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
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CHANGING THE WESTERN ALLIANCE IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

By WING COMMANDER BRIAN L. KAVANAGH, RAAF



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AIR WAR COLLEGE  
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THE CHANGING WESTERN ALLIANCE  
IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

by

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Wing Commander, RAAF

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY  
IN  
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REQUIREMENT

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AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: The Changing Western Alliance in the South Pacific

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The Western alliance in the South Pacific has experienced three decades of success based on a cooperative spirit established through its keystone, the ANZUS Treaty. Over the last few years some events have occurred in the region which are now challenging this spirit.

The author examines the alliance, including its history, objectives and the issues confronting it. He also analyses current policies of ANZUS nations and their perceptions of the Treaty. He concludes that the traditional ANZUS Treaty can no longer meet the security objectives of its members, and requires major revision. A blueprint for change is suggested.

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Wing Commander Brian L. Kavanagh is a navigator in the Royal Australian Air Force, whose flying experience is in Long Range Maritime Patrol aircraft. He has served on a tour in operations in South Viet Nam, and has worked for a number of years within the discipline of Combat Survival. His interest in Australian - American relations and the ANZUS alliance began when he served for two and a half years as the Australian Defence Representative at the Joint (US-Aust) Defence Space Communications Station in Nurrungar Australia from 1984 to 1986.

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**CHAPTER I**  
**INTRODUCTION**

"Our commitment to the security of  
our allies and friends is a commitment  
to our own security as well" [1]

Caspar W Weinberger

There is a consensus today among trading nations of the world that a new, strategic interest is emerging in the Pacific region. While the East - West political struggles in Indochina, the two Koreas and the Philippines have no doubt contributed to this state of affairs, economic concerns appear to be the main driving force. Central to the issue are the emergence of Japan as a leading industrial nation and the enormous trade connections it has with the United States and the rest of the world. The associated growth of the countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations [ASEAN] has also helped. The world, and especially the superpowers, is turning more to the Pacific to satisfy various economic needs.

The Peoples' Republic of China, led by Deng Xiaoping, has undergone a transformation, and as part of its economic reforms the Chinese government is now looking to the Pacific nations for guidance and investment. Even Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev has made it clear that the USSR for many reasons, not the least being economic, now

places high priority on improving relations with both China and Japan.[2] Meanwhile the Soviet Union continues its military build-up in East Asia, and the United States, retaining a wavering Philippines as a keystone of Western power projection in the Pacific, accumulates an unfavourable balance of trade with Japan unprecedented in her history.

The new world interest is not contained solely within North East Asia, around the economic giants. Because of superpower interest in the Indian Ocean and the increasing importance of Sea Lines Of Communication (SLOC) from the Middle East to northern Pacific regions which pass through South East Asian 'choke points', the whole Pacific Ocean now plays a more important part in the communications network of trading nations.

While the world watches the Pacific with renewed interest, a number of events has occurred in the South West Pacific over the last few years that has caused serious concern for the nations of the free world, and which has upset the traditional stability of the area. For the purposes of this study, the South Pacific region encompasses the area of Pacific Ocean between Australia, Papua New Guinea and New Zealand in the West, and the coastline of South America in the East. It includes the countries of Australia, Papua New Guinea and New Zealand as well as the island chains of Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia, south of the Equator. The South West Pacific denotes the western half of this region.

The most significant development has been the unravelling of the very foundation upon which the Western alliance depends in the region, namely the Australia, New Zealand and United States (ANZUS) Treaty. For the past 34 years ANZUS has welded its three member nations together and ensured peace and regional stability by maintaining a dominant Western power presence throughout the South Pacific. Dislocation of the Treaty occurred in February 1985, when the New Zealand Labour Party, newly elected on a popular mandate to establish a nuclear-free New Zealand, refused port entry to the US Navy ship, USS Buchanan. This was done in response to a US refusal, in accordance with Defence Department policy, to confirm or deny a presence of nuclear arms or power on board any US ships. The NZ Government asserted that denial of port access to nuclear armed or powered vessels was its sovereign right and within the confines of ANZUS, while the US avowed that unrestricted port access was a contiguous part of any alliance. Both parties stood on positions of fundamental principle, which according to each were irreconcilable, and the Treaty itself was open to either interpretation. Today the ANZUS Treaty remains in existence, but "...in a state of suspense", as was noted ambiguously by the Australian Foreign Minister, Bill Hayden [3], with Australia and the US reaffirmed in their bilateral defence interests and New Zealand having been struck from the US list of bona fide allies.

Another threat to security arrangements in the

South West Pacific is the gradual and systematic encroachment of the Soviet Union into a region which in the past has held no special interest for it. This was predictable given its new interest in the Pacific and the strains within ANZUS. As the strategist Dora Alves predicted in 1984, "...the withdrawal of any ANZUS partner would send a very potent signal to the Soviets.." [4] The Soviet government has completed a one year fishing contract with Kiribati [formerly Gilbert Islands], has approached Papua New Guinea, Tuvalu, and the Solomon Islands for similar contracts, and very recently obtained a new fishing agreement, which includes stationing rights, with Vanuatu [formerly the New Hebrides]. These inroads of Soviet influence are particularly disturbing to the ANZUS nation for obvious security reasons.

The spirit of ANZUS has been further taxed by other issues within the region. One of the most contentious among alliance members is the continuing nuclear debate beyond the NZ unilateral action . Over the last 15 years both New Zealand and Australia have become more independent in foreign policy, in part as a result of shifting away from previous narrow overseas trade markets and of moving towards greater self-reliance in defence. The tendency now is to less subjugation to the policies of other powers and to more representation of national interests in the international arena, particularly in regard to such nuclear issues as nuclear disarmament, a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone [SPNFZ]

Treaty. The peace movement and anti-nuclear groups are active and well supported in both countries.

The latest and possibly most damaging threat to the alliance after the New Zealand split is the US Congress' decision to subsidize overseas grain and sugar sales in support of an ailing US agricultural industry and at the expense of traditional Australian markets. In the words of the Australian Foreign Minister, "genuine outrage" was felt among the Australian people, many of whom questioned for the first time the true value of the alliance. Coupled with past complaints from SW Pacific Island states of "poaching" in Exclusive Economic Zones and encroachments into sovereign territories by American private fishing fleets, this has led to a growing disenchantment with the United States within the South West Pacific.

The increasing number of disputes presently challenging the ANZUS Treaty is in many respects indicative of the state of flux which the entire Pacific is undergoing. As world strategic interests change, traditional allied interests and objectives within regions may need to be reviewed. Certainly the policies that are currently employed by the US and its allies within the South Pacific are susceptible to the changing environment, and should be constantly reevaluated.

A reassessment of those policies therefore is the essence of this study. It poses the question: in the changing environment of the Pacific, do present policies of the Western alliance in the South Pacific fully support

alliance security objectives today, and will they continue to do so into the future? The paper's specific aim is to review current policies against security objectives in a changing Western alliance, to identify policies that are inadequate, and to suggest adjustments necessary to protect alliance interests in the years ahead. The analysis will first look at ANZUS in general, including its history, status today, and objectives. Policies will then be reviewed, and lastly, if considered necessary, alternative policies will be recommended.

**CHAPTER II**  
**THE ANZUS ALLIANCE**

"In short, diminish us  
and you diminish all of us." [1]

Rt. Hon. Sir Wallace Rowling  
NZ Ambassador to the USA

History

From the beginnings of their European settlements, both Australia and New Zealand suffered a sense of remoteness and vulnerability which encouraged them to seek alliances with more powerful nations. First, alongside Britain, Australia and New Zealand, bound by a tight, enduring bond formed from the ANZAC (Australia New Zealand Army Corps) spirit of World War 1, fought in two world wars to support 'Mother England'. The United States' influence on the war in the Pacific and the British withdrawal east of Suez after the war caused a subsequent shift of allegiance to the United States by the trans Tasman twins.

With the onset of the 'cold war' after 1945, widespread disillusionment with the United Nations' collective security system, the Korean War, and fears of a US supported Japanese defence independence, Australia and New Zealand vied for a formal alliance treaty with their new-found, powerful, wartime ally. On 1 September 1951, the ANZUS Security Treaty was signed in San Francisco and came into

force when ratified by Australia, New Zealand and the US on 29 April 1952. Since that time ANZUS has been the mainstay of the Western alliance in the South Pacific. It became more than a security treaty; it was a total relationship among the three members which encompassed historical, cultural, personal, political, and commercial links, as well as close defence cooperation designed to ensure ANZUS forces could operate together quickly and effectively should the need arise.[2]

ANZUS has had unprecedented success over the past 34 years, exemplified by continuing peace in the area and a general underlying consensus that is not evident in most other Western alliances. While the Treaty was loosely worded, and the alliance had no formal organizational support structure or military command, its success was due in part to the spirit of cooperation, consultation and mutual consent which underlay it.

The turning point in this hitherto ideal relationship came with the declaration of the Nixon Administration's 1969-70 'Guam Doctrine' of US withdrawal from South East Asia, and the dictum to its allies that America would in the future "...look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.."[3] Total reliance on strong, powerful allies for defence was now a thing of the past for Australia and New Zealand. This also marked the beginning of the end to the 'Forward Defence' policies that had prevailed in both countries until that time. Both would

now look to greater defence self-reliance and would seek greater cooperation with regional neighbours, while at the same time reevaluating their unswerving loyalty to the world-wide policies of the US as had been the case in the past. On this point, Thakur in his treatise on New Zealand's foreign policy choices in the nuclear age explains that "...the Vietnam war was most probably the critical catalyst in leading New Zealand away from the role of faithful and unthinking ally..."[4] In Australia also, the "All the way with LBJ"[5] thinking of the people in the sixties was soon diverted by a conscious nationwide re-assessment of Australia's capability to support a more independent, self-reliant and even 'continental' defence strategy.

It was at this time that the seeds of doubt were sown as to exactly how far the United States would commit itself to the security of South East Asian and Pacific allies in a post-Vietnam era. From this point onwards the significance and expectations of the Treaty to each member became less clear, and differing perceptions of the meaning of ANZUS evolved. The extent of the divergence of allies' perceptions was only fully realised when the current crisis between the US and New Zealand began to unfold. To illustrate the point, consider that the US was totally nonplussed at New Zealand's determination to proceed with its "irresponsible action," while New Zealand for her part completely underestimated the US reaction to this "one rather narrow issue," as Mr Lange termed the denial of port

access. The fact that the situation has not been resolved, even after two years of careful negotiation is further evidence of these irreconcilable differences. Coming to grips with the different perceptions of the meaning of ANZUS is crucial to understanding the whole complex of the alliance as it exists today: therefore perceptions will be examined more closely in a later chapter.

At present the ANZUS Treaty is, in the words of Australia's Prime Minister Hawke, "a treaty in name only." At a recent bipartite ANZUS council, US Secretary of State George Shultz declared the ANZUS Treaty "inoperative" and announced that the US was "suspending its security obligations to New Zealand."<sup>[6]</sup> The door was left open to New Zealand, however, to permit a return to trilateral co-operation should she see fit. Unfortunately New Zealand seems unwilling or unable to relent as the Lange Government is proceeding with action to legislate its nuclear arms policy. Secretary Shultz further warned that the status of ANZUS would be "reviewed" if New Zealand proceeded with the proposed legislation. Many speculate this would mean the formal abolition of ANZUS.<sup>[7]</sup> At the time of writing the proposed bill had not been passed by both New Zealand Houses of Parliament.

In the meantime the Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden, and the New Zealand Prime Minister, in an attempt to expand bilateral co-operation between the two countries, have held talks in Wellington. Both however publicly agreed that the defence relationship between the

two countries could not be expanded significantly. An Australian expectation of greater defence spending by New Zealand to improve defence links was dampened by Wellington's declaration that New Zealand had no plans to increase its defence budget.[8] Conversely, Wellington's expectation that Australia might take up defence responsibilities to New Zealand where the US left off was abruptly dispelled by Bill Hayden.

The question that many are now asking is where will it all go from here? All agree that ANZUS is in a crisis; the Treaty is weakened by the New Zealand split, and the alliance is threatened by other political and commercial issues. As Washington and Wellington continue to exchange rhetoric, Australian Foreign Minister Hayden, with concerns of his own, warned that "...Australia and the United States have reached a stage in their alliance of quite extraordinary significance.." He further stressed the need to determine exactly the value of the alliance to each other and to consider these "...current developments in the alliance with great care.." [9]

A logical way of coming to terms with a crisis such as this is to go back and reexamine the basic objectives upon which the Treaty was originally set up and is now operating. Reaffirming traditional security objectives will help to focus on the overall aims of the Treaty; identifying new objectives will provide guidance for evaluating policies and perceptions and making adjustments for future alliance integrity.

### Security Objectives

A close perusal of the ANZUS Treaty document sheds little light on specific security objectives. Only vague terms are found in the articles of the Treaty, such as "resist armed attack," or "consult..(if)..territorial integrity, political independence or security...is threatened." [10] As has often been suggested, the loose wording of the ANZUS Treaty was intentional, specifically designed to retain utmost flexibility through consensus, rather than relying on formalized structures as is the case with other treaties such as NATO. What is also different about ANZUS is that although set up originally as a defence treaty only, its broad terms allowed it to develop into an alliance of far more consequence than simply one for mutual defence. One would expect therefore an all-encompassing ANZUS to have engendered other objectives beyond those connected only with defence and the employment of military power. Both the United States and Australia are acutely aware of the vastness of the South Pacific region, the diversity of history, culture, politics and economics of the many island states, and the vulnerability of their own SLOC to attack by opposing forces. In a region of such complexity, political and economic objectives also play a large part in regional security.

In his book The Australian - American Security Relationship, Henry Albinski, a leading US expert on South Pacific affairs, addresses some of the regional, political interests of both countries that stem from these complex-

ities. "Australian and American regional objectives include the stability and friendship of resident nations and a harmonious climate of intraregional relations." He puts it more succinctly that both countries see their security objectives in the region related to "the collective cooperation as well as the individual viability of regional countries." [emphasis added] [11] Secretary Shultz, speaking of the East Asia-Pacific region in 1985, affirmed the US view of the importance of the two objectives identified by Albinski:

Our goal can be simply stated: peaceful progress for all countries in the region, based on a shared belief in the value of economic cooperation, and mutual respect for the rights of all participants to freely pursue their own interests. [12]

In closing his chapter on the South Pacific, Albinski gives a more detailed list of traditional American - Australian security objectives in the region. In addition to the aim of fostering an orderly, intraregional political climate, he cites promotion of the health and upkeep of the ANZUS alliance, ensuring adequate access and mobility for ANZUS forces, and minimizing regional Soviet influence as issues central to continued regional peace and harmony.[13] Professor Albinski's list is indeed supportive of US national interests in East Asia and the Pacific, which were recently articulated by Gaston J Sigur, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, when he spoke of cooperation and consultation, maintaining the strategic balance through defence commitments, support for democratization and human rights, and strengthening the open market

system.[14]

Australia also has demonstrated her support for these objectives. Australia's views on ANZUS are clear and concise. Prime Minister Hawke recently stated explicitly that any reduction of the capacity of ANZUS by any member would be "an act of mutual insanity." His government is in full support of the continuance of the Treaty and is firmly committed to ANZUS[15], while the political opposition also stands behind the Treaty as the basis for its defence posture. At the same time Australia displays her full commitment to regional stability and friendship through cooperation with and economic development of the micro states of the South Pacific. The leading role she has played in regional politics within the South Pacific Forum in such matters as mediating in fisheries disputes, lobbying France to allow peaceful decolonization of New Caledonia, and proposing the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) Treaty, as well as the substantial and continuing aid she supplies to island states all attest to this commitment.

Australia has also been in the forefront in bringing to the notice of the alliance the increased presence of the Soviet Union within the South Pacific. She first raised the matter at the 1976 South Pacific Forum and the ANZUS Council Meeting, but generated little interest from the US at the time. The then Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser, postulated rather accurately that "...the Soviet Union would love to have a land-based presence, free of

restraint, somewhere in the area." [16] Subsequent warnings went largely unheeded until Kiribati signed a fishing agreement with the Soviet Union in 1985.

Today Mr Fraser's fears have come true. The Kiribati fishing contract has lapsed, but a more dangerous accord has been struck. The Soviet government has obtained fishing rights from Vanuatu to fish the Coral Sea and part of the agreement is to establish ground facilities at Palikula on the big island of Espiritu Santo. Ground facilities are for maintaining and replenishing ships and ferrying crews to and from the Soviet Union by Aeroflot charters. [17] This development is of grave concern for Australia, whereby a regional government with renowned leftist, radical leanings has openly invited Soviet Union ground stationing only one thousand miles from Australia's shores.

For New Zealand's part, it would be fair to say that during the recent contretemps, her fundamental security objectives in common with the other alliance members have remained unchanged. However the 75 percent popular support by the New Zealand people for a nuclear-free state, and the moves to legislate this policy indicate a new national security objective of keeping New Zealand sovereign territory free of any nuclear influence in the future. This of course is at odds with past alliance understandings of free access for all ANZUS forces.

In what appears to the US to be mutually exclusive viewpoints, 78 percent of New Zealanders also support a

continued New Zealand commitment to ANZUS. Prime Minister Lange denies that his country has been thrown out of ANZUS and his deputy, Mr Palmer, amplified that no member could be ejected from the Treaty. Furthermore, he added, port visit denial for nuclear ships was not in breach of the Treaty, whereas unilateral withdrawal of treaty obligations by the US was.[18] Here Wellington is saying that New Zealand remains committed to ANZUS. It does so because it has few other viable choices, considering New Zealand defence is totally reliant on integration with larger Western powers, and the same defence relationship available through ANZUS is unavailable elsewhere. But what Wellington is also saying is that in the future "...this is how we propose to run our affairs; it is a bit different from before; but we believe you [US] should be willing to fit in..."[19] A maturing New Zealand, moving beyond the colonial mentality, is now demanding a more independent say in regional issues, and one that increasingly takes into account the changing reality of the area.

As this review has shown, the aims of ANZUS include traditional objectives which are intrinsic among member nations with similar backgrounds, cultures and value systems, and these are ongoing and unchanging. Such objectives are common to the interests of the alliance as well as to those of most other nations in the South Pacific. They are in essence promotion of regional co-operation, economic development of all nations, minimizing Soviet influence, and maintaining a strong, healthy ANZUS.

However as regional interests (and indeed world interests) have changed, new security objectives are emerging that in some cases conflict with traditional ways of doing business. New Zealand's anti-nuclear stance is one such example, as is the South Pacific Forum's SPNFZ Treaty. Underlying this is a need within the antipodean countries for greater representation in regional matters in the future and less subjugation to the policies of more powerful allies.

The whole network of ANZUS interrelationships is changing. These new realities and new objectives have placed the current alliance in some jeopardy, and there is now a real threat to achievement of the traditional, core objectives unless the nations concerned can find a better working relationship. A more equitable working arrangement can only be postulated if the policies and perceptions of today's alliance are examined in detail, for it is here that misunderstandings and tensions arise.

**CHAPTER III**  
**POLICIES AND PERCEPTIONS**

"America was nice to its enemies  
but murder on its friends"

Henry Kissinger 1968

In his testimony to the 99th Congress, US House of Representatives Hearing on ANZUS, Professor Henry Albinski stated that "policies should steadily be calibrated with basic, national objectives, which in turn need to relate to wider interests."<sup>[1]</sup> In Chapter II the ANZUS security objectives were reviewed in the light of the South Pacific's wider interests and changing environment. As a follow-on, this chapter centres on the actual policies that exist in the South Pacific today and their effects on both the key powers and the resident states. However, as has already been mentioned, there is more to the current ANZUS crisis than conflicting policies; perceptions of what to expect from past relationships and what to avoid in future relationships have altered and are now beginning to cause deep divisions in the very fabric of the alliance.

At times it is difficult to separate policies and perceptions when one tries to isolate factors of conflict within a relationship. Such is the case within ANZUS, a pact which evolved with few rigid guidelines and one where

at times the dividing line between policy and perception has become rather hazy. This chapter therefore will not attempt to differentiate policy from perception, but will examine both together as they pertain to the divisive issues within the ANZUS relationship.

#### The New Zealand Split

The United States firmly believes that New Zealand has abrogated its alliance responsibilities by its port entry policy. Washington allows that the Treaty's fine print does not specifically address port access, but in the US mind, New Zealand has violated the very spirit of ANZUS on which the last 34 years of alliance success has depended. To many Americans this is just another manifestation of their over-all disillusionment with allies at large. Having witnessed worldwide apathy among traditional allies to US past initiatives in Iran, Libya and Grenada, much of the American public believes, in the view of the New Zealand analyst Thakur, that "allies are generally blind to the Soviet threat, disloyal to the common cause of the West and unwilling to take their fair share of the burdens of defence." [2]

Certainly one immediate consequence to the United States of the New Zealand action is the repercussion among other friendly nations of a small ally taking a forceful, unilateral stance that could be perceived regionally and globally as anti-American. Many believe that this US concern was the prime reason for the tough move against her

old and faithful ally. Prime Minister Lange argues that New Zealand policies are for New Zealand only, and that his country's stand is anti-nuclear not anti-American. The US on the other hand sees this as the logic of a nation that is in effect politically 'insular', and the Reagan Administration is convinced that other countries cannot help but be affected by this small nation that has been held in such disproportionately high regard in the past. Thus at the risk of appearing heavy-handed, bullyish and uncaring, the US has taken a decisive stand -- more as a warning to other allies than as a direct response to New Zealand -- that abrogation of alliance responsibilities will not be cost free in the future.

The United States disavowal of New Zealand as an ally is a major change of policy within the alliance and one that is not without serious implications. Broadly speaking, relinquishment of security obligations by her former alliance partner means New Zealand no longer has access to US intelligence support, is excluded from joint military exercises with the US, and is precluded from any further defence development through training, scientific research and staff interaction. Also New Zealand no longer has US congressional protection under its former 'special relationship' status in matters of trade and commerce, which may well lead to less favourable future bargaining power in US markets.

There is little New Zealand can do in response except to try to convince the US that its decision is in

the best interests of nobody. Wellington has made it clear that the nuclear issue is not negotiable, and even if Mr Lange's government relented, or was replaced in a future election, visits by US nuclear-powered or armed ships would be unlikely for years to come as the issue is too politically 'hot' for any New Zealand government to override in the immediate future. After all, in New Zealand's eyes, this has become a matter of fundamental, national sovereignty, and supersedes any friendship or alliance interests. New Zealand demands the right to be heard around the world, she demands the right to determine her own policies in nuclear-related matters, and she believes that to do otherwise is an abdication of her national sovereignty.

And where does Australia fit into all this? She now finds herself in a position much like that of a confused child following the divorce of its parents: having to continue relations with each separately, while trying desperately to affect a reconciliation between the two. To carry the 'family' analogy further, Australia has a distinctly 'mother' relationship with New Zealand in that both, bound by common geography, heritage and custom, are strategically one, whereas a 'father' relationship exists with the United States, upon whom Australia relies so heavily for many of the essentials of survival. To say the least, Australia's position is delicate -- she is having to walk the thin line between the other two ANZUS partners. She has publicly disagreed with New Zealand's port access

policy, expressed an understanding of the US action, but all the while has carefully distanced herself from details of the debate.[3]

Without doubt the New Zealand split from ANZUS has great potential for enduring harm to the Western alliance in the South Pacific, and possibly to the strategic balance within the whole East Asian - Pacific region. An impasse exists: a superpower's demands under a long standing treaty are at odds with a perceived sovereignty right of a small but traditionally loyal ally. Reaching a consensus seems remote unless one side (or both) compromises its views. The US wants New Zealand back in the fold as before, but this can no longer be, simply because the United States' priority Treaty expectation of unrestricted access to all ANZUS territories is now unacceptable to New Zealand, certainly in the short term. On the other hand, New Zealand's expectation of a future ANZUS arrangement with business as usual except for a nuclear presence may be difficult, if not impossible for the US to swallow.

#### The Soviet Encroachment

It is not difficult to see that the Soviet Union is bent on exploiting this and other current difficulties in the South Pacific. The past confrontations between the US and regional states over confiscated fishing vessels and sovereign fishing rights, and the looming ANZUS difficulty were precursors to Soviet approaches to South Pacific nations. In the author's view, their timing was no

accident -- they had picked up the political vibrations.

The mood of the South Pacific Islands has changed over the last decade. As P. Lewis Young points out, "...the activities of the US fishermen ..[and their]..rampaging, free-booting purse seiners created a bewildered anti-Americanism in an area which has always cherished the idea of the generous American." [4] The difficulty for these small island nations was that Washington failed to recognize their claims of 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zones [EEZ] under the new International Law of the Sea, nor did she recognize for years the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency [SPFFA], which was set up to protect commercial fishing interests in the region.

The United States' policy on tuna fishing reflects the view that no state is entitled to exclusive coastal jurisdiction over highly migratory fish species. The island nations on the other hand are often totally dependent on their one and only exportable commodity - fish. They felt they were within the law, whereas the US, by "poaching" in their territorial waters, was not. Furthermore, the US showed total insensitivity to their welfare. "Friendship isn't poaching..," said Solomon Islands Prime Minister Sir Peter Kenilorea, while Ieremia Tabai, Kiribati Prime Minister, expressed his view that "earning a fishing living from the Russians is better than having to ask our traditional friends to support us." [5] For many of these micro-states the issue at stake is one of pure survival in an increasingly commercial Pacific.

The years of rancor ended a few months ago when a formal fishing agreement was negotiated between the SPFFA and American tuna fleets. The draft agreement is still to be ratified by Congress. However one could argue that although the belated agreement was welcome and necessary, the damage as far as Soviet influence is concerned has been done. The Soviet Union, capitalizing on US past indifference to the island states' plight, managed to gain a firm and important foothold in the region, firstly through the Kiribati contract and lately through the Vanuatu connection.

Australia feels a sense of frustration over the increased Soviet presence in the South Pacific. Successive Australian political leaders tried unsuccessfully for a number of years to bring to US attention the implications of its policies regarding sovereign rights of small island nations. For Australia takes her role as a regional leader seriously. As Professor Albinski explained, "Australia has calculated that its assumption about a major South Pacific responsibility for itself represents a contribution to the American alliance, and thereby to global security."<sup>16</sup> And indeed the US has been perfectly content with Australia's increased significance in the South Pacific. This has obviated direct superpower contact with small independent nations, while ensuring ongoing Western diplomacy through a regional middle power. The frustration and sense of 'I told you so' is therefore understandable when Australia appears thwarted by its ally in its attempts

to maintain regional harmony, deny the Soviet Union any chance of influence within the area, while doing its share to maintain the strategic balance.

#### The Continuing Nuclear Debate

Besides New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy, there are other aspects of the continuing nuclear debate that are undermining traditional alliance harmony. Australia, during the last four years under a Labour Government, has been a leading critic of the superpowers' policies on disarmament and arms control. She has openly criticized the US and other nuclear nations for their failure to meet the conditions of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty [NPT], and she has vigorously urged establishment of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty [CTB]. As a sign of its political purpose, the Hawke Government in 1983, appointed Australia's first ever Ambassador for Disarmament as a means of ensuring continued international representation on these issues. Australia has also publicly censured the United States' Strategic Defence Initiative [SDI] concept as destabilizing to global deterrence and has declined participation in official SDI research. These are examples where Australia has been forthright in expressing her own, individual opinions through international forums.

Not all matters of a nuclear nature are rejected in Australia, however. Unlike New Zealand, Australia offers port access to nuclear as well as conventional allied naval forces, and hosts a number of joint American Australian

electronic sensor stations, three of which place Australia on the Soviet Union's nuclear targeting list. While these policies of the Australian Government have their share of opposition from local peace movement and anti-nuclear groups, the majority of Australians are content in the knowledge that this is the price they have to pay for a viable alliance. It is worth pausing here to note exactly what Australia's perceptions of the ANZUS alliance are in terms of real costs and benefits to its security.

At present Australia hosts over twenty US and joint US-Australian defence facilities within the country, of which the 'big three' (Pine Gap, Nurrungar, and North West Cape) provide essential real-time communications, early warning and intelligence for the United States. US naval ships visit Australian ports regularly, and United States Air Force B52 navigation and surveillance flights stage through Darwin in the north. Australia also contributes significantly to the alliance surveillance and intelligence network, and takes a leading role with defence assistance within the South Pacific. Additionally Australia assists in the defence network of South East Asia through its membership of the Five Powers Defence Agreement, which provides a direct link between ASEAN and the Western alliance.

In return Australia enjoys the indirect benefit of inclusion under the United States' global nuclear umbrella. Direct benefits are participation in joint exercises with the US, complete support from the US intelligence network, staff interaction with US defence forces, and access as a

favoured nation to Western technology. Few doubt the importance of these direct benefits of the alliance. The question in many Australian minds rather is: exactly how binding is the Treaty in today's world should Australia's security be threatened?

Pragmatic Australians can envisage very few scenarios in which the US, under ANZUS, would offer direct military assistance to a threatened Australia. Many Australian strategists and defence thinkers now believe that in any conflict in which their country was engaged, short of a global confrontation, Australia would stand alone. To what extent US defence forces are committed to protect Australian security under ANZUS is one of the most pressing defence questions in Australia today.

Still other long-term alliance questions perplex Australians. How will Australia be expected to pay the 'premium' for its ANZUS 'insurance policy' in the future, once the joint defence facilities become redundant or outdated, as indeed they must given the pace of technology and the vulnerability of these vital but strategically 'soft' targets? Also, will ANZUS require Australia to provide military assistance to the US in the Philippines or Korea should US bases there come under attack -- a prospect politically unpopular for any Australian government? More important, what would the US expect of Australia with regard to home-porting in the event that the US is forced to withdraw from the Philippines? Should the US indeed seek Australian home-porting assistance, then America's

policies on nuclear weapons handling will clash with Australia's policies as ratified under the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. These and other questions raise a great deal of uncertainty with Australians as to exactly what defence benefits they gain from the alliance and at what costs.

Turning now to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. This has become yet another thorn in the side of the superpowers, and particularly the US and France. Spawned by Labour governments of both Australia and New Zealand during the last 20 years, the SPNFZ entered into force at the end of 1986. Australia as the initial proposer of the Treaty went to great pains to influence the South Pacific Forum (SPF) to draft a middle road and therefore workable treaty. The two crucial, debatable points were port visits for nuclear (armed or powered) ships and right of passage of nuclear ships through the zone. The US naturally was never particularly enamoured of the whole treaty idea, but was relieved when the final document took a conservative line and allowed free passage for nuclear vessels and left port access decisions to individual member states. The US, with other superpowers, has been invited to sign the Treaty Protocols, but as yet has declined, claiming it is "...giving the Treaty and its protocols serious high level study ...(to determine any implications) ...that would limit ability to defend free world interests." [7]

This political smoke screen is seen in the South Pacific as evidence of how little worth the US puts on the

SPNFZ now that her freedom of operation has not been curtailed. Further evidence of US disregard for the Treaty was her reaction to Australia's calls under the protocols of the Treaty for the US to apply political pressure to France to stop nuclear testing in the South Pacific. The SPF's concern with France's behaviour after all was one of the prime reasons for creating the Treaty in the first place. Prime Minister Hawke made a direct plea for US assistance in this highly charged debate, and the Australian ambassador to Washington, Rawdon Dalrymple made an impassioned case that "...continued American indifference to what the French were doing would be an act of folly ...[providing] ...fertile ground for anti-United States, anti-west propaganda and activity." [8] The US State Department's reaction was to support France's need to modernize its nuclear deterrent and to reject the Australian pleas out of hand.

#### The International Trade War

The United States' dismissive response to Australia over French nuclear testing went virtually unnoticed when compared to the later step it took in the middle of 1986, to support declining US agricultural trade at the expense of Australia. First the subsidized US wheat sales to the Soviet Union, and then subsidized sugar sales to China, brought howls of protest from all levels of Australian society. Timothy Mackey, the then agricultural counselor for the Australian Embassy in Washington, reported, "...now

for the first time, the common people [of Australia] are asking, 'is the US really our friend?'"[9] In government circles, the Minister for Primary Industry, John Kerin, predicted a loss to Australia on wheat sales alone of \$296 million, while the Federal Treasurer, Paul Keating, announced threateningly that grain sales would force Australia to reconsider its military relationship with the United States. [10] Many Australian farmers called for the closure of the joint US - Australian bases in retribution. Since then Australia has seen other traditional markets infiltrated by subsidized US produce, in particular its barley sales to Saudi Arabia and more recently wheat markets in China. Foreign Minister Hayden sardonically compared Australia's and New Zealand's latest standings with the US, whereby New Zealand was told it "would remain a friend but not an ally..[and]..Congress is now telling Australia that it is an ally but not a friend." [11]

Irrespective of how contentious the 'Farm Bill' decision was for the US Congress, or how much US officials justify their action as counter-strategy to the European Economic Community, the fact remains that this decision has done a great deal of harm to Australian - American relations. For this is more than trade competition, it is a 'gut' issue with Australian people - the way you treat your friends and mates is a fundamental principle that strikes at the very heart of the common Australian. It is important to note here that this 'outraged' reaction by Australians gives a good indication of the depth of feeling

the country has for its tie with the US, a tie formed primarily through ANZUS. It highlights the extent of Australia's perception of what the Treaty means to her. Correspondingly the US action also gives some clues as to its own interpretation of how far alliance responsibilities extend.

In Australia's case, as the smaller partner to the US, it has vital reasons to view the ANZUS Treaty more seriously than does its larger partner. Australia relies on the US for much of its security, economy, standard of living, and regional political influence, and stands to gain more in immediate and visible terms from the alliance than does the US, which is primarily interested in enhancing its long-term strategic interests. As such Australia (and arguably NZ as well) over the years has fostered a relationship with the United States which far transcended the meaning of the original defence treaty. The broad significance Australia sees in the alliance today stems mainly from this traditional dependence; it is complemented significantly by the tendency of the Australian people to value lasting, deep relationships based on loyalty and commitment much more than formalized, rigid, contractual arrangements.

On the United States side the tendency these days seems more to a 'politics is politics, but business is business' viewpoint. Congress appears to react to powerful electoral constituencies and lobby groups in the short term interests of the US economy, irrespective of the

repercussions to allies or to long-term global economics. Such is the nature of American politics. What this demonstrates to allies such as Australia and New Zealand though, is that when it's all said and done, ANZUS has a different basic significance to the United States than it does to them.

The United States has certainly shown that it takes the defence aspects of its alliances seriously. Retribution to New Zealand was one poignant example. Another was US public criticism of the Australian Government's recently tabled Defence Report, the Dibb Report. US Defence Secretary Weinberger advised his Australian counterpart that the Report's view of the Australian role in ANZUS was unacceptable to the United States. The Report's fundamental premise of a 'strategy of denial' for Australian defence planning, based on a 'layered strategy of defence' with application of military power only within Australia's area of direct military interest (Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, the nearby island states of the SW Pacific and New Zealand), was antithetical to the Western strategy of Soviet deterrence.[12] In this way the US was reminding Australia of its defence commitment to the total Western alliance, and to the security of the whole South Pacific Region. Yet beyond this pervading desire to ensure defence loyalties from the ANZUS alliance, there appears less US concern for other, wider-ranging issues, such as economic support and regional harmony. This suggests that in the US mind a security treaty is primarily one concerned with

defence issues. Dora Alves supports this viewpoint:

It should be underscored that the US views ANZUS as a defense treaty and that the steps taken by the US Government are all confined to defense matters. Furthermore all the steps are reversible.[13]

And what of the consequences of economic protectionism? While the trade war continues, major improvements to Australian - US relations are unlikely to occur. More importantly and realistically, the effect on Australian markets will no doubt impact South Pacific regional nations. Indeed a carry-over effect has already been felt, as Australia, much to the chagrin and disappointment of its SPF colleagues, has proposed substantial cuts in its aid to South West Pacific nations in an effort to reduce its rising budget deficit.[14]

#### Summary

This examination of the policies and perceptions of members of the ANZUS alliance as they apply to the current disputes in the South Pacific highlights two fundamental divergences of opinion that exist today between the United States and regional South Pacific nations. The first is the increasing gap that is forming between the nuclear and non-nuclear states of the world in relation to production and use of nuclear energy for military purposes. The second is the global trend among the more powerful nations towards economic hegemony through trade cartels and protectionism, and all to the detriment of the weaker, less capable nations of the world.

The New Zealand split from ANZUS, the continuing debate on other nuclear issues including the SPNEZ and French nuclear testing in the Pacific, and the economic pressures on primary commercial resources of Australia and the Pacific Islands are all direct testimony to these differences. The consequences are an increased Soviet presence in the South Pacific, a gradual breaking down of the ANZUS alliance and a slow, steady spread of regional anti-Americanism, which all threaten regional cooperation and stability.

That these differences are challenging the basic security objectives of ANZUS is undeniable. What is also evident to even the most casual observer is that some adjustments to today's policies are needed that take these fundamental differences into account, yet at the same time allow more traditional security objectives to be met.

**CHAPTER IV**  
**POLICY ADJUSTMENTS**

"Negotiate until hell freezes over."

Adlai Stevenson

From an appraisal of the ANZUS pact in the South Pacific, its security objectives, and present policies and perceptions, we have determined that the Western alliance in the region is today challenged more than at any other time since the inception of the Treaty. We have also seen an enormous shift of global interest into the East Asia Pacific region for economic as well as other purposes. Now is obviously not the time to allow the alliance to be further weakened by these challenges, nor is it the time to see ANZUS fail, for this would be, in Paul Dibb's words, "of enormous benefits to the USSR's worldwide interests." [1] Dora Alves concurs, and in her call for magnanimity among ANZUS members to establish a common ground for agreement, adds that "the prolongation of the completion of the [ANZUS] rupture would strengthen only potential enemies." [2]

No doubt ANZUS is important. As we have already discovered, its maintenance is a prime security objective of each member nation. According to Henry Albinski, it is

important not only for what it does but also for how it appears to outsiders. A faltering ANZUS in disarray, says Albinski, creates doubt in the minds of the nations of the greater East Asian - Pacific community as to the credibility of the transregional security system as a whole.[3] Professor W.T.Roy of the University of Waikato in New Zealand takes this point further. He argues convincingly that among the nations with vested interests in the South Pacific, and particularly East Asian countries, a reluctance by Japan to build up militarily, and a preoccupation by South Korea with the North and by Taiwan with the Peoples' Republic of China, all but preclude any Pacific-wide concept of defence cooperation in the near future. He postulates that because of these very real limitations, "clearly...the core of South Pacific defence must remain the ANZUS pact." [4]

Given the importance of ANZUS, the most logical question to ask is: can the alliance as it stands today overcome the threats to its coherence? Or in other words, can the alliance meet its security objectives in the face of augmented fragmentation, increased disharmony and economic frictions -- factors which all provide opportunities for its traditional enemy the Soviet Union to extend its influence in the South Pacific? To answer the question one has to speculate on how ANZUS will evolve should New Zealand be completely disassociated from the cooperative defence efforts, and Australia be expected to take on a greater political role in the region while suffering major

trade damage from its main ally.

Many would argue that the US action against New Zealand was an overreaction and a classic example of cutting off the nose to spite the face. Prof Albinski explained to the US House of Representatives Sub-Committee Hearing on ANZUS that the US would have a predicted net loss by distancing New Zealand from the alliance. He warned of the eventual degradation of skills of the thoroughly professional (if small) New Zealand standing forces, the run-down of naval and air surveillance assets which are important to the region, and the weakening of Western political influence among New Zealand's neighbours. He believes furthermore that the "object lesson" taught New Zealand was futile because, without economic sanctions (a course he diagnosed as inappropriate for New Zealand), ostracism proved nothing except to weaken the defence capability of the alliance in general. [5]

Others would accuse the US of a lack of prudent diplomacy in not fully appreciating the feelings of the New Zealand people nor the peculiarities of their politics, while at the same time helping Mr Lange to paint himself into a corner. Then of course there are many who observed that the New Zealand people had not fully thought through the implications of an anti-nuclear policy and how diametrically opposed it is to the very essence upon which their defence is based. Both arguments suggest imprudent, inopportune and inconsiderate diplomacy on each side.

New Zealand 'out in the cold' cannot possibly main-

tain the same defence posture it did before the rift. Only two options appear viable. It could either increase its defence spending appreciably, an option already dismissed by the Lange Government, or reduce defence capacity to cope only with low level threats to its immediate area. The inevitability of the latter option is that New Zealand will slip into a posture of de facto non-alignment. Additionally this situation will impose severe strains on the Australian military who will need to 'double handle' all regional defence matters which involve US and New Zealand, through separate contracts with each partner. An isolationist posture therefore is inappropriate to New Zealand, not sought by her and is seen by many as eventually harming the bilateral relation with Australia.

Another by-product of New Zealand isolationism is the withdrawal of its forces from Singapore and the resultant loss of a Western voice in the Five Power Defence Agreement (Australia, New Zealand, UK, Malaysia and Singapore). Mr. Lange announced on 23 December 1986 that New Zealand would phase out its military presence in Singapore over the next three years, thus ending a commitment that began in 1955 during the Malayan Emergency.[6]

In all it would appear that if New Zealand is left out of ANZUS it cannot help but see its regional defensive and political strength diminished significantly. While the US may be able to pick up any defence shortfall left by New Zealand, Australia would also be expected to assist militarily. Additionally she would become even more

responsible than at present for maintaining regional cooperation and pursuing economic development. Whether Australia would be nationally willing, economically capable or politically able to meet this added responsibility is a moot question that will depend largely on how the US is perceived locally and regionally in the future. Certainly one point that is not debatable is the motives of the Soviet Union in its regional endeavours. Soviet persistence will only be dampened by a determined and united stand from a strong regional alliance. But this is not the case today.

Western cooperation in the South Pacific region cannot work effectively without ANZUS, and yet at the same time the alliance cannot meet its objectives under the present ANZUS relationship. That leaves only one alternative -- ANZUS has to be changed. The policies that make up the alliance have to be adjusted so that those fundamental differences between the industrialized, nuclear nations and others over nuclear defence and trade competition are taken into consideration, and the perceptions of alliance member nations as to what the Treaty means for them are duly clarified.

A first step to adjusting policy would be to better consolidate the provisions of the ANZUS Treaty itself. Vague promises of assistance in times of trouble in the present Treaty appear no longer capable of guaranteeing continued cooperation among its members in a world increasingly divided by global, vested interests. The Treaty

must be rewritten in a manner to eliminate any doubts in the minds of its signatories as to each party's defence commitments. It must be drawn up as a defence contractual agreement that specifically addresses contentious issues such as port access for nuclear ships, long-term hosting of member nations' military forces and equipment, and alliance mobilization in times of hostilities. The new contract should make clear the limitations of the Treaty, so that no violations of Treaty spirit can arise from disagreements in other arenas beyond the terms of reference of the Treaty, for example the economic arena.

On the issue of port access, in order to appease both the US and New Zealand a compromise position will need to be reached, for example, port access for US nuclear vessels only during times of hostilities. The US has to recognize that the loss of New Zealand's defence contribution weakens the Western position in the Pacific, that in some ways the growing global disenchantment over nuclear proliferation has to be acceded to, and that port access in New Zealand has been of little strategic importance in the past. In New Zealand's case, the full implications of their anti-nuclear stance need to be logically articulated and publicly debated away from political rhetoric and pacifist jingoism. If a compromise cannot be defended by the government, then an issue of this importance should be put to public referendum for decision. Only then will the clear, unambiguous wishes of the New Zealand people be represented.

Second, with regard to long-term hosting of member nations' military forces and equipment, an open access policy during wartime would appear mutually acceptable to alliance members. A peacetime policy on the other hand would be more difficult to conclude. One possibility is to limit peacetime hosting of bases to those facilities that address only functions of C<sup>3</sup>I (Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence). This will preclude peacetime basing of nuclear weapons or large scale military forces in the South Pacific -- an arrangement which accommodates Australia and New Zealand. The US, on the other hand, should be given better guarantees that their vital defence facilities in alliance countries will receive secure, long term tenure. This is not to usurp the individual Country to Country agreements that govern these facilities, but rather to prevent the sort of diplomatic 'blackmail' that seems to arise when essential US defence bases are used as bargaining chips in political differences -- a situation unpalatable to the US and destabilizing to an effective alliance.

The last major point requiring specific definition in the revised treaty is alliance mobilization in times of hostilities. The Australian strategist, T.B. Millar best summed up a practical, overall, strategic outlook for Australia when he said, "...the 'defence of Australia' involves far more than defending the homeland against attack by hostile forces. Australia cannot opt out of the world."(7) A continued strategic balance in the East Asian

Pacific region is vitally important to the South Pacific nations, and regional middle powers such as Australia must participate directly in its maintenance. Australia and New Zealand have to firmly commit themselves through the alliance to support the US presence throughout the whole Pacific region. This means militarily assisting the United States to defend their bases in the Philippines, Korea and Japan should they be threatened. After all, any reduction of US influence in these countries creates a power vacuum which no doubt would soon be filled by the Soviet Union. On the other hand, in order to preserve alliance integrity the US must guarantee automatic theatre assistance to the allies in case of South Pacific regional conflicts, regardless of any regional economic considerations the US may have at the time.

There is no suggestion here that renegotiating ANZUS will be a simple task. Converting a document which has the broadest possible flexibility into a narrow, task-oriented agreement will be extremely difficult because of strong, vested interests among member nations. Such a change may even be impossible or politically unfeasible in today's climate. However, its feasibility should be given the utmost attention, because a revised treaty is the only viable method of overcoming the US - NZ impasse and its broader ramifications. It is also a sure way to clarify for Australia and New Zealand what they can expect from the alliance in the future, thus ending the plethora of debate concerning this subject. Each member nation would be

guaranteed a more definitive commitment from the others, while any doubts in the minds of potential aggressors about invocation of the treaty (which is the case at present), would be dispelled.

If a new treaty cannot be agreed upon and then ratified, then ANZUS as it stands must be abandoned, as clearly unworkable. The possibility of dissolving ANZUS should be used as pressure to encourage all parties to compromise in working out a new and clearly defined treaty.

If this fails, what then is the best alternative relationship to ANZUS? Abandoning ANZUS should not mean abandoning New Zealand. Bilateral treaties would obviously be set up between the US and Australia and Australia and New Zealand, with Australia acting as a bridge between the two alliances. The onus would fall heavily on the United States, however, as to how well the two interacted, and therefore how well overall regional defence integrity was maintained. The US would need to allow enough defence support flow from Australia to New Zealand to enable the latter to continue her political and defence role of the past. In this way New Zealand could remain defence 'solvent', and the US and Australia could bide their time until New Zealand returned to a more conservative anti-nuclear policy.

A revamped ANZUS agreement should not exclude the defence of the island nations of the South Pacific. At present island security is monitored by the South Pacific Forum and only verbally assured by the ANZUS partners.

Naturally enough this causes some concern among many of the regional nations. Attempts in the past by some to join ANZUS as a means of gaining greater security guarantees have been rejected politely. A suggestion by Dr Coral Bell of the Australian National University, to formalize Pacific Islands' defence is worthy of consideration. She advocates "promotion of a Pacific Protocol to the ANZUS Treaty, making the treaty partners more specifically responsible for the security of the island ministates."<sup>[8]</sup> An alternate solution proffered by Allan E Goodman, another Australian strategist, is the "...development of an ANZUS rapid reaction force for missions to protect island states and essential Sea Lines Of Communication.<sup>[9]</sup>

Instruments of this nature would do much to enhance stability in the region, and present a more united front against the Soviet Union and other potential aggressors. Also there is no logical reason why the micro-states of the North Pacific, for example the islands of Micronesia, should not be included in such a protocol.

A new ANZUS treaty tailored to defence security would do much for regional stability. However stability and individual states' viability are also heavily dependent on economic development. In the world economic scene, there is very little that Australia can do through an alliance to ensure fairer trading practices in the future. Essentially the international trade war is a problem of global proportions and one that can only be solved in the market place or by careful international politicking. To this

latter end Australia is at present vigorously pursuing a freeze on international agricultural subsidies through the EEC, the US Congress and the nations who subscribe to the General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs [GATT]. Failing this, the only hope for middle powers such as Australia in an international trade war may be to form trade cartels of their own as the best means of countering larger economic communities. The Cairns group of 14, named after the 14 countries (including Australia, Canada and Argentina) which met in Cairns, Australia last year to determine a strategy against US subsidized agricultural products, may very well be the foundation for such a cartel should Australia's negotiations fail.

Developed countries such as most of those in the Cairns Group of 14 will eventually find some way around their economic difficulties. But it is the emerging, newly independent island states within the Pacific which often have vulnerable governments and economies that need special protection by larger powers against exploitation, particularly from potential enemies. Past measures to do this, including establishment of the South Pacific Forum, have been only partially successful mainly because of lack of superpower support. The US must realise that it is in her own very best interest and directly supportive of her security objectives to strongly encourage the SPF and its endeavours. This has not been the case in the past. Whether a formal link between the US and the SPF to ensure political stability in the South Pacific is appropriate for

inclusion in a revised defence treaty is a matter for further discussion and debate. Certainly a case could be made along economic lines.

It would seem appropriate that all East Asian - Pacific countries with interests in the South Pacific should be encouraged to take a more meaningful part in ensuring economic development of these emerging societies. Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, together with the United States, Australia and possibly even Indonesia, should collectively devise guarantees which will protect their tiny, struggling neighbours from being exploited, as too often has been the case in the past. Japan has already conceded this point, and recently the Japanese Foreign Minister, Tadashi Kuranari unilaterally pledged, "as much assistance as possible to make the [South Pacific] region more economically prosperous." [10]

There are other less revolutionary but timely measures that could be taken which will ease the tension within the current alliance. The US needs to reconsider its stance on France's activities in the South Pacific, in regard to both nuclear testing and the decolonization of New Caledonia. The latter issue especially has much potential for future unrest in the region. New Caledonia may be allowed to transition peacefully to independence and trouble may be averted, with a little US influence. Additionally the US should move quickly to ratify the protocols of the SPNFZ. This move would acknowledge support for a treaty which had US best interests in mind

when it was drawn up and which does not directly encroach on US freedom of operation. Ratifying the Treaty would serve the US well from two sides. It would send a subtle message to the French thus avoiding direct confrontation with another ally, and at the same time strengthen the SPNFZ and satisfy the South Pacific Forum. These initiatives would do much to boost the flagging American image among South Pacific nations and will reinject into the region some trust and solidarity which have been seriously eroded over the years.

#### Conclusion

After more than three decades of unprecedented success the Western alliance in the South Pacific is in trouble. A new global interest in the Pacific Basin is part of the reason, but a clash of fundamental values that has developed recently between the United States and its other two ANZUS partners is also a major cause. The ANZUS pact is a victim, as is regional stability within the South Pacific, and the atmosphere is encouraging to nobody except the Soviet Union. Differences of opinion now seem irreconcilable under the terms of the existing ANZUS Treaty, which relies on broad interpretation of meaning to encourage cooperation and consensus. Unfortunately today's issues of nuclear weapons and global economic competition seem too far-reaching to be overcome by the good will and vague spirit of cooperation developed in the past. The differences are widening and they are challenging the

security objectives of the alliance.

This study has shown that the ANZUS Treaty, as the keystone of the Western alliance in the South Pacific, remains vital to its security and important to the strategic balance of the Pacific in general. It has also shown that ANZUS in its present form is incapable of solving these differences of opinion now and in the future. Accordingly this study calls for a complete reappraisal of the Treaty to take account of disparate viewpoints and member nations' divergent perceptions.

The study recommends a much tightened treaty that addresses specific defence issues, including those of a contentious and public nature. It offers practical, compromise solutions to home porting and basing of alliance members' forces, both nuclear and conventional, and provides options where military assistance would be appropriate in times of conflict. In essence these compromises are an unlimited access to alliance territories in times of hostilities only, with trilateral military involvement assured in defence of alliance or member nations' security interests. It suggests defence of island micro-states be formally included, and it invites further debate to establish formal US and northern Pacific commitment to regional viability and economic development through the South Pacific Forum. Lastly, it offers some short-term policy changes for the US to consider as a means of re-establishing confidence and unity within the region. Recommendations here are inconclusive; anything to the

contrary would be beyond the limits of this study. Rather, these recommendations are considered merely practical starting points for meaningful negotiation.

Perhaps the greatest obstacle of all to negotiating a revised ANZUS Treaty is the United States' general lack of concern for issues relating to the South Pacific -- a region of the world particularly low on the US National Interests priority list. However, it was the United States Secretary of Defence, Caspar Weinberger who brought to the world's attention the importance of US alliances when he said:

...the long term maintenance of these alliances is vital to our mutual interests, and we must remain resolute in our determination to overcome occasional disagreements even those that become subject to intense public attention. [11]

The Western alliance in the South Pacific does have disagreements, in some cases substantial ones, and now is the time for magnanimity, tolerance, and creative thinking among member nations if they are to be overcome. Surely there are sufficient warning signs to suggest that a time for change has come, and surely there is enough of that cooperation, consensus and spirit remaining from the old ANZUS relationship to see appropriate changes incorporated.

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