A STUDY OF THE LEADERSHIP DISPLAYED BY LIEUTENANT
GENERAL THOMAS JONATHAN JACKSON
DURING THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
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fulfillment of the requirements for the
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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

PERRY C. CASTO JR, MAJ, USA
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A Study of the Leadership Displayed by Lieutenant General Thomas Jonathan Jackson During the American Civil War

Major Perry C. Casto, Jr.

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Confederate Lieutenant General Thomas J. Jackson is considered one of the greatest tacticians who ever lived. His Valley Campaign of 1862 is a classic example of the effective use of maneuver warfare. While much has been written about Jackson's tactics, very little attention has been paid to his leadership of the soldiers who executed his tactical plans. The United States Army's recent emphasis on maneuver warfare has stressed the importance of leadership in the conduct of such warfare. This study is an analysis of Jackson's military leadership as he commanded units from brigade to corps level in the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia to determine if he met the requirements of a good leader as those requirements are defined by current U.S. Army doctrine.

The study uses current Army doctrine as the basis to judge the effectiveness of Jackson as a leader. It discusses Jackson's background and its effect on
19. ABSTRACT (Continued)

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The study concludes that while some of Jackson's actions deviated significantly from today's doctrinally sound leadership practices, in the aggregate his leadership was congruous with current doctrine and contributed to his success as a field commander.
Name of candidate: MAJ Perry C. Casto, Jr.

Title of Thesis: A study of the leadership displayed by Lieutenant General Thomas Jonathan Jackson during the American Civil War

Approved by:

William G. Robertson, Thesis Committee Chairman
Dr. William G. Robertson, Ph.D.

Frederick A. Eiserman, Member, Graduate Faculty
MAJ Frederick A. Eiserman, MA, MMAS

Accepted the 5th day of June 1987 by:

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D., Director, Graduate Degree Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other government agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

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ABSTRACT

A STUDY OF THE LEADERSHIP DISPLAYED BY LIEUTENANT GENERAL THOMAS JONATHAN JACKSON DURING THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, by Major Perry C. Casto, Jr., USA, 157 pages.

Confederate Lieutenant General Thomas J. Jackson is considered one of the greatest tacticians who ever lived. His Valley Campaign of 1862 is a classic example of the effective use of maneuver warfare. While much has been written about Jackson's tactics, very little attention has been paid to his leadership of the soldiers who executed his tactical plans. The United States Army's recent emphasis on maneuver warfare has stressed the importance of leadership in the conduct of such warfare. This study is an analysis of Jackson's military leadership as he commanded units from brigade to corps level in the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia to determine if he met the requirements of a good leader as those requirements are defined by current US Army doctrine.

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In recent years the United States Army has made a major change in its warfighting doctrine. According to the Army's new AirLand Battle doctrine, units must be prepared to fight on chaotic, nonlinear battlefields and, through the use of maneuver, bring superior fire power to bear on an enemy in selected areas. According to the doctrine, the use of maneuver on this future nonlinear battlefield will enable smaller forces to defeat larger forces. The doctrine goes on to say that the commander must skillfully combine the dynamics of combat power to be successful. Combat power, defined as the ability to fight, includes the dynamics of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership. Of these, the most essential element is competent and confident leadership.

This change in Army doctrine and the identification of leadership as the most essential element of combat power has caused a resurgence of interest in the development of leadership within the Army. In an effort to develop leaders for this concept of maneuver warfare--leaders who can fight outnumbered and win on nonlinear battlefields--Army schools
are placing renewed emphasis on leadership training. The Center for Army Leadership at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas has, since the new doctrine was introduced in 1982, produced two new field manuals on leadership for the Army. This renewed emphasis on the leadership necessary to successfully implement maneuver warfare raises an obvious question. Are there any good examples of leadership in maneuver warfare to use as a guide to help future commanders develop their own abilities to lead in this environment?

Maneuver warfare is not a new concept. It has been used successfully before. One of the most outstanding examples of the successful use of maneuver warfare occurred during the American Civil War. In the spring of 1862 Confederate General Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson conducted his now famous Valley Campaign. During this campaign Jackson's outnumbered forces moved up and down the Shenandoah Valley, keeping a superior Union force separated and its leadership confused so that its larger numbers could not be concentrated for combat. Thus, by outmaneuvering the Union forces, the Confederates were able to engage and defeat different elements of that force in detail without ever having to fight the whole force at one time. Jackson has since been considered one of the greatest tacticians who ever lived and the Valley Campaign one of the most analyzed campaigns of any war.
While Jackson’s tactics have been the object of a great deal of study, very little note has been taken of his leadership. The study of Jackson as a leader, and the impact of his leadership on his maneuver warfare, would add to the knowledge necessary to the development of those who must lead on future battlefields. The leadership displayed by Jackson is not expected to become the model for training future leaders. But a knowledge of how his leadership added to or detracted from the conduct of his campaigns would certainly help future combat commanders as they attempt to turn their battle plans into decisive actions. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine the leadership displayed by Jackson, not only during the Valley Campaign, but throughout the war, to determine if he met the requirements of a good leader, as those requirements are defined by current US Army doctrine. It will look at his leadership as he commanded units from brigade to corps level in the Army of Northern Virginia. The period covered will be from his assumption of command of the garrison at Harpers Ferry on April 30, 1861 until his death on May 10, 1863, from wounds he received during the Battle of Chancellorsville.

This study does not include an examination of the tactics used by Jackson during the Civil War, but is limited to the leadership he used in implementing his tactics. Discussions of tactics are included only where necessary to provide a clear picture of specific situations in which Jackson’s leadership was demonstrated.
The procedure used to develop a picture of Jackson as a leader was to search available sources, both published and unpublished, to find examples of Jackson's exercise of leadership, then cross reference these examples to determine as accurately as possible the facts of each situation. When the circumstances of each situation had been determined, Jackson's actions were then compared to the concepts of good leadership as delineated by current Army doctrine. This process was repeated throughout the period under study to determine if any changes in his leadership occurred as he progressed in rank, and also to develop a composite of Jackson as a leader. This composite was then compared to the same concepts of good leadership mentioned above.

To determine if Jackson's leadership met the requirements of a good leader as currently defined by doctrine, it is first necessary to examine the Army's present criteria for good leadership. The Army's doctrine on leadership is contained in three field manuals (FM), FM 22-100 Military Leadership, FM 22-999 Leadership and Command at Senior Levels, and FM 100-5 Operations. FM 22-100 is the Army's basic leadership manual. It was designed to be used primarily by junior leaders, but the concepts set forth in it are fundamental to the Army's philosophy of leadership and apply to leaders at all levels within the Army. FM 22-999 was designed to be used by senior level leaders and addresses those concepts of leadership peculiar to leaders at higher
levels in military organizations. It is a follow-on to the basic manual and the concepts found in it are designed to complement those of the basic manual. FM 100-5 is the Army's basic manual on AirLand Battle Doctrine. It incorporates the leadership doctrine into the operational doctrine. Therefore all three manuals must be used to develop the criteria for good leadership currently used by the Army.

FM 22-100 defines military leadership as, "a process by which a soldier influences others to accomplish the mission." According to the doctrine, the concept of what makes a good military leader is based on eleven principles of good leadership. To apply these principles and to effectively influence others to accomplish the mission, a leader must possess ten attributes of a good leader.

The principles of good leadership identified in the FM are not new to military thinking on the subject. They are, instead, the traditional principles that the Army has used as the basis of its doctrine for many years. The principles are listed in Table 1. The attributes needed to apply these principles are listed in Table 2.

FM 22-999 points out that while the elements of leadership listed in the two tables are necessary for any leader, the leaders of large units have additional elements that are required of them to be effective. Senior level leadership is defined as, "the art of direct and indirect influence and the skill of creating the conditions for
Principles of Good Leadership

1. Know yourself and seek self improvement.
2. Be technically and tactically proficient.
3. Seek responsibility and take responsibility for your actions.
4. Make sound and timely decisions.
5. Set the example.
6. Know your soldiers and look out for their well-being.
7. Keep your soldiers informed.
8. Develop a sense of responsibility in your subordinates.
9. Ensure that the task is understood, supervised, and accomplished.
10. Train your soldiers as a team.
11. Employ your unit in accordance with its capabilities.

Table 1.

Attributes of a Good Leader

1. Be committed to the Professional Army Ethic of loyalty to the nation's ideals, loyalty to the unit, selfless service, and personal responsibility.
2. Possess professional character traits of courage, competence, candor, commitment, and integrity.
3. Know the four factors of leadership, the follower, the leader, communications, and the situation.
4. Know personal strengths and weaknesses of character, knowledge, and skills.
5. Know human nature.
6. Know the requirements of the leadership position.
7. Know how to develop necessary individual and team skills, cohesion, and discipline.
8. Provide direction.
10. Motivate subordinates by developing morale and esprit in the unit; teaching, coaching, and counseling.

Table 2
sustained organizational success to achieve the desired result."

The emerging doctrine for senior level leaders states that to be effective, they must have a vision for their units. Vision is defined as a personal concept of what the unit must do by some future time. It is the goal that the unit works toward accomplishing. Moreover the leader must communicate his vision to his subordinates so that all understand his intent.

In addition to vision, senior level leaders must possess well developed historical, operational, and organizational perspectives. An historical perspective, based on a thorough study of history, provides the leader with a core of background knowledge to apply to current situations. An operational perspective is based on a knowledge of operational doctrine, the art of war, and the capabilities of men and machines. This knowledge allows the leader to employ his unit effectively to attain the desired result. An organizational perspective is an understanding of the people within the unit, what their conditions and capabilities are. This knowledge allows the leader to know what he can expect the unit to accomplish.

FM 22-999 lists three imperatives for senior level leaders. These imperatives are to provide purpose, direction, and motivation to their units and soldiers. Providing purpose to a unit allows the members of the unit to
know why they are doing what they are doing and gives meaning to their actions and sacrifices. Providing direction keeps the unit moving toward its goal as established by the senior level leader's vision. Providing motivation to the unit gives soldiers the will to achieve the desired unit goal.

This study consists of five chapters. Chapter One provides the introduction, the purpose of the study, and the criteria used to evaluate Jackson's leadership. Chapter Two discusses Jackson's development as a soldier and a leader prior to the Civil War. It covers the period from his early childhood to his years at the Virginia Military Institute. Chapter Three describes Jackson's activities as a leader from the time he was given his first command at Harpers Ferry in April of 1861 through the Valley Campaign of 1862. Chapter Four discusses his activities from the Seven Days' Battles in June of 1862 until his death in May of 1863. Chapter Five presents conclusions about Jackson as a leader, discusses the applicability of his leadership to the present Army, and provides recommendations for further inquiry.
CHAPTER 1

END NOTES

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., p. 13.
4 The term "General" as used here is a generic term to signify a general officer. During the period studied Jackson rose from the rank of Colonel to Lieutenant General.
5 U.S. Army, FM 22-100, Military Leadership, (1983) p. 44.
6 Ibid., p. 50.
7 Ibid., pp. 41-43.
8 Ibid., p. 49.
9 Ibid., p. 2-1.
10 Ibid., p. 2-14.
11 Ibid., pp. 2-8 -- 2-13.
12 Ibid., pp. 2-13 -- 2-17.
CHAPTER 2

JACKSON'S DEVELOPMENT

Among the generals of the Army of Northern Virginia the name of General Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson stands out. His fame, second only to that of his commander, General Robert E. Lee, far exceeds the fame of any of his contemporaries, and even that of the army in which he served. As the American Civil War fades in the American memory, few who have not studied the war remember which side the Army of Northern Virginia was on, or even that there was such an army. But Jackson's name has retained its familiarity.

While Jackson's name has become a part of Americana, his leadership, the subject of this study, is not so well remembered. To understand his leadership it is necessary to understand how he developed into the general who won such fame on the battlefields of the Civil War. Since the practice of leadership is a series of interactions with other people, it is particularly important to determine how he viewed relationships with other people, how his views were developed, and how he put them into action. To do this it is necessary to begin the study by examining his early childhood and tracing his development, both as a leader and a soldier.
Thomas Jonathan Jackson was born in Clarksburg, Virginia (now West Virginia) in 1824. Although the date of his birth is generally believed to be the 21st of January, according to his second wife, Mary Anna, no record of his birth was ever found and he himself was not sure of the exact date. He was the third child of Jonathan and Julia Jackson. He had an older sister, Elizabeth, born in 1819, and an older brother, Warren, born in 1821. A younger sister, Laura Ann, would be born in 1826.

Jonathan Jackson practiced law in Clarksburg. He had a reputation for winning his cases and had a successful practice going. Unfortunately, he was not as successful at managing his money as he was practicing law. Bad investments and his habit of securing other people's loans with his holdings put him deeply in debt. In March of 1826, while his wife was pregnant with their fourth child, their daughter Elizabeth came down with typhoid fever. Since Julia was not able to nurse the sick child, Jonathan assumed these duties until he also contracted the disease. By the end of the month both father and daughter were dead. Also by the end of the month, Julia had given birth to another daughter, Laura. Because of her husband's poor judgement with money, Julia Jackson then found herself a destitute widow with two small boys and an infant daughter. Their home had to be sold to pay debts, so the local Masonic Lodge, of which Jonathan had been a member, provided a small, one room house and helped
feed them. Thomas was then two years old. And so, his first memories of childhood were of living in this small house with his mother as his only parent.

In 1830 Julia Jackson remarried. Her second husband was Captain Blake B. Woodson, also a lawyer in Clarksburg, and also without money. Her Jackson inlaws, who had been helping support her and the children, opposed this marriage and predicted that if she married Woodson they would have to take the children from her to support them. Woodson had secured the post of county clerk of Fayette County, Virginia and so took his new wife to live in that county in the town of Ansted, approximately sixty miles south of Clarksburg.

Soon after the family moved to Fayette County Julia’s health began to deteriorate. This, combined with the lack of money, forced her to farm out her children, just as the Jacksons had predicted. Thomas, who was then six years old, was sent to live with his step grandmother Jackson and a group of bachelor uncles. The parting between mother and son was very emotional with Julia holding young Thomas and crying violently. Jackson would always remember this departure from his mother and it would help to form his outlook on life and family.

A few months after the children had been sent to live with their relatives, Julia’s health became much worse. She had given birth to another son, Wirt Woodson, and would not recover. She sent for her other children to say her last
farewell and to give them her dying blessing. She was a devout woman and with the children there, prayed that God would watch over them. This last meeting with his mother would make another lasting impression on young Thomas. He would, thereafter, idolize his mother and would, in fact, have an idealized view of all women.

In October of 1831 Julia Jackson Woodson died. The Jackson children were to be shuttled among their Jackson relatives for the next few years. Historians disagree on exactly who lived with whom and for how long during this period, but Thomas ended up with his bachelor uncle, Cummins Jackson, at the family home of Jackson's Mill, near the town of Westen in Lewis County. It was this place that he would consider his home and remain, except for an adventure down the Mississippi River with his brother Warren, until he left to attend the United States Military Academy in 1842.

While he was living with his uncle three things occurred that were to have significant impact on young Jackson. First, he was diagnosed as having dyspepsia, a chronic form of indigestion. This was the beginning of a health problem that would plague him throughout his life and become an obsession with him. He was probably a hypochondriac, but his search for good health and the strange therapies that he was advised to engage in for his illness would add much to his later reputation of being strange. The second significant factor was that he learned of the past
glories of the Jackson family. His grandfather's brother, George Jackson, had been a colonel during the American Revolution and had later served in Congress. This man's eldest son, John G. Jackson, had succeeded his father in Congress, was the first Federal Judge of the Western District of Virginia, and married Dolly Madison's sister. All of this sounded very impressive to a boy whose earliest memories were of living in poverty in a one room house provided by the charity of the local Masons. These past glories of the family were to give his own ambition, a quality which he possessed in abundance, a purpose. In later years Jackson would write to a relative, "I am most anxious to see our family enjoying that high standard and influence which it possessed in days of yore."

The third significant thing that occurred while Jackson lived with his uncle Cummins was that he learned how to be a man and what it meant to be a man. The Jacksons, like most of the people living in that area at the time, were descendents of that group of people who referred to themselves as Scotch-Irish. These people had begun in Scotland, moved first to Ireland, and then on to America. Large numbers of them settled in the mountains of what was then western Virginia and is now West Virginia. He grew up among these people and, like boys everywhere, learned how to act like a man by watching the men around him. The Scotch-Irish concept of manhood would have a profound
influence on the way that Jackson conducted himself throughout his life.

These people had some very strict rules on manly behavior and it was these rules that guided Jackson in his dealings with other people. These were fiercely independent, exceedingly proud men who considered a man's pride to be most important. A man had to maintain his pride at all cost or lose the respect of the community. There were several weaknesses that men had to guard against to maintain their pride and thus the respect of those around them. Once a man started a project he was expected to see it through to completion. He could never quit because something proved to be too difficult for him. Men were expected to never show or express physical fear of anything. They could have "respect" for something that could do them harm, but could never admit to being afraid. Another weakness that men had to guard against was showing any emotion. Men were expected to display a stoic exterior at all times. Talking too much was also considered an obvious sign of weakness. Men said only what needed to be said and stopped. If nothing needed to be said, then nothing was. The only place that a man was not bound by these rules was in his own home. There, in the presence of his immediate family and very close friends, he could relax, be friendly, and allow his feelings to govern his actions. But even in his home, a man could never relax in the presence of an outsider. To the outside world, men
were expected to be quiet and strong. This did not mean that they were a particularly peaceful people however. Any perceived wrong would receive swift, violent retribution. And so Jackson grew up learning that if he was to be highly regarded as a man he must present a quiet, stoic exterior to those around him.

In 1841, at the age of seventeen, Jackson was working as a county constable. He was saving money hoping to further his education but making little progress, when he heard that his Congressional district had a vacancy at the United States Military Academy at West Point. An appointment to West Point meant a free education. This was the answer to his problem so he set out to get the appointment. Even though his schooling had not prepared him for the academic demands of the Military Academy, he was determined to get the appointment. He enlisted all the support he could muster to influence his Representative to recommend him to the Secretary of War, who would make the appointment. He had developed a reputation among those who knew him of determination, integrity, and exactness. This reputation was enough to convince people to intercede on his behalf and he was recommended. He had a personal interview with the Secretary of War, who also was impressed by his determination and gave him the appointment. And so, in July of 1842, the future general began a new and completely different phase of his development. He would now learn to be a soldier.
When Jackson arrived at West Point in late June of 1842, the new fourth class had already reported and so, as a late arrival, he immediately stood out. He also stood out for another reason. He had arrived dressed in a homespun suit. Well dressed in his home town of Westen, Virginia was not so well dressed on the Hudson. But, although he looked quite the country bumpkin to the cadets, he also had a look of grim determination. Classmate D. H. Maury, who would also become a Confederate general, later wrote about seeing Jackson on that first day, "There was about him so sturdy an expression of purpose that I remarked, 'That fellow looks as if he had come to stay.'"

The look of grim determination was probably caused by the entrance examinations that he had yet to take before he could enter the Academy as a student. The deficiencies of his education were weighing heavily on his mind as he approached these examinations, and he surely had "come to stay." He managed to pass the examinations and was admitted to the class in July. He would later credit his passing to the indulgence of the administrators. This indulgence had been requested by the Secretary of War in a letter to the authorities requesting that allowances be made for Jackson's defective scholarship in favor of his good character.

Although indulgence may have gotten him through the entrance examinations, it did not get him through his first year as a cadet. His lack of academic preparation and the
fact that he did not learn things quickly made it very difficult for him to pass. He was determined, not only to pass, but to learn the subjects being taught. His resolution to learn the subjects being taught was so great that he would not leave a subject until he had mastered it. This caused him some problems since cadets were required to recite each day on the work assigned for the previous evening and, on many occasions, he had to report that he was unprepared for the day's recitation because he had not yet finished the assignment of the day before. During that first year he would become somewhat famous for his struggles at the blackboard. When he had a particularly difficult problem to solve he would end up with both his face and uniform covered with chalk and would perspire so freely that other cadets jokingly said there was fear that he would flood the classroom. But his determination paid off, and although he ranked very low in the class at the end of his first year, fifty first in a class of seventy two, he was still in the class.

Each succeeding year at the Academy saw Jackson rise in class standing. By the time he graduated he had risen to seventeenth in a class of fifty nine. Later his classmates would say that if the course had been one year longer, Jackson would have graduated first in the class. He did not accomplish this rise from the bottom easily. Most of his time was dedicated to study, with little time for
recreation. He would later tell his wife that he did not remember having spoken to a lady the whole time that he was at West Point. He instead spent what free time he had taking walks, either alone or with a companion, around the area and enjoying the beauty of the Hudson Valley.

While at West Point Jackson developed a reputation for being intense in anything that he went about, whether it be studying, engaging in a conversation, or taking care of his health. While he was a cadet he decided that if he sat in a chair with his body compressed, it would be bad for his internal organs and aggravate his dyspepsia. He, therefore, developed a habit of sitting bolt upright in his chair when he studied. This fear of compressing his organs would be with him throughout his life. He would later take to standing while he studied, and even had a special high desk made for his home in Lexington so that he could stand while he prepared his classes at the Virginia Military Institute.

While he was at West Point he also developed a set of ethical and moral maxims that he recorded in a blank book. These maxims give a great deal of insight into how a young Jackson viewed many things that would have great importance in later years. Some examples of these maxims are shown in Table 3 on page 20. In retrospect it would appear that, as a cadet, Jackson had written the rules by which he was to live his life.
Jackson’s Maxims

You may be whatever you resolve to be.
Through life let your principal object be the
discharge of duty.
Disregard public opinion when it interferes
with your duty.
Endeavor to be at peace with all men.
Sacrifice your life rather than your word.
Endeavor to do well everything which you
undertake.
Temperance: Eat not to dulness, drink not to
elevation.
Silence: Speak but what may benefit others or
yourself; avoid trifling conversation.
Cleanliness: Tolerate no uncleanness in body,
clothes, or habitation.

On June 30, 1846 Jackson graduated and was
commissioned a Brevet Second Lieutenant in the artillery. At
the time of his graduation the United States was at war with
Mexico. So, brand new Lieutenant Jackson was ordered to
report immediately to the First Regiment of Artillery, then
preparing to go to Mexico.

When Jackson arrived in Mexico he was assigned to a
heavy artillery battery and his first duty was to transport
guns and mortars to the forts protecting Port Isabel. By the
time his unit arrived, the war had come to a standstill. It
appeared that he might not see action at all. This was not a
pleasant thought to Jackson. In a conversation with fellow
West Pointer, Lieutenant D. H. Hill, he said that he envied
those who, like Hill, had seen combat, and that he wanted to
be in one battle. He would have to wait a few months,
but his chance was coming.
Jackson's unit was part of the amphibious force that landed to take the fortress city of Vera Cruz and drive up the National Road to Mexico City. This put Jackson in the middle of the fighting. The First Artillery was being employed as infantry at that time, and at Cerro Gordo had won a reputation with the bayonet. Although Jackson's company was not engaged in the battle, it would appear by later actions, in another war, that he learned a lesson about using bayonets that day.

During this battle Captain John B. Magruder captured a Mexican field battery. For his gallantry, General Winfield Scott, the Commanding General, presented this battery to Magruder. Magruder needed two lieutenants for the battery, but few wanted to work for him because he had a reputation for being restless, hot-tempered, and hard to please. Jackson knew all of this, but he also knew that if there was a fight, Magruder would be in it, and he wanted to be in it too. He, therefore, determined that he would be one of Magruder's lieutenants.

Jackson got his position in Magruder's battery and soon thereafter got into the fighting. During the move on Cherubusco on 19 August 1847, Lieutenant Johnstone, Magruder's second in command was killed early in the action. Jackson had to take his place commanding the battery's second section. The battery was in a duel with heavier Mexican artillery and was slowly being outgunned. But when Magruder
moved the first section forward, Jackson brought the second section up and continued to place effective fire on the enemy. In his official report to General Pillow, Magruder commended Jackson for conspicuous gallantry. As a result, Jackson was promoted to the brevet rank of captain.

During the storming of Chapultepec, Magruder's battery was split into two sections, with each section assigned to support a different part of the offensive. This allowed Jackson to operate independently. During the battle his section's forward advance was stopped by a ditch that they could not cross. Their position was covered by both enemy artillery and musket fire. This quickly resulted in the loss of one of the section's two guns, most of the horses and several men. The remainder of the men took cover. But Jackson stayed with the guns and urged the men to come out and help him move the one remaining operational gun forward. He walked back and forth saying, "See, there is no danger; I am not hit!" But his demonstration failed to convince the men, and he later admitted that he did not convince himself either. He would say that it was the only lie he ever told.

With the aid of one sergeant, Jackson moved his one operational gun across the ditch and put it back into action. General Worth, who had been watching this action, sent him an order to retire to the cover of infantry because he feared that the gun would be lost. Instead of retiring,
Jackson responded that if he could get the support of one company of regulars, he could carry the work. Worth moved a brigade forward. During the fighting, Magruder arrived and helped get the other gun back into action. The brigade that had moved forward, supported by the two guns, was able to carry the Mexican redoubt.

Later that day Jackson would take his guns in support of a wild pursuit of the enemy by a small force led by Lieutenants D. H. Hill and Barnard E. Bee. The latter was the man who, fourteen years later, would, with a single sentence, have more effect on the reputation of Jackson than any other human. This pursuit, which did not really amount to much, was the end of Jackson's fighting in Mexico.

For his actions at Chapultepec, Jackson was promoted to the brevet rank of major. So when the first brevet promotions were actually made, he was one of only five or six to receive a double brevet. Years later, when questioned about that day in Mexico, the answers that he gave are most revealing about his character and motivation. When asked by his pupils at Virginia Military Institute why he did not run, he replied, "I was not ordered to do so. If I had been ordered to run, I should have done so. But I was directed to hold my position, and I had no right to abandon it." He confessed to a friend that he was forever grateful to Major General Pillow for separating his section from Captain Magruder, and thereby giving him an opportunity to win...
distinction. When asked by friends if he felt no fear when those around him were falling, he replied that he did not, his only anxiety was that he would not meet enough danger to make his conduct under it as conspicuous as he wanted. He also said that instead of fear while under fire, he felt exalted, that he had a more perfect command of all his faculties, and of their more clear and rapid action, then at any other time. Jackson had developed into a soldier who enjoyed the thrill of combat, wanted the glory that can come with it, and saw no alternative to following orders as given. All of these traits would show themselves again when next he took the field.

Jackson remained in Mexico for almost another year. During that time he studied Spanish, became something of a social lion in the society of Mexico City, and may have considered marrying a Mexican girl. The latter possibility he never admitted directly, but did make reference to sharing his life with some amiable senorita in a letter to his sister. He also began to study religion in earnest while in Mexico, and appears to have considered becoming a Roman Catholic for a time. During this period he also began a concentrated study of history and the art of war.

After Mexico, Jackson was posted to Fort Hamilton, New York. While at Fort Hamilton he continued to study history and the art of war, believing that a wide knowledge of these two subjects would make him a better soldier. He also became
more obsessed with his health, and began to associate his health with his religion. By the time he left the post in 1850, he was convinced that his bad health was a result of God's punishment for past sins. His religious faith, which would become so famous during the Civil War, was becoming more and more a basic part of his life. He was baptized in the Episcopal Church during this period.

In 1850 Jackson was reassigned to Florida. Most of his biographers do not address this time in his life, except to say that he was there for a very short time. While it is true that he only spent six months there, it was probably the low point of his life. While in Florida he became embroiled in a running feud with his commanding officer that resulted in numerous charges and counter charges of misconduct. Captain William H. French, Jackson's commanding officer, and like Jackson a brevet major, charged that Jackson was trying to usurp his authority as the commander. Jackson then accused French of sexual misconduct with a family maid. While the whole affair seems to have been based more on the ambition of the two men than on any real misconduct on either man's part, each man made formal charges against the other and requested that a court of inquiry investigate the situation. No court was ever held, but the commanding general lost confidence in French's ability to command and relieved him. While there is no evidence to indicate that any derogatory action was taken or contemplated
against Jackson, it was during this feud that Jackson decided to resign from the Army and accept a post at the Virginia Military Institute in Lexington, Virginia.

Jackson reported to Virginia Military Institute on 13 August 1851 to become the Professor of Natural and Experimental Philosophy and Artillery Tactics. He would spend the next ten years there as a professor. As an instructor, he soon developed a reputation among the cadets as a strict disciplinarian and bad teacher. As he proved at West Point, he did not learn academic subjects quickly, and some of the subjects he taught were very difficult ones. Along with the theory and practice of gunnery, a subject of which he was quite knowledgeable, he also taught mechanics, optics, and astronomy. These subjects required mathematical analysis. Because he had problems understanding the material himself, he could not effectively teach it to his students. One of his students would later write, "Professor Jackson was an able instructor at artillery tactics, but in the regular collegiate course he did not appear to have any special genius for teaching; yet he was always a conscientious, laborious instructor."

His reputation as an eccentric would also become firmly established at VMI. The students disliked his unbending discipline and found him to be a dull teacher who always stuck to the text and was embarrassed when forced to deviate from it. This was the perfect situation for
students to find fault with the instructor, and Jackson gave them plenty to attack. His preoccupation with his health was their main weapon. As an example, because of his fear of going blind, he had, by this time, quit reading by artificial light. So when, prior to examinations, he was forced to hold reviews for the students after dark, he would assemble them in a dark classroom, sit with his eyes closed, and question them on the material. While he had what he thought were very logical reasons for such actions, many of his students did not see the logic in his behavior.

Other things that would add to his reputation of strangeness were his natural shyness and inability to seem at ease when talking to strangers and his total dedication to honesty. His devotion to honesty was such that he preceded even the most obvious ironical remark with the phrase, "Not meaning exactly what I say," to ensure that no one misunderstood. This phrase became a byword with cadets when talking about their odd professor.

Jackson married twice while he was at VMI. In 1853 he married Elinor Junkin, the daughter of Rev. Dr. George Junkin, who was the president of Washington College in Lexington. A year later she died in childbirth. He married again in 1857, once again to a minister's daughter, Mary Anna Morrison. Shortly after his second marriage he bought a home of his own, and settled down to live the family life that he had always wanted. He appeared to be quite
happy there where he could relax. People who knew him well said that he became a completely different person when he was at home. But this was in keeping with the rules of being a man that he had learned as a child. His time in this home would be very short. Virginia was about to call her sons to battle, and Jackson, the eccentric professor, would be among the first to answer.

On April 12, 1861 Confederate forces opened fire on Fort Sumter, South Carolina to begin open warfare between the southern and northern states. The Union force surrendered the fort on April 14, and Virginia seceded from the Union on the 17th. This chain of events would cause Jackson, who had opposed secession, to offer his services as a soldier to his home state.

Jackson was then thirty seven years old. The traits that would determine what kind of combat leader he would be were, by that time, well established. He was a shy, taciturn man who believed in telling people only what he thought it necessary for them to know. He possessed great determination and had learned from experience that tenacity led to success. He was a strict disciplinarian, with himself as well as others, who believed in following orders to the letter, no matter what others might think. He was deeply committed to his religion and openly practiced it. He was also ambitious and wanted to reestablish the influence that his family had once enjoyed. As a soldier, he was well
schooled in how to fight. He had spent the fifteen years since the Mexican War studying the history and art of war. He was also an experienced combat veteran who knew what combat was like and what demands it placed on the men who engaged in it. He also enjoyed the thrill of combat more than he feared it. All of these things would affect the way that Jackson led his troops and would help determine the quality of his leadership.
CHAPTER 2

END NOTES


4. Jackson, Letters, p. 16


12 Ibid., p. 6.
13 Henderson, Stonewall Jackson, vol 1, p. 32.
14 Henderson, Stonewall Jackson, vol 1, pp. 37-38;
Mrs. Jackson, Memoirs, pp. 30-32.
16 Dabney, Life and Campaigns, p. 32.
17 Henderson, Stonewall Jackson, vol 1, p. 16.
18 Vandiver, Mighty Stonewall, pp. 15-16.
19 Jackson, Memoirs, p. 35.
20 Dabney, Life and Campaigns, p. 37.
22 Ibid., pp. 35-36.
24 Henderson, Stonewall Jackson, vol 1, p. 27.
25 Ibid., p. 32.
26 Ibid., p. 145
27 Henderson, Stonewall Jackson, vol 1, p. 32;
Vandiver, Mighty Stonewall, p. 31.
28 Jackson, Memoirs, p. 41; Vandiver, Mighty
Stonewall, pp. 34-35.
29 Jackson, Memoirs, p. 43; Vandiver, Mighty
Stonewall, p. 38.
30 Vandiver, Mighty Stonewall, p. 38.
31 Ibid., p. 39.
32 Jackson, Memoirs, p. 44.
33 Dabney, Life and Campaigns, p. 52.
34 Vandiver, Mighty Stonewall, pp. 41-44.
35 Ibid., pp. 52-55.
36 Dabney, *Life and Campaigns*, p. 60.
37 Cook, *Family and Early Life*, p. 2.
39 Dabney, *Life and Campaigns*, p. 62
44 Ibid., p. 18.
46 Ibid., p. 106.
47 Dabney, *Life and Campaigns*, p. 117.
CHAPTER 3

THE FIRST YEAR

HARPERS FERRY TO THE VALLEY

On April 18, 1861, one day after Virginia seceded from the Union, the Virginia State Militia seized the town of Harpers Ferry, Virginia and the arsenal located there. At this same time Virginia Governor John Letcher notified the superintendent of VMI that he would need the members of the more senior classes at VMI to act as drill instructors for the great number of volunteers who were then assembling. He directed that the cadets, under the command of Major Jackson, be prepared to go to Richmond at a moment's notice. The notice came on Sunday April 21st. Jackson was notified about dawn to bring the cadets immediately. He set the departure time at one o'clock that afternoon. The cadets were ready to march before one, but when Jackson was asked if they could leave early, he only pointed at the barracks clock. At precisely one o'clock he gave the order to march.

On April 27, 1861, while in Richmond with the cadets, Jackson was appointed a colonel of the Virginia Volunteers. On that same day, Governor Letcher ordered Robert E. Lee, then a major general in command of the state
troops of Virginia, to direct Col Jackson to proceed to Harpers Ferry to take command of the Virginia troops there and organize the volunteer forces in the area. Jackson arrived at Harpers Ferry on the 29th and assumed command on the 30th.

Jackson commanded the garrison at Harpers Ferry for only twenty five days. He fought no battles during this time, but the leadership that he displayed there would be indicative of some of the facets of his leadership that he would display throughout the war. During that twenty five days he demonstrated that he did not care for the pomp and circumstance often associated with senior military officers, but was totally dedicated to preparing his command for combat. He showed that he demanded strict compliance with his orders, but that he could temper his orders with judgement when he thought it necessary. The Jackson secretiveness about military affairs, which would become so famous later in the war, was already in evidence. He also showed that he followed the orders of his superiors to the letter and would not deviate without a change of orders. Lastly, he showed a tendency to favor one part of his command over another.

Since the seizure, the garrison of approximately one thousand troops had been commanded by militia officers who knew little more than their green troops about how military organizations should operate. Major General Harper was the
overall commander. He had three brigadier generals and a full retinue of staff officers under him. These officers were all magnificently dressed, rode fine horses and dedicated themselves to holding full dress reviews on sunny afternoons. As one officer of the garrison would later write, "Troops were scarce, but as for officers, we were simply magnificent in numbers and display." The garrison quickly discovered that Jackson was a very different kind of officer from those they were accustomed to. He wore the plain blue uniform that he had worn at VMI; he made no speeches; and he held no reviews. He had very little to say and seldom smiled. Instead of drawing attention to himself, he made it a point to not be recognized when he moved about checking the area, and his retinue consisted of one adjutant, who was also from VMI, and also dressed in a plain VMI uniform. Jackson was the antithesis of the dashing military leader.

The volunteers who made up the garrison were not immediately ready to accept Jackson as their leader. At the same time that he had been ordered to take command at Harpers Ferry, the state legislature had invalidated the commissions of all the militia officers above the rank of captain and authorized the Governor to fill the vacancies. As was the custom of militia units, the officers had been elected by the men in the units. The volunteers thought the removal of their elected officers an outrage and an infringement on
their rights as free men. They began holding meetings to discuss terminating their service. Jackson went on with his organizing of the garrison, seemingly oblivious to the controversy. He had been ordered to muster all the companies into service for either one year or the duration of the war, whichever each company chose. Therefore, on his first full day of command, without so much as mentioning the ongoing controversy, he issued an order to all company commanders to muster their companies in by ten o’clock the next day. While Jackson was issuing his order, the volunteers were holding a mass meeting to decide what they should do about the removal of their officers. They failed to reach a decision that day and the meeting was adjourned until the next day. The second meeting never occurred. Given a night to think about their situation, it appears that most men decided that they could not resist the order of this austere new colonel.

If the volunteers found him to be a different kind of officer than they had known, the contrast was no greater than for those in the garrison who had been his students at VMI. They found a different man from their old instructor, "Tom Fool" Jackson. Much more competent as a commander than he had been as an instructor, Jackson was now in his element. He took charge and, using clear and decisive orders, began to convert the volunteers into soldiers. The easily confused professor of the classroom was gone. Here he gave the impression of knowing exactly what needed to be done and how

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it should be done. He had no doubts or misgivings. They soon decided that he was every inch a soldier.

Jackson saw that his most pressing duty was to make soldiers out of his force of civilian volunteers. While they had plenty of enthusiasm, they had never been under fire and lacked the training and the discipline necessary to withstand combat. To remedy this situation he instituted a training program that included seven hours of drill a day. Both officers and men greeted this with much opposition, but he was unbending and demanded strict compliance with the drill requirement. He also got out among the men every day to insure that training was progressing properly, and to give instruction where it was needed. While it seemed to the soldiers that Jackson demanded strict compliance with all military discipline, he, in fact, did not. He knew that these volunteers had a great deal to learn and a very short time to learn it. Harpers Ferry was susceptible to attack at any time from Union forces in Maryland. Morale was high in the garrison and training was progressing at a good rate. He feared that attempting to overly regiment his troops would destroy that morale and slow the training process. While he would not tolerate obvious breeches in discipline such as neglect of duty or insubordination, he only enforced those regulations that he felt were essential to the efficiency of the garrison. He overlooked many minor infractions of the regulations, but those that he chose to enforce were enforced

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to the letter. John Opie, who was a private at Harpers Ferry, later wrote, "At last Gen. T. J. Jackson arrived, took command, and soon produced order out of chaos."

One of Jackson’s functions in producing this "order out of chaos" was to issue weapons to those who needed them. In the process of issuing these weapons, he demonstrated that he sometimes favored one part of his command over another. Units were arriving, not only from Virginia, but from throughout the Confederacy, almost daily. While most of the units arrived at Harpers Ferry armed, some did not. Since Jackson had control of the arsenal, he had access to a large store of weapons. Some of these weapons were the most modern that the US Army had, but many were older weapons that had been stored at the arsenal for many years. In his report to General Lee on May 6, 1861, Jackson wrote that he was having a problem with his issue of arms and referred the matter to Lee. He had about 480 Kentucky volunteers in the garrison who needed weapons. He had ordered that they be issued some of the older weapons. They had refused to accept them, wanting the newer arms instead. In his report, Jackson stated that the weapons the Kentuckians had refused were in good working order. He further said that, since his mission was to defend Harpers Ferry, he felt that he should give the best weapons to the Virginia troops because the others could be ordered away at any time. This situation, when considered in isolation, was insignificant. But, while this
was an insignificant occurrence, it demonstrated a side of Jackson's leadership, that of favoring one group under his command over another, that would surface again nine months later on a much larger scale, with much more significant results.

While he was in command at Harpers Ferry, Jackson demonstrated his determination that he would never divulge military information that could be useful to the enemy. He never told anyone what his plans were. Once, when asked, by a member of a visiting contingent of Maryland Legislators, how many men he had at his disposal, he replied, "Sir, I should be glad if President Lincoln thought I had fifty thousand." He even chastised his wife in a letter for complaining that his letters never contained any news. He asked her what she wanted with military news and told her that it would be unmilitary and unlike an officer to write such news. This determination to keep all military information secret has been credited to his study of history. Particularly his study of Napoleon's campaign of 1814 in which the allies discovered the distribution of the French troops during a critical moment by capturing a courier who was carrying a letter from Napoleon to the Empress which contained the information.

As was stated earlier, Jackson commanded at Harpers Ferry for only a short time. The Confederacy was in the early stages of organizing its armed forces and as it
organized command changes were very common. On May 15, 1861
Joseph E. Johnston, who held the rank of brigadier general in the Confederate Army, was ordered by the Adjutant and Inspector General, CSA, to assume command of the troops near Harpers Ferry. He arrived there on May 24th and asked Jackson to publish an order affecting the change of command. Since Jackson was an officer of the State of Virginia and not a Confederate officer, and since he had not been informed of Johnston taking command, he politely, but firmly refused to publish such an order without further guidance from Governor Letcher or General Lee. Although Johnston outranked him, and it was obvious that he would soon be Johnston's subordinate, Jackson had not been given an order that would allow him to relinquish his post. Therefore, he would not do so until he had authority from his superiors in Richmond. He communicated his position, in writing, to both Johnston and the Adjutant General for Virginia forces. Johnston then produced an official document referring to himself as the commanding officer of Harpers Ferry which had been endorsed by Lee. Jackson took this as Lee's approval of the change of command and immediately published an order to that effect. Jackson had not refused to change the command because he did not want to give it up, or because he doubted Johnston. He did it because he was following orders as they had been given.
After he turned command over to Johnston, Jackson did not have a position, but this lasted only a few days. During the first week in June Johnston’s command was formed into the Army of the Shenandoah and Jackson was assigned to command the First Brigade. As a brigade commander Jackson had more time to dedicate to training his green troops than he had as a garrison commander. He personally drilled the brigade, preparing it for the fighting that he knew was coming.

On June 8, 1861 this brigade, along with all other Virginia troops, was merged into the Army of the Confederacy. Thus Jackson became a Confederate officer and Johnston his immediate supervisor in all respects.

On July 2, 1861 the First Brigade fought its first engagement. Johnston had decided to withdraw from Harpers Ferry to Winchester and had ordered Jackson to delay the Union advance while the Army moved back. Near Falling Waters Church one of Jackson’s regiments, the Fifth Virginia, made the brigade’s first contact with a Union force. It was a short skirmish and, while neither side suffered much loss, the Virginians seemed to get the better of the fight. The Union troops then attacked Jackson’s small force of 380 men with a force estimated at from eight to ten times that number. Jackson’s constant insistence on training paid its first dividend there. Although this was the first time that any of these men had been under fire, they held their position for three hours and won the fight. Jackson,
himself, said that both officers and men behaved beautifully. They inflicted fairly heavy casualties on the Union troops, their cavalry captured forty-five prisoners, and they had only two men killed and ten wounded. During this action, Jackson demonstrated, as he had in Mexico, a total disregard for the dangers of combat. While the whole battle was no more than a skirmish, it gave the men of the First Brigade confidence in themselves as a fighting unit. It also gave them confidence in Jackson as a fearless man who knew how to fight and, more importantly, knew how to win. Jackson's influence over them, which had been growing as they trained, was then firmly established.

Jackson's success as a commander during this period was noticed by his superiors. On July 4, 1861 Johnston wrote to Richmond recommending that Jackson be promoted to the rank of brigadier general. But this recommendation was somewhat late. Lee had sent Jackson's commission as a brigadier in the Confederate Army on July 3rd. His date of commission was set at June 17th.

The letters that Jackson wrote regarding this promotion demonstrate two interesting aspects of his personality. A letter to his wife shows him as the humble servant of God and country that he probably wanted to be, while letters to a politically powerful friend show the ambition that he had had since childhood.
When he received notification of his promotion he wrote a very humble letter to his wife about it. In that letter he said that it was more than he had anticipated, and that the most gratifying aspects to it were the pleasure that she would get from it and the opportunity that it gave him to serve the Confederacy better. He also stated that he should not even desire another promotion, but should thank God for what he had and be content.

His correspondence with his friend Jonathan M. Bennett, who was active in Richmond politics, show that, while the promotion may have been more than he anticipated, it was also something that both he and Bennett had been working toward. Their letters show that they had been working on the promotion since at least early June and had written to one another several times on the progress of it. Jackson actually had Bennett working on two things. Along with the promotion, he wanted to be transferred to the area where he had grown up in northwestern Virginia. The loyalty of that area was then in contention and Jackson felt that he could help bring it more securely into the Confederacy. But on June 24th he wrote to Bennett saying that being promoted was the higher priority. He feared that if he were not promoted some other brigadier would be placed above him in command of the First Brigade.
At first glance his letters seem to show some inconsistency, if not dishonesty. But in the letter to his wife he did not say that he was content, only that he should be. Jackson felt that his ambition was not in keeping with his religion and was, therefore, wrong. While he might have thought of ambition as a sin and wanted to change, it was a part of him and he could not change it.

Bennett’s actual influence in Jackson’s promotion is not known and may have been minimal. It appears that Lee had already been impressed with Jackson’s ability as a commander. If this is true, Lee was only slightly ahead of the public. Jackson was about to become the South’s first media hero.

By July, 1861 President Lincoln was applying pressure to his generals to move against the rebels in northern Virginia. General Winfield Scott resisted this move because he felt that the green troops were not ready for combat. But the President would not be swayed, and on the afternoon of the 16th, Brigadier General McDowell, who commanded the Federal army in Washington, moved his army south out of Arlington toward Brigadier General P. G. T. Beauregard’s Confederate Army of the Potomac, then camped along Bull Run near the town of Manassas, Virginia.

On the 17th the Union forces met Beauregard’s outposts at Fairfax Courthouse. From this encounter Beauregard determined that he was about to be attacked and requested
that Johnston send reinforcements from the Army of the Shenandoah as quickly as possible. At noon on the 18th Jackson’s First Brigade left Winchester marching toward Manassas. The first day they marched seventeen miles, waded the Shenandoah, crossed the Blue Ridge Mountains, and did not stop, except for supper and rest halts, until two o’clock the next morning.

While he had pushed his troops hard that first day, Jackson was not insensitive to their welfare. When they stopped, the Brigade dropped from exhaustion without posting sentries. When an officer asked Jackson if he wanted some troops awakened to guard the camp, he replied, “No, let the poor fellows sleep. I will guard the camp myself.” He then proceeded to do just that until nearly dawn when his staff convinced him that he too had to sleep. He then lay down for an hour, but as dawn broke he was up and arousing his men to continue the march. This first day’s march showed the men of the Brigade that Jackson demanded they give all they had to give, but that he demanded just a little more from himself. It also reinforced a perception among the lower ranks that Jackson never slept. They were beginning to think of him as super-human.

On the 19th the Brigade marched to Piedmont Station where the infantry boarded trains to travel the last thirty miles to Manassas. Jackson reached Manassas about four o’clock that afternoon and moved his troops into the
defensive line along Bull Run that evening. The 20th was a quiet day. More units from Johnston's Army arrived and took up positions along the creek. But the first big battle of the war was still a day away.

McDowell attacked in force across Bull Run early on Sunday morning, July 21st. His plan was to turn the Confederate left flank. Through the early hours of fighting the plan worked well. Although several Confederate commanders saw what was happening and quickly moved their units to the left in an attempt to stop the Union attack, they were outnumbered and were being driven back.

Upon hearing the fighting on the left flank, Jackson marched to the sound of the guns. When he reached the crest of Henry House Hill he could see the smoke from the battle that was occurring approximately two thirds of a mile to his front. He could also see the wounded moving back toward his position and learned from them that the battle was going badly for the Confederates. He halted on this hill and deployed his brigade for combat. Jackson's skill and experience as a combat commander were demonstrated by his decision to take up a defensive position on this hill. A less knowledgeable commander might have rushed headlong into the ongoing fight to come to the aid of his embattled comrades. Such a move, while heroic, would have been a piecemeal attack and would probably have had little impact on the Union advance. Also, Jackson's troops were green. Only
one of his regiments had ever been under fire at that time. History had proven, and doubtless he was aware, that green troops perform better on the defensive than in an attack. The battle was moving toward him; he chose to wait for it.

The fight for Henry House Hill was significant for several reasons. The Union advance stalled there and a battle that appeared to be nearly won was lost. The legend of "Stonewall Jackson" was born there and the South had a new hero. But more importantly for Jackson as a leader, not only was it the first time that his brigade was under fire, it was the first time that most of them saw their commander under fire. How he handled himself and them in this first fight would determine if he was a man they could follow in combat.

While Jackson was no longer the brash young lieutenant of the Mexican War seeking danger to win glory, he again gave the impression that he was in complete control of himself and that he did not consider a battlefield a particularly dangerous place. When he first arrived on the hill he met Captain John D. Imboden who was moving his artillery battery to the rear. Imboden had been supporting Brigadier General Barnard S. Bee's brigade in the battle then raging in front of the hill (this was the same Bee that Jackson had supported in the pursuit during the Battle of Chapultepec). Imboden felt that General Bee had left his battery exposed to capture and had therefore withdrawn. Imboden was upset with Bee and when he met Jackson proceeded to tell him about it, using
some very strong language. With a look, Jackson quickly expressed disapproval of Imboden’s language and then told him that he would support his battery and to unlimber his guns right there. Thus, Imboden became a witness to Jackson’s actions during the battle.

While Jackson and Imboden were talking, General Bee rode up to Jackson and told him that his brigade was being beaten back, to which Jackson replied, “Then sir, we will give them the bayonet!” Although witnesses, and consequently historians, have different versions of what was actually said by the two generals, Jackson’s message was clear to those around him. He had selected his ground, and he would not be driven off.

After talking with Jackson, Bee rode back to attempt to rally his brigade. While extolling his troops to stop retreating, he made some reference to Jackson or his brigade standing on the hill like a stone wall. Once again, there are several versions of what he actually said. Bee was killed during the battle so all the versions are from people who claimed to be witnesses. Regardless of what was actually said, the Richmond and Charleston newspapers quickly picked up the story and “Stonewall” Jackson became a southern hero. Jackson claimed that the name belonged, not to him, but to the brigade. Shortly after Jackson died the Secretary of War officially changed the brigade’s name to the Stonewall Brigade.
When Imboden's battery arrived on Henry House Hill, each gun had only three rounds left. After each had fired its three rounds, Jackson ordered the guns to the rear. He then sent Imboden to check the guns of the First Brigade. With this job finished, Imboden went back to Jackson to ask permission to join his battery. Imboden later wrote that as he rode up to Jackson, the fight was just becoming intense enough for Jackson to enjoy it and he noticed that, "His eyes fairly blazed." Jackson's eyes flashing seem to be the only outward sign he gave that he was under any stress in combat. Otherwise he had a, "coolness under fire that makes a man more than ordinarily collected and enables him to form prompt decisions." His coolness under fire was a big factor in convincing his troops to stand their ground and fight.

When Jackson talked to someone he had a habit of holding up his left hand with the palm toward the person he was speaking to. He did this as he was telling Imboden that he could go to the rear. At that moment he was wounded in the hand. Although the wound was not serious, because of it his hand tended to hurt even after it had healed. To relieve the pressure on this hand, Jackson often held it up in the air while he rode. The story later spread that when he did this he was calling on God to help destroy his enemies.
While Jackson did not ride around the battlefield holding up his hand appealing to God for victory, he was a very religious man who practiced his religion every day and prayed openly before every battle. The fact that he was so religious had great significance to his leadership. Religion was a major force in the Army of Northern Virginia. Many of the men who served under Jackson were also very devoted to Christianity. In their letters home they often wrote about their religious beliefs and experiences. Pvt Willie Hardy’s letter was not uncommon when he wrote to his mother on the day that he fought at Manassas, not only about the battle, but also about the prayers for the Sunday service that he had attended that morning. While not all of the men had Jackson’s zeal, even those who did not respected him for his. They felt that his devotion was evidence of his strong and trustworthy character.

The First Brigade held its position on Henry House Hill and formed the center of a new Confederate defensive line that broke the Union advance. The Union troops began a withdrawal that quickly turned into a rout. Although the Brigade had not won the battle all by themselves, they did establish in their own minds that they were soldiers who could win, not only a small skirmish, but also a big battle that seemed to be lost before they arrived. Also on that day, a bond was formed between them and their commander that would never be broken. His demands would continue to be
extreme and they would not always be happy about it, but they would always be Jackson’s.

After the battle Jackson went to the rear to have his wounded hand dressed. One of his fingers had been broken and he was in a great deal of pain. When he reached the surgeons he found several hundred wounded awaiting medical attention. As a general officer he received immediate attention from several doctors, but he refused to allow them to examine him, saying that his wound was only a trifle and that they should attend to the others first. He then sat down on the grass and waited until the common soldiers had been treated. When they examined his hand, all but the First Brigade Medical Director, Dr. Hunter McGuire, agreed that the broken finger should be removed. When Jackson asked McGuire his opinion he replied that trying to save the finger would be more painful than removing it, but if it were his hand, he would try. Jackson then told McGuire to dress his wound.

Three days after the battle CPT Imboden went to visit Jackson to see how his wounded hand was doing. During this visit Imboden asked Jackson how he could be so calm and unconcerned about the dangers of battle when shells and bullets rained around him. Jackson replied that his religion had taught him that he was as safe in battle as he was in bed, that God had fixed the time of his death and therefore he did not concern himself with it. His only concern was to be ready to die when the time came. He further stated that
if all men lived that way, then all would be as brave as he was. By this time Jackson's religion had become so much a part of his thinking that he may have believed what he told Imboden. But he showed no less fear at Manassas than he had shown in Mexico as a lieutenant. In Mexico he did not credit his bravery to his faith in God, but simply to the fact that he was not afraid in combat.

After the battle the Confederate Army went into camp around Fairfax, Virginia. Through the rest of the summer and fall they remained in these camps and did not engage in any major fighting with the Union troops who were encamped across the Potomac. Disease, the age old problem of an encamped army, soon struck the Confederates. To reduce the soldiers' exposure to disease during this period, most commanders had a very liberal furlough policy. Jackson's policy for the First Brigade was somewhat different. He granted no furloughs. He also refused to take one himself. When his wife wrote to him requesting that he come home for a few days, he replied that since his officers and men were not permitted to see their families, he could not see his. And yet, with all his troops in camp, his brigade did not have a significant problem with disease.

Disease was not a problem for the First Brigade because Jackson appreciated this danger of camp life and took steps to minimize its effect. When his first camp proved to be a gloomy place with bad water, he immediately went to
General Johnston and explained that he had to move his troops to another location. He also got new tents and clothing and managed to get his troops paid their back pay. The money allowed them to buy food from local farmers. Therefore, they ate better than most of the other soldiers in the camps. Although none of the men who wrote about their life in Jackson's camp at that time discussed the cleanliness of the camp, Jackson's intolerance of uncleanliness, as stated in the maxims he wrote while a cadet, surely helped hold down the spread of disease in his camp.

After Manassas the Confederate Army still resembled a large mob more than an army. The troops were undisciplined. Many people, including officers, saw no reason to change that situation. After all, they had won the battle as an undisciplined mob, and many thought that it was the only battle they would have to fight. Jackson did not believe that the South had won the war with one battle. He foresaw a long hard struggle ahead and thought it necessary to prepare his troops by instilling discipline in them and training them to perform like soldiers in the upcoming battles. Therefore, while most of the army relaxed in camp, the First Brigade spent its time drilling. H. K. Douglas, a member of the brigade who was promoted from enlisted man to lieutenant during that time, said that the brigade was a good school of war.
On October 7, 1861 Jackson was promoted to the rank of Major General. He was given command of the Army of the Valley on November 4th. Many senior officers did not think that he was capable of higher command and felt that the promotion was an exchange of the army's best brigade commander for a second or third rate major general. By this time, however, the officers and men of the First Brigade were convinced that he could command any size organization.

His departure from the Brigade was difficult for both Jackson and his men. He hated to give up these men that he had trained and they did not want to lose the man they considered the best commander in the army. The Brigade also wanted to go with Jackson because he was returning to the Shenandoah Valley where most of their homes were.

Jackson left the brigade on November 4th. Before leaving, he agreed to give the only speech to his soldiers that he would give throughout the war. When the men were formed Jackson sat on his horse in front of them and gave a very short farewell speech in which he complemented them for their achievements and told them that they were, "the First Brigade in the affections of your General." Then, waving his hat over his head, he turned and rode away as the Brigade cheered. For most it was the only time they ever actually heard him speak.
Jackson's leadership requirements changed significantly when he moved to Winchester. As Commander at Harpers Ferry and as a brigade commander he had been working with inexperienced people. Although they were full of patriotism and eager to be good soldiers, they did not know how, and therefore depended on Jackson's experience to learn. At Winchester, although most of his troops were still new to being soldiers, he had immediate subordinates who were also experienced soldiers. These men required a different type of leadership. Jackson did not always appreciate this difference and conflict was unavoidable.

The separation from his old brigade was to be short. When he arrived at Winchester on the 5th, he immediately requested seasoned troops be sent to him because all he had were untrained militia and he feared attack from Union forces then located just across the Potomac and at Romney. The Shenandoah Valley was a rich agricultural area that was used primarily for food production. It was an area that the Confederacy could not afford to lose. Therefore Richmond reacted quickly to Jackson's request and ordered his old brigade to the Valley. Although General Johnston opposed it bitterly, on November 8th he ordered the First Brigade, then commanded by Brigadier General Richard B. Garnett, to Winchester. Garnett was from the old army. A West Point graduate, he had been a major in the Ninth United States Infantry.
Jackson’s problems as a leader began as soon as the First Brigade got off the train at Strasburg. They arrived in a pouring rain and were ordered to proceed to Kernstown to make camp. All baggage, tents, and cooking utensils were left at the train station awaiting wagons. Until the baggage was brought up, Kernstown provided no shelter. The people of Winchester offered to take the troops in, but Jackson would not allow it. He had ordered them to Kernstown and would not change it. While the First Brigade thought Jackson was the best commander in the Army, they thought his refusal to allow them to take shelter from the rain in Winchester was unreasonable. His decision infuriated both the officers and men. Many refused to obey the order. In one regiment, the regimental commander and his brother, a captain, nearly shot one another over the captain’s refusal to obey.

In spite of the order, many of the officers, as well as many of the men went into Winchester. As a result, several officers were arrested. Jackson’s reaction was to issue an order requiring any officer up through the rank of colonel to get a pass from headquarters before going beyond the camp pickets. The pass had to state whether the officer was on official or private business. The colonels felt that Jackson had insulted them. All five regimental commanders signed a letter protesting the order and requesting that it be modified. Jackson refused to change the order and
admonished the colonels saying that two of them had shown either incompetency or neglect of duty by the disorganized way their commands had arrived. He went on to instruct them in how to gain the respect and control of their commands by remaining habitually with them, attending to their instruction and comfort, and leading them well in battle. During this whole incident there is no evidence that he ever discussed the problems that he was having with the brigade with General Garnett, the brigade commander. All records indicate that Jackson was actually commanding the brigade and ignoring Garnett. But the brigade that he had trained had acted badly. He would remember the man who commanded it when it did.

Along with his old brigade, Jackson was given three brigades from the Army of the Northwest commanded by Brigadier General W. W. Loring. Loring, like Garnett, was from the old army. He was a former Colonel of the United States Mounted Rifles and an esteemed soldier. Unlike both Jackson and Garnett, he was not a West Pointer. These new troops and their commander were to give Jackson much more serious problems as a leader than the problems he was having with his old brigade.

In November, 1861 Jackson developed a plan for a winter campaign to advance on Romney and drive the Union forces out of western Virginia. Most historians agree that the reason for this campaign was based on his study of the
maxims of Napoleon. Jackson believed, as Napoleon had written, that, "An active winter's campaign is less liable to produce disease than a sedentary life by camp-fires in winter-quarters." While Napoleon may have been right in principle when he formulated his maxim, he did not have the mountains between Winchester and Romney in mind as a place to campaign. The forty seven miles between these two towns traverses the Allegheny ridge and is some of the most difficult terrain in the eastern United States. The mountains are high, steep, and almost always covered with deep snow in winter. Jackson, who grew up in these mountains, should have known better than anyone else the extreme harshness of the region and the hardships to which his troops would be exposed. But his desire to drive the enemy out of his childhood home probably colored his thinking more than he or anyone else realized.

The campaign began on January 1, 1862. As they left Winchester the day was bright and unusually warm for that time of year. It had been that way for more than a week, and those who knew the area where they were going hoped that it would stay that way for another. But the weather did not hold. When they got into the mountains snow and sleet began to fall, and with it the spirits of the men and the pace of the march.
The weather grew worse and the roads became all but impassable for the supply wagons. Since these wagons carried the food for the troops, the advance had to be held up each day until the wagons caught up and the soldiers were fed. By January 3d Jackson was growing impatient with the lack of progress. On that day he found five regiments of his old brigade sitting along the road eating when he thought they should be marching. When he asked General Garnett why the march was delayed, Garnett told him that he had halted to allow the men to cook their rations. Jackson said that there was no time for that. Garnett argued that it was impossible for the men to go any further without eating, to which Jackson replied, "I never found anything impossible for this brigade!" While this incident was not particularly significant, Jackson tended to have a long memory about what he considered wrongdoings by his subordinate commanders. This was the second problem that Jackson had had with his old brigade since Garnett had taken command.

If Jackson was displeased with his old brigade, his displeasure did not compare with his feelings about General Loring's command. He later charged that Loring allowed the head of his column to stop too often, thus slowing his advance to an unacceptable rate. He also said that Loring had allowed his troops to become demoralized. These troops were demoralized. They were not accustomed to operating in such foul weather, nor to Jackson's harsh discipline and
constant driving. They were near mutiny and thought Jackson was crazy. They also thought the First Brigade, who by this time had taken up the habit of cheering Jackson whenever he passed, was as crazy as he was. Instead of cheers, Jackson heard hisses and hoots when he passed these troops.

Even though the First Brigade still cheered Jackson, their confidence in their leader was severely shaken by the march through the mountains. After the war John Poague, a member of the brigade, wrote that he never before or after endured physical and mental suffering as he did on the Romney expedition. He said that everyone in the brigade thought the expedition was a dismal failure.

Added to the problems with the weather, Jackson's battle plan had been compromised. Before his force was half way to Romney he found his intended campaign plan printed in a Baltimore newspaper that he was reading at a roadside inn. Initially there was talk in Richmond of court-martiauling Jackson over the compromise, but no action of that type was taken. Such action was probably dismissed because the city of Richmond itself was a much more likely location for a compromise to occur than in Jackson's command. People frequently travelled between the southern capital and northern cities; many of these people were close to the Confederate government and its military and had access to information on the Romney campaign. Although Jackson was not charged as a result of the compromise, the incident surly
reinforced his belief that military plans must be a very closely guarded secret.

In spite of the difficulties in getting through the mountains, Jackson managed to take Romney and force the Union troops out of the area. After he took Romney he decided to leave part of his force in winter quarters there to hold the area and to take part of the force back to Winchester to winter there. He chose the First Brigade to return to Winchester with him. For a tactician this may have been a logical choice. The Valley was much more important to the Confederacy than the mountains around Romney and the First Brigade was the proven combat unit. But for a leader it was an error in judgement. Loring's men had already seen the closeness that existed between Jackson and his old brigade, a closeness they did not share. When he chose the First Brigade to leave Romney, Loring's men saw Jackson taking his "pet lambs" back to the warmth and comfort of Winchester while he left them in a frozen wasteland to try to survive the winter. To them, if not to Jackson, it was a clear case of favoritism on his part.

After Jackson arrived back in Winchester on January 24th, complaints about his treatment of Loring's command began to reach the administration in Richmond. Colonel Samuel V. Fulkerson of Loring's command wrote letters to well-known Richmond politicians Walter R. Staples and Walter Preston complaining about the command being left in Romney.
Colonel William B. Taliaferro, Fulkerson's Brigade Commander, added an indorsement to these letters saying that the Army of the Northwest had been destroyed by bad marches and bad management. Eleven of Loring's officers signed and sent to him a request that he go to the Secretary of War if necessary to have the command withdrawn to Winchester because they were in an exposed and dangerous position. Loring wrote an indorsement agreeing with the officers' position and forwarded both documents to Jackson, requesting that he forward it to Secretary of War J. P. Benjamin. Jackson's indorsement disapproved the request, but he forwarded it to the Secretary as requested.

On January 30th, before the request by Loring's officers reached Richmond, the Administration decided to order Jackson to bring Loring's command back to Winchester. On that day Benjamin sent a telegram to Jackson ordering him to recall Loring immediately. The next day Jackson informed Benjamin that he had complied with the order. He further stated that he did not think he could be of much service as a field commander with such interference in his command and, therefore, requested that he be ordered back to the Virginia Military Institute as an instructor. If that were not possible, he then requested that the President accept his resignation from the Army.
On the same day that Jackson offered his resignation, Loring wrote to both Benjamin and Jackson concerning conditions at Romney. In his letter to Benjamin he requested that he have the command moved out of Romney. In his letter to Jackson he complained that he could not hold his position with the force he had and requested three thousand more troops, but he did not mention withdrawing from Romney.

When Johnston received Jackson's resignation he wrote to Jackson agreeing that under normal circumstances the Secretary of War's actions would justify the resignation, but begged him to think of the needs of Virginia and to reconsider. Johnston was also having problems with Benjamin making decisions from Richmond that were normally made by commanders in the field, and had already requested that Benjamin stop and allow him to command his army. Even on the Jackson--Loring problem, Benjamin had ignored Johnston after the latter had informed him on the 29th that he was sending an assistant Adjutant General to Romney to determine what problems existed there.

Jackson also wrote to Governor Letcher informing him of his resignation. Letcher managed to convince him not to resign. After he decided to remain in the army, Jackson brought court-martial charges against Loring for neglect of duty and conduct subversive to good order and discipline. Loring, however, was never court-martialed under these charges. He was transferred to Georgia and his command
broken up and parceled out to other commanders, but none were put under Jackson. 72

While Jackson might have been justified in his actions after Secretary of War Benjamin became involved and began giving orders, he could have avoided the whole situation if he had taken positive steps to establish good order and discipline in Loring's command instead of leaving them in Romney where he could not directly influence them. The command had already proven to him that it was undisciplined and had failed to meet his requirements, and yet, instead of working on ways to correct the problems in the command, he left them to fend for themselves while he went back to Winchester, taking with him his most disciplined unit. He did not take them for their comfort, but he did like having this brigade with him.

The Valley Army remained in Winchester until early March, 1862. General Banks moved his Union troops across the Potomac at Harpers Ferry in late February and in early March began to move south thus threatening Winchester. Banks had approximately twenty three thousand troops under his command. Jackson had approximately thirty six hundred. Threatened by such superior force, Jackson had little option but to withdraw from Winchester. So on the evening of March 12th he began moving his army south, out of town. But Jackson could not give up the town without a fight. He planned to move his forces south, but to leave his wagons
just outside town so that he could reverse his direction that night, feed and supply his troops, and conduct an early morning attack against the Union troops. He called General Garnett and the regimental commanders of the First Brigade together, told them his plan and gave the order to execute. Later in the evening, as his troops were moving out of Winchester, he held another meeting to see how the plan was progressing. At that time he discovered that the wagons had been moved to Kernstown and Newtown, both several miles away, and that several of the units had followed the wagons. An early morning attack around Winchester was then impossible. Still later that night, as he watched the last of his soldiers leaving the town, he told his surgeon, Dr McGuire, "That's the last council of war I will ever hold." Jackson's secrecy was then complete. He had begun the war very determined not to let military information get out to anyone who did not require it to perform his mission. After his experience during the Romney campaign, where the information was leaked, and Winchester, where the information was misunderstood, he would keep his plans secret from even his own generals. His refusal to tell his generals his plans insured that no one could either misunderstand or compromise his battle plans, but it would also infuriate and frustrate many of his subordinates and make leading them much more difficult.

Jackson's decision never again to hold a council of war was not the only significant result of the incident at Winchester. His ranking subordinate at the Winchester
meeting was General Garnett. Jackson’s statement implied that his subordinate commanders had failed him. As the brigade commander, the biggest failure would have to be Garnett’s. With this incident Garnett had then failed three times in Jackson’s eyes. His first failure, at Strasburg, had resulted in the First Brigade soldiers running out of control through Winchester in total disregard of Jackson’s orders; his second failure, on the Romney expedition, had kept the First Brigade from getting to a fight as quickly as Jackson had wanted; the third had caused them to miss a fight altogether, and, in fact, had caused the fight not to occur. To Jackson, a case against Garnett’s ability as a commander was building. He would soon become convinced that Garnett was unfit for command.

When Jackson left Winchester, Major General Nathaniel P. Banks’ Union forces occupied the town. As part of the Union strategy in Virginia, Banks was ordered to drive Jackson out of the Valley and then move toward Washington while Major General George B. McClellan’s Army of the Potomac moved up the Virginia Peninsula toward Richmond. Jackson’s orders were to avoid pitched battles but to keep Banks occupied so he could not detach troops to assist McClellan.

On March 17th Banks sent a strong advance force under Major General James Shields up the Valley in search of Jackson. As Shields advanced, Jackson withdrew, leaving
Colonel Turner Ashby's cavalry behind to screen his movements and delay Shields. Shields sent his cavalry ahead to penetrate the Confederate screen. They did not penetrate but reported back to Shields that Jackson had left the Valley. With this news, Shields then withdrew to Winchester and reported to Banks. Then Banks, assuming that the first part of his mission, that of driving Jackson from the Valley, was complete, began the second part, moving east toward Washington. He left Shields at Winchester to guard the northern exit of the Valley, and began his movement east on March 20th.

Jackson found out on the 21st that Banks was doing exactly what he had been ordered to prevent. Therefore Jackson had to move quickly to stop him. On the 22d he moved his army north toward Winchester. Ashby erroneously reported that Winchester was held by a small Union force of four regiments. In reality Shields' whole division of over nine thousand men was still in and around Winchester. On the 22d Ashby skirmished with a Union force near the village of Kernstown. When Jackson arrived at Kernstown on the 23d he made a quick but incomplete reconnaissance of the area and decided that, even though it was Sunday and because of his religion he did not want to initiate combat, he had to attack that day or his opportunity would be lost. Without telling anyone his plan of attack he quickly sent couriers back to hurry the infantry forward. He attacked with approximately
thirty six hundred men, still thinking that he was going against the four regiments that Ashby had reported.

As the battle developed, the Confederates were badly outnumbered. As ammunition began to run low and more Union reinforcements kept arriving, Garnett ordered the First Brigade to fall back. Jackson had not been consulted about this retreat and when he saw his old brigade moving to the rear he was infuriated. He rode over to the brigade personally to try to stop the retreat. He stopped a soldier moving to the rear and asked him where he was going. When told that he was out of ammunition and did not know where to get more, Jackson shouted, "Then go back and give them the bayonet." He then rode up to Garnett and ordered him to hold his ground. Next he grabbed a drummer, dragged him to a high ground, and told him to beat the rally. But all of this could not stop the retreating troops. Garnett had set up a new defensive line well to the rear and the brigade reformed on that line and continued to fight. But again they were driven back, and by nightfall were more than a mile from their first position. Night allowed the Confederates to break off and retire back up the Valley toward Mount Jackson where they had started. The Battle of Kernstown was over and Jackson had been defeated.

Although Kernstown was a tactical defeat, it turned out to be a strategic victory. Jackson had accomplished his objective. Because of the battle, Banks was ordered back to
the Valley. But even this good news did not soothe Jackson's anger with Garnett. Eight days after the battle he relieved Garnett of command of the First Brigade, had him placed under arrest, and filed formal court-martial charges against him for neglect of duty at Kernstown. The charge contained seven specifications. But the case against Garnett was really that he had quit the field when his troops still had the means to fight and that he had done so without orders.

The officers and men of the First Brigade thought that Garnett had acted correctly and that Jackson's charges were totally unjustified. The cheering for Jackson, which had become almost a ritual when he passed his old brigade, suddenly stopped. The men greeted Colonel Charles S. Winder, their new commander, with hoots and hisses and their conduct bordered on insubordination. This reaction was short-lived, but the officers who had been with Garnett during the battle did not forget so quickly. To a man, they agreed that Garnett had been right in his actions and that the charges were a wrong against him. Many volunteered to testify in his behalf at a court-martial. One of those who volunteered to testify was Colonel Andrew J. Grigsby of the 27th Virginia. Grigsby was well known as a brave and fierce fighter. Jackson asked Grigsby if he did not think that the brigade could have stood five minutes longer at Kernstown, to which Grigsby replied, "No Sir, they could not have stood a damned second longer."
But Jackson would not be swayed. He was convinced that Garnett was unfit to command. His opinion had been building since the incident at Strasburg and Jackson was determined to keep him from commanding. When the Adjutant General suggested to Jackson that he release Garnett from arrest and drop the charges against him, Jackson wrote, "I regard Gen. Garnett as so incompetent a Brigade commander that, instead of building up a Brigade, a good one, if turned over to him, would actually deteriorate under the command." This statement probably sums up what Jackson saw as Garnett's real crime. Not only that he withdrew without orders, but that he was causing the best brigade in the army, Jackson's old brigade, to deteriorate.

The court-martial did not convene until four months after the battle and then only met for two days. It began on August 6, 1862 and was suspended after the second day because Jackson's army began a move north that led to the Battle of Cedar Mountain. The court was never convened again. Less than a month later General Lee released Garnett from arrest and assigned him to General Longstreet. Thus the controversy was never officially decided.

Although the controversy was never settled, it taught those under Jackson an important lesson about him as a leader. Henry Kyd Douglas, who was on Jackson's staff at the time of the controversy, summed this lesson up when he wrote in the Hagerstown Mail on November 5, 1880:
If he erred in his condemnation and removal of Gen'l Garnett—a severe and cruel punishment for doing what every other officer in that little army except Jackson would have done—it was an error that the future operations and success of that army excused, perhaps justified. It taught Jackson's subordinates what he expected of them.

While all of this controversy between generals was going on the Valley Army did not stop functioning, nor did Jackson stop leading it. An occurrence the day after the battle helps to explain why the men of the First Brigade so quickly forgot about their commander being relieved and arrested and began to cheer Jackson again. Jackson had directed that the wounded be moved to Middletown, eight miles south of the battlefield. Dr McGuire worked all night using every vehicle he could get to move wounded, but as morning approached he still had many people to move and no transportation. He knew that Jackson was ready to withdraw and when he met the General he told him of his problem and said that if he did not get transportation the rest of the wounded would have to be left to the enemy. Jackson told him to impress the necessary vehicles from the local population. McGuire then stated that it would take some time to get the vehicles and asked if Jackson could stay and protect them during that time. Jackson's reply was, "Make yourself easy about that. This army stays here till the last wounded man is removed. Before I leave them to the enemy, I will lose many men more."
The men may not have agreed with Jackson's treatment of Garnett. But in the final analysis, that was general's business. The possibility of being wounded and left to the enemy was privates' business, and a man who promised that such would not happen, as long as he could prevent it, was a man worth following.

After Kernstown Jackson slowly withdrew up the Valley with Banks following. But no major engagements were fought for more than a month. This gave the Valley Army time to recuperate. It also gave Jackson an opportunity to institute a training program. Each day that they were not actually moving, the infantry conducted drill and the artillery went through the artillery manual. Even after a battle, Jackson demanded that his troops train to be better prepared for the next one.

Kernstown marked the beginning of Jackson's brilliant Valley Campaign. The campaign was a tactical masterpiece. Between March 23d, when he fought at Kernstown, and June 9th, when he fought the Battle of Port Republic, he moved his outnumbered forces up and down the Shenandoah Valley holding off two Union armies and defeating them at every turn.

During this time his secrecy was complete. Not only did the Union commanders not know where he would show up next or what he would do, neither did any of his subordinates. Speculation soon became a major pastime for everyone from general to private, with everyone trying to get any
information they could. On May 13th, William L. Wilson, a
cavalry private, recorded in his diary that couriers from
Major General Richard S. Ewell to Jackson had been passing
through his location that day. He observed that it must be
time for Ewell to act, but that because of Jackson's
"obstinate silence" Ewell had no idea what he was supposed to
do. On that day Wilson was not near either general, but
his information was correct. Ewell was about to join Jackson
in a move north to Front Royal, but all Ewell knew was that
he was about to move, not where he was going. Wilson must
have gotten his information from the couriers.

During the Valley campaign Ewell, whose division had
been assigned to assist Jackson, proved to be the perfect
subordinate for Jackson. Jackson never gave him the plan,
only terse orders about movements. Although he complained
while in his own headquarters about not knowing what was
going on, he followed his orders and did not go to higher
authority about the problem. At the same time he was
receiving orders from Generals Johnston and Lee, both
Jackson's superiors, which conflicted with Jackson's, but he
followed no orders until he checked with Jackson. On one
occasion he even made a personal visit to Jackson after
getting conflicting orders. Whether he did this because
of the Garnett case, as suggested by Douglas, is not known.
The Valley Campaign was one of the greatest tactical campaigns in history and it was strategically vital to the Confederate cause in Virginia at that time because it kept the Union forces from concentrating against Richmond. But it exhausted both Jackson and his army. During this campaign Jackson's infantry earned the name "foot cavalry" with their long, swift marches. Although Jackson used trains to move his infantry whenever possible, the few rail lines in the Valley meant that most of the movement had to be done on foot. Marches of twenty five to thirty miles a day were common, with some marches approaching forty miles a day. The army that made these marches was poorly supplied and many of the men made these marches with their feet wrapped in rags because they did not have shoes. While Jackson was pushing his men to their limit of endurance, he was also pushing himself just as hard. He literally slept in the saddle. He would have members of his staff hold his coat tails so that he did not fall from his horse while he slept.

He and his army kept up this pace almost nonstop for over two months. During that time they marched the length of the Shenandoah Valley three times and fought six major engagements along with numerous smaller ones. Most of the marching and five of the major engagements occurred in the last thirty days of the campaign. By the time he was called out of the Valley following the Battle of Port Royal on June
9, 1862 to assist in keeping McClellan out of Richmond, the campaign had taken its toll. Both the army and the general were exhausted. Neither would look like the great fighters of the Valley in their next engagement.

By the end of the Valley Campaign Jackson had emerged, not only as a great tactician, but also as a very consistent leader. He demanded strict discipline and orders were to be followed to the letter. There was no room for interpretation by subordinates, no matter what the situation. The function of subordinate commanders was to carry out the orders of their superior commander. They did not need to know what the superior intended or what his plan was, only what their duty was. He was very intolerant of what he perceived to be shortcomings in senior officers and acted quickly to remove them if, by his standards, they failed to do their duty. If time and the situation permitted, he could be very tolerant of the common soldiers and showed great concern for their welfare. But their welfare was always second to accomplishment of the mission. If he felt that the situation demanded it, he could completely ignore his soldiers’ welfare and drive them until they dropped on a march, or sacrifice them in battle against a superior force. In combat he led from the front and his coolness under fire was a steadying influence that helped his soldiers fight their own fear. If one word could sum him up, it would be strength. But his strength would not seem to be there when he got to Richmond.
CHAPTER 3

END NOTES

3. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (hereafter O.R., unless otherwise noted, all references are to Series I), (Washington, DC: War Department, 1880-1901), Volume II, pp. 784-785.
12. Ibid., p. 810.
13. This refers to the controversy over Jackson leaving Loring’s command at Romney that led to Jackson submitting his resignation.
19 Henderson, Stonewall Jackson, vol 1, pp. 122-123
22 Jackson, Memoirs, p. 167.
24 Ibid.
26 Chambers, Stonewall Jackson, vol 1., p. 357.
27 Ibid., pp. 359-361.
28 Dabney, Life and Campaigns, p. 212; Wheeler, We Knew Stonewall, p. 42.
29 Wheeler, We Knew Stonewall, p. 43.
30 Selby, Jackson as Commander, pp. 19-21; W.P. Atlas, vol 1. map 22.
31 Dabney, Life and Campaigns, p. 218-220.
34 The best discussions of the origin of the name Stonewall are Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, vol I, p. 9, and Selby, Jackson as Commander, pp. 28-29.
42 Willie Hardy to his mother, July 21, 1861, Park Library, Manassas Battlefield National Park, Manassas, VA.  
43 Robson, *One Legged Rebel*, p. 45.  
49 Cook, *Family and Early Life*, p. 3.  
59 As an example of the weather in the mountains between the two towns, the author drove from Romney, WV to Winchester, VA in Jan 1986. On the day of the trip Winchester had a bright, spring-like day, Romney was somewhat cooler with patches of snow on the ground, and the mountains between had over two feet of snow on the ground and US Highway 50, the main route through the area, had six inches of packed snow and ice on it.
63 Ibid.
65 Selby, *Jackson as Commander*, p. 55.
67 Ibid., pp. 1046-1048.
68 Ibid., p. 1053.
69 Ibid., pp. 1054-1055.
70 Ibid., pp. 1057-1060.
71 Ibid., p. 1051.
72 Ibid., pp. 1065-1067.
73 *W.P. Atlas*, vol 1, map 49.
75  W.P. Atlas, vol 1, map 49.
76  Ibid.
77  David E. Roth, "Stonewall Jackson's Only Defeat" Blue and Gray, III/6 (June-July 1986), pp. 8-11; Selby, Jackson as Commander, pp. 58-60.
79  Selby, Jackson as Commander, pp. 62-64.
81  Douglas, I Rode With Stonewall, p. 46.
85  Dabney, Life and Campaigns, p. 324.
89  Walter E. Long, Stonewall's Foot Cavalryman (Austin, TX: Privately Printed, 1965), pp. 12-14; Robson, One Legged Rebel, p. 28.
CHAPTER 4

THE SECOND YEAR

RICHMOND TO CHANCELLORSVILLE

The Battle of Port Republic ended the Valley Campaign. The Valley Army’s next operation was to assist in the defense of Richmond in what is now known as the Seven Days’ Battles. McClellan had moved up the peninsula to within five miles of Richmond. During the Battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines on May 31, 1862 General Johnston, the Confederate commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, had been wounded and General Robert E. Lee had taken command. Lee’s first priority was to keep the Union army out of the Confederate Capital. The Union army around Richmond was arrayed such that the bulk of its forces were south of the Chickahominy River, but its right flank was north of the river. Lee developed a plan to attack this right flank. His plan called for Jackson secretly to move his army out of the Valley to the vicinity of Richmond and then to turn the right flank while Longstreet and A. P. Hill made a frontal assault against the same flank. The plan was bold and very ambitious. Jackson was to move his army over one hundred miles, join with a force already engaged with the enemy, and,
with almost no time to reorganize for an attack, deliver the killing blow. If Jackson failed, the plan could not succeed.

While the plan was ambitious, after his performance in the Valley, Jackson seemed to be the one man in the army who could execute its most ambitious part. But during the Seven Days Jackson failed. His failure to execute Lee's plan was as complete as had been his success in the Valley. Unlike the Valley, the Seven Days did not require him to develop a tactical plan. Lee had given that to him. His duty there was to lead his army in executing the plan. His failure, therefore, was a failure in leadership.

Jackson's leadership of his army changed dramatically after Port Republic. While his secrecy became even more obvious, almost every other aspect of his leadership was different. The hard driving, strict disciplinarian of the Valley, who accepted no excuses for failure, was replaced by a lethargic man who did not seem to have or want very much control over his army.

Lee began developing his plan for uniting his army even before the end of the Valley Campaign. His first communication with Jackson about his plan was written on June 8, 1862, the same day that Jackson fought the Battle of Cross Keys. In that letter he asked Jackson to let him know if he thought he could leave the Valley for a few days without the enemy knowing it and, "unite at the decisive moment with the army near Richmond." He told Jackson to make his
arrangements accordingly, but not to pass up a chance to strike the enemy if it presented itself. On June 11th Lee wrote to Jackson that he was sending six regiments under Brigadier General Lawton and eight regiments under Brigadier General Whiting to the Valley so that Jackson could crush the Union forces in the area and then move his army, including Lawton's and Whiting's commands, east to attack McClellan's right flank. He also directed Jackson to precede his troops so that they could confer on making a simultaneous attack. By the 11th, based on Jackson's report of the Battles of Cross Keys and Fort Republic, Lee decided that the Union forces in the Valley would need time to regroup. Therefore he ordered Jackson to begin his movement east as soon as possible. He also warned Jackson to keep the operation a secret and to tell no one why he was personally leaving the Valley when he came to the conference.

On the 16th General Whiting, who had been made division commander for the new regiments, rode the twenty miles from his headquarters at Staunton to Jackson's headquarters at Port Republic to ask for orders. Jackson only told him to return to Staunton and that he would receive his orders by dispatch the next day. Whiting was furious at this treatment and that evening told John Imboden that Jackson had no more sense than his horse. The orders that he received the next day simply directed him to move his troops to Gordonsville at once, and that he would receive further
orders there. Gordonsville is between Staunton and Richmond and Whiting had moved his troops through there just two days before Whiting was again incensed. He told Imboden that this order proved that Jackson was a fool. Later, when he found out what Jackson’s plan was, he went back to Imboden and told him that when he had made the prior statements about Jackson he did not know the man, that his plan was worthy of Napoleon, and that he was no fool. But he brought up one excellent point about Jackson’s secrecy. He said that he should have been told the plan, for if Jackson had died, he would not have known what Jackson was trying to do and might have made a mess of it. Jackson never seemed to consider the possibility of his being unable to execute a plan, or at least never took precautions against it by informing at least one of his subordinate generals of what his plans were. His secrecy not only insured that plans could not be compromised. It made Jackson indispensable.

At dawn on the 17th Jackson’s army began to move. As H. K. Douglas put it, it was “on its way somewhere.” Jackson had disappeared and no one seemed to know where he had gone or where the army was going. Several of his staff, including Douglas, reported to General Ewell for duty. Ewell told them that he was only commanding a division on the march, that he did not know where it was marching, and that he had more staff than he needed. He also told them that Jackson might be headed toward Richmond. So the staff set out to find
their commander. They found him at noon the next day getting off a train from Staunton at Mechums River. Jackson was headed for Richmond, but had gone down the Valley to insure that all was well before he departed.

While he talked to his staff at Mechums River he told them nothing of what he was doing, simply shook hands with each and told them good-bye. While there he did hold a private meeting with his chief of staff, Major (Reverend Doctor) Robert L. Dabney, in which he told Dabney that he was going to meet with Lee and that the army was on its way to Richmond.

Why he chose Dabney to tell what he would tell no one else is a mystery. Jackson’s staff tended to be made up of very young men, but men who had shown great promise as soldiers. Dabney was the outstanding exception. He was a forty-two year old Presbyterian minister who had been a professor at Union Theological Seminary. He was a very intelligent man, but he was no soldier. He did not like the duties, the hours, or the living conditions of a soldier. He had no military training and was only in the army at Jackson’s insistence. He was the chief of staff in name only. The rest of the staff seemed to tolerate him, but not take him seriously. When Jackson boarded the train his staff had no direction or director. Therefore, being young men, they set off on a romp through the local area. When Jackson started for his meeting with Lee he left behind an
exhausted army trying to march without a destination and the only man who knew where they were going could not control the staff, not to mention the army.

Before Jackson met with Lee he accidentally met Dabney again in the town of Gordonsville on Saturday the 21st. During this meeting Dabney told him about a problem he had just had with an officer. Jackson’s reaction to this problem was totally out of character. Dabney was outraged with the commander of a brigade wagon train that he had just met on the road to Gordonsville. The train had gotten far ahead of its guards and when Dabney had corrected the commander he had replied that he had no orders, that he had just come along with no orders from anyone. Dabney told the General that if his officers were allowed to act like that, his army was "going to sticks". Jackson only smiled at Dabney and said that he realized that such things were bad, but that he had not had time to straighten such people out.

That evening he and Dabney rode the train to Fredericks Hall where Whiting’s Division was camped. He arrived there on Sunday morning and even though his army was marching to the relief of Richmond, he decided to have everyone stop for observance of the Sabbath. Although he was a very religious man, he had not allowed his religion to interfere with military operations in the past. But now he seemed quite unconcerned about moving his troops in any hurry.
Jackson left Fredericks Hall on horseback at one o'clock on Monday morning, June 23, 1862, to travel the last fifty three miles to his meeting with Lee. The trip required fourteen hours of hard riding. That afternoon he met with all of the general officers who would be involved in the attack on McClellan's right flank north of the Chickahominy River just east of Richmond. In addition to Lee and Jackson, Major Generals James Longstreet, A. P. Hill, and D. H. Hill were in attendance. Generals Magruder and Huger, who had the mission of holding McClellan's forces that were south of the Chickahominy in place, were not at the meeting. Lee explained his plan and each general's part in the operation. They then worked out a time schedule that called for Jackson to begin his turning movement north of the Chickahominy River at three o'clock on the morning of June 26th. A. P. Hill was to make a frontal assault against the Union right flank when he heard Jackson's attack begin. Jackson had said that he could attack by the 25th, but the others, led by Longstreet, convinced him that he should give himself an extra day to get into position since neither he nor his army were familiar with the area.

When the meeting was over, Jackson rode the fifty three miles back to Fredericks Hall without stopping to sleep. He had then ridden over one hundred miles in two days and had not slept in almost forty eight hours. Rain was falling by the time he reached Fredericks Hall at mid morning.
on the 24th. In addition to the rain, which would slow up the march east, he found that in his absence the march had already slowed down and the column had become stretched over several miles. He decided to halt the march until the column could close up. This meant the loss of some very precious time. He still had to move his army over twenty five miles to get into a position to launch his attack. By stopping on the 24th, he would have less than twenty four hours to move that distance. This did not seem to concern Jackson when he made his decision. His army had made longer marches, but those had been done in familiar country. He no longer had that advantage.

While his army was closing up, Jackson, instead of moving about coordinating activities as he usually did, sat down on Henry Carter's front porch and began to read a novel. This was a pastime that he rarely allowed himself, even in less pressing times. Henry K. Douglas, who was not aware of this incident, later wrote that he only saw Jackson read one book that was not strictly military or religious during the war. That occurred on July 6, 1862 when Jackson asked for a novel to read after he had taken a nap. He told Douglas then that he had not read a novel since long before the war and that it would be a long time before he read another. On June 24th, after reading for a while, he went into the Carter house and went to bed. This was the first time that he had slept since before he had started for his meeting with Lee.
Jackson gave orders that the army was to march at dawn on the 25th, but it did not start until an hour after sunrise. MAJ Dabney blamed the delay on the carelessness of what he called "julep drinking" officers. After the march had begun, mud and high water slowed it down. By nightfall Jackson was still five miles short of the location that Lee had told him to make his camp. To make up the distance the next day, Jackson decided to start the march at two thirty in the morning instead of three o'clock as he had agreed at the meeting with Lee. An army that was moving at twenty miles a day could not make up the five miles in half an hour. Jackson sent a message to Lee telling him of the delay and his planned start time on the 26th.

Jackson did not sleep during the night. He spent it going over his preparations and praying. Although their commander was awake throughout the night, the army was not awake and moving at the appointed hour. Even though Jackson had told Lee that he would be marching at two thirty, the march did not start until eight o'clock, fully five and one half hours late. When they did get started they moved very slowly. Jackson seemed to accept this slow pace even though he was already supposed to be on the field. By three o'clock that afternoon A. P. Hill became impatient waiting for Jackson to start the attack and started his frontal assault toward the town of Mechanicsville. By five he was heavily engaged. Jackson could hear the sound of the battle off to
his right. Instead of marching to the sound of the guns, he

went into bivouac.

This was the first of four failures by Jackson over

the next seven days. On the 27th his troops were again slow
to get started and slow to arrive on the field. After taking

a wrong road and having to backtrack to get into the proper
position, he did not arrive at the Battle of Gaines’s Mill

until after four o’clock that afternoon. When he did get

into the battle his fighting spirit seemed to return. Dabney
wrote that his eyes "glared with fire," and that he rode

about restlessly issuing his orders to carry the fight to the

enemy. With only about a half hour of daylight left, and the

battle not yet decided, he ordered all of his division

commanders to "sweep the field with the bayonet." But before

this order could be passed to the division commanders the

Union forces broke off the engagement and withdrew. One

of the more famous Jackson legends was born during this

battle. Sometime during the day someone gave him a lemon.

He sucked on this lemon throughout the battle. That

Jackson always sucked on lemons when he went into combat has

since become a popular story. Although he did like lemons,

this battle is the only one where he was noted as having one
during the fight.

The Army of Northern Virginia spent the 28th trying to
determine which way the retreating Union troops were going.
McClellan had three options for his retreat. He could go
northeast toward the York River, east toward Yorktown and Fort Monroe, or south toward the James River. By that evening Lee had determined that the retreat was south toward the James. He ordered Longstreet and A. P. Hill to attack the flank of the retreating Union columns and Jackson to press directly against the Union rear. On the morning of the 29th Magruder's division, which had been south of the Chickahominy, struck the rear corps of the retreating Union column in the flank just south of the river at Savage's Station. The Union troops set up a defensive line to repel Magruder. By mid-afternoon he organized an assault against this corps, expecting Jackson to cross the river behind the the Union column. Had Jackson followed the Union force across the Chickahominy, when they turned to fight Magruder, he would then have been on their flank. But Jackson did not cross the river.

Jackson's orders called for him to rebuild Grapevine Bridge over the Chickahominy and cross it as he moved after the Union force. The bridge had been destroyed by the retreating Federals. The rebuilding of the bridge became his primary concern on the 29th. Some time during the day Brigadier General D. R. Jones, a division commander under Magruder, asked Jackson to come to his assistance, but he refused saying that he had other important duty to perform. Lee, by that time, thought that Jackson's only important duty was to vigorously pursue the enemy. It is not clear if
Jackson was aware of Lee's thinking at that time because he received a message from Lee at three o'clock that directed both he and Stuart to watch the Chickahominy for any Union force that might try to cross. He followed this order by remaining in his position and continuing to work on the bridge. He finally began crossing the rebuilt bridge about two thirty on the morning of June 30th. Jackson, himself, crossed at three thirty and met with Magruder at the latter's headquarters. Again he did not sleep throughout the night.

During the Battle of Frayser's Farm, fought on the 30th, Jackson again showed a total lack of aggressive spirit. His mission was to pursue the enemy across a small stream called White Oak Swamp. When he reached White Oak Swamp he again found that the bridge that he was to use had been destroyed. The crossing site was also covered by a small Union force that prevented Jackson's troops from rebuilding the bridge. This situation seemed to confound Jackson completely. He made one attempt to cross in a rush and when this failed, he seemed to give up the possibility of crossing. There is no evidence that he attempted to find fords at other locations and when officers reported to him that they had found fording sites, he took no action. By that time, he had all but ceased to function because of his exhaustion.
When Brigadier General Wade Hampton reported that he had found a ford that would put troops across behind the Union line protecting the bridge site, Jackson asked him if he could build a bridge there. Hampton said that he thought he could build one for infantry but not for artillery. Jackson told him to build it. When Hampton finished the bridge he reported to Jackson, who was then sitting on a fallen tree. Hampton sat down beside him and told him that the bridge was ready. Without saying a word, Jackson got up and walked away.

After he left Hampton, Jackson lay down and went to sleep. When General Winder's aide came to find out why the army was not moving, the staff told him that Jackson was asleep. He later said that other than some slow artillery fire all was quiet, that it appeared to him that the army was waiting for Jackson to wake up. When he did wake up he did not appear to be rested, but still drained of energy and incapable of action. He took no action for the rest of the day. That evening while he was eating supper, he fell asleep with a biscuit in his mouth. When he woke up he said to those around him, "Now, gentlemen, let us at once go to bed, and rise with the dawn, and see if tomorrow we cannot do something!"

When he rose the next day he found the Union forces had withdrawn during the night and he could cross White Oak Swamp at will. McClellan had concentrated his troops on
Malvern Hill and any chance that the Confederates might have had of catching and destroying the retreating Union army had passed. The Confederates assaulted Malvern Hill that day, but could not force the Union troops under General Porter off. After a very bloody confrontation for both sides, Porter's troops again withdrew under the cover of darkness, this time to Harrison's Landing on the James River. Lee decided break off the attack, thus ending the Battle of the Seven Days.

Jackson's failure to live up to the standards as a combat commander that he had established before this battle has been the subject of controversy since the battle ended. Many theories have been presented to explain what happened to him. The theories range from his exhaustion being the cause, to his feeling that the Valley Army had already done its share of fighting, to his refusal to work as a direct subordinate after his independence in the Valley. All of the arguments that his actions were based on some willful refusal to work in concert with the other generals present or as Lee's subordinate do not fit Jackson's personality. Nor does the theory that he felt that his troops had done their share of the fighting. A relatively new theory that he was the victim of stress fatigue even before he left the Valley could be closer to the truth than any of the older hypotheses.
Whatever the reason, Jackson’s actions and those of his subordinates, both before and during the Seven Days’ Battles, show a weakness in his leadership. As stated earlier, Jackson had made himself indispensable. This was caused, not only by his secrecy, but also by the way he commanded. His people did not function well without him present to guide them. This was evident when he went to Richmond to meet with Lee. Most of his staff decided that since he had not given them specific instructions and since he was not there, they had no reason to remain on duty and took the time off to visit the young ladies of the area. His subordinate commanders did not know where they were going on the march and, without Jackson there to push them, they saw no reason to hurry. Therefore virtually his whole army became on more than stragglers. Again, on the afternoon of June 30th, when he stopped functioning and then went to sleep, his whole army stopped, waiting for him to wake up and tell them what to do. His requirement for strict obedience to his orders allowed his subordinates to escape any personal responsibility for inaction. Perhaps the example of General Garnett taught his subordinates more than what was expected of them. It also seems to have taught them what was not expected of them.

If Lee lost faith in Jackson after the Seven Days he never let it be known. Jackson had failed to accomplish his mission each time that it was the critical mission for
success of the Army of Northern Virginia. But Lee seemed to accept what occurred as being out of Jackson's control. In his report on the campaign, Lee did not praise Jackson, but he did not find fault with him either. This was the first time that Lee had commanded Jackson, so he might have thought that at least part of the blame was his own for not being the commander that Jackson needed. For whatever reason, Lee had been impressed with Jackson's earlier exploits. Although he made several general officer changes in the army, he was not yet ready to give up on the "Mad Man of the Valley".

The most pressing problem for the Army of Northern Virginia at the end of the Seven Days was the organization of a new Union Army. The Army of Virginia had been organized on June 26, 1862 using McDowell's Corps, Banks' Valley troops and Fremont's Mountain Department. Major General John Pope had been brought from the west to command the new army. The order that President Lincoln signed creating the army also gave it missions. Along with defending Washington, and assisting McClellan in his attempt to take Richmond, it was given the mission to overcome the forces under Jackson and Ewell.

Soon after taking command, Pope began to move his army south. The Army of Northern Virginia was then concentrated around Richmond. It was obvious that at least part of that army would have to move against Pope. The mission fell to
the men who knew the area of operations best. On July 13th Jackson and Ewell began to move north toward Gordonsville to oppose Pope.

By the time Jackson reached Gordonsville he had recovered from the lethargy of Richmond. He was again the general who had fought the Valley Campaign. Both the good and bad elements of leadership that he had displayed prior to Richmond were again in evidence. He continued to demonstrate these same elements throughout the remaining ten months of his life. Although the number of people under his command increased significantly over the next ten months, Jackson never changed his approach to leading them. Once again he was a strict disciplinarian who demanded that his orders be followed to the letter. Even though his command had grown to such a size that he could not directly control all of his units, he continued to withhold information on his plans from his subordinate commanders, thus forcing them to rely on his direct control to operate effectively. His intolerance of perceived shortcomings in senior officers also returned, as did his determination to remove any senior officer who he thought had failed to do his duty. He continued to concentrate his leadership efforts at the common soldier level, even though he had less and less direct contact with common soldiers. He did not provide effective leadership to his subordinate general officers. He did not seem to think that senior officers required leadership, only orders. While
his operations were successful during this period, his failure to adjust to the requirements of leading at higher levels in the army, to directly lead his generals instead of his privates, hindered his operations on more than one occasion.

Even before Jackson began the move out of the Richmond area he again focused his attention on his lower ranking soldiers. He began preparing his troops for future battle. He decided that both discipline and training needed improvement. Therefore on July 10, 1862 he issued a general order that forbade any soldier going to Richmond unless he had a pass signed by a division commander or issued by Jackson's own headquarters. The order also required units to conduct three drills a day. This policy was not unlike his policies at Harpers Ferry in April, 1861 or in his camp at Centreville following the First Battle of Manassas. The major difference between Harpers Ferry and Richmond was not in Jackson, but in his troops. His order for daily drill at Harpers Ferry had met with much opposition. By the summer of 1862 his soldiers accepted the discipline of camp and the restrictions on their movements without complaint. John Worsham and John Casler, two lower enlisted men, discuss their time in the camps around Richmond in their accounts of their war experiences under Jackson. Both men wrote about the pass policy and how much they wanted to visit Richmond. Worsham got to visit the town because his company received a
one day pass, Casler was granted a pass, but the army moved to Gordonsville before he got to use it. Even though one man only was allowed one day in the Capital and the other did not get to go at all, neither mentioned any complaint about the pass policy. By that time such restrictions had become a part of life. Neither man even took note of the three drills a day in their accounts.

Jackson reached Gordonsville on July 19th with 11,000 men. Pope had 47,000 under his command. When Jackson discovered the size of the Union forces opposing him he requested that Lee send him reinforcements. Lee, however, still had McClellan to contend with and was hesitant to deplete the Richmond defenses any more than he already had. For several days Lee delayed sending more troops north, but Pope began to move south, thus Lee had no choice but to reinforce Jackson.

When Lee sent reinforcements to Jackson he not only improved Jackson’s situation, he also solved a problem he was having with his generals in the Richmond area. Soon after the Seven Days’ Battles a disagreement broke out between A. P. Hill and James Longstreet. It began over press coverage of the battle that credited Hill with all but single-handedly defeating the Union Army. Longstreet resented the articles and wrote a strong letter criticizing the editor for publishing them. Because he was Hill’s commander, Longstreet did not think it proper for him to send the letter, so he had
his Assistant Adjutant General, Major G. Moxley Sorrel, sign it. When the letter appeared in print Hill refused to talk to Sorrel, even in an official capacity. He further requested that he be relieved from Longstreet’s command. Lee took no action on the request and the disagreement continued to grow. Longstreet had Hill placed under arrest for refusing to answer correspondence delivered by Sorrel. The two generals then began to disagree with each other openly. When it looked as though the two would fight a duel, Lee stepped in and managed to quiet the situation without getting one of his generals killed.

After Lee’s intervention Longstreet agreed to release Hill from arrest and, on July 27, 1862, Lee ordered Hill to proceed with his division to join Jackson at Gordonsville. On that same day Lee wrote to Jackson telling him that Hill was on the way. He also took that opportunity to counsel Jackson on two things. First, he cautioned him to not allow his troops to become exhausted and to pay personal attention to their wants and comforts. If Lee needed them again, he obviously did not want to hear that Jackson’s troops were too worn out to fight. His second counsel was for Jackson to consult with his division commanders and to keep them informed of his movements so that they could better support him. Jackson greatly admired his commanding general, but he was not prepared to take his advice about consulting with his division commanders.
By sending Hill to Jackson, Lee solved the problem of the clash between Hill and Longstreet, but in so doing he set the stage for more trouble among his subordinates. Jackson and Hill had known one another for many years. They had both entered West Point with the Class of 1846. Although both were Virginians, they had little in common. Unlike Jackson, Hill was from a wealthy, established Culpeper family. He was also an outgoing young man who was popular with his classmates. He formed many lasting friendships during his first year as a cadet, most notably with his roommate, George B. McClellan, but he found the austere, introspective, and unsociable Jackson particularly unimpressive. Hill dropped out of the Academy during his first year due to illness, but returned the next year and graduated with the class of 1847.

Even though Hill had developed a low opinion of Jackson as a cadet, he probably could have dismissed it had it not been for Jackson's performance during the Seven Days' Battles. It was the first time that Hill saw the Hero of the Valley in action; it was not a good beginning. Jackson's failure to attack on the first day had resulted in Hill's division making a frontal assault without support and suffering heavy casualties. While it can be argued that Hill should not have attacked at Mechanicsville since his orders were to wait for Jackson to attack first, Hill certainly did not see the fault as his own.
Trouble between the two men began almost immediately upon Hill's reporting to Jackson at Gordonsville. On August 7, 1862 Jackson received a report from spies that part of Pope's army was in Culpeper, but that the remainder had not yet closed. Seeing this as an opportunity to defeat the lead elements in detail before Pope could react, he immediately began his move on Culpeper. That night Jackson issued orders for his three divisions to move at dawn the next day. The order of march was to be Ewell's Division, Hill's, and then Jackson's old Division. Brigadier General Charles S. Winder was then acting commander of Jackson's Division. Some time during the night, Jackson changed the order of march. He directed Ewell to go by a different route. This would mean that Hill would be in the lead on the original road. Hill was not informed of the change in plan. On the morning of the 8th he had his division ready to move out with its lead brigade waiting for Ewell's troops to pass. Shortly after sunrise troops began to pass. Hill, not knowing about the change in plan assumed that these were Ewell's. After one or two brigades had passed, he discovered that it was Jackson's Division passing. He decided that he could not cut into the march and divide the other division, so he waited for it to pass.

Jackson rode up to Hill as he was waiting and asked why he was not moving. Hill explained that he was waiting for Jackson's Division to pass. Jackson looked down the
street and saw a column of his old division. He told one of his staff to ride to the column and order it to move on, and then rode away. Strangely, neither man asked the other about why Jackson's Division was ahead of Hill's. Both should have thought that Hill's Division was to be ahead of Jackson's, and yet they both seemed to accept the situation as it was without question.

The column moved out but had not progressed far when it was delayed at Barnett's Ford on the Rapidan River. The delay there took several hours and the result was that Hill returned to Orange Court House to make camp for the night. He had progressed one mile on the first day's march. Hill said that he had received a verbal order from Jackson to return to Orange Court House that evening. Jackson said that he had given no such order, but had instead twice urged Hill to press on. Jackson began to doubt Hill's ability to conduct a march as a result of the problems of that day. As he had done with Brigadier General Garnett, Jackson began, in his own mind, to build a case against Hill. But Hill was not like Garnett; he would not accept Jackson's accusations so quietly.

General Hill was not the only leadership problem that was facing Jackson during the time that he was trying to begin his movement toward Pope's army. He was also having a problem with stragglers. Since straggling was a problem of common soldiers, Jackson probably felt more comfortable
dealing with it than with Hill. At least he took more positive action in dealing with it than he did with Hill.

Straggling has been a problem for armies since men developed the idea of moving large numbers of soldiers from place to place as a group. Jackson's army was no exception to this. He and his subordinate commanders were constantly faced with the problems of straggling and dedicated a lot of time and effort to its reduction. When they were at Gordonsville General Winder decided that a way to reduce straggling was to have the stragglers bucked. To be bucked a man sat with his knees pulled up to his chest, his hands were tied at the wrists and slipped over his knees, then a stick was placed under his knees and over his arms. Winder issued an order that required roll to be called at the completion of marches. Any man who was not there to answer roll would be bucked the next day from sunrise to sunset.

When the division marched to Gordonsville about thirty men did not answer the roll at the completion of the march. John Casler was among this group. Some of the officers from the Stonewall Brigade went to Winder and tried to convince him to forego the punishment. It had never been used in the brigade before and the men not only thought it severe, but also degrading. But Winder was determined that it would be carried out. So the next morning all the guilty were taken out into the woods and bucked. That night about half the men who had undergone the punishment deserted. Casler did not
desert, but told his captain that if the punishment were ever repeated on him, he would never shoulder his musket again. He said that he could not fight for a cause that treated its soldiers in such a manner.

After the first incident a group of officers went to Jackson about the bucking order. Jackson told Winder that he did not want another man in the division bucked for straggling. Needless to say, this made Jackson very popular with the men, but it did not cure the problem. The next time that he was confronted with straggling as a major problem, Jackson reacted much more harshly.

Unlike the confusion on the 8th, the army got an early start on the 9th and made good progress on its march toward Culpeper. Hill had his division up and on the march before daylight. Throughout the morning the leading elements reported retreating Union cavalry to their front. Shortly before noon the head of the column was approximately seven miles from Culpeper. As they approached Cedar Run, Ewell's troops reported that the Union cavalry had massed in some strength a mile in front of them and was no longer retreating. Ewell ordered artillery forward to engage the cavalry. When the artillery opened fire, Union artillery fired back. It was obvious that the column had met a sizable enemy force that intended to fight. Jackson quickly deployed his troops for combat.
The troops opposing the Confederates were part of General Banks' corps, which had reached Culpeper on the 8th. Banks had sent one brigade south to Cedar Run and although he had General Ricketts' division moving from Culpeper toward Cedar Run when Jackson arrived, Ricketts had not closed and Banks was outnumbered on the field when the two forces met. In spite of being outnumbered, Banks ordered a general attack. This attack initiated the battle known as Cedar Run, Cedar Mountain, and also Slaughter Mountain.

At first the attack made progress. The Southern troops began to break, but Jackson drew his sword and rode forward, into the fray, urging his troops to rally. His presence steadied his shaken troops and they held until reinforcements could be brought into the fight. While Jackson was rallying the troops, General Taliaferro rode up, told him that the middle of the fight was no place for the army commander, and insisted that he go to the rear. Jackson stared at him for a moment, then said "Good, good," turned his horse and slowly rode to the rear.

When Jackson rode up to stop his retreating troops, he had already set in motion the counterattack that carried the day. Hill's division came up and turned the Union left flank, thus forcing them to retire across Cedar Run. An attempt to pursue the defeated Union force was stopped by Ricketts' division, which had hurried forward when the battle began.
On August 10th Jackson learned that all of Pope's army was in the area. He did not have sufficient force to attack an army that large, therefore he went into defensive positions until the 12th, then he withdrew back to Gordonsville. Lee also realized that Jackson could not defeat Pope alone, therefore he ordered Longstreet to Gordonsville on the 13th. On the 14th he learned that McClellan was evacuating the Peninsula. With McClellan no longer a threat to Richmond, Lee could concentrate his efforts on defeating Pope. He left two brigades to guard the city and moved the remainder of the Army of Northern Virginia to Gordonsville.

When Lee unified his army at Gordonsville Jackson's Army of the Valley ceased to exist as a separate force. Although the First and Second Corps had not yet been officially recognized, they existed from August of 1862 as the "Left and Right Wings" under Longstreet and Jackson respectively.

As soon as Lee arrived at Gordonsville he began to try to outmaneuver Pope. This maneuvering went on for several days without notable result. But during this maneuvering another problem between Jackson and Hill occurred. Jackson assigned Hill to take the lead in crossing the Rapidan at Somerville Ford on August 20th. Jackson later claimed that he ordered Hill to begin movement at "moonrise." Remembering the experience at Orange Court House, shortly after
"moonrise" but before dawn, Jackson went to check on Hill's progress. He found that none of Hill's troops were moving. When he found a brigadier general and questioned him about the delay, he was told that no marching orders had been given. Jackson then ordered the division forward.

Once again Hill's failure to move seems to be the result of poor communications between Jackson and himself. Lee's written order of the 19th had stated that the move would begin at "dawn of day." But Lee had subsequently changed the time to "moonrise." For some reason Hill did not act on the change; either he did not understand the change in time, or he chose to follow Lee's written order instead of a verbal order given by Jackson. It is doubtful that Jackson gave the order to Hill personally, since it was his practice to send his staff to deliver verbal orders to his subordinates. For whatever reason the delay occurred, it was the second time that Jackson had been disappointed in Hill's performance.

The rift between the two generals was also widened by an incident during this period that did not personally involve Hill, but one of his brigade commanders. On the night of August 21st some men in General Maxcy Gregg's Brigade burned some fence palings in a bonfire. This was in direct violation of Jackson's standing order against destruction of private property. Jackson's reaction was to order Gregg and all five of his commanders arrested. Jackson
had obviously overreacted to the incident and the six officers were quickly released from arrest, but only after they had compensated the farmer whose fence had been destroyed. Hill considered Jackson's actions unfair, but more importantly, an example of Jackson's leadership overall.

As the two armies maneuvered around one another, Pope was being reinforced. Lee feared that if he did not take decisive action soon McClellan's whole Army of the Potomac would join Pope. The combined armies would greatly outnumber Lee's forces. Therefore on August 24th Lee decided on an extremely audacious plan to defeat Pope before he could receive more reinforcements. His plan called for Jackson to take half the army and secretly move northwest, up the Rappahannock River, cross the river, then move east into Pope's rear and cut his line of communications with Washington. While Jackson was moving, the remainder of the army would conduct a diversion and then follow him. Lee was risking defeat of his divided army in detail if Pope determined what he was trying to do. But he hoped that Pope would make a mistake and thus allow the Confederates to go on the offensive.

Jackson moved out early on the 25th and by the night of the 26th had severed Pope's line of communications at Bristoe Station on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. Reminiscent of the Valley Campaign, Jackson had force-marched
his troops over fifty miles in two days. No one, except Jackson and his chief engineer, Captain J. K. Boswell, who led the column, knew where they were going as they started the march, but the veterans of the Valley Campaign knew that Jackson was making one of his then famous flanking movements. All went well on the march; straggling was even within acceptable limits. By the time they reached Bristoe Station men were exhausted, but spirits were high and Jackson was very pleased with his soldiers. The next day he moved seven miles up the Orange & Alexandria to Manassas Junction where the Union Army had established a large supply depot. Even the iron discipline of Jackson could not control his hungry troops when they arrived at the depot. Most of the day was spent looting the Union supplies.

Jackson was able to make the march to Bristoe Station without trouble because Pope's army lost contact with him. Most of his movement to the northwest on the 25th was reported to Pope, but the Union cavalry lost him before he made camp at Salem that night. Pope decided that Jackson was moving back into the Valley and sent scouts west to find him. When Jackson turned back toward the east on the morning of the 26th, his change in direction was not reported to the Union commander. Pope did not know where Jackson was until the night of the 26th when the telegraph between him and Washington went dead. A party sent to determine what had happened to the telegraph reported the Confederate troops in Bristoe Station.
By the morning of the 27th Pope knew that Jackson was across his line of communications and that Longstreet was moving to join him. Pope decided to defeat both in detail by first attacking Jackson and then Longstreet. But before Pope could engage him, Jackson again disappeared on the night of the 27th. He had moved west over the old Manassas battlefield and taken up a defensive position in the woods near the Warrenton Turnpike. At that point Pope seemed to forget about Longstreet and focused all his attention on finding and defeating Jackson. Jackson reappeared late on the 28th when he attacked General King’s division as it marched up the Warrenton Turnpike. Through the 29th and the morning of the 30th Pope concentrated his forces to eliminate Jackson. By the afternoon of the 30th he had Jackson trapped in his defensive position and was attacking him with superior numbers. Then Longstreet, whom Pope had ignored and allowed to close to within a mile of Jackson’s right flank on the 29th, attacked Pope’s flank and the Union troops were soon driven back to Henry House Hill. During the night Pope withdrew his forces to Centreville. The Union army had suffered its second defeat in a battle on the same ground in 62 thirteen months.

After his victory at Manassas, Lee decided that the time was right to take the war into the north. He could not support his army in war-ravaged northern Virginia, and to withdraw south would give the initiative he had just won back
to the Union army. Although his troops were ill prepared for an invasion, he considered it his best option. Therefore, Confederate troops began crossing the Potomac on September 4, 1862.

When the Army of Northern Virginia began its move toward the Potomac straggling once again became a critical problem. Thousands of men were dropping from the ranks. There were several reasons for this sudden increase in straggling. Many men opposed the invasion of Union territory, they had joined the army to defend their homes, not invade. Many others were barefoot because the army could not supply shoes and their feet were not tough enough to allow them to march the long distances required. Many others were weakened because they developed severe diarrhea from eating green corn. During this campaign the army was subsisting on a diet made up mostly of green corn because the Confederate commissary could not supply them. When these new problems were added to the old problem of stragglers who did not want to fight, the loss of fighting strength became serious. Jackson, the man who just two months before had forbidden Winder from bucking stragglers, had a very simple solution to the problem. He ordered that anyone who fell from the ranks was to be summarily shot.

No one was actually shot for straggling. But this was due to the quick thinking of the chief provost marshal, Major D. B. Bridgford, not Jackson's lack of intention to have the
order carried out. Bridgford developed a system for checking anyone who left ranks. He had a doctor check those who claimed to be sick. He also checked passes of those who claimed to be authorized to break ranks. Those who were found to be straggling were placed under guard and marched off to the first major general going into action to be placed in the most exposed portion of his command. This system, along with Jackson's order, greatly reduced the problem.

Jackson's complaints against Hill's marching also resurfaced as the Maryland Campaign began. On September 4th, the first day of the campaign, Hill once again started his march late. Jackson was watching Hill closely on this march. During the first hour he thought that Hill was setting too fast a pace and that he was leaving too many stragglers. At the end of the first hour Hill broke one of Jackson's cardinal rules. He did not halt for a rest break. Jackson himself stopped the first brigade. Hill, who had been riding ahead of his men, came back to see why the column had stopped. When he asked the brigade commander, he was told that Jackson, who was still with the brigade, had ordered it. Hill then offered his sword to Jackson saying that if Jackson were going to command the division, he was not needed. Jackson told him to consider himself under arrest. As the army began its most ambitious operation of the war, Jackson removed his most experienced division commander from command.
By September 7th Lee had concentrated his army around Frederick, Maryland. He had expected the Union garrisons at Martinsburg and Harpers Ferry, Virginia to quit their positions when he isolated them with his move into Maryland, but both garrisons remained in place. These troops threatened his line of communications through the lower Shenandoah Valley and had to be eliminated. Therefore on the 9th, he ordered Jackson to take the two towns.

Jackson began his move out of Frederick at four o'clock the next morning. Since Hill was under arrest, he had been forced to follow his division into Maryland and, as Jackson began the move to Martinsburg and Harpers Ferry, was still no more than a spectator. But when it became obvious that a battle was near he asked a member of Jackson's staff, Kyd Douglas, to go to Jackson and request that his arrest be suspended and that his division be returned for the duration of the fight. Jackson agreed to this without comment.

The Confederates took Martinsburg without a fight on the 11th and proceeded to Harpers Ferry. They took the high ground surrounding the town and began an artillery bombardment. The Union garrison had little choice but to surrender. The garrison surrendered on the morning of the 15th.

After the capture of Harpers Ferry Jackson moved to Sharpsburg, Maryland to rejoin Lee. Lee had planned to move his army back into Virginia, but had decided to stop at Sharpsburg, concentrate his forces, and wait for McClellan.
By the time Jackson left Harpers Ferry he must have reconsidered his opinion of Hill because he left Hill in charge of coordinating the details of the surrender.

When Jackson reached Sharpsburg on the 16th the two armies were already facing one another across Antietam Creek. The Army of the Potomac had arrived on the 15th, but McClellan had delayed attacking the Confederate position. He again delayed throughout the 16th, thus allowing Lee to concentrate his army. McClellan finally launched his attack on the morning of the 17th. The resulting battle was the bloodiest single day in American military history. The combined casualties came to 22,719.

The Battle of Antietam or Sharpsburg contained no master stroke of great tactics. McClellan simply attacked Lee with his superior numbers, first on Lee's left, then in the center, and then on Lee's right. Meanwhile Lee stubbornly held his ground. But by late afternoon the attack under Union General Burnside was about to turn the Confederate right flank. Just then Hill's division marched onto the field. Hill had forced marched his division the seventeen miles from Harpers Ferry that day. Without halting he attacked from the march into Burnside's flank. Within an hour the surprised Union troops were driven back to the banks of Antietam Creek. The battle ended after Hill's attack without a clear winner. Although his army had been badly hurt, Lee remained in position at Sharpsburg until the 19th.
Then he withdrew back across the Potomac, thus ending the Maryland Campaign. After Lee withdrew his army back into Virginia, both armies began a period of relative quiet as they rebuilt their forces. In late October McClellan began to cross the Potomac and move south once again. Lee's reaction was to divide the Army of Northern Virginia, leaving Jackson in the Valley near Winchester while he retreated slowly before McClellan until he reached Culpeper on November 6th.

During this period the Army of Northern Virginia reorganized into two corps. Jackson and Longstreet were advanced to the rank of Lieutenant General and, on November 6, 1862, Longstreet was given command of the First Army Corps while Jackson was given the Second Army Corps. Jackson took his promotion in stride. There is no evidence that he sought the advancement, as he had his promotion to Brigadier General, nor did he make mention of it in his letters after he was selected. He seemed to be much more comfortable in his position within the army. Perhaps, as one of the two corps commanders under Lee, he had satisfied his ambition.

The one disruption of the quiet period after Sharpsburg for both Lee and Jackson was A. P. Hill. Jackson had not placed Hill under arrest again after the Battle of Sharpsburg, and seemed prepared to drop the subject of Hill's arrest altogether. But Hill was a proud and willful man who felt that Jackson had degraded him in front of the whole
army. He thought that Jackson should be reprimanded for wrongfully arresting him. Therefore on September 22d, he formally requested that Lee hold a court of inquiry on Jackson's charges. His actions in this case were not unlike those of a young Major Jackson in Florida in 1850 when he felt that he had been wronged by his commander.

On the 24th Lee attempted to relieve the situation without a court when he wrote to Hill that what had appeared to Jackson to be neglect of duty could not have been intentional on the part of an officer of Hill's character and would surely never be repeated. He further stated that any further investigation into the matter would offer no advantage to the service but would instead be a detriment at that time.

But Hill was determined to not let the controversy end without some public action against Jackson. After Lee refused to hold a court, Hill drew up charges against Jackson and forwarded them, through Jackson, to Lee. When Jackson received the charges against himself, he felt obligated to also forward his charges against Hill. He did not actually write up any charges until after Hill had made formal charges against him. When Jackson did finally write up his charges, he also wrote that he did not think a formal hearing was necessary. If the dispute between the two ever had any basis in the maintenance of good order and discipline in the army, it had, by that time, long passed. The situation had
deteriorated into a personal vendetta between the two men. While Jackson was ready to let the controversy stop where it was, he was not willing to take any positive steps to end it.

Lee decided that he could not settle the matter between these two, so he put the charges in the confidential files and left them, saying that he did not then have time to study the case. He had already decided that these were two of his best generals. In his recommendation to President Davis concerning the promotions of Jackson and Longstreet he had written, "Next to these two officers, I consider A. P. Hill the best commander with me." Any formal action would hurt one or the other, and thus hurt the Army of Northern Virginia. Given the situation that his army faced in the fall of 1862, he could not afford to risk either man in a public hearing.

On November 7, 1862 other circumstances required the controversy between Jackson and Hill to be forgotten for the time being. On that day President Lincoln replaced McClellan as commander of the Army of the Potomac with Major General Ambrose E. Burnside. By November 9th Burnside had developed a plan to concentrate his forces near Warrenton, as if he were going to attack either Culpeper or Gordonsville, and then to move southeast to Fredericksburg and from there on to Richmond. By the 17th his lead elements were in Falmouth, across the Rappahannock from Fredericksburg.
Burnside's rapid shift to Falmouth caught Lee's divided army in a vulnerable position. But delays by the Army of the Potomac in crossing the Rappahannock allowed Lee to once again recall Jackson from the Valley and thus concentrate his forces before the Union army could attack. Jackson, then at Winchester, began his move to join Lee on November 22d but did not tell anyone where the corps was going until he reached Fisher's Gap, some 60 miles from Fredericksburg, on the 25th. On the 30th he reached Fredericksburg and the Army of Northern Virginia was again united.

The Union army did not begin to cross the Rappahannock until the night of December 10th and were not completed until the 12th. On the 13th Burnside finally attacked the Confederate positions. Lee had chosen to defend the heights south of Fredericksburg. This battle was similar to Sharpsburg in that the Union attacked while the Confederates defended. But the high ground south of Fredericksburg was a much better defensive position than Lee had at Sharpsburg. The Union assaults were repulsed with heavy losses. Burnside continued to try to break the Confederate lines throughout the 13th with very little success. He wanted to continue the attack on the 14th, but his subordinate commanders convinced him that he was using up the Army of the Potomac attacking positions he could not take. Burnside withdrew across the Rappahannock during the night of the 14th.
After the Battle of Fredericksburg the Union army made another attempt at conducting operations, but was stopped by heavy rains and mud. Both armies then went into winter quarters. The Confederate Second Corps established its winter quarters around the Corbin home of Moss Neck on the Rappahannock. Jackson spent most of his time at Moss Neck insuring that strict discipline was enforced within his Corps. One example of this occurred in the Stonewall Brigade. During that winter the Stonewall Brigade had six men tried by court-martial for desertion. Two of the six were sentenced to be flogged and three were sentenced to death. The Brigade Commander, General Paxton, wrote to Jackson saying that the punishments were too severe. Jackson responded that one of the problems with the army was its overly lenient courts; when a court faithfully discharged its duty its decisions should be sustained. General Lee also upheld the punishments of the court-martial, but President Davis overrode the two death penalties.

Jackson’s time was also taken up that winter fighting A. P. Hill once again. On January 8, 1863 Hill wrote to Lee again requesting a trial. On January 12th Lee replied to Hill with a rather long letter in which he stated that any commander had a right to place a subordinate officer under arrest and to release that officer without a trial by court-martial if such action was not warranted. He was of the opinion that Jackson had exercised that right and that he
hoped that Hill would agree with him that no further prosecution of the case was necessary. Hill did not agree. He demanded that Jackson be publicly rebuked for having him arrested. He also forwarded his charges against Jackson once again and requested that he be tried on them.

The situation was further complicated by a policy of Hill's that was in contradiction to Lee's policy. Hill required that all orders affecting his division go through him. Lee preferred that orders involving staff operations go directly to the staff officer. This became an issue involving Jackson when Lee ordered him to find out who had been in General Lane's headquarters talking about a message copied from a Union signal line. Such messages were to be kept secret. Hill's signal officer had been the guilty party. When he was reminded of the requirement to keep such information secret, he replied that he was responsible to General Hill and Hill's orders were different. Jackson then relieved the signal officer and ordered him to report to Lee. Hill demanded to know why Jackson had relieved his signal officer and the controversy again became high priority for both Hill and Jackson.

By late April Jackson, feeling that Hill was disregarding his orders and undermining his authority as corps commander, requested that Lee relieve Hill. Once again Lee delayed acting on the request.
On April 29th the Army of the Potomac, then commanded by Major General Joseph Hooker, began to cross the Rappahannock in an attempt to turn Lee's left flank. By three o'clock that afternoon Hooker had the greater part of four corps, some 54,000 men, across the river and in Lee's rear near Chancellorsville. Hooker then halted his advance waiting for reinforcements. This halt allowed the Confederates an opportunity to react. Lee began shifting his forces to the left to meet the Union advance. Throughout the 30th the Union troops remained around Chancellorsville as reinforcements arrived. On May 1st Hooker began to move once again. By mid afternoon he had Lee in an excellent position to defeat him, but he stopped the advance and ordered his troops back to their positions around Chancellorsville for the night.

Not content with defending, throughout the 30th and the 1st Lee and Jackson had been looking for a way to attack Hooker. Jackson attempted to advance toward Chancellorsville on the 1st, but could not overcome the enemy in front of him. On the night of the 1st the two generals met to discuss the possibilities for an attack. During the meeting Jeb Stuart arrived to report that the Union right flank was in the air. With that information, Lee decided to turn the unsecured flank. The cooperation between Lee and Jackson was about to yield what many have called their greatest victory.
Lee had 43,000 men at Chancellorsville; Hooker had 73,000. On the morning of May 2d Jackson began his move around Hooker with 26,000 men. During the afternoon General Sickles, who had discovered Jackson's move, made a limited attack against his column. This attack had some success, but did not stop Jackson. The success of the attack convinced Hooker that Jackson was retreating and he gave orders to prepare for a pursuit. By 6 o'clock that evening Jackson had turned Hooker's flank and was in position to attack. The attack quickly routed the Union right flank. As darkness fell, the Union forces had regrouped in a defensive line that halted the Confederate attack. That night, Jackson and his staff rode out between the two armies searching for a weakness in the Union lines that would allow him to continue the attack. As they were returning to their lines in the dark, Confederate pickets mistook them for Union cavalry and fired on them. Four members of the party were killed and Jackson was mortally wounded. Ironically, as Jackson lay there wounded, the man who held his head in his lap and comforted him was A. P. Hill.

When Jackson was wounded Hill took command of the corps, but was himself wounded shortly thereafter. Command then passed to Jeb Stuart. Jackson was moved to a nearby house where doctors began trying to save his life. Stuart's first action as the corps commander shows how little Jackson's leadership style had changed during the two years
of war. Because he did not know the plan of action, Stuart
sent Major Pendleton to see Jackson to ask what should be
done.
CHAPTER 4

END NOTES

2. Ibid., p. 910.
3. Ibid., p. 912.
10. Ibid., p. 492.
17. Ibid., p. 504.
22 O.R., XII, pt. 2, pp. 491-495.
24 O.R., XII, pt. 2, pp. 675.
26 W.P. Atlas, vol 1, map 46.
28 Ibid., p. 70.
29 Ibid., p. 915.
33 Ibid., p. 919.
34 Casler, *Four Years*, p. 98; Worsham, *Jackson's Foot Cavalry*, pp. 105-106.
35 Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, vol 2, p. 79.
36 Casler, *Four Years*, p. 98; Worsham, *Jackson's Foot Cavalry*, pp. 105-106.
39 Ibid., pp. 918-919.
40 Ibid., pp. 918-919.
41 Ibid., pp. 918-919.
43 Ibid., pp. 111-112.
49. *Ibid*.
61. *Ibid*.
64. Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, vol II, pp. 149-152.
This was part of Special Order 191, the famous "Lost Order." SO 191 is not discussed in this thesis. For a detailed account of SO 191 see Sears, *Landscape Turned Red*, pp. 381-386; and Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, vol II, pp. 715-723.


W.P. Atlas, vol 1, map 66.


W.P. Atlas, vol 1, map 66.


Chambers, *Stonewall Jackson*, vol 2, pp. 238-239.


Ibid., p. 247.


Ibid., p. 325.

W.P. Atlas, vol 1, map 85.


W.P. Atlas, vol 1, map 87.
92 Selby, *Jackson as Commander*, pp. 204-205.
CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

JACKSON AS A LEADER

Lieutenant General Thomas J. Jackson died on May 10, 1863. By the time he died his reputation as the great Christian soldier of the south had already elevated him to mythological proportions in the eyes of many Southerners. He had become the symbol of southern victory. Many felt that his death ended any hope the Confederacy had of winning the war. General Lee certainly added credence to such thoughts when, after the war, he said that if Jackson would have been with him at Gettysburg, he would have won the battle. For many years after the Civil War those who wrote about the Army of Northern Virginia treated Jackson's memory as sacrosanct; any criticism of their fallen hero would have poured salt in the psychological wounds of a defeated people.

Recent biographers have attempted to give a more balanced view of Jackson. In their attempts to look critically at his career all have recognized his tactical genius, but some have found him wanting as a leader. His success as a leader has been attributed to his ability to win battles only. It has been asserted that men only gradually
accepted the trials and tribulations that they had to suffer under Jackson because they recognized his supreme talent as a tactician who could win battles.

Attributing Jackson's success as a leader to his skill as a tactician is a simplistic view of the requirements of leadership. While military leaders must be good tacticians to win battles, a great deal more is required of a leader than a good battle plan to get his force to the battle in a condition that will enable them to execute his plan successfully.

To determine the quality of Jackson's leadership, his leadership must be compared to a standard. The attributes that he possessed must be compared to the attributes required of a good leader. The principles that guided his actions must be analyzed in the light of the principles that should guide a leader in performing his duties. Because he was a senior officer who never commanded any unit smaller than a brigade during the period studied, his leadership of large units must be compared to the unique requirements of leadership at high levels. When each of these areas has been assessed individually it will then be possible to draw conclusions about the quality of Jackson's leadership and how it either assisted or hindered the accomplishment of his missions. It will also be possible to determine if his exercise of leadership has any applicability to the problems faced by leaders today and in the future.
As discussed in Chapter 1, good military leadership is based on eleven principles. Further, a leader must possess ten attributes or traits that allow him to effectively apply these principles. Since these traits of the leader are the foundation of leadership, a logical beginning for the examination of Jackson's leadership is to compare the attributes he displayed with those of a good leader as listed in Table 2 on page 6.

1. Be committed to the Professional Army Ethic of loyalty to the nation’s ideals, loyalty to the unit, selfless service, and personal responsibility.

Jackson displayed selfless service to the Confederacy and dedication to his unit throughout the period studied. An example of this was his refusal to take a furlough after the First Battle of Manassas. Another example of his selfless service was demonstrated during the winter of 1862-1863 while his Corps was in winter quarters at Moss Neck. Again he refused to take time to visit his family, even though he had not been home since the war began and he had never seen his daughter. He felt that it was his duty as an officer to remain at his post to set the example.

2. Possess professional character traits of courage, competence, candor, commitment, and integrity.
Even before his death, Jackson's physical courage in combat was legendary. Both his mental courage and candor were demonstrated by his refusal to bend when he thought he was right, even when he knew that his superiors did not agree with him. Although many things can be said both for and against his court-martial charges against Generals Loring, Garnett, and Hill, each demonstrated Jackson's mental courage and candor because in each case he risked his own position as a commander. Even those with whom he had difficulty did not seriously question his integrity. An example of this was General Garnett's statement just prior to Jackson's funeral when he said, "I believe he did me great injustice, but I believe also he acted from the purest motives."

3. Know the four factors of leadership, the follower, the leader, communications, and the situation.

Jackson's greatest shortcoming as a leader was in this area. He did not accept that different situations and different followers required different leadership styles. He saw no reason to treat a general officer any different than he treated a private. He always demanded blind obedience to his orders, no matter what the situation or who received the order. His controversy with A. P. Hill is an excellent example of Jackson's failure to appreciate the difference in followers. That Hill was a proud and willful man who carried his vendetta against Jackson to extremes can not be denied.
But he was also a very good soldier and outstanding division commander. Jackson’s challenge as a leader was to make full use of Hill’s many attributes in accomplishing their common mission, not change his personality to what Jackson thought it ought to be. Had Jackson met his leadership challenge, the vendetta would never have occurred. Each time that Jackson found Hill’s performance lacking in some way his corrective action was to attack Hill’s pride. When Jackson placed him under arrest, he did it in front of one of Hill’s brigades. As a soldier in combat, Hill had proven he could personally withstand a great deal. But one thing he could not accept was being belittled in front of his men. Jackson never seemed to appreciate what he had done to his very proud subordinate when he caused him to lose face.

4. Know personal strengths and weaknesses of character, knowledge, and skills.

He understood his own weaknesses and took action to alleviate their effect on both himself and his unit. He depended heavily on his religion to help him combat the weaknesses in his character. Where his knowledge or skills were weak he studied as much as possible to improve himself. He also surrounded himself with people who possessed the skills he lacked and depended on them to fill the voids in his own ability. The prime example of this was his dependence on Major Jedediah Hotchkiss’ ability to make
maps. Although Jackson could quickly read the terrain of a battlefield and determine the best use of that terrain to defeat the enemy, he did not have that same ability when maneuvering over great distances or planning campaigns. He needed to study very detailed maps to develop a course of action. Hotchkiss could make those maps. The one occasion when he had neither Hotchkiss nor his maps was the Battle of the Seven Days. Among the many problems that Jackson had during that time was that he could not properly orient himself on the terrain. This resulted in his troops marching down the wrong roads and having to backtrack to get into the fighting. Backtracking was one of the reasons that his troops failed to attack at Gaines' Mill.

5. Know human nature.

FM 22-100 clarifies this requirement by stating that a leader must know human needs and emotions; how people respond to stress; and the strengths and weaknesses of the character, knowledge, and skills of his people. Jackson seemed to be a good judge of the knowledge and skills of his subordinates and, on a macro level, their strengths and weaknesses of character. He never gave any indication that he appreciated the effects of stress on people or considered human needs and emotions when faced with a decision. An example of his disregard for such things occurred during the Valley Campaign when his quartermaster, Major John Harman, requested leave.
because his family had been stricken with scarlet fever. Jackson granted him forty eight hours to visit his family. When he got home he found that two of his children had already died, and that two more were seriously ill, one near death. Harman requested an extension of his furlough. Although he was sympathetic, Jackson refused and ordered the Major to return to the army immediately. A few days later Harman was notified that the child had died. Again he went to Jackson and requested time off to attend the funeral. Jackson again refused the request because he did not feel that Harman could be spared for the time it would take him to go to the funeral. Jackson did not consider that Harman's utility during that time was questionable at best. Major Jedediah Hotchkiss wrote to his own wife about the incident saying that Harman was completely unmanned by the deaths of his children.

6. Know the requirements of the leadership position.

To meet this requirement a leader must be technically and tactically proficient. He must understand the technical capabilities of the weapons systems available to him and how to tactically deploy those systems to maximize their effect. Jackson's Mexican War experience as an artilleryman and his teaching of artillery tactics at VMI allowed him to develop a high degree of technical competence with artillery, the most
complex weapon system of the Civil War. Through the study of
military history he developed a vast base of knowledge in
tactical deployment of all the weapons available to him.
This knowledge gave him a definite advantage over many
generals of the time, particularly early in the war, when
many generals were learning what their weapons could do and
how to use them through mistakes on the battlefield.

7. Know how to develop necessary individual
   and team skills, cohesion, and discipline.

As evidenced by his training of the Stonewall Brigade,
Jackson proved to be very adept at this at the common soldier
level. However, he did not demonstrate the same ability to
develop senior officers, nor did he seem to make any effort
to develop senior officers under his command. He thought
that these men should not require development. If they did,
his solution was to get rid of them, not develop them.

8. Provide direction.

This attribute requires the ability to set goals,
develop plans, solve problems, and make decisions that lead
to accomplishment of those goals. It demands that the leader
know what needs to be done and how best to do it. From the
beginning of the war when he took command at Harpers Ferry,
Jackson demonstrated the ability to provide direction to his
command when he "produced order out of chaos." His
ability to decisively provide direction was one of his strongest characteristics as a leader. Men followed him because they believed that he knew what needed to be done and how it should be done.


Although a very quiet man by nature and early training, Jackson began the war implementing his direction very well. But as his plans became more sensitive and he became more secretive about them, he tended to be less willing to communicate his direction to anyone. While the lower ranks did not expect to know what immediate goals were, the senior leaders did expect to know and many times resented not knowing.

10. Motivate subordinates by developing morale and esprit in the unit; teaching, coaching, and counseling.

Once again, Jackson did this very well at the beginning of the war. While at Harpers Ferry he began developing esprit in the First Brigade through his involvement in the training program that he established. His continued personal involvement in the brigade’s training and the victory at Manassas made the brigade a very cohesive unit. It also convinced them that they worked for the best general in the army. After he was made Commander of the Army
of the Shenandoah he did not work closely with his soldiers. But the members of the First Brigade, the only ones who knew the General, willingly told other soldiers how great Jackson was. The other units also saw the brigade cheering him whenever he passed. During the Romney Campaign the other units thought that both Jackson and the First Brigade were crazy. But as he began to win battles in the Valley and the Richmond papers began to extol his virtues as a commander, the opinion of the First Brigade began to spread throughout the ranks without any effort on Jackson's part. His reputation did more to form esprit in his army than anything he did toward trying to develop it.

Considering Jackson's attributes for leadership, it is now necessary to examine how he applied those attributes to the principles of good leadership in his efforts to influence others to accomplish the missions he was given.

1. Know yourself and seek self improvement.

Jackson sought self improvement throughout his life. Not only did he study the art of war to make himself a better soldier, he also studied his religion and worked very hard to improve his character. He was aware of such faults as his ambition, and his letters to his wife make it plain that he spent a lot of time thinking about his faults and ways to improve on them.

2. Be technically and tactically proficient.
This principle requires that a leader know what needs to be done--tactical proficiency, and also what can be done with the assets he has available--technical proficiency. The two are inseparable. Jackson's great reputation as a tactical genius gives testimony to his technical proficiency. Had he not known how to use his available assets, his tactics would have failed.

3. Seek responsibility and take responsibility for your actions.

Jackson always sought responsibility. He sometimes worried that he would not be given enough responsibility as was evidenced by his letters to his friend Jonathan Bennett just prior to his promotion to brigadier general. There is no evidence that Jackson ever openly declared any responsibility for his actions. But he also never tried to deny responsibility. He did not explain his actions. He left it to his superiors to determine if he had met his responsibilities, just as he determined if his subordinates had met theirs.

4. Make sound and timely decisions.

On only one occasion did Jackson fail to make timely decisions. During the Seven Days' Battles his decisions were slow and he sometimes failed to make decisions at all, as when he was told about the fording sites at White Oak Swamp. But the Seven Days was an aberration for Jackson.
His decisions were normally timely. The soundness of his decisions is somewhat more difficult to judge. He took risks in battle and anytime a commander decides to take risks, the soundness of his decision is open to the interpretation of the person making the judgement. On every occasion that he took risks, subsequent events proved that his decision to take the risk was right. All but one of his risks resulted in a Confederate victory, and even his defeat at Kernstown resulted in accomplishment of his mission of holding Banks in the Valley.

5. Set the example.

If Jackson believed in any principle of leadership, it was this one. Whether leading from the front in combat, refusing to take a furlough, or obediently following the orders of his superiors, he always set the example that he wanted his soldiers to follow. He believed that setting the example was one of the most important responsibilities a leader had.

6. Know your soldiers and look out for their well-being.

On a macro-level, Jackson knew his soldiers very well, much better than he knew his senior officers. This was demonstrated by his ability to motivate the common soldiers under his command while having problems motivating his
generals. This discrepancy may have been due to Jackson's upbringing as a poor mountain boy. His background had a great deal more in common with the members of the lower ranks than with his generals, who tended to come from the more affluent families of the south. He looked out for his troops' welfare when his mission allowed it, and could be very adamant about insuring that their conditions were the best that could be had. But if the well-being of the troops clashed in any way with accomplishment of the mission, the mission always took priority. His Romney Campaign, where his army was nearly destroyed by the mountains and the weather, is an excellent example of his disregard for his soldiers' well-being when taking care of the soldiers would have meant failure to accomplish the mission. He followed the old army adage of "Mission First" completely.

7. Keep your soldiers informed.

Jackson's refusal to follow this principle has become part of the Jackson legend. His secrecy insured the security of his plans since the enemy could only speculate what he would do next. But, as discussed earlier, his refusal to tell his generals what his plans were caused him problems as a leader and also put his plans at risk. If he were incapacitated for any reason, no one else could have implemented the plan, since no one knew what it was.
8. Develop a sense of responsibility in your subordinates.

Jackson's secrecy affected his implementation of this principle. He held his subordinates accountable for carrying out his orders and could be very harsh in his punishment of those who did not execute precisely as he had directed. This policy made his subordinates acutely aware of their responsibility for carrying out his orders. But his refusal to allow them to know what was going on removed any responsibility on their part without orders. If they did not know what the plan was, and they had no orders, they could justify taking no action until they received orders. This situation occurred at White Oak Swamp when the army waited for Jackson to take a nap.

9. Ensure that the task is understood, supervised, and accomplished.

Jackson was good at personally supervising, whether it was getting out and watching training to insure that it was being done properly as he did at Harpers Ferry, or placing himself at a critical point on a battlefield as he did throughout the war. He was not a commander who sat in his headquarters and waited to see how things turned out. He got involved in the action, no matter what that action was.

10. Train your soldiers as a team.
Jackson was one of the better generals of the Civil War at applying this principle. From the beginning of the war he insisted that his units conduct combat training. While other units relaxed between battles, his troops drilled. The units were not only better prepared for combat because of this training, but also had higher morale and esprit.

11. Employ your unit in accordance with its capabilities.

Jackson was able to expand the capabilities of his forces beyond what could logically be expected of them. On two occasions he obviously overextended their capabilities. He did not believe that his troops had limitations. As he said to General Garnett when talking about his old brigade during the Romney Campaign, "I never found anything impossible for this brigade." His other overextension occurred during the Seven Days' Battles when both he and his army were too exhausted to go from the Valley Campaign into another fight. No evidence exists that he even considered the condition of his army before telling Lee that he could do it. Jackson continued to operate at or near the limits of his soldiers' capabilities up through his turning of Hooker's right flank with a numerically inferior force at Chancellorsville on the day that he was mortally wounded. In most cases he managed to achieve his aims, but he took risks each time he tried it.
The attributes and principles discussed thus far have been primarily concerned with Jackson's direct influence over people. As a senior commander, he was also required to have an indirect influence over his subordinates. As discussed in Chapter 1, a senior level leader must have an indirect influence as well as direct if he is to create the conditions for sustained organizational success. To be an effective senior level leader, he must have a vision of the goal that the unit works toward and communicate that vision to his subordinates; he must have well developed historical, operational, and organizational perspectives; and he must provide purpose, direction, and motivation to the members of the organization.

Jackson consistently demonstrated that he had a very clear vision of what he wanted his command to accomplish. But, because of his secrecy, his vision of that accomplishment was rarely evident to his subordinates until after it was accomplished. His Valley Campaign is an excellent example of this. Everyone assumed that his overall objective was to defeat the Union forces in the Valley, but he was the only one who knew how he intended to do it. Because his subordinates did not know his intentions, he was dependent on several factors over which he had no control. The two most obvious were that he had to remain personally effective and he had to be able to communicate with his subordinates almost constantly. If he had been incapacitated
in any way his vision of the campaign would have been lost. Since he placed himself in the same danger as his soldiers during combat, he risked the success of the campaign each time he went into battle. Also, his plan required periodic concentrations of separated forces; the commanders of these forces did not know about these concentrations or even where they were to move until they received a movement order from Jackson. If the Union Army had been able to cut his communications with his subordinates at a time when he needed to concentrate his force, no concentration would have occurred.

In addition to vision, senior leaders are required to have well developed historical, operational, and organizational perspectives. Jackson spent most of his adult life developing his historical perspective. As was discussed earlier, he studied the history and art of war for fifteen years before the beginning of the Civil War. Although weapons had changed requiring adjustments in the application of the principles of war, the principles themselves had not changed. Jackson understood these principles and how their application had changed over time in the past. This knowledge allowed him to make the changes necessary to apply the principles to his own situation.

His study also gave him an appreciation for the operational perspective of doctrine and the art of war plus the capabilities of men in general and the machines of war.
that he had available. He pushed his soldiers to the limits of their capabilities, and exceeded the capabilities of many individuals. But pushing his men to their limit allowed him to win when less effort would have resulted in defeat. An example of his appreciation of the machines available to him was his determination to collect all the railroad rolling stock he could get. At Harpers Ferry he captured engines and had them transported south using horses to pull them on roads because he appreciated the value of rail transportation to the war effort and there were no railroads that went south out of Harpers Ferry without going through Union held territory.

Organizational perspective is related to operational perspective in that it is an understanding of the conditions and capabilities of the people within the leader’s specific unit. Jackson generally understood what his troops were capable of doing. He did, however, sometimes allow his desire to reach his objective cloud his view of their capabilities, as in the Romney Campaign.

The final requirement outlined by the Army for its senior leaders is to provide the three imperatives of purpose, direction, and motivation to his organization. Jackson did provide direction and motivation to his troops, but did not concern himself with purpose. Purpose allows the members of a unit to know why they are fighting. Jackson’s soldiers came to him with that knowledge. Most of them
considered the Union Army as invaders. Their purpose was to repel the invaders. Jackson made no effort to expand on this purpose and it was probably unnecessary for him to do so.

Jackson provided direction for his forces, but he did it in an indirect way. He never told them what his goals were or how he intended to move toward those goals. But, as he won victories and attained his goals, and more importantly, as soldiers saw what the goals had been and approved of them, they began to trust in his judgement. They followed orders to march without knowing where or why. Their goal became doing whatever Jackson directed because they believed that Jackson had selected a proper course of action, even though they did not know what the course was.

As with direction, the motivation that Jackson provided his soldiers took time. He did not talk to his soldiers so they had to depend on the results of his leadership to be motivated to future action. Until his reputation became so great that everyone in the Army of Northern Virginia knew and revered him, he had problems with every new unit that he took command of until he established himself as a leader worthy of following.

Thomas Jackson was a man of extremes. As might be expected, when his leadership is compared to each of the requirements for a good leader, his actions tend to the extremes. He met some of the requirements extremely well, while he failed to meet others altogether.
He was not the perfect leader. Some of his faults as a leader had a negative impact on his ability to accomplish his mission. His inability to effectively lead his general officers cost him the services of an able officer in General Garnett. It also led to a personal war with General A. P. Hill that caused both of them to spend time and effort on their personal battles rather than dedicating that time and effort to the mission. His failure to recognize the physical limits of both himself and his soldiers contributed to the poor showing during the Seven Days’ Battles when his army did very little to help in the defense of Richmond. His secretiveness and his demand that subordinates follow orders explicitly also contributed to the poor performance. Those subordinates who had commands capable of performing the mission did not have orders to act and under Jackson would not act without orders. Even if they had shown the initiative to act on their own, they did not know what needed to be done.

Although Jackson was not a perfect leader, the positive aspects of his leadership far exceeded the negative. He was totally dedicated to the performance of his duty and through his actions, let his soldiers know it. He had prepared himself through study before the war and knew his business as a combat soldier. He insisted that his soldiers train for combat and placed that training above all other activities. He led by example and asked no one to take
personal risks that he did not take himself. Finally, he was brave. In the words of Jomini:

The first of all the requisites for a man's success as a leader is that he be perfectly brave. When a general is animated by a truly martial spirit and can communicate it to his soldiers, he may commit faults, but he will gain victories and secure deserved laurels.

The study of Jackson's leadership is as relevant today as it was during the Civil War. Although the weapons of war have changed drastically over the 124 years since Jackson died, the concepts that make a combat leader effective have not. Commanders do not lead weapons systems; they lead men. While a knowledge of weapons and their employment is a required part of successful leadership, it is only a part. A knowledge of what Jackson did as a leader that was effective, as well as what he did wrong, would be valuable information for those who might one day be called on to lead in battle. Such knowledge would clear, if just a little, some of what Clausewitz called the "Fog of War" for an inexperienced combat commander.
CHAPTER 5

END NOTES

2. Selby, *Jackson as Commander*, p. 49.
8. See pages 92 and 93 for discussion of White Oak Swamp.
10. See pages 57 to 60 for discussion of the Romney Campaign.
11. See page 93.
13. His mission was to hold the Union forces in the Valley and to not become decisively engaged. But the results show that he not only intended to hold them, he intended to beat them while they were there.
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