



STUDENT ESSAY

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COMMAND, LEADERSHIP AND CONTROL
ESSENCE AND APPLICATION

BY

COLONEL ALWALI J. KAZIR

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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Command, Leadership and Control is one of the most commonly talked about activities, especially in the military circle. It is a subject in which historians, academicians, and military leaders have written volumes, with varying approaches. This wide source of information makes the subject one of the most challenging to write about: even more challenging however is the fact that no individual can claim to have found a 'recipe' to successfully conduct this all embracing human activity. The military leader could only tell us the best he did to succeed: the historian and the academician can best write based		

on hearsay and analyze. The effort of such writers are nonetheless commendable, as they give us the opportunity to learn from other people--the guinea pigs--experience.

The importance of this human activity to the managers of violence requires no over emphasis. The logic of command, leadership and control is that, at the highest level of decisionmaking within a particular system, let there be an individual or a group, that either has the answers or the means to find answers to problems affecting the smooth functioning of the system: communicate these answers or means down the hierarchy, setting objectives and the guidelines and constraints within which the objectives must be accomplished: provision of resources and delegation of authority are hallmarks of the system. The overall responsibility for success or failure remains with the decisionmaker.

Command may connote authority--function or an organization. Command responsibilities increase and become more complex in proportion to the complexity of the issue in question. Its role increases with the sophistication of the forces. In addition to looking after itself, the command has the responsibility of planning, coordination, and mission execution. Leadership is more of a function of personality: it requires the leaders personal examples, and exhibition of his personal qualities and character. Good leadership must possess certain positive qualities and prerequisites which the subordinates can emulate. Leadership is an art, as such its functions cannot be accomplished by rigidly following set principles and procedures. As for control, I look at it as the link between command and leadership. It is the activity that enables the art of command and leadership to be conducted, within the set guidelines, to meet the standards. It is an activity that relies on such instruments as communications, staff functions, rules and procedures, and the command and leadership motivation. The litmus test for command, leadership and control is the application to successfully accomplish tasks within constraints in peace as well as in war: the 1973 Arab-Israeli War is discussed here.

My inspiration to write on this subject is derived from my interest in it and my desire to succeed in applying it. My sources are however based mostly on other peoples' experiences depicted in the literature I have been able to lay hands on. It is my hope that the little I have been able to discuss in this essay will be beneficial to the readers and especially others craving command and leadership positions. Discussion and comments that may be stimulated by this essay are welcome!

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

COMMAND, LEADERSHIP AND CONTROL
ESSENCE AND APPLICATION

An Individual Essay

by

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ABSTRACT

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The final task of a leader is that he leaves behind him in other men the conviction and the will to carry on. The genius of a good leader, is to leave behind him a situation which common sense, without the grace of genius can deal with successfully.¹

Introduction

In this all encompassing statement, Walter Lippman in his "Roosevelt has gone," has stated what every leader must endeavor to achieve. This statement is very much applicable to the military. The military is one of the most complex organizations an individual may find himself leading. It is an organization made up of people as varied in their creed as they are in their race; people of varied backgrounds as they are of intellectual differences; people of varied ethical values as they are of experiences in life; people as varied in their approach to problems as they are in perception. The military has an array of equipment as varied as the people making up the organization. What makes the military organization even more complex and challenging to lead is that it is controlled by the civilians: the constitution has given the civilians that mandate. The reasons for the civilian control are objective as well as subjective:

The essence of the objective civilian control is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism; the essence of subjective civilian control is the denial of independent military sphere: the one prime essential for any system of civilian control is the minimizing of military power.²

Objective civilian control achieves this minimization by professionalizing the military, by rendering them politically sterile and neutral. The military is not the organization that should bother to resist the civilian control, as it has got enough complex issues to handle. The military organization's complexity has given it the characteristics of a system full of conflicts,

contradictions and uncertainties. Despite these shortcomings, the military's prime function is to deter aggression and if that fails, to fight and win in all odds.

Discussing the problems of organization, reminds me of Thompson's comment when he said,

Although the pyramid headed by an all powerful individual has been a symbol of organizations, such omnipotence is possible only in simple situations where perfected technologies and task environments make competitive decisions possible.

Thompson continued that, "where technology is incomplete or task environment heterogeneous, judgemental decision strategy is required and control is vested in a dominant coalition."³ Emphasizing the need for prompt and effective decisionmaking which can best be done by a central authority, he continued,

that the more numerous the areas needing judgement, the larger the dominant coalition, and as areas within the organization shift from characteristically computational to characteristically judgemental decision strategies, the dominant coalition will expand to include their representatives

and that, "the potential for conflicts also increases with the variety of professions (expertise) incorporated in the organization."⁴

Laying emphasis on the influence of power and the requirement for sharing it, Thompson reiterated

That when such forces result in a wide distribution of power, and therefore in a large dominant coalition, coalition business is conducted by an inner circle: as without an effective inner circle such an organization is immobilized.⁵

In an analogy very much applicable to the theory of centralized control and decentralized execution, Thompson visualized that, "When power is widely dispersed, compromise issues can be ratified but cannot be decided by the dominant coalition in toto."⁶ Emphasizing on the dominant role of the

commander, he continued that, "in the organization with dispersed power, the central power figure is the individual who can manage the coalition."⁷

The statements quoted in the preceding paragraphs are analogous to the military establishment. I agree with Thompson's dictum and we shall utilize that as the spring board for the discussions in the succeeding paragraphs. Thompson's dictum is easily applicable to the structure and the functional organization of the military institution, especially at the senior headquarters level where the set up could be described as truly complex. The representatives described in the dictum can easily fit the members of the various services and component commands, and the coalition in this instance is applicable to the relationship between them and the central figure, and the relationships within them: and the relations between them and the staff officers at the headquarters. That central power figure very nicely and completely fits the commander in such a set up. The relevance of this analogy and its applicability to the contemporary military organization where the advancement in science and technology has enhanced the employment of sophisticated military systems requiring expertise, as never experienced before. This analogy is further validated by today's battlefield where the employment of a single service only cannot be imagined: the environment has lent itself to employment of multiservice efforts and resources. A sure way to ensure the functioning of the organization and the effective employment of these multitude of resources and expertise is through the application of command, leadership and control.

Objective and Scope

The foregoing description and analogies clearly indicate that an organization such as the military, and in particular the command aspect

requires the efforts of many people and material to make it function. The central figure or the individual, must make it function as perfectly as the expertise he possesses would permit: it must function as smoothly as the coalition allows it to: it should function as effectively as the various representatives could contribute to its success. The commanders functions will to a large extent be affected by both the internal and the external environment within which the organization must operate. The command's functional responsibilities will also be affected by the extent to which the resources, personnel, money and time, at its disposal contribute to the overall effort in the fulfillment of a given task. That central figure is the authority, he is the one responsible for whatever happens within the command. In the context of this essay that central figure is the commander who must possess certain characteristics and tools to facilitate his assurance of the success of the sound coalition. The commander must be able to employ the functions, command, leadership and control in such a manner as to contribute to his other efforts in the accomplishment of his organization's desired objectives. In this essay therefore I shall discuss the familiar, though not so comprehended activities, command, leadership and control. I shall in particular discuss their essence and application. In the process of discussing these activities, efforts will be made to ensure their comprehension, with reference to some renowned military commanders. We shall examine the interrelationship between these activities and how they have been applied and employed in a particular operation.

This essay is written with the hope that it would be beneficial to a wide range of readers to whom it is expected to get the message across that, no matter the environment and the threat, these activities are the hallmark to success. It is through the employment of command, leadership and control, in

their proper perspective, that a formidable and virile fighting machine like today's military can be built: it is through them that we can prepare and make men, the most critical asset at the leaders disposal, to go into the future battle, fight and win. As Marshall put it, "I have yet to see a Sherman tank or a Browning gun that added anything to the national defense until it came into the hands of men who willingly risked their own lives. . . ."8 As a result of time and space constraints this essay has to be just as long and cover just as many areas as the limitations permitted. Despite these limitations, it is my hope that the essay would be found interesting and beneficial.

Command, Leadership and Control

In the succeeding paragraphs we shall discuss the terms Command, Leadership and Control with a view to having a better insight into understanding them more clearly.

Command--Of the three terms under consideration, the one most commonly under discussion is command. Though it is the one that is constantly talked about, especially in the military cycle, it is the least employed, as there are by appointment, fewer commanders than leaders. While it is true that all commanders are expected to be leaders, not all leaders are commanders. Although it is a fact that the majority of officers in the military aspire to hold command positions, yet very few of them fulfill the prerequisites for that position. Puryear puts it without mincing words when he said,

. . . there are some who get command and lose it. They lose it because they are incompetent and fail, or because they are unwilling after learning what it entails to undertake the responsibilities of command.⁹

Command entails a series of activities and the term itself connotes many functions. Command may be the functional organization over which the

individual is imposed as the commander: it may connote the authority given that individual imposed on the organization: and yet it may connote the process of exercising that authority which has given him the power to exercise the responsibility to ensure that all goes well in the establishment. While it is very difficult, if not impossible, to completely separate the three command connotations from one another, the one that is most felt by subordinates and assessed by superiors is the process: this, as a matter of fact entails the entire spectrum of the command function.

History is replete with great commanders and generals, and great captains. Prominent among these great captains were Hannibal, Ceasar, Alexander; later in time were Napoleon, the Duke of Wellington, and others, coming nearer to our time there were Patton, MacArthur, Marshall, Eisenhower and Montgomery. As studies have revealed, each of these captains had his peculiar style of exercising command, leadership and control. Their actions were also, more often than not, dependent on the situation and the environment in which they had to operate. While it is advocated that these great commanders be studied, caution must also be applied, as one is not likely to apply in entirety any of the past successful commanders style or the consequent lessons learned and expect to achieve success in a manner similar to theirs. It however goes without saying that no matter the situation, it is that single individual, the commander, employing his art of command, on whom success or failure depends. Another great warrior Frederick the Great put it clearly that,

The success of any war depends greatly on the capacity of the general; on a knowledge of the places he occupies, and on the act with which he may derive advantage from his situation, either from preventing the enemy from taking such posts as might favor his purpose or in choosing himself those most conducive to success.¹⁰

In keeping with this premise, history has taught us that "One of Fredericks first lessons in tactics, apparently was to learn not to rely on formations simply because they have seemed to work in another place and at another time."¹¹ An aspect we must keep clear in our minds is that command actions in war must be seen as a continuations of command actions in peace time. The command style must be established in peacetime so that transition from peace to war situations is done smoothly and effectively without doubt in any part of the command structure. It must also be understood without any iota of doubt that the most important resource, at the disposal of a command is the human being. No matter the type of environment in which the command will find itself, no matter the situation that prevails and no matter the sophistication and the effectiveness of the systems at the disposal of the command, which therefore will affect the method of application, the central figure to success is the human facts. Keegan put this succinctly:

Every battle in world history may be different from any other battle, but they must have something in common, if we can group them under the term battle at all. . . . What battles have in common is human; the behavior of men struggling to reconcile, their instinct for self preservation, their sense of honor and the achievement of some aim over which other men are ready to kill them.¹²

Leadership--I have taken time to describe command at length, based on my premise, that though it is the most talked about of the three, it is the most difficult and the rarest to attain. Leadership on the other hand is the most prevalent as it commences the moment there is more than one person, in a group, on assignment or found themselves in a situation that required direction, despite the need for consensus. It is however the most complex, with so many dynamics and attributes. Every leader has his own style and there are no set out rules and regulations for successful leadership. As Colonel Wood states, "Leadership is an Art: A practical Art." I am a staunch

believer of this maxim. While it is true that there are certain attributes that great leaders possess, and that there are certain principles for successful leadership, these are only guides. This is because the principles do not portray truism, as in scientific principles such as those of Archimedes and his "Eureka" finding. Success, either in the execution of missions in battle or leading men in peacetime, depends on the leader himself and how he applies that art of leadership. Colonel Wood stated this truism clearly when he said,

Battles can be won by the minds of leaders, those who are skilled in the Art of Leadership. . . . The art of leadership is embodied in the man not in some set of abstractions. . . . The art is based on certain attributes which are found in leaders who have proved themselves in battle.¹³

It must be added at this point too that the leader in battle does not lead by applying or exercising a set of "aesthetic" principles. The art can be described as an exceptional skill in conducting a human activity that is employed by the commander; it is a means of applying ideas to govern his craft. Leadership is a command tool.

Control--The authority given to the commander and the fact that the failure and the success of his command is solely his responsibility requires the commander to, through the instruments of command, exercise effective control across the whole spectrum of the organization--his command. One of the commanders foremost requirements is to create an atmosphere that is conducive for the exercise of his command and leadership. It is in that atmosphere that his subordinate commanders, his troops and his staff will live and function. In his circular, High Command in War, General Montgomery stated:

One of the first responsibilities . . . is to create . . . atmosphere and in that atmosphere his staff, his subordinate commanders, and his troops will live, and work and fight. His armies must know what he wants; they must know the basic fundamentals of his policy, and must be given firm guidance and a clear lead. Inspirations and guidance must come from above and must permeate throughout the force.¹⁴

Let it be stated here that the commander must provide clear and effective means of communicating with his subordinates, he must also be able to communicate with the higher headquarters. In effect there must be an effective means of communications vertically and horizontally. The commanders behavior and status in his command must not portray a single iota of "Laissez-faire" attitude. While it is true that he must constantly be in the know of the situation, he must not usurp his subordinates powers and initiatives. As mentioned earlier, one of the dynamics of an organization like the military is uncertainty. The command structure should be such as to ensure the prevalence of centralized directions but a decentralized execution. This is a panacea to uncertainty and a catalyst for the employment of initiative by subordinates. In his efforts to find solutions to the phenomenon, uncertainty, Thompson, came up with a direct and an indirect method. The direct method is based on internal regulations: this is aimed at producing a disciplined system that can quickly meet the adverse effects of environmental themes or changes. Another method where possible, is the control or prediction of the environment itself. The prediction is however necessary only if the environment cannot be controlled. As we are aware, control or prediction of the environment, especially in war is an uphill task, one may even dare to say is out of the question. A viable possibility is to exert influence. This is done where there is the capability to gather critical and relevant information on the environment and its attendant threat. The commander should have the ability

to influence the behavior and subsequently the actions of superiors. The commander should have the communication skills and eloquence, and be able to exploit these assets to his advantage. Using his communication skills, the commander, should be able to establish good relations between him, his command and the senior headquarters and its staff officers. General MacArthur was able to convince the Joint Chiefs of Staff to authorize and bless his Inchon Landing by the careful and effective employment of the influence he had over some of the officers at that level, and more importantly by his eloquence. The indirect method in influencing the enemy is done by, preparations in peacetime, a better and more functional organizational structure and cultivation of influence in the entire command and instilling fear into the enemy. After all war is a battle of will between commanders. Audacity plays its expected important role here. As Patton put it,

theory leaves it to the military leader . . . to act according to his own courage, according to his spirit of enterprise and his self confidence. Make your choice therefore according to the inner force but never forget that no military leader has ever become great without audacity.¹⁵

Audacity is a character that is best exhibited in war.

WAR--Before discussing the relationship between command, leadership and control, and their essence and application, it is pertinent that we briefly discuss the phenomenon, war. So many philosophers, historians, academicians, and military leaders in particular, have produced an enormous amount of literature on war. Few exemplary quotations will give us further insight into this phenomenon. While it is true that there had been and there may be war mongers today, one can safely say that war is not a phenomenon one should either like or even admire. As Confucius said, "A really great general does not like war, and is neither vindictive nor impassioned."¹⁶ Freedom and peace are the ultimate goals of every nation, for it is in such an environment

that there is likely to be development and improvement of the standard of living and the general well being of the society. The attainment of perpetual peace is however impossible especially, today, in a world with a variety of ideologies. As Kant put it,

after showing that the idea of perpetual peace embraces all the contradictions, inherent in the concept of eternity, - perpetual peace is impracticable . . . there need to be no limit . . . to attempts to achieve it.¹⁷

When talking about war, one cannot help but to think of Clausewitz. In his efforts to justify his claims of the supremacy of politics over war, Clausewitz stated,

Wars are in reality only the expression or manifestation of politics - its nonsense to wish to subordinate the political view point to the military, for it is the factor that has determined the war. It is that which is the intelligent faculty, war is only its instrument not the reverse. The subordination of the military view point to the political is thus the only possible way.¹⁸

Talking about the juridical aspects of war, Quincy Wright put it succinctly that "War is the legal condition that permits two or more hostile groups to wage a conflict with armed forces."¹⁹ At this point one may 'bite the bullet' and state without mincing words that war is an absolute general fact, that is found in all human society from the most primitive to the most civilized. It must be remembered that a nation has at its disposal, political, psychosocial, economic and military instruments which it can employ to protect its national interest and fulfill its national objectives. With this premise in mind I can safely say that war should be resorted to only as a last option when other instruments have shown imminent signs of failure or have actually failed. It should be employed in conjunction with other instruments, and not in isolation. Resorting to the military instrument does not mean outright violence; it can be employed as a show of force without necessarily resorting to avoidable destructions: Cuba in 1962 and Libya in

1984 are examples of the respective nonviolent and violent uses of the military. We should console ourselves that the decision to go to war is not that of the military. That decision is the responsibility of the civilians, who control the military. The military should concern itself with preparing itself and ensuring itself that it goes to war in an acceptable state of readiness to make the enemy die for his country while it achieves victory. It must constantly be kept in mind that "war is an act of violence the aim of which is to force the adversary to carry out our will"²⁰ as Clausewitz would put it.

Relationship Between Command, Leadership and Control

The activities, command, leadership and control are so interrelated that they are inseparable: They are like the tongue and cheek. Their employment must begin very early in peacetime. The commander must constantly see to it that the interrelationship between them is clearly understood throughout the formation. The subordinate commanders and the staff must be fused into a closely knit organization that knows its strengths and weaknesses. General Bradleys comment on early preparation should also apply here. He stated, "all of us worked hard . . . you start working hard right from the first . . . you have to start in the beginning."²¹ This statement is analogous to the preparation and the assurance that these activities are clearly understood right from the word go. To be a commander one must have the desire to work towards that goal. We daily discuss model commanders and military leaders, such as MacArthur, Eisenhower, Marshall and Patton, who successfully lived their military lives and left behind indelible marks in the annals of military history especially in the art of command and leadership. As Puryear summarized,

There are many officers who think they want command, but who are not willing either consciously or subconsciously, to expend the effort required. There are some who get command and lose it. They lose it because they are unwilling after learning what it entails to undertake the responsibilities of command.²²

To be a successful commander means devoting ones entire time, twenty-four hours a day, to the function of command. The commander must be willing to learn and teach all that entails to make an efficient and good unit. He must learn to withstand the strains and stresses of command, he must learn to live with the basics, the fundamentals and rudimentaries of the well being of a formation especially its human resources. The commander must constantly be thinking of how best to improve and in addition raise the standard of his unit. His thought must always be geared towards something better and more challenging. The commander must realize that even a genius cannot do everything by himself. He must be able to delegate authority, but be aware of the bitter fact that the responsibility of whatever happens in the formation lies squarely on his shoulders. He owes the higher headquarters the ability to do well and gain the praises but he must realize that, if things do not work out in accordance with the higher headquarter's directives then he shoulders the blame. The commander must not always seek praise; personal satisfaction is more than glory. He must be able to exhibit initiative, foresight, good management and be able to accomplish tasks with the littlest at his disposal. It is very important for a commander to realize that his superior may be rewarded for his achievements, just as he too may be rewarded for his subordinates successes. The commander must be able to think on his feet. He must be able to simultaneously handle training, the most important peacetime activity, the well being of the unit, attainment and maintenance of right standard of disciplining and morale; he must be able to handle all these

activities concurrently "Command therefore requires a man who can physically and emotionally cope with the responsibility and strain without losing his effectiveness and patience."²³ At this point it is pertinent we reflect the thoughts of some great commanders and military leaders. Omar Bradley was of the opinion that people choose to command because of their sense of accomplishment. As for General Collins it is the handling of people that appeals to him:

To him it is the wonderful thing. General Clark however put it, the men who seek command are those who are sparked by the desire to give everything their best. Nothing less than the best satisfies them. In the case of General McAuliffe he wanted command because in the time of war that is the most important job, the most satisfying.²⁴

Let it be added that the commander must be able to assess any situation correctly. Study the environment carefully, get his priorities in the proper perspective and ensure that he employs his right assets in the right place and at the right time. S.L.A. Marshal put it rightly when, he said,

We do not believe in wasting infantry on mission which can better be done by tanks: We are opposed to wasting armored forces lives on task which can be accomplished by artillery and air bombardment . . . it is the policy not to sacrifice men in order to save machine.²⁵

In the case of leadership, taking a glance at the profiles of some great military leaders indicates that a dedication to ones career; and willingness to work, study, and preparation are essential to success. It is necessary that one devotes ones life to the military career and possess the desire to be an outstanding leader before he can make the most of other qualities; courage and intelligence are two very important qualities that a leader must possess. The leader must be both morally and physically courageous: As war mongers would say--war and courage have done more better things than charity. In Nietzsche's words, "War is the real test, the only impartial and just contest; is the only form of contest imaginable."²⁶ In any environment the

leader must show that he is aware of the situation, ready to partake in finding solutions to problems, and treat his subordinates as humans, as it is through these that the leader will gain his men's love and respect. Describing the characters of Patton, Eisenhower, Marshall, and MacArthur, Puryear, states: "Their character was of the highest; they showed the integrity, the humility, the selflessness, the concern for others, the reverence and the showmanship which are present in most top military leaders,"²⁷

The leaderships appetite for the acquisition of knowledge must never be seen to be satisfied. A leader must constantly seek to acquire knowledge especially of the methods employed in past wars and the characters of other leaders. The four great military leaders referred, to due to their desire for command, craved responsibility. They kept themselves busy studying past wars, utilized the little time and the slightest opportunity they had to discuss some strategic as well as tactical problems: they visited battlefields and reconstructed battles to see why things happened the way they did. They constantly kept themselves updated on the weapons of other countries, both friend and foe. All four were said to have created at their headquarters atmospheres conducive for mutual respect, confidence, and understanding between them, their staff, subordinate commanders down to the private soldier: it is this character that endeared these generals to their subordinates. Their ability to communicate was another asset, which radiated their honesty and frankness to the delight and willingness of their subordinates to obey orders, without coercion or threat: those are the leaders qualities. Their personal contacts with these men radiate warmth: their disregard for their safety to be where the action was and to visit the men were catalysts in moral

boosting and devotion to duty. As General Eisenhower put it when he visited the men,

I found that it did a great deal of good to get down to troops in the combat area. My presence relaxed them and made them feel more comfortable about the situation. But I was not deceived as to the reason. I knew what was going through their mind. They were saying to themselves; there must be less danger than we thought or the old man wouldn't be here.²⁸

While command portrays the authority, the functional organization and the act, and leadership is the portrayal of the commanders personality and influence through certain qualities which he must have and be seeing to have, the cycle is not complete without that very important link, the control. Our discussion so far has set the base for the commander, through his leadership assets to employ the methods of control for successful execution of command responsibilities. The first and foremost thing to do to effect control is to ensure the structuring of a functional organization: the logic of organization is to have tiers, the hierarchy and a system whereby orders and directive can easily flow forward while information and intelligence, especially battlefield intelligence, can easily flow from the front to the rear. A senior commander in the field should be able to divide the battlefield into zones, commensurate with which he should have, a tactical headquarters, a main headquarters and the rear. The commander must always be in a place from where he can best control activities and operations; where he can be reached easily by his superiors as well as his subordinates; from where the subordinates should feel his presence and participation in operations.

The commander must have a small but very efficient staff, especially at the tactical headquarters. The tactical headquarters should be small but highly efficient, mobile and self contained; it must be able to move on its own transport. This is where the commander should spend most of his time and

should therefore be as far forward as the situation permits. The majority of the staff officers should remain at the main headquarters where the commanders orders are given details. The rear area should be organized in such a way as to support the fight efficiently and effectively. It must function and be seen to function as the life wire of the organization where logistics and administrative activities are carried out. The commander must establish a secure and efficient communication means between the headquarters. Where possible the commander should hand pick his staff officers and subcommanders. After ensuring that his command is well organized and staffed, the commander should give latitude for independent work by the subordinates. He must nonetheless ensure effective supervision and constant assessment of performances. As General Montgomery put in his high command in war:

He must keep his fingers on the spiritual pulse of his armies: obviously, therefore he must decentralize. He must lay down the form very clearly; he must then trust his subordinates and his staff and must leave them alone to get on with their own jobs. He himself must devote his attention to the larger issues; he must not belly ache about details.

As indicated in the foregoing, command, leadership, and control are very closely interrelated. The employment of all of them at the same time will depend on the level and the situation. But while it is true that command connotes leadership responsibilities, leadership may not necessarily mean having command authority. Control on the other hand is ubiquitous and cuts across the spectrum of the other two activities. The commander, the leader, must exercise effective control to see their will through and ensure the accomplishment of the given assignment, through proper planning and coordination.

Essence of Command, Control and Leadership

It is essential that any organization be it civil or military must have elements of leadership if it is to function successfully. While leadership is more prevalent in civil institutions and organizations command is not; even there the leadership must still devise some means of control. Both command and leadership, coupled with effective control are however essential for the military. Command and leadership have certain inherent responsibilities that must be upheld. In peacetime these responsibilities include the preparation of the organization in its entirety, to defeat the perceived threat should hostilities breakout. It is the leadership's responsibility to ensure the availability of adequate manpower and other resources for the command. The leadership must ensure that the manpower is well trained and skilled enough not only to operate but also maintain the systems at hand. Training must be conducted to perfection in peacetime, since there will be no chance to train the manpower to that level once hostilities breakout. The fighting machine must be forged and moulded to the commanders liking; then create an organization that will enable the weapon to be wielded properly and develop its full power rapidly. The command must now set itself to prepare for action in the battlefield. It must tune everybody's mind in the organization to think battle and victory for as General "Dutch" Kerwin put it, "to be an effective servant of the people, the army must concentrate not on the value of our liberal society, but on the hard values of the battlefield. These values are simply live or die, win or lose."³⁰ The essential thing is to remember the dynamics of the battlefield and find ways of successfully minimizing or eliminating them altogether.

The future battlefield is an environment in which we must be prepared to face a formidable adversary, who has access to the services of the

contemporary advanced technology. The environment will be dominated by the positive as well as the negative effects of the technological advancement. The future will present an operational environment more violent and more lethal than any that has ever been experienced, it will be complex, expansive and may even be unlimited, it will be an environment in which operations will be fluid; it will be an environment in which loss of life and equipment will be unprecedentedly high. It will be an environment in which formations will be required to operate isolated, independently and so must possess the prowess and the leadership that will motivate them to fight outnumbered and win. We are looking at an environment in which operations will cut across the spectrum of conflict from low to mid to high intensity--and in any part of the world. The future battlefield will present situations in which formations will be required to make do with organic resources, and support; replacement and reinforcements, casualty evacuation of equipment and personnel, will be very difficult and time consuming due to dispersion. Communication, command, and control, will be very difficult due to the vulnerability of communication means to the sophisticated electronic warfare system; working clad in N.B.C. protective clothing will be perceived in this type of environment.

Keeping the foregoing in mind, it becomes incumbent that the leadership finds ways and means to eliminate the dynamics of uncertainty, fear, exhaustion, and despair. The leadership in this instance must develop/possess qualities and attributes that will enable it to not only withstand the rigors of the battlefield but also make the men, the most important resource at its disposal, to withstand these dynamics and fight and win. We must always have it in the back of our mind that no two battlefields are the same and no matter the experience, one cannot get used to combat, especially in the environment just described. As Keegan put it, "There is no such thing as getting used to

combat. . . . Each moment of combat imposes a strain so great that men will break down in direct relation to the duration and intensity of the exposure."³¹

It is very essential that the leadership employs the resources at its disposal to minimize the effects of such an intensity and duration of the mens' exposure to danger. The leadership must possess certain unnegotiable qualities.

The leaders must be courageous; must be a big thinker; be a change master; be ethical; be persistent and realistic; have a sense of humor; be a risk taker; positive and hopeful; be morally strong; be a decisionmaker; accept and use power wisely and be committed. It is also incumbent that the leader has communication and conceptualization skill. He should also develop the pertinent attributes of frame of reference, initiative and foresight, high technical competence, the capacity to generate higher levels of unit cohesion, capacity to operate autonomously, greater flexibility and adaptability, the capacity and ability to experiment, the capacity to create, and awareness of power and politics.³²

Another very important aspect of command and leadership is the creation and dissemination of vision, the strategy to accomplish that vision, the resources and the standard required. These must be clearly set in motion and accomplished before going into battle. As Clausewitz put it,

During operation decisions have to usually be made at once; there may be no time to review the situation or even to think it through. . . . If the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle, with the unforeseen, two qualities, are indispensable, first an intellect that even in the darkest hour retain some glimmering of inner light which lead to truth; and the second courage to follow this fine light wherever it leads.³³

Command, leadership and control like any other activity in the military has problems associated with it. While some of this problem can be said to be inherent, others can be termed to evolve with the nature of war and varying environment and society. While it is acceptable that the problems of command

and control are anything but new, their dimensions have grown exponentially since the advent of the Second World War. This growth is exacerbated by a number of factors such as, increased demand made on command systems by present day warfare, technological developments that have multiplied the means at the disposal of command system. Changes in the nature of command process resulting from the interaction of the increased demand and the technological development, the appearance of new weapon systems, that when coupled with the structural changes inside command systems themselves have increased the vulnerability of the command systems, the rise in costs as a result of factors already covered and the cost of other systems associated with the command systems.³⁴

Other problems are associated with the complexity, dispersion and mobility of modern land forces. There is the problem of proliferation of specialized troops, equipment, functions, speed and range of weapons which reduce reaction time; others are the sophistication and complexity of communications and data process technology, intelligence gathering systems-- television cameras, sensors, remotely piloted vehicles, image intensifiers and remotely controlled sensors. The essence of command leadership and control in this instance is to ensure an efficient and effective interface between man and machine, in such a way as to minimize weaknesses and to maximize strength.

The set of problems already enumerated gives rise to yet another set of different types of problems, such as, demands by modern forces, modern machines, modern warfare and the amount of data to be processed. All these require complex systems of management. These consequently demand and increase the numbers of staffs and expansion of the headquarters. These trends are contrary to our efforts to reduce the size of headquarters and the staff and consequently reduce the signature emitted from the headquarters. The increase

in the size of the headquarters make their detection easier and their defense more complex and difficult. The dependence on electronic data transmission has given rise to an increase in vulnerability of headquarters to electronic warfare. The rise in material and equipment cost, the rise in the cost of procuring men has made today's military more expensive to maintain, field, train and sustain.

Command, leadership, and control have become very crucial then ever, before in view of the aforementioned problems, and the need to win-outnumbered. The importance of these activities is exacerbated by the roles they must play to sort out these problems and complexities. A competent superior command system is a force multiplier and serves as a means to compensate for weakness in other areas of numerical inferiority and isolation and frustration. The essence of these crucial activities is to be able to make the best of the situation at hand. Our study of past historical events, great military leaders and commanders, and the appreciation of the threat, environment and ethical values and applying the knowledge acquired from these will enable us to find the panacea to the numerous shortcomings already cited. These can only be done through the application of the numerous important essentials of the art of command, leadership and the important link, control, that is abreast with the contemporary situation. The whole spectrum of approach is, "to look at old facts through new glasses then to make use of the facts in order to gain a better understanding of those glasses--that, after all, is what makes history worthwhile."³⁵

The essences of the activities of command leadership and control, will be hollow without taking a look at the requirements for a leader to instill ethical and moral values into his command. Values are very important factors of the professional character molding parameter. The leader must be looked up

to as a model in all possible aspects, as values begin to form once an individual is capable of conscious thought, and are learned from those we consider to be significant in our lives: and a commander is very significant in lives of his subordinates. The leadership must be able to motivate the subordinates to acquire the military's inherent values, beliefs and attitudes which cause an individual to perform an action consciously and unhesitatingly. The leadership that is able to motivate the soldier has performed an essential part of its responsibilities, as, such an individual will be diligent, innovative, conscientious and eager to do his best to accomplish any task with little or no supervision: feedback is however necessary.

It is essential that the leadership ensures the development of organizational values by integrating the individual soldiers acquired values. The subordinate must be made to know the values that are essential for the organizational cohesion and success, and how those values meet and contribute to the attainment of the national standard. The leadership's understanding and acceptance of its moral and ethical responsibilities and its requirement to ensure that the subordinates, down to the troops, understand theirs and, the value upon which they are based is an incumbent command responsibility and must not be compromised in any way. The following quotation has said it all:

. . . A general officer damages the force that he ostensibly serves if he cannot deal fairly with differing ethical view points. The morally improvised military leader is an enemy of the Constitution he sworn to protect and defend.³⁶

It must be emphasized that the most essential aspect of leadership is leading by example, morally as well as physically. The leadership must be exemplary and show practically how to overcome the dynamics of danger, chances, exhaustion, uncertainty, apprehension and frustration, to the

admiration of the subordinate especially in combat. Mr. Strongburg, Mr. Wakin and Mr. Callahan put it nicely, hitting the nail on head, when they said:

If they, leaders, in the field fail to provide exemplary moral leadership, no course in ethics can be expected to overcome the power of their bad example. Worse still, failure of moral leadership at the command level can and often does introduce a moral cynicism that no class in ethics can possibly surmount.³⁷

In the following section we shall discuss the application of command, leadership, and control in a war with a view to examining how these activities were employed and bring out lessons we can learn from their employment. The 1973 Arab-Israel War will be discussed.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War

Since its creation in 1948 Israel has been in a state of war with its Arab neighbors. In all the wars fought before 1973 Israel was victorious, defeating the Arabs with surprising successes. The 1973 war, or the Yom Kippur War, or the Ramadan War was different at least at the initial stages.

Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement, is celebrated annually. The period is expected to be time for sober reflections, prayers, and repentance; it is expected to be a quiet period devoted to religious activities, when every other activity comes almost to a standstill. Incidentally the celebration in 1973 happened to be in the month of Ramadan, the Muslim holy month during which they fast from dawn to dusk. It is similarly a period of less activities; it is a period of tranquility, prayers and sober reflections. This was therefore a period during which hostilities were least expected to erupt between Arabs and Israel, especially of the magnitude experienced in 1973: True to expectation the world was taken aback, when on 6 October 1973, Egyptian troops crossed the Suez Canal into Sinai, and Syrian troops crossed

the Golan Heights. This two pronged attack from the South and North respectively took Israel completely by surprise.

After a considerable appreciation of the situation the Israelis faced the threat to the north. The reason being the command view the Golan Height has over Israel. Employing a combination of tanks and infantry attack the Syrians were made to retreat within 36 hours of their offensive. As this front was stabilized, Israel shifted emphasis to the South to face Egypt. Since the Egyptian attack did not reach the passes, Mitkla and Giddi, the Israelis occupied high grounds commanding the passage through the passes. Initially the Israelis suffered casualties in personnel equipment and aircraft. Ten days later however the table turned and the Israelis were on the offensive. By 15 October, Israeli "troops were across the canal and fighting a devastating battle which lasted up to Wednesday, 17 October 73, and were moving north and south along the canal; Cairo itself was threatened."³⁸ In a nut shell that was the 1973 October War. We shall now examine how command, leadership and control were applied. In this discussion I shall take an item at a time and then discuss it based on the Egyptian/Syrian and Israeli application of the particular item and its contribution.

Relative Strengths--Since its creation Israel fought the Arabs outnumbered. In this war, before mobilization Israeli army consisted of four armored brigades, five mechanized brigades, five infantry brigades, one parachute brigade and three brigades of artillery. When fully mobilized the strength increased by six armored brigades, four mechanized brigades, and four parachute brigades--the total strength rose from 75,000 to 275,000 troops by the time the 72 hour's call up time had elapsed: a brigade made the basic formation.

The Egyptian army fighting elements were composed of basically six armored divisions, three mechanized divisions and five other infantry divisions: all organized and equipped on the Soviet pattern. In addition, 16 artillery brigades were shared among these divisions. There were also two brigades of paratroopers and 28 commando battalions. The Syrian army had three armored divisions, 11 mechanized divisions, three infantry divisions, five commando battalions and special troops, all trained in Soviet tactics and method.³⁹

This was therefore a clear case of not only fighting out numbered but on two widely separated theaters, and yet the Israelis were able to turn the odds in their favor. This is due to many reasons but the prime factor is the proper application of the art of command and leadership, and control.

Objectives and Strategies--The Egyptian objective was limited to the capture of a small strip of land on the east bank of the Suez canal. This objective was limited by the fact that operationally the Egyptian troops could not afford to venture too far away from their air defense umbrella; as General Ismail put it after the war, "Arab objectives were limited to the capture of Strip of the Sinai on the east bank of the canal in order to provide 'The Spark' to transform the situation in the Middle East." The Egyptian strategy was basically a defensive one as indicated by the deployment pattern of their missile systems. The Egyptian doctrine and preparation for the war were therefore based on that strategy, as General Adan put it,

The doctrine according to which the Egyptians prepared for Yom Kippur War held that they must quickly achieve a situation of static battle in which their densely deployed sophisticated missile systems, in combination with other elements, would shatter the IDFs two main shock components - the Air Force and Armor.⁴¹

The Israeli strategy on the other hand was that of taking the battle to the enemy and fight it on his territory through maneuver and mobility. It

states that, "Israeli strategy was based on Israeli air superiority; the prime role of the Air Force was to make sure that Arab air raids were defeated outside Israeli territory if possible and without doing damage if it was not."⁴² Thus Israeli preparations for any war were based on this strategy. Their doctrine during the Yom Kippur War was depicted, by General Adan when he said,

Israeli security doctrine held that the best defense is a good offense, that the war must be transferred as soon as possible into enemy territory, with the enemy to be vanquished in a lightening thrust. In view of this doctrine priority within the I.D.F. was given to the Israeli Air Force and the armored troops.⁴³

The foregoing statements are classic examples of cases where the leadership studied the adversary thoroughly and evolved strategies and doctrines to defeat the opponents systems. This is part of that very important aspect of preparation. The effect of technological advancement--the number of casualties, especially in material, suffered by both sides was very high. It was said to be higher than ever experienced and, especially tank casualties, in any single battle. It was based on their knowledge of the effectiveness of the Israeli Air Force and the tank that the Arab leadership employed colossal number of missiles, both anti tank and anti aircraft, and limited operations, especially Egypt, within the umbrella of their missiles. Technological advancement enabled the superpowers to carry out satellite reconnaissance taking pictures of the battlefield, to the extent of pinpointing gun positions to confirm this deployment pattern.

Communication--The awareness of the Israeli electronic warfare effectiveness forced the Egyptians to be very careful in their use of radio communications. In some cases, especially, since they adopted a defensive posture they employed signs and markers, in some instance. Lack of effective communication and coordination affected Arab operations in the Syrian front;

Iraqis and Jordanians entry into the war. "The two combined Arabs attacks were failures owing to no coordination . . . between the three armies."⁴⁴

The failure on the part of the Egyptian leadership to effect coordination between the third and Second Armies left unprecedentedly a gap between the two. It was through this gap that the Israelis crossed the canal. This shortcoming also affected the contribution of the Moroccan troops when sent there to reinforce the Egyptian army.

Transmission of Intelligence and Information--The leadership must ensure the inculcation of the practice to immediately pass important battlefield information and intelligence to higher authorities. Information on the Israeli crossing of the canal was not passed to Egyptian authorities until General Shazii demanded: then it was already too late.

Motivation and Ethical Values--The Arabs code naming of the Operation, 'Badr' had some historical and ethical connotations which gave the Arab soldiers the motivation to fight gallantly. The Egyptians and Syrian preparation and initiative initially gave them the advantage to surprise the Israelis; an Egyptian armored corps brigadier said, "the Egyptians were taught more self reliance."⁴⁵ The Israeli soldier on the other hand, though proved this capability in past wars did not have the advantage of being on the side with the initiative. The surprise attack saw him being thrown into the battlefield without the usual mobilization training and motivation. According to O'Ballance, "the Israelis had tended to go soft since 1967. There were many instances of the avoidance of call-up and annual training, of slackness, indiscipline and indifference. . . ."⁴⁶

Training--The Egyptian leadership, based on its 1967 experience, endeavored to change the Egyptian soldier to a formidable fighting force. The Egyptian and Syrian soldiers were well trained, disciplined and tough. The

Egyptian soldiers' standard of education was higher than in the past wars, thus they were able to manipulating antitank missiles and to become competent tank crews and gunners. The Israeli soldier was also well trained, better educated, and more flexible than his Arab counterpart, but the technological gap which gave the Israeli advantage over the Arab was narrowing fast. According to O'Ballances comparisons, "perhaps the Egyptian rangers were better than their Israeli counterparts, and the Syrian commando's were also equal to them. While the Egyptian and Syrian infantry may be tougher than the Israelis, the latter is more flexible."⁴⁷ As regards discipline O'Ballance said

The discipline of the Syrians and Egyptians seemed to be good both among officers and men in the field. . . . The Arabs gave rewards, promotions, honors, and medals for meritorious service with some publicity, but they carried out their demotions, dismissals and punishments and inflicted their penalties quietly and without comment.⁴⁸

Though Israelis followed much the same pattern, they seemed to be "extremely coy over issuing medals for valor. Medals awarded were not publicized," according to O'Ballance.

Morale--Although Israelis exhibited high morale in the past wars, at the beginning of this war their "morale was almost in an inverse ratio to what it had been in June 1967." This time the Arabs morale was very high. As O'Ballance indicated, "This time it was the Arabs who were delirious with elation, and it was the Israelis who were despondent than ever before. The situation in Israel throughout the war was that of alarm, unease and despondency."⁴⁹ Israeli soldiers were said to be carrying transistor radios to listen to foreign news broadcasts as well as their own because both sides were said to be making claims of unachieved successes.

Position of Commanders--The commander's position especially in fluid operations should be as far forward as possible, where he could influence

situations without seizing the initiative from the subordinate commander. General Elazer visited the Syrian front and talked to the men. Generals Sharon Gonen and Adan remained as far forward as possible, especially during Israeli Suez Canal crossing. The Egyptian and the Syrian leadership, on the other hand stayed so far away from the forward troops. General Ismail and Shazli were in the rear, in the headquarters: the (G.H.Q.) too far back once the battle was joined and operations became fluid. Replying to the question why he did not have a field GHQ forward, General Ismail stated,

the distances were too small and a corps HQ would have required an extra 100 staff officers which we did not have. I did have a forward HQ, which both my self and Shazli visited, from time to time, and also a field GHQ designed to move forward if we advance.⁵⁰

Relationship Between Comdrs--On both sides there were frictions among Comdrs. Ismail and Shazli disagreed on the Egyptian advance to the passes. General Sharon had problems with General Gonen. In Syria the senior officers on the battlefield were blamed for the reverse; there were however no dismissals. The Israelis too were able to contain their differences. In the Egyptians case, however, General Shazli was dismissed. All the three countries recalled generals from retirement. These generals tended to overshadow the serving generals, who's job it was to fight the war. Recalling the generals from retirement raised, "suspicion that politics was intervening in the military machine to the detriment of its efficiency." Generals Bar-Lev and Weizman were the recalled Israeli generals. The Syrian and Egyptians recalling of their generals did not raise as much suspicion.⁵¹

Competence of the Staff--The Egyptians were said to have very competent staff officers. General Gamasy, the director of operations, was said to have remained cool and level headed. He was said to have counterbalanced, General Shazli who was said to have "proved to be mercurial, alternating extreme

optimism when things are doing well with extreme pessimism when they were not."⁵² At the national level, President Sadat and Prime Minister Golda Meir remain solid, calm and collected through out the war. General Ismail was also said to have maintained his calm. The Syrian President, Assad, and General Tlas did not seem to maintain the same cool, confidence and decisiveness. The Syrian general team according to O'Ballance, "was less effectual than the Egyptians," but external advice saved the situation which might have been due to their level of readiness--as Tlas told O'Ballance, "We were politically ready but not militarily ready."⁵³ This is a situation that must not be allowed to manifest itself. As O'Ballance rightly put it, "political leadership of an army in battle is no substitute for sound generalship. A flair for politics is not a substitute for a flair for battle."⁵⁴

Command Styles--The Arabs and Israelis employed the centralized and decentralized command styles respectively. At the initial stage the Egyptians' crossing of the Suez Canal required centralized control, but after the crossing they should have adopted a decentralized posture which would have given them the latitude for the employment of initiative and more flexibility to exploit their initial success. The Israelis on the other hand though adopted the decentralized styles, in keeping with their offensive doctrine, in their early attacks probably out of panic committed their troops piece meal, the results were excessive casualties.

Throughout the duration of the war the Egyptians retained control at the highest level, at the G.H.Q. in Cairo. This affected the employment of initiative by the subordinate commanders: This also adversely affected their October 14th offensive. The Israelis, though gave strategic guidance from Tel Aviv, in effect separated the war into two theaters, giving each theater

enough latitude to operate independently in accordance with the dictates of the situation. The Israelis' offensive on 15 October succeeded to a large extent because the commanders operated in decentralized styles in accordance with the environment. This style gave the Israeli commanders the latitudes to operate more aggressively, employing their initiative. This method of independent operation and consequent decentralized execution gave the Israelis a clear advantage over the Egyptians who employed the centralized method and failed to coordinate the action of its forces and thus its ability to deal effectively with the Israeli crossings to the West Bank.

Proper Employment of Assets-- knowing the Israelis very well the Egyptians worked out their priorities and employed their infantry armed with anti tank and anti aircraft missiles forward and kept their armor to the rear. This was a good disposition in view of the circumstances, thus taking the Israelis by surprise, as that Egyptian move was the contrary of what they had expected and hoped for. The Egyptians therefore saved their armor and employed infantry, equipped as it were, to deal with Israeli armor and aircraft, its main arm on land and in the air respectively.

Summary and Conclusion

Command, leadership and control are so intertwined that for effectiveness they must be employed together. While command connotes authority, the functional organization, and the process of taking actions to ensure that things are done in accordance with internal and external rules, regulation and directives, leadership portrays the personality and the individuals attributes and character; control on the other hand is the vehicle through which the commander employs his leadership attributes and qualities to influence actions through out the organization. The success of these activities will depend on the commanders ability to create a fighting machine of men and materials by

interfacing them into a formidable organization. The leadership must then create an atmosphere conducive for exerting its influence which must be felt throughout the organization. The leadership must create a vision, clearly stating the strategy for its attainment and communicate these to the comprehension of everybody throughout the organization. It is the leader's responsibility to see to it that he utilizes his subordinate commanders and staff officers by clearly laying out guidelines spelling out his command style. He must endeavor to see to it that centralized control is kept at the highest level only when that is necessary. Centralized control and decentralized execution which enable subordinates to operate independently, employing their initiative should be the command and control style of an effective leadership.

The leadership must ensure that moral and ethical values are instilled into the subordinates; the soldiers must be made aware of their moral and ethical responsibilities and what they are based on. Attainment of skill, discipline and morale, through effective continuous training must be seen as the commanders most important activity in peacetime.

The leader's personal qualities and his ability to lead by personal examples are the sure parameters to overcome the formidable dynamics of the battlefield. The leadership's relationship with superiors and subordinates should be and must be seen to be cordial, but without compromising the leadership's effectiveness. The leadership's ability to prioritize and employ assets in accordance with their abilities as dictated by the situation in the given environment must be the norm in the employment of assets.

The Arab Israeli War of 1973 clearly brought out the essence of command, leadership, and control. The points already enumerated while discussing the war indicate clearly that the outcome of any operation depends on the

effective application of these activities. The condition is even more pertinent considering the environment in which our troops will be expected to fight and win, out numbered. The entirety of the 1973 War must be studied far more closely and continuously as by virtue of its intensity, the casualty figures in equipment-2500 tanks and 500 aircraft-have raised serious questions on the ability to continuously sustain forces in modern battle where the effects of modern technology seriously challenge the effectiveness of the parameters of command, leadership and control.

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