


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
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TRAINING OF THE AMERICAN SOLDIER DURING
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A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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ABSTRACT

TRAINING OF THE AMERICAN SOLDIER DURING WORLD WAR I AND WORLD WAR II, By Major Roger K. Spickelmier, USA, 158 pages.

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


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CHAPTER 1

BACKGROUND AND ORGANIZATION

INTRODUCTION

Of all the civilized states of Christendom, we are perhaps the least military, though not behind the foremost as a warlike one.

-Dennis Hart Mahan¹

Practically considered, then, the nation has no army in time of peace, though, when the clarion voice of war resounds through the land, the country throughout its vast extent becomes, if necessary, one bristling camp of armed men....It is a circumstance quite unique in character....it belongs to the genius of the American Republic....

-John A. Logan²

The United States entered the twentieth century with a tradition of isolation from European politics and with an army that was small and widely scattered at numerous frontier posts. Neither our domestic nor foreign policy had, until then, required a large permanent military establishment. But by the turn of the century the United States was beginning to realize its potential in both material resources and population. By 1890, the American frontier was settled, and the United States was among the leading industrial nations of the world with a population of 76,000,000 people (of which 39,000,000 were male).³ By 1900, the United States had established a colonial empire

in the Caribbean and Pacific and had defeated a European colonial power. The Spanish-American War was an expression of the country's new relationship to the other nations of the world and its implicit responsibility as a new world power. The United States, by the twentieth century, possessed the wealth and military potential that drew it into international political activity, whether desired or not.⁴ In its position as a world power, it was inevitable that the United States would be drawn into the century's two great wars. At the outset of both world wars, and without a tradition of a large military establishment, the United States was faced with the formidable task of creating a military force capable of assisting its allies in defeating Germany, considered in both wars to have the best army in the world.

Critical to the creation of an effective military force is training. The primary combat force during the wars of the twentieth century has been infantry and, as such, the basic training of infantry has been critical in the creation of twentieth century American armies. This study will examine the development of individual infantry training by the United States Army during both World War I and World War II in order to trace the evolution of training programs during each wartime period. The purpose of this study is to determine if individual infantry training practices, programs, and procedures of the United

States Army during World War II improved as a result of the experiences of World War I.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The United States Army, prior to its entry into the First World War, was essentially a constabulary force with little experience in large unit operations. The Army was kept small, normally less than 50,000 officers and men, and was scattered at small outposts throughout the country.⁵ Its primary purpose prior to entry into the First World War was to support civilian authorities in the maintenance of domestic order and disaster relief; guard the Mexican frontier against bandit incursions; and fight a counter-insurgency war in the newly won colony of the Philippines. As a result of the Spanish-American War, a number of improvements had been made in the organization of the Army, and limited planning had begun to facilitate mobilization, but the United States was not prepared for the First World War, especially in programs to train soldiers.⁶

At the outset of World War I, the Army was required to create a military force capable of functioning with the technologies and organizational concepts of the twentieth century. While the American Civil War was fought with much of the technology and the mass armies of later wars, it was during World War I that all of the basic weapons systems,

mobilization methods, and organizational principles used through World War II until today were employed.⁷ Following the American Civil War, the Army concentrated on immediate operational requirements, reduced in size and failed to keep up with the European nations in many technological and organizational improvements. Our future enemy, Germany, was considered, during the period after the Franco-Prussian War, to be the best military organization in the world.⁸ Of all the nations considered to be world powers at the beginning of the twentieth century, only Britain and the United States had not copied the German system of organization, manning and training.⁹ At the outset of the war the Army numbered only 213,557 officers and men, both Regulars and National Guard in federal service. To expand and train this army into an effective force eventually numbering 3,684,474, was a formidable task.¹⁰

Prior to World War I, the predominant philosophy within the United States Army for creating a large military force was the expansible army concept. First proposed by John C. Calhoun and later refined by COL Emory Upton, the expansible army concept was based upon a full organizational skeleton of a wartime force with a full complement of officers and non-commissioned officers. During war, the Army's enlisted strength was to be fleshed out by an influx of new recruits and the recall of reservists who had received rudimentary training during time of peace. Recruits and reservists were to be trained

and assimilated into units by the long term Regulars.¹¹ While proving impracticable in terms of the military requirements of the late nineteenth century and in terms of what the nation was prepared to support economically, the concept did have an effect upon training.¹² Inherent in the concept of an expansible army was the desire to train new recruits to the standards of discipline and skill characteristic of the Regular rather than depending on the enthusiastic, but undisciplined and unskilled volunteer. Equally important was the reliance on experienced soldiers to train the influx of recruits. Although mobilization programs during each World War did not provide the skeletal organizations advocated in the expansible army concept, they attempted to train the new recruit to the standards expected of the Regulars. The training programs of both World Wars also depended on Regulars, trained reservists, and experienced veterans to provide the training.¹³

The manpower for both World Wars was provided by the Selective Service system. The Selective Service Act of May, 1917, was developed after careful study of conscription during the Civil War and provided the broad outlines of the nation's wartime structure during the First World War. Based upon the division structure, there were to be three increments: The Regular Army, raised immediately to a wartime strength of 286,000; the National Guard, brought up to an authorized strength of 400,000; and a newly formed National Army, called the "Volunteer Army,"

made up of conscripts enrolled in 500,000 man increments.¹⁴ Even in the beginning, almost two-thirds of the Regular and National Guard divisions were made up of new recruits, while the National Army divisions were predominately conscripts. As the Regular Army and National Guard approached full strength, enlistments were discontinued, and the Army began to rely on conscription for the creation of new divisions and the replacement of losses in established divisions. As the war progressed and more replacements joined all divisions, differences among units lessened, resulting in orders on 7 August 1918 eliminating the what had become an artificial distinction and formally incorporating all units into the United States Army with a common administration and command.¹⁵ Selective Service in World War I made possible the expansion of the Army to an eventual enlisted strength of almost 3,470,000 out of a total strength of 3,685,458.¹⁶

Modeled on the May 1917 act, the Selective Service Bill of 16 September 1940, was passed in reaction to the events in Europe during 1939 and 1940. The initial effect of the 1940 bill, referred to as the "Draft," was to expand the Army of 172,000 into a force of 1,400,000, of which 500,000 were in the Regular Army, 270,000 in the National Guard, and 630,000 identified as the Army of the United States. Selective Service in World War II made possible the expansion of the Army to an eventual enlisted strength

strength of 7,300,000 out of a total strength of of almost 8,300,000.¹⁷

Finally, it is necessary to understand pertinent dissimilarities and similarities between the two wartime periods that indirectly affected the development of training programs. During much of the period prior to the United States' entry into World War I, President Wilson opposed any action which might be construed as preparing for war.¹⁸ Prior to our entry into World War II, however, President Roosevelt actively sought to mobilize both public opinion and the nation's military capacity.¹⁹ During World War I the Army began mobilization after the declaration of war, but World War II mobilization began a year prior to the nation's entry.²⁰ The Army entering the First World War had only the nucleus of a General Staff and was faced with the problem of mobilizing and training an unprecedented number of men for a European war with no previous experience in either.²¹ The Army entering the Second World War had a substantial staff organization, experience from the First World War, and the benefit of studies conducted during the interwar years.²²

A significant difference between the two World Wars, yet difficult to quantify in relation to training development, is the relationship of the United States to its allies. The United States was a late arrival in both wars, but during the First World War it was the allies who provided the bulk of the manpower, equipment, and

leadership for the total war effort. Even within the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), most of the equipment and supplies were provided by allies, and during certain phases of training it was common for American soldiers and units to operate under a French or British Division or Corps headquarters.²³ In contrast, during the Second World War, the United States was the dominant participant among the Allies on the Western Front after 1944 and provided the greatest number of soldiers, the vast majority of armaments, and, because of our contribution in resources, the dominant voice in policies and strategies.²⁴ Because of this greater contribution, the United States was much less susceptible, though not immune, to criticism from the Allies regarding the quality of our soldiers and our training programs.

Despite these dissimilarities, there were also many similarities between the two wartime periods which provide a basis for determining a logical evolution between World Wars. The Army had the advantage of building on the lessons of previous wars in both periods. The Spanish-American War and the United States' incursion into Mexico provided valuable experience in mobilization prior to the First World War. The Army of the Second World War benefitted from lessons of the First World War in meeting the requirements for massive mobilization and training. During the periods prior to the United States' entry into both wars, the Army had been reduced in manpower and had

not been provided modern weapons, resulting in the problem of accepting and training large numbers of new recruits without adequate cadre, facilities, or equipment.

The United States had instituted the Draft and had begun limited mobilization prior to the Second World War; nevertheless, the extent of full mobilization after entry into the War created problems similar to those of the First World War. Although the Army had the advantage of "lessons learned" in developing training programs for World War II, the magnitude of the mobilization during the Second World War resulted in problems in accepting, equipping, and assimilating new recruits as well as in providing replacements for losses to units overseas. And while the United States, being the dominant power among the allies, was more confident in developing its own programs, the Army was still sensitive to criticism by the allies in regard to the performance of American soldiers.

METHODOLOGY

To begin the study it is necessary to present assumptions and establish definitions to serve as a basis of understanding and to set parameters of what will be examined.

Assumptions

The primary assumption of this thesis is that training during each World War experienced a similar training life cycle. Each war began with an initial training concept aimed at preparing both individuals and units for combat. These initial concepts were transformed into initial training plans. After implementation of the initial training plans, dissatisfaction and experience led to significant modifications of the initial programs. As a result of these modifications, final programs were developed.

It is also assumed that the training of the infantryman is a reliable indicator of individual basic training program development. It is realized that other individual training, that of officers or specialists for example, was critical in the overall war effort, but the infantryman was the most numerous soldier and the primary combatant during both World Wars. The infantryman was the common denominator of each wartime period, and it was believed and practiced that every soldier was liable for duty as an infantryman. This is not intended to detract from individual training programs of other soldiers, many of which were more effective and experienced different problems than that of the infantryman but, rather, as a means of limiting the topic to be examined.

Definitions

Four terms must be understood initially for the purpose of this study: training, trainer, individual training and training life cycle. Training is the instruction and practice of required skills of both units and individuals, conducted in the preparation for combat.²⁵

The trainer is the officer or non-commissioned officer who provides the instruction.²⁶ Individual training is that instruction aimed at the development of individual soldier skills and may include instruction in small team or squad operations so as to better develop the ability of the individual to work as a member of a team.²⁷ Individual training is distinct from unit training which is that training conducted specifically to develop collective unit skills.²⁸ The training life cycle, as discussed before, is the three phases of training program development: initial training program, modification, and final training program. Other definitions will be provided as they are required in subsequent chapters or as they pertain to a specific topic.

Limitations and Delimitations

This study will concentrate on the training of the individual enlisted infantryman, consistent with the assumption that individual infantry training is an indicator of all individual training. This study will be

concerned with that training conducted during the two World Wars, after the beginning of mobilization. World War I mobilization is considered to have begun in April 1917 and World War II mobilization in the fall of 1940. For proper understanding of the background specific to each period, this study will briefly examine military policies and training conducted prior to the United States' entry into each war. This study will not examine specialist training or officer training, except as they may relate to individual enlisted soldier training.

ORGANIZATION

The study will examine the training of individual infantry soldiers in World War I and II. Chapters two and three will examine factors affecting the development of training programs, organizational responsibility for training, and program development through the training life cycle for each wartime period. After having established an understanding of each period's training programs, it will be demonstrated in Chapter three, that a logical evolution of training from World War I to World War II is evident. The study, furthermore, will demonstrate that training in World War II improved as a result of the experiences of World War I.

SIGNIFICANCE

World War I was the first of this nation's twentieth century wars and established many of the procedures used throughout subsequent wars. While technology and tactical doctrine change, certain training procedures and policies remain constant, or display a logical evolution. A knowledge of this evolution and its inherent improvement provides better understanding of the training philosophies of today and may be useful in developing future training.

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CHAPTER 2

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIVIDUAL TRAINING PROGRAMS DURING WORLD WAR I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to present the development of individual infantry training programs within the American Army during World War I. To accomplish this three areas will be addressed. First, factors affecting the development of individual training programs during the war will be studied. Next, the organization and responsibility within the Army for the development of training programs will be described. Finally, the actual development and evolution of individual training programs will be examined. These three areas will serve as a basis of comparison for individual infantry training development during World War II.

FACTORS AFFECTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIVIDUAL TRAINING PROGRAMS IN WORLD WAR I

Although numerous factors affected the experience of the United States during World War I, six were important in the development of individual training. The first, and most important factor was the Army's lack of preparedness.

The second was the nation's lack of experience in creating a modern twentieth century army. The third, due to the Army's lack of experience in creating a modern military force, was a disagreement on how to produce an effective soldier, specifically, the length of time required for training. The fourth factor was the requirement to provide American troops overseas earlier than had at first been expected. The fifth factor was disagreement over tactical doctrine, trench warfare as practiced by America's allies versus open warfare as espoused by GEN Pershing. And finally, the sixth factor was obstacles to the development and conduct of training: lack of housing, lack of equipment, and lack of opportunity.

Underlying all factors in training program development was the Army's unpreparedness for war, especially modern twentieth century war. While possessing the industrial capability and the population necessary for conducting such a war the War Department had completed little planning, and few systems for mobilization were in place prior to entry into the war. Prior to the war, the Army's total active federal service strength was only 213,557 officers and men. The Army was basically a constabulary force with only the rudimentary beginnings of a general staff.¹ There were no leaders or staffs experienced in directing large units or directing large training programs. To aggravate the problem, as the Army increased in size, the leaders with the most experience in

training soldiers moved up in rank and position, away from the actual conduct of individual training.²

So as not to overstate the case, it must be recognized that a primary reason for the Army's unpreparedness was little perceived threat to U.S. national interests and, therefore, little need to prepare. The Army did possess the foundation on which to create a modern military force. The post-Civil War Army is best characterized by reduced budgets and limited manpower, isolation of the Army at frontier posts, and rejection of the Army by society at large. During this period the Army tended toward introspection and internal concerns. This, along with the study of European armies, fostered the beginning of many of the institutions and policies which were to benefit the Army during the First World War, including extensive Army reform in organization and professional development.³

The second factor affecting the development of the individual training program during World War I was lack of experience. During World War I, all of the basic weapons systems and military organizational principles used throughout World War II until today were employed. The United States fought the American Civil War with rifled weapons, the telegraph, and railroads. However, World War I was the first war in which there was large scale use of rapid-fire, rifled weapons with smokeless powder; of wire and radio communications; of the internal combustion engine

for both ground transportation and combat vehicles; and of airplanes for both reconnaissance and combat.⁴ The United States fought the Civil War with massive armies which amounted to almost four million men for both the Union and Confederacy during the course of the war.⁵ In contrast, the American Army in World War I numbered almost four million men at its peak strength. The United States Army fought the Civil War with unit organizations, from battalion through corps, that were similar to those used today. But, staff organizations were small and undeveloped. A commander's staff normally consisted of personal aides and each commander was required to do his own planning and supervision. World War I saw the development of staffs from battalion through Army level, each responsible for planning and supervision in the name of the commander, similar in function and organization to today.

As the United States entered the First World War, the Army had benefited from the lessons of the Spanish-American War, counter-insurgency operations in the Philippines, and operations along and across the Mexican border. These operations provided valuable experience with mobilization and leadership of units above battalion level.⁶ But, it was in World War I that the United States first experienced the full development of a staff in the modern sense, from battalion through Army level; of a mass army in which all male citizens were liable for service;

and of the projection of this mass army overseas to fight. The technological improvement in weapons and communications meant an increased lethality of the modern battlefield over those of the past and the requirement for a large army led to conscription and force created new requirements in training. Hence, the Army was required to train a greater number of recruits than ever before in methods and technologies in which it had little, if any, experience.

The third factor, because of the Army's lack of experience in creating a modern military force, was disagreement over the length of time required to train a soldier. Experience and conventional military thought indicated that the inculcation of discipline and soldier skills was a long term process which required at least two years. Opposing this conventional thought, LTG Leonard Wood asserted that he could train a soldier in six months.⁷

Under practices followed by the Army prior to our entry into World War I, the inculcation of discipline and soldier skills was a long term process. Assimilation of a new recruit into a unit was accomplished through what is referred to today as "on the job training." The new soldier learned his duties and soldierly skills by performance of a task under the guidance of non-commissioned officers and by practice.⁸ Ideally, a new recruit would receive four months of rudimentary instruction in basic soldier skills in "companies of instruction" conducted at a recruit depot--David Island, NY

or Columbus Barracks, OH, for Infantry--before joining his unit. Training would be completed after arrival at his unit under the guidance of company officers and non-commissioned officers.⁹

In reality, however, problems in recruiting and implementation resulted in the ideal system being the exception rather than the rule. Recruiting problems arose primarily in regulating the flow of replacements. Ideally, replacements would be provided to a unit twice each year, enabling a unit to develop a program for acceptance and training of new soldiers in a systematic fashion. In reality, the flow of recruits was not as well regulated, and replacements joined a unit throughout the year, in response to unit needs and availability of enlistees, making the planning of unit individual training difficult.¹⁰ Actual practice also belied theory in implementation where fatigue detail, guard, and normal duties, rarely left enough men or time for conducting formal training.¹¹

In the period just prior to entry into the First World War, the basic instruction period was reduced from four months to 36 working days (approximately 6 weeks) in the belief that a shorter time at the recruit depot might enable better management of the replacement flow. Greater efforts were also made to provide replacements to units every six months. Training at the recruit depot was limited to basic military courtesy and drill and relied on

training conducted in the unit to develop more of the soldier's needed skills. Inspector General reports indicate that this system was meeting with only limited success.¹² With these detractors to effective training, it is understandable that experience prior to entry into World War I indicated that the training of an effective soldier was a long-term process. Furthermore, the practice of most European powers reinforced this belief.¹³

Opposing the conventional thought of the Army was LTG Leonard Wood, Army Chief of Staff from 1910 to 1914, who asserted that he could train a soldier in six months.¹⁴ While opposing conventional thought as to individual training time, Wood was in agreement with the military thought of his time in believing that the nation required the nucleus of a wartime army in time of peace to provide the organization and training of the citizen soldier in time of war. Wood believed that the most important military problem of the nation was to devise a means for the preparation of an army of citizen soldiers in order to meet the emergency of a modern war, and that the time required for training of this "extemporized" force depended primarily on the presence of qualified instructors. With trained instructors and sufficient arms and equipment, Wood contended that an effective army could be formed in six months.¹⁵

To take advantage of the "preparedness movement" occurring in the United States prior to entry into the war,

Wood developed the "Plattsburg idea." While Army Chief of Staff, Wood organized summer camps where college students could receive military training. In 1915, he expanded this idea by opening a camp at Plattsburg, New York, for business and professional men. These camps were only four weeks long and were paid for by private funds.¹⁶ Their primary purpose was to foster the enthusiasm for preparedness, although they had the collateral benefit of providing partial validation to Wood's premise that a citizen soldier could be trained in a relatively short period of time. The training was partial in that it provided only an exposure to the military and by itself was not accepted, even by Wood, as sufficient for modern war. The training was validated in that most of those who participated in the camps received commissions after entry into the war and performed in a very creditable manner, both in the training and operations of the World War I Army.¹⁷

The fourth factor in World War I training development was the requirement for early deployment of military forces. Many believed that the United States would not be required to send any actual combatants at all, and those who did foresee the requirement for American ground forces saw it taking place in the distant future.¹⁸ Many Americans agreed with the New York Morning Telegraph, in April 1917: "They don't need more warriors, they want money and food, and munitions of war."¹⁹ This belief was

consistent with a cable sent by Major James Logan, Jr., just one month before entry into the war, in which he stated that the French General Staff had "no particular interest in having American Troops in France."²⁰ Moreover, constitutional considerations appeared to preclude the deployment of the states' militia outside the United States.²¹ Of those who did envision the creation of an American Expeditionary Force, it was commonly held that the Army would require at least a full year, and preferably two, of preparation before American soldiers could be deployed to France in any appreciable numbers.²² And even if a large number of soldiers could be trained earlier, the lack of available shipping made it appear impossible to send American soldiers overseas in significant strength.²³

However, by June 1917, the first American division was in France. By the end of 1917 American strength in France reached 175,000 men and by the end of the war, just over eighteen months later, the AEF contained almost two million men.²⁴ The early deployment of the 1st Division was intended to raise the morale of allied soldiers who had been at war for almost three years and had recently suffered extensive casualties in the French Nivelle Offensive and the British offensives in Arras during April 1917.²⁵ Continued American deployment was a result of allied reverses during the fall of 1917 at Caporetto and Passchendale, and the Bolshevik revolution, which freed German troops from the east for use along the western

front. Acceleration of American deployment was a result of the German offensives in 1918. Allied reverses and the need for American troops gave urgency to the creation of an expanded American Army. The efficiency of the German offensives of 1918 gave incentive to the British to provide additional shipping for transport of the American Army.²⁶ The result of early deployment was the requirement to develop individual training programs both in the United States and France.

The fifth factor affecting the development of the World War I training program was disagreement over the tactical doctrines of trench versus open warfare. The European powers of the First World War had begun with a belief in open, or maneuver warfare. But, the machine gun and improved artillery increased the lethality of the battlefield and created a situation which tactically favored the defense. Initial operations on the Western Front had resulted in a tactical stalemate and the advent of what is referred to as trench warfare. After three years of war, the Allies had accepted trench warfare and trained accordingly. GEN Pershing believed that the allies had adjusted too well to what he considered to be the "abnormal stabilized warfare" of the trenches, and asserted that the key to victory over Germany lay in driving the enemy out of their trenches and defeating them in a war of maneuver.²⁷ Pershing's official instructions on the subject are significant:

Trench warfare gives prominence to the defensive as opposed to the offensive. To guard against this, the basis of instruction should be offensive, both in spirit and practice....All instruction must contemplate the assumption of a vigorous offensive; this purpose will be emphasized in every phase of training,²⁸ until it becomes a settled habit of thought.

From a tactical point of view, the method of combat in trench warfare presents a marked contrast to that employed in open warfare, and the attempt by assaulting infantry to use trench warfare methods in an open warfare combat,²⁹ will be successful only at great loss.

So as to not overstate this conflict, Pershing did recognize that basic instruction in trench warfare was necessary and did recognize the value of Allied experience. During the course of the war French and British instructors assisted in American training camps and both French and British commanders took responsibility for the initial training of American units.³⁰ But, throughout the training of World War I, Pershing continued to emphasize his belief in open warfare as the key to victory and to press for American training, under American instructors.³¹

The final factor, obstacles to training, affected the development, but more so the conduct, of training programs. Related to the factors of unpreparedness and inexperience, obstacles to training were the combined deficiencies in housing, equipment of war, and training opportunity.

In mid-March of 1917, planning began for building camps capable of housing up to one-million men. The Army had selected 32 camps (16 National Guard and 16 National Army) for training of the expanded force. The National Guard camps were to have platforms for tents, and the National Army camps were to have wooden barracks. By September, two thirds of the initial construction was complete with space for 400,000 men. The problem arose in the efficiency of the selective service system which provided 500,000 men in the fall of 1917. As the new recruits arrived, they found the camps in various stages of readiness with cramped conditions and incomplete buildings.³² Overall, however, cantonment construction was sufficient to meet the needs of the expanding military force. GEN Pershing, somewhat unfairly, criticized the construction program and blamed it for delaying training by six months.³³

The lack of the equipment of war--including arms, munitions, clothing, and tentage--had a greater and more long-term effect on training than the slow start in construction. The mobilization and deployment of the National Guard along the Mexican border prior to the war had depleted most of the existing military stores of the nation. Manufacturing in the United States that was producing war material was often tooled to foreign specifications (i.e. the British Lee-Enfield rifle). When the Army bureau chiefs were asked to provide an estimate as

to how long it would take to obtain supplies for a 1,000,000 man army, the Quartermaster General estimated 9 to 12 months to procure the required clothing. The Chief of Ordnance estimated 12 months for small arms but 18 months for machine guns and 30 months for artillery. The other department estimates ranged from 6 to 12 months. Compounding the problems of supply, no orders were placed for the expanded Army until May, 1917.³⁴

While these estimates were based upon peacetime procurement procedures, they are indicative of the supply situation during the the war. The result was that many soldiers did not see crew served weapons until they arrived in France. Hand grenades were so scarce that only officers and non-commissioned officers attending the hand grenade school had the opportunity to train with live grenades. The shortage of rifles made it necessary for many new recruits to drill with wooden stakes, and when rifles did become available, rush calls for a division to report for deployment prevented recruits from using their rifles in practice.³⁵ Shortages in weapons and armaments were made up, in part, by using Allied equipment, but quartermaster supplies could not always be filled as easily. There were serious shortages in uniform items such as O.D. breeches and coats, gloves, leggings, shoes, stockings, and shelter halves. These shortages affected the rate of mobilization, and subsequently the number of recruits available for training.³⁶

Compounding the problems of housing and equipping the Army was the lack of opportunity to train caused by weather and disease. The winter of 1917 was one of the harshest on record, and in conjunction with the primitive state of the cantonments, prevented or delayed the training of recruits. But more critical to training was the fight against disease. Measles, mumps, diarrhea, tuberculosis, smallpox, chicken pox, meningitis, typhoid, diphtheria and other diseases resulted in the deaths of between 17,000 to 19,000 men during the course of the war. Lessons of the Spanish-American War and good sanitation practices kept the disease rate low until the flu epidemic, which began during the winter of 1917, reached its peak. During the period mid-September to mid-October 1918, the flu epidemic affected over one-quarter of the Army. By November it had stopped all draft calls and practically halted training. While not having a direct effect upon operations in Europe, the flu epidemic did have an effect upon the development and conduct of training. In the final tally, 31% of the men who died in the Army during the war, died from disease in training camps.³⁷

Throughout U.S. participation in World War I, there was increasing pressure for what is termed amalgamation of American soldiers and units into Allied formations. The pressure for amalgamation resulted from increasing German activity which threatened to defeat the allies before American units, under American command, could be

effectively committed.³⁸ While the pressure for amalgamation may have increased Allied criticism of American training, and is a factor in Pershing's resolve to have a distinctive American Army, it did not directly affect the development of individual training, and is not considered a critical factor for purposes of this study.

These six factors--unpreparedness, inexperience, disagreement on the length of time required to train an effective soldier, the requirement for early deployment, ambivalence as to tactical doctrine, and obstacles to training--were interrelated and affected the development of training programs. Lack of experience in twentieth century warfare made it difficult to be properly prepared. Lack of experience and preparation meant that the Army was required to develop its training programs after entry into the war. In developing training programs, the Army had to consider the arguments for long-term training versus the requirements for manpower. Complicating the development of a training program was the requirement for early deployment of soldiers overseas. In the development of its training programs, the Army had to reconcile the realities of trench warfare with the predominant belief that open warfare was the method necessary for victory. And finally, the Army had to overcome the obstacles to training that were a result of our unpreparedness and inexperience.

In general terms, the Army was successful in its approach to these issues. The Army overcame its

inexperience and lack of preparation in time and reconciled, under pressure of early deployment, disagreement over the length of time necessary for training in favor of shorter term training.³⁹ As a result, the first American troops entered the trenches on 20 October 1917, only six months after the 1st Division was activated. By May of 1918, American units were taking an active role in the war at Cantigny (28 May 1918, with the 1st Division) and Chateau-Thierry and Belleau Wood (30 May to 17 June 1918, with the 2d and 3d Divisions).⁴⁰

More difficult to evaluate is the disagreement over tactical doctrine. The Americans trained in both trench and open warfare, which created confusion in the development of the training program.⁴¹ It is difficult to determine which doctrine of warfare was correct. When the Americans were taking their most active role in the war and attempting to apply the doctrine of open warfare, the Germans were in retreat and the war was coming to an end.

ORGANIZATION FOR TRAINING

During World War I, there was no single headquarters responsible for training, either in the development or the supervision of programs. The War Department oversaw the training conducted in the United States prior to shipment of units and soldiers overseas and the AEF supervised training after the unit or individual

arrived in France. This was due to lack of experience and the requirement for early deployment of forces overseas. Inexperience and unpreparedness were manifest in the Army's lack of a substantial general staff and the lack of comprehensive mobilization plans addressing the requirement to train a large influx of new soldiers. The requirement for early deployment of soldiers overseas disrupted any orderly, long-term preparation in the United States and resulted in the development of programs overseas designed to meet the immediate needs for both individual and unit training.

A major portion of the General Staff, prior to World War I, was in reality the Army War College. The War College was, in fact, the planning staff for the recently created office of Chief of Staff of the Army (1903); however, it was kept small, only nineteen officers, and had neither the influence nor scope of operations normally afforded a modern General Staff.⁴² As well as being small, the War College had to contend with the continuing power and influence of the bureau or department chiefs, who still exerted political and bureaucratic power. Small, and with limited influence, the War College had difficulty accomplishing the coordination with and among the various departments necessary for comprehensive planning.⁴³

The requirement for early deployment resulted in the arrival of GEN Pershing and the beginnings of the AEF staff in France in May, 1917, followed in June by the 1st

Division. GEN Pershing had been given unprecedented authority by the President. In the absence of specific instructions from the War Department or General Staff, Pershing set about developing the organization and training programs for preparation of the AEF for employment.⁴⁴ Using the French system as a model, he developed the General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces (GHQ,AEF) which would be critical in the development and supervision of training.⁴⁵ Moreover, using the 1st Division, he developed methods and procedures that would become the basis for all AEF training.⁴⁶

Both the War Department, through the General Staff, and GHQ,AEF made improvements in organization as the war progressed and experience increased. In the United States the Chief of Staff, GEN Peyton March, was able in May 1918 to establish authority over the bureau chiefs and expand and reorganize the General Staff into four divisions: Operations; Intelligence; Purchase, Storage, and Traffic; and War Plans.⁴⁷ Prior to the reorganization the War College Division had been concerned with war plans, training, and operations. Within the General Staff, Operations and War Plans shared the functions of the old War College Division with Operations assuming responsibility for training.⁴⁸ In France, General Pershing had initially organized his staff similar to the French with four divisions: G1, Personnel; G2, Intelligence; G3, Operations and Training; and G4, Logistics. Pershing later

expanded the GHQ,AEF to include a fifth division, G5, responsible for training.⁴⁹

By tradition, the War Department raised and equipped an army and the Commanding General became responsible for its organization, training and, when ready, its employment. Conceptually, World War I training did not depart from tradition. The War Department was to raise, organize and equip the expanded wartime army and provide rudimentary individual training in the United States. The army then would be shipped overseas for completion of its training under the guidance of the Commanding General of the AEF, GEN Pershing.⁵⁰ In practice, the completion of even rudimentary training was not always possible before deployment and GEN Pershing and GHQ,AEF were required to develop training programs for instruction in basic individual skills. Although influencing all training by virtue of his position, Pershing did not have direct control over the programs conducted in the United States. The result was a division of effort with the War Department responsible for individual training within the United States and GHQ,AEF the agency for both individual and unit training in France.

The division of responsibility between two headquarters, although not efficient, was effective for two important reasons. First, although the Army Chief of Staff was technically superior in rank to Pershing, the wartime chiefs considered it their duty to provide all the support

possible to Pershing and to allow Pershing to determine the training requirements.⁵¹ Second, the country was only fighting in one major theater of war, and all efforts could be aimed and tailored to support the needs of that theater.⁵²

DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTION OF WORLD WAR I INDIVIDUAL INFANTRY TRAINING

The development of the individual training programs of World War I evolved in three phases. The first phase was the development of initial training programs, both in the United States and France. Initial programs were based on the recruit training practices of the Army prior to its entry into the war and borrowed from the literature and practices of France and Britain. The second phase was the transition from the initial training programs to the final training programs. This transition was due to three factors: dissatisfaction with the content and quality of the initial programs; lessons learned in training and combat; and the need to provide individual replacements for combat losses. The third phase was the development of the final program. This last phase included the final individual training program to be conducted under the control of a division and the program to be conducted in replacement training centers. There are no distinct dates to identify the beginning and end of each phase. Initial programs were still being developed when dissatisfaction

was voiced over the quality of training, and modifications were still being made in the initial programs when the war ended.

Initial Training Programs

The individual training programs of World War I were developed by the War Department in the United States and by the AEF in France. The programs were similar in several respects. Both programs: (1) drew, in part, on past experience in recruit training; (2) borrowed freely from training literature and experience of the French and British; (3) depended initially on assistance from French and British instructors; (4) were imperfectly coordinated; and (5) were suggestive as opposed to directive (consistent with the idea that the division commander was responsible for the training of his unit). In addition, the program development in the United States was influenced by the experiences of the AEF and the desires of GEN Pershing.⁵³

Both past experience in recruit training and available training literature were inadequate to meet the demands of training a modern army. While a program for training in fundamental skills was conducted at recruit depots, this training had not been practiced on a large scale and was not evenly applied. Prior to entry into the war, the normal yearly requirement was for the training of only 4,000 recruits at nine depots.⁵⁴ As previously

mentioned, recruits did not always receive this basic training because of difficulties in replacement flow.⁵⁵

Furthermore, there were few officers or non-commissioned officers with experience in the recruit training program.

Related to this lack of experience was a shortage of standardized training literature. Prior to World War I there had been a minimal amount of activity in the development of training literature. Drill regulations were published at irregular intervals with infrequent revisions.⁵⁶ When the United States entered the war, the latest revision of Infantry Drill Regulations was published in 1911, and updating did not occur until 1918. Moreover, the field service and drill regulations gave guidance on what was to be accomplished but did not address specifics of setting up a program or conducting the training. Compounding an overall lack of development in training literature was a lack of standardization. Although the War Department was the agency responsible for all training literature, private publishers were not discouraged from providing training literature, with the only requirement being that they generally followed War Department policy.⁵⁷

Lacking experience in the development and conduct of training for a large army and similarly unprepared in providing the required training literature, the Army accepted the Allied offer of assistance. During the course of the war, 286 French and 487 British instructors assisted in American training. They were active in training camps,

in schools, and on staffs assisting in the design and development of training programs. In France, French and British divisions became sponsors of American divisions to assist in the development and conduct of the division training programs.⁵⁸ The Americans, through both the War Department and the AEF, borrowed freely from Allied training and tactical literature, and 55 training manuals of World War I are copies, or modifications of those already being used by either the French or British.⁵⁹

The initial program for individual infantry training in the United States prior to shipment overseas was prepared and published by the Army War College in August, 1917, under the title, "Infantry Training."⁶⁰ The purpose of this pamphlet was to provide instructions pertaining to the training of an infantry division and the establishment of division schools. It provided a detailed training program for the individual soldier but contained the caveat that "the responsibility for training the division rested solely with the division commander; therefore, the program was suggestive and advisory in character, to be adapted at the discretion of the division commander." Nevertheless, it continually stressed standardization in practice and application.⁶¹ Because this program will be used as a basis for comparison of the program developed in France and subsequent modifications, it is necessary to describe pertinent aspects of the program in some detail.

The 1917 program covered sixteen weeks and specified planned training of at least 36 hours each week, exclusive of additional training required for officers' and non-commissioned officers' schools and preparation. Sundays were non-training days and Wednesday and Saturday afternoons were normally kept open for recreation and athletics but available for make-up training or retraining as needed. The program was designed to be progressive so as to avoid unnecessary repetition yet condition the soldier to perform automatically, "out of habit."⁶²

The program⁶³ recognized that the training cycle might be interrupted and listed the following areas, in order of priority, as the minimum essential training:

1. Discipline.
2. Physical efficiency, including marching.
3. Combat efficiency, bayonet, rifle, and musketry.
4. Development of leadership.
5. Development of cohesive action, maneuver, liaison, etc.
6. Training in specialties.
7. Tactics in open warfare (platoon thru brigade).
8. Personal hygiene.
9. Entrenching.
10. Elementary principles of trench warfare.

Individual training⁶⁴ was further broken down into four levels of instruction:

1. Recruit instruction:

- a) Articles of war.
- b) Military discipline and courtesy.
- c) Arms, uniforms, and equipment.
- d) Personal hygiene and care of feet.⁶⁵
- e) School of the soldier⁶⁶
- f) School of the squad.
- g) Setting up exercises, recruit instruction.⁶⁷
- h) Orders for sentinels.

2. Squad instruction:

- a) Testing by the squad leader on the subjects taught in recruit instruction.
- b) Setting up exercises, trained soldier instruction.
- c) School of the squad.
- d) Tent pitching.
- e) Bayonet exercises and bayonet combat.⁶⁸
- f) Whistle and arm signals.
- g) Color sentinels, countersigns and paroles, complements from guards, guarding prisoners and flags.
- h) Sighting drills.
- i) Position and aiming drills.
- j) Making triangles.
- k) Target practice.
- l) Musketry duties of the squad, involving target designation, fire distribution, fire discipline, fire direction, and fire control.
- m) First aid to the wounded.
- n) Gas warfare: methods of employment, effects of gas, use and care of protective mask.

3. Platoon instruction:

- a) Tests by platoon leader on subjects taught by the squad leader.
- b) Close order drill.
- c) Drill in trench and open warfare.
- d) Musketry duties similar to those of squad to include range finding and communications.
- e) Entrenching.
- f) Individual cooking.
- g) Gas warfare: marching, fighting, and firing while in protective mask; prevention of damage to weapons and equipment due to gas; and use of sprayers and fans for clearing gas.

4. Company instruction:

- a) Tests on those subjects taught at squad and platoon level.
- b) School of the company, close order drill.
- c) Further training in trench warfare.
- d) Inspections.
- e) Guard duty, duties of commander, sergeant, and corporal of the guard. Mounting the guard.
- f) Physical Training and swimming.
- g) Musketry at company level, including all of training at platoon and squad level.
- h) Field service.
- i) Marching and camping.
- j) Target practice.

Also included in the instruction was training for infantry specialists--snipers, messengers, scouts, grenadiers, and liaison patrols. Infantry specialists were selected from the rifle companies and received additional specific training as opposed to other specialty arms such as cooks, signallers, clerks, etc.⁶⁹ Range firing and target practice time was restricted due to range and instructor availability, so it was not possible for everyone to fire at any range at one time. Firing was conducted by platoon, with non-firing platoons undergoing what is referred to today as concurrent training. Concurrent training stressed related musketry skills, trench warfare, gas warfare, and related infantry specialist skills. Beginning in the seventh week, night training was to be incorporated with other scheduled instruction. Training was to be conducted in accordance with the appropriate drill manual for the subject being taught. Initially, the drill manuals from 1911 were used but were superseded as new manuals, often copied from the Allies, became available.⁷⁰

The quality of training was a reflection of the instructors and most instructors were not much more knowledgeable than the soldiers they were teaching. Experienced officers and non-commissioned officers were thinly spread across the Army, and newly appointed officers and non-commissioned officers had received only limited training prior to their assignments with the incoming

recruits. To assist in preparing instructors, refresher classes were conducted each evening as was the planning and rehearsal of company instruction for the next day.⁷¹

The sixteen week program was restricted to individual, squad, platoon, and company training, except for two short periods of battalion training in the fifteenth and sixteenth weeks.⁷² For the purpose of this study, the sixteen weeks of individual through company level training will be considered to be predominately individual training. The breakdown of hours taught, by subject, is as follows:

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Hours</u> ⁷³
Recruit instruction.....	21
Discipline training (school of the squad through company).....	80
Physical training.....	59
Bayonet, exercise and combat.....	44
Theoretical (general subjects).....	15
First aid and hygiene.....	3
Marching.....	20
Guard duties (separate from recruit training).	3
Auto-rifle, grenades and bombs.....	29
Gas/Anti-gas warfare.....	14
Target practice/Musketry (48 hrs range fire)..	164
Specialty training (grenadier, messenger, etc)..	43
Open warfare.....	11
Trench warfare and obstacles.....	37
Unit maneuver (battalion level and above).....	13
Testing.....	20
Inspections (not included in 36 hr/wk guide)..	32

Development of the training program in France contained the problems of programs in the United States as well as problems unique to the AEF. Problems unique to the AEF stemmed from the requirement for early deployment. The 1st Division was the first American combat unit to arrive

in Europe. Its experience was to provide the basis for training of divisions arriving later in France. While later units trained under both French and British tutelage, it was the 1st Division, training with the French, which was most instrumental in the development of the AEF training program.⁷⁴

The 1st Division was formed in May, 1917, and arrived in France on 23 June. Although a regular division, between one-half to two-thirds of the division was made up of new recruits, many having received barely fundamental instruction while on shipboard enroute to France.⁷⁵ Initial training guidance to the division from the AEF was minimal, and the members of the division developed their preliminary training plans during the voyage to France. The principles guiding the initial plans included a belief that discipline and physical readiness were required for combat effectiveness. To develop discipline and physical fitness, the initial plans stressed drill, physical training, and marching. Later training memoranda also added emphasis on marksmanship. These three themes would be consistent throughout the training plans of the 1st Division and all subsequent divisions.⁷⁶

The division was trained in three phases: preliminary training, basic unit training, and advanced unit training. While all phases of division training included training of individual soldiers, it was the preliminary training phase that was specifically aimed at

training in individual basic skills, and of greatest importance to this study.⁷⁷

Most of the details of the first phase, preliminary training, were left to the discretion of the division and were designed to provide inexperienced soldiers with knowledge in basic military subjects. During this preliminary phase, the division was under the guidance of the French 47th Division for demonstration, instruction, and assistance in training program design. A problem arose, in that, the French had designed and proposed a program which presupposed a division already trained in the basics of combat. By accepting the French program, the division was required to plan and conduct its training in an attempt to satisfy both the French program and the need to conduct basic individual training simultaneously. The result was that the soldiers of the division would train with the French in the morning and try to make up the basics each afternoon, which satisfied neither GEN Pershing nor their French trainers completely.⁷⁸ A directive for Brigade and Regimental Commanders for the week of 6-25 August, 1917⁷⁹ is representative:

Training to be conducted with the French:

- Specialist training
- Grenade training
- Automatic rifle
- 37 MM gun
- Machine gun
- Extended order
- Communications and liaison
- Field works

Company level unit training

General training to be conducted by unit instructors, to emphasized:

- Physical training
- Bayonet
- Target practice
- Marching with full pack
- Close order drill

GEN Pershing was dissatisfied with the division's training for two reasons. First, he was displeased with the lack of proficiency the division was displaying, particularly in discipline and appearance. The 1st Division was representative of the entire Army, and its performance was the subject of constant scrutiny by the AEF staff and allied visitors. Second, Pershing desired a uniquely American Army, adhering to the tactical doctrine of offensive maneuver warfare. Pershing believed that the French program laid too much emphasis on defensive (trench) warfare. In response to Pershing's dissatisfaction, the AEF centralized the 1st Division's training on October 8, 1917, as enumerated below:

<u>Weeks one and two:</u>	<u>Hours</u> ⁸⁰
Individual instruction on weapons; rifle (including range practice), bayonet, grenades, auto-rifle, pistol.....	12
Specialist groups.....	6
Close order drill, platoon and company.....	6
Platoon in combat.....	6
Company in combat.....	24
Other skills, liaison, signalling.....	18

Weeks three and four:

Range practice, school of the platoon, extended order drill, scouting,.....	9
Close order drill, platoon and company.....	9
Exercise in trenches, company.....	6
Exercise in open warfare, company.....	6
Exercise in advance guard.....	6
Exercise in outpost duty.....	36

Weeks five through seven:

Range practice, school of the soldier through school of the company.....	17
Close order drill, platoon.....	8
Close order drill, company.....	25
Regimental exercise.....	48
Training in gas warfare.....	9

Weeks eight through ten:

Company drill and range practice.....	25
Brigade exercise.....	72

Weeks eleven through thirteen:

Company drill and range practice.....	30
Division exercise.....	78

Weeks fourteen through sixteen: determined by progress
in the preceding phases.

The program prescribed by Headquarters, AEF was designed to be progressive, building upon basic skill development. In addition, training continued to stress, through school of the soldier and rifle range practice, the basic principles discipline, physical stamina, and marksmanship. It must be noted that the 1st Division arrived in France with a large percentage of untrained recruits and needed to devote more efforts to basic soldier skills than later divisions. A comparison of the program prescribed for the AEF and that prescribed by the War Department indicates a greater emphasis on unit training in

the AEF program. This was consistent with the concept that the War Department would provide the initial, rudimentary training, and the AEF would direct the completion of an individual's training and direct the conduct of unit training prior to employment of the individual and his unit.

Modification

Having established the initial programs, the second phase in the training life cycle is modification. Unlike World War II, where significant modification can be linked to one event and a specific period, World War I training modifications began with the initial programs and proceeded until almost the end of the war. The reasons for the modification were conflict and confusion over tactical doctrine and its effect on training; dissatisfaction with the proficiency of units and individuals in conjunction with lessons of combat; and the requirement for individual replacements and their training after units began to sustain casualties as a result of combat. Of the greatest significance in both wars were the lessons of combat and the requirement for individual replacements.

The conflict in doctrine has been discussed at length. The effect of the conflict was to engender further pressure for change in the initial programs. Initial programs, because of American inexperience in designing

programs, borrowed heavily from the Allies and relied on Allied instructors for assistance. The Allied emphasis on trench warfare created a constant source of dissatisfaction for Pershing and was a factor in his desire for a separate and unique American training program. This conflict, the actual use of trench warfare at the front and Pershing's belief that open warfare was the means for achieving victory, would continue to be a source of confusion in the development of American training programs until the end of the war.⁸¹

Dissatisfaction with the proficiency of American soldiers resulted from three related circumstances: the dictum not to fail, the desire to measure up to allied standards, and the lessons of combat. The avoidance of failure was the first reason for Pershing's expressed dissatisfaction with proficiency. Pershing was the subject of severe criticism and pressure because of his reluctance to commit American soldiers to combat. His reluctance was born out of his desire that the Americans be assured of victory, both for national honor and Allied morale. In an effort to insure victory, Pershing retained final approval for the employment of American forces until he personally considered them ready or until the Allied situation was so dire that there was no other choice.

In addition to avoidance of failure, there was also Pershing's desire to measure up to allied standards of discipline and appearance so as to impress the allies with

the ability of the American Army. In this desire, Pershing directed that the standards of appearance and discipline be those of West Point and was dissatisfied when soldiers failed to meet those standards.⁸² As American units were employed, there were also the lessons and experiences of actual combat. Although most criticism of American performance, both internal and by the allies, was directed at the inexperience and failures in staff work and leadership, it was found that there were also deficiencies in soldier training. American soldiers were commended for their enthusiasm and bravery but in turn received criticism for failure to disperse and, again, for lack of discipline as measured by European standards.⁸³

The final impetus for modification of the individual training program was the requirement to provide individual replacements for combat losses. The replacement of individuals, for both combat and organizational losses, was possibly the Army's most unsuccessful program during the war. An effective system had not been established by the end of the war and continuing attempts to develop an adequate program created confusion, especially in the area of training.⁸⁴ In practice, no adequate system was devised. Nevertheless, through experimentation, a system was developed in theory.⁸⁵

Ideally, a depot brigade would be instituted for the purpose of receiving and classifying new recruits. Next, these new recruits would be distributed to

replacement depots and training centers. From replacement depots and training centers the men would then be sent to France where a two echelon system of base depots and advance depots was established. Base depots were to receive newcomers to the theater and distribute the men to meet the requirements of the advance depots. The advance depots would be filled from both the base depots and from the returning sick and wounded and, in turn, provide replacements to the combat divisions. In theory, each corps was to have six divisions: four combat divisions, one replacement division, and one depot division.⁸⁶

In practice, the system was not as effective. Late initiation of the replacement program and frequent enlargements of the total manpower requirements resulted in men being used to form new units who were intended as replacements. The requirement for immediate replacements also resulted in combat units, already formed but not yet committed, being stripped of men to provide fillers to replace combat losses of units already committed. For a new soldier the system was the most confusing. Initially, draftees were assigned to a depot brigade in the United States. From the depot brigade the men would move to training camps or to divisions being newly organized. These newly organized divisions would, in turn, provide men to other divisions and these divisions, in turn, to still other divisions.

Eventually, the men from the training camps and whole divisions would pass through the ports of embarkation to the ports of debarkation in France. From here, men from the replacement training camps went to depot divisions, special provisional depots, divisions designated for combat, or divisions designated to be broken up for further replacements. The newly arrived whole divisions would be designated for combat or as a replacement division.⁸⁷ The confusion of the replacement system resulted in many men receiving little, if any, training. Those receiving training would often lose effectiveness because of the loss of discipline and morale during the constant reshuffling. In practice, divisions were required to establish their own training programs for instruction of replacements in most fundamental soldier skills.⁸⁸

The Final Training Programs

The last phase of the training life cycle was the development and refinement of the final training programs. These programs were of two categories, training of new recruits and training of replacements entering a combat division. In the United States recruit training was conducted in training camps and in newly formed divisions. Ideally, all recruits participated in these programs but it must be recognized that, in practice, not all new soldiers

underwent the program, either in total or in part, due to problems identified earlier in the replacement system. The second program was that conducted by established divisions for training of replacement personnel. It was designed for the replacement who had completed recruit training, but again, the wide disparity in the training of recruits would affect how the division implemented its actual replacement training program. Replacement training within the divisions would be included in refresher training for veteran soldiers. Both categories of training programs demonstrate a response to the factors of modification.

New recruit training was conducted within the newly formed division or replacement training camps. The recruit training program was prescribed in Training Circular Number 5, "Infantry Training," prepared by the War College in August 1918. Administrative and implementing instructions are similar to the initial program of August 1917, with noticeable modification in the number of hours prescribed for various subjects. Apparent was an increase in recruit instruction and discipline training as well as an increase in the amount of time devoted to unit maneuvers for battalion level and above. The modified program contained an increase in the number of training hours to 39 hours each week, as compared to 36 hours in the initial program, but significant changes were due more to reallocating hours of instruction than on increasing the total hours of instruction. A comparison of the initial program, finally

adopted in August 1917, and the final program of 1918 is as follows:

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Number of Hours</u> ⁸⁹		<u>Difference</u>
	1917	1918	
Recruit training.....	21	30	+ 9
Discipline training:			
School of the soldier			
thru company.....	80	158	+78
Physical training.....	59	36	-23
Bayonet.....	44	32	-12
Theoretical (general subjects)...	15	16	+ 1
First aid and hygiene.....	3	12	+ 9
Marching.....	20	12	- 8
Guard duties.....	3	22	+19
Auto-rifle, grenades and bombs...	29	8	-21
Gas/Anti-gas warfare.....	14	10	- 4
Target practice/Musketry.....	164	78	-86
Infantry specialist training.....	43	6	-37
Open warfare(indiv/small unit)...	11	24	+13
Trench warfare(indiv/small unit).	37	12	-25
Unit maneuver, (Bn and above)....	13	156	+143
Testing.....	20	12	- 8
Inspections (over prescribed)....	32	24	-12

Unit maneuver would include all individual skills of gas, trench, and open warfare, but the exact breakdown was not prescribed in the training circular. The program prescribed was for both individual replacement training camps and newly formed divisions, with replacement training camps conducting training at company but not battalion level.⁹⁰

The training program conducted by the 1st Brigade, 1st Division in March 1918, provides an example of unit replacement and refresher training in France. The brigade was returning from seven weeks at the front and was accepting new replacements and incorporating lessons learned from duty at the front. This program, while not

specified by the AEF, is indicative of a program conducted by an experienced unit with a tradition of success. It was estimated that the brigade would have four weeks in which to conduct new recruit/refresher training, out of the front lines. Special instructions called for recruits and "indifferent soldiers" to be given additional training, as required. The 1st Brigade program directed the following:

<u>Week one</u>	<u>Hours</u> ⁹¹
Care of personnel and equipment.....	6
Marching.....	5
Physical training/Bayonet.....	5
School of the soldier through platoon.....	7
Infantry specialist training.....	3
Liaison and signalling.....	3
Target practice.....	8+
Inspections.....	3
Gas drill.....	3

Week two

Same as week one, except company training in close and extended order drill and trench warfare in place of 7 hours for school of the soldier through platoon.

Week three

Care of personnel and equipment.....	6
Marching.....	5
Physical training/Bayonet.....	5
Battalion in trench warfare exercise.....	3
Battalion in open warfare exercise.....	3
Patrolling.....	3
Inspection.....	3
Gas drill.....	3

Week four

Care of personnel and equipment.....	6
Marching.....	5
Physical training/Bayonet.....	5
Regimental exercise in trench warfare.....	4
Regimental exercise in open warfare.....	4
Infantry specialist training.....	2

Inspection.....	3
Gas drill.....	3

Using the brigade program as an indicator, it is seen that provisions for untrained recruits would be made by additional training. All soldiers, whether veterans or recruits, trained or untrained, would continue to practice basic soldier skills in a progressive program building upon mastery of the basics.

Training Aids

The extensive use of training aids benefited all aspects of training program development during World War I. To assist inexperienced trainers and promote standardization, the Army began the development of training aids on a scale surpassing any period prior to World War I. Again, borrowing freely from the French and British, the Army published 55 texts of various kinds and introduced hands on training aids and "mock-ups." An especially important training aid was the motion picture. Although they met with resistance from the War Department, movies of school of the soldier and squad were completed and being used in troop training. By the end of the war an entire series was produced under the heading, "The Training of the Soldier," ranging in subject matter from "Discipline and Courtesy" to more specific instructions in the firing of field guns.⁹²

CONCLUSION

The United States Army entered World War I with a tradition of isolation and no experience in highly technical mass warfare of the 20th century. The Army overcame its inexperience and achieved remarkable success in creating a military force and projecting this force to Europe to assist in defeating Germany. Vital to this success and key to creating a modern army, was training. The Army overcame unpreparedness, inexperience, and disagreement as to methods in the development of its training programs. But while most problems were addressed, not all were solved. Equipment shortages were subject to the quick fix, borrowing from Allies. American industry was just beginning to provide the required materials at the end of the war. Lack of opportunity to train was not solved, but was further aggravated by an inefficient replacement system. Without an efficient replacement system, the replacement training program could not be properly tested or proven. While the headquarters organization responsible for training was sufficient for the First World War, it remained to be seen if it would be effective for a conflict with more than one major theater.

Although the Army was reduced in size following the war, many of the lessons in training were not forgotten. During the interwar years, 1919-1940, the Army and Congress

took important steps, based upon the experiences of the First World War, to improve military preparedness and many of the lessons in training were incorporated into the Army planning.

CHAPTER TWO ENDNOTES

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8. Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regular: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891 (1973), pp. 24-26.
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37. Coffman, pp. 81-84.
38. Kennedy, pp. 170-178.
39. The War Department eventually decided that four months training in the United States was sufficient for infantrymen, prior to sending them to France where they would receive the remainder of their training under the guidance of the AEF. Wiegley, p. 374.
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- | | |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------|
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| Major General Tasker H. Bliss, | Sep 22, 1917-May 18, 1918 |
| General Peyton C. March, | May 19, 1918-Jun 30, 1920. |
- For further information see Weigley, pp. 380-381.
52. Pogue, pp. 81-82.

53. Willoughby, pp. 34-38; division commander's responsibilities in training are stressed in all training circulars and manuals used as reference throughout this study, first referenced in Infantry Drill Regulation (1911), p. 7, hereafter referred to as IDR (1911), throughout training literature to "Training Circular No. 23," (Sep, 1918), p. 4., hereafter referred to as TC 23 (1918).

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56. Virgil Ney, Evolution of the United States Army Field Manual (1966), pp. 55-71.

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59. Department of the Army, Historical Division, United States Army in World War I, 1917-1919 (1947), Vol 14, referred hereafter as DA, WWI, pp. 329-333.

60. Army War College, referred hereafter as AWC, "Infantry Training" (August 1917), referred hereafter as Inf Tng (1917).

61. AWC, p. 7.

62. AWC, pp. 8-10.

63. AWC, pp. 8-9.

64. AWC, pp. 13-15.

65. School of the soldier would be training given normally by the squad leader, aimed specifically at individual skills. School of the soldier might include such subjects as: wear of the uniform; military courtesies; proper positions of 'attention', 'parade rest', etc. Found WD, IDR (1911).

66. School of the squad was training given by the squad leader or platoon sergeant dealing with individual duties as part of the squad. Instruction might include: the squad in marching, the squad billets, etc. WD, IDR (1911).

67. Setting up exercises were a form of physical training and included the assembly of the physical training formation and the conduct of physical exercises. WD, IDR (1911).

68. Bayonet exercises were exercises where soldiers would practice with the bayonet assuming proper stance and positioning, not against an opponent. Bayonet combat was drill against either a training aid, simulating the enemy, or against other soldiers. Bayonet combat was borrowed from the Japanese, as observed during visits by American officers following the Russo-Japanese War, Larry I. Bland, ed. and Sharon R. Ritenour, The Papers of George Catlett Marshall: 1880-1939, The Soldierly Spirit (1981), Vol I, p. 89.

69. AWC, p. 15.

70. AWC, pp. 12-13; and DA, WWI, pp. 329-333.

71. AWC, p. 20.

72. AWC, p. 19.

73. AWC, p. 20-25.

74. Stone, p. 2.

75. Stone, pp. 9-10, cites MG Sibert, 1st Division Commander's estimate of one-half new recruits, while Weigley, p. 356, puts the size at two-third. Regardless, the division had a large percentage of new recruits.

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84. A detailed examination of the replacement system of the First World War is beyond the scope of this study. For thoughts prevalent immediately after the war, recommend AWC, Monograph No. 8, Study of Replacement Systems in the American Expeditionary Forces (1926).
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86. AWC, "Report of Committee No. 9," (Feb 1921), pp. 5-9.
87. AWC, "Report of subcommittee No. 5 of Committee No. 9," (Oct 1926), p. unmarked.
88. AWC, p. unmarked.
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91. World War Records, Volume XXI, 1st Brigade, 1st Division AEF. Memorandum, subject: Instruction and Training, 1st Brigade, March 13, 1918.
92. Kreidberg and Henry, pp. 289-290.

CHAPTER 3

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIVIDUAL TRAINING PROGRAMS DURING WORLD WAR II

INTRODUCTION: THE INTERWAR YEARS

...In the years between World War I and World War II little was done to maintain an adequate armed force in this Nation. During that period many persons in the executive and legislative branches of the Government, as well as in the military agencies, evidenced an attitude of complacency regarding our national defense. This same attitude also existed among large segments of the American people. Largely as a result of this attitude, congressional appropriations for the support of our national defense were reduced to a dangerous minimum during the 20-year period prior to World War II. This Nation should not again make the same costly error.¹

With the end of World War I, "the war to end all wars," most Americans desired a speedy demobilization and a return to "normalcy." By 1 January 1920, only 130,000 men remained in the Army for the occupation of Coblenz in Germany and normal peacetime duties.² Although most Americans and their representatives in Congress began to concentrate on domestic issues, there were those in the military and government who began work on the foundations for future military policy. Four actions during the interwar years had an effect upon the preparedness and training of the Army of World War II. The National Defense Act of 1920 instituted many Army reforms based upon the

experiences of World War I and established the basic structure of the Army during the interwar years. The Harbord Board, in 1921, proposed the organization and direction for a wartime Army and gave impetus to the idea of planning for war in time of peace. The Protective Mobilization Plans (PMPs) during the 1930's brought mobilization planning closer to reality and included effective Mobilization Training Programs (MTPs). Finally, the actions of President Roosevelt and the War Department during the late 1930's enabled the United States to begin restoration of its military strength in a progressive, gradually accelerating manner.³

Influenced by proposals of COL John McAuley Palmer, the National Defense Act of 1920 provided the legislative foundation for the Army of the interwar years and World War II. While not including all of Palmer's proposals, the act did establish the basis of the nation's defense on the citizen soldier and avoided the Uptonian concept of the skeletal army by emphasizing training within the reserve components. The Regular Army was limited to 280,000 men, backed by a 436,000 man citizens' army of the National Guard and Organized Reserve (the counterpart of the World War I National Army).⁴ The Regular Army units were to be as complete as possible so as to be capable of use in limited emergencies not requiring mobilization. The primary purpose of the Regulars during peace was to train

both the National Guard and Organized Reserve, which were to meet federal training standards.⁵ The new law established nine corps areas, responsible for administration and training, each containing one Regular division, two National Guard divisions, and three Organized Reserve divisions.⁶ The law also gave the service arms--infantry, cavalry, artillery, etc.--administrative headquarters in the War Department and charged them with development of doctrine and training for their particular branch.⁷

While the National Defense Act of 1920 set down the principles of defense establishment structure, it suffered in implementation. Although establishing a peacetime strength of 280,000 for the Regular Army, Congressional authorizations from 1921 until 1940 never exceeded 190,000.⁸ The National Guard rarely reached half the 435,000 man strength authorization because of limits in appropriations which reduced drill pay.⁹ The Organized Reserves enlisted strength was virtually nonexistent, and Congress would not appropriate money to permit periodic officer training.¹⁰ Furthermore, Army mobilization plans of the 1920's continued to emphasize manpower and use of a skeletal Regular Army as the basis for expansion regardless of the provisions of the 1920 National Defense Act to the contrary.¹¹

The National Defense Act of 1920 gave the General Staff a reasonable complement of officers and the responsibility for general planning but left unclear its proper organization. In 1921 a board under the direction of Major General James G. Harbord, Pershing's first chief of staff and later commander of the Services of Supply in the AEF, was formed to study the organization of the War Department General Staff. Harbord recommended, and Pershing (now Army Chief of Staff) accepted, that the General Staff be organized similar to that of the AEF of World War I. The staff was to be divided into five divisions: G1, Personnel; G2, Intelligence; G3, Operations and Training; G4, Supply; and WPD, the War Plans Division.¹² The G3 training and War Plans divisions would be important in the training of American soldiers for World War II and in the establishment of Army Ground Forces (AGF), the primary training agency of the war. The Harbord Board also proposed an Army organization, again based upon the AEF, for peacetime prepared for war. The Board proposed that a General Headquarters (GHQ) be established with four subordinate field armies in the United States. The Field Armies would supervise the organization and training of divisions, duties which were performed under the 1920 Act by the nine regional corps. Under the Harbord proposal, the Army would be organized for war in time of

peace and the establishment of a headquarters, such as the AEF, after mobilization would be unnecessary.¹³

The Army in the 1920's and early 1930's emphasized mobilization planning over strategic planning. As a result, a series of mobilization plans were developed in 1923, 1924, 1928, 1933, and 1936.¹⁴ The plans of the 1920's dealt primarily with manning and relied on a skeletal Regular Army as the basis for expansion and training. General Douglas MacArthur, Army Chief of Staff from 1930 to 1935, recognized the inability of a skeletal Regular Army to meet small emergencies. MacArthur directed planning to keep the Regular Army substantially intact and provide for an Instant Readiness Force (IRF). The IRF, made up of predominantly Regular troops, would be available for situations not requiring full mobilization. In the event of full mobilization, the IRF would be available for early commitment to allow time for an orderly, full mobilization. These changes were the basis of the Protective Mobilization Plan (PMP) of 1933.

MacArthur also recognized that mobilization planning did not address the problems of supply and the effects of technological improvements. He inaugurated the first of what was to be a series of "Six-Year Programs" for research and development, reequipping the Army, and addressing the problems of supply, thereby bringing planning closer to the actual requirements of

mobilization.¹⁵ In addition, MacArthur established the four field armies, proposed by Harbord, to bring the peacetime organization of the Army in line with the organization envisioned for training soldiers and conducting war. A General Headquarters to supervise the Field Armies was to be established during actual mobilization.¹⁶

While the plan initiated by MacArthur was more realistic than previous plans in its regard for available manpower and material, it was still highly theoretical.¹⁷ General Malin Craig, Army Chief of Staff from 1935 until 1939, directed a new PMP based upon actual Army strength and attainable goals in additional manpower and supply. Craig desired to maximize the limited resources available to provide the strongest possible force at the outset of the war. He also returned to the basic idea of the National Defense Act of 1920, that the Army must be ready to fight but must also be prepared to train recruits. Craig, furthermore, directed reductions in research and development to enable procurement of weapons and equipment needed at the time by the Army. It was his belief that the Army could not rely on systems that would take years to develop but must be prepared to fight as soon as possible with the equipment it had.¹⁸

Important elements of all PMPs were the developments of Mobilization Training Programs (MTPs) and

further study of the replacement system, to include replacement training. Based upon the experiences of World War I, training and replacement plans went into detail as to subjects to be taught and the design of training programs for newly formed units in an expanded army. Plans were also included for training of replacements for casualties after the war started as well as replacements and filler personnel for existing units.¹⁹

The main features of the final mobilization plans were as follows:²⁰

1. Units of the Regular Army would be brought to full strength.
2. The National Guard would be inducted into Federal Service and its units brought to full strength.
3. Units of the Organized Reserves would be activated, according to plan, as needed.
4. The training nucleus of each of these new units would be a cadre of officers and enlisted men drawn from existing units.
5. Fillers, to bring existing units to full strength and new cadre units to authorized strength, would be obtained by voluntary recruitment or draft, and, before assignment, be put through a basic training course in replacement training centers.²¹
6. Replacement Training Centers were to be set up and operated by corps area commanders under the supervision of

branch chiefs, except for "Branch Immaterial" centers operated by the War Department.

7. Officers for new units, in addition to cadre officers, would be drawn, for the most part, from the Officers Reserve Corps.

8. Preparation of tactical or combat units would be done by the field armies set up in 1932.

9. A General Headquarters, United States Army, would be activated to control the field armies.

It is difficult to determine when actual mobilization for World War II began. Rearmament began gradually, although 14 November 1938 can be identified as the first date that President Roosevelt laid out a proposal for the expansion of the Army. The President's proposal dealt mainly with the expansion of the Air Corps and was primarily concerned with equipment. The War Department worked for a balanced force expansion which was finally approved on 30 June 1939. The balanced expansion, although addressing personnel requirements, was also primarily equipment oriented, and manpower remained well below the strength authorized in the National Defense Act of 1920.²²

The war began in Europe on 1 September 1939 when Germany attacked Poland and England and France declared war on Germany. On 5 September 1939, President Roosevelt declared a national emergency and on 8 September directed limited increases in the Regular Army and National Guard

and authorized expansion of the officer corps by placing some reserve officers on extended active duty. Planning and authorizations provided for continued gradual increases in Regular Army manpower throughout the remainder of 1939 into 1940.²³ In July 1940, the Regular Army had a total enlisted strength of 264,118, including the 6000 Philippine Scouts, and an officers' corps of approximately 14,000.²⁴ The National Guard had an enlisted strength of 241,612 and an officer strength of 14,776.²⁵ Organized Reserve units existed only on paper but included a reservoir of officers numbering 104,228, mainly graduates of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) and Citizens Military Training Camps.²⁶

On 31 May 1940, the President requested authority from Congress to federalize the National Guard. The request was not intended for immediate mobilization but as a contingency which would permit partial mobilization as required by the situation and allow commitment of Guard units outside the United States. On 20 June 1940, a bill for peacetime selective service was introduced by Senator Edward R. Burke and Representative James W. Wadsworth and received generally favorable support from the Congress, public and press. On 27 August Congress gave the President the authority to call the National Guard and Reserve components to active duty for a period of twelve months, and on 16 September passed the Selective Training and

Service Act of 1940.²⁷ Both legislative actions limited the employment of forces to the western hemisphere or possessions and territories of the United States, but began the manpower mobilization which is the basis for the study of training and the purpose of this chapter. These actions resulted in the expansion of the Army to 1,455,565 by 30 June 1941.²⁸

Having established an understanding of actions during the interwar years which served as a basis for training development, this chapter will examine three areas in the development of individual infantry training during World War II. The first area will be factors affecting the development of training programs during World War II. The second area will be the organization of the agencies responsible for training development, specifically the establishment of the Army Ground Forces (AGF). The final area will be the actual development and evolution of individual infantry training programs. These three areas will serve as a basis of comparison to the individual infantry training development of World War I, presented earlier in chapter two.

FACTORS AFFECTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIVIDUAL TRAINING PROGRAMS IN WORLD WAR II

As in World War I, numerous factors affected the experience and performance of the United States Army. In

the development of training four factors were important: unpreparedness, inexperience, obstacles to training and, of greatest importance, early mobilization. Unpreparedness, inexperience, and obstacles to training were common factors to both wartime periods, although different in their scope and influence. Underlying all other factors was early mobilization, begun while the nation was technically at peace. Training development was greatly facilitated by this early mobilization which enabled the Army to correct many identified problems in training prior to the commitment of soldiers to combat.

Army preparedness at the beginning of World War II benefited as a result of developments during the interwar years. Since the end of World War I, an effective General Staff organization was established and realistic mobilization planning was accomplished. But, the most important action was the beginning of mobilization prior to hostilities.

As the result of the National Defense Act of 1920 and the Harbord Board proposals of 1921, the War Department and the Army had established the staff system with functional responsibilities that would oversee the national efforts during World War II.²⁹ The G3 of the Army General Staff was responsible for operations and the development and implementation of training for the active component, while the National Guard Bureau, working with the War

Department, provided direction for National Guard training. The War Plans division of the Army General Staff was responsible for planning for war in time of peace.

As mentioned, the planning during the interwar years emphasized mobilization and a critical element of mobilization was the development of Mobilization Training Programs.³⁰ During the interwar years there were mobilization Command Post Exercises (CPXs) as well as exercises, to evaluate the training readiness of the National Guard with the results used to refine the PMPs and MTPs.³¹ A test of these programs on the scale required by the war was not possible, and plans and implementation were not always in accord during the initial stages of the 1940 mobilization.³² Nevertheless, the mobilization of 1940, though not a total mobilization, was of a scale sufficient to identify most problems and to provide, if not solutions, at least an appreciation for future requirements. Although the country was technically at peace, the Army was receiving almost all it requested from Congress in appropriations and legislation, including the beginning of industrial mobilization.³³

Conversely, there were still areas in mobilization that had not been addressed or where effective solutions had not been developed during the interwar years. Many of these issues would continue to affect the war effort and training after mobilization, some well into the actual

conflict. For one thing, technology and its influence on tactical doctrine had been neglected to a large extent during the interwar years. While General MacArthur had directed a system of research and development in the "Six-Year Plans" to begin in 1934, budget appropriations were not adequate to meet the Army requests for even normal operations. The economic depression of the 1930's, coupled with the absence of an immediate threat to our national security, led the President to concentrate the resources of the nation on domestic affairs and Congress to forbid the spending of relief monies on munitions. General Craig, after 1935, further reduced what little monies were being used for research and development, emphasizing instead the proper equipping of the Army then in being.³⁴

Training and doctrine, while stressing mobility and maneuver, also failed to embrace the full extent of the advances in weapons technology. Entering World War II, the Army placed its reliance on the infantryman, trained and equipped essentially as the doughboy of World War I.³⁵ This is not intended to portray the Army as having no knowledge of technological advances and their effect upon warfare. There were a number of officers who were very aware of the changes in weapons and related doctrine and who advocated the modernization of our military forces. But lack of an immediate need and lack of congressional appropriations restricted developments to theory as opposed to large scale

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The status of training and personnel in the reserve components was another area of concern related to the Army's state of preparedness. Although training of the National Guard, under specified standards and in conjunction with the Regular Army, had been a provision of the National Defense Act of 1920, it was unrealistic to expect the Guard to meet the standards of the Regulars. The Guardsmen drilled forty-eight nights a year and participated in two weeks of field duty annually. Their equipment was even more outdated than that of the Regulars and in shorter supply.³⁷ The Guard had many officers and noncommissioned officers who lacked adequate training and others who were not adept in military skills or leadership. Others were overage in grade or physically unfit and had to be removed.³⁸ The Organized Reserve was almost nonexistent. There were no appropriations to allow the officers to train, and most continued military study only haphazardly. Without money for recruiting the enlisted strength dwindled to almost nothing.³⁹

Despite these areas of concern, the mobilization in 1940 enabled the Army to overcome many of its shortcomings and improved overall preparedness by the time of our entry into the war. Programs were begun, addressing both equipment and training shortcomings, through industrial and

manpower mobilization that would benefit the Army when it was actually at war. Most importantly, the planning and key legislation of the interwar period fostered the fundamental preparedness of the Army entering World War II.

Closely related to preparedness in all areas of mobilization, particularly training, is the level of experience. Entering World War II, the Army possessed a staff that while not experienced in actual war was experienced in procedures and operations. Lack of experience was at the lower levels, in the officers and noncommissioned officers responsible to supervise and conduct the training. Before 1939, units and soldiers of the Regular Army were, as in previous times of peace, assigned to widely scattered posts under organizations of regimental size or below. Until 1939, Army divisions existed only on paper, with limited opportunity to conduct large-scale exercises.⁴⁰ This situation, similar to pre-World War I, meant that few officers had experience in operations above division level, particularly in the development of division training programs. The Regular Army officer corps numbered only 14,000 prior to mobilization and did not have the benefit of combat experience such as the Philippines or Mexican incursion. The Regulars did, however, have experience in dealing with the citizen soldier through greater contact with the National Guard and work in the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC).⁴¹ Many of

the reserve component officers knew no more than the men they were to train. The problems with the Reserve Component officers and noncommissioned officers were addressed in the discussion on preparedness. As the Army had not kept pace in technological preparedness, the experience of the trainers was also deficient in new equipment and methods of employment.⁴²

While the Army was inexperienced at the trainer level, the expansion of the General Staff had produced officers who, if not experienced in the actual directing of a war effort, had experience at planning and staff procedures. Also, many studies of the World War I were conducted at the Command and Staff College and Army War College, which provided at least a substitute for actual experience. Through study and what experience was available many of the mistakes of the previous wartime period were avoided and early mobilization enabled correction of many of the problems that did arise. The mobilization of 1940 also allowed the trainers to gain experience necessary when the mobilization expanded after our entry into the war.

The third factor affecting development and conduct of training programs during World War II was the obstacles to training. Three areas constituted obstacles to training: training facilities, materiel, and personnel. The shortage of training facilities was overcome during the 1940-41 mobilization period. Materiel problems continued

into 1942 and to a lesser degree in 1943. But, personnel management, particularly personnel turbulence, was a constant problem throughout the wartime period.

Problems developed with the influx of new recruits in 1940 because of the failure to have reception stations established prior to the beginning of mobilization. Without recruit and replacement training centers already set up, it was necessary to assign the new men to Regular and National Guard units for their basic training. The result was that a unit was conducting advanced and basic training simultaneously. This short term solution caused a related problem in National Guard units where there was a shortage of qualified instructors to conduct the basic training.⁴³ Provisions for the establishment of training centers was begun with the first influx of new men, and the needed housing was available, and no longer an obstacle, by mid-1941.⁴⁴

A more serious problem, which lasted into 1943, was the shortage and obsolescence of equipment and material. Tables of Organization authorized improved and modern equipment, and regulations specified issue of about fifty percent of the authorized equipment for training. However, inspection reports through 1942 indicated severe shortfalls in what was actually available and what was available was often obsolete.⁴⁵ The shortfall and obsolescence was caused by industry not being capable of matching the rapid

expansion of the Army, competing demands with other services, and the President's "Lend-Lease" program that provided arms and other equipment to the allies.⁴⁶ These shortages of both equipment and ammunition were rectified generally by the end of 1942, although shortages of ammunition for late-model weapons continued into 1943.⁴⁷ As a solution, until the problem was rectified, the Army instituted a rotation system whereby successive groups of trainees used the same equipment. The Army also placed considerable emphasis on the maintenance of the equipment then on hand to prevent loss or deterioration, placed strict controls on ammunition, and encouraged improvisation and the use of training aids.⁴⁸

The most serious obstacle to effective training was personnel management, specifically personnel turbulence, which continued to plague Army training throughout the conduct of the war. Initially there were losses due to illness, injury, or unsuitability. The most constant reason for turbulence, though, was the competing demands within the Army for manpower. The demands came from the various programs calling for quality personnel to be assigned as cadre, or to the Air Corps, officer schools, specialist training, and Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP).⁴⁹ Turbulence became even more severe as replacements for combat losses became the Army's greatest manpower need. It was estimated by LTG Lesley McNair,

commander of the Army Ground Forces, that at one point after the Army had reached a strength of eight million men, fully two million were somewhere between units.⁵⁰ This turbulence affected some units more than others and resulted in uneven states of training between divisions. When personnel loss reached a certain point, it was necessary to begin training again at a lower level, sometimes returning to basic training.⁵¹ The greatest need was for infantry replacements and drew more from the rifle battalions than other specialties. Moreover, the demand for replacements emphasized intelligence and good character.⁵² Thus, infantry training suffered disproportionately from personnel turbulence and also experienced problems in the quality or adaptability of the people to be trained.

A distractor to training, but not actually an obstacle, was the expanding paper work load throughout the training organization. The situation was such that in 1942 a battalion commander wrote:

We are actually swamped by typed and mimeographed literature. More than 90% of it is utterly useless. Trite exhortations and repetition of much of the information found in field and technical manuals. Each general and special staff officer all the way down the line, tries to amplify and expand his own department. it would take me 6 to 8 hours a day to read and digest all the stuff that reaches this battalion. The Army and the Army corps are shoving it out by the ream, and this division shoves it on down...we have training programs, master schedules, weekly schedules, progress charts, and so on ad infinitum. I have had 6 clerks busy day and night since we received our typewriters. The field

manuals and the unit training program put out by GHQ are all we need to turn out a good battalion. But we don't have time to read the former, and the latter is so bastardized when the staffs get through changing that it is useless.⁵³

McNair eventually prepared a stinging letter on the subject; staff officers who tried to improve upon War Department manuals were rebuked; headquarters below division level were prohibited from publishing training literature; and division commanders and staffs were encouraged to use personal communication rather than written correspondence with subordinates. The results of these efforts were soon effective.⁵⁴

The final, and most important factor, was the positive effects of early mobilization. Early mobilization enabled the training of over 1,000,000 soldiers prior to formal entry into the war.⁵⁵ With a substantial number of soldiers already trained, the Army had sufficient manpower to meet initial deployment requirements.⁵⁶ Early mobilization and training also provided the time to begin work many problems such as shortages in material and trainers, and to be better prepared for the greater influx of conscripts after the actual entry into the war. Most significant was the experience gained in training during the year prior to the declaration of war.

One final concern deserves mention when examining factors affecting training, that of the extension of the draft of September 1940 and National Guard term of federal

service. If Congress did not extend the one year term on both programs, selectees would be discharged and the Guard would go home. In the event that the extension was not approved, the General Staff would have to have programs prepared for rebuilding the shattered Army. This concern barely escaped being a factor as Congress approved the extension, by a vote of 203 to 202 in the House, in August 1941.⁵⁷

The factors affecting training development and conduct during the Second World War were in some ways similar to the First World War. Many of the problems were overcome during the year of mobilization prior to our entry into the war but some continued into the latter stages. Personnel turbulence was the only continuing problem in which a workable solution had not been found when final victory was achieved in Europe. Possible solutions were begun, but the victory over Japan came before these systems could be proven.⁵⁸

ORGANIZATION FOR TRAINING

One of the most important considerations during mobilization was the development and supervision of training. In 1940 the G3 division, the agency of the General Staff responsible for training, was fully occupied with policy making and planning. Training inspections by

the G3 or other members of the General Staff were restricted in scope, and brief in duration. To provide proper supervision the War Department could either expand the G3 or establish a separate headquarters.⁵⁹

In response to recommendations by the Harbord Board in 1921, mobilization planning was based upon the establishment of a General Headquarters (GHQ) based upon the GHQ, AEF of World War I. Planning prior to 1940 was based upon the assumption that mobilization would be an all out sudden effort and that three or four months of intensive training would be conducted in the United States before the GHQ and the field forces were sent overseas for operations. But in 1940 the nation began to mobilize while still technically at peace. The GHQ was established in July, 1940 to oversee the training of the field forces until such time as they, GHQ and the field forces, were required overseas.⁶⁰ When created, GHQ had as its function only the supervision of training for tactical combat units, tactical units of the Air Corps (GHQ aviation), tactical units of the armored forces, coast defense units, and other miscellaneous GHQ reserves.⁶¹

In accordance with plans, General Marshall, as Army Chief of Staff, also assumed the position as commanding general of GHQ and the field forces. Marshall designated BG (later LTG) McNair as his chief of staff in the GHQ. Although Marshall remained concerned about training, the

demands of his other duties precluded an active role in GHQ, and McNair was given full operational direction of GHQ activities from the start. McNair established the policy in accord with traditional Army planning that training was to be progressive and the most important foundation for all training was good basic individual training.⁶²

GHQ and McNair encountered problems almost at once, stemming from the confused command and staff relationship between GHQ and the armies, corps areas, Air Corps, and General Staff. To clarify the relationship, McNair recommended that an operational theater, similar in responsibilities and authority to a combat theater, be established in the Zone of the Interior, within the United States, and that the established corps areas be limited to purely administrative functions. McNair's recommendations were only partially implemented in October 1940. GHQ was not given administrative or logistical authority in the zone of the interior; moreover, corps area commanders remained under the War Department. As a result, for the first year GHQ remained an extension of the G3 division rather than command headquarters over tactical forces within the zone of the interior.⁶³

In 1941, the War Department was becoming more involved with the tremendous amount of work connected with mobilization. The need to delegate some of the workload of the War Department and the apparent imminence of war led to

an expansion of GHQ, more similar to the original plan based upon the AEF. On 3 July 1941, GHQ was formally given authority to plan and command military operations in addition to its responsibility to supervise ground forces training. While the War Plans Division would prepare strategic plans, GHQ would be responsible for implementation and execution. To cope with the combined missions of training and operations the GHQ staff was reorganized and expanded.⁶⁴

Even with this expansion in size and mission, GHQ never fulfilled the original concept based upon GHQ, AEF. There continued to be an overlap with the War Department in the area of command authority. The War Department General Staff was unwilling to allow the independence that GHQ requested and would not yield on control of administrative and logistic support that GHQ felt was necessary. When the Air Corps attained effective autonomy in June 1941 it, in particular, was outside GHQ authority. Without control of logistics or air support, planning was difficult if not impossible.⁶⁵ It became apparent that action would have to be taken to solve the confused staff-command situation among the General Staff, GHQ, and the Air Forces.

Under the reorganization the War Department in March 1942, the General Staff resumed direction of all defense commands and theaters of operation (part of the planning function that had been delegated to GHQ).

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
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
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planning and supervision of operations reverted to the War Plans Division (renamed Operations and Planning Division). GHQ, as such, ceased to exist. In addition, three zones of the interior commands were created, to which the General Staff delegated operating duties connected with logistics, organization, administration, and training. The three commands were the Army Air Forces (AAF), the Services of Supply (SOS), and the Army Ground Forces (AGF). The Army Ground Forces was responsible for all training in the United States and were assigned: all combat arms--less Engineers and Signal; the new quasi-arms (Military Police, Military Intelligence, Chemical Corps, etc); and the functions of the chiefs of service branches or arms--whose offices were abolished. McNair, whose primary concern had always been training, was chosen to command the AGF.⁶⁶

The efforts and achievements of the Army Ground Forces are praiseworthy. Divisions never lacked for guidance. The AGF adequately defined tasks which were to be trained, conditions under which the training was to take place, and the standards by which training was to be measured. Units knew what was expected of them and how they were to achieve it.⁶⁷ Through the use of air travel, staff officers and inspection teams visited one training camp after another. While in World War I inspection visits in the United States were rare, a division training during World War II could expect the corps commander and the

commander of AGF to visit at least each quarter. Their visits prompted even more visits by senior staff officers.⁶⁸ By their clear guidance and constant visits the commander and staff of the AGF insured quality and standardization in training that was to benefit the entire war effort. Furthermore, having one headquarters responsible for training insured unity of effort in training and allowed for flexibility necessary to fight a war in multiple theaters of operation.

DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTION OF WORLD WAR II INDIVIDUAL INFANTRY TRAINING

Development of individual infantry training during World War II, followed a cycle similar to that of World War I. Initially, training was conducted in accordance with Mobilization Training Programs (MTPs) developed during the interwar years. Standardized Army Subject Schedules further detailed procedures and methods to be used for each subject taught. The second phase in the cycle was analysis and modification of the initial MTPs, partly as a result of experience in training, but more so in response to lessons learned in combat and comments from commanders in the field. The final phase of training was the development and refinement of final MTPs and Subject Schedules, incorporating the lessons learned from combat. Unique to World War II, the final phase also included major

modifications to address the change in strategic emphasis from fighting in the European war to fighting in the Pacific.

Coincident with, but not strictly correspondent to, this cycle were three phases of implementation in providing individual training. Upon initial mobilization in late 1940, individual training was provided primarily through Replacement Training Centers (RTCs). After the declaration of war, and full mobilization, individual training was provided within newly formed divisions. And finally, as the war progressed and the army neared its 90 division level, individual training began to shift back to the RTCs. It is important to understand the development of the RTCs and division training and their contributions to individual training. But, in both the RTCs and division training the specifics of individual training were primarily set forth in the MTPs and Subject Schedules and were similar in subjects taught and hours allotted in both RTCs and division individual training. The remainder of this chapter will first describe training in RTCs and divisions and then examine the three phases or cycles in training development--initial training programs, modification and final training programs.

Training in RTCs and Divisions

In early 1940 the General and Special Service Schools, designed for advanced and specialist training of key personnel, were the only organizations then in place with the specific function to provide individual training. Basic military training for all soldiers was the responsibility of units. In 1940, in accordance with mobilization plans, the Army began the establishment of special training organizations; known as Replacement Training Centers (RTCs). The purpose of these training centers was to rotate citizen soldiers through successive cycles of individual basic and basic specialist training. Training centers were to provide a steady flow of trained men to tactical units, relieving the units of the responsibility to conduct individual training and enabling the units to concentrate on combat readiness, even when experiencing heavy losses. By March 1941, twelve centers were established, with four centers devoted specifically to infantry training. Through 1941, these centers trained over 200,000 men for the Army ground arms.⁶⁹ By the end of 1941, 36 divisions were activated, of which 29 were infantry (10 Regular Army, 18 National Guard, and 1 Army of the United States).⁷⁰

After Pearl Harbor, the RTCs were not expanded and therefore did not possess sufficient capacity to provide

both filler replacements for newly activated divisions and loss replacements for units already in training or units engaged in combat. Instead, RTCs functioned as training centers to provide for loss replacements, cadre, and cadre replacements. Filler replacements for newly activated units were provided from reception centers and basic training became part of a unit's overall training responsibility.⁷¹ In 1942 and 1943, 55 additional divisions were activated, of which 38 were infantry, for a total of 91 divisions, 67 of which were infantry.⁷²

From the beginning, AGF placed great importance on unit integrity and training as a member of a team. With this philosophy AGF resisted the mass production of individuals and small units at training centers. But, casualties in 1943 and 1944, particularly among infantrymen, exceeded the capability of RTCs and resulted in newer low-priority divisions becoming, in effect, replacement training units. The related personnel turbulence associated with the call for replacements was addressed earlier in the chapter and essentially prevented some divisions from reaching an acceptable level of combat readiness.⁷³

Various methods were attempted to satisfy the requirements for overseas loss replacements. The RTC training programs were shortened, but this led to a decline in the quality of replacements. An attempt at branch

immaterial training was conducted, but it was found that branch immaterial training did not provide the skills necessary for specialist replacements nor did it provide adequately trained infantrymen. Retraining of soldiers in overstrength specialties was tried but it was found that, with few exceptions, the soldiers identified for retraining were of noticeably lower quality than those not selected for retraining. The solutions were the use of lower priority divisions as replacement training units and the expansion of the RTC system, to include a form of advanced individual training.⁷⁴ From mid-1943 until the end of the war, as loss replacement became the major concern of the AGF, the greatest emphasis was given to individual training programs. During the this final period, the program development of the RTCs provide an indicator of the individual training development with divisions in training generally following programs developed in the RTCs.⁷⁵

Initial Training Programs

Replacement training centers trained newly inducted enlisted men in basic military subjects and in elementary specialist techniques of the arm to which they were assigned. Before the nation's entry into the war their primary function was to supply filler replacements. Only individual training was conducted, with team training being

the responsibility of the gaining tactical unit. Training was standardized to allow tactical units a common foundation on which to design advanced training. Instruction was centralized to enable maximum use of a limited number of experienced trainers and permit inexperienced instructors to concentrate on a limited number of subjects. All men within an RTC company were trained for identical jobs. This specialization of training allowed cadre instructors to concentrate on a single broad type of instruction which was a favorable compromise between the special service school instructor who taught only specific subjects and the tactical unit trainer who was to be essentially a "jack-of-all-trades."⁷⁶

Training centers were organized with reference to instruction rather than tactical function. A center normally consisted of the center headquarters and a number of training units. Training units were organized by regiment, battalion, and company. The center headquarters performed most of the administrative duties, and the training units emphasized the actual conduct of training. Trainees were assigned to companies based on their specialty, e.g., rifleman, and companies were grouped within battalions and regiments providing like training. Normally four companies made up a battalion and four battalions a regiment. The rifle training company, for example, consisted of four platoons, each of four squads.

Each rifle training company was assigned a permanent trainer group of six officers and 30 enlisted cadre. Eighteen of the enlisted cadre and all officers were instructors. Cadre in training companies were stabilized in their assignments for normally a minimum of one year. Two hundred forty trainees were assigned to a rifle training company which resulted in a trainer to trainee ratio of 1:10.⁷⁷

Mobilization Training Programs (MTPs), developed by chiefs of arms in 1940 and refined by GHQ in 1941, were used as a general guide to training with Subject Schedules providing specific details as to instruction. Infantry training was 13 weeks in length, with five weeks devoted to basic infantry instruction and eight weeks to infantry specialist instruction. Specialty training was begun early in the cycle to permit the formation of habits, and some basic subjects such as drill and physical training were continued throughout the cycle.⁷⁸

Training in RTCs was conducted by either the company cadre or by committee. Subjects requiring close supervision, or having opportunity for the development of leadership or discipline, were taught by company cadre. Examples of company instruction included close order or extended drill, physical training, marching and bivouac, and inspections. Subjects that were more technical in nature, required pooling of resources, or coordination of

facilities were taught by committees, set up by battalions or regiments on a part time basis. Examples of battalion committee instruction included map reading, hand grenades, mortars, machine-gun firing, and engineer techniques. Examples of regimental committee instruction included chemical warfare training, tactical exercises, and battle courses. Permanent training committees were established by the training center when resources and facilities were particularly scarce. The permanent committees gave standardized instruction to large numbers of trainees from all units on a continuing basis, for example in rifle ranges. Other training center committees were used to conduct training inspections and supervise instruction presented by companies or battalions.⁷⁹

Overall, organization of RTCs simplified planning and scheduling of instruction since only one type of training was conducted within a company. Facilities, equipment and instructors could be centralized for major subjects, and supervision was simplified by a single set of standards and requirements. Administration was facilitated as was uniformity of instruction and economy in instructor overhead.⁸⁰

As with training provided by RTCs, division training bore certain characteristic features. Infantry divisions activated prior to November 1942 followed a training schedule published by GHQ in February 1942. The

training period of 44 weeks was divided into three definite phases--individual training, unit training, and combined arms training. Individual training was set at 17 weeks with four weeks allowed for organization and receipt of filler personnel and 13 weeks for actual training. Training was conducted in accordance with MTPs. The new training plan included the requirement for schools for the trainers, officers and noncommissioned officers. These schools were conducted concurrently with other activities and had as their primary purpose refreshing the trainers on subjects they were to teach in the immediate future. The schools were normally held at night to prepare trainers for their duties of the following day and stressed methods of instruction, leadership, technical proficiency, and practical exercises. At the end of the individual training period the entire division underwent testing as prescribed by the MTPs.⁸¹

In November 1942, AGF (established in March) issued a training directive to combine all training guidance heretofore published by GHQ and AGF. This directive was to be the "directive to end all training directives." The overall training cycle for divisions was reduced to 35 weeks, with individual training being reduced to 13 weeks. It was believed that experience gained in programs thus far and acceleration of the draft would enable training to begin immediately upon activation. Training of divisions

hereafter would remain relatively stable with only minor alterations.⁸² The 13-week basic training phase was allotted to individual and small-unit training up to battalion level. With the MTP as a guide, this period was further divided into three phases. The first month concentrated on basic subjects such as military courtesy, discipline, sanitation, first aid, map reading, individual tactics and drill. The premise was that the individual must first learn to be a soldier before learning a specialty. After the first month, the emphasis shifted to specialty training with infantrymen concentrating on physical conditioning, obstacle courses, bayonet courses, rifle ranges, and grenade courses. The principle of learning by doing was the standard method of instruction during this period. During the last month of the basic period, training began to have more of a tactical emphasis with infantrymen undergoing various weapons qualification courses and learning individual duties in squad exercises. The last few days of the basic period were spent in review and MTP testing, given by the corps or army commander.⁸³

During this same period, 1942-1943, RTCs followed a similar basic training program. Also based upon the MTPs, four to five weeks were devoted to common basic soldier skills, similar to the first month of the division program, after which soldiers continued with a program designed for their specialty. Since each RTC was designed to provide

specific specialty training, there was a problem with standardization of instruction among specialties. But, within a specialty, such as infantry, instruction was standardized to an acceptable degree.⁸⁴

Through refinement brought about by experience in training and limited experience in combat during 1942, AGF published the MTP for October with a listing of common subjects for both RTCs and newly activated divisions. The listing of standardized subjects and time allotted was as follows:

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Hours</u> ⁸⁵
Military courtesy and discipline, Articles of war... ⁸⁶	6
Orientation course.....	7
Military sanitation, first aid, and sex hygiene.....	10
Defense against chemical attacks,.....	12
Practice marches and bivouacs (minimum).....	20
Dismounted drill.....	20
Equipment, clothing, and tent pitching.....	7
Interior guard duty.....	4
Field fortifications and camouflage.....	8
Elementary map reading (minimum).....	8
Physical training (minimum).....	36
Inspections.....	18
Protection of military information.....	3
Organization of the Army.....	1

The listing specifies those subjects to be taught during the first five weeks of RTC and division individual training. The remaining eight weeks of RTC and individual training would be devoted to specialty training. For infantrymen this would be technically oriented dealing with their specific duties such as riflemen, mortarmen, or

machine gunners. The listed schedule is the result of limited experience in combat during 1942, but the major pressure for modification of training would come in 1943.

Modification of Training

From 1943 until the end of the war there began a shift in manpower focus from creating new divisions to supplying replacements for combat losses. Initially, quality was emphasized to insure that replacements overseas were properly trained. As combat intensified after 1943, quantity was emphasized, to enable units to maintain their strength and continue combat.⁸⁷ In response, AGF Headquarters kept close watch on battle performance of ground units in the combat theaters through observer teams in the theater, interviews with unit commanders, and interviews with participants returning from overseas. Important lessons from these reports and interviews were used to prepare letters for subordinate commanders training new divisions and to revise and redesign programs for training centers.⁸⁸

The North African campaign, begun in November 1942, was the first large scale operation requiring a significant number of individual replacements.⁸⁹ North Africa also provided the opportunity to examine wartime expansion training from which lessons could be learned to prepare for

the invasion of Europe. It was reported that many of the replacements arriving in North Africa had not completed the prescribed thirteen weeks of basic training, had never fired their assigned weapons, were improperly equipped, and were physically unfit.⁹⁰ There were also reports of disciplinary cases being "unloaded" by units in the United States.⁽⁹¹⁾ In response, LTG McNair directed observers in North Africa to look into the situation, determine causes, and recommend possible remedies.

Among the problems found were misconceptions by commanders and administrative shortcomings in the system that were not the fault of the AGF but would, nevertheless, lead to improvements in individual training. One of the first things the observers found was a misconception by commanders on how much training replacements had actually received. When questioned, soldiers often answered that they had received only four to five weeks of basic training. In fact, soldiers had received the thirteen weeks, prescribed by the MTPs, but had spent much of the time during the final weeks of the training learning their particular specialties.⁹²

Administratively, specialties were not always considered when assigning replacements within the theater. Men were selected for duties based upon appearance and the impression they made on a commander. With this misassignment without regard to specialty (what today is

referred to as MOS mismatch), it is understandable that many soldiers were unfamiliar with their required duties, as well as the weapon they were required to operate.⁹³

Compounding the problem was the experience of replacements enroute to the theater of operations. Shipped as individuals, without unit organization or strong leadership, they were moved from one agency to another--depot to port, transit to receiving depot, and then to a myriad of intermediate agencies within the theater. Often spending months in transit, replacements became physically soft, discipline slackened and skills eroded.⁹⁴

Although not the fault of the AGF training program, the quality of replacements began to shed doubt on the adequacy of individual training.⁹⁵ Many in the Army, supported by some on the AGF staff, believed that replacements should receive more than thirteen weeks of training and that training should also place more emphasis on team work and cohesion. It was recommended by The Committee on Revision of the Military Program and the G3 of the General Staff that training be increased to six months and that training divisions be established in which officer and enlisted replacements would train and deploy together as a unit.⁹⁶

This proposal presented four dilemmas for the AGF. To lengthen the training time in replacement centers,

especially to six months, would require a significant increase in training center capacity and unacceptable cost. To lengthen the training time in replacement centers would also result in an initial decrease in the number of replacements from the centers as trainees began the longer training cycle. A decrease in the number of replacements from training centers would require new divisions then in training to provide even more replacements for units overseas and further aggravate the personnel turbulence problem. And finally, unit commanders overseas wanted only lower ranking enlisted replacements, preferring to replace positions in the chain of command through promotions or inter-unit transfers.⁹⁷

Believing that the problems experienced in North Africa were caused mainly by misassignment and other administrative faults in regulating the replacement flow, the AGF successfully resisted the proposals to extend training in centers to six months and form training divisions. However, the individual program was increased, at first to 14 weeks and later to 17 weeks, and modified to incorporate small unit training and many of the lessons learned in combat.⁹⁸

Lessons learned, as reported by interviews with commanders and observer reports, pointed out that field training was one of the major weaknesses among replacements. Assuming that after a trainee had learned his

required skills he could master them under field conditions, most trainees had not been tested under field conditions. In response to the identified weakness, a three day field period was included in replacement center training in March 1943. The period included a 20-mile march, squad and platoon exercises, and overall field discipline. As further lessons were analyzed, it was recognized that combat firing, night fighting, mine removal, patrolling, infiltration, and physical hardening also required improvement. BG John M. Lentz, G3 AGF noted "after all, [replacements] are supposed to go straight into battle. Cables from overseas state they are not ready....If the purpose is to fit men for battle--why should not replacements be exposed to actual physical hardships?"⁹⁹ Lentz recommended the field period be increased to two-weeks and an extension of the overall program to 14 weeks.¹⁰⁰ The 14 week program was approved on 11 June 1943, and included a 10 day field period which included night marches, patrolling, combat firing, and battle courses.¹⁰¹

The problem of tactical small unit training was more difficult. Replacement training had originally been designed to provide only individual training, with unit training the responsibility of the gaining division. With the shift in emphasis to replacement of combat losses, the need for some type of tactical unit training became

apparent. Criticism from the field on the insufficiency of unit training created pressure to train replacements in some size of regularly organized unit. While it was recognized that the team in which a soldier normally trained was the squad, AGF incorrectly construed the requirement to be for company tactical training. In July 1943, AGF directed training centers to conduct field problems from "a company point of view" and extended the training cycle to 17 weeks.¹⁰²

Within the divisions training under AGF, improvements in programs of individual training corresponded to those of the training centers. While most divisions by this time had completed their individual training phases, improvements in individual training were incorporated in unit training and added as an additional phase after unit maneuvers.¹⁰³ The training prescribed by the 1943, MTP 7-3, Individual Infantry Training, applicable to both RTCs and divisions, is enumerated below:

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Hours</u> ¹⁰⁴
Organization of the army	2
Military courtesy and discipline.....	5
Military sanitation and first aid.....	3
Equipment, clothing, tent, pitching.....	4
Interior guard.....	4
Chemical warfare.....	6
Combat and counter-intelligence.....	5
Protection against carelessness.....	2
Physical training.....	36
Dismounted drill.....	20
Map reading and land navigation.....	8
Inspections.....	18
Bayonet.....	16

Extended order drill.....	6
Marches.....	24
Antitank and antipersonnel mines and booby traps.....	8
Hand grenades.....	8
Operation of patrols.....	40
Tactics of the rifle squad and platoon.....	82
Tactical training of the individual soldier..	20
Concealment and camouflage.....	4
Hasty fortifications.....	4
Scouts, observers, and messengers..	8
Practice and qualification.....	4
Battle courses (mental conditioning).....	10
Automatic rifle.....	36
Mechanical training.....	8
Firing at field targets.....	8
Practice and qualification.....	20
Aircraft recognition.....	4
Company tactical training.....	44
Light machine gun.....	48
Mortar, 60-mm.....	42
Rifle marksmanship.....	126

Included in infantry specialty training were:

Tactics of the light machine gun squad and section.....	34
Tactics of the 60-mm mortar squad and section.....	34

Under the modified program two important ingredients were added, increased realism and increased supervision. On 4 December 1943, Lentz wrote:

Combat firing...is our major weakness. It is the one phase about which I am discouraged...Officers with years of background and peacetime safety concern simply will not cut loose with realistic combat firing as a general thing. There are so many flags and umpires and control they no more resemble a battle field than a kindergarten. 105

In November 1942, AGF began a consistent emphasis on providing realism in training. Comparing current obstacle courses to gymnasiums they encouraged division commanders and RTCs to design courses that resembled actual

battlefields.¹⁰⁶ On 4 February 1943, AGF issued a lengthy letter directing the conduct of close combat courses, designed to "teach men to fire small arms with speed and accuracy at surprise targets while negotiating broken terrain," and directed the use of rough, wire-traversed terrain, with explosives going off, and targets appearing suddenly at unexpected locations. The purpose was to subject the trainee to every sight, sound, and sensation of the battle and to train him to perform regardless of the noise, confusion, and surprise.¹⁰⁷ In February 1944, AGF directed commanders of divisions in training and RTCs to loosen the control to which firing exercises had been subjected. Umpires and safety officers were ordered to permit advances of trainees in uneven lines as on the battlefield, to restrict the use of flags, and in advanced training, to eliminate them altogether. Ammunition in unprecedented amounts was made available to support the new program.¹⁰⁸

Coupled with increased realism was an increase in AGF supervision. In a report to the War Department in response to criticism of initial training, AGF unjustly faulted itself for deficiencies in supervision.¹⁰⁹ In reaction, inspections became more thorough and more frequent. New tests were prepared and old tests were revised to provide a better check on the quality and progress of training.¹¹⁰

The Final Training Programs

The final individual infantry training programs were developed during 1944 and 1945 in response to changes in quantitative and qualitative requirements of the combat theaters. No substantial changes were made in training center organization although there was an attempt at common branch immaterial training. The European theater requirements in numbers and skills determined the direction of changes until April 1945. After April 1945 replacement training and training within non-deployed divisions began to focus on the peculiar needs of the Pacific theater.¹¹¹

Replacements trained under the 17 week program began to arrive in Europe during the spring of 1944. While better trained than earlier replacements in basic skills, they still did not meet expectations in regard to unit training. The problem appeared to be in the level of unit training. Overseas commanders and AGF observers reported that company tactical training was too advanced for replacements and that the time spent on company training would be better used in more "basic" instruction.¹¹²

Although some commanders did believe there was value in company level tactical training, most recommended that the time should be spent on squad and platoon exercises.¹¹³ In May 1944 the War Department G3 reported to McNair that

reports it received from the field indicated the importance of squad and platoon training but suggested company training be reduced or eliminated.¹¹⁴ The War Department also asked AGF for comments on elimination of company tactics and aircraft recognition (found to be of lesser importance as the allies gained air superiority) to enable more time for training in mines, booby traps, weapons, and individual tactical training.¹¹⁵

In response to its own observations, and coinciding with the concern of the War Department, AGF was already in the process of making significant revisions in the MTPs. Under the changes initiated by AGF, aircraft recognition and company tactics were eliminated and replaced by mental conditioning under artillery fire, and additional hours on basic skills. As the revision progressed from May until July of 1944, more subjects were eliminated or reduced and a number of lesser subjects were combined or taught concurrently with critical skills. Some subjects were reoriented and renamed to portray what was actually required of the individual soldier. The comparison of MTP 7-3 of 9 December 1943 and 4 November 1944 is as follows:

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Hours</u>	
	1943 ¹¹⁶	1944 ¹¹⁷
Organization of the army.....	2	c
Organization of the battalion and regiment.....	0	2
Military courtesy and discipline.....	5	a
Military sanitation and first aid.....	3	3
Equipment, clothing, tent pitching.....	4	a

Interior guard.....	4	4
Chemical warfare.....	6	6
Combat and counter-intelligence.....	5	c
Prisoners of war, protection of military information, censorship...	0	2
Protection against carelessness.....	2	a
Physical training.....	36	36
Dismounted drill.....	20	20
Extended order drill.....	6	8
Map reading and land navigation.....	8	8
Inspections.....	18	18
Bayonet.....	16	20
Marches.....	24	28
Mines and booby traps.....	8	18
Hand grenades.....	8	12
Operation of patrols.....	40	48
Tactics of the squad and platoon.....	82	94
Tactical training of the individual....	20	31
Battle courses (mental conditioning)...	10	12
Automatic rifle.....	36	48
Light machine gun.....	48	62
Mortar, 60-mm.....	42	60
Rifle marksmanship.....	126	103
Aircraft recognition.....	4	e
Company tactical training.....	40	e

Included in infantry specialty training were:

Tactics of the light machine gun squad and section.....	34	20
Tactics of the 60-mm mortar squad and section.....	34	20

a--combined with other training
c--changed in orientation
e--eliminated

Under the 1944 MTP, training was in conformity to the needs of the overseas commanders, tactical training emphasized squad and platoon, and nonessential subjects were eliminated. It was generally agreed that this was the best program and produced the highest quality replacement.¹¹⁸

Individual training within units overseas was not a major factor in the development of World War II training programs. Without the requirement for early deployment, as

in World War I, there was no requirement to develop simultaneous programs for the units overseas and in the United States, and the AGF was the sole agency responsible for training development. Also, without the requirement for early deployment, most soldiers completed their individual training before embarkation, and there was no requirement for extensive basic training of replacements. Training conducted overseas was generally refresher training for veterans or training to update lessons learned from combat.

In July 1944, LTG Lesley McNair was killed while he visited the front in Normandy. LTG Ben Lear acted as Commander AGF until February 1945, when General Joseph Stillwell assumed the duties. Also at this time, demands for replacements, particularly infantry replacements increased as the Army entered the continent of Europe. To fill the demand, Branch Immaterial Training (BIT) was instituted for the period August 1944 until March 1945. BIT was essentially a modification of the 1944 MTP, with basic instruction given during the first six weeks and specialist training the last 11 weeks. The purpose behind BIT was not to shorten training but to permit greater flexibility in meeting replacement requirements. It was difficult to forecast requirements five months in the future, as was necessary with the branch training. Under BIT, individuals would complete basic training and then be identified 11

weeks before the completion of training as a specific specialty replacement. It was determined that the administrative advantage in flexibility did not justify the administrative problems in transferring individuals between training organizations or the disruption in training the transfer entailed. BIT was discontinued 17 March 1945.¹¹⁹

The final revisions of the MTPs began in March 1945 to meet two conditions: the special characteristics of war in the Pacific and the replacement of losses. Combat in the Pacific emphasized demolitions, flame throwers, assaults against pillboxes, and different small unit tactics. Hence, these areas as well as prevention and control of jungle diseases were added to instruction and compensatory reductions were made in other areas.¹²⁰

Loss replacement was more complicated as it now had to meet the demands of combat losses as well as losses due to personnel rotation. Recognizing the effects of too long a time in combat, the Army instituted a point system in 1944, whereby a soldier earned points for time spent in a combat unit. A combat infantry man upon completing 200 days of combat was eligible for non-combat duty for six months, with the option of serving in the United States. Many of the soldiers in units due to be redeployed from Europe to the Pacific had exceeded their 200 days and would not remain with their units during redeployment. Replacement requirements from 1943 to the summer of 1945

were for entry level soldiers, and the system evolved to provide them. With the loss of experienced soldiers, replacements would have to fill positions for which they had not been trained.¹²¹ Fortunately, the war in the Pacific ended before this became a major problem.

Training Aids

The training literature, methods of instruction and instructional aids used during World War II greatly enhanced the overall training effort. The use of these aids in training compensated for inexperience on the part of trainers by providing instruction to the trainer through literature and prescribed methods of instruction. The trainee benefited from the better prepared trainer and from the understanding provided by training aids.

By 1930, four types of training publications were prepared and issued: (1) training regulations--prepared by each branch and similar to Army Regulations; (2) technical regulations--pamphlets dealing with technical subjects or equipment, similar to today's Technical Manuals (TMs); (3) training manuals--pamphlets containing instructional material on military and nonmilitary subjects, similar to training regulations; and (4) field manuals--pamphlets and books prepared by each branch, similar to today's Field Manuals (FMs). During the 1930's there were frequent

revisions of all training publications and a substantial increase in new publications, addressing new equipment and organizations. To simplify the resulting confusion, training regulations were incorporated into revised and expanded field manuals in 1938. As further improvements were made in weapons and changes were completed in organization, revised field manuals were published in 1940.¹²² In order to stay current, manuals were revised throughout the war by the service schools, the Command and General Staff School and War Department General Staff. To control the quality, but not the volume, revisions followed a standardized format and were edited by the AGF.

Methods of instruction developed by the Army were based on the principles of: (1) preparation; (2) explanation; (3) demonstration; (4) application; and (5) examination. It was a system of learning by doing and proved effective in the mass production of soldiers.¹²³ Training centers produced instructors who became experts in their general fields and accomplished at training new recruits. RTCs established special schools to teach instructors and conducted cadre training between training cycles.¹²⁴ Unit training was accompanied by the principles of training adequately spelled out in manuals and regulations, with Subject Schedules providing ready made lesson plans for most topics. Testing was conducted both during and after each phase of training and provided a

reliable gauge as to the ability of the soldier and the instructor. The quality of instruction improved as new officers and noncommissioned officers became more experienced, as the lessons learned from combat were incorporated into instruction, and as training became more free of peacetime safety constraints.¹²⁵

Corresponding with improvements in literature and methods of instruction was the use of training aids. During the interwar years the Army and its branch schools had developed the use of charts, films, slides, film-strips, sand tables, mock-ups, models, pictures, and other devices to assist instructors. During the war these aids were further developed with the assistance of the motion picture industry and produced effective training films for almost every subject. With the centralization of training at RTCs, charts, sand tables, battle courses, mock-ups, and other aids were further refined to produce the most effective aids for the greatest number of trainees. Training aids were refined at the RTCs and freely shared with the training divisions, with each RTC and major command having a training support center for the production of training aids and charts.¹²⁶

CONCLUSION

Individual training, specifically infantry training, during World War II was one of the most successful accomplishments of the United States Army.(126) It began with a solid foundation provided by mobilization planning during the interwar years. Building on this foundation training improved through applying lessons learned in the experience of training. Modifications were made to provide improvements in response to the lessons learned in combat and the suggestions of commanders in the field. The final training program was innovative, realistic, and well supervised, and contributed greatly to the effectiveness of the American soldier.

CHAPTER THREE ENDNOTES

1. Secretary of War report, Number 110, point 7, to the 79th Congress, "Investigation of the National Defense Program: Additional Report," (3 Sep 46), p. 3, cited in Marvin A Kreidberg and Merlin G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945 (1955), p. 541.

2. C. Joseph Bernardo and Eugene H. Bacon, American Military Policy: Its Development since 1775 (1955), pp. 381-382.

3. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (1967), pp. 399-420.

4. Weigley, p. 399, citing Statutes at Large, XLI, pp. 759-812.

5. John McAuley Palmer, America in Arms: The Experience of the United States with Military Organization (1941), pp. 136-137.

6. McA Palmer, loc.cit.

7. Weigley, p. 400, citing Statutes at Large, XLI, pp. 759-761, 766, 768-775.

8. Kreidberg and Henry, p. 379, citing as source: Secretary of War (SW), Annual Report(s) (1922-1941).

9. Bernardo and Bacon, pp. 387-389; McA Palmer, pp. 187-190; and Weigley, p. 401.

10. Bernardo and Bacon, loc.cit.; and McA Palmer, loc.cit.

11. Kreidberg and Henry, p. 432.

12. Weigley, p. 405, citing Roy S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division (1951), pp. 20-21.

13. Kreidberg and Henry, pp. 424-425; and Weigley, loc.cit.

14. Weigley, p. 406.

15. Kreidberg and Henry, loc.cit.; and Weigley, pp. 406-407.

16. Kreidberg and Henry, pp. 426-433.

17. "Report of Chief of Staff," in SW, Annual Report (1939), cited in Kreidberg and Henry, p. 438.
18. Kreidberg and Henry, loc.cit.; and Weigley, pp. 415-417.
19. Kreidberg and Henry, pp. 377-401.
20. AGF Historical Section, A Short History of the Army Ground Forces (undated), referred to hereafter as History of AGF, pp. 5-6, available in CARL, call number N-15415-B.
21. AGF Historical Section, History of AGF, p. 6. Replacement centers were not set up until the spring of 1941, and their output was never sufficient for the purpose stated. From the beginning, fillers went directly to tactical units and received instruction IAW MTPs including basic, unit, and collective.
22. Kreidberg and Henry, pp. 554-555.
23. Kreidberg and Henry, pp. 563-575.
24. SW, Annual Report (1940), pp. 26-27.
25. Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Annual Report (1940), p. 6.
26. SW, Annual Report (1940), p. 40.
27. Kreidberg and Henry, pp. 575-580.
28. SW, Annual Report (1941), p. 104.
29. McA Palmer, pp. 136-137; and Weigley, pp. 405, 759-775.
30. Kreidberg and Henry, pp. 377-401.
31. Kreidberg and Henry, pp. 416-425.
32. Kreidberg and Henry, pp. 541-580.
33. Kreidberg and Henry, p. 581.
34. Kreidberg and Henry, pp. 406-407, 426-433, 438; and Weigley, pp. 415-417.
35. Weigley, pp. 408-414.
36. Weigley, loc.cit.

37. Weigley, pp. 419-420; and Jim Dan Hill, The Minute Man in Peace and War: A History of the National Guard (1963), Ch. xv., passim.

38. Kreidberg and Henry, p. 605.

39. Bernardo and Bacon, pp. 387-389.

40. WPD Study, 2 Feb 39, cited in Kreidberg and Henry, p. 547.

41. SW, Annual Report (1940), pp. 26-27; and Kreidberg and Henry, pp. 461-463.

42. Weigley, loc.cit.

43. WD Mobilization Report 3-1, 1-5, 1-7, cited in Kreidberg and Henry, p. 604.

44. WD memo, G3 for CofS, 3 Jan 42, subject: Detailed Troop Unit Basis, MMRB 381, cited in William R. Keast, "The Training of Enlisted Replacements," found in Robert R. Palmer, Bell I Wiley and William R Keast, The Army Ground Forces, The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops (1948), referred hereafter as Palmer, et al., p. 172.

45. AGF memo, G4 for CofS, 5 Aug 42, subject: Report of G-4 Inspection Trip, 26 Jul-1 Aug 42.33.I/1250, cited in Bell I. Wiley, "The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions," found in Palmer, et al., p. 456.

46. Palmer, et al., p. 456.

47. Palmer, et al., pp. 456-464.

48. Par 6b, AGF ltr to CGs, 19 Oct 42, subject: Training Directive Effective 1 Nov 42. 353/52, cited in Palmer, et al., p. 457.

49. Joint Statement of Secretaries of War and Navy, 17 Dec 42, MMRB 353, cited in Robert R Palmer, "Procurement of Enlisted Personnel: The Problem of Quality," found in Palmer, et al., pp. 29, 472-474. ASTP was established to ensure a continuous flow of technically and professionally trained men for the war effort. Men below the draft age of 20 were sent to civilian colleges and universities in anticipation of the draft age being lowered to 18. It was felt that army schooling did not provide the proper subjects or character of instruction desired.

50. Weigley, p. 440.

51. John S. Brown, Winning Teams: Mobilization-Related Correlates of Success in American World War II Divisions (1985), pp. 48-58; and Palmer, et al., pp. 479-482.

52. Memo, CG,AGF to CofS,USA, 10 Jan 46, subj: AGF Activities, cited in Brown, p. 48.

53. AGF ltr to CGs, 25 Jun 42, subj: Paperwork. 312.11/82, cited in Palmer, et al., p. 461.

54. Palmer, et al., p. 462.

55. SW, Annual Report (1941), p. 104. The Army increased in strength from 264,118 on 30 June 1940 to 1,455,565 on 30 June 1941.

56. Kreidberg and Henry, pp. 606-614.

57. Kreidberg and Henry, pp. 592-593.

58. Palmer, et al., pp. 426-428.

59. Kreidberg and Henry, p. 581.

60. Kreidberg and Henry, loc.cit.

61. AR 10-15, 25 Nov 21, with changes 1933 and 1936, cited in Kreidberg and Henry, p. 582.

62. Kreidberg and Henry, p. 583.

63. Kreidberg and Henry, pp. 583-584.

64. Kreidberg and Henry, p. 585.

65. Kreidberg and Henry, loc.cit.

66. Kreidberg and Henry, pp. 559-600.

67. Memo for CofS, USA from CG,AGF, 10 Jan 46, subject: Report of AGF Activities, cited in Brown, p. 14.

68. Brown, p. 14.

69. Palmer, et al., p. 369.

70. Palmer, et al., p. 433.

71. Palmer, et al., p. 370.

72. Palmer, et al., pp. 433-434.

73. Palmer, et al., p. 461; and Brown, pp. 48-58.

74. Palmer, et al., pp. 394-408, 470-482.
75. Wiley, Training in the Ground Army, 1942-1945 (1948), AGF Study No. 11. referred hereafter as AGF # 11, p. 56.
76. Palmer, et al., pp. 372-374.
77. Palmer, et al., pp. 374-376.
78. Palmer, et al., pp. 377-378.
79. Palmer, et al., pp. 378-379.
80. Palmer, et al., pp. 374-376.
81. Palmer, et al., pp. 442-443.
82. Palmer, et al., p. 444.
83. Palmer, et al., pp. 445-446.
84. WD, "Mobilization Training Program," (MTP) 7-3, Infantry Training, (1 Mar 1941).
85. MTP 7-3 (1 Mar 1941).
86. The orientation course was established to familiarize new soldiers with the functions and purpose of the various service branches and the duties involved with each specialty. New recruits and inductees would be taken to a county fair type display of equipment. Guides would present at each station to answer questions. Later more emphasis was placed upon orienting soldiers as to their specific duties and the rules of the post and displays were somewhat curtailed. Wiley, The Activation and Early Training of "D" Division, AGF Study No. 13, referred to hereafter as AGF # 13, (1948), pp. 11-17,
87. Palmer, et al., pp. 181, 394-408.
88. Palmer, et al., pp. 448-449.
89. Palmer, et al., p. 181. The Philippines campaign in 1941-1942 resulted in losses of entire units that did not lead to the requirement for large numbers of individual replacements.
90. Palmer, et al., loc.cit.
91. Palmer, et al., loc.cit.

92. Palmer, et al., p. 182.
93. Palmer, et al., loc.cit.
94. Palmer, et al., loc.cit.
95. Palmer, et al., loc.cit..
96. Palmer, et al., p. 183, citing WD memo (S) WDGCT AG 320.2 Gen (6-12-43) for CG, AGF, 13 Jun 43, subject: Loss Replacements, 354.I/4 (RTC)(S); and memo (S) of Col Maddocks, Chamberlain, and Carter for CofS, USA, 7 Jun 43, subject: Revision of Current Military Program; Tab C: "Problem: To Improve the Present Replacement Training System." 381/177(S).
97. Palmer, et al., pp. 183-184.
98. Palmer, et al., p. 185. To correct the "administrative" problem of loss of proficiency and discipline during transit, AGF took over responsibility for departure depots and established refresher training to be conducted at the depots, until shipment.
99. Palmer, et al., p. 390, citing Record of tel conv between Gen Lentz and Gen Haslett, Replacement and School Cmd, 31 Mar 43. AGF G3, School Branch files.
100. Palmer, et al., loc.cit.
101. Palmer, et al., p. 391, citing AGF M/S, G3 Tng to G3, 15 Apr 43, subject: Increase of MTP 7-3 to 14 weeks; and AGF M/S, G3 to CofS, 9 May 43, subject: Increase in Length of Tng of Loss Replacement from 13 to 14 weeks.
102. Palmer, et al., loc.cit., citing AGF ltr to CG, F&SC, 25 Jul 43, subject: Increase in FTCs.
103. Palmer, et al., p. 448.
104. MTP 7-3, (9 Dec 43).
105. Palmer, et al., p. 451, citing Personal ltr of BC John M. Lentz to BG Marcus E. Bell, 81st Div, 4 Dec 43.
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107. Palmer, et al., p. 449, citing ACF ltr to CGs, 5 Jun 43, subject: Tng in Cpns against Permanent Land Fortifications.

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109. Brown, p. 13.
110. Palmer, et al., pp. 450-451, citing AGF ltr to CGs, 1 Jan 43, subject: Conduct of Training.
111. Palmer, et al., pp. 409 and 426-428.
112. Palmer, et al., pp. 409-410.
113. Palmer, et al., p. 410, citing AGF M/S, G3 to CG, 4 Apr 44, subject: G-3 Items Resulting from Trip, 29-30 May 44. AGF G3 Files.
114. Palmer, et al., p. 411, citing WD G3 memo to CG AGF, 12 May 44, subject: Rpts of Visit to IRTC at Cp Blanding, Fla.
115. Palmer, et al., loc.cit., citing WD memo WDGCT 353 (13 May 44) to CG, AGF, 13 May 44, subject: MTPs for Enl Repl.
116. MTP 7-3, (2 Dec 43).
117. MTP 7-3, (4 Nov 44).
118. Palmer, et al., p. 414.
119. Palmer, et al., pp. 417-426.
120. Palmer, et al., p. 426; MTP 7-3, (4 Nov 44); and MTP 7-3, (11 Jul 45).
121. Palmer, et al., p. 426.
122. Virgel Ney, Evolution of the United States Army Field Manual (1966), pp. 85-93.
123. Kreidberg and Henry, p. 610.
124. Palmer, et al., p. 379.
125. Kreidberg and Henry, p. 611.
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CHAPTER 4

COMPARISON OF WARTIME TRAINING PROGRAMS

INTRODUCTION

Individual training, specifically infantry training, within the United States Army during World War II, benefited from the experiences of the Army during World War I. The purpose of this chapter is to compare and analyze training development of the the two world war periods, presented in preceding chapters, and demonstrate the logical evolution and conscious actions which led to improvement of individual training during World War II, as a result of the experiences of World War I. To prove this thesis, a format similar to that of the preceding chapters will be followed. Three areas will be addressed: (1) factors affecting training development; (2) organization responsible for training; and (3) individual infantry training development. Following discussion of these areas, the overall effects upon training development will be analyzed. Finally, the significance of this study will be evaluated.

FACTORS AFFECTING TRAINING DEVELOPMENT

To facilitate comparison of the two wartime periods this study will first address those factors affecting training development unique to World War I: disagreement over the length of time required for training; ambiguity over tactical doctrine; and the requirement for early deployment. Then, the study will compare and analyze three factors common to both wartime periods: inexperience, unpreparedness, and obstacles to training.

Factors Affecting World War I Training Development

At the beginning of World War I, there was disagreement over the length of time required to produce an effective soldier. Experience and the demand for manpower during the war eventually proved that four months of individual training was sufficient to provide an acceptable skill level for citizens soldiers to be effective.¹ Using four months, or sixteen weeks, as the standard for individual training, Mobilization Training Programs (MTPs) were developed and refined during the period between the two world wars. MTPs provided the basis for World War II training. MTPs specified what was to be trained and the amount of time allowed for training. In accordance with

the MTPs, the overall training period was 52 weeks. Basic individual training was conducted in either twelve, thirteen or sixteen weeks, depending on the mobilization plan in effect at the time and the immediate need for manpower.² Mobilization Training Programs were a direct result of experiences of World War I.

During World War I, the requirement for early deployment of at least a token force created confusion and disruption in the development of training. Early deployment required the Army to develop individual training programs both in the United States and overseas. During World War II, mobilization began prior to formal entry into the war, and training programs were underway when the first requirement came for troops overseas. At the beginning of World War II, trained troops were available for deployment, although not in the number needed for the long term conduct of the war. Requirements for deployment added urgency to further program development but not confusion and rethinking as with the early deployment during World War I.

Early deployment, and its effect upon training, was not a factor in World War II. It was not a factor because of early mobilization and did not directly benefit from the study of World War I.

During World War I, there was disagreement between General Pershing and the Allies over tactical doctrine. Pershing advocated open maneuver warfare, while the Allies,

practiced and trained in trench warfare. American trainers were caught the dilemma of trying to comply with the directions of General Pershing while preparing their soldiers for the immediate requirements of trench warfare. During World War II, German mechanized warfare and its related successes had surprised most of the nations of the world. Advances in technology brought back mobility and the opportunity for maneuver warfare. While the Allies, specifically Britain and the United States, may have had differences as to strategic direction, there were no major disagreements over tactical methods and doctrine which might lead to ambiguity and confusion in training. Disagreement over doctrine was not a factor in training development during World War II. Doctrine evolved to meet the challenge of mechanization, but not directly as a result of training practices of the First World War.

Factors Common to World War I and World War II

Three factors were common to both wartime periods: inexperience, unpreparedness, and obstacles to training. All three common factors were overcome during the course of both wars, although the factors were not as great at the beginning of World War II because of the experiences of World War I.

The nation and the Army entering World War I had little recent experience at mass warfare. The Army had limited experience in the operation of units above battalion level and less experience at developing programs for training a large influx of citizen soldiers. As the Army expanded, the experienced soldiers available, advanced in rank and were replaced by trainers who were themselves citizen soldiers. The result was that the nation was inexperienced at providing for the mass army of citizen soldiers, and the Army was inexperienced in designing programs and providing the training necessary.

To overcome these deficiencies, the government expanded its authority over the economy and developed programs which are the basis for mobilization today and providing the materials of war. The Army expanded in size and complexity and developed a modern General Staff responsible for planning both the preparation for and conduct of the war. Within the Army, training programs were developed which produced trained manpower which helped bring about final victory.

Based upon the lessons of World War I, the National Defense Act of 1920 provided for the retention of the War Department organization and Army General Staff developed during the war; organization and standards of training for the reserve components; and mechanisms for mobilization should the nation again have to fight a twentieth century

war. The Army, through studies conducted by the General Staff, War College, and Command and Staff School, developed methods and procedures to improve on the training programs of the first war. From these studies and work by the General Staff, Protective Mobilization Plans (PMPs) were instituted during the 1920's and 1930's. A critical element of the PMPs was the Mobilization Training Programs (MTPs) which formed the basis for World War II training.

Although the Army at the the beginning of World War II was again faced with the problem of inexperience among its trainers, the experiences in training the trainer of World War I were not forgotten. Programs were established which enabled the new officer and noncommissioned officer to quickly learn their duties and become effective trainers. Again, drawing on the experiences of the earlier war, the Army maximized the use of training aids to assist the trainer and enhance training.

The nation and the Army were unprepared for World War I. The nation was unprepared to provide the materials of war and the procedure for inducting the required manpower was the subject of historical debate. The General Staff was small and inexperienced and had accomplished little real planning for the mobilization, training, and employment of an Army on the scale required for the war. The allies provided a large amount of the materials of war

and in more important, time to enable the United States to prepare.

As a result of the lessons of World War I, the PMPs were developed to provide the mechanisms for mobilization and training. Again, it was the National Defense Act of 1920 and the work of the General Staff during the interwar years which provided the foundation for mobilization and preparedness during World War II. While the nation and the Army were not completely prepared for World War II, the level of preparedness was much higher than 1917, directly as a result of the World War I experience.

Common to both wars were a series of obstacles to training. During World War I the obstacles were a lack of housing, a lack of equipment, and a lack of opportunity to train because of disease, weather, and early deployment. During World War II the obstacles were a lack of housing, a lack of equipment, and poor management of personnel, which is closely related to the World War I obstacle of early deployment. Using the experience World War I, programs were developed under the PMPs and the housing problem of World War II was quickly remedied before it became a real obstacle to training.

Like housing, equipment shortages were overcome in World War I, and were no longer a problem by 1943. A significant advantage in overcoming equipment problems was the indirect industrial mobilization to meet the arms

requirements of the allies, prior to the nation's entry into the war. But, of direct benefit, methods were established, in accordance with PMPs, which enabled a systematic identification of equipment needs and procurement. Unlike World War I, the United States provided a much of the equipment for the Allies in western Europe.

The lack of opportunity to train was a continuing problem in World War I and was not satisfactorily resolved before the war ended. The lack of opportunity was due to a number of causes: disease, weather, and early deployment overseas. World War II programs fared somewhat better, in part, as a result of the lessons learned in World War I. While disease was a concern in World War II, particularly in the Pacific, it was not a major distractor as in World War I. World War I experienced the great flu epidemic of 1917 and 1918, which was not a concern in World War II. The normal evolution of medicine was a major contributor to the control of disease and illness benefiting during the second war. The evolution in medicine, while accelerated during World War I, did not directly result from the lessons of the war. Weather, always a factor in training, was not an overriding concern during World War II, possibly due to the increased size of the Army over that of World War I and possibly due to improvements in equipment and facilities.

Early deployment, both of units and individuals, was a constant problem during World War I and relates very closely to the problems of personnel turbulence of World War II. Recognized as an unresolved problem, many studies of the interwar years were devoted to the problem of personnel replacement and its effect upon personnel management and individual training.³ Programs were developed which formed the basis of the Replacement Training Centers of World War II, and improvements were made over the procedures of World War I. But the management of replacements, and its resulting personnel turbulence, continued to be an obstacle to training until the end of the war.

Conclusion

The three factors unique to World War I training development were resolved prior to our entry into World War II. The length of time required to adequately train a soldier was resolved directly from the experience of World War I. Problems of early deployment were avoided through early mobilization but benefited indirectly from the activities in training of World War I and the interwar years. Disagreement over doctrine was overcome by the evolution in warfare, with no direct benefit from World War

I, but the indirect benefit of an established precedence of adaptation to change.

Those problems common to both wars which affected training development were resolved as a direct result of lessons learned during World War I. The actions of the Army General Staff and the War Department in mobilization planning were in response to studies of the first war and laid the foundation for the programs of the second war. Many of the problems were similar in the beginning, but this was due to the increased size of the Army fighting World War II and, while similar, were not of the magnitude of World War I.

So as not to overstate the benefits of the World War I experience, it must also be recognized that the United States had the advantage of early industrial and military mobilization during World War II. Industrial mobilization began in response to requirements of our future allies for equipment well before the United States entered the war. Industrial mobilization provided the equipment necessary for conducting training when manpower mobilization began. Military mobilization began in September 1940, and, while only partial, provided time to correct many problems prior to our entry into the war. The year of partial mobilization enabled the Army to establish a training base of both facilities and trainers. It must also be acknowledged that our allies provided protection in

Europe which enabled the nation's full mobilization in a systematic efficient manner.

HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR TRAINING

A problem in World War I training was a division of responsibility and effort in the development of training programs. This problem was primarily a result of to the requirement for early deployment but was compounded by unpreparedness. The War Department provided direction and supervision in the United States while the GHQ, AEF provided direction and supervision in France. While GHQ, AEF provided adequate supervision and direction of programs overseas, there was a lack of supervision by the War Department over training conducted in the United States. This lack of supervision was due primarily to inexperience but also inadequate organization, a result of unpreparedness. PMPs of the interwar years addressed this problem and determined the need for a General Headquarters (GHQ) based upon GHQ, AEF of the First World War. Upon mobilization, GHQ was established and provided initial direction and control of the organization and training of the wartime army.

With the increasing size and complexity of World War II, it became impossible for General Marshall to perform his his of duties as Army Chief of Staff and

commander of GHQ. To correct this organizational problem operational commands were established for each theater of war, and the AGF was established to provide training of the ground combat forces. Established in 1942, the AGF provided trained manpower to the combat theaters.

As a direct result of the experiences of World War I, and following a philosophy established by General Pershing, both GHQ and the AGF established procedures to insure proper direction and supervision of training. Under the AGF, training methods were standardized and testing was enforced to ensure high levels of proficiency of both individuals and units. Under the guidance of the GHQ and later the AGF, many of the factors discussed earlier and problems in training that occurred during the war were resolved. GHQ provided the foundation for organization and supervision; the AGF built upon this foundation to train over twice the number of soldiers as World War I to a higher standard of proficiency and effectiveness.

DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTION OF INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

Basic Individual Training

With only limited previous experience within the Army, individual training programs were developed during World War I. As the war progressed, these initial programs

were modified and refined to meet the demands of manpower and combat. These programs became the guide within the United States Army for training of the large influx of citizen soldiers required in modern, mass warfare. As a result of the lessons of World War I, the following principles were set down in the final PMPs of the interwar years:⁴

1. The training nucleus of each new units would be a cadre of officers and enlisted men drawn from existing units.

2. Fillers for existing units and new cadre units would be put through a basic training course in replacement training centers.

3. Officers for new units, in addition to cadre officers, would be drawn, for the most part, from the Officers Reserve Corps.

4. Replacement training centers would be established to provide basic individual training, afterwhich, soldiers would be assigned to units for the completion of collective training.

5. Replacement training centers would provide loss and filler replacement as the war progressed.

Within these principles, Mobilization Training Programs (MTPs) were developed, based upon the final training programs of World War I. A comparison of the

final individual infantry training program of World War I and the initial program of World War II is as follows:

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Hours</u>	
	WWI ⁵	WWII ⁶
Recruit training.....	30	18
Discipline training.....	158	32-a
Physical training.....	36	36
Bayonet.....	32	16
Theoretical (general subjects).....	16	-a-
First aid/Hygiene.....	12	10
Marching.....	12	20
Guard duty.....	22	4
Auto Rifle/Grenades/Bombs.....	8	52-b
Gas/Anti-gas warfare.....	10	12
Target practice and musketry.....	78	126
Infantry specialist training.....	6	34
Open warfare(squad thru platoon).....	24	137-c
Trench warfare.....	12	8-d
Unit maneuver, battalion and above.....	156	-e-
Testing.....	20	24
Inspections.....	24	18

a-included in other training.

b-demonstrating a change in emphasis due to technology and as a result of World War I experience.

c-including battle drills, patrolling, etc.

d-including field fortifications and camouflage, demonstrating a change in doctrine.

e-taught in units after basic training.

While actual names and hours may have changed, a direct correlation is evident between the two programs as demonstrated in the general subject headings taught.

Identical programs were the administrative methods governing the conduct of training during World War I and World War II. Training was conducted in both periods using either a 36 a 40 hour weeks as a basis. Additional training for slow learners or recalcitrant soldiers was conducted on Wednesday or Saturday afternoons or, if

required, in the evenings. Trainers attended classes in the evenings to learn and practice the subjects they were to teach in the following days. Much of the training was incorporated, or conducted concurrently, with other training. And most importantly, training was progressive, building on basic skill proficiency and repetition.

As a result of the experiences of World War I, greater improvements were made in the actual conduct of training. Improvements were made in standardization of training and testing; better record keeping was instituted; and a much better system of supervision was provided by the entire training chain of command.

Replacement Training

A continuing problem during both wartime periods was the provision of replacements for filler personnel and combat losses. Studies were conducted during the interwar years, and a system was devised that was sound in principle but encountered difficulties in execution. Replacement Training Centers (RTCs) were established, initially to provide basic training to individuals before assignment to units and later to provide filler and loss replacement personnel. Difficulties in replacement training during World War II were not due to the quality of training as much as to administrative problems and the War Department

decision to limit the size of the training base within the AGF and the number of citizens called to service.⁷ The quality of training and the organization of the training centers was sound and was a result of the studies conducted during the interwar years to remedy the problems of the World War I. While training within newly formed divisions became the focus of AGF efforts after our formal entry into the war, the RTCs received the greatest attention as the war progressed and were the primary mechanism for improvements in training and the development of the final training programs.

Training Aids

Expanding on the programs begun during World War I, training literature, methods of instruction, and training aids continued to improve during World War II. Prior to World War I, there had been a minimal amount of activity in the development of training literature. Regulations and pamphlets were not standardized and were not in sufficient quantity to meet the training needs. Borrowing freely from our allies, the Army expanded and centralized the publication of training material until by the end of the war, sufficient quantities and standardization were achieved. Continuing this trend, publications during the interwar years were of four types: (1) training

regulations; (2) technical regulations; (3) training manuals; and (4) field manuals. To simplify the requirements for revision as new equipment was introduced during the interwar years, all training literature was incorporated into only field manuals and technical manuals. To further provide control on the quality of training literature, the AGF, during World War II, established a standardized format and retained final approval on new publications.

Standardized methods of instruction, also begun during World War I, were continued and refined during World War II. World War II methods improved on the practices of World War I by complying with the principles of: (1) preparation; (2) explanation; (3) demonstration; (4) application; and (5) examination. Schools for instructors produced qualified trainers and RTCs provided for validation of training methods and procedures.

The use of training aids, "mock-ups," and films, begun during World War I to assist inexperienced trainers and promote standardization, were continued in World War II. An especially important training aid, and an excellent example of the improvement during World War II, was the motion picture. Overcoming initial resistance, movies were produced in World War I under the heading "The Training of the Soldier," and ranged in subject matter from "Discipline and Courtesy," to specific instructions on weapons. During

the interwar years the Army continued in the development of charts, films, and slides and during World War II also enlisted the aid of the motion picture industry.

Conclusion on Training Development

In the three areas of training program development, a direct correlation can be identified between the experiences of World War I and World War II. The initial training program of World War II, while not identical, bears a marked similarity to that at the end of World War I. The problem of replacement training, while not solved, was reduced due to studies of the interwar years and the establishment of RTCs. The use of training aids benefited directly from the initiatives begun in World War I and continued to expand and improve throughout World War II.

CONCLUSION AND ANALYSIS

There is a convincing school of thought, which holds that World War II was, in reality, an extension of World War I. While the people of the United States may have looked on World War I as the "war to end all wars", the Army recognized the possibility of future conflict and accomplished what preparation it could. Accepting this premise, an analogy can be drawn between what was initially

referred to in this study as the training life cycle. Within this analogy, World War I is considered as the period in which initial training programs were developed. In reaction to experiences with the initial programs, modifications were made during the interwar years to produce the final training programs of World War II. This analogy, then, demonstrates a direct relationship between the two wartime periods and a logical, conscious evolution in the individual training programs.

An analysis of the two wartime periods and the interwar period supports this analogy. Of the six factors affecting training development during both wartime periods, four factors: disagreement over the length of training; inexperience; unpreparedness; and obstacles to training, were either eliminated or mitigated by programs developed during the interwar years in response to the experiences of World War I. Solutions to the remaining factors, disagreement over doctrine and early deployment, benefited indirectly from the World War I experience, in that, systems were established which solved or reduced the scope of the problems.

GHQ established at the beginning of World War II, was modeled on the AEF of World War I. GHQ was the agency which directed and supervised the initial training programs of World War II. When it became necessary to modify the organization of the War Department and the Army, GHQ became

the basis for the AGF. It was the AGF, which directed and supervised the final training programs of World War II.

A general correlation can be identified between the final training programs of World War I and the initial programs of World War II. Accepting refinement and modification during the interwar years as part of the MTPs, this correlation demonstrates an evolution between the two wartime periods. Included in this evolution is the direct benefit demonstrated in the organization of replacement training and the use of training aids.

Two activities were important in the evolution of training programs between the two world wars and training development during World War II. The first activity was the continuing development of the Army and the nation during the interwar years. The programs of the army and legislation of congress were based directly on the experiences of World War I. These programs (the protective mobilization plans and organizational changes within the War Department) and legislation (the National Defense Act of 1920) established the foundation for World War II training programs and organization.

The second significant activity was early mobilization in 1940. World War II training benefited directly from early mobilization, which, itself, was an indirect result of the experiences of World War I. During the interwar years procedures were established to enable

industrial mobilization based upon principles used in the first war. As the war progressed in Europe, the national leadership recognized the possibility that the United States might become involved. During initial mobilization the Army was able to correct many of the problems found in mobilization prior to the requirement to commit troops to combat.

In conclusion, an analysis of both wartime periods and the activities of the interwar years proves that individual training during World War II benefited from the experiences of the Army in World War I.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This study is significant for two reasons, as an example of response to extraordinary change and as an example of adaption of existing methods in reaction to less extreme change. World War I was a radical change for the United States Army. Entering World War I, the United States possessed a frontier, constabulary military force, unaccustomed to the demands of twentieth century European war. In a very short period of time the Army had to adjust its methods of training to meet the demands of this new style of warfare. World War II was an evolutionary continuation of twentieth century conventional warfare. While the size and complexity of armies changed and new

technologies and doctrine were introduced, the organizational structures and methods of basic individual training were easily adapted to the requirements of the war. The procedures in training development and organization of the World War I provide an example of response to extreme or revolutionary change. A study of the activities of the interwar years and of World War II provide an example of learning from experience and adapting and improving organizational structures and methods in response to evolutionary change.

Today's Army faces two significant changes in the nature of warfare. The first significant change is the advent of the nuclear age. Fearing escalation to a nuclear exchange, responsible nations are less likely to intentionally start a general war on the scale of the two world wars. Instead, nations vie for advantage in either limited objective wars, such as Korea, or irregular war. An extension of the limited objective wars results in the second significant change in warfare, the transition to low-intensity irregular (or revolutionary) warfare. The Army today must realize the changes in warfare and design new programs of training to be able to fight in the wars of the future. The study of World War I training development gives an example of adapting to change. While World War I individual training programs transitioned an army from

small counter-insurgency force to large conventional force, many of the principles of adaptation are the same. in

Also important is an understanding of the evolution of twentieth century warfare. The most obvious threat at this time to our national security, and the security of our allies, is the massive conventional strength of the Soviet Union. Even if one accepts that the military is now on the verge of a new type of warfare, all conflicts since World War II have been fought with conventional weapons and, in part, conventional tactics. The training methods used today are similar to those of World War I in their adaptation to technical change and conventional doctrine. The methods of basic training used today are similar to the methods of World War II, with refinements made for nuclear/biological/chemical warfare and increased technology of weapons systems. TRADOC, the organization responsible for training is the direct descendent of the AGF, even down to the unit patch. An understanding of the development of these systems and organizations will enable the Army to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past and develop methods of the future.

The Army must train to fight both a conventional, although technically more sophisticated, war as well as the low-intensity non-conventional war. Without the ability to see into the future the Army must rely on past experience in developing training, but must realize that future will

be in many ways unique and lessons of the past must be themselves modified to the actual situation.

The consolation is that this problem is the same for all armies. Usually everybody starts even and everybody starts wrong....When everybody starts wrong, the advantage goes to the side which can most quickly adjust itself to the new and unfamiliar environment and learn from its mistakes.
--Michael Howard

A solid foundation of individual training will enable the Army to meet the requirements of future conflicts. Having an established program in the basic, and in many ways unchanging, skills will enable the Army to modify its training to meet either logical evolution or radical changes in warfare. A soldier well trained in basic skills is valuable in his availability as a trainer for an expanded army and for his ability to accept further training to meet changes in the methods of war.

CHAPTER FOUR ENDNOTES

1. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (1967), p. 374; and Maurice Matloff, American Military History (1969), p. 377.
2. Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merlin G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945 (1955), pp. 377-401; also Chapter 3, endnotes 17-20.
3. Army War College (AWC), Study of Replacement Systems in the American Expeditionary Forces (1926), Monograph No. 8; also see Chapter 2, endnotes 70-74.
4. AGF Historical Section, A Short History of the Army Ground Forces (undated), pp. 5-6; CARL # N-15415-B.
5. AWC, Training Circular No. 5, Infantry Training (August 1918), pp. 18-23.
6. War Department, Mobilization Training Program (MTP) 7-3, Infantry Training (1 March 1941).
7. See Chapter 3, endnotes 111-120.
8. Michael Howard, "Military Science in an Age of Peace," Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (1 March 1974), Vol. 119, pp. 3-10.

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