HOW DO UNITED STATES DOMESTIC FACTORS AFFECT ARMS SALES TO THE MIDDLE EAST?
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HOW DO UNITED STATES DOMESTIC FACTORS AFFECT ARMS SALES TO THE MIDDLE EAST

by

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AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: How Do United States Domestic Factors Affect Arms Sales to the Middle East

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Identification, examination and analysis of U.S. domestic factors that affect Congress' decision to approve arms sales to moderate Arab countries in the Middle East. A discussion on the increasing Congressional control on arms sales and how it has given some countries like France, United Kingdom and the Soviet Union the opportunity to take advantage of the situation and to sell their arms to moderate Arab countries. Jordan case study provides an example of a moderate Arab country turned down by Congress and tries elsewhere to satisfy its national security requirements. Several recommendations are suggested for future activities by moderate Arab states to help them in paving the way for future Congressional approval of arms sales.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Colonel Nader A. Dahabi was born in Amman in 1946. He graduated from high school in 1964 and the Royal Hellenic Air Force Academy - Greece in 1969 with a B.Sc. in Aeronautical Engineering. He attended several technical courses in U.K. and U.S. He attended the ACSC, Maxwell AFB, Alabama in 1978. In 1982 he graduated from Cranfield Institute of Technology, England, with M.Sc. degree in Aerodynamics and Flight Dynamics. He started his career as maintenance officer. Three years before he came to attend the AWC, he served in logistics. Colonel Dahabi is a graduate of the Air War College, class of 1987.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DISCLAIMER-ABSTAINER</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE MIDDLE EAST</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition of the Middle East</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Significance of the Middle East</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Objectives in the Middle East</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Conflicting Issues</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why Israel and U.S. Oppose an International Conference</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why Jordan calls for an International Conference</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. ARMS SALES; PROS AND CONS</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms Sales Dilemmas</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critics of Arms Sales</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocates of Arms Sales</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. DOMESTIC FACTORS</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Groups</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of the Congress</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of the Mass Media</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Opinion</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JORDAN, A CASE STUDY</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan's Strategic Vulnerability</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Threat</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principals of Jordan's Policy</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan's Constraints to the Peace Process</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Story of the 14 Hawk Batteries</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Soviet SAM-8 Missiles</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why F-16? And What Are the Alternatives</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan's Request for Arms</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reagan Administration Action</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification for the Arms Package</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressional Response to the Request</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why Congress Opposed the Sale</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

The role of arms sales in United States (U.S.) foreign policy in the Middle East has grown greatly over the past two decades, yet it has received little systematic attention. Because political, economic, and security interests of the various states in the Middle East must be considered, arms sales are an extremely complex issue. This complexity is compounded by U.S. domestic factors.

The U.S. Congress has become the most important participant in the arms sales decision-making process. Many arms transfer requests by moderate Arab states in the Middle East, for example, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait, failed to get Congressional blessing, although these sales were approved earlier by the executive branch.

The purpose of this thesis is to identify the factors that affect Congress' arms sales decision-making, examine them, analyze them, make recommendations which the moderate Arab countries can use to inform Congress, and determine methods they can employ to influence the vote in Congress. It will also discuss the consequences of moderate Arab states, turned down by the U.S., buying arms from other sources.

Jordan's arm package case is used to demonstrate the U.S. executive-legislative struggle over the formulation of
foreign policy in arms sales. It also illustrates the conflict between U.S. global interests, Israel's regional interests, and Jordan's national security requirements.
CHAPTER ONE
THE MIDDLE EAST

DEFINITION OF THE MIDDLE EAST

It is interesting to note that the term "Middle East" was originated by the American naval historian Admiral Alfred T. Mahan in 1902. He was examining the strategic and political contest then in progress between Russia and Britain. Mahan used the term to describe a vague area between Suez and Singapore where this conflict was created. Since that time the concept of the Middle East has had many definitions.(1)

For the purpose of this thesis, the Middle East is defined as the area located east of Libya, north of Sudan, south of Turkey, and west of Pakistan. The countries included are: Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Kuwait, Iraq, North Yemen, South Yemen, and Iran.

THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MIDDLE EAST

Prior to WW II, the United States(U.S.) had relatively minor contact with, or interest in, the countries of the Middle East. There had been some private commercial interests represented which were involved primarily in oil and foreign trade. American missionaries, educators and archeologists had been active there since the middle of the nineteenth century. "Although President Woodrow Wilson specifically treated the Turkish portion of the Ottoman
Empire in the twelfth of his farsighted "fourteen points for peace," there was little official concern for the Middle East prior to 1945."(2:26)

In an Army Day address in April 1946, President Harry Truman referred to the Middle East as "containing vast natural resources and comprising an area of strategic importance."(2:27) The Truman administration had always regarded the Middle East as one of strategic significance; and in the early 1950s its special attributes, the source of two-thirds of the West's oil reserves, the Suez Canal, and the location of important British military bases were seen as immediately vital should there be a global test of strength.(3:77)

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The next major pronouncement of U.S. foreign policy for the Middle East came in an address by President Dwight D. Eisenhower before a joint session of Congress of 5 January 1957. Later incorporated into a House Joint Resolution, this statement became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine and was more specific in language than the Truman Doctrine of a decade earlier. He declared that "the U.S. considered the preservation of the independence and integrity of the Middle Eastern nations as vital to American security, and that we were prepared to use armed forces to assist any nation or nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by
In a news conference of 8 May 1963, President John F. Kennedy enunciated his policy for the Middle East. He stated that the U.S. supports social, economic and political progress in that area. He further stated that "it is not enough to talk only in terms of guns and money for guns and money are not the basic needs in the Middle East. It is not enough to approach their problems in a piecemeal basis. It is not enough to merely ride with a very shaky status quo. It is not enough to recall the Baghdad Pact or the Eisenhower Doctrine. It is not enough to rely on the Voice of America or the Sixth Fleet. These approaches have failed."

U.S. OBJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

In a major address in January 1964, Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs pronounced the U.S. objectives in the Middle East. He stated that:

First, as a fundamental contribution to peace, we are concerned with helping create some political stability in the Middle East.
Second, we are concerned to limit Soviet influence in the area.
Third, there should be an accommodation between Israel and its Arab neighbors which we believe is the only way in which the area as a whole can develop political stability, self-sustained economic growth and thus true independence.
Fourth, the continued flow of oil at economically reasonable rates to Western Europe is of great importance and essential to free world strength.
Fifth, access to the air and sea routes to and through the Middle East is important to us commercially and militarily. (2:29)

Although U.S. objectives summarized above have remained fairly consistent throughout the years following WW II, the policy for implementing those objectives can be reasonably termed an ad hoc policy. Grave decisions were made with each new development. These decisions have not always been consistent with previous policy or what seemed to be the real U.S. objectives. As a result, confidence in American resolve and reliability has been seriously questioned. One of the most important and conflicting area of concern is arms sales.

THE CONFLICTING ISSUES

A major goal of the U.S. in the Middle East was to protect Western interests against the Soviet Union, and while this was not synonymous with maintaining peace and order, it automatically brought Washington into the region as the guardian of stability. In defence against the overall Soviet threat, the U.S. developed the Truman Doctrine and the Baghdad Pact, and established bases in Morocco, Libya, and Saudi Arabia. American arms aid programs had been developed to obtain such bases and strengthen the recipient countries. (6:35)

For the U.S., in playing its global role, making arms available to the Middle East states can be a major instrument of policy. The most important political benefit
of arms transfers may be leverage over other countries' sensitive foreign policy decisions. In the Arab-Israeli conflict, the offer of arms has been used to make political and territorial decisions more acceptable. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who was especially inclined to use arms transfers as an instrument of foreign policy, promised Israel substantial amounts of new weapons (including the first sale of the F-15 to another country) in exchange for its leaders' approval to the 1975 Sinai disengagement agreement. Implicit in the large-scale provision of arms to Iran and Saudi Arabia was the belief that this would make it less likely that the Shah or King Khalid would support an OPEC embargo cutting off the supply of oil. (7:15-16)

The Middle East, more than any other developing region, offers the Soviet Union a golden opportunity for replacing the U.S. as the dominant foreign power. The uniqueness of the Middle East lies in the situation in which a group of Arab states is drawn together by common opposition to the existence of Israel, a state identified with the U.S.. Recent history demonstrates that the use of military assistance is the most effective Soviet strategy for penetration of the Middle East. (6:39) The U.S. should be prepared, therefore, to expect more of the same.

WHY ISRAEL AND U.S. OPPOSE AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

President Reagan has rejected the international conference formula because it would give the Russians a
stronghold in negotiations and a calling card for inserting themselves more deeply into the Middle East. This is not in Jordan's interest, not in Israel's interest, and very definitely not in the interest of the U.S.

In reality, an international conference would be little more than a fruitless propaganda exercise. It would turn the process more to the PLO, Syria and the Soviet Union—those parties who have no stake or interest in genuine peace with Israel. It is equivalent to allowing the foxes to rule over the chicken coop. An international conference would be controlled by the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China—nations which recognize the PLO but have no diplomatic relations with Israel.

**WHY JORDAN CALLS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE**

Jordan believes that the problem calls for the help of a neutral third party. This party could be the European Community, or the European Community and the U.S. and the Soviet Union, or the European Community and the United Nations (thus implicitly including the two superpowers). A neutral third party could work to help Israel reach an understanding with other countries in the region based on a respect for the sovereign rights of all, rather than on Balkanization and spheres of influence.

An international conference without the participation of the Soviet Union would be a flawed
conference. "If the reason to exclude the Soviet Union from the conference was that it had no diplomatic relations with Israel, which is a party to the conflict, the U.S. on its part does not recognize the PLO, which represents another party to the conflict."(8:68) Thus the U.S. and the Soviet Union were in the same position in this regard. It would be futile to plan seriously to convene an international peace conference if any party had the right to place conditions on who could attend.
INTRODUCTION

The direction of the flow of arms is as volatile as world politics. For example, in 1972 the main recipient region was the Far East, which received 43.1 percent of the global total of exports of major weapons; the Middle East was a distant second with a 28.7 percent share. But in 1973, with the Arab-Israeli war erupting, the Middle East accounted for 61.3 percent of world imports of major weapons. (9:147)

In 1973, the total value of defense articles and services actually exported throughout the world amounted for $5 billion. (10:72,119) For the 1980-1983 period, all individual developing regions except the Middle East and Latin America had declining arms import trends. The Middle East continues to be the major recipient of arms transfers, in 1983 its share of the world total reached almost 43 percent (see figure 1), and its share of the developing countries total reached nearly 55 percent. (11:8) Whereas in 1983 the U.S. was the leading arms exporter (see figure 2), the Soviet Union, with deliveries of $9.4 billion to the World and $8.6 billion to developing countries, took over first place in 1984.
ARMS SALES DILEMMAS

In recent years, the scope of U.S. conventional arms sales has come under increasing scrutiny in Congress, and several legislative enactments during this period have sought to impose greater controls and a more thorough legislative oversight of such transfers. This is countered by arguments that, in the absence of multilateral agreement, any vacuum caused by U.S. reduction of arms transfers would quickly be filled by the world's other leading arms producers, chiefly the Soviet Union, France, and the United Kingdom.

CRITICS OF ARMS SALES

Among the principal criticisms of arms sales abroad are the following:

- U.S. arms have been used for domestic repression, coups, and aggression against neighboring countries. Arms sent to unstable regions may exacerbate political tensions and lead to armed conflict.

- U.S. arms exports accounted for only 4 to 5 percent of total U.S. exports; and these exports, according to the U.S. Bureau of Statistics, provided approximately 277,000 jobs in the sample year of 1975, or approximately 0.3 percent of national employment. Limited and tempered reductions in arms sales would have relatively minor economic consequences.

- The transfer of arms may involve the supplier country in a political and strategic relationship with the recipient.
which could lead to unwanted commitments and draw it into a local conflict.

- The purchase of arms is, for many countries, a wasteful diversion of scarce economic resources which could be more productively spent on economic development and social welfare needs.

- The introduction of new, more sophisticated military technologies into a region may spur an arms race, and should a war break out, make it more destructive. (12:106-126)

**ADVOCATES OF ARMS SALES**

The major justifications cited by arms sales advocates include the following:

- Arms sales are not out of control. The validity of each major arms sale rests on a mix of policy considerations.

- When the U.S. makes a foreign arms sale, it has control and influence through the provisioning of spare parts and maintenance of the service that does not exist when the sale is made by other countries as the Soviet Union, France, or China.

- Arms sent to allies will assist them in maintaining an adequate defense capability and augment their self-reliance. Arms transfers may restore a local imbalance that could tempt a stronger state to initiate conflict, and consequently create or enhance a regional balance.

- Arms can be exchanged for benefits important to the supplier, such as military bases, intelligence-gathering,
oil and other important raw materials.

- Arms sales contribute to a favorable balance of payments, help relieve unemployment, reduce unit costs, and can lead to further sales in the commercial arena.

- If the U.S. does not sell, others will. (12:99-128)

How does the export of defense articles and services operate in the U.S.? What are the mechanics of the sale? What must take place before the decision to sell arms is reached? Who are the main players? And what are the influences of U.S. domestic politics on the decision to sell arms?
CHAPTER THREE

U.S. DOMESTIC FACTORS

INTRODUCTION

Today, the U.S., like any other country in the world, can not formulate its own national security policy without being conditioned by domestic factors. Three domestic, nongovernmental forces are particularly relevant to arms sales policymaking: interest groups, the mass media, and public opinion. "Although all of these forces have the potential to affect policy, they share a common handicap in the sense that they have no formal policymaking authority." (13:506) Thus to influence policy, they must work through actors, such as the President and the Congress.

INTEREST GROUPS

From the eighteenth century onward, observers of the U.S. have noted its group orientation. America, more than most, is a society of joiners and groups. Lobbyists and lobbying groups have a very limited ability to control the selection of officials or to affect the likelihood that an official can keep or enhance his or her position. They also find it difficult and very expensive to try to manipulate public opinion. This is not the same as saying that groups have little influence on politics; they obviously do have considerable influence; however, the influence of groups is derived from the fact that members of groups are citizens and the political system is designed to respond to the
To some observers, American politics is best understood in terms of group actions and conflicts. Although group influence can be exaggerated, there is no question that virtually every decision made in American politics, whether it is on a legislative committee bill, a congressional floor amendment or a bureaucratic regulation, affects one or more groups in American society. Increasingly, the affected groups are becoming aware of the whole range of important governmental decisions and are endeavoring to have an input into them.

Beyond money and size, the ability of a group to mobilize its membership strength for political action is a highly valuable resource; a small group that is politically active and cohesive can have more political impact than a large, politically apathetic, and unorganized group. The American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), a major lobby for Israel, can take advantage of the political activity of American Jews, and the importance to them of the issue of American aid to Israel or the blocking of an arms sale to an Arab country. In the words of a Democratic congressman, "If I cast a vote against Israel, every Jew in my district will know about it, and will be on my back." (15:74) AIPAC is only a part of the Israeli lobby, but in terms of direct effect on public policy, it is clearly the most important. The organization has deepend
and extended its influence in recent years. "It is no overstatement to say that AIPAC has effectively gained control of virtually all of Capitol Hill's actions on Middle East policy. Almost without exception, House and Senate members do its bidding, because most of them consider AIPAC to be the direct Capitol Hill representative of a political force that can make or break their chances at election time." (16:25)

The activities of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee and the National Association of Arab Americans are signs of progress, but neither group has established a program rivaling the grassroots activism that gives the Israeli lobby influence even where Jewish numbers are small. "A dramatic illustration of this weakness occurred in June 1984 when the forty House members who voted for the amendment cutting U.S. aid to Israel's fighter aircraft industry were smothered with protests from pro-Israel activists but received almost no call or letters supporting their action. In the wake of that experience, the forty Congressmen are unlikely to support similar amendments in the future." (16:325)

Congress particularly, as an institution decentralized by a committee system and based on a detailed division of labor, found that the information provided by groups, and the tendency of groups to sort out issues and to set the priorities for the congressional agenda, were useful in
overcoming the natural congressional inertia. So, interest
group activity in Congress more and more has become a
mutually supportive arrangement. Groups turn to Congress as
an institution where they can be heard, establish their
positions, and achieve their policy goals.

ROLE OF THE CONGRESS

Congress has never been a simple or single institution.
One can examine Congress through many lenses: parties, the
two chambers, committees, subcommittees, joint and
conference committees, leadership, staff assistants, outside
agencies, issue coalitions, and individual members. The
most powerful administrative units within Congress have
traditionally been the committees. Both the Senate and the
House of Representatives are divided into more than twenty
committees apiece, to which members are assigned by their
respective parties in numbers reflecting the overall balance
between the parties in Congress. In all cases chairmen are
members of the majority party. Each committee has
responsibility for a broad area. Until recently, committee
recommendations would rarely be over-ruled by full
membership; indeed, Woodrow Wilson once described the U.S.
as a "government by the standing committee of
Congress." (17:55)

Today the situation is quite changed, particularly in
the areas of foreign policy. Neither of the Senate nor the
House has a single "National Security Affairs Committee."
The chief consequence of this structural disunity is to divide the congressional perspective, making the creation of integrated and coherent legislation and policy almost impossible. The capacity of the Congress to produce coherent policy has been further eroded by other trends within the institution. Formal authorities, whether party leaders or committee chairmen, have been successfully challenged and weakened. Power has flowed mostly to individual members, ad hoc groups, and coalitions. Closely connected to this redistribution of power within Congress has been a growth and redistribution of resources. "The power of the purse to influence foreign policy is much broader than many realize. Through its budget resolutions Congress sets priorities among competing domestic, international, and defense needs. Through authorization legislation, appropriation legislation and revenue process Congress influences policy toward virtually every country in the world."(18:4)

A combination of many factors--the oil price hike in 1973, the personal style of a secretary of State, the end of the Vietnam war--contributed to growing Congressional involvement in the issue of conventional arms sales during the 94th Congress.(19:228) The main intention was directed at achieving restraint in the sale of U.S. arms abroad. Those in Congress concerned about arms transfers sought to realize this objective by writing into legislation new policy statements advocating restraint, opening the arms
sales process to public and Congressional scrutiny, bringing significant sales under more centralized executive branch control and, finally, giving the Congress a right to block certain sales.

Congressional interest in arms sales grew with the rise in their volume and reflected a lack of influence in the executive branch's decision-making process. Acting out of frustration with the administration's unwillingness to impose self-restraints, the Congress passed in 1974 the Nelson Amendment to the military assistance bill which obligated the executive branch to give twenty-days' advance notice of foreign military sales of over $25 million, during which time a sale could be blocked by the passage of a concurrent resolution of disapproval by both houses of Congress. But this proved to be too unwieldy a procedure to be very effective, requiring a major political mobilization by the Congress, and was never successfully applied. More comprehensive and flexible legislation, expanding Congressional oversight was enacted on June 30, 1976, after President Ford had vetoed an earlier and stronger version of the bill because of his belief that it would seriously "obstruct the exercise of the Presidents' constitutional responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs."(20)

The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act (AECA) was the most significant piece of legislation dealing with arms transfers since the enactment
of the Mutual Security Act more than a quarter of a century earlier. "It sought to shift the focus of U.S. arms policy from that of selling arms to controlling arms sales and exports."(21:10) The act emphasized public disclosure and review procedures.

In the initial years of the AECA, Congress forced the Ford Administration to pledge that the sale of C-130 cargo aircraft to Egypt would not be followed immediately by other requests for military transfers to that country; in addition, a proposed sale of Pershing missiles to Israel was withdrawn and a sale of Sidewinder and Hawk missiles to Saudi Arabia reduced in number. "Congress only withdrew its threat to disapprove a proposed sale of fourteen Improved Hawk missile batteries to Jordan in mid-1975 when the administration guaranteed that they would be deployed only in a fixed manner, thereby diminishing their potential contribution to offensive operations against Israel."(22) Similarly, the Carter Administration was forced both to modify its sales of seven AWACS aircraft to Iran in mid-1977 to allay fears in Congress that sensitive technologies might be compromised, and to provide assurances about basing restrictions and future transfers in order to gain support for its package of arms to Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt in the spring of 1978.

Tension, even struggle, between the executive and the legislative branches over control of the foreign policy is
intrinsic to the political system. The Constitution consciously created it and history has failed to resolve it. In recent years Congress has created a situation that is damaging to the security of the U.S. and her allies.

This said, the influence of Congress is not likely to be the same in all circumstances. Congressional influence will tend to be greatest when the domestic political dimensions of a security-related issue become a major concern of the individual legislator. Thus, American foreign policy towards such diverse regions as the Middle East, Africa and the Aegean is constrained in varying degrees by the influence of highly active organizations and individuals who have a particular interest in one country or area of the world. Domestic economic forces, labor unions, oil companies and more important the mass media assert a significant impact on the formulation of certain policies. The mass media have several interwoven, usually unintentional effects on power and politics. The media influence the decisions and actions of politicians and officials, change their priorities and can reduce their ability to control events.

THE ROLE OF THE MASS MEDIA

Much of what most Americans learn about the world stems from the mass media. The mass media --television, newspapers, and popular journals-- play several important roles that affect the conduct of American foreign affairs.
They serve as the primary link between the government and the American people by providing information from government decisionmakers to the public and feedback from the public to policymakers. In practice the mass media have contradictory effects. They educate the people and they pacify the people. "They mythologized John F. Kennedy; they helped topple Richard M. Nixon."(23:6)

On foreign policy, the mass media tend to speak in a monolithic voice, to report a narrow perspective, and to limit rather than expand public knowledge of alternative possibilities. When foreign coverage is criticized for being too brief, too simple, frequently distorted, and often misleading, the explanation is conventionally traced to the shortages reporters encounter overseas. These are four: time, knowledge, labor, and interest. Time: foreign news often concerns fast-breaking crises that do not allow reporters the opportunity to unearth and carefully confirm information. Knowledge: American reporters are frequently dealing with countries whose language and culture are unfamiliar; they cannot help misunderstanding some of what transpires; inevitably, they graft familiar concepts onto an alien reality that might otherwise baffle American audiences. Labor: profit-conscious media proprietors circulate few American reporters around the globe; there are fewer than 200 stationed outside Europe. Correspondents must cover diverse countries spread out over huge territories that often have poor communications and
transportation. Interest: even if more and desirable foreign stories were being produced, they would be omitted entirely or cut down to fit the limited foreign news slot. (23:215-216)

The bulk of foreign news originates from states where American cultural ties or diplomatic interests are strongest. A study of network foreign news from 1972 - 1976 shows 29 per cent of the stories stemmed from Western Europe, 26 per cent from Indochina, and 19 per cent from the Middle East. (24:86-95)

In recent years, television news has become the primary source on which most Americans claim to rely for international news, and consequently, is a key source for images of the Arab nations and conflicts in the Middle East. The typical American citizen's understanding of contemporary affairs, specially international events, depends more and more on television news. Foreign leaders now realize that to overcome the media's wall, they must scale it themselves and address Americans directly in as unmediated a way as possible -- if necessary, come to this country. No one in recent years has understood this better than the former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. (24:231-232)

Except for those who serve on foreign affairs committees, most members of Congress (and their staffs) rely on a few specialized and prestige media, specially
the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times*, for most of their information about the state of the world. Cohen maintains that newspapers have enormous impact on congressional perceptions of foreign reality, and that those ideas shape their responses to foreign policy proposals.(25:215,232) A survey of leading journalists found widespread support for the proposition that the U.S. has a moral obligation to prevent Israel's destruction.(26:49) Pro-Israeli sentiment within the media elite appears to extend well beyond the levels of support for Israel found among general public, although precise comparisons are impossible. The Middle East has long been an object of interest to the American news media. Even in the late Sixties, the Middle East received more coverage than any other foreign affairs story with the exception of the war in Vietnam.(27:60-75)

Since the establishment of the state of Israel, U.S. media have been accused of a pro-Israel bias. The New York Times had favored Israel in its reporting of the early stages of the 1956 Middle East war.(28) Similarly, during the last six months of 1956, seven major U.S. news magazines were found to be pro-Israeli and anti-Arab.(29:9-30) In the 1967 war, Israel was presented as working miracles in a kind of "David-Goliath" match. For example, reports often contrasted the large combined Arab populations with the small Israel population rather than Israel's 300,000 troops to the 285,000 Arab troops. Other studies also concluded that the American media were pro-Israel in covering the Six
Coverage of the 1973 war is often cited as a turning point in the slant of Middle East reporting and as a marked departure from approaches of the 1950s and 1960s. Studies found a strong trend toward more neutral coverage. Gordon (1975) conducted the first published study of network television news coverage of the Middle East and found the reports balanced. (31:76-85) The American "prestige press" no longer uniformly depicted the Israelis as "heroes" and the Arabs as "villains." In fact, "Israelis were increasingly described as angry, upset, worried, and gloomy." (31:737) These studies strongly suggest that the American news media became decidedly less pro-Israel between the 1956 war and the 1973 war. In the years following the 1973 "turning point," new complaints were voiced: some now said coverage was slanted against Israel. (32:49-59)

PUBLIC OPINION

The American public, it should be noted, has been less than enthusiastic about the high level of U.S. arms sales achieved in recent years. Public opinion polls have consistently supported greater restraint. Indeed the largest portion of respondents to polls taken in the late 1970s stated fairly routinely that as a general policy the U.S. should not sell weapons to other countries at all. (24:231-232) Even after the Reagan administration
adopted a new approach, poll results are quite striking, particularly in light of the shift during the last decade toward more conservative views on foreign and defense affairs.
CHAPTER FOUR

JORDAN, A STUDY CASE

INTRODUCTION

Jordan is a small and highly vulnerable state. "A friend of the U.S., is technically at war with another U.S. friend, the state of Israel. This paradox has long caused serious problems for U.S. military relations with Jordan." (33:11) Since WW II, Jordan has gradually been transformed into a modern state. Its economy has shifted from a relatively primitive agricultural economy, to an urbanized service and industrial economy. Jordan, like the other Arab states, has worked for Palestine and the Palestinian people. Its position on these has been shaped by historical experience, demography, geography and resources.

In contemporary Jordan's first decade, Britain was the primary source of arms, but after 1957, as the British influence in the Middle East decreased, the U.S. began to take up this role, first through financing London's arms transfers and then by direct U.S. grants or credit sales. "In the late 1950s the Eisenhower Administration concluded that it was critically important to maintain a stable Jordan and that this would require direct economic and military aid." (34:189-217) After that point, successive American administrations supplied arms on that assumption.
JORDAN'S STRATEGIC VULNERABILITY

- 60% of Jordan's agriculture is now on the eastern half of the Jordan Valley and is fed largely by the East Ghor canal. (see Jordan map) Most of the water in this canal passes through one tunnel which can be interdicted by Israeli raids.

- Potash and chemical facilities, involving some $400 - $650 million, being put on the Dead Sea are vulnerable to Israeli air and artillery fire.

- Jordan lacks the forces and air bases to put up more than a token defence of its only port, Aqaba.

- Jordan has two major power plants. One is located in the vulnerable area near Zarka and is one and one-half to two kilometers from Jordan's only refinery, and the second is located in the south and it is equally vulnerable to Israel.

There is no doubt that Jordan has learned from the 1967 war and the Israeli's well managed strategic bombing effort against Syria in 1973. Jordan fully understands how few strikes it would take to set back Jordan's development. The mix of inferior forces and external threats inevitably forces Jordanian military planning to be extremely defensive.

Jordan's vulnerability was amply demonstrated in the 1967 war, when it not only lost the West Bank but had its entire air force wiped out in the first day of combat. All
of these factors combine to make Jordan a highly defensive power, but Jordan's growing military weakness is also making it a threatened power, and this is the main motivation behind its current search for arms.

THE THREAT

Under its current government Israel projects an aggressive and threatening image to its neighbors. While recent tensions between Israel and Jordan have been limited, Israel has committed continuing violations of Jordanian territory. The military threat to Jordan diminished somewhat during 1974-1978, as a result of King Hussein's acceptance of the Rabat Summit decisions, and after Sadat's search for peace. This breathing space ended in 1979.

Israel has also presented a steadily rising threat because of the Israeli government's commitment to annexation of Jordan's occupied territories, and to a policy of aggressive deterrence. Such factors would undoubtedly seem less threatening to Jordan if Israel had not invaded the West Bank, and if the Israeli Army had not invaded Lebanon in 1982. In 1982, both the Israeli defense and foreign ministers increasingly referred to Jordan as a Palestinian state. "The Israeli foreign minister had also taken the unusual step of threatening Jordan that Israel will launch a pre-emptive strike if Jordan buys modern arms."(35)

Jordan feels that Israel is conducting economic and
social warfare against Jordan by dumping West Bank agricultural produce in Jordan's markets in ways which both destabilize Jordan's development and allow Israel quietly to dispose of its own agricultural surplus. It feels also that the Israeli government is putting pressure on the West Bank to force continuing immigration into Jordan at levels Jordan can not absorb and is forcing politically active people on the West Bank to leave for Jordan in an effort to weaken Jordan's domestic political unity.

Finally, just as Israel regards the Arab states outside its immediate region as potential threats, Jordan fears what could happen if a friendly regime on its borders should fall under pressure to a new radical regime.

**PRINCIPALS OF JORDAN'S POLICY**

Jordan continues to believe in the necessity of reaching a peaceful solution to the Middle East crisis. Such a solution must be based on the total withdrawal of Israel from the occupied Arab lands, especially Arab Jerusalem. In return, reasonable security guarantees acceptable to Israel and the other Arab states must be provided.

Any peaceful solution must be comprehensive. All immediate parties to the conflict, including Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), along with the U.S., the Soviet Union, and the European community, must participate in any solution within the
framework of the United Nations. The importance of the U.S. in the Middle East peace process is obvious. It can be an effective role if the U.S. acts as a superpower, not as a "full partner" in the negotiations as stipulated by the Camp David Accords. The continuing commitment of the U.S. as a full partner makes that country a party to the conflict rather than a neutral, honest broker."(36:13)

JORDAN CONSTRAINTS TO THE PEACE PROCESS

A number of political and military factors affect Jordan's role in the Middle East peace process and place the Kingdom in a precarious position, these include:

- Approval by the Saudi Arabia before Jordan can assume its full role in the peace process. Jordan does not want active Saudi support to enter the process, but it can not afford an actively and publicly negative Saudi Arabia.

- Possibility that Jordan would be isolated from the rest of the Arab world, just as Egypt was after Camp David, if the Kingdom takes part in the peace process without strong backing from other Arab states, especially the Gulf Cooperation Council states.

- Hamilton amendment language approved in the House Foreign Affairs Committee, named for Rep Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind), and a similar amendment in the Senate by Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass). The amendment, denies Jordan advanced aircraft, air defense equipment or other modern weapons unless the President certifies to Congress that Jordan is publicly committed to recognition of Israel and to
prompt entry into direct negotiations with Israel.

THE STORY OF THE 14 HAWK BATTERIES

In 1974, Jordan put priority upon the acquisition of an air defense system. The U.S. began negotiations with Jordan over improving its air defenses in November 1974. Jordan's original request was based on informal U.S. advice which indicated Jordan need for 21 self-propelled Improved Hawk batteries. As the negotiations proceeded, U.S. officials decided such a sale would be a threat to Israel. As a result, only 14 mobile Improved Hawk batteries were formally offered in April 1975. This offer, not coordinated with key members of Congress, was withdrawn in July 1975 as a result of Congressional pressure. The U.S. Congress was reluctant to make this offer available because of the opposition of Israel. King Hussein for the first time turned to the Soviet Union, visiting Moscow in June of 1976 to discuss the purchase of an air defense system. The gambit paid off, for neither Israel nor the Congress was willing to facilitate a Soviet inroad into such a strategically situated country. "After delays and Israeli lobby opposition in the U.S. Congress, Jordan won approval for only 14 Hawk batteries, and those could be obtained only if they were mounted in stationary positions in concrete, making them highly vulnerable to aerial strikes." (37:51)

THE SOVIET SAM-8 MISSILES

In 1981, Jordan asked the U.S. for air defense missiles
but encountered opposition to the move, and according to Dr. Henry Gaffrey, a senior official of the Defense Security Assistance Agency, the U.S. lacked the on-the-shelf items to send to Jordan on time. (38:66) Jordan then turned to the Soviet Union, purchasing 20 SAM-8 units as well as 16 ZSU-23-4 radar guided anti-aircraft batteries to show the U.S. that when the national security of Jordan is at risk, Jordan will do what it must. Pentagon officials knew in advance of Jordan's desire to purchase Soviet SAM-8 missiles, but did not protest because "Jordan needed the weapons to counter a neighboring threat and the U.S. lacked the ability to get an air defense equivalent to Jordan in time." (38:66)

**WHY F-16? AND WHAT ARE THE ALTERNATIVES?**

Jordan's acquisition of the F-16 would increase its maximum theoretical daily sortie rate. This would probably meet Jordan's goal of deterring neighboring countries by being able to inflict major losses during any major attack on Jordan's vital points and rear areas. The F-16 has a superiority in avionics and aids to the pilot that gives him a vast advantage in air-to-air and air-to-ground combat. This is particularly true under the extremely demanding conditions enforced by the time-distance problem in the area, and the very high densities of air combat. Jordan wants American arms because they are qualitatively superior to alternative weapons available elsewhere and because the American arms will be considered as a symbol of U.S. support
for Jordan. Alternative aircraft would include the French Mirage-2000, the British air defense variant of the Tornado, and the Soviet MIG-29.

**JORDAN'S REQUEST FOR ARMS**

The inferiority in land and air forces drive Jordan toward trying to improve its basic defense and deterrent capabilities. The years since the 1973 October War have seen a steady drop in Jordan's overall military capabilities relative to those of Israel, Egypt, and Syria. According to the latest data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Jordan had 20 percent of Israel's tank strength in 1974-75. Jordan has managed to preserve this percentage, but Israel's tanks are much more advanced than Jordan's. Jordan had 27 percent of Syria's tank strength after the October War, but it has only 20 percent in 1985. Although Jordan has increased its combat aircraft strength since 1973, it now has only 16 percent of Israel's strength and 16 percent of Syria's. Jordan fighters are now less competitive in terms of relative performance. This imbalance will continue to worsen relative to Israel, which has F-15 C/Ds and F-16 C/Ds on order.(39:3)

The shift in the regional balance is even more striking in terms of defense spending. The latest available Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) data covering 1972-1982, show that Jordan's defense expenditures increased by only 36 percent in constant 1981 dollars between 1972 and 1982. In contrast, Israel's expenditures increased by 92
percent and Syria's increased by an incredible 302 percent. The fighting in Lebanon has raised Israeli and Syrian defense expenditures and arms imports to the point where comparisons with Jordan are almost academic. Syria has recovered its equipment losses and gained practical combat experience while Israel has developed high technology weapons and highly trained combat forces. The issue for Jordan is not whether it can acquire an offensive capability, the issue is compensation for the military build-up of both Israel and Syria.

REAGAN ADMINISTRATION ACTION

Jordan has the key role in President Reagan's peace plan, which calls for self-government for Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza Strip in association with Jordan. The administration is believed to be using Jordan's interest in obtaining the F-16 or the Northrop F-20, the Raytheon Improved Hawk surface-to-air missile and the shoulder-fired Stinger air defense missile as a lever to win King Hussein's participation in the peace talks. After considerable agonising, the Reagan Administration has gathered its courage to seek a modest arms package for Jordan and, presumably, to go ahead with another cautious step in the peace process. The arms package would include 40 air defense fighters, 12 Improved Hawk fire units, 72 Stinger air defense systems, 300 AIM-9 air-to-air missiles, and 32 Bradley fighting vehicles.

Administration officials were concerned that pro-Israel
advocates in Congress might try to delete the 40 fighters from the proposed arms package. One analyst said that "the aircraft are the most controversial item, at the same time the planes have strong Administration support. Should they be cut, King Hussein is almost certain to reject the entire proposal." The Administration officials said "He is not going to settle for a quarter of a loaf from the U.S. at a time when he needs a real commitment." (39:306)

JUSTIFICATION FOR THE ARMS PACKAGE

The Administration notified Congress of its intent to sell Jordan about $1.9 billion worth of arms. It broke the package into three parts-- aircraft and air-to-air missiles, missiles for protection of ground forces, and armoured fighting vehicles. The sale of 40 advanced air defense fighter aircraft, will replace portions of Jordan's aging interceptor fleet of F-5s and maintain its capability to deter and counter present and projected regional threats to Jordanian airspace. The AIM-9P4 air-to-air missiles will provide the necessary armament for those aircraft. For protection of ground forces, the Pentagon was offering 12 Improved Hawk assault firing units, two AN/TSQ-73 Missile Minder systems, 222 I-Hawk missiles, 14 Improved Platoon Command Posts, 14 Improved Continuous Wave Acquisition Radars, all in a PIP(Product Improvement Program) III configuration. In addition, it was offering 224 vehicles, 72 Basic Stinger weapons and 32 missile reload rounds. The I-Hawk fire units and missiles would go far in redressing
longstanding deficiencies in Jordan's ground to air defense capabilities and permit employment of a missile defense with some degree of mobility to afford umbrella protection to ground forces. The same quantity of the Basic Stinger provides Jordan the ability to counter intruding aircraft that succeed in penetrating the interceptor force and I-Hawk missile batteries. Finally, 32 Bradley fighting vehicles will provide Jordan's scout and armoured cavalry units with a full-tracked, lightly armoured fighting vehicles for their reconnaissance and security missions.

CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO THE REQUEST

Senior members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee urged Secretary of State George Shultz to delay sending the proposed Jordanian arms package to Congress for clearance. Shultz responded by saying that "The President is determined to proceed and it would be a real setback to peace if Congress rejects the sale."(40:260)

With substantial majorities in both the House and Senate opposed to the Reagan Administration's proposed arms package for Jordan, the Senate voted 97 to 1, for a resolution deferring the sale until March 1, 1986, unless "direct and meaningful peace negotiations between Israel and Jordan are underway."(41:300) On March 1, 1986, direct negotiations between Jordan and Israel did not start, and Jordan's arms package was declared dead.
WHY CONGRESS OPPOSED THE SALE

Congress argued that Jordan's arm package would harm U.S. interests in the Middle East in the following manner:

1. It reduces the incentives for King Hussein to enter the peace process.

2. It escalates an already staggering arms race in the region and heightens the likelihood conflict.

3. Until King Hussein makes peace with Israel, a Jordanian arms buildup adds to the threat to the Jewish state.

4. It narrows Israel's margin of security and weakens the Peres government ability to take risks for peace.

5. It deepens Israel's dependence on West Bank facilities to ensure her security and it adds to the burden of Israel's economy.(42)

Arms to Jordan are dangerous to Israel because of geography which had made Israel especially vulnerable to attacks from Jordan. Israel's longest border is with Jordan. Although portions of heavy terrain along the Jordanian border are relatively inaccessible to ground forces, aircraft are unaffected by such limitations. Jordanian air bases are in close proximity to targets in Israel, ground attack aircraft are only 7 minutes away from Eilat (see Jordan map). These conditions make Jordan the state best positioned to spearhead a combined Arab attack against Israel, especially a surprise attack.
Arab states are now giving priority to strengthening their air forces, since they know that Israel must maintain air superiority in order to survive. Jordanian advanced aircraft should not be taken in isolation, since they will be qualitatively important additions to the overall Arab air threat array in a "reasonable worst case." The Syrians could provide the quantity while Jordan, using its sophisticated American aircraft and air defenses, provides the quality. Targets of attack could include Israeli air bases, command posts, early warning radars, mobilization centers for ground units, naval facilities, or other high priority and high valued targets, the loss of which could seriously affect Israeli combat capabilities.

Jordan case is an example of how a moderate Arab pro-Western state is denied by Congress to purchase American arms to ensure its national survival. What is infuriating for Jordan is that Congress attaches so many strings to arms sales to Jordan. Yet, after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Israel still received F-16s and the technology with which the Lavi fighter can be built.

It is this blanket refusal to sell sophisticated weapons that angers moderate Arab states most, even when the system in question is a defensive weapon. It is almost as if Congress actually wants the moderate Arab states to turn to the Soviet Union for arms, and in so doing, pushes them further away from political and military reliance on U.S..
DISCUSSION

In recent years, the U.S. has been responsible for the delivery of billions of dollars' worth of military equipment to the Middle East countries. Critics of the flow of arms to volatile and conflict-ridden areas such as the Middle East deplore U.S. policy asserting that it stimulates "arms races," raises the level of destruction when war breaks out, and, in any case, fails to achieve the goal of providing Washington with that much sought-after asset in diplomacy influence.

Jordan's case illustrated in microcosm some aspects of the contemporary politics of arms sales. Even though it has historically been dependent on the U.S. for military and economic assistance, it was unwilling to join direct peace negotiations with Israel, either at Camp David or in the subsequent negotiations on Palestinian autonomy. The Carter administration made repeated attempts to bring Jordan into the process, all to no avail. Jordan's objections were based upon the view that the framework was too limited for the negotiations to succeed and that they must include Syria, the PLO, and the Soviet Union under the auspices of the United Nations.

The U.S. Congress, under great pressure on its members
by the Israeli lobby, tied up any arms sales to Jordan with progress on a direct negotiation between Jordan and Israel. Jordan's refusal to enter the proposed direct negotiations underscored the limits of influence the U.S. had obtained with its arms sales, and left the door open for countries like France, U.K., and the Soviet Union to sell arms to Jordan or any other moderate Arab country in the Middle East, which could not meet its national security needs in the U.S.. Increasing congressional control on arms sales has given some countries, who are more than ready to take advantage of any opportunity afforded by the U.S., this opportunity.

Jordan's arms package has demonstrated the struggle for power between the executive branch and the legislative branch over arms sales to Middle East countries, and how U.S. domestic politics is affecting the outcome of U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. Congress should not be so naive to believe that such an action by the U.S. will be a deterrent to war, or even make an iota of difference in international relations as long as others are willing to fill the gap left by the U.S..

The recent Saudi decision to buy the British Tornado shows the road which Jordan could follow if it wishes to do so. Some would see this as an easy way out for the Administration, but it poses its own risks and problems. In particular it would mean a diminution of American influence
In the Middle East at a critical time. Jordan needed, and still needs, the arms to defend itself against any outside aggression on its territory. If it does not get them from the U.S., it has to follow the Saudi's action to get them from the Europeans or the Soviets, or even both. The outcome of Jordan's arms package will have a potential impact on the political alignment in the Middle East and on the prospects for peace, which far outweighs its impact on U.S. Congress-Executive relations or on bilateral U.S.-Jordan relations.

For moderate Arab countries, good relations with the U.S. executive branch is not enough. Channels with Congress have to be opened through well organized lobbying. Arab countries are new to lobbying Congress. They thought of lobbying as a direct interference in the internal affairs of the U.S., while Israel was more successful in lobbying due to the presence of six million American Jews. Israel's lobby has many offices in Washington D.C., and a grass-roots network with American Jews all over the U.S.. Saudi Arabia, together with American oil companies, made a lot of progress in lobbying for the AWACS deal. The oil companies, which once influenced host governments in behalf of U.S. views, are now trying to influence Washington in behalf of the oil states. Cultivation of American Arab voting power, financing of American Arab public affairs organizations, and building a good working relationship with mass media in the U.S. are some of the important techniques which could be
used to influence the Congress.

More effective than any other institution are the individual Arab governments and their representatives. They can mobilize a vast network of influential lawyers, public relations experts, political consultants, and a host of other specialists. Arab Ambassadors can make important regular trips to the Hill to meet privately with members of Congress. They can establish a long term relationship with Congress which can be cultivated to make the Arab point of view available when needed. Arab governments can extend invitations to members of Congress to visit Arab countries to acquaint them with the issue of national security, where they can see the geography, talk to professionals in military and political institutions and get first hand information. Such steps may urge a more even-handed U.S. Middle East policy.

Arab Information Centers in the U.S. can play a significant role in providing U.S. media with counterpoint information. They can buy ads in national and local U.S. television stations, and in national prestigious newspapers on behalf of their cause.

CONCLUSION

The Decision-making process in the American political environment is constrained by domestic political priorities, interest group influence, bipartisan relationships, mass
media and public opinion. American foreign policy in arms sales to Middle East countries can not be formulated without being influenced by all these factors. Congressional involvement in foreign policy matters is increasing, but most of the time, is at conflict with executive branch views.

For moderate Arab countries of the Middle East seeking to purchase American arms, Presidential approval is not the end. An active and organized lobbying effort is very important to pave the way for Congressional blessing. Such effort should be preceded by extensive cultivation of mass media, and continuous public relations campaign.

The Middle East is a central issue in U.S. foreign policy. The absence of peace in the Middle East constitutes a serious threat to the security of a region where, perhaps more than in any other area, significant U.S. interests--strategic, political, and economic--come together. The more arms sales requested by moderate Arabs, in the Middle East, are turned down by Congress, the less influence the U.S. will have in the Middle East, an area which the Soviet Union is ready to move into it when the time seems ripe to proceed.


Figure 21. Shares of world exports, 1966:

- 28.4% United States
- 11.5% France
- 5.1% Other Nations
- 4.8% West Germany
- 4.3% U.K.
- 13% All Other Suppliers
- 5.6% Other Regional Pact
- 0.3% Others
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