept NATO lines of communications and supply;
6. To provide maritime flank support for land operations in coastal areas.

These aims show clearly the exposed situation Norway has both in peace and war.

NATO MARITIME STRATEGY--

NATO's defense strategy derives from a strategy paper written by the Military Committee in 1967 (MC 14/3) which outlines the now famous flexible response and forward defense. (8) NATO's guidance for fighting a war at sea is contained in the Concept of Maritime Operations agreed to by all three major NATO commands (Tri-MNC). This document, which was approved by NATO's political leaders in 1982, stems from a recommendation by the Maritime Posture Task Group of the Long Term Defense Program of 1977. The concept identifies and assesses NATO maritime objectives in light of Alliance interests; considers the type of confrontation that can be expected and the associated allied priorities; establishes the principles to be used by NATO forces; and outlines the campaigns that are likely to be waged and the involvement of various types of forces in these campaigns.
The three principles that are established therein are: containment, defense in depth and keeping the initiative. (9) **Containment**, includes tying down Warsaw Pact forces in defensive tasks by creating allied threats from the sea against the enemy's coastal areas; **defense in depth**, including striking enemy bases and facilities which support his forces at sea as well as amphibious landings as required in the high North; and most importantly, **keeping the initiative**, because distances are too great in the region for maritime forces to be deployed in time to prevent critical damage being done by the Soviets were NATO solely to chase after events. (10)

As Vice Admiral Mustin, Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic, stated; NATO's maritime commanders can no more decide to fight only in some areas, than land commanders can propose defending only some parts of Europe. (11) The forward commitment of maritime forces is essential to the success of NATO's overall strategy because of NATO's vital dependence upon the sea.

**NATO ASSETS & ORGANIZATION**

Already three years after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, D.C., NATO established Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT). Its headquarters is located at Norfolk, Virginia. The Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) is a U.S. Navy Admiral. He is nominated by the
President of the United States, and his appointment must by approved by the North Atlantic Council, NATO's highest governing body. He receives his direction from NATO's Military Committee. SACLANT's mission is to contribute, together with other forces of NATO countries, to the deterrence of all forms of aggression in his area of responsibility. Should deterrence fail and aggression occur or be considered imminent, SACLANT would take all military measures within his capability that are required to maintain control of the vital sea lines of the ACLANT and to protect therein the seaborne traffic of the NATO Alliance.

In peacetime, the Standing Naval Force Atlantic is the only force under SACLANT command. Contingency plans are prepared to assist in preventing hostilities and to improve NATO's and SACLANT's ability to conduct maritime operations during the early stages of a crisis. (12) In this way, it is possible to make a timely transfer of forces, with the nations approval, to SACLANT command. This also makes it possible to have a graduated response to a crisis. As an example, Striking Fleet Atlantic positioned in the Norwegian Sea, with established local sea and air superiority, might simultaneously ensure the security of the "Northern Flank" and land defense in depth for the successful reinforcement of Europe. (13)
Since NATO was founded, there has not been a serious NATO or U.S. naval presence in the Norwegian Sea. NATO's naval presence is generally limited to deployments of the seven-to-nine ship Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) operating under Allied Command Atlantic. Permanent-member navies are those of Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. Other NATO nation's navies operates with the force on a routine basis and during exercises. Because of its responsibilities in all of Allied Command Atlantic's area of operations, this force is not focused on the Norwegian Sea.

NATO presence in the Norwegian Sea comes mainly with the different exercises. Exercise TEAMWORK, which was established in 1964 and is performed every 4-years is one. This is a navy exercise directed by SACLANT which transfers over into an amphibious landing, and there ends up with a land exercise (field training exercise). The purpose is to practice contingency operations and acceptance of allied reinforcements to Norway. Usually this exercise had taken place in September and involved the Southern part of Norway, but TEAMWORK 84 was conducted in February/March and north Norway was the area which was reinforced. In addition, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), has...
executed his EXPRESS-series of exercises since 1964. These exercises are focused on reinforcement of North-Norway, and are executed in February/March every second year. During recent years more emphasis has been placed on maritime aspects of reinforcement with the participation of U.S. marines and UK/NL amphibious units, ending with a field training exercise for the ground forces. Two other exercises; NORTHERN WEDDING, which practices reinforcement and support of Denmark and the Central Front; and OCEAN SAFARI, which practices seacontrol and logistical support in the Eastern Atlantic, provide expertise helpful in preparing for operations in the Norwegian Sea.

The environment in the Norwegian Sea is unusually inhospitable, and to make our allied contribution in the Norwegian Sea credible, NATO's naval assets need to demonstrate the capability to operate within these waters especially during the most hostile season of late fall, winter, and early spring. (17) A consequence of the Maritime Strategy would be to increase the presence of CVBG's in the Norwegian Sea in peacetime. If we look back ten years, this presence amounts to some 41 days over those years, of which eight fell in 1985. (18) Logic dictates that NATO navies conduct extensive exercises in harsh northern waters if the capability to conduct aggressive warfare against the Kola peninsula is ever to be established. From a purely operational point of view there
is a requirement to operate in the north for a number of weeks annually.

The general tendency of the development of NATO exercises is that the ships are more often operating further north than before, and more exercises are taking place during winter months. (19) This must be seen as the effort needed to improve the Alliance's capability to conduct operations at sea under the special hard climate conditions found in Northern waters.

An interesting option is a permanent presence by European navies, and there are at least two possibilities, either to use STANAVFORLANT or to establish a new naval group like STANAVFORLANT. Such an option is analyzed by two Norwegians in an article last year. (20) They baptized it STANDING NAVAL FORCE NORTH and NORWEGIAN SEAS (STANAVFORNOR), and their listing of naval assets shows that it might be possible, although they do not draw any such conclusions. Primarily they use naval assets from UK, FRG, and the Netherlands but as they also point out, a French participation would make it even more interesting.

SUMMARY

1. The Soviet build-up of their Northern Fleet increases its vulnerability because of the limited space available at Kola. The build-up thereby increases the value of Northern Norway to the Soviets both in times of crises or
in times of war as a deployment area for their naval assets. While Soviet ships are only hours away, the Alliance today needs days to deploy to the Norwegian Sea.

2. NATO strategy of defense is still flexible response and forward defense. Because of the Soviet naval build-up, especially the Northern Fleet, NATO SLOC's across the Atlantic were severely threatened. Thus, the TRI-MNC's adjusted their concept of maritime operations (CONMAROPS) to be able to meet this maritime challenge farther forward. A more aggressive maritime strategy was accepted by NATO Defense Planning Committee (DPC) in January 1982. Such a forward commitment of maritime forces is essential to the success of NATO's overall strategy, because of NATO's vital dependence upon the sea. This is especially true for Norway because of its dependence on NATO reinforcements.

3. The presence of NATO naval forces in the Norwegian Sea has been limited to the STANAVFORLANT and other allied forces during exercises. Recent exercises and force deployments demonstrate that NATO leaders have decided to increase allied presence in northern waters to counter Soviet Naval expansion. The 600-ship U.S. Navy, being built as the result of The Maritime Strategy "campaign," gives NATO the possibility to increase NATO presence further and make an aggressive strategy in this area more credible.


8. Current Defense Issue Fact-Sheet No. 1086, October 1986, p. 96-97. (Statement made by the Minister of Defense J. J. Holst, as an answer regarding the TRI-MNC CONMAROPS.)


11. Striking Fleet is the U.S. fleet first to be assigned to NATO and SACLANT in time of crises or war, but is in peacetime under U.S. national command.


15. Ibid., p. 137.

16. Ibid., p. 135.


CHAPTER FIVE

NORWEGIAN SECURITY POLICY

To complete the basis of information necessary to conduct an analysis of The Maritime Strategy, this chapter will address the main components of Norwegian security policy, including:

1. The need for allied support to make the security policy credible and thereby have the needed deterrent effect against the Soviet Union.

2. The importance of reassurance towards the Soviet Union, which must insure that Norwegian security policy threatens no use of Norwegian soil as a base for offensive intrusion against the USSR.

3. The preservation of the "Nordic Balance" and the low level of tension that Norway believes currently exists on the Northern Flank.

GENERAL--

The history of the independent Norwegian foreign and security policy is not very long. National responsibility for foreign policy came only when the union with Sweden ended in 1905. Norway's union with Sweden was dissolved without war; bilateral arms control agreements proved to be an integral part of the dissolution. These agreements helped reduce the level of bitterness that might have resulted from the separation, and they eased the way for Norway, Sweden and Denmark to adopt common policies of neutrality during World War I. (1)

During the interwar period, Norway believed that it had no enemies, for the country was not involved with any power in a political conflict that could be solved by military means. But when tension rose in the 1930's, however, the alternative of a Scandinavian defense arrangement was considered: Finland (independent during the Russian revolution in 1917) feared the Soviet Union; Denmark feared Germany; Sweden could not make up its mind which of those two they feared most; Norway feared none and was not willing to consider any such arrangement. (2)

The German attack on 9 April 1940 shattered the Norwegian belief in pursuing national security based on strict neutrality and left a lasting imprint on Norway's security policy. The legacy of 9 April contains three
elements. First, Norwegian territory proved too important to major European powers for them to refrain from attempting to occupy it. Secondly, Norwegian forces proved insufficient to deter or repel such an attempt. Thirdly, those states naturally allied to Norway acted too late to deter the attack, had insufficient strength to repel it, and withdrew too early to prevent occupation. This legacy influenced the Norwegian postwar-security outlook, both before entry into the Atlantic Pack and in the final decision to become a member of NATO. (3)

REASSURANCE AND DETERRENCE—

Norwegian security policy reflects a balance between the needs for security and reassurance in relation to the world around. This is not a special problem for Norway, but being located in a strategically sensitive area, Norway must weigh these matters against each other with more attention to detail, than most other nations. Norway has sought credible security through membership of NATO and maintenance of a national defense. Membership in NATO is the cornerstone of Norway's security policy. This policy makes it possible to plan, prepare and practice allied reinforcement of Norway in time of crisis or war. This reinforcement, especially aircraft, is an important part of the deterrence policy in Norway's area. (5)
The United States is the primary allied underwriter of Norwegian security, with its contribution of the majority of air reinforcements, Marine amphibious forces and to NATO's Strike Fleet Atlantic. U.S. commitments tend to fluctuate over time. The Northern Flank was in the U.S. focus in the 1950's only to sink into relative obscurity during the later 1960's and early 1970's. (6) However, Norway does not want to transform the need for countervailing power against Soviet military force into a onesided relationship of dependence. (7) The involvement of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands (UK/NL LF - United Kingdom/Netherlands Landing Force), Canada (CAST-BG, Canadian Air/Sea Transportable Brigade Group), as well as the AMF (Allied Mobile Force) provides a multilateral framework within which to manage plans and exercises for reinforcements involving other nations than the U.S. In regard to reinforcements of Norway, there are three conditions that have to be fulfilled: (8)

1. The Allies have the will to assist Norway with reinforcements if that should be necessary, and this must be credible towards the Soviet Union.

2. The Allies have reasonable possibilities to transfer reinforcements in times of crisis.

3. The Norwegian Defense is able to hold until the allied reinforcements are in place in Norway.
Reassurance is made up of a series of unilateral confidence building measures designed to communicate peaceful intentions and avoid challenging the vital security interests of our neighbour in peacetime. The peacetime policy of neither permitting bases for foreign troops on Norway, nor the stocking and deployment of nuclear and chemical weapons constitute together with certain constraints on allied military activities, the main elements of restraint on Norwegian security policy.

The base policy is the most important element in the posture of restraint. (9) It is a self-imposed and conditional restraint, because it is not based on agreements with other states, and it applies only as long as Norway is not subject to attack or threatened by attack. The absence of foreign troops on Norwegian soil in peacetime creates a need to reinforce Norway earlier and more rapidly than otherwise would be necessary. (10)

Another confidence building restraint is the special restriction regarding aircraft in Finnmark County and the use of Norwegian Airbases and Ports on missions taking them east of longitude 24 degrees east. Also the prestocking of the U.S. MAB in Trondelag not in North Norway was a restraint, at the same time it was an improvement of reinforcement capability. (11)

Traditionally, the north-western region of Europe has been viewed as a flank area from the central front.
However, during the last decade the north and center have increasingly come to be considered as an integral theatre from the point of view of military planning. (12)

From the perspective of the central balance of nuclear deterrence, the north-western region of Europe provides an important avenue of approach as well as an arena for forward strategic defense and deployment.

With regard to the global naval balance, the area encompasses primary routes of access to blue waters for the Soviet Union while it contains a forward defense zone for the trans-Atlantic sea lines of communication for the Atlantic Alliance. It is an important zone of deployment for Soviet submarine based missile systems.

The creation of a Soviet Strategic Missile Carrying Nuclear Submarine (SSBN) bastion strategy would affect American interests in surveillance and interception. Looking at the strategic interests interacting in Nordic Europe, you can say that Norway creates the pivotal area, with Iceland as a close second.

THE NORDIC BALANCE--

The relatively stable situation in the Northern part of Europe in the last 20 years or more is in many ways a result of the differing solutions to their security needs found by the Nordic countries. Finland, for example, has a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance with the Soviet
Union. Sweden follows a unilaterally declared policy of non-alignment in time of peace and of neutrality in time of war, while Norway, Denmark and Iceland are members of the North Atlantic Alliance. The Norwegian and Danish memberships are qualified by unilateral and self-imposed restrictions concerning bases and nuclear weapons on their territory in peacetime. (13)

It is a pattern which evolved with due consideration being given to the security interests of the neighbour to the East, the Soviet Union. This pattern was in fact used as an active instrument of policy in the early 1960s to make the Soviet Union also respect the stability which this balance offered to the area. The Soviet Union, in reaction to, among other things, the increased role given to the Federal Republic of Germany in the allied defenses of the Baltic Approaches, wished to bring pressure to bear on the Finnish Government for closer military cooperation under their treaty of mutual assistance.

This brought a response from the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Mr. Lange, during an official visit to the Soviet Union and also in public statements made both by him and by the Norwegian Defense Minister to the effect that any change in Finland's status would force the Norwegian Government to review Norway's policy on foreign bases. (14)

This security pattern in Northern Europe, which is a graduated local balance within the more elaborate East-West
balance, has become known as the "Nordic balance". None of the Nordic countries sees any reason for changing its present security policy, unless this is part of a comprehensive European security package. In fact any change in the Nordic balance could easily have repercussions outside the area itself. (15)

At the end of this chapter, we shall look at the last proposition (No 1 - 1986-87) for the budget period 1987 from the Ministry of Defense regarding the Norwegian security objectives and defense policy objectives.

SECURITY POLICY OBJECTIVES--

The basic objectives for Norwegian Security policy are (of Report No. 74 (1982-83) to the Storting and Recommendation S. No. 230 (1983-84)): (16)

- to prevent war in our area
- to safeguard our sovereignty and freedom of action, as well as our right to shape our society
- to contribute to peaceful development in the rest of the world.

In a world of sovereign states, with no accepted superior authority which can ensure that the states refrain from the use of violence and other forms of aggression, the states themselves take measures to defend themselves. These measures should be of a kind which do not cause mutual fear and insecurity. Armaments may lead to insecurity which
strengthens and intensifies political antagonism. The nations are interwoven into a comprehensive relationship of mutual interdependence. For this reason, part of the security policy has to be to weigh security considerations against the need for reassurance.

In this nuclear age, no nation can obtain security at the expense of other nations. They should therefore seek joint security. In spite of this, international politics are to a large degree marked by unilateral efforts and lack of mutual restraint. It has also been shown to be difficult to translate the conception of joint security into agreed and coordinated actions. Nevertheless, true security can be created only by negotiations, mutual restraint and confidence-building measures.

Norway is located in an important and sensitive area from the point of view of military strategy. Such a location also implies a responsibility to make sure that national security policy is placed in an international perspective. A clear position in the political pattern helps to prevent uncertainty and misjudgments. A firm course helps to prevent initiatives and pressure from outside. By combining the ability and the will to defend herself, and by her efforts to promote reciprocal restraint, Norway is making an important contribution to the conditions necessary for continued low tension.
DEFENSE POLICY OBJECTIVES

The Defense Establishment shall help to prevent war and in this way secure peace in our part of the world. It shall furthermore protect our freedom of action to assert Norwegian interests and rights.

The Defense Establishment is an important instrument in Norwegian security policy. In order to be able to promote security policy objectives it must be in a position to:

- to offer the strongest form of resistance to any form of attack;
- ensure sovereignty over Norwegian territory and be able to rapidly repel, limit or defeat various forms of violation;
- carry out effective surveillance and warning;
- reinforce the standing forces in exposed areas rapidly, and by suitable means;
- provide optimum conditions for the reception, protection and support of, and cooperation with, allied forces in the event of a crisis.

The Defense Establishment shall further:

- be prepared to give support to UN peace-keeping operations by allocating and training special stand-by forces, and by providing, if possible, Norwegian contingent upon request;
- contribute towards the exercise of authority in areas under Norwegian resource jurisdiction by control and inspection of activities on the continental shelf and in the economic zone;
- render as much assistance as possible to the civilian community in peacetime as is compatible with its other tasks.
SUMMARY--

The Norwegian foreign and security policy changed drastically after the second world war. From being neutralistic, it suddenly changed to an Alliance policy. The main points to remember are:

1. The credibility of Norwegian security is made up through the national defense and the membership in NATO. It has never been a goal to have an equilateral force structure against Soviet Union, therefore, reinforcements both aircraft and ground-forces is an important part of the deterrence policy.

2. The reassurance aspect towards the Soviet Union is made up by the self-imposed constraints like the base policy, the nuclear policy, the chemical policy and the special restriction regarding allied aircraft and naval forces taking off from Norway not being permitted to go east of longitude 24 degrees east. The Maritime Strategy has to be implemented within these constraints.

3. To maintain the Nordic Balance and low level of tension in our area, has been an important part of the security policy, and depending on how The Maritime Strategy is put into effect, this might be disturbed.

4. Official Norwegian security and defense policy rests on the twin pillars of deterrence and reassurance.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid., p. 172. For a brief overview of the period and a comprehensive bibliography, see Nils Oervik "Norwegian Foreign Policies: A Bibliography 1905-1965" (Oslo: UP, 1968).

3. Ibid., p. 173.


11. Arne Olav Brundtland, p. 191, (See Note 5), p. 3.


17. Ibid., pp. 3-4.
CHAPTER SIX

NORWEGIAN OFFICIAL STATEMENTS AND AN ASSESSMENT REGARDING THE MARITIME STRATEGY

After having established the base for the thesis, and before the evaluation, is it necessary to combine Norwegian Officials Statements with an assessment of The Maritime Strategy. The intention of this chapter is to show how The Maritime Strategy can contribute to Norwegian Security policy in the different phases

1. Peacetime presence
2. Crises response
3. Transition to war
4. Carry the fight to the enemy.

and how Norwegian government views the strategy.

GENERAL--

The U.S. Maritime Strategy can be classified as a "sequential" strategy, because it is composed of a series of steps that may be taken in response to international events. Each step can be examined by the strategist ahead of time, and it can be quite clearly appraised in terms of expected results, and the actual result in turn will lead to the next step, the next position to be taken, or the next
action to be planned. The great drive across the Pacific in World War II - MacArthur's campaign in the Southwest Pacific is an earlier example of the same type of strategy.

The other strategy that might be used is the "cumulative," which is a less perceptible minute accumulation of little items piling one on top of the other until at some unknown point, the mass of accumulated actions may be large enough to be critical. The submarine campaigns in the Atlantic or in the Pacific in World War II is an example.

Those two kinds of strategies are not incompatible strategies, they are not mutually exclusive. Quite the opposite, in practice they are usually interdependent in their strategic result. (2)

PEACETIME PRESENCE--

With the exception of occasional surges of U.S. and allied naval power in support of schedules exercises, NATO's naval presence in the Norwegian Sea is generally limited to periodic deployments of the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), consisting of seven to nine ships operating under Supreme Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT). Composed primarily of ships from Canada, West Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, this force has a limited capability for antisurface warfare (ASUW), antiair warfare (AAW) and antishubmarine (ASW).
operations. Although this force has performed capably in recent exercises in the area, it has responsibilities in all of SACLANT's area of operation and is not solely designated for the Norwegian Sea.

Norway and the Allies know that the balance of forces in the region favors the Soviets, especially in its initial unreinforced state. Soviet ground and amphibious forces are positioned to seize critical objectives in northern Norway, supported by a large number of attack and interceptor aircraft. The naval equation is also very much in favor of the Soviets, as the Northern Fleet could quickly launch out from its bases in Kola to seize control of the Norwegian Sea and beyond, protected by Soviet aircraft flying from seized air bases in northern Norway.

As stated by Major Hugh K. O'Donnel (USMC) in an article in *Proceedings* about maritime offensive on the Northern Flank:

> The effectiveness of NATO naval operations will be critical in determining the winner in this maritime theater and may well be decisive in the war's outcome. (3)

The peacetime presence has been discussed in Norway, too, and it is beneficial to look at some of the statements made by government officials.

The Norwegian Minister of Defense said in a lecture to the XIX Scandinavian-West European Conference 19th September 1986:
Norway is clearly interested in American fleet presence in northern waters in order that these waters not become subject to a form of territorialization through Soviet presence and Western absence.

But Norway's interests are not served by her adjacent sea areas becoming an avenue of intensive superpower rivalry. Therefore it is important that other Allied navies show their flag as well in these waters, as for instance STANAVFORLANT.

The maritime competition in the northern waters will influence the shape and form of the security situation in north-western Europe in the years ahead. The Norwegian perspective will be one of protecting the state of confusion and the infrastructure of restraints and confidence building practices against the ripple effects of intensified competition in northern waters. (4)

In the Proposition No. 1 (1986-87) for the budget period 1987 from the Ministry of Defense, it says:

Norway is dependent on allied military support which to a large degree has to be transported across the sea. It is therefore important that allied naval forces are in position to protect sea lines of communication to Norway.

In this connection, an intermittent allied presence is necessary in maritime regions off the coast of Norway. This presence is also important because Soviet naval forces have shown increasing activity in northern water. (5)

These different statements clearly show the interest of a peacetime naval presence, and because of very limited presence today, it might mean an increased presence.

CRISIS RESPONSE--

Besides being prepared to fight a war, crisis response is the heart of The U.S. Maritime Strategy.
Because if war with the Soviets ever comes, it will probably be as a result from a crisis that escalates out of control. The ability to contain and control crisis is an important factor in the ability to prevent a global conflict. This is also true on the Northern Flank, because the sea is an arena where NATO can move forces into position (show of force) to show Alliance determination without risking war. The ability to conduct crisis response in the Norwegian Sea is very much dependent on the peacetime positioning of U.S. forces. It takes 7 days to get a naval force from the U.S. East Coast into the Northern Atlantic. (6) During that time the Soviets might have been able to seize some of their objectives on the Northern Flank. So in this respect it would improve NATO’s ability to react in crisis if the naval assets were positioned closer to the Norwegian Sea.

A special feature of The Maritime Strategy is the concept of inshore carrier operations in Norwegian territorial waters to minimize the threat from missiles—carrying aircraft and submarines. This concept is thought to promote crises management by separating U.S. and Soviet units in the critical phase of a mounting crises and to enhance the carrier survivability in time of war. (7) Such a concept presupposes that Norway has given political clearance for the deployment of CVBG’s into the territorial waters so early that the carriers can reach our waters before the fighting starts. This concept will mean that the
burden on an early and tough decision on behalf of the Alliance will shift to Norway to a significant degree.

TRANSITION TO WAR--

The transition to war and crisis response is closely linked together, especially where the two superpowers (or two Alliances) are involved.

In a crisis with potential for global hostilities, one must expect the Soviet Union to disperse their naval assets in order to limit their vulnerability. This means that surface ships and submarines would deploy to their wartime operating areas and naval aviation elements would be flown to alternative airfields.

At the same time, U.S. naval forces would be commencing their forward movement as well. The attack submarines would deploy to locations in proximity of the enemy forces. Carrier and surface action battle groups would be sent from their home ports into their assigned operating areas. The Marines, Army and Air Force elements would similarly posture themselves for war, and this includes the Air Force elements and the MAB which are designated to the Northern Flank.

To be able to achieve sea control in the Norwegian Sea ahead of the Soviet Union, the U.S. naval assets have to move into the area very early. But the overriding purposes of this transition phase are to increase readiness, to avoid
mal-deployment of forces, to maximize available warning time, and to cede no vital area (Norwegian Sea) by default.

The big question in this situation is at what time and at which level of tension/crisis do you start this phase, and what sort of naval assets should be used? At this point you will be balancing on the edge of one side being best prepared for war, and on the other side avoid unintended escalation and war. According to different general statements made by Secretary of the Navy, Lehman, this action will have to be taken very early in a crisis situation. (9)

This phase is also linked to what the Norwegian Minister of Defense calls the objective of ensuring predictability on the one hand and freedom of action on the other. He has said that there is a certain tension between these two, and

While we should strive for a certain regularity of allied presence we should not strive for such fine tuning that even small variations which are bound to occur, not the least due to the need to train under difficult seasonal conditions, be interpreted as political signals in one direction or the other. A balance must be struck. This matter has become particularly important due to the trends in Soviet naval exercises towards less regularity and more pronounced variations.

In the future emphasis should be placed on arriving at measures which can create an atmosphere of trust contributing towards the stabilization of the situation in the northern waters and thereby reducing the danger of unintended escalation in
SEIZE THE INITIATIVE--

If hostilities commence between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the initial NATO strategy would be to counter the attack, cause enemy forces attrition, and seize the initiative. The objective would be to protect the Atlantic SLOC as far forward as possible to ensure the reinforcement of Central Europe and the Northern Flank. In regard to the Northern Flank, this means very much far forward.

Seizing the initiative is vital for several reasons:

(1) It demonstrates to the allies the U.S. determination to prevail and thus contributes to Alliance solidarity.

(2) The history of war tells us that gaining the initiative is the key to destroying the opponents forces.

(3) Seizing the initiative opens the way to apply direct pressure on the Soviets to end the war on NATO's terms, which is the new goal of our strategy once deterrence has failed.

Besides using attack submarines to engage Soviet naval assets in the Norwegian and Barents Seas, and thereby reducing the submarine threat against SLOC, it also calls for establishing antisubmarine barriers in the GIUK-gap.

To be able to secure these missions, the strategy calls for sending carrier battle groups into the Norwegian
Sea. Together with landbased tactical airpower provided by the Air Force, Marine Corps and allied air forces, the efforts of the carrier battle groups would be complimented as an important asset in the struggle for air supremacy over the Norwegian Sea.

The naval support for the land battle would constitute an important aspect of the fight in the north. Air strikes from carrier battle groups would be of great assistance to allied defenders attempting to repel a Soviet attack in northern Norway, and the opportunity for an amphibious end run with MAGTF to strike behind Soviet lines on the Norwegian coast would be considered and ruthlessly exploited. (11)

Through this phase the strategy envisions establishing sea control or in the worst case, regaining sea control in the Norwegian Sea, and as a result, force the Soviet Navy to stay in the Barents Sea by denying access to the Atlantic.

This part of the strategy has not been much discussed in Norway, partly because it can be perceived as an offensive strategy, which could create more problems than it can solve during peacetime.

To be successful, the phase will need a very early decision of allocating naval assets to the Norwegian Sea. (12) This could have a negative effect on the stable situation in a crisis and could have an escalatory effect.
A peacetime presence of naval assets, including a carrier battle group, would be the best way to ensure success. Today's presence is not sufficient, which means at least an increased naval presence, and the best way to avoid any increase which can lead to peacetime presence by any of the superpowers is to seek other solutions.

According to the minister of defense:

"The United States and the Soviet Union have signed an agreement which includes rules of conduct which are to prevent incidents at sea. In consultation with our allies we can assess needs and possibilities for comparable multilateral arrangements between the coastal states in the northern regions and the flag states conducting naval exercises or other types of naval operation in the northern nations. Such regional arrangements could also be extended to include institutions and procedures for crisis management.

The tacit understanding that none of the great powers establish or maintain permanent naval combat patrols in the Norwegian Sea should be preserved. Agreements or understandings concerning non-interference with certain types of surveillance activities could also have a stabilizing effect. (13)

CARRY THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY--

The third phase of The Maritime Strategy seeks to build upon the success of its predecessors, so that war termination can be achieved on terms favorable to NATO.

According to Secretary Lehman's statements, actions against Soviet bases on Kola or the Soviet homeland must be seen as a part of the whole European scenario, meaning NATO's general military situation.
In the media discussion this is often stated as an included part of the strategy in case of conflict in this area, thereby classifying the strategy as offensive which, to a certain extent, would be inconsistent with NATO-strategy.

In the Norwegian Storting, 15 OCT 86, the Minister of Defense answered a question about this so called "new and more offensive maritime strategy," and the last part of his answer was:

NATO strategy is still funded on MC 14/3 of 1967, also in the sea. But the build up of the Soviet navy has made it necessary to be able to meet the maritime challenge more forward than earlier. The development of the U.S. Navy makes this possible. CONMAROPS of 1982 is in this way not a new strategy, but a planning guidance to meet changed force ratios. Within the framework of cooperation in NATO we will, from the Norwegian part of course, continue to contribute to the exercises taking place and avoid pressure against our security as well as maintain low tension in the northern area. (14)

SUMMARY—

This chapter shows a common basic problem in the Norwegian security policy; the need to increase deterrence while insuring the reassurance aspect. These are in conflict with each other. As we can see by the numerous quotes by Norwegian government officials, they are in favor of:

- U.S. naval presence in the Norwegian Sea to avoid Soviet domination.
- The Allied forces being able to control the vital sea lines of communication needed to reinforce Norway.
- The importance of other allied nations also to show their flag in the Norwegian Sea, STANAVFORLANT is used as an example.

On the other hand, they are not interested in:
- Norway's adjacent sea areas becoming an area of intensive superpower rivalry which could destroy the low level of tension believed to exist.
- Total reliance on the U.S. Navy for Norwegian security.
- An establishment of permanent naval presence by either the U.S. or the USSR.

The preference of the Norwegian government is to build on the system of previous restraints and confidence building measures to avoid confusion and superpower rivalry.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid, Chapter 5, pp. 39-42.


CHAPTER SEVEN

EVALUATION

GENERAL--

In this chapter we will analyze The Maritime Strategy’s impact on Norwegian security policy. The analysis will be done by using Dunn and Staudenmaier’s methodology for strategic analysis. Feasibility will not be considered, as the study focuses on the remaining two criteria, suitability and acceptability. The study concludes that The Maritime Strategy is suitable and acceptable from a Norwegian perspective. The main reason is that it contributes to the deterrence of Soviet expansion into the Norwegian Sea, and thereby makes Norwegian security policy more credible.

The theory behind The Maritime Strategy consists, briefly, of two major points: (1)

- the establishment of control of the sea
- the exploitation of the control of the sea toward establishment of control on the land.

This theory fits quite well into the problem facing the NATO-alliance on the Northern Flank, although it is the challenge of maintaining control of the land (Norway)
instead of establishing that control of the land. With the background so far, one should think that the debate concerning The Maritime Strategy would be embraced by the Norwegians with undivided enthusiasm, because, at a first look, it supports Norwegian security in its focus on the Northern Flank.

SUITABILITY--

The official Norwegian reaction has been positive, (2) but as shown in Chapter Six, the defense minister has emphasized that Norway does not support a permanent presence of CVBG's in the Norwegian Sea, and that a development where the Norwegian Sea becomes yet another arena for superpower confrontation—a "Mediterraneanization" of the Norwegian Sea—should be avoided.

The presence should be routine in order that the deployment of a CVBG is not interpreted as an indication of increased hostility, but not regular to the extent that a variation in the deployment pattern may be translated into intentions or motivation. (3)

As shown, the Norwegian support of The Maritime Strategy is a little bit reserved, and you may ask why? Chapter Five explains the "history" behind Norway's security policy, and history is a part of the why. Because Norway is a small neighbor to the superpower to whom we are not allied, the security policy is built on a trade-off between
deterrence and reassurance. Deterrence is made up of our national defense and our membership in NATO. Reassurance is made up of our base policy that prohibits the establishment of bases for foreign armed forces on Norwegian soil in peacetime; our nuclear policy which, among other things, prohibits the storage of nuclear weapons on Norwegian soil and training in the use of nuclear weapons by Norwegian armed forces; and a set of self-imposed restrictions on allied exercise activities in Norway. The Maritime Strategy would increase the deterrence part, and restore the credibility of our defense policy, which has been declining during the Soviet naval build-up, but it has to be within the fine structure of restraints and constraints.

The U.S. Maritime Strategy is a global strategy. It calls for bringing the war to the enemy by taking the initiative early and keeping it. The most serious maritime threat to the continental USA is represented by the Soviet SSBN's from their patrol areas in the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea. An important aspect of The Maritime Strategy is to destroy these submarines in the early conventional phase of a war between the Soviet Union and the USA, thereby making Soviet escalation to nuclear war seem unfavorable to the Soviets and thus induce incentives for war termination on U.S. terms. There are reasons to fear that deliberate and successful attacks on Soviet SSBN's may bring about the escalation that it was intended to avoid, through the
pressure on Soviet decision makers to use their weapons before they are lost. (4) But having the capability and declaring that this is U.S. strategy will also contribute to deterrence, (5) which again enhances Norwegian security.

Furthermore, one of the strategy's objectives is to ensure that the Soviet Union is not allowed to fight at the time and place of its choice. The Soviet Union will have to face the risk of being confronted in arenas where they least want it. This has, of course, an important deterrent effect, but to Norway it causes concern that The Maritime Strategy will become a conveyor belt of armed conflict from outside of the NATO area into our local waters.

As explained in Chapter Four, to make the allied contribution in the Norwegian Sea credible (6), NATO's naval forces need to demonstrate the capability to operate in northern waters during the most hostile seasons (winter, etc.), and to do so they need an increased peacetime presence. An increased presence in the Norwegian Sea creates the need to establish some form of supporting infrastructure in Norway, in the form of ammunition, fuel and communication facilities. The replenishment ships would want regular access to Norwegian ports, and transport aircraft with spare parts and mail will want access to airheads located not too far from these ports. Depending on the scope and volume of such support measures, they might be seen to constitute a certain pressure on the Norwegian base
policy. The possibility that the ships might carry nuclear weapons is already in focus in Norway, and as such it would be a negative contribution to the Alliance commitment.

Norway's dependence on allied reinforcements and allied maritime presence is unquestionable and is one of the cornerstones in its defense-concept. The question is how does Norway ensure that these reinforcements arrive and that NATO at the same time is able to control the Norwegian Sea, including the island of Jan Mayen, thereby securing the Norwegian territory. The NATO Atlantic Fleet is the only source of the necessary guarantee. This uncertainty was one of the reasons for prepositioning equipment for the U.S. Marine Amphibious Brigade in Norway in 1979. Control of Norwegian airspace is another critical aspect of Norwegian security policy. The contribution of allied naval forces, as well as allied air reinforcements, are vital to solve this problem. There are already plans and agreements for reinforcing the Norwegian Air Force.

The three conditions for reinforcements stated in Chapter Five have to be valid, but because of the Soviet expansion in our close waters, the credibility of this support can be questioned. To be able to perform such support, The Atlantic Fleet is dependent on early warning, furthermore a satisfactory level of exercises/ experience under all weather conditions, and development of tactical concepts which can increase the level of survival in a
hostile sea environment. (7) To maintain the credibility and deterrence, an increased presence is needed, and in doing so this could also be an important element in regard to crisis management.

It seems to be the question of peacetime presence in the Norwegian Sea that generates most of the discussion, because this is a aspect of both deterrence and defense of Norway, as well as the offensive aspects of The Maritime Strategy (striking the Kola bases). This is not surprising, because Secretary Lehman has used the Northern Flank as an example where his strategy can be applied. Norwegian security policy has to prevent the Norwegian Sea from becoming dominated by the Soviets, which thereby over some time can have unfavorable influence on Norwegian politics and security. Norway tries to do so through NATO. When it comes to the Norwegian Sea, U.S. presence is important, mainly because the U.S., through its military power, represents the greatest deterrence within the Alliance, and thereby The Maritime Strategy enhances the deterrence aspects of Norway’s security policy.

The question becomes then, how does Norway reestablish this important part of our defense concept, and what options does it have? A continuous high level U.S. naval presence with surface ships would undoubtedly increase the credibility of Norway’s defense concept, because such a presence would have a deterrent effect. It would show the
adversary that the U.S. gives priority to the defense of Norway, and that the U.S. does not accept Soviet domination in the Norwegian Sea. From a military point of view, that would create a favorable starting point to be able to support Norway in times of crisis or war. However, an establishment of a permanent naval presence in the Norwegian sea, especially far north would require a considerable amount of resources. As I see it today, the U.S. Navy does not have sufficient means to establish this presence, and I see no indications that the resources will be available even with a 600-ship Navy. Consequently, The Maritime Strategy as such is not on a collision course with Norwegian policy, which would not support such permanent deployment.

A more frequent deployment of U.S. naval vessels would not give the same advantages as a permanent presence, but would be a reinforced demonstration of political will and determination showed by the U.S. A sign that is wanted by many. Such a measure would especially increase the understanding about the determination to conduct reinforcements in crisis or war, and it would also make it more credible. It is also reasonable to believe that the Soviets would look at such a development as a lesser challenge than permanent presence. Such an option would probably be acceptable in providing realistic training to operate within the region under different conditions. Politically, it would clearly show the U.S. obligation to
the region. You always have to look at the risk of Soviet countermeasures, and take them into consideration. The goal must be to establish an adequate presence to take care of the function of crisis prevention and war prevention, and as such this seems to be a reasonable price to pay to get the increased security such an option would give. One way of implementing such an option would simply be to use the NATO exercises mentioned earlier, like "Ocean Safari," "Northern Wedding," "Teamwork," and "Express." As explained earlier, these exercises during the last years seem to have increased in size and have taken place farther north than previously. There have been some statements by Norwegian officials, that it is desirable to have an increased participation of U.S. carrier groups in our waters. (8) Another way would be to have independent sailings in the area, or to combine both. In planning such operations, one must insure that the U.S. will make adjustments to the viewpoints of the European allies including the Norwegians.

A permanent presence by European navies mentioned in Chapter Four, either by use of STANAVFORLANT or establishing a new naval group like STANAVFORLANT, is another option. This alternative would not have the same deterrent effect as U.S. forces, but it would give the alliance (and Norway) new military and political options on the Northern Flank. To be acceptable from a NATO perspective, both U.S. and Canadian naval ships have to
exercise or be a part of the force from time to time, and as such it would be a supplement to make up for the U.S. Navy's sailing time from the east coast or other areas. Such a multinational force would provide for effective cooperation in peacetime and show that NATO has flexibility, credibility and can react together. Another reason for close cooperation with the U.S. Navy is to avoid any sort of split between Western Europe and the USA, they are mutually dependent. The force would contribute to deterrence in the Northern Flank without direct involvement of the U.S. Navy, thereby maintaining the reassurance aspects in Norwegian security policy, and it would link the European NATO countries closer to Norway, which has always been a part of Norwegian Security policy in this area. At the same time this force would provide NATO with a new tool in handling crises in the region without involving complete reliance on U.S. forces.

Such a force would also reduce or eliminate the two other objectionable aspects of The Maritime Strategy, namely the problem of U.S. fluctuation over time and the horizontal escalation. The "fluctuation" can be connected to some of the U.S. critics that have been stating that The Maritime Strategy is neither strategically sound, nor financially affordable. (9) This can mean that if the budgets for the department of Defense in the U.S. are shrinking in the future, which might well happen, the U.S. might not be able
to implement their strategy on a full scale. That will probably mean that the earlier low priority given to the Atlantic and Norwegian Sea will remain low priority, and in that respect Norway could be worse off without a structural guarantee, like a standing NATO naval force dedicated to the Norwegian Sea.

Another aspect of this presence has to do with the well-known "phenomenon" that U.S. commitments fluctuate over time. In the 1970's, U.S. attention was focused elsewhere as the Soviet Northern Fleet increased which left Norway in the unpleasant situation it is in today. A renewed U.S. presence in the Norwegian Sea could lead to an increased Soviet build-up in the same area. Until now there have not been permanent patrols of Soviet warships in the Norwegian Sea despite the fact that it is relatively close to their home base. If, however, after an initial increase, the U.S. Navy reduces its presence again and the Soviets maintain theirs, it will leave Norway in a more uncomfortable situation than before. A NATO standing Naval force for the area would reduce the impact of such fluctuation on Norwegian security.

The increased naval activity in the Norwegian Sea and renewed attention to the naval dimension of the East-West rivalry may increase the danger of inadvertent conflict and escalation at sea. The United States and the Soviet Union have long since concluded an agreement
concerning the prevention of incidents at sea, and recently a similar agreement was concluded between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. Because Norway is not a major naval power, such a bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union of the same nature would seem somewhat incongruous. However, because confidence building measures (CBM) is an important part of our security policy, a multilateral agreement including the major naval powers and the littoral States on the Norwegian Sea could focus attention on the shared interest in a certain code of conduct for purposes of avoiding inadvertent crises. In addition such an agreement would link the smaller powers to an evolving system of minimum world order. A treaty of this type would not be in conflict with The Maritime Strategy, it would rather enhance the deterrent component of the strategy.

Maintenance of a low level of tension in Scandinavia is another aspect of Norwegian security policy. The fact that a low level of tension is believed to exist, has led the Norwegians to the conclusion that they have struck the right balance between deterrence and reassurance. Because of this, Norway is very sensitive to all developments which may threaten the low level of tension. Reticence in regard to the U.S. Maritime Strategy is understood in this context. Consequently, this strategy is implemented with its impact on suitability...
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In spite of the difficulties discussed above, it appears that the potential advantages of The Maritime Strategy out-weigh its disadvantages. The prospects for enhanced deterrence are great and the strategy can be implemented in such a way that it will not greatly disturb reassurance. Consequently, it is suitable for Norway.

**ACCEPTABILITY**—

An important aspect in The U.S. Maritime Strategy is the horizontal escalation. As mentioned earlier, this is one of the parts of the strategy that not everyone in Norway (or Europe) agrees upon. It is not likely to believe that all European - NATO members would agree on the U.S. demonstrating its power in the northern waters as a result of, for example, a crisis in the Middle East area. In that case a European force would be a better instrument to reduce the risk for confrontation between the super powers in the region.

It seems that the problem in implementing The Maritime Strategy on the Northern Flank in the future circles around how to assure a sufficient capability to be able to reinforce Norway in time of crises and at the same time trying to maintain the usual reassurance towards the Soviet Union, without destroying the level of tension. As I have pointed out earlier, Norway needs a viable sign from the Alliance to prove that our geographical location has an
important place in the overall defense of Western Europe. And as such Norway has to be prepared to risk some Soviet countermeasures. This will in any case involve the U.S. Navy, because the U.S. is the primary underwriter of Norway's security, and because only the U.S. Union has sufficient power to deter the Soviet navy. Some Norwegians seem to think that maintaining the status quo would be acceptable, but that would be over the coming years excepting Soviet domains and making the Norwegian Sea--a Mare Sovieticum. That would probably be the first step to putting pressure on Norway to gradually distance itself from the Alliance perhaps eventually choosing a neutralistic course, with special understanding for the Soviet point of view (a type of Finlandization). (12)

As was demonstrated in Chapter Six, there is broad political agreement in Norway (13) about the need for the members of NATO to show their interests in the Norwegian Sea through naval activity as a counterbalance against the expanding Soviet Navy. Thus the former Prime Minister Kare Willoch wanted an increased Allied interest for presence in the Norwegian Sea. And on behalf of the new government, Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund said in his first statement to the Storting (Parliament) that it was desirable to have a regular allied presence. (14)

When both superpowers have increased interests in the area close to Norway, it becomes more difficult to come
up with a useful mixture of deterrence and reassurance against the Soviet Union. And because this area, to a much greater extent than earlier, has become a starting-point for Soviet power—projection beyond Western Europe, to great an emphasis on reassurance could be misinterpreted by the Soviet Union as a lack of Norwegian resolve to counter the increasing Soviet expansion in its home waters. Or to explain it in another way; by continuing to focus too much on reassurance of the Soviet Union, who’s security interest becomes more global, Norway could weaken its deterrent posture and cause the Soviet Union to make dangerous miscalculations. It becomes important to show determination within the Alliance and send a signal to the Soviet Union to "slow down" their expansion. The Maritime Strategy would be a useful tool in sending that signal. This aspect adds to its acceptability for Norway.

Allied naval presence in the northern waters takes place within the framework of NATO, wherein Norway is able to contribute to shaping this presence in consonance with our needs and assessments. The confusion and uncertainty about The Maritime Strategy is a result of two things. Firstly, there had not been an unclassified "White Paper" which thoroughly explained the policy until the beginning of 1986. Secondly, the policy has been exuberantly oversold, which often happens in the American politics system, especially as budgetary decisions are made. This oversell
may be effective with Congress but it frightens allies who take official statements very seriously. In part this confusion is due to a mixup of tactics with grand strategy. (15) The maritime strategy is designed to orchestrate the naval means for forward defense of the vital sea lines of communications and the expanded territories of allies and is not a tactic for aggressively attacking the Kola bases, although such a tactic might be employed.

It is vital that the United States government reassure its allies of the reasonable way in which this strategy is likely to be employed and establish a structure for its implementation within the NATO framework. These issues have been discussed previously in this chapter and will not be covered again. However, it is clear that The Maritime Strategy will not call for increased basing or storage of nuclear weapons in Norway or a permanent presence of the U.S. Navy in the Norwegian Sea. Increased presence of the U.S. Navy, establishment of a standing NATO force in the Norwegian Sea, and increased port call of allied navies in Norwegian ports would be the more likely result. All of these developments would be acceptable to Norway and would not be perceived to upset the "Nordic Balance." Consequently, The Maritime Strategy is acceptable to Norway.
CONCLUSIONS—

The Maritime Strategy is a suitable and acceptable Strategy from a Norwegian perspective. The main reason is that it contributes to deterrence in response to the Soviet expansion into the Norwegian Sea, and thereby makes our security policy more credible. The reassurance aspect towards the Soviet Union can be taken care of when the peacetime presence aspect of the strategy is worked out. Policy measures are likely that would make it possible to maintain the low level of tension, because there is nothing in The Maritime Strategy that calls for a permanent U.S. presence.

The expansion of the Soviet Northern Fleet is a challenge which Norway has to meet. The question is how we meet this challenge, while taking care of Norwegian security and still maintaining a good neighbor-relationship to the Soviet Union. When we decide what kind of presence we prefer, it will have to be a "mixture" which contributes to stability in the region without weakening the credibility of the three conditions which Norwegian defense planning is based upon and still maintaining the low tension that exists.

The Norwegian Sea is not Norwegian in spite of the name. However, since Norway is immediately affected by the pattern of naval activity in the Norwegian Sea, it is
important for Norway to give clear expression to her interest. This is also true in regard to The Maritime Strategy, and as usual the discussions will take place mainly in NATO because the area is SACLANT's area of responsibility.

The basing policy and the nuclear policy are the two major self-imposed constraints that are not likely to be changed, and the needed and welcomed increased presence in the Norwegian Sea has to be established within this limitation. This means that a permanent U.S. presence is not desirable; partly because such presence will be in need of supporting infrastructure in Norway and as such, depending on the scope and volume, might constitute pressure on the base policy; partly because such a presence would certainly do away with the low tension in the region that has been a central goal of Norwegian security policy for some forty years.

The solution appearing most favorable would be the establishment of a STANAVFORNOR. In doing so, the European NATO countries would compliment the U.S. Navy, would fit well into The U.S. Maritime Strategy and at the same time reduce the parts of the strategy which generate some concern in Norway. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, both the U.S. Navy and the Canadian Navy need to be closely linked to and have exercises together with this force, because if a crises in this area occurs, they are needed to be able to
counter the Northern Fleet if the crises ends in a war fighting scenario. Separation of U.S. and Soviet forces might be useful in peacetime as a part of crisis control, such a separation is, of course, senseless in time of war. (16) To avoid an increase in the East-West rivalry, the Norwegian security policy will continue to look for confidence building measures to avoid inadvertent crisis and contribute to a more stable world.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES--

I have identified four areas which require further study:

1. The options of creating a STANAVFORSO to be used as a force in place and as a force to "split" U.S. and Soviet forces within the Norwegian Sea in times of crisis. This option becomes especially interesting if the French Navy is included into the force.

2. Another study could be to analyze the feasibility of The Maritime Strategy if the 600-Ship navy becomes a reality. A sub issue of this study would be to determine the minimum number of ships required to implement the strategy.

3. The need for increased "cooperation" which could be needed if the U.S. would establish a permanent "fleet" in the proximity of the Norwegian Sea.
4. How The Maritime Strategy could be combined with the current Coalition Strategy, and as such make up a new combined strategy.
ENDNOTES


2. See Chapter Five.


4. Ibid, p. 15.


7. J. Boerresen, (See Note 3), p. 15. See S. Farstad (Note 6) also, p. 21.

8. S. Farstad (See Note 6), p. 23.

9. Dunn and Staudenmaier (See Note 5), pp. 44-50.


15. J. Boerresen, (See Note 3), p. 15.

16. Brundtland & Gjelsten, (See Note 13), pp. 80-94.
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