A Report
Prepared by the
US Army Training Board
May 1987
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report covers the conclusions and recommendations of an Army Training Board project designed to determine how the Army can best assist reserve component unit commanders in the execution of their training mission.

The broad conclusions of the report orient on relating the Army's approach to identification of training requirements, training management, and training support to the realities of the training environment of reserve component units. It discusses the Reserve Component training environment and its implications and translates them into recommended actions and approaches which are designed to optimize the capacity of units to train effectively within the constraints that face them.

The recommendations contained in this report are interactive. Taken together they are designed to provide a framework within which unit commanders can maximize the potential of their units during premobilization training. In order to do this, the Board recommends that the Army initiate concurrent actions designed to reduce and simplify the administrative burden on units, review and delimit the total training requirement expectation, and provide an RC oriented training support system designed to meet the unique requirements of reserve forces.

The report contends that the reserve component training challenge is considerably different from that of the active component and that approaches to maximizing the effectiveness of training in RC units requires solutions derived from an understanding of that challenge and a recognition that methods and procedures which are effective for the active Army will not always have equal applicability to the RC.
Section I reviews, in brief, the new challenge facing reserve component units. Section II provides an overview of the methods used to conduct the study. Section III provides an examination of the reserve component training environment and the implications of it with respect to effective training. Section IV discusses the nature and extent of RC training requirements as they now exist and proposes methods designed to permit clearer focusing on a more limited number of individual and collective tasks in professional schooling and unit training. Section V discusses the impact of administrative requirements on unit training time and suggests methods to reduce it in order to free units to train more effectively. Section VI discusses the Army's training management system as it applies to RC units and recommends that Army training management doctrine address the unique management challenge in RC units more completely, that training guidance to RC units be regularized, and that the number of headquarters to which units must respond be decreased. Section VII covers a variety of issues pertaining to support of unit training and recommends that funding of ARNG and USAR units be made more equitable, that a more coherent RC training device strategy be implemented, that a stronger AC-RC institutional training relationship be established, that ARNG-USAR unit interface for training be strengthened, and that special attention be devoted to the training of CSS units.

Appendices to the report provide a description of study methodology and procedures, and an extensive bibliography of pertinent directives, training guidance and studies related to training in units.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTION</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>PAGE(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</td>
<td>i-ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH</td>
<td>5-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>THE RESERVE COMPONENT</td>
<td>7-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>TRAINING ENVIRONMENT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>UNIT TRAINING REQUIREMENTS</td>
<td>20-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>UNIT ADMINISTRATION</td>
<td>27-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>TRAINING MANAGEMENT IN UNITS</td>
<td>31-36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>TRAINING SUPPORT</td>
<td>37-52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>APPENDICES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>STUDY METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURES</td>
<td>53-61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>62-94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECTION I

INTRODUCTION

In 1935, facing imminent attack by Italy, the Emperor of Ethiopia issued the following mobilization order:

"Everyone will now be mobilized and all boys old enough to carry a spear will be sent to Addis Ababa. Married men will take their wives to carry food and cook. Those without wives will take any woman without a husband. Women with small babies need not go. The blind, those who cannot carry a spear, are exempted. Anyone found at home after receipt of this order will be hanged."

Haile Selassie was not prepared, and he knew it. Faced with the threat of attack by a large, modernized Army, he had to fight a quickly developing war without the benefit of a trained and organized force that could be activated for rapid employment. One thing was certain—the regular army was not going to be able to meet the threat alone.

It has been a long time since the United States faced a crisis approaching the magnitude of Ethiopia's in 1935, and one of the principal reasons is our continued and growing recognition of the vital importance of our reserve forces in the national defense structure.

Not too many years ago our attention to this key element of the Armed Forces had lagged, and our capacity to respond was in danger of falling behind our requirements for responsiveness.
Toward the end of 1971, shortly after Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird announced a total force concept, the Board for Dynamic Training, forerunner of today's Army Training Board, reviewed the status of training in the Army. In a review of what the Reserve Components wanted and needed the most they cited:

- Formal association with the Active Army.
- An expanded budget.
- Enhancement of NCO proficiency.
- More and better assistance from the school system.
- Inducements for recruiting and retention.
- Revitalization of training in the RC with advanced training devices.
- Higher level command (brigade and above) recognition of its responsibilities to reduce the administrative load and orient on resourcing and supporting unit training.
- The adoption of a total force training system.
- The creation of an RC tailored training program.

The wisdom of these observations and recommendations is evident both in the remarkable progress which has been made and the continuing validity of the insights. Over the past decade, but particularly during the 1980's, the United States Army has instituted a host of initiatives designed to strengthen, support, and upgrade the readiness of our Reserve Forces. Over the past several years the Army has put teeth into reserve force readiness with modernized equipment, expanded training opportunities and a variety of programs which interface the active and reserve component elements of the total Army with increasing frequency, and mutual benefit.

The end result of these activities and initiatives is that the terms of reference within which we train our reserve forces have changed for the better and this change is permanent. The
days of "summer camps" and "social clubs," readily acknowledged by those who were there, are gone and they will not be returning. Our Reserve Components are better equipped, better trained, and better led than anytime in their history. Across the country Army National Guard and Army Reserve units are grappling with complex problems of combat readiness with greater intensity and a stronger sense of professional responsibility than ever before.

The mechanism through which the Army's concerted efforts to upgrade the combat readiness of the Reserve Components has taken place is the "One Army" or "Total Army" concept founded on a need for levels of readiness far exceeding those of the past. Those needs in turn are based on the velocity of technological advances in warfare and an increasingly aggressive expansionism on the part of potential enemies which suggest that rapidity of response will be essential in any conflict, large or small. When these phenomenae are coupled with the increasing probability of any conflict being conducted in a joint environment, and we recognize that many of our required forces for such operations are in the Reserve Components, their probable role looms larger than ever. The critical link between the existence of appropriate forces and their potential for rapid deployability is effective training.

Optimizing the effectiveness of training is the legitimate goal of every unit in the Army, but nowhere is the mandate to do so, or the consequences of failing, more evident than in our reserve forces. They operate and train in a unique environment foreign to, and not well understood by, the active force. In this environment, outlined later, the margin for error is narrowed to its lowest point. The capacity of units to recover quickly from even minor false starts, disconnects, and interruptions is severely limited by the absence of most of the inherent training flexibility available to Active Army
units. The fundamental nature of the training environment for reserve units is set by a number of key truths, some of which are subject to minor modification, but not to substantial change. Chief among these are time available, dispersion of units, and the nature of the chain of command.

The Reserve Component Unit Training Project (RCUTP) is an examination of what the Army can and should consider doing to facilitate the capacity of Reserve Component units to optimize their training readiness.
SECTION II

METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH

The Reserve Component Unit Training Project (RCUTP) was conducted by the U.S. Army Training Board under the auspices of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) with the support and assistance of the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM); the National Guard Bureau (NGB), and the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR).

Officers and senior noncommissioned officers from the Board, the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) in equal numbers participated in the conduct of the project. A total of 17 officers and 12 noncommissioned officers from the Reserve Components participated in the project.

The purpose of this project, in accordance with the provisions of the Army Training Board's DA charter, was to conduct an objective analysis of what the Army, at any level, could and should consider doing to enhance the capacity of Reserve Component unit commanders to optimize the readiness of their units through training.

During the course of the project all current documents pertaining to the training of the RC (a total of over 300) from the pertinent federal statutes through Continental United States Army and state Adjutants General level training guidance were reviewed; all known relevant studies, papers and reports on Reserve Component training conducted over the past 10 years (over 100) were analyzed and a total demographic analysis of RC units was executed. Current programs, methods, and procedures and ongoing initiatives were examined by special study teams. Most importantly, members of the project team held in-depth discussions with 1656 key trainers in 386 Army National Guard and Army Reserve units and 91 other organizations involved with RC unit training.
Selection of troop program units (TPU) and other organizations was made using accepted and verified techniques for random sampling designed to provide a 95 percent confidence interval with less than a 5 percent estimated sampling error. These criteria are applicable in nine categories: overall RC units, National Guard units, Army Reserve units, ARNG Combat Arms (CA), Combat Support (CS), and Combat Service Support (CSS) units, and Army Reserve CA, CS and CSS units. The methodology used was validated by the Soldier Support Center-National Capital Region (SSC-NCR) and the TRADOC Analysis Command (TRAC).

The unique value of this effort lies in the fact that it was a fully integrated Active Component/Reserve Component project involving on-the-ground discussions with the most comprehensive representation of Reserve Component units ever undertaken.

A detailed outline of the study methodology is contained in Appendix A.
SECTION III

THE RESERVE COMPONENT TRAINING ENVIRONMENT

General. The combination of factors which together ultimately describe the environment within which Army National Guard (ARNG) and United States Army Reserve (USAR) units train is complex and challenging. On the surface, the nature of the training challenge appears to parallel that of the active Army, albeit under far more time-limited conditions. Just beneath the outer layer of apparent commonality, however, lie a host of factors which drive the nature of planning, dictate the methods of managing and evaluating, and prescribe the limits within which training is and can be executed.

Almost everything about the reserve component (RC) training environment is at least somewhat, and often significantly different from that of the active component (AC). While the similarities between the two parts of the total force are important, it is the differences, and their ramifications which are critical to optimizing training. These differences and what they mean are not, according to both RC and AC trainers involved in the day-to-day business of training our ARNG and USAR units, well understood by the active force. From senior commanders to company and detachment commanders this message comes through clearly. The purpose of this section is to examine and highlight some of the key characteristics of the RC training environment and what they infer. Overarching all other factors is that of time. It is literally of the essence for the RC.

Time. Of all the factors which impact on a reserve component unit's capacity to train, time is both the most crucial and the most obvious. It is generally understood that time to train is a critical factor for these units; and broadly, though less
well understood that this time is discontinuous. Reserve Component units are officially allocated 39 days per year to accomplish their training (actually minimums of 39 for ARNG and 38 for USAR). This factor has been the subject of considerable scrutiny over the last several years and additional time has been resourced for use by the RC. Various statistics indicate higher averages than the classic 39 days. While these averages are accurate, they can be misleading in that most of the additional time allocated is used by individuals, designated units, and one-time or infrequently recurring requirements (JET, NTC, REFORGER, etc.). On the ground the typical (and large majority) RC unit spends about 41 days per year in a collective environment for training. At best (using 240 days as a base) this means RC units have less than 1/5 the time available to their AC counterparts; at worst (using 365 days as a base) they have slightly less than one of every 9 days available to AC units.

This collective environment is divided into two parts: Inactive Duty Training (IDT) and Annual Training (AT). IDT time is allocated based on discrete periods called Unit Training Assemblies (UTA). Each UTA must, by definition, be at least 4 hours long, though they may be longer. The typical RC unit (there are selected exceptions such as aviation, nuclear and airborne units which receive more) is allocated 48 UTA's (or 24, 8 hour days) per year. Whenever two or more UTA's are combined into a continuous training period, the result is called a Multiple Unit Training Assembly (MUTA). A MUTA-4, therefore, is a continuous block of four UTA's, etc.

The classic 39-day allocation is derived from the combination of these 24 days plus 15 days of AT. An RC soldier is paid one day's pay for each UTA attended, therefore for pay purposes, one UTA equals one day, while one (if extended) or two UTA's equal a training day. The allocation of 48 UTA's per year conveniently divides into 12 blocks of 4 UTA's, or two,
8-hour days per month. Units are not constrained to organize their UTA's in this way as regulations permit sufficient flexibility to enable them to construct variations. Units tend to organize training on a two, 8-hour day, one weekend per month, basis. Selected weekends normally align with those of a higher headquarters.

The actual amount of effective training time which this allocation provides is somewhat less than it appears, for it incorporates travel time between armories/reserve centers and external training sites (local training area, motor pool, etc.), unit formations, religious services, and general administrative chores. In addition to these routine decrements, most special requirements imposed on the unit by higher headquarters, up to and including Department of the Army, which require access to, or participation by, all members must be executed during this time.

Annual Training (AT) consists of 14 continuous days for USAR units and 15 for ARNG. In each case, this time may be extended to 17 days (to cover all or part of travel time) without an exception to policy. AT is typically, and almost always, conducted during the summer at an RC or AC major training area. During these periods units are able to assemble at higher levels than during IDT and, depending on the construct of the unit, normally go to AT in a battalion or higher configuration or in conjunction with such a unit. While AT provides the means for units to assemble and train at higher collective levels, few units have their full assigned strength available at AT as a number of their soldiers will be training elsewhere (basic/advanced training, NCOES, etc.) during the same period.

Training during AT is essentially continuous though it is often broken in the middle to provide some free time and to handle administrative requirements. The mid-AT break is slowly being discarded in favor of a similar period at the end of AT.
While 14-17 days, including travel, are allocated for AT this does not mean that they are all available for effective training. On the average an RC unit gets no more than 11 days for effective field training out of these periods. The remainder is used for travel, pick up and turn in of equipment, administrative set up, a break period, etc. The break provided RC soldiers has, on occasion, been the subject of controversy, but it is incorporated to provide some time to soldiers for a respite during a period in which they are frequently giving up their only vacation period to serve, hence the function it plays goes beyond a simple matter of "giving up" two days which could be used for training.

Finally, at the individual and personal level, there is a constant interplay between the demands for time of a soldier's unit, civilian job and family. In spite of federal laws to the contrary, the tolerance of employers for service that interferes with their interests varies considerably across the nation. Whenever the pressure of civilian job requirements on which their livelihood depends, or family needs, interfere, the RC soldier--though he or she may prefer to stay--will often leave the service.

While there is some variation in the allocation and availability of time to an individual unit in a particular year or small groups of units over several years, the nature of the time factor for RC units is as described above and the implications are important. They are:

- RC units have approximately 1/5 of the time allocated to the AC to meet combat readiness requirements.
- Total time available to RC units is less than the apparent time available.
- There are practical limits to the lengths and frequencies of IDT periods.
Training during IDT, with rare exceptions, is, at best, limited to the collective level of the unit occupying an individual armory/reserve center.

Training must be organized and managed in small discrete increments.

Intensive management is required to extract the maximum amount of effective training time out of IDT and AT.

Reliable long-range planning and coordination are fundamental to success.

Minor disruptions to carefully planned training can create major disruptions to yearly training plans.

Discontinuity interrupts the flow of planning, coordination, and execution of training. Sustainment of skills is made more difficult.

The overall time constraints on RC training cannot be substantively changed as they are shaped by factors which are not likely to vary in consequential ways (employer tolerance, family time, civilian requirements, etc.). Enhancing effectiveness of training is, therefore, a qualitative versus quantitative matter for RC units. In spite of the overall time constraints, U.S. RC units have more time allocated than RC units of any allied country to include those, such as Israel, whose national survival depends on them.

All other key factors impinging on RC unit training affect, or are affected by, the time box. One of these is dispersion.

Dispersion. The RC force is a dispersed force in a wide variety of ways. The 7000 + RC units in the force are based in over 4000 separate facilities. At unit (battalion/separate company and detachment) level the average distance to its headquarters is 105.6 miles, and it takes almost 3 hours to get there. Comparable units in the active force through brigade and frequently division level are within walking distance. At battalion level the average unit is dispersed over a 150-mile
radius and some extend to over 300. Their AC counterparts are typically clustered within a mile or less of each other. At the higher levels of command (MUSARC, division), few headquarters have all of their subordinate units in the same state; many extend over several, and some cover as many as 12 states. Comparable AC units live on a single installation or on several within a few hours drive. The dispersion of RC units is dictated largely by recruiting capacities related to population densities and the ability of soldiers to get to their units for training from reasonable distances. Even so, many travel several hundred miles one way to train during IDT and some travel up to 500. This level of dispersion within units, among other things, forces commanders and many others to devote more time to moving between their units and to higher headquarters than their AC counterparts do.

Distance between units is only one effect of dispersion. The distances from a given unit to almost every other common training support location is also lengthened. On the average, RC units travel 9.2 miles to get to a motor pool, primarily to access wheeled vehicles. To get to their major equipment at Mobilization and Training Equipment Sites/Equipment Concentration Sites (MATES/ECS) they travel 128.5 miles. In order to reach a collective training site they travel 40.1 miles to the nearest Local Training Area (LTA) or 154.2 miles to the nearest Major Training Area (MTA). To go to a rifle range, RC units travel 65.7 miles (only 20 percent have usable local small caliber ranges) and if an RC unit wishes to draw devices for training, it travels 149.2 miles to get them. These are all average one-way distances and whenever they come into play, time is used to make the trips.

The factors that generate the dispersion of RC units are not subject to significant change, thus approaches to mitigating the impact of dispersion cannot count on changing
the dispersion itself. The impacts of dispersion on RC unit training are:

- Communication and coordination among and between units is made more difficult.
- The frequency with which units can effectively use training facilities and areas is diminished.
- The level of difficulty in providing support, evaluation, and other services to subordinate units is increased.
- The ability of next higher headquarters to influence training in person is diminished.
- Reaction time to change is increased.
- Major restructuring of forces (putting all divisions in single states, all Europe oriented units on the east coast, etc.) is precluded.
- Training in units is and must be decentralized.

In the active Army turbulence is a significant factor affecting training. It is also true in the Reserve Components.

**Turbulence.** It is generally believed that while RC units train under some severe constraints compared to their AC counterparts, stability is the major positive offsetting characteristic. While this perception is true in straight line comparison terms, it is false in relative terms. In fact, RC units experience more rather than less, relative turbulence than their AC counterparts.

Turbulence comes in several forms, the most common one applies to personnel. The FY 86 reported forcewide annual turnover experienced by the ARNG and USAR for enlisted personnel was 18.7 percent and 30.7 percent, respectively. At unit level, however, these figures are 32.0 percent and 43.0 percent. (13 percent leave their unit but stay in the force). At the E5 and below level, turbulence in units rises to 37.5 percent and 48.7 percent per annum. Relative to training time
available, in conservative terms, this equates to AC annual turnover rates of between 187 percent and 243 percent per year.

Unlike the active force, many soldiers joining an RC unit are not MOS qualified. Between 38 percent (USAR) and 53 percent (ARNG) of them (non-prior service) have no military training on assignment and a portion of the remainder (prior service) do not have MOS training in the positions to which they are assigned. The result is that approximately 70 percent (USAR) and 75 percent (ARNG) of all new enlisted soldiers arriving in a unit each year require training to qualify for the MOS to which they are assigned. In addition to the obvious training challenge which this phenomenon creates, 12.6 percent of the personnel assigned to the average RC unit are non-deployable according to commanders.

Personnel turbulence is not the only factor involved for RC units, they are also faced, as are their AC counterparts, with a significant level of structural turbulence. RC units have historically faced a higher level of structural turbulence than the AC, as units were converted wholesale from one functional area to another (tank battalion converts to a signal battalion, etc.). This type of structural turbulence is on the decrease, but is still a part of the way of life in the RC. As the force is modernized, RC units, like AC units, are undergoing major structural changes based on TOE series transitions and new equipment introductions. This type of change is on the increase. On average, RC units will experience more of these changes over the next decade than their AC counterparts as they will transition through a larger number of systems (AC M-60 units convert to M-1, RC unit converts from M48A5 to M-60 to M-1). In FY 1986, 122 RC units were activated, 18 were inactivated and 233 underwent major conversions (about one unit of every 20 in the force). Each of these structural changes is accompanied by a major management workload sometimes including
the physical relocation of soldiers, but more often by having to leave groups of soldiers where they are and convert them in place. This in-place conversion creates large scale MOS changes which then become an added training and training management challenge for the unit. In extreme cases in which units convert from one type to another (an H to J series change converts the scout platoon to a tank platoon or the entire unit goes from combat arms to combat support) the unit is faced with an almost completely revised set of individual and collective training requirements which will take several years (read 39+ day periods) to assimilate. Unlike their AC counterparts, they are not issued a new group of MOS qualified soldiers to start up the new organization.

The turbulence levels faced by RC units is significant and they are not likely to decline rapidly or appreciably in the near term. Turbulence is a part of the training environment. The implications for training are:

- The overall impact of turbulence is greater on RC units than on AC units.
- RC units always have an irreducible minimum number of soldiers who have not fulfilled MOS qualification criteria.
- Records keeping and management requirements increase.
- The percentage of assigned strength available for training in units is reduced.
- Personnel turbulence is a significant training distractor in RC units.
- MOSQ is a major and continuous challenge.
- The capacity of units to manage change is challenged.

The Chain of Command. Most active Army units respond directly to the requirements of a single, unambiguous chain of command though some respond indirectly to more than one headquarters. The chain of command for most RC units is less uniform, and they respond to more of its elements.
The lines of authority in the RC are complex. At DA level, the two elements (the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve) each have their own Army level staff office. The office of the Chief of the Army Reserve (OCAR) acts as a staff manager on the Army staff and a conduit to FORSCOM on resources for the USAR. The Director of the Army National Guard (DARNG), subordinate to the National Guard Bureau (NGB), has more authority and influence with respect to ARNG units. At the Army major command (MACOM) level, command authority over USAR units is clear—it is vested in the CG, FORSCOM; however, while FORSCOM has responsibilities and requirements with regard to ARNG units, it does not act as their command MACOM. Command responsibility for ARNG units is vested in the several state and territorial governors who execute their responsibilities through Adjutants General. There is, therefore, no single MACOM which has "command" authority over the ARNG—there are 54 of them (50 states, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and the District of Columbia). This does not mean that there is no unifying element, FORSCOM fulfills this role for the Army, but its formal and authorized relationship to the ARNG varies from that of its relationship to the USAR. This phenomenon is the result of the dual responsibilities of the ARNG for both state and federal service and their status by federal statute during periods in which they are not federalized (which includes both IDT and AT; AT, though not IDT, is active federal service for USAR units).

Five, RC oriented, Continental United States Armies (CONUSA) are directly subordinate to FORSCOM and execute the FORSCOM commander's responsibilities within geographic areas (Multiple States and territories). Their relationship to the ARNG and USAR units is the same as FORSCOM's.

Below the CONUSA's and state AG's the chain of command diverges into USAR and ARNG commands. These commands, are primarily area based. The names and structure of higher
commands differ between the ARNG and USAR. In the ARNG with its preponderance (over two thirds) of Combat Arms units and consolidation of units within single states, commands tend to follow standard Army structure. The primary exceptions to that structure are State Area Commands (STARC) and/or Troop Commands. These organizations usually act as the peacetime headquarters for those units which are not organic to brigade or equivalent units located within the state. Even in the ARNG, structure and command is not simple. Seven of the ten ARNG divisions are split between two or more states thus several state AG's oversee the training of elements of these divisions. The wartime headquarters of units in the STARCS or Troop Commands are in the active Army, another state or the USAR.

The command structure in the USAR is more complex and less internally consistent with respect to mobilization missions. The USAR, with its preponderance of CSS units (almost 60 percent) and CS units (slightly less than 25 percent), cannot organize for training along classic lines as easily as the ARNG. A large number of USAR units are organized at the separate company, platoon/detachment level and their mobilization headquarters are spread throughout the force. In addition to the general diversity and lesser coherence of USAR units in general, many groups of them have few and some have no AC counterparts. Some types of units exist exclusively in the USAR and others comprise a large majority of their type in the total force.

USAR commands subordinate to CONUSA's are called Major U.S. Army Reserve Commands (MUSARC). These commands are normally authorized a Major General and they report directly to a CONUSA CG. They equate to Division level units in a Corps. MUSARC's consist of Army Reserve Commands (ARCOM) and General Officer Commands (GOCOM). All ARCOM's are MUSARC's but only some GOCOM's are MUSARC's while others (19) are subordinate to an
ARCOM. This system is somewhat less confusing in the USAR than outside of it. The larger commands in the USAR are, with the exception of some of the GOCOM's, organized along geographic versus functional lines in order to reduce span of control. The result is that most MUSARC's are responsible for a wide variety of units whose principle common denominator is that they are based within a pre-described geographic area. Commanders at this level and their subordinate commanders, many of whom face similar diversity, are faced with a complex training management and evaluation challenge.

The RC chain of command is not the only one to which unit commanders must respond. CAPSTONE, roundout and other interface programs place varying degrees of responsibility for responsiveness and compliance on RC units. In the ARNG almost all units have some responsibilities to the state with regard to state, versus federal, missions. It may be reasonably stated that the chain of command in the RC is more complex, diverse and difficult to deal with than it is in the Active force. The consequences for training are:

- Senior commanders, particularly in the USAR, face unique training management challenges.
- The potential for disconnects in training guidance is increased.
- Quality control of training is made more difficult.
- The creation of balanced training programs which satisfy multiple headquarters is more difficult.

Conclusion. The preceding examination of key aspects of the RC training environment could, taken in isolation, lead to conclusions that little has been done; that little can be done; or that we cannot sustain acceptable levels of readiness in RC units. None of those conclusions would be accurate. It is accurate, however, to conclude that the training challenge for RC units is unique in many ways and that training approaches
which are unique, creative, and practical are called for. It is equally important to realize that the business of meeting that challenge is evolutionary and that it began some time ago.

- CAPSTONE and its subordinate and related programs which interface Active and RC units and individuals has responded to a key need identified in 1971.
- Readiness Groups throughout the country work with RC units on a daily basis.
- RC units are at the beginning of a major modernization effort.
- RC soldiers and units are training in more places and more often than ever before.
- A major effort to reconfigure training courses and tailor them to RC needs is underway.
- Reserve Force (RF) schools are developing a relationship to the active force training base.

These actions and many others have, together, put the U.S. Army's Reserve Components on a new course. That course is correct. As we proceed, there are adjustments to be made which can benefit the force as a whole and the unit commanders who face the training challenge in particular. The adjustments which seem to be the most worthy of consideration, in the judgement of the U.S. Army Training Board, are contained in the following sections.
SECTION IV

UNIT TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

Any examination aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of training must necessarily take into account both what is required and the means available to meet the requirements. An examination of the total training requirement placed on RC units versus the training environment within which they are to be met, suggests strongly that this equation is out of balance. In simple terms this means that the total training requirement, as it now exists, exceeds RC units' capacity to execute.

Observations attesting to the truth of the idea that the "plate is too full" are plentiful. A review of 100 studies and reports conducted over the last 10 years reveals that it is the most often cited finding. In 1978, the Army Training Study (ARTS) pointed out that: "To achieve the necessary level of proficiency, the number of skills and tasks must be vigorously scrubbed, reducing them to the absolute minimum so that training can focus on truly essential tasks," and that "the key to determining the steady state training program is the amount of training which the unit can actually conduct measured against that required to maintain training readiness." Clearly these observations are applicable to both AC and RC units. It is equally clear that, considering the differences in their training environments, the final lists of these things cannot be expected to be the same.

The Army's current approach to dealing with balancing collective requirements and training capacities is the Mission Essential Task List (METL) through which commanders are to outline their focus for collective training in a delimited document based on a training needs analysis and guidance from higher headquarters. Ultimately, this list is supposed to be
shaped by and reflect probable wartime missions. This is a rational and sensible process and it has had the effect of reducing units' training load from everything in the ARTEP to something less than that. On average, however, the something less is about 80 percent of the total requirement listed in ARTEP's.

In the field, in units, the training load remains too big to handle effectively. At the higher levels of command, 89 percent of state AG's and staff officers and 82 percent of MUSARC commanders and staffs feel that the current training requirements on unit METL's exceed their capacity to effectively train. On average, unit commanders at lower levels feel they can handle about 70 percent of the METL tasks they list. Since commanders list 80 percent or less of the total ARTEP tasks available, this means that a reasonable collective training requirement for RC units may be described in terms of about one-half of the tasks on a typical ARTEP.

This general mark on the wall has been recognized by some CONUSA's. Independent actions have been taken within armies to devise the means to provide a delimited focus for units under their jurisdiction by creating a common 80 percent METL for like units in one case and a common ARTEP for like units in another. These actions are noteworthy for two reasons. First, because they further substantiate the need for uniform delimitation and second, because they reflect the fact that this need has not been met by the Army's training system.

Collective training tasks are only one part of the training requirement faced by RC units. The other half of the overall training load is described by individual training requirements outlined in soldier's manuals; professional development training, basic training, and MOS qualification requirements. Due to the nature of the means available to conduct most of this training, its requirements impact on the capacity of units to conduct collective training and to optimize the effectiveness of individual training in units.
Basic training, most MOS qualification training, and professional development training (officer education, NCOES, and special skill training) takes place in the school system (AC, RF, ARNG academies, or a combination). In each case, a soldier undergoing this training is necessarily away from his or her unit and cannot, therefore, participate in its individual or collective training programs. Since RC unit strengths include soldiers in the unit and away for training outside the unit, there are always decrements to available strength on the ground to train with the unit. This can and does result in squads without squad leaders, crews without full crews, etc., which mitigate the effectiveness of training.

A study by the Armor school in 1985 demonstrated the potential results of this impact in these terms: an RC soldier as he moved to E6 over 8 years would spend one-fifth of his weekend drills and three-fourths of his AT periods away from his unit; an RC officer as he moved to captain over 11 years would spend 30 percent of his weekend drills and over half of his AT periods away from his unit. In fact, the actual impact is not this severe as additional time has been funded to take up the slack, but there is a limit to the amount of additional time over and above monthly IDT periods and annual AT periods which an RC soldier can devote to training.

The system which is in effect for individual training in institutions is complex, but it is necessarily complex as it must respond to the realities of time available to RC soldiers and, with some exceptions, this means weekends and AT periods. As a result, courses for much of this training have to be configured into segments which accommodate weekend and/or 2-week blocks of training. TRADOC, in conjunction with FORSCOM, is embarked on a program to prioritize and reconfigure these courses and FORSCOM has proposed an initiative to create an RC school's account to alleviate the impact of training away from units on training in units. These are positive
initiatives which may be viewed as complementary efforts aimed at the same problems.

The current process of reconfiguration orients on breaking courses into segments, but does little to reduce the total requirements and, therefore, little to reduce total time away from units. An examination of several of these courses reveals the reconfigured course has the same subjects and is just as long as the original. In the case of courses designed for reclassification, many of the subjects are redundant to training the soldier has already received. The school's account initiative aims directly at the unit strength for training issue and, if implemented, will be limited only by the ability to recruit and ultimately to promote qualified soldiers.

At unit level, commanders must balance the competing demands for individual training requirements away from the unit and individual and collective training and sustainment requirements expected to be conducted in the unit. Unit trainers believe that they can effectively sustain slightly over 60 percent of the individual tasks outlined in soldier's manuals.

The total plate which describes the tasks which units are expected to master and the standards attendant to them exists in the ARTEP, soldier's manual of common tasks, MOS by skill level soldier's manuals, DA directed mandatory tasks, functional FM's, technical manuals applicable to given units/equipment, and directives by senior headquarters. This plate of requirements is modified by the METL process and individual command decisions. The result of this system is that the Army has placed, with few modifications, the total level of training load expected of AC units on RC units and has suggested in a variety of ways that they should be able to absorb it. RC commanders have responded to this challenge by attempting to do some of everything and find themselves forced into a position in which the real and implied expectations of
the Army are beyond the reach of the time and resources available. In this situation, units stretch beyond their elastic limit and are forced to dilute their efforts over too wide a spectrum of requirements. The inevitable result of this process is that it severely limits the probability of sustaining excellence in any one or group of tasks.

There is a powerful psychological impetus to try to do it all. It is the fact that in the end all units AC or RC must be prepared to face the same challenges on the battlefield. While this is ultimately true, the immediacy of those challenges will depend on the unpredictable variable of post mobilization training time availability which will vary by situation and type unit.

There is an equally powerful argument to suggest that the units which ultimately meet that challenge best have been and will be those that have sustained a high level of excellence in a carefully selected, but limited number, of tasks and that their capacity to absorb change in combat is enhanced by the group confidence that has been generated by that approach in training. This approach has been characterized as "doing less, better."

Given the need to delimit training requirements to the levels indicated, there is no cogent reason why the large majority of the tasks required should vary between like type units and much to be gained by uniform requirements for them in terms of standardization of support, evaluation, and administration. In the judgment of the Board, such delimitation will, in the end, enhance overall combat readiness by permitting commanders to focus on and sustain excellence on a corpus of achievable requirements.

The reality is that we cannot recreate the AC training environment for the RC and must, therefore, approach optimizing training readiness in the RC by carefully reducing what is required and supporting execution of those requirements in a variety of ways.
Recommendations

The US Army Training Board recommends that the Army approach the issue of delimitation of requirements in a systematic and comprehensive manner by:

- Reviewing all ARTEP's and carefully selecting approximately 50 percent of the collective tasks outlined as those on which RC units and AC units with similarly constrained training environments should focus. This effort should use the work already started by the 4th CONUSA and should be published as an addendum to ARTEP's or in some other suitable form.
- Maintaining battalion level operations as the goal of operational proficiency while more clearly establishing the company as the focal point of effective collective training in the field.
- Strongly orienting battalion and above staff and integrative training on CPX's, simulations, TEWT's, and other non-troop intensive training vehicles.
- Reviewing DA mandatory training requirements with regard to frequency and number of requirements for RC units.
- Reviewing the common skills manual to reduce requirements to approximately 70 percent for RC soldiers.
- Reviewing soldier's manuals to reduce requirements to approximately 60 percent for RC soldiers.
- Reconfiguring RC POI's for reclassification MOSQ, NCOES, and other development courses with the objectives of reducing the length and content of the courses as well as constructing them to meet the time increments available to RC soldiers. It is recommended that this be done by:
  - Scrubbing each course to eliminate peacetime AC oriented redundant and non-absolute essential tasks (the result of this scrub should provide the basis for a good mobilization POI).
  - Dividing the remaining requirements into those which can be learned through self-study and those requiring on the ground instruction/practice.
Creating an ACCP supported Phase I covering those requirements amenable to self-study.

Establishing the RF/AC school POI as Phase II covering those requirements that must be taught/practiced on the ground.

Formally orienting the ACCP on support of RC training.
SECTION V

UNIT ADMINISTRATION

The combined effect of the administrative load currently experienced by RC units severely impedes their capacity to optimize training programs. This administrative load is the cumulative result of policies, procedures, and requirements of all levels of the chain of command and effective reduction of it will require a coordinated effort.

The observation that the administrative load on units is a major distractor to effective training is not new. It has been cited in one form or another in most studies of RC training. In 1978, the 6th CONUSA's "Something for Nothing" Study suggested that it appeared that unit commanders spent approximately 75 percent of their time on other than mission related training. More recent analysis by several CONUSA's have identified over 130 major administrative requirements at company level. There is considerable evidence to suggest that the impact of the administrative load on training in RC units is, if anything, growing rather than diminishing.

Unit commanders regard a substantial portion of the administrative load as unnecessary, redundant, and irrelevant. They cite multiple inspections apparently intended to serve the same purposes, procedures that seem awkward and unnecessarily time consuming, and unprogrammed immediate action requirements which force reprogramming of planned training as key detractors. The latter often preclude the accomplishment of previously planned training when support for it cannot be renegotiated for a later time.

When asked what their "real" versus "desired" first priority was, 71 percent of RC unit trainers listed some form of administration as their top priority. Almost a third (31.5 percent) list general administration as the top priority and
well over half (57.8 percent) list it in the top three. Conversely, only 24 percent of unit trainers list the execution of training as the "real" first priority and slightly less than half (49.5 percent) list it in their top three "real" priorities.

The chain of command, as might be expected, is hit the hardest by the administrative load and because of the decentralized nature of RC training generated by dispersion, this extends down to and tends to be centered on the level of command which occupies an armory or training center. At this level, unlike their AC counterparts, commanders must often maintain extensive personnel, finance, and other records which in a centralized environment are handled for them. Commanders and key trainers report that they spend an average of an additional 20 hours a month on administrative matters. In spite of the additional hours spent, however, 62 percent of unit commanders find that they do not have the time to personally oversee and evaluate the training of their units and, therefore, seek alternative means to execute this responsibility.

The impact of the administrative load on training is not relegated to commanders and administrators alone; it extends frequently to the entire unit. Entire units become involved in preparation for inspections, entire units use valuable time to change into and out of "PT" clothes for weigh-ins, and entire units stand down for panographic X-rays and other similar requirements. Some requirements, while not involving every soldier, do require the entire chain of command, thus separating trainers from their soldiers and further splitting squads, crews, and sections involved in collective training.

The Army Training Board, based on input from and discussions with unit trainers, estimates that units are currently able to devote less than one-half (about 3 weeks) of the total time available to them over a year to the execution
of training. The impact on IDT time is more severe where it appears that only about one-third of that time is effectively used for training. The major cause of this lost time is unit administrative requirements.

Outside of the administrative load itself, there is a noticeable lack of automation available to units to assist in easing the burden of execution. Virtually all administrative records, reports, and requirements are calculated, analyzed, and maintained by hand. Where automation does exist, incompatibility of hardware, software, and information requirements formats tend to stifle the effective use of it. Senior commanders in particular point to a need for effective automation to assist in facilitating the execution of administrative requirements.

The Army has devoted a considerable effort to reducing the administrative burden on units over the years, but most of the effort has centered on AC units and it has paid dividends in the AC. Some attention has been given to the problem in the RC such as the Briggs Study of 1980. An Army Regulation, AR 1-27, Army Reduction of Administrative Workload for Unit Commanders Program, 20 Feb 86, has been published. In spite of these and other efforts to date, however, the Army has not succeeded in effectively mitigating the impact of the administrative load on the effectiveness of training for RC units. An effort to do so is clearly in the interests of combat readiness for the RC where every day saved is equivalent to at least 5 days for an AC unit.

Recommendations

The US Army Training Board recommends that the Army approach this subject as a joint FORSCOM/TRADOC/ARNG undertaking designed to reduce the administrative load on units by 50 percent by:

USATB
MAY 87
- Conducting a joint review of required inspections, reports, records keeping requirements, and procedures and:
  - Eliminating redundant and unsupported administrative requirements.
  - Limiting the total number of annual inspections to which a unit is subjected.
  - Simplifying procedures and reports where possible.
  - Insuring that DA carefully review one time requirements and attempt to permit flexibility in execution to avoid major disruption of training.
  - Commencing the long term development of an RC oriented administrative automation architecture for the future.
SECTION VI

TRAINING MANAGEMENT IN UNITS

The Army's training management system, while valid at the base concept level for all units, is oriented strongly toward the realities of the AC training environment at the "how to" level and does not adequately address divergent methods more amenable to the RC training environment.

Training management has always been and will always be a major challenge for RC commanders. Most studies of RC training have addressed the subject in one form or another, and 10 years of Army Audit Agency (AAA) reports cite weakness in this area. Soldiers in units sense the problem too. In a recent study of RC soldiers in one state, 56 percent said they thought the organization of training was poor.

The factors of time available, dispersion, and geographic versus functional structures in the RC combine to present the RC commander with a management and planning challenge that is substantially different in important ways from that of AC unit commanders.

The Army's training management doctrine is contained in the FM 25 series of manuals and FC 25-7 (How to Develop Training Management Skills in the Unit) published in 1984-85 and FC 25-100 (Training the Force) published in June 1985. The initial focus of Army doctrine in this arena was on managing training at the battalion level and the Battalion Training Management System (BTMS) was the vehicle used to teach commanders how to enhance the effectiveness of training through planning, analysis, and prioritizing on a continuous basis. Subsequent to the fielding of this system, the Army turned its attention to the responsibilities of higher level commanders to manage training through a systematic approach to analysis, prioritizing and resourcing of training at brigade/division and
equivalent levels to insure that the benefits of the Battalion Training Management System could be fully realized, and that senior commanders played an active role in making decisions affecting the quality of training across the spectrum of diverse units.

Our attempts to inculcate this doctrine into the force have been generally successful, and it may be said to be well understood in the AC. The RC has lagged somewhat behind due in part to the time available factor. Ninety-five percent of RC units have the FM 25 series on hand, although many (34 percent) do not have sufficient quantities. Training management is not yet fully understood in the RC. The Board's informal analysis is that about two-thirds of RC commanders are conversant with the doctrine. Understanding, however, is only part of the problem. Applicability is the other part.

Discussions with trainers in units suggest that while there is a growing awareness of the doctrine, it does not provide RC commanders with the perspectives on management that are the most useful to them. Forty-one percent of them find the 25 series to be generally useful to not useful in managing training on the ground. Many find that while the general principles involved are fully supportable, the details of how to execute are not. For this reason, over half (56 percent) of units use the FM 25 series to a moderate extent or less. FC 25-100 appears to be less familiar at the higher levels than the FM 25 series is at the lower levels of command. Those who are familiar with it find no fault with its general principles, but find it difficult to follow and too time consuming to utilize on the ground. In order to adapt the concept of training management to the RC environment, various headquarters from CONUSA down have published documents designed to align the principles with the realities of the management challenge to RC units.
That challenge is unique in a variety of ways. The methods and techniques of accessing information, coordinating requirements, evaluating training, and providing feedback that are amenable to a battalion whose companies are within sight of the battalion headquarters may not work as well for those that are three hours away; management procedures that work well for a large functionally organized command may not be amenable to one without those characteristics, etc. This fact has been generally, but in the view of the Board, insufficiently recognized in current plans to revise the FM 25 series and publish FC 25-100 as an FM. A review of the FM 25 series of manuals, which was written by the Board, makes it clear that the analysis which generated them was based on the AC training environment and that its methods and procedures are founded on unstated hypotheses (equipment available, unit in close proximity, etc.) which do not exist in the RC.

The importance of effective training management in the RC cannot be overstated. It can be persuasively argued that RC commanders need to be better training managers than their AC counterparts as the impact of failing to be is greater and the capacity of units to recover from management errors which fail to optimize training is smaller.

The RC unit commander's training management challenge is exacerbated by the fact that he or she is faced with a requirement to respond to multiple higher headquarters. Units receive their guidance from a variety of headquarters to include DA MACOM's, CONUSA's, TAG's, CAPSTONE units, and their own more immediate chain of command. MACOM's other than FORSCOM often publish guidance that goes to the field without going through FORSCOM. The corpus of training guidance comes in a variety of forms and varying degrees of specificity. The average RC unit receives guidance from more than 3 headquarters and almost one-fifth (18.7 percent) receive guidance from 5 or more headquarters. This guidance is not uniform, is frequently
inconsistent, and is often contradictory (39 percent of RC commanders report that they receive contradictory guidance in one form or another). The METL process, central to training management, is not even referred to in one-fourth of the State AG training guidance documents. Commanders report that higher level guidance is frequently superseded by priorities established by their immediate headquarters. Competing demands of various headquarters make the orderly process of prioritizing more difficult and often place the commander in the position of being unable to satisfactorily respond to all. Commanders report that it is not uncommon to train to tasks under one set of criteria and find themselves evaluated based on a competing set. This happens most often when IDT is performed in one state or Army area and AT is conducted in another.

A considerable amount of secondary training guidance covers training records and it has generated a records keeping requirement which, in many cases, has created a situation in which the records appear to be more important than the training they reflect. This syndrome in turn supports methods of inspection which tend to orient on the inspection of training records rather than more substantive indicators of training effectiveness. Discussions with commanders reveal that more often than not, it is training records that are inspected vice indicators of individual and collective proficiency.

The majority of RC commanders do not appear to be aware of the flexibility available to them in planning MUTA's. Though there are exceptions most units conduct IDT using a standard MUTA 4, one weekend per month system on a continuing basis. There are some practical considerations which limit the degree and frequency with which commanders can utilize longer MUTA's but those limits have not been reached in most cases and significant effective training leverage is available through the use of a more flexible approach to constructing training
periods. Under current regulations sufficient flexibility is available to commanders, who are taught how to use it and encouraged to do so, to permit better use of time available through a more imaginative approach to constructing these periods for unit training.

Under current policies, CAPSTONE guidance is designed to play a major role in the formulation of training goals and plans. The interface opportunities and sense of mission provided by CAPSTONE are rated highly by units at all levels, but guidance for METL development is not. Less than half of RC units (45 percent) incorporate it into their METL. Of those who do not, one-half have no CAPSTONE guidance and the other half find it too general for METL development. Of those units who do use CAPSTONE guidance, there is a reverse problem in that overly specific guidance sometimes leads units to stretch to train to tasks and in environments which waste training time. This situation appears to be caused principally by a lack of understanding with regard to the intent of the regulation. Overly detailed tasks are not productive and to the extent that they force units to stretch to train to nonstandard tasks and/or in particular environments are counterproductive to optimizing overall proficiency.

Recommendations

In order to deal with the unique training management faced by RC units, the Army Training Board recommends that:

- Training management in the RC be analyzed and addressed separately either in dedicated chapters to current FM 25 series documents or in separate documents of that series.
- MACOM's other than FORSCOM which send guidance to the RC do so through FORSCOM headquarters.
- The format of training guidance documents published by CONUSA's and state AG's be regularized and that CONUSA policies and procedures be made more uniform.
o The expected level of specificity of CAPSTONE training guidance and its use by units be clarified in regulations.

o Current training records requirements be reviewed and that unsupported requirements be eliminated.

o The Army's development of the Integrated Training Management System fully incorporate RC needs into its development, and that RC units play a concurrent role in validation and fielding of the system.

o The flexibility available to RC units in planning MUTA's be advertised and utilized on a more extensive basis.
SECTION VII

TRAINING SUPPORT

The total level of training support to RC units provided over the last several years in terms of equipment, additional training time, full time staffing, interface programs, and dollars to support training has increased substantially. Increased responsibilities and expectations have accompanied these upgrades and a course has been set that establishes the need for ready RC units for a variety of contingencies. As we look to the future, there are a number of areas in which Army action can provide further leverage in training which can provide the means to sustain the higher levels of readiness expected.

Funding. The total funding authorization for RC training will undoubtedly increase to some extent over the next several years and the extent to which it does will depend on variables outside the scope of this project. Given a level of funding, however, it should provide equitable training readiness support to like units, barring clearly defined exceptions, and equitable support to units in the ARNG and USAR. Current funding methods do not appear to do this. Funding of training is based essentially on operating tempo (OPTEMPO) formulas geared to types of equipment and units. There is some question as to whether the percentage of OPTEMPO approach is the best method to determine relative funding support for RC units. FORSCOM analysis suggests that it is not. In 1985 RC units were to be funded at 25 percent of AC authorized OPTEMPO; however, a successful reclama by the National Guard Bureau resulted in a ramp up to 36 percent for ARNG units. Subsequent funding has been based on these percentages but the disparity is scheduled to grow in FY 88-89 using 28 percent for USAR.
units and 41 percent for ARNG units. Within the general OPTEMPO framework, relative levels of funding are based on a 3-tiered structure which places equipment into one of three categories. Tier one, the highest funding priority, is combat arms oriented; tier three, the lowest funding priority, has most of the CSS equipment. Since the ARNG is CA heavy and the USAR is CSS heavy, there is further disparity in training support generated by the tiers. There are no apparent substantive differences in the training environment between ARNG and USAR units and the training challenge is essentially the same. The relative importance of ARNG versus USAR units for mobilization may be argued in a variety of ways, but none of them appear to justify the current disparity in funding. It would appear, particularly in view of the importance of CSS units to joint operations below full scale mobilization, that a more uniform approach would be in the interests of overall readiness.

Exchange Programs. Various interface programs between the AC and RC have probably done more than any single concept to enhance the overall level of readiness and training in RC units. The KEEPUP program and others have offered RC soldiers opportunities to serve for short periods of time with AC units. There may be leverage to extend this concept at the individual level in several beneficial ways. Discussions with senior RC commanders suggest that literal exchanges on a limited basis between AC and RC units might be feasible. An example of such an exchange would be to provide an AC major to serve as the S3 of an RC unit for 1-2 years while his RC counterpart served in a similar position in the AC. A second and clearly beneficial concept involves the temporary service of RC lieutenants in AC units. Under this concept, originally called Lieutenants for Hood (oriented on a roundout battalion), selected lieutenants upon graduation from ROTC would join a
roundout unit in the RC and then serve as a platoon leader in one of the like battalions in the AC parent division for two years. Upon completion of this tour, he would revert to the RC with an obligation to continue service in the RC roundout unit for several years. The obvious advantages to the roundout relationship and to the RC unit seem worth pursuing as a pilot project. This concept should be particularly beneficial to units undergoing modernization as the level of expertise and experience it could provide to the RC unit should be considerable.

Training Aids, Devices, and Simulations. In 1971 the Board for Dynamic Training pointed out that RC training should be device based and recommended that the Army chart a course designed to include that characteristic into a coherent training system for RC units. The same recommendation has been made in a variety of ways in subsequent studies and the need to do this has been validated in discussions with senior RC trainers throughout the Army.

Any examination of the RC training environment must inevitably lead to the conclusion that device based training is essential for RC units. In spite of the absolute necessity for such support to enhance training, the Army has done little until recently to make it happen. Some actions have been taken to meet this need. FORSCOM's Five Year Training Device Plan marshals current fielding plans into a single document, and TRADOC has instituted procedures to more adequately ensure that training needs are identified in Basis of Issue Plans (BOIP's). In spite of these actions, however, the Army still does not have a focused effort to generate the support required.

Training device acquisition is divided roughly into two components--systems and non-systems. Systems training devices are identified and developed in conjunction with the system (tank, M2, etc.) and unit level devices are to be issued to
units with issue of the system. Non-systems training devices are developed and procured separately and cover all devices not associated with a system. Since the full implementation of this concept is relatively new, many systems were not developed in concert with devices. Devices developed and procured for these systems are funded as non-systems devices. The majority of the equipment which falls into this category is located in RC units and this will continue to be the case for some time to come. The result is that most systems devices and all non-systems devices for RC units are acquired as non-systems devices.

The process through which acquisition of non-systems devices takes place is meant to fully account for both AC and RC needs, but it does not appear to effectively accomplish this goal. Evidence of this observation lies not only in the paucity of training devices found in RC units, but also in the lack of evidence reflecting analysis of unique RC requirements and in the prioritizing system itself. It may be argued that there should be no devices generated exclusively for the RC as they should be mutually usable by both AC and RC units. RC units do, however, have some unique requirements generated by the fact that some types of units exist almost exclusively in the RC and that a greater degree of training leverage can be gained and more relative time saved by an RC unit that has a device which the AC does not need or want (e.g., if the RC had a device that permitted a rifleman to validate a level of firing proficiency every other year countless hours could be saved and put into other training; if it had a simple but effective civil affairs management simulator, these units could train more effectively). There are other and better examples of unique requirements which can help commanders to enhance training, but neither the USATB or anyone else in the Army has the list of what they are for we do not have a mechanism to ensure that they are identified.
The system which generates training device requirements permits anyone to identify a need and send it through channels into a process that makes it visible and assumes that this will happen. At unit level, where the need should be identified, commanders and trainers have given little thought to the subject and many are not familiar even with devices that do exist (MILES and a few others are most often mentioned). There are a few, but only a few, examples of the identification of unique needs. Two of these are GUARDFIST I and II generated by the ARNG (and subsequently separately funded by Congress to the NGB for development and acquisition). This off-line method of identifying and procuring devices, while positive in its effect, should not be necessary and may inadvertently fail to fully describe the total requirement for support, etc.

The prioritizing process which ultimately generates acquisition, using a one MACOM-one vote procedure, may also not provide an adequate representation of RC needs. It is assumed that all members fully account for RC needs, but it is not clear that this happens as procedures to ferret out what they are do not seem to be as effective as they should be.

Many devices are acquired for joint use of AC and RC units and are controlled and managed by Training and Audio-Visual Support Centers (TASC's). While this procedure is necessary and cost effective, the time distance factors involved in acquiring and turning in these devices, and competition with AC units for them, play a part in the ability of RC units to use them. In some cases there may be better solutions to include giving them to units or storing and maintaining them at MATES/ECS's (in the case of M-1 MILES for example if the equipment is not used by AC units in the TASC area, having them stored, maintained and mounted by a MATES can save considerable training time). Some selected items normally maintained by a TASC should be considered for issue to RC units to facilitate training. Decisions to do so cost additional money and cannot
be supported by classic cost effective analysis based on hours used, etc., but may provide valuable training leverage anyway and be worth the cost on behalf of training readiness. This approach to training support clearly would reduce the number of devices available to the AC; however, it can be reasonably argued that at least in some cases, the trade off would be advantageous to the force as a whole and that RC units have a relatively greater need for the training leverage they provide.

In the final analysis we have not clearly placed RC units on a device based training strategy or ensured that the means to do so are guaranteed.

The School System. The Army has made some progress in enhancing support of RC units through the institutional training base, but there remains considerable potential to improve it. A fledgling school affiliation program, modeled on FORSCOM unit affiliation programs, between AC and RF schools was initiated in 1986; TRADOC meets annually with RF school commandants, and other support has been provided by the AC training base.

Institutional training, outside of that conducted in AC schools is conducted by 167 RC organizations exclusive of training divisions, Maneuver Area Commands (MAC) and Maneuver Training Commands (MTC). An additional 31 organizations/facilities are planned through FY 1992 at which time there will be 198. These training elements operate, or will operate, under the control of FORSCOM, CONUSA's, MUSARC's, State AG's, AMC, and the Director of the ARNG. Some serve both ARNG and USAR units, others serve only ARNG units. They have varying degrees of relationships with the AC training base. The AC is responsible for creating the POI's, supporting materials, and regulatory and other requirements for the satisfactory execution and completion of training conducted by the school system at large. There are a variety of ways in which these
functions can be enhanced over the long term which will benefit RC units and the force as a whole.

Reconfiguration of POI's designed to reduce them to minimum essential requirements and use of the ACCP in support of RC schooling is one of these. Recommendations on this aspect of support are contained in Section IV, Unit Training Requirements. Various reviews of the ACCP have found that much of it is out of date and not aligned with soldier's manuals, the SQT and other training support material. Efforts now underway to deal with this problem are important and if its primary purpose is shifted to support of RC training, will become more important.

While TRADOC has some interface with RF schools, it has little with ARNG institutions. There is considerable potential available in the future to reinforce TRADOC's relationship to the RF schools and to establish an equal relationship with ARNG academies. A measured program to do so appears to be in the interest of uniformity and standardization in training executed in institutions and can provide a continuing mechanism to facilitate training support to them.

The AC school system should, ideally interface with RC units at about the same level as with AC units as half the force is in the RC. In FY 86 school branch training teams (BTT) visited 192 RC units and 372 AC units. The figures do not suggest that absolute parity is a requirement, however, visits to these units provide the insights necessary to attend to general and unique RC training needs and assist in providing a balanced perspective in a variety of responsibilities of the schools. There is a limit to the total amount of visiting that can be done, and in the long term current and future technology can provide the means to generate this interface on a more comprehensive and continuing basis. It is possible in 1996 to have an automated school to unit training and training support structure in place as an integral characteristic of how TRADOC runs. This concept originally developed by General (Ret.) Paul
F. Gorman merits attention and could in the future play a major role in training support.

The Army has embarked on a course to provide a series of over 35 regional training facilities oriented on aviation, military intelligence, medical and maintenance skills. Some of these facilities exist now and most are scheduled for completion by 1992. While centralized solutions for training exceptionally decentralized units is not the ideal solution, resources do not permit the total level of decentralization which might otherwise be desired and selective centralization of some training permits a higher level and quality of training. The Israeli Army, faced with many of the same kinds of RC training challenges, albeit in a far smaller area, has established a series of one day training centers and urban training centers that may have some applicability to the training of U.S. RC units.

The one day training center is oriented on maneuver battalions. It is located on a small (1-2 square kilometer) post with a cadre of 15-20 personnel who run the center, maintain its equipment and assist in training. Under this program, a battalion arrives at 0600, draws uniforms, equipment and weapons and commences an intensive training day at 0800 which terminates at 2000. During this period, every soldier in the battalion is put through a series of classes and practical instruction on common and MOS related skills and squad/crew level collective skills. The cadre, together with the chain of command, run the training and it is organized with a degree of precision which leaves almost no time in which the soldier is not undergoing some form of training. The majority of this training is supported by relatively simple but highly effective training devices (the exception is a complex but highly effective driving simulator). By the end of the day, more effective training has taken place than is likely to be accomplished in 3-4 or more normal MUTA's.
The urban training center concept orients on individual, common and MOS related skills. These centers are placed in high population density areas and are about the size of a small learning center. They are staffed with a cadre of 3-4 personnel who manage the center and oversee the training. Soldiers arrive in groups of 30-40 each day in the late afternoon to undergo 4 hours of training in a highly structured but informal program. Each group of soldiers is from the same brigade or equivalent sized unit and they arrive based on a schedule prearranged between the brigade and the center. Over a 4-hour period soldiers are refamiliarized with selected common skills such as identification of enemy equipment (using movies) and MOS skills using second generation (better than TEC, not as good as EIDS) interactive trainers and relatively simple gunnery trainers. Interactive training devices put soldiers through situations to which they must respond correctly and their performance is evaluated and sent to the unit. The software provides a vertical inquiry into any situation to which the soldier fails to respond correctly (if a medic fails to choose a soldier with arterial bleeding to treat first, a series of questions follow such as how long does it take for a person to die from uncontrolled arterial bleeding? how many pints of blood does a person have? etc.) designed to determine why he failed to respond correctly to the initial question and to instruct.

It is possible that these training concepts may have some useful applicability for our RC units and that further examination of them could be useful.

One other area of schooling worthy of review is the adequacy of instruction in unit training management skills for RC lieutenants prior to OBC attendance. Under current regulations RC officers entering units upon commissioning have three years to complete the Officer Basic Course (OBC). A review of units indicates that at least 20 percent of serving
lieutenants and a substantial portion of platoon leaders or equivalent have, therefore, not been exposed to the training management and how to train skills they teach. This phenomenon, which probably cannot be substantially modified in terms of time requirements nevertheless clearly impacts on units' training management skills and on their ultimate capacity to optimize training. It may be possible, however, to approach enhancing platoon leader level skills through the MQS-1 program taught in OCS and ROTC. This 248 hour program currently contains only 6 hours on training management. While any adjustments require some trade off, it may be a worthwhile one for RC units, which due to dispersion, must depend more heavily on the independent training and training management skills of their junior officers than their counterparts in the AC.

**Structural Turbulence.** The RC has historically been subjected to considerably more change than the AC. The combination of generators of this turbulence presents the force with a formidable challenge. A portion of it is unavoidable as force modernization proceeds. It appears, however, that there is some leverage available to decrease the total level of change in structures and alignments which have a major impact on training effectiveness. A principal generator of changes in alignments and follow-on structural changes to units are the operational plans of Major Joint and Army Commands and their subordinates. These changes tend to coincide with changes of command and thus contribute on a continuing basis to the turbulence experienced in the RC. In 1984, for example, a Corps change of command (and coincident change of war plans) generated 29 structural changes in one CONUSA area alone. Outside of the impact on units, these constant changes may in fact degrade the readiness of the command which generates them as the resulting reorganization in the RC may take several
years to fully execute. It would appear that action by the
Army to base decisions which change structure should orient
more strongly on overall force readiness considerations aimed
at creating the least turbulence possible as changes in plans
are proposed.

** ARNG-USAR Interface. ** ARNG and USAR units work together
principally during AT, overseas deployments, and on major
exercises. There are some good examples of extensive and
continuing cooperative training programs such as that of the
state of New Jersey in which units from the ARNG and USAR are
constantly working together in a variety of ways supported by
an information system that keeps them abreast of activities and
capabilities of units throughout the state. The total
interface and mutual support in training at unit level is,
however, relatively low and there is a great deal of potential
available for mutual and cooperative interface in training at
unit level throughout the year which can benefit both. The
Army, through AR 11-22, has established an informal mutual
support and equipment sharing program, but unit trainers are
not familiar with it, and senior ARNG and USAR trainers rarely
alluded to it in discussions. Discussions with unit commanders
indicate that many do not know what other units, not in their
part of the RC (ARNG or USAR), are located within reasonable
proximity of their unit and most have never visited or
attempted training coordination with them. It appears that a
more concerted effort, using a variety of methods, to encourage
interchange and mutual training and training support between
ARNG and USAR units could yield training advantages to the
force and to individual units. It may be that the procedures
for exchanging funds for training support are part of the
problem, and that a portion of the total training funds
available should be provided to FORSCOM to underwrite
beneficial ARNG-USAR unit training programs.
Combat Service Support Units. Combat service support units suffer from relative neglect in comparison to other units in the RC structure.

The difficulties of effectively training combat service support units experienced in the AC are magnified in the RC and particularly in the USAR in which most of the CSS units are located. Discussions with trainers at all levels of command about which types of units were the best trained invariably listed them combat arms (CA), combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) in that order. CSS units were, by broad agreement, rated the least effectively trained and many senior commanders expressed serious concern over the fact. This is a particularly important point in view of the fact that they are likely to be the first and perhaps the only units required in limited mobilization scenarios.

In general, most of the indicators of training effectiveness and support reflect the relative inattention we have given to effective training for CSS units. They understand and use training management doctrine less well, they have a higher percentage of units without ARTEP's, they are visited by readiness groups half as often as combat arms units, they have fewer contacts with AC units, they participate in CPX's or like exercises half as often as others, they have more administrative requirements, and fewer effective days for training, etc.

There are a variety of very real and practical reasons for the relatively less effective training of CSS units. They are organized into smaller elements (separate units) than their contemporaries, some have no, and many have few, counterparts in the active force; many are area or general support units with only an administrative peacetime headquarters and a high level wartime headquarters that is less involved in direct coordination with them; most of the Army's low density MOS's are in these units and it is relatively more difficult to find qualified personnel to work with them.
A major factor in the continuous difficulty we experience in enhancing the training effectiveness of CSS units appears to be that we do not know enough about them and do not devote enough attention to them to generate the level of creativity and support that is provided to CA and CS units. Most of the Army's key trainers are and have been combat arms officers as are their deputies, and training staffs and agencies tend to be heavily weighted with combat arms experience and expertise throughout the Army. In addition to the trainer background factor there is a general tendency, even on the part of CSS units, to believe that what they do on a normal day is good training because it is the same function which they perform in combat (drive a truck, repair a tank, provide supplies, etc.) This fallacious thinking undermines the motivation to seek more realistic training, to conduct multi-echelon training, or to push for creativity in converting routine tasks into imaginative training. The fallacy is accentuated in RC units where, during IDT, soldiers are not, for the most part, engaged in support of a larger unit.

A second generally held view is that soldiers in CSS units are more technically competent than their AC counterparts because many of them have parallel functions in civilian life. A 4th CONUSA study of this contention found no evidence to support it based on any available criteria.

During AT, CSS units are often relegated to post support missions. CSS commanders understand the need to support posts, but they do not understand the apparent inability of senior commanders to integrate more realistic training into their missions. More specialized units such as graves registration and civil affairs units tell stories of being attached to larger units and left in the woods for two weeks on their own with no guidance and no role to play in the training of the larger unit.

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising to find that CSS units, above all others, seek more and better guidance (almost half, 44.8 percent, favor having the Army provide them
with a prioritized METL to train to) and feel less confident that their training is properly oriented.

The Army has not completely ignored the challenge confronting CSS units. Recent initiatives to establish Regional Maintenance Training Sites (RMTS) for divisional and non-divisional maintenance units, Consolidated Training Facilities for Military Intelligence Skills, and Regional Training Sites-Medical (RTS-MED)/Regional Medical Training Centers (RMTC) for evacuation hospitals and other medical units should be of significant assistance to these units over time and provide them with a much needed hands-on training capability. The efforts of the Logistics Center to create logistics support CPX simulations will also fill a clear need.

CSS units, for a variety of reasons, are and always have been the most difficult to create effective and imaginative training for. It is not likely that this will change, but a concerted effort to assist in upgrading their capacity to train more effectively seems in order.

The system of directed permanent training associations for CSS units has probably reached or exceeded its limit due to the imbalances in the CSS structure between the AC and RC (e.g., 71 percent of all supply and service units are in the RC; of the 29 percent in the AC, some are overseas deployed). Seventy-seven percent are not affiliation or partnership units for the same reasons. Discussions with AC G3's indicate that their capacity to effectively interface with additional RC units is marginal. Some support up to the equivalent of almost two divisions plus 50 or more separate companies and detachments and devote up to 21,000 man-days to work with their counterparts. It is possible, however, that a less permanent system of training associations could expose more units to the benefits of association with AC units.

The need for training device support is nowhere more evident than in the RC's CSS units. While some units are equipment oriented, and access to equipment is desirable, others are process or method oriented. Both will have to
depend largely on the effectiveness of training aids, devices, and simulations to enhance their training. A review of FY 86 funding for RC training devices shows that only about 10 percent (all for maintenance training) was allocated to support of CSS unique training. It appears that a review of the breadth and depth of our training support to CSS units is in order.

**Recommendations**

In order to provide a better training support system to RC units, the Army Training Board recommends that:

- DA review current methods used to determine the level of funding provided to support training in USAR versus ARNG units.

- DA in conjunction with OJCS review procedures which generate approval of RC structure changes and insure that they consider the impact of lowered readiness during the period in which the change takes place.

- DA/TRADOC/FORSCOM review current methods and procedures which identify and provide training devices to RC units in order to clearly establish a device based training platform for RC units and the means to execute it over time.

- TRADOC strengthen its relationship to RC training institutions and extend it to include ARNG academies and training facilities.

- TRADOC consider assigning LNO's to each of the Readiness Groups to assist in identifying training support needs and to provide a continuing interface with Readiness Groups for training support requirements.

- TRADOC and FORSCOM examine the feasibility of instituting an exchange program at the Battalion S3 level and a program to train RC lieutenants in their AC roundout divisions.

- TRADOC consider prototyping the one day training center and urban training center concepts.
o The Cadet Command review MQS-1 for training management instruction and establish a relationship with ARNG OCS's.

o ARNG-USAR unit interface for training be enhanced and extended and that FORSCOM be provided funding to support mutual training initiatives.

o TRADOC and FORSCOM take actions designed to upgrade the visibility of and support of training of CSS units.
STUDY METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURES

I. Overview. The USATB Reserve Component (RC) Unit Training Project (RCUTP) began with a review of USATB interaction with RC units. The purpose of this review was to determine if the Army Training Board might provide useful help in the RC training arena. Initial study indicated that an in-depth look at both RC unit training and training management activities, designed to isolate measures which would enhance the capability of RC commanders to meet their training challenge would be worthwhile. This perception was presented to a council of senior trainers from RC units, Readiness Groups, State Adjutant's General Offices, the Office of the Chief of Army Reserve (OCAR), the National Guard Bureau (NGB), and Forces Command (FORSCOM). The council's assessment was that in-depth study was not only warranted, but was highly desirable. To accomplish the project, the USATB designed data collection instruments and gathered data from a major sample of Reserve Component field units, all Continental U.S. Armies (CONUSA's), State Adjutant's General headquarters, all major Army Commands dealing with Reserve Component training, and conducted a review of all research studies on Reserve Component training within the last ten years. This information was compiled, along with observations of the field survey teams, and was analyzed with contract assistance using advanced statistical analysis techniques. The results of the analysis were carefully screened, and all trends of significance were checked with other data obtained from follow-on trips to FORSCOM, NGB, OCAR, and other major headquarters before findings were synthesized into conclusions. The narrative, findings, conclusions, and recommendations of this report are the result of this collection, analysis, and synthesis process.
II. Literature Search. The initial literature search began with a review of twenty-six major studies concerning Reserve Component training and the training environment completed within the last four years followed by a review of over 100 studies done on Reserve Component training issues within the last ten years. Those studies' findings and recommendations were analyzed to determine content, trends and possible applicability to current RC training needs. The results of this analysis were used in the preparation of structured interviews and special analysis. These documents are listed in the bibliography. Major regulations concerning both USAR and National Guard training were reviewed to determine the content and scope of current training guidance followed by a review of all pertinent Army, FORSCOM, OCAR, and NGB regulations and training guidance, training directives of the five CONUSA's, and all fifty-four Adjutant's General Offices. These documents were reviewed for content, uniformity and consistency against the base document for RC training—FORSCOM Regulation 350-2 and DA regulations.

III. Sample. The size and composition of the sample populations were chosen to give the greatest statistical and scientific validity possible. The base units chosen for survey were battalions and separate companies and detachments. These latter units represent a sizable portion of the reserve force, with special training support needs and requirements. To determine the full population available, a report of all National Guard and Army Reserve organizations having a Unit Identification Code (UIC) was retrieved from the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) on 1 August 1986. This report listed some 9000 organizations. To establish the population for our study, the WWMCCS report was edited using the following criteria to define a unit:
A. All "paper units" were eliminated. A "paper unit" was defined as a unit known to be scheduled for inactivation, unmanned units, and proposed units (units whose names appear on the WWMCCS report but that had not yet been activated).

B. All detachments, sections, and platoons organic to other detachments, sections, platoons, or companies were collapsed into their organic headquarters. Editing the WWMCCS report in this way resulted in the identification of 5604 separate platoons, sections or companies, companies organic to battalions, and headquarters units at battalion and higher level. Companies organic to battalions were collapsed into parent battalions, leaving battalions and separate companies and detachments. These units were classified by their role as Combat, Combat Support, or Combat Service Support using the Unit Designator Code (UDC) contained in the WWMCCS report. Chart 1 shows the breakdown of units by component and role.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>in Population</th>
<th>% of Population</th>
<th># to be surveyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>USARNG</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cmbt Arms</td>
<td>2466</td>
<td>44.00</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cmbt Spt</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>6.73</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cmbt Svcs Spt</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>11.78</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>3503</td>
<td>62.51</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>USAR</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cmbt Arms</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>7.28</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cmbt Spt</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>8.94</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cmbt Svcs Spt</td>
<td>1192</td>
<td>21.27</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>2101</td>
<td>37.49</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>5604</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>386</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. We wished to choose a sample that would provide us with estimated sampling error of 5 percent or less, with a confidence interval of .95. The sample was chosen based on the following formula:

\[ n = \left( \frac{Z_{\alpha/2} \times \sigma}{E} \right)^2 = \left( \frac{1.96 \times 0.5}{0.05} \right)^2 = 384.16 \text{ units} \]

where \( n \) = sample size
\( Z_{\alpha/2} = .95 \) level of confidence or 1.96
\( E = 5 \) percent sampling error or .05
\( \sigma = .5 \) based on estimated variance of .25

2. The number of units surveyed by type were computed so that the number of units surveyed from each of the cells shown in chart 1 were in direct proportion to their representation of that cell in the general population (384 x the % of the population in each cell = the number of units to be surveyed from each cell). The actual units surveyed were determined by a computer driven random number sampling process.

C. Units in each of the component role categories (cells of chart 1) were numbered consecutively and a random number sequence for each cell was produced using a computer random number generator. Units were selected using the random number list. If a company organic to a battalion was identified on the list the actual survey was conducted at the battalion level.

D. Replacement Units. There were 15 units originally selected that could not be surveyed either because the units were unexpectedly inactivated (11), or the unit leadership was all newly assigned and could not adequately answer questions relating to the units training. Replacement units were
selected by component/role (cell) using the continuation of the same random number list which was used to select the original units.

E. At each unit, the goal was to interview four key training management personnel. Teams interviewed, in order of priority, the first four of the following list who were available:

1. Unit commander
2. Executive officer
3. Training officer
4. Senior NCO (First Sergeant or Sergeant Major)
5. Training NCO
6. Full-time training technician
7. Other senior trainers

In all 1321 RC unit personnel were surveyed. Seventy percent of the unit commanders (272 commanders) took part in the survey. A full table of those who took part in the project is shown below.

Unit Survey Respondents by Position

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>% of 386 units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commanders</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Officers</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-3's</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant S-3's</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Sergeants</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major/First Sergeants</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Officers</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training NCO's</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Positions</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Interviewed 1321
F. In addition to the unit surveys, a full evaluation of the RC training management process required a survey of the training management leadership at the highest level. USATB survey personnel interviewed the commanders and major training personnel at the OCAR, the NGB, and FORSCOM and the commanders and four key training management personnel in each of the following headquarters:

1. 5 CONUSA's
2. 49 State Adjutant's General Headquarters
3. 6 Army Commands (ARCOM's)
4. 8 other General Officer Commands (GOCOM's)
5. 15 Readiness Groups

The target was to interview the Commander and at least three other senior training personnel in each headquarters. That goal was exceeded. A total of 335 interviews from the headquarters listed was conducted.

IV. Data Collection Instruments. Structured interview guides were developed for each of the organizations surveyed. In order to develop these guides, the major parts of the Army Training System, defined as Institutional Training, Forces Training, and Training Support were studied to determine those subsystems that relate to RC training. Key questions on subsystems were developed for inclusion in the structured interviews. In all cases, the method used to collect the data was a structured conversation with the respondents, using open-ended questions designed to elicit the respondents own ideas on each subject area without introducing bias or perceptions of the data collectors. A separate demographic questionnaire was developed and mailed to each unit to be visited. These questionnaires were completed by the representative from that unit and returned either by mail or hand carried by the USATB survey teams on their return from the interviews. Structured interview instruments were designed...
with the help of the Soldier Support Center, National Capitol Region, and an analyst from the North Carolina Memorial Hospital and the University of North Carolina. These instruments were tested by using them on two small group samples of 20 units each and were revised to eliminate ambiguity from the questions and cover areas identified from the field validation as important for study in the project.

V. Data Collection Techniques. Demographic survey questionnaires were mailed to the units for completion by their representative before members of the USATB survey teams interviewed the unit leadership. For all other interviews, each respondent in a selected organization was interviewed by a USATB representative. Fifty percent of the 386 units were visited and 50 percent were interviewed by phone. All other headquarters were visited and interviews at these organizations were face-to-face by one of sixteen USATB survey teams. Each survey team was made up of an officer and an NCO, one member from the active component of the USATB and one from the RC component of either the USAR or Army National Guard called to active duty to participate in the project. In order to insure uniformity in data collection and that survey team perceptions did not bias the data collection, all members of the survey teams were given a 2-day training course in survey procedures and data recording techniques conducted by a research expert from the University of North Carolina. To accomplish all the interviews required for the study each survey team took three trips to the field. After each trip survey team members were debriefed on each of the surveys they conducted to ensure that all questions were adequately answered, the analysts understood all the answers as recorded by the survey team members, and to ascertain significant trends observed by the survey personnel.
VI. Other Data Sources. All data gathered from the surveys was reinforced by data collected from other sources. These sources included the regulations and previous research studies already mentioned, the records pertaining to RC units at FORSCOM and the NGB, and information taken from unit Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&E's), conversations with active Army division G-3's, and CAPSTONE units. This information was synthesized into the conclusions and recommendations found in the body of the report. Written sources appear in Appendix B, Bibliography.

VII. Data Analysis and Interpretation.
A. Surveys.

1. Once the data was collected, the full range of answers received to each question was listed after all answers were reviewed. Once this range was identified, the answers were grouped into finite categories of "type answer" for each question. These type answers were set into a template for each survey instrument. The answers from all the instruments were then coded according to the template and entered into a database on an IBM PC XT using the DBASE III software package. This database was analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) to give statistical trends, correlations between answers to the different questions, and standard statistical compilations. Frequencies of responses, means, medians, modes, standard deviation, and ranges were calculated for each question for each component/role cell and for the total sample. Statistical differences between the six component/role cells, the components, and the roles as groups were investigated using a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) for those answers within ratio, interval, and ordinal data. Since the purpose of analysis was to indicate possible differences, the multiple comparison test Least Squared Differences (LSD) was used. The differences indicated by these
tests were further investigated by analysts to determine if there was a significant difference of importance and possible causes of the difference. Kindal's Tau tests were used on all responses with ordinal answers and Pearson's correlation procedures were used on all interval and ratio responses. Further analysis was performed to interpret the data.

2. As most questions were open-ended and respondents were given no leading questions, interviewer biases, or cues to the specific or type answer to give to each question, responses understandably varied a great deal to each area addressed. Like answers given by different respondents became significant based on a question by question analysis when they showed a trend of perceptions in a given area. Therefore, some responses and trends are given as significant in the report even though the percentage of those giving a response is low in comparison to those expected from closed-ended surveys and questioning techniques.

B. Other Sources. Data supporting the findings in the report were obtained from the other sources listed in paragraph VI above. This data was integrated with that obtained from the surveys and lead directly to the observations and findings of the document. To minimize the complexity of reading this document these sources are listed in the bibliography at the end of the study. References to specific manuals, regulations, and studies are shown in the text. All data and observations given are the result of the data collected from these sources.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

TITLE CODES OF THE UNITED STATES
United States Code, Title 10 - "Armed Forces and Appendix."
United States Code, Title 32 - "National Guard."

ARMY REGULATIONS
AR 1-27, 20 Feb 86, _Reduction of Administrative Workload for the Unit Commander Program._
AR 10-5, 1 Dec 80, _Department of the Army._
AR 10-21, 15 Apr 81, _Army National Guard Operating Activity Center._
AR 10-27, 1 May 84, _United States Army Reserve Personnel Center._
AR 10-41, 1 Feb 82, _United States Army Training and Doctrine Command._
AR 10-42, 15 Mar 84, _United States Army Forces Command._
AR 10-49, 15 Sep 80, _United States Army Western Command._
AR 10-79, 20 Jun 85, _Army National Guard Recruiting and Retention Management Center._
AR 10-80, 15 Jan 81, _Army National Guard Personnel Center._
AR 10-81, 15 Jan 81, _Army National Guard Financial Services Center._
AR 10-82, 15 Jan 81, _Army National Guard Computer Center._
AR 11-29, 1 Nov 80, _Affiliation Program._
AR 11-30, 1 Sep 85, _The Army CAPSTONE Program._
AR 37-104-10, 1 Feb 85, _Military Pay and Allowance Procedures for Inactive Duty Training, JUMPS-RC._
AR 70-1 W/C 1, 15 Aug 84, _Systems Acquisition Policy and Procedures._
AR 71-9, 15 Aug 84, Material Objectives and Requirements.
AR 71-11, 1 Nov 82, Total Army Analysis (TAA).
AR 130-5, 8 Dec 77, Organization and Function of the National Guard Bureau.
AR 130-400, 5 Jan 77, Logistical Policies for Support.
AR 135-2, 7 May 86, Full Time Support Program.
AR 135-5, 1 Oct 83, Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee.
AR 135-7, 26 Sep 86, Incentive Programs, Reserve Components Personnel Update, Issue 17.
AR 135-9, 18 Aug 76, Participation in State Reserve Forces Facilities Boards.
AR 135-11, 15 Jul 84, The Reserve Component Foreign Area Officer Specialty.
AR 135-14, 16 Jun 72, Military Training for Physicians and Dentists Registered Under the Military Service Act of 1971.
AR 135-18, 15 Jul 85, The Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) Program.
AR 135-32, 16 Feb 85, Retention on Active Status After Qualification for Retired Pay.
AR 135-50, 24 Feb 70, Armed Forces Reserve Medical Osteopathic, Dental, and Veterinary Programs.
AR 135-51, 31 Dec 84, Criminal Investigation Units Accreditation, Training, and Mobilization Criteria.
AR 135-91, 26 Sep 86, Service Obligations, Methods of Fulfillment, Participation Requirements, and Enforcement Procedures, Reserve Components Personnel Update, Issue 17.
AR 135-100, 26 Sep 86, Appointment of Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the Army, Reserve Components Personnel Update, Issue 17.
AR 135-101, 15 Jul 79, Appointment of Reserve Commissioned Officers for Assignment to Army Medical Department Branches.
AR 135-133, 26 Sep 86, Ready Reserve Screening, Qualification Records System, and Change of Address Reports, Reserve Components Personnel Update, Issue 17.

AR 135-155, 26 Sep 86, Promotion of Commissioned Officers and Warrant Officers Other Than General Officers, Reserve Components Personnel Update, Issue 17.

AR 135-156, 15 Dec 79, General Officer Assignments, Promotions, Retention In and Removal From Active Status.

AR 135-175, 26 Sep 86, Separation of Officers, Reserve Components Personnel Update, Issue 17.


AR 135-210, 26 Sep 86, Order to Active Duty as Individuals During Peacetime, Reserve Components Personnel Update, Issue 17.

AR 135-316, 26 Jun 73, Judge Advocate Training.

AR 135-318, 15 Dec 80, Reserve Components Chaplains Candidates (Staff Specialist).

AR 140-9, 1 Nov 78, Entry on Active Duty or Active Duty for Training (ROTC Officers).

AR 140-10, 26 Sep 86, Assignments, Attachments, Details, and Transfers, Reserve Components Personnel Update, Issue 17.

AR 140-15, 29 Aug 85, Maintenance of Equipment.

AR 140-24, 25 Jun 85, U.S. Army Reserve Outstanding and Superior Unit Awards.
AR 140-40, 7 Jun 73, Logistic Policies For Support.
AR 140-50, 26 Sep 86, Officer Candidate Schools, Reserve Components Personnel Update, Issue 17.
AR 140-108, 5 Jul 74, Civil Affairs Branch.
AR 140-120, 1 Apr 80, Medical Examinations.
AR 140-125, 18 Sep 85, Marksman Training and Competitive Program.
AR 140-158, 26 Sep 86, Enlisted Personnel Classification, Promotion, and Reduction, Reserve Components Personnel Update, Issue 17.
AR 140-185, 26 Sep 86, Training and Retirement Point Credits and Unit Level Strength Accounting Records, Reserve Components Personnel Update, Issue 17.
AR 140-192, 15 Apr 80, Organization, Training Assignment, and Retention Criteria for MI, EW, and Signal Security Units.
AR 140-478, 15 Apr 82, Facilities, Projects, and Programs.
AR 140-480, 15 Oct 81, U.S. Army Reserve Facilities Assets Catalog and Tracking System.
AR 145-1, 15 Jan 75, Senior ROTC Program: Organization Administration and Training.

USATB
MAY 87 65 Appendix B
AR 145-2, 1 Apr 77, Junior Reserve Officers Training Program.
AR 220-1, 16 Sep 86, Unit Status Reporting.
AR 310-2, 12 Jul 76, Identification and Distribution of DA Publications and Issue of Agency and Command Administrative Publications.
AR 310-3, Dec 68, Preparation, Coordination, and Approval of Department of the Army Publications.
AR 350-2, 15 Jun 83, Opposing Force (OPFOR) Program.
AR 350-3, 20 Nov 84, Tactical Intelligence Readiness Training (REDTRAIN).
AR 350-4, 20 Jun 85, Qualification and Familiarization with Weapons and Weapon Systems.
AR 350-5, 29 Aug 85, U.S. Army Training Board.
AR 350-7, 8 Feb 73, Training and Evaluation of Forces for Civil Disturbance.
AR 350-9, 1 Sep 83, Reserve Component Overseas Deployment Training with Active Component Commands.
AR 350-10, 1 Jul 84, Management of Army Individual Training Requirements and Resources.
AR 350-15, 30 Dec 85, Army Physical Fitness Program.
AR 351-1, 15 Jan 84, Individual Military Education and Training.
AR 381-21, 10 Jan 86, Department of the Army Reserve Exploitation Program.
AR 500-10, Oct 78, Allocations of Non-industrial Facilities for Mobilization as of 30 Sep 78.
AR 500-51, 1 Jul 83, Emergency Employment of Army and the Resources Support to Civilian Law Enforcement.
AR 500-70, 1 Oct 82, Military Support of Civil Defense.
AR 600-9, 1 Sep 86, Army Physical Fitness and Weight Control Program.
AR 601-10, 6 Mar 86, Mobilization of Retired Members of the Army.
AR 601-25, 15 Jul 84, Delay in Reporting for and Exemption from Active Duty, Initial Active Duty for Training, and Reserve Forces Duty.
AR 601-50, 8 Jan 86, Appointment of Temporary Officers in the Army of the United States Upon Mobilization.
AR 601-210, 2 Jun 86, Regular Army and Army Reserve Enlistment Program.
AR 611-101, 30 Sep 86, Commissioned Officer Classification System, Officer Rank Personnel Update, Issue 9.
AR 614-100, 30 Sep 86, Officer Assignment Policies, Details, and Transfers, Officer Rank Personnel Update, Issue 9.
AR 624-100, 30 Sep 86, Promotion of Officers on Active Duty, Officer Rank Personnel Update, Issue 9.
AR 680-30, 6 Aug 73, Army Reserve Retirement Point Credit System.
AR 680-150, 1 Feb 82, Reserve Component Officers Eligible for Promotion Consideration.
AR 690-11, 1 Aug 84, Mobilization Planning and Management.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLETS
DA PAM 140-1, 1 Oct 78, Army Reserve Mission, Organization, and Training.
DA PAM 600-3, 30 Sep 86, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Utilization, Officer Rank Personnel Update, Issue 9.
DA PAM 600-11, 30 Sep 86, Warrant Officer Professional Development, Officer Rank Personnel Update, Issue 9.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY CIRCULARS
DA CIR 60-84-3, Undtd, Reserve of the Army Medical Osteopathic, Dental, and Veterinary (MODV) Student Commissioning Program (AR) FY'S 84-85.
DA CIR 621-85-1, Undtd, Education/Assistance Program for Members of the Selected Reserve.
The Department of the Army Manual, CML 83-2072, Apr 82.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUALS
FM 25-1, Feb 85, Training.
FM 25-2, Sep 84, Unit Training Management.
FM 25-3, Dec 84, Training in Units.
FM 25-4, Sep 84, How to Conduct Training Exercises.
FM 25-5, Jan 85, Training for Mobilization and War.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD CIRCULARS
FC 25-100, Training the Force.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY TRAINING CIRCULARS
TC 25-7, Sep 85, How to Develop Training Management Skills in the Unit.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY ACTION PLAN
Action Plan for Reserve Component Training, DAMO-TR, 21 May 84.

USATB
MAY 87 68 Appendix B
NATIONAL GUARD REGULATIONS
NGR 10-1, 31 Mar 80, Training Readiness Standards.
NGR 600-200, 14 Nov 86, Enlisted Personnel Management.

NATIONAL GUARD PUBLICATIONS
NG BUREAU OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, Jul 86, A Brief History of
the Militia and The National Guard, NGB-DAP-D 86.
NG BUREAU, The Story of the Army National Guard, ARNG-84-106

NATIONAL GUARD LETTERS
Letter, NGB-ARA, Subject: The Army National Guard Plan

AUTOMATED DATA SYSTEMS MANUALS
ADSM 18-P19-GRA-IBM-FD, 1 Mar 83, SIDPERS United States
Army Reserve Functional Description.
ADSM 18-P19-GRA-IBM-IP, 30 Aug 84, SIDPERS United States
Army Reserve Implementation Procedures.
ADSM 18-P19-GRA-IBM-OM, 1 Dec 85, SIDPERS United States
ADSM 18-P19-GRA-IBM-PT, 1 Jun 84, SIDPERS United States
Army Reserve Test Plan.
ADSM 18-P19-GRA-IBM-RD, 1 Apr 83, SIDPERS United States
Army Reserve Data Requirements Documents.
ADSM 18-P19-GRA-IBM-RT, 1 Mar 85, SIDPERS United States
Army Reserve Test Analysis Report.
ADSM 18-P19-GRA-IBM-UM, 2 Jun 85, SIDPERS United States

FORCES COMMAND
FORSCOM REGULATIONS
FORSCOM REG 135-1, 1 May 83, Full Time Unit Support
Program.

USATB
MAY 87 69 Appendix B
FORS.COM REG 140-1, 14 Jun 85, Recruiting Partnership Council.
FORS.COM REG 140-2, 28 Feb 86, USAR Aviation Program Data, USAR Aviation Unit Activity Report and USAR Aviation Unit Personnel Information.
FORS.COM REG 140-4, 1 Jan 86, FORSCOM U.S. Army Reserve Retention Program.
FORS.COM REG 140-8 W/C, 1 Oct 84, Army Reserve Retention Advertising/Awareness.
FORS.COM REG 140-10, 30 Nov 84, USAR Flying Hour Program Worksheet.
FORS.COM REG 350-3, 1 Jan 86, Specialized Training in FORSCOM Active Army and Reserve Component Units.
FORS.COM REG 350-12, 15 Aug 83, Tasking and Support of Active Component Installations and Units.
FORS.COM REG 380-41, 1 Jan 83, COMSEC Readiness in Active and Reserve Component Units.
FORS.COM REG 500-2, 1 Sep 82, FORSCOM/USARRED Mobilization and Deployment Improvement Program.

FORS.COM PAMPHLETS
FORS.COM PAM 135-3, 1 Oct 86, Guide for the Analysis of Training Performance.

FORS.COM LETTERS
Letter, AFOPE, Subject: Engineer Training Alignment and Evaluation, 18 Jun 86.
Letter, AFOPE-PSR, Subject: FY 86 FORSCOM USAR Troop Action Guidance (TAG), 13 Apr 84.

FORS.COM/TRADOC REGULATIONS
FORS.COM/TRADOC REG 135-3, 15 Sep 86, United States Army Reserve Schools.
FORSOM/TRADOC REG 350-10, 10 Mar 80, Initial MOS Qualifications Training in Units; Advanced AIT by OJT.

TRADOC REGULATIONS


TRADOC REG 10-5, 28 Jun 85, Headquarters United States Army Training and Doctrine Command.

TRADOC REG 10-41 W/C 1, 1 May 80, Mission Assignments.

TRADOC REG 11-7, 3 Jan 86, Operational Concepts and Army Doctrine.

TRADOC REG 11-14, 15 Oct 85, USAR Energy Conservation Program.

TRADOC REG 135-3, 1 Oct 83, United States Army Reserve Schools (FORSOM REG 135-3, C 1 AND 2).

TRADOC REG 140-1, 25 Jun 81, Active Guard and Reserve Personnel Utilization and Accountability.

TRADOC REG 140-2, 22 Jun 84, The USAR Liaison NCO Program at Army Training Centers and Schools.

TRADOC REG 145-3, 14 Jul 80, Guaranteed Reserve Forces Duty (RFD) Programs.


TRADOC REG 350-7, 1 Apr 85, A Systems Approach to Training.

TRADOC REG 351-1, 16 Jan 84, Training Requirements Analysis System (TRAS).

TRADOC REG 351-6, 1 Dec 82, Support of Training in Units.

TRADOC REG 351-10 W/C 1, 2 Jul 84, Guidelines for the Development of Enlisted Training (NCOES/EPMS).
TRADOC REG 672-2, 1 Dec 84, U.S. Army and USAR Drill Sergeants of the Year, Selection, Recognition, and Utilization.

TRADOC CIRCULARS
TRADOC CIR 70-83-1, 19 Aug 83, Training Device Development.
TRADOC CIR 350-85-5, 1 Nov 85, TRADOC USAR Schools Affiliation Program.

TRADOC/PORSCOM PLANS
Action Plan for Reserve Forces Schools, 7 Aug 85, as revised 4 Feb 86.

DARCOM/TRADOC PAMPHLET

TRAINING GUIDANCE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
AR 140-1, 26 Sep 86, Mission, Organization, and Training, Reserve Components Personnel Update, Issue 17.
AR 350-1, 1 Aug 81, Army Training.
AR 350-41, 26 Sep 86, Forces Training.

NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
NGR 350-1, 30 Nov 83, Army National Guard Training.

FORCES COMMAND
FORSCOM REG 350-1, 1 Sep 82, Training.
FORSCOM REC 350-2, 10 Apr 84, Reserve Component (U.S. Army) Training.
FORSCOM REG 350-4, 1 Oct 84, Training Under CAPSTONE.

WESTERN COMMAND

US ARMY EUROPE
USAREUR REG 350-1, 20 Dec 83, Training.
Letter, Training Smarter with Fewer Dollars, 14 Apr 86.

FIRST US ARMY
1st Army Supplement 1 to FORSCOM Reg 350-2, Reserve Component Training, 1 Jul 86.
Letter, AFKA-TR, Subject: (Not stated--Training Update), Undtd.
Letter, AFKA-RM-MB, Subject: First US Army Command Performance Review (CPR) for 3rd Quarter FY 86, 1 Sep 86.

SECOND US ARMY
2nd ARMY REG 350-22, 26 Feb 86, Training: Reserve Component Unit Training Administration.
2nd ARMY REG 350-25, Undtd, Training: Training Readiness Assessment Criteria (TRAC) (Draft).
2nd ARMY REG 500-3, 9 May 85, Mobilization Planning, Training and Execution Program.
2nd ARMY PAM 135-1, 22 Feb 85, Second US Army Training Sites.
2nd ARMY PAM 350-1, 29 Jun 84, *How To Train.*
2nd ARMY PAM 350-4, 10 Jan 86, *Training: Training Evaluation Program-MOS 76C Equipment Records and Parts Specialist.*
2nd ARMY CIR 350-86-8, 8 July 86, *Training: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Training.*
Letter, AFKD-CG, Subject: Expanded Training Guidance for Training Year 87 and Guidance for Training Year 88, 6 Aug 86.
Letter, AFKD-CG, Subject: Second United States Army Training Guidance, 3 Dec 85.
Letter, AFKD-LG, Subject: Maintenance of Equipment, 22 Aug 86.

**FOURTH US ARMY**

4th ARMY REG 350-2, 8 Sep 86, *Training: Reserve Component Training Management.*
Fourth Army COSSTAR Support Manual (Combat Service Support), Ver 2, 22 May 86.
Letter, Subject: Training Year 87 Guidance, 25 Jul 86.
Letter, AFKE-TR, Subject: Five Year Plan, 15 Nov 85.
Letter, AFKE-PR-PM-P, Subject: Command Philosophy, 16 Dec 85.
Letter, AFKE-TR-CT, Subject: Fourth U.S. Army Regulation 350-XX (DRAFT), Training Management, 15 Apr 86.

**FIFTH US ARMY**

Supplement 1 to FORSCOM REG 350-2, 9 Sep 86, *Training: Reserve Component (U.S.Army) Training.*
Letter, AFKB-IG, Subject: Training Evaluation Command Readiness Inspections (CRI), Undtd.
Letter, AFKB-IG, Subject: Guide for Preparing Combat Readiness Inspection Reports IC 87/88, 1 Oct 86.
Letter, Subject: Training Guidance FY 87, 9 Jul 86.

SIXTH US ARMY
6TH US ARMY PAM 21-5, 1 Oct 85, How to Train.

EIGHTH US ARMY
8th ARMY REG 350-1, 8 Feb 83, Eighth US Army Training.
Letter, Subject: Commanders Training Guidance for FY 86, 3 May 85.

CORPS GUIDANCE
V CORPS, FRANKFURT, FRG
Letter, FY 86 Command Training Guidance, 21 Jan 85.

VII CORPS, STUTTGART
Letter, FY 86 Command Training Guidance, 14 Dec 84.
Letter, FY 86 Training Management Briefings, 13 Jun 85.
Letter, 2d Quarter, FY 86 Quarterly Training Guidance, 1 Oct 85.

DIVISIONAL GUIDANCE
2nd AR DIV, FT HOOD, TX
Letter, Quarterly Training Guidance, 4 Dec 85.
3rd INF DIV, WURZBURG
3rd Infantry Division REG 350-1, 17 Mar 82,
Training.
Briefing, FY 86 Training Briefing, Undtd.

5th INF DIV (MECH), FT POLK, LA
Letter, 5ID(M) Training Lane Program, 27 Nov 85.
Letter, 5ID(M) Training Guidance, 16 Aug 85.

6th INF DIV (LIGHT), FT RICHARDSON, AK
Letter, 6 ID & Non Divisional Units Training
Guidance FY 87, 16 Apr 86.

7th INF DIV (LIGHT), FT ORD, CA
Letter, Command Training Guidance, 29 Apr 85.

8th INF DIV (M), BAD KREUZNACH
Letter, Fiscal Year 86 Annual Command Guidance,
1 Jun 85.

9th INF DIV (MTR), FT LEWIS, WA
Letter, FY 87 Command Training Guidance, 2 Jan 86.
Letter, 9th ID Training Philosophy, 3 Sep 85.
Letter, Training Guidance for 3rd and 4th
Quarters FY 86, 24 Feb 86.
Letter, Quarterly Training Guidance, 4 Dec 85.

10TH MTN DIV, FT DRUM, NY
10 MTN DIV REG 350-1 (Draft), Undtd, Training.
10 MTN DIV CIR 350-8, 21 Mar 86, Officer
Professionalism Program.
10 MTN DIV CIR 350-2, 25 Oct 85, Training School
Guidance.
10 MTN DIV CIR 350-1, 15 Sep 85, Procedures for
(OPFOR) Weapons.

24th INF DIV(M), FT STEWART, GA
24 INF DIV REG 350-1, 9 Oct 85, Training.
Letter, FY 86 Brigade Training Notes, 22 Nov 85.
Letter, 3rd and 4th Quarters Training Guidance,
19 Feb 86.
Letter, Commanders Training Guidance for 3d Quarter, FY 86, 11 Feb 86.
Letter, Desert Living 3rd Quarter FY 86 Training Plan, 6 Mar 86.
Letter, Training Guidance for the 3rd Qtr, FY 86 (Apr-Jun '86), 3 Mar 86.
Letter, Commanders Training Guidance for 3rd Quarter FY 86, 14 Feb 86.
21st SUPCOM, KAIERSLAUTERN
21 SUPCOM CIR 350-1, 16 Apr 85, 21st Support Command Training Policy.

US ARMY NATIONAL GUARD STATE GUIDANCE

ALABAMA, TAG
Training: Standard Operating Procedures, AL-ART, reprint cover letter dated 3 Feb 86.

ALASKA, TAG
Letter, LOI, 2nd Qtr, FY 86, USR and Commander Training Conference, 27 Feb 86.
Letter, SCTG-CO, Training Guidance, TY-87, 24 Feb 86.

ARIZONA, TAG
AZ ARNG PAM 350-1, 1 Jan 86, Trainers Guide.

ARKANSAS, TAG
SOP and Training Guidance, 22 Nov 83.

CALIFORNIA, TAG
CA ARNGR 350-5, 21 Feb 84, Annual Training.
CA ARNGR 350-6, 10 Feb 84, Physical Readiness Training.
CA ARNGR 350-9, 1 Jun 75, Marksmanship.
CA ARNGR 351-3, 1 Jan 86, NCO Education System.
CA ARNG TC 20-3, 12 Aug 81, NBC TRAINING.

COLORADO, TAG
DMA REG 350-1 W/C 2, 15 Apr 85, Training Management.
CONNECTICUT, TAG
MCTGC-T CIR 350-86-2, 1 Apr 86, TY 87 Training Guidance and Two-Year Calendar.

DELAWARE, TAG

FLORIDA, TAG
FLORIDA NG CIR 350-1, 1 Oct 84, Training Guidance.

GEORGIA, TAG
Letter, DCS-OPS-T, Subject: Significant Training Events Calendar FY 87, 20 Oct 86.
Letter, DCS-OPS-R, Subject: TY 87 State Goals, 13 Sep 86.

GUAM, TAG
CIR 350-1, 9 Aug 85, Yearly Training Program FY 86.
CIR 350-86-1, 24 Feb 86, Annual Training Program, FY 86.
Letter, Subject: Priorities, Goals, and Objectives 86-87, 18 Dec 85.

HAWAII, TAG
CIR 350-1, Mar 86, Annual Training 1986.

IDAHO, TAG
AGO OD CIR 350-6, 1 Mar 86, TY 87-88 Training Guidance.

ILLINOIS, TAG
MNIL REG 350-2, 1 May 85, Training Management.

INDIANA, TAG
IMDR 350-1, Feb 86, Indiana Army National Guard Training.
CI IMDR 350-2, 1 Mar 86, Training and Training Administration Instructions.
MDI PAM 350-2, 1 Oct 85, Individual Training.
MDI PAM 350-4, 17 Feb 86, NBC.
MDI PAM 350-37, 1 Oct 83, Individual Training (ITEP).
MDI CIR 350-86-5, 6 Jan 86, Training Program 1986.
IOWA, TAG
IOWA ARNG 350-1, 1 Oct 85, Iowa ARNG Training Policy.

KANSAS, TAG
KNGR 350-1, 10 Dec 84, Training.
KNGR 350-2 W/C 1, 20 Jul 84, Training Ammunition Management ARNG.
KNGR 350-4, 10 Mar 86, Training, The RC Non-Commissioned Officer Education System Program.
KNGR 350-6 (ARMY) (KNGR 50-57 (AIR)), 28 Feb 86, Small Arms Readiness Training.
KNGR 350-10, 1 Nov 84, Nickell Barracks Training Center Facility Operation.
KNGR 351-5, 14 Mar 86, Kansas ARNG Officer Candidate School.
AGKS CIR 350-2, 1 Jan 86, Administration and Evaluation of the FY 85 Common Task Test (CTT).
AGKS CIR 350-5, 1 Aug 85, Mobilization Planning & Training.
AGKS CIR 350-8, 1 Oct 85, ANGR Program for Readiness Management Assembly.
AGKS CIR 350-10, 20 Nov 84, Junior Officer Maintenance Training.
AGKS CIR 350-11, 11 Feb 86, Training, 54E30 NBC School.
AGKS CIR 350-13, 14 Aug 85, Training, Command Maintenance, and Evaluation Team Training.
AGKS CIR 350-14, 2 Jun 86, MOS Qualification Management Plan.
AGKS CIR 350-16, 9 Jun 86, KNGR Combat Rifle & Pistol Championship Matches.
AGO KANSAS PAM 350-1, 28 Mar 84, Annual Training, Administrative Instructions.
AGO KANSAS PAM 350-2 (ARMY), 1 Sep 76, Education and Training, Training Management.
Letter, Supplemental Instructions-AGO PAM 350-1 (Finance & Fiscal) Subject: Annual Training, FY 86, 1 Feb 86.

KENTUCKY, TAG
KY ARNG CIR 350-2, 1 Sep 85, Training (Missions, Goals, and Training Guidance).

LOUISIANA, TAG
Letter, Training Guidance, FY 86, 6 Sep 85.

MAINE TAG
ME ARNG-DO SOP, 1 Dec 82, Training.

MARYLAND, TAG
MD STARC REG 350-2, 1 Feb 86, Training Policies and Procedures.
MD STARC CIR 350-9, 7 Mar 85, Training File Update.
Letter, Priorities, Goals, Missions FY 86-87, 17 May 85.

MASSACHUSETTS, TAG

MICHIGAN, TAG
MI ARNG CIR 350-7 W/C 1-7, 9 Aug 85, MI ARNG IDT Program TY 86.

MINNESOTA, TAG
AGO CIR 350-1, 12 May 86, Training Program TY-87.

MISSISSIPPI, TAG
Letter, Training Guidelines for TY-87, 24 Mar 86.

MISSOURI, TAG
MONGR 350-1, 3 Sep 85, Training.
TAGMO CIR 350-86-1, 28 Jan 86, Administration, Training, Logistics Instructions FY 86.

MONTANA, TAG
DMA-MT-OTAG CIR 350-85-1, 1 Apr 85, Training Guidance TY 86.
NEBRASKA, TAG
NEB ARNG TC 350-1, 1 Feb 86, TY 87, Yearly Training Guidance Program.

NEVADA, TAG
NMD CIR 350-1, 19 Sep 85, Training Guidance, FY 86.  
NMD CIR 350-1, 15 May 86, Training Guidance, TY 87.

NEW HAMPSHIRE, TAG
NHARNG CIR 350-1, 1 Aug 86, Three Year Training Plan.

NEW JERSEY, TAG
NJARNGR 350-1, 1 Feb 86, Education and Training.  
NJARNG Commanders Conference, 14 Sep 85.  
NJARNGR 350-1 W/C 1-3, 1 Apr 84, Education and Training.  

NEW MEXICO, TAG
AGONM REG 350-1, 1 Feb 86, Evaluation and Training (Draft).  

NEW YORK, TAG
PAM 210-2, 1 Jun 86, Station List.  
Letter, Training Guidance, 29 Aug 86.

NORTH CAROLINA, TAG
OTAGNC REG 350-1, 1 Oct 86, Training.

NORTH DAKOTA, TAG
NDNG REG 350-1 W/C 2-4, 6-7, 9-11, 1 Oct 80, Training.  
NDNG REG 350-1-5, 19 Nov 81, Training Ammunition Management.  
Letter, Training Guidance for TY 87, 1 Apr 86.

OHIO, TAG
AGO SUPPL TO FORSCOM REG 350-2, 12 Mar 84, Training.  
AGO CIR 350-1, 1 Mar 86, Ohio ARNG AT Plan TY 86.  
AGO CIR 350-11, 1 Oct 85, TY 86 Training Guidance.  
AGO CIR 350-14, 1 Jan 86, OPFOR Policy.
OKLAHOMA, TAG
OMD REG 220-1, 1 Apr 85, Ready The Force.
OMD REG 350-1, 10 Jan 86, Train The Force.
OMD REG 350-3, Recruit Training.
OMD REG 350-5-13, 1 Aug 85, Guide For Ammunition Management.
OMD REG 350-37, 1 Aug 85, ITEP.

OREGON, TAG
ONGM-3 W/C5, Oct 85, Multi-Year Training Plan.

PENNSYLVANIA, TAG
TC 350-2, 25 Sep 86, Training.
Letter, AFKA-NG-R, Subject: CAPSTONE Alignment 28th Infantry Division, 22 Aug 86.

RHODE ISLAND, TAG
TAGRI Suppl to FORSCOM Reg 350-2, 28 Jan 86, Training: Rhode Island Army National Guard.
Letter, TAGRI-AG, Command Guidance for TY 87, 19 Feb 86.

SOUTH DAKOTA, TAG
SDNG PAM 350-1, 15 Jan 86, Training.

TENNESSEE, TAG

TEXAS, TAG
TXARNG REG 350-1, 5 Mar 86, Training.
TXARNG REG 350-2, 1 Nov 73, School Program.
TXARNG REG 350-3, W/Cl, 19 Nov 80, Training.
TXARNG REG 350-7, 1 Jan 84, Training.
TXARNG REG 350-8, 1 Jul 81, NBC Defense.
TXARNG REG 350-15, 1 Sep 82, Marksmanship Training.

UTAH, TAG
UTNG CIR 350-1, 1 Jul 85, Annual Training FY 86.
UTNG CIR 350-4, 1 Jun 85, Multi-Year Training Program
TY 85-86.

VERMONT, TAG
CIR 350-1-86, 1 Jan 86, Training Guidance, TY 87-88.
CIR 350-1-85, 1 Apr 85, Training Guidance, TY 86-87.
Letter, Command Training Guidance, TY-87, 10 Dec 85.

VIRGINIA, TAG
CIR 350-1, 7 Oct 85, Training TY 86-87.
Letter, Training Guidance, FY-87, 27 Feb 86.

VIRGIN ISLANDS TAG
Letter, Revised Training Guidance TY 86, 1 Oct 85.

WASHINGTON, TAG
WA ARNG CIR 350-86-2, 20 Feb 86, TY 87 Training
Directive.
WA ARNG CIR 350-86-4, 1 Oct 86, FY 88 Training
Directive.

WASHINGTON DC, TAG
DC ARNG CIR 350-1, 8 Sep 86, Training.

WEST VIRGINIA, TAG
WV ARNG CIR 350-1, 22 Feb 86, Training Guidelines
TY 87.

WISCONSIN, TAG
WI ARNG CIR 350-2, 26 Dec 85, Yearly Training Program
TY 86.
WI ARNG CIR 700-1, 31 Dec 84, Administration and
Logistics Annual Training 85.

WYOMING, TAG
WY ARNG CIR, 1 Aug 86, Training.

MILITARY STUDIES TEXTBOOKS
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS PA, Army Command and
COMBINED ARMS SERVICES STAFF SCHOOL, E515 Reserve Components/
Mobilization, Jun 83.

USATB
MAY 87 83  Appendix B
PERIODICALS AND ARTICLES
Griffin, Joseph W., Major General, US Army National Guard, "The Guard of the 80's: 15 Years of Progress," National Guard Magazine, Jan 86.
"Active Reserve Response Imbalance is a Problem," Army, Vol 36, Number 2, Feb 86.
United States Army Personnel Center (ARPERCEN), Individual Ready Reserve Enhancement Program, Volume II, 10 Dec 85.
National Guard Bureau Information Management Agency, Information Management Booklet, FY 87 Management Conference, 19 Sep 86.

SPEECHES/PRESENTATIONS
Griffin, Joseph W., Major General, US Army National Guard, Speech to the Citadel Club of Atlanta, Georgia, 3 Oct 85.

STUDENT STUDIES/PAPERS


Jenkins, Everett R., Major, US Army, "Training is Better than Ever, It Has Nowhere to Go But Up," Mar 82, Air Command and Staff College.

Kille, Bruce R. Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, "Improving Training Assistance from Army Schools to Army Training Managers," Dec 72, U.S. Army War College.


McDevitt, James P., Colonel, ARNG, and Lieutenant Colonel James L. McLaughlin, USAR, Mobilization Studies Program, Army "Reserve Components Remobilization Training: Should the US Codes be Changed?," Mar 85, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University.


Olesen, Gerald C., Captain, Air National Guard, "ANG Combat Readiness--Technician or AGR (Active Guard/Reserve)," Apr 86, Air Command and Staff College.


CONTRACT STUDIES


REPORTS
ARMY AUDIT AGENCY (AAA), "Administrative Workload in the Reserve Components," 16 Apr 79.
ARMY AUDIT AGENCY (AAA), "Audit of Ability to Support Deploying RC Units 1st ID (Mech) and Ft Riley, Report of Audit SW 85-3," 22 Jan 85.
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), "Can the Army and Air Force Reserves Support the Active Forces Effectively?," Supplement, Apr 79.

ARMY AUDIT AGENCY (AAA), "Deployment Planning for Army Forces in Support of the U.S. Central Cmd, 81st USARC East Point Georgia," Jun 84.

RESERVE FORCES POLICY BOARD (RFPB), "Fiscal Year 1983 Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components," Jun 84.

RESERVE FORCES POLICY BOARD (RFPB), "Fiscal Year 1984 Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components," Jun 85.


CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (CBO), "Improving the Army Reserves," Nov 85.

ARMY AUDIT AGENCY (AAA), "Indiana National Guard, Indianapolis, Indiana, Report of Audit," Jun 84.

ARMY AUDIT AGENCY (AAA), "Oklahoma Army National Guard, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Report of Audit," Sep 84.


U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), "Problems in Implementing the Army's CAPSTONE Program to Provide All Reserve Components with a Wartime Mission, 22 Sep 82.


ARMY AUDIT AGENCY (AAA), "Reserve Component Activities, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., Report of Audit," Feb 73.

ARMY AUDIT AGENCY (AAA), "Reserve Component-Fifth US Army, Ft Sam Houston, TX, Report of Audit," Jan 73.

U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), "Reserve Components; Army Personnel Qualification Data Could Be Improved," Mar 86.
NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU (NGB), "Reserve Component Troop Basis of the Army. Annex II, Army National Guard Unit Program," Dec 71.

ARMY AUDIT AGENCY (AAA), "Virgin Island Army National Guard, St. Croix, Virgin Islands, Report of Audit," Mar 85.


STUDIES


OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (RESERVE AFFAIRS) (OASDRA), "Evaluation of Future Requirements and Acquisition of Non-Systems Training Devices for the Army National Guard and Army Reserve," 1 Feb 86.


CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, "Improving the Readiness of the Army Reserves and National Guard: A Framework for Debate," Feb 78.


ARMOR FORCE MOBILIZATION READINESS TASK FORCE (MOBTAF), VOL 5, "Personnel Screening - Diagnostic," Nov 85.


KETRON INC., "A Proposal to Develop a Mobilization Training Program for Ft A.P. Hill, Virginia; KP 113-86," Jan 86.

THE RESERVE COMPONENT COORDINATION COUNCIL TASK FORCE, "Reduction of Administrative Workload at the Reserve Component Unit Level," 1980.

NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU, "Reduction of the Administrative Workload in Army National Guard Units," 31 Jul 74.


ARMOR FORCE MOBILIZATION READINESS TASK FORCE (MOBTAF), Vol 7, "Reserve Component Collective Training."

ARMOR FORCE MOBILIZATION READINESS TASK FORCE (MOBTAF), Vol 8, "Reserve Component Individual Training Units."

ARMOR FORCE MOBILIZATION READINESS TASK FORCE (MOBTAF), Vol 10, "Reserve Component Leader/Professional Development Training."

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (RESERVE AFFAIRS) (OASDRA), "Reserve Component Manpower Readiness and Mobilization Policy," Volume 1 (Based on the Colloquium on Mobilization with Special Emphasis on Guard and Reserve Components, 1-4 Nov 83), Jan 84.

USATB
MAY 87

Appendix B
ARMOR FORCE MOBILIZATION READINESS TASK FORCE (MOBTAF), Vol 9, "Reserve Component MOS/Specialty Qualification.

COMBINED ARMS TRAINING ACTIVITY, FT LEAVENWORTH KS, ATZL-TAB, "Reserve Component Staff Training/Sustainment," 19 Nov 86.

FORSOM, FUTURE REQUIREMENTS STUDY GROUP REPORT, "Reserve Components Command and Control (RC3) Future Requirements Study," 20 Sep 84.


FORSOM, FORSCOM STUDY GROUP, "Simplify Personnel Actions by Revision and Elimination (Spare Study)," 4 Dec 79.


OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS AND PLANS, ODCSOPS, "Tailoring of Reserve Component Unit Training Assemblies and Unit Manning Levels," Vol. 2. - Appendices A to E, Mar 74.


DRAFT STUDIES


TRIP REPORTS