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NATO AND TURKEY

BY

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TUA, ENG

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23 MARCH 1987

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013
NATO has provided a general balance of power and European stability since the late 1940's. The Southern flank is vital to NATO not only from a military standpoint but also economically. Turkey plays a vital role in defending the Southern flank of NATO by safeguarding the Turkish Straits (Bosporus, Sea of Marmara and Dardanelles) and lines of communication to vital elements of the Middle East. Turkey maintains the largest armed forces in NATO after the United States. Although Turkey is trying to modernize its armed forces by using more than 25% of the general budget, it cannot be said that equipment
obsolescence is being overtaken. On the other hand, Greece, in accordance with historic ambitions, is creating problems in the Aegean Sea, and espousing policies which are anti-NATO. Unless these problems are properly addressed and security assistance to Turkey significantly increased, the deterrent role of NATO forces in the Southern Region will be increasingly and dramatically lessened.
NATO AND TURKEY

An Individual Study Project

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ABSTRACT

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This research project will examine the past and present relationships between Turkey and NATO, the significance of NATO's Southern Flank, some existing problems in this vital area and forecast possible problem areas and how they may be resolved.

Project will cover:

- Short history of NATO and Turkey's membership in this organization.
- The significance of NATO's Southern Flank.
- Geopolitical and geostrategic importance of Turkey for NATO and the Western world.
- Turkey's problem within NATO.
- Conclusions and some solutions to these problems.
CHAPTER II

SHORT HISTORY OF NATO AND TURKEY'S MEMBERSHIP IN NATO

World conditions prompt nations to establish coalitions as a means of furthering their mutual interests in peace and war.

While World War II, which lasted almost six years and brought about great catastrophes for humanity, ended 26 June 1945, the people of the world were overjoyed because there was peace over the universe, and they looked upon the future with confidence.

However, the continuation of Soviet aggressive behavior including land annexations, intervention into the internal affairs of neighboring states and even changing regimes by force eliminated the optimistic feelings and nations began to worry about their future.

Many nations which had as a result of the war lost their economic powers and to a large extent their military powers, were not able to defend themselves, as the Soviet threat and military forces had become very powerful. As a result it became quickly apparent that a force balance must be recreated to ensure the peace. Certain nations, assessing this situation, decided to jointly act against the threat in compliance with the United Nation Treaty.

The Brussels Treaty signed by United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg on 17 March 1948, stemmed from this view. These five nations agreed to integrate their powers against a potential threat based on a Defense Treaty.

The Brussels Treaty became the first step the Western World took for the sake of the common defense. It was apparent that the forces which were to be
organized by the above cited five nations would not be sufficient to establish an effective defensive system. So, as from July 1948, negotiations started between the representatives of U.S. and Canada and the members of the five nations included in the Brussels Treaty. Shortly thereafter, Italy, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, and Portugal were invited to attend the negotiations. The result was a defense alliance of the size and the power unprecedented in peacetime; the North Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4 April 1949 in Washington.

The membership of the North Atlantic Treaty increased to 16 with the joining of Turkey and Greece in 1952, of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955 and Spain in 1982. NATO is a defensive alliance. The general strategy of this alliance is to deter the aggressor and if deterrence fails to protect and insure the integrity and security of NATO area.

Since the establishment of NATO, the world has experienced a cold war period of many crises. However, the fact is that during this period, no attack was launched against NATO countries. It is appropriate to believe that the reason for this long period in which no attack or hot war took place lies in the unity and defensive strength of NATO.

NATO by insuring a general balance of power, and creating stability among its members renders service to the preservation of world peace and the security of all nations.

Since its foundation, in 1923, the Turkish Republic has followed the motto of "Peace at home, peace abroad:" a philosophy of Mustafa Kemal ATATURK, the founder of the Republic and the first president of Turkey. The basic premise is that Turkey neither casts covetous eyes upon any other countries land, nor will it allow any claims to be made on its territory.
In the aftermath of the war the Soviet demanded unrestricted use of the Turkish straits as well as the right to militarily control passage through the straits. Additionally, the USSR wanted Turkey to cede three provinces in Eastern Turkey, Artvin, Kars and Dogubeyazit. Turkey began to take measures to enhance its own security and sought external support. The United States responded both militarily and politically via the Truman Doctrine. However, it was apparent that only a more complete alliance structure would fully deter Soviet ambitions. Therefore in support of the common interests of the region and of Turkey itself, a decision was made to seek NATO membership. Turkey became a member of the alliance on 18 February 1952.
CHAPTER III

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK

The Southern Flank of NATO offers a wide range of perspectives, more than any other NATO region. It is isolated from Central Europe and is geographically fragmented. The principle mission of North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces in this region is maintaining freedom of transit in the Mediterranean. Naval power, therefore, plays a dominant role in defense planning and force projection for the region.

Moreover, this region's strategic importance has been dramatically increased by recent events in the area. Turkey is the only alliance nation in the Middle East and it sits on the flank of any Soviet thrust into Iran or the Persian Gulf. Straddling the Straits of Bosporus and the Dardanelles and Sea of Marmara, it virtually controls the Soviet Union's only means of egress into the Mediterranean. Turkey lies athwart the direct avenues of Soviet expansionism into the Arab world and Africa.

The Mediterranean plays a significant economic role. On any given day, there are more than 1500 ocean-going ships transiting the Mediterranean. Presently, about 60 percent of European oil comes from the Persian Gulf and 30 percent of that moves through the Mediterranean. As a consequence, the Mediterranean SLOCs are critical, not only from a military standpoint, but also economically.

From the Soviet perspective, the Eastern Mediterranean and Southern Flank's land areas provide NATO potential bases/missile-launching areas against the Warsaw Pact and European Russia's Southern Flank. The Soviets
have managed to build a buffer zone of satellite states through most of Europe; however, Turkey represents bases from which a strike can be launched directly against the Soviet Union. In the event of hostilities, the Soviets would want to drive NATO units from the eastern Mediterranean to prevent naval air and missile strikes against its southern flank.

The Soviets would also like to neutralize Turkey and Greece as impediments to their maritime access to the Mediterranean from Black Sea ports through Turkish straits.

In a crisis situation, such as occurred during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, an enforced closing of Turkish air space has a devastating impact on Soviet ability to aerially resupply client states such as Syria.

Consequently, it can be said that Southern Flank of NATO is continuously dynamic and plays a vital role for NATO both militarily and economically.
CHAPTER IV

THE GEOPOLITICAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF TURKEY FOR NATO AND THE U.S.

In order to understand the geopolitical and geostrategic importance of Turkey, it is useful to relate to Turkey's history and give some information about the Anatolian Peninsula.

According to remains from the Neolithic period found in caves near Antalya, Konya and Burdur, Anatolian history goes back 6000 years.

- In 4000 B.C. Southern Anatolia fell under the influence of Syria, this was the Tell Holof civilization.

- In 3000 B.C. east/west relations had been well established.

- At the beginning of the second Millennium B.C., a new people, the Hittites arrived on the scene (this was the Bronze Age of human history). Hittites were the founders of the first kingdom between 1600-1400 B.C. Hittites reached their highest expansion in 1200 B.C. and fought with Egyptians whose king was Ramses. The two armies clashed in the famous battle of Kades in 1286 B.C., and the result was a tie.

- 1100 B.C. Anatolia invaded by warriors known by the generic name of "The Sea People," the Phrygians.

- After a century, various small kingdoms were founded in Asia Minor (Anatolian Peninsula). This was the period in which Greek expansion enabled it to span the Aegean, entering Asia Minor. In many instances, the Hellenes found local settlements more or less firmly in place.
- These settlers coexisted with Phrygians, and also with the Sumerians until the sixth century B.C.

- During the sixth century B.C., the Persian Empire swept over everything invading all of Anatolia. Their invasion was finally stopped by the Greeks preventing Persian entry into Europe.

- In the Fourth Century B.C. another storm arose - this time from the west - in the person of Alexander the Great. After conquering all the Aegean settlements, he defeated Persians, Egyptians, invaded Mesopotamia and reached the banks of Indus. This huge empire lived only ten years. After Alexander the Great's death at the age of 33, his generals divided up the empire, quarreling over parcels of territory.

- The Second Century B.C. ushered in a new rival, Rome. By the fourth century (A.D.) Roman empire provinces appeared throughout Asia, including Anatolia, Syria, Palestine, and Egypt. But this big empire divided at the end of the Fourth Century and two Roman empires were established, West Roman Empire with its capitol Rome and East Roman (Byzantine) Empire with its capitol Constantinople (Istanbul).

  Constantine the Great (Emperor 306-337 A.D.) made Christianity the state religion. After Attila's conquest of the Western Roman Empire in the Fifth Century, Byzantium became the sole imperial power of the known world.

- Byzantine Empire lived through several periods of power and weakness until the year 1453.

The first Turkish settlers entered Anatolia from Persia in the 11th Century. Banding together, they formed a powerful tribe known as Seljuks. The Seljuk Turks under the King Alp Arslan defeated Byzantine Emperor Romanos IV in Malazgirt in Eastern Anatolia in 1071. By 1078, the Seljuks had spread out to Kayseri, Konya, Erzurum, Antalya, Iznik, Bursa, and the shores of 
Bosporus. However, Constantinople was too strong to conquer and besides, events had taken an unexpected turn - the Crusaders were now knocking at the gateway to Anatolia.

**Between 1097-1326, nine crusades of combined armies came from European countries. Only one, Frederick Barbarossa, a German king, was able to cross Anatolia and reach the Holy Land. He met his death by drowning in the Goksu River, where upon his army scattered.**

In 1299, a small tribe of Seljuk Turks lived under their ruler Ertugrul. He left his son, Osman (1281-1326) a principality that was to become one of the largest and most powerful empires in human history. The name Ottoman is a western derivation of Osman's name.

In the ensuing 300 years the Turks accomplished their greatest territorial expansion.

In 1453 Mehmet II (Conqueror) conquered Constantinople and consolidated the Ottoman Turkish Empire and changed the city name Constantinople to Istanbul. During the period of Suleyman I, the Magnificent who ruled from 1520-1566, the Empire was at its strongest. The Balkans, Southeastern Europe, the Northern port of the Black Sea and North Africa were under Turkish domination. Turkey's possessions stretched out around the eastern Mediterranean in a curved manner like the prophet's crescent.

The Empire began to disintegrate and the Ottomans continued to lose power and territory from the 17th Century, until the end of World War I.

As a result of Sevres Agreement signed at the end of World War I, all of modern day Turkey, excluding a small part of central Anatolia, was invaded and occupied by British, French, Italians, Russians, and Greeks.
As a result, between 1918 and 1923, Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) led a war of independence. The success of that effort culminated on 29 October 1923, when the Republic of Turkey was proclaimed to the world.

Ataturk instituted many reforms after the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey. Adoption of the international calendar and time, adoption of the Swiss civic code, adoption of the Latin alphabet and metric system are among the important reforms. He also made the country secular by separating political and religious matters.

Turkey developed peacefully between 1923-1939 maintaining excellent relations with all of its neighbors including Iran and Greece. As the war clouds of World War II approached, Ankara realistically assessed its position and capabilities against a combined Soviet-German threat and opted for armed neutrality whereby its territory was inviolate. It joined in the Allied war effort in the latter stages of the war.

After this brief overview, I will now describe the geostrategic and geopolitical importance of Turkey.

Turkey is an important element in affecting the world balance due to its geopolitical situation.

Located at the intersection of three continents, Turkey controls the East-West and North-South axes and constitutes an intercontinental passage between Europe, Asia, and Africa. For that reason, Turkey has been a crossroads of different civilizations, cultures, and international relations all through the past centuries, as explained above in the short history of Turkey.

Along the Southeastern Flank of NATO, Turkey shares long land and sea borders with Warsaw Pact members, the Soviet Union and Bulgaria and serves as the eastern most strong hold of NATO's strategic defense line.
Turkey controls the direct sea route of the Soviet Union from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and guards the Turkish Straits (Bosporus, Sea of Marmara, and Dardanelles) which provide the only access to the Mediterranean for the Soviet Black Sea fleet.

In consideration of geostrategic imperatives as well as a conviction that peace is best preserved by strength, Turkey maintains very large armed forces, comprising 820,000 active duty troops. This is the second largest military force in NATO after the United States.

Among the NATO countries, Turkey defends 33 percent of NATO's frontier with the Warsaw Pact, and 27 percent of the land mass of European NATO. Turkey also faces one-third of the Pact's military deployment.

Turkey with its key geopolitical position and its geographical shield, contains Soviet expansion into the Mediterranean and secures NATO's Southern Flank.

Furthermore, Turkey's proximity to the turmoil in Southwest Asia and Middle East increases its strategic importance.

The Iranian revolution, the ongoing war between Iran and Iraq, the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan, the very apparent threat to the security of Pakistan and continuous instability in the region has shifted the intensity of threat to the Middle East and Southwest Asia where Turkey is situated.

Iran and Iraq are trying to weaken each other both economically and militarily in the ongoing war. The debts of each country are increasing day by day to western countries as well as eastern countries. This means that in the post war (Iran-Iraq War) era there will be huge economic problems to deal with.
Turkey as a NATO member in the region with its geographic shield for the Middle Eastern and North African countries, has become a deterrent factor which also should be considered by any threat directed to the region.

Turkey with its geographical position, is roughly in the form of rectangle, approximately 1000 miles in length and 400 miles in width with a total area of 301,000 square miles.

Turkey has a common border of 380 miles with the Soviet and 170 miles with Bulgaria, and has to defend a coastline of approximately 1000 miles at the Black Sea. This coastline and border with the Soviets constitute the largest frontier in NATO exposed directly to a possible Soviet threat. It should be noted that in NATO, only two countries, Norway and Turkey, share a common frontier with Soviets. Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Greece are Turkey's other neighboring countries. More than 50 million people live in Turkey.

Turkey forms a separate theater of operations from the rest of the NATO Alliance. This theater of operations includes three distinct and separate combat zones, identified as Turkish Thrace and Straits, Eastern and Southeastern Turkey.

Turkish Thrace with its mostly rolling plains, little vegetation and obstacles is ideal tank country. The depth of Turkish Thrace is limited and the city of Istanbul is only 200 miles from the Bulgarian border. On the other hand, rough terrain features of eastern Anatolia favor defensive operations. But this area is still vulnerable to the operations of airborne and airmobile units.

The specific terrain features of the different combat zones, compel Turkey to maintain a varied force structure and special tactical and logistical arrangements.
Seizure and control of the Turkish straits has been a long-standing ambition of the Soviet Union. Such control would enable the Soviet Union to ensure the free passage of its enormous Black Sea fleet into the Mediterranean Sea.

Seizure and control of the Turkish Straits and eastern Anatolia would also allow the Soviets to use Turkey as a forward base for further operations toward the Middle East and North Africa, and to outflank NATO forces in the Mediterranean Sea.

Some writers have suggested that the Aegean Islands provide an opportunity for NATO forces to conduct defensive operations in depth. To me this is illogical for the following reasons:

First of all, current NATO strategy (MC 14/3) calls for forward defense. To withdraw from, or lightly defend the Turkish Straits would violate that strategy, its sound military basis and the supporting political imperative.

Secondly, after loss of the Turkish Straits, Turkish air and sea space between the Black Sea and Mediterranean would be open for both Soviet Naval and air forces. It would be impossible to defend the Aegean against Soviet naval, land, and air forces which could range so freely. Thirdly, there are thousands of islands in the Aegean Sea grouped within specific areas, with hundreds of miles between them. A coherent and coordinated defense among those separated groupings would be impossible. Fourthly, for valid regional political concerns and in accordance with international agreements, such as 1914 London Agreement, 1923 Lousanne Agreement, and 1947 Paris Agreement, Aegean Islands just in front of the Dardanelles, in the Eastern Aegean, and the Dodecanese Islands cannot be militarized. For those reasons, the best defense is constituted by strengthening Turkish Thrace and the Turkish Straits.
The Black Sea is the main trade marshalling center for the littoral nations. Almost 50 percent of Soviet foreign trade passes through the Turkish Straits to and from the Black Sea ports.

It has been estimated that the Soviets together with other Warsaw Pact countries are able to employ roughly 45 divisions (25 divisions in the Turkish Thrace and Turkish Straits area and 20 divisions in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey) against Turkey in addition to the enormous Black Sea fleet and air forces located in the region.

That NATO defense goals call for the defense of the Turkish land, sea and air space via a collective defense, has contributed significantly to the security interests of Turkey.

Turkey is fully determined to support and enhance NATO's stability and expand cooperation with the members of the Alliance.

Turkey considers that, under present conditions, a strong deterrence posture is the best safeguard for the peace within this context. Turkey fully realizes its responsibilities and in spite of economic and financial difficulties supports all efforts to enhance the strength of the alliance.

In addition to the Turkey’s importance to NATO and Europe, the United States has specific national security interests.

Donald E. Nuechterlein, writer of the "America Overcommitted, United States National Interests in the 1980s," says about Turkey: "Turkey is the most important U.S. ally, from a strategic point of view, in the entire Mediterranean area." He continues, "As one of the two countries directly affected by the Truman Doctrine of 1947, successive Turkish governments provided the United States with extremely valuable military and intelligence facilities from which to monitor Soviet weapons tests and gather other sensitive information." Since joining NATO in 1952, Turkey has been among the
staunchest members of the Alliance and has maintained strong defense forces. After the fall of the Shah in Iran in 1979 and the revolutionary regimes decision to close U.S. military facilities there, Turkey is the only country in the Middle East that is near the vital level of U.S. defense of homeland interest. The loss of U.S. military and intelligence facilities in Turkey would directly affect the defense of North America, and Turkey is therefore an extremely important asset for United States defenses. He shows the United States interests in Turkey in terms of the intensity of interest; Major in Defense of Homeland and vital in Favorable Word Order.

It has been stated at congressional hearings that electronic intelligence gathering stations in Turkey are indispensable to United States security since they enable the west to monitor Soviet nuclear tests, experiments, deployments, troop movement, and other developments in detail.

Former SACEUR and Secretary of State Alexander Haig and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David Jones characterized the intelligence data collected from monitoring sites as "irreplaceable and critical, . . . . often unique." A publication of the Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates that 35 to 50 percent of the ground-based electronic surveillance data on the Soviet Union is obtained through monitoring systems in Turkey.

Incirlik Air Base in south central Turkey is one of the U.S.'s largest air installations in Europe. Two new air bases that are to be used in support of NATO forces and very close to the Soviet border, are under construction in Eastern Turkey (Tatvan and Mus). Diyarbakir and Sinop are two key U.S. intelligence installations located in Turkey.

It is clear from these factors that Turkey's contribution to Western defense and U.S. security is indeed "invaluable and irreplaceable."
CHAPTER V

TURKEY'S PROBLEMS WITHIN NATO

Turkey's large pool of trained fighting men, whose combat proficiency, discipline, tenacity, and plain ruggedness are acknowledged by friend and potential foe alike, is its principal military asset; Turkey's principal weakness is the inadequacy of its equipment in terms of both quantity and quality. In the main, Turkey is armed with Korean War vintage, and older weapons.

Turkey faces threats from vastly superior and modern air forces, very large armored and mechanized ground forces, and units equipped for seaborne and airborne landings.

The conventional balance in the area is totally in favor of the WP. This state of affairs stems from the inadequacy of military assistance to Turkey and the inability of a burdened Turkish economy to come close to making up the difference, despite very high defense expenditures.

The second problem that Turkey has as a NATO nation is its dispute with Greece, one of the other allies. While Turkey is trying to prepare to meet Warsaw Pact threats to both Turkish Thrace and Eastern Turkey, Greece is advancing its Megali Concept (Grand Design).

In order to understand the conflicts which beset the relations between Turkey and Greece, it is necessary to understand the major differences between the ideologies of the two nations.
First of all, it is important to understand the Megali Concept or Big Ideal (Grand Design), which has been a principle focus of Greek foreign policy since the beginning of the 18th Century.

The origins of this concept go back to a document which was written in the late 17th Century at a place which has no relationship to the Greek Islands. This place was Odessa in Southern Russia. This document was prepared by a committee composed of three people none of whom were Greeks: A Russian Orthodox Bishop, another Russian who was a merchant, and a slav. These three men were commissioned by the Russian Czar to construct a plan to use the Greek Orthodox Church as leverage against the Ottoman Empire. The Czar's ultimate objective was to assume leadership of the Orthodox Church by taking advantage of the struggles between the Greeks and Ottoman.

The principles of this ideal are quoted as:

- Gain independence from the Ottoman Empire.
- Secure Macedonia.
- Secure Cyrete.
- Secure Rodos and Aegean Islands.
- Secure Cyprus.
- Secure Izmir and Western Anatolia.
- Secure Eastern Thrace.
- Secure Istanbul.
- Re-establish Greek Pontus State.
- Recreate ancient Byzantium Empire.

So far, realization of the first four principles has been completed. What Greece is doing today is seeking to realize the remaining six objectives of the Megali Concept. Unfortunately the U.S. Congress and world public opinion
generally seems to be unaware of this serious endeavor by past, present, and future Greek administrations.

Pierre Oberling, Professor of Near and Mideast history at the City University of New York writes: "There are still fundamental differences in ideology between modern Greece and modern Turkey. Modern Greece was born out of a religious-sentimental dream of reconstituting the Byzantine Empire, and even through the Greek Government officially disavowed the Megali Concept after the Anatolian disaster, the result of the Greek invasion of the Western Turkey in 1919, it has nonetheless continued to push for its implementation in the case of the Dodecanese Islands as well as that of Cyprus. Moreover, the Greeks, as we have seen, are still emotionally committed to the Ideal. On the other hand, modern Turkey rose in opposition to such a dream as a reaction to the folly of the young Turks, whose military adventurism brought about the final collapse of the Ottoman Empire and to the recklessness of the Greeks, who, in their haste to fulfill the Megali Idea, tried to seize what was left of that Empire after World War I."

A statement made by Archbishop Iakovos, Primate of the Greek Orthodox Church in America, clearly demonstrates how even today powerful figures within the Greek Orthodox world keep alive the Greek concept of the Megali Idea. An interview with the Archbishop published by Greek Forum International in its September 1979 issue is very interesting -

GREEK FORUM: "Archbishop, you speak as a true Hellenic, do you still nevertheless believe in the Byzantine dream? Do you believe Istanbul should be called Constantinople? What comes first, the great Hellenic Empire or modern real-politics."

IAKOVAS: "I cannot live with the real politics of post war politicians, and I cannot live without dreaming, without the hope one day my dreams might
come true. As a Christian, I believe in God, and God helped return the Dodecanese Islands to Greece after 500 years of foreign occupation. So why should I give up what you call the Byzantine dream? I dislike the Turks and they dislike me."

In a visit to Cyprus in 1982, Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou called for a crusade to drive the Turks from the Island. During this speech he referred to Cyprus as "Greek national territory." In 1983, he repeated in a public statement that Cyprus was part of Greek national soil. In a statement on 10 May 1984 at a Pasok Congress in Athens: "Constantinople, Tenidos, Imbros, and Cyprus concern Hellenism."

When, in December 1923, a group of Turkish Cypriot leaders visited Ankara to press for the return of Cyprus to Turkey, Ataturk rejected their plea, repeating in essence what he had previously said in a speech about the new nationalism. "Although our nationalism loves all Turks, . . . with a deep feeling of brotherhood, and although it desires with all its soul their wholesome development, yet it recognizes that its political activity must end at the borders of the Turkish Republic."

In a statement before the Turkish Grand National Assembly in November 1931, he continued "The Supreme interest of Turkey and Greece no longer oppose each other. It is proper that our two countries should find their security and force in a sincere mutual friendship."

The Second World War marked a hard time for the Greek people. Particularly towards the end of 1941, scarcity of food became a major issue. Throughout those difficult years, Turkey extended a hand of friendship to Greece by supplying her with much needed foodstuffs for which Greece was very grateful. Greek guerillas were also helped from the Anatolian shores.
Mr. Turgut Ozal, the current Prime Minister of Turkey, announced on
April 3, 1985 that he would be willing to sign an agreement of "Friendship,
good neighborliness, reconciliation, and cooperation which would mutually
guarantee the inviability of the present boundaries with Greece." Mr.
Papandreou unfortunately has turned down all Turkish proposals, saying that
Greece had nothing to negotiate with Turkey.

Turkey has brought to the attention of Greece and Allies that the present
Greek policies damage not only Turkish Greek relations but also undermine the
unity and the very essence of the Atlantic Alliance.

In summary, while Turkey is trying to solve the problems which exist
between Turkey and Greece, by direct negotiations, because geographic
position, the historical inheritance, the economic structure, the political
regime and more important defense requirements of the two countries clearly
point to the need for close friendship and coordination between them; Greece
is continuing to seek the implementation of the Megali Idea (Grand Design) and
generally being intransigent in the resolution of those problems.

The specific disputed topics between the two countries are:

- Cyprus
- Territorial water
- Continental shelf
- Aegean airspace
- F.I.R. responsibilities
- The demilitarization of the Aegean Islands
- Greek government attitudes toward international terrorism
- The Turkish minorities in Greek Thrace
Cyprus was conquered and governed by the Ottomans for 300 years. In 1878 the Island was placed under British protection, becoming a Crown Colony in 1914. In 1960, in a compromise that was not fully satisfactory to either Turkey or Greece, independent national status was accorded. The government structure called for a Greek Cypriot President with 70% Greek Cypriot membership, and a Turkish Cypriot Vice President with the remaining 30% of the governmental positions being allocated to the Turk Cypriots. This arrangement lasted for slightly over three years before disintegrating due to traditional animosities and differing political objectives.

The problem on Cyprus has been basically the same for that entire history. The Turkish minority has been subject to the whims of the Greek majority. While at times that disparity has been dealt with via political means, at other times violence, murder and massacre have dominated. As the ethnic Turks have never comprised more than 20-25% of the total population and have been widely dispersed throughout the Island, they have suffered that brutality in very unbalanced proportion.

The Megali Idea has dominated Greek Cypriot political motivation over the past 100 years. Their battle cry has been "Enosis," meaning "joining together" with mainland Greece. The Turkish minority leadership has always felt that the only means of assuring the Turkish population's safety and voice in public affairs was via some form of communal and political separation. While complete partition was at one time advocated, the post 1974 Turkish Cypriot position has been in favor of a bi-zonal status, with a cooperative but limited central authority.
The Ankara government dispatched mainland Turkish armed forces to intervene in Cyprus in the summer of 1974 in accordance with its legal rights and Treaty guarantor status to insure the preservation of the Cypriot Republic. At that time, the Turkish Cypriot population was in grave danger and the revolutionary Greek Cypriot leadership supported from Athens was openly declaring Enosis. The intervention resulted in communal separation and a period of stability which has lasted to the present.

Since then, Turkish authorities have been amenable to negotiation. However, the Greek Cypriot administration, openly encouraged by Prime Minister Papandreou's government, has adamantly refused to even sit down to discuss the matter unless unacceptable preconditions are agreed to. In a measure of frustration at Greek intransigence and in hopes of encouraging their realistic approach to a solution, the Turkish-Cypriots declared their independent and sovereign status in 1984. However, despite strong U.N. support for negotiations, the Greeks have steadfastly refused.

Mr. Papandreou's unwillingness to negotiate is based on at least three principal considerations.

First, contrary to Athens press releases, the southern 70% of the Island, on which the Greek Cypriot population has resided since 1974, is prospering. There has been significant investment from mainland Greece. The international tourist industry has invested heavily in hotels and tourist facilities in the south. A substantial portion of the Beirut banking and business activities have relocated to southern Greek Cyprus. The result of all this is that the Greek Cypriots are economically in better condition than ever before. There are no "homeless refugees of Northern Cyprus." In fact, those who relocated as a result of the 1974 confrontation, have settled in and are fully sharing the economic well-being of southern Cyprus.
Second, Mr. Papandreou does not want a political settlement. His very effective international anti-Turkish propaganda campaign would lose one of its principal themes – that the Turks have illegally occupied and subjucated Northern Cyprus. The falsity of that claim is irrelevant – the fact is that it has been broadly distributed and asserted by the Greeks via their worldwide propaganda machinery. Were Mr. Papandreou and the Greek Cypriots to agree to negotiate an equitable resolution to the Cypriot situation, which would certainly include a negotiated level of Greek and Turkish mainland armed forces, he would lose a potent club with which he can currently strike Turkey at will.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, a negotiated settlement would be in direct violation of his, and all Greeks, ultimate motivation -- Enosis -- joining together -- kept alive and inspired by the Megali Idea.

Before ending the Cyprus problem, let me quote from an article in the Wall Street Journal, dated September 22, 1986: "The Stateless of Cyprus" -"It is one of the great myths of our time that Turkey is behind the troubles. Athens, not Ankara, is the enemy of Cyprus. In 1974, the Greek colonels staged a coup on the Island to encourage mainland interest in unification. They replaced Archbishop Makarios with a convicted pro-unification terrorist. This led to bloodshed and the arrival of troops from Turkey. A Greek appeals court in 1979 said that Turkey, as one of the guarantor powers, had the right to fulfill her obligations. The real culprits are the Greek officers who engineered and staged a coup and prepared the conditions for this intervention."
TERRITORIAL WATERS

The breadth of territorial sea is a vital element of the delicate balance of interests in the Aegean Sea and has a bearing on many other issues. Under the present six mile limit, Greece possesses approximately 43.5 percent of the Aegean Sea and Turkey 7.5 percent. The remaining 49 percent is high seas. (See Appendix 3)

Greek Position: The Greek government asserts the right to extend unilaterally territorial waters from their present breadth of six miles to twelve miles.

Turkish Position: The Turkish government has reiterated that such a situation would be totally unacceptable. Should Greece resort to even a partial extension of the territorial sea or the declaration of other kinds of maritime jurisdiction areas in the Aegean. Turkey would take all the necessary measures to safeguard its legitimate rights and interests in this sea. Were the limits of territorial waters extended to twelve miles, Greece, by virtue of her islands, would acquire approximately 71.5 percent of the Aegean Sea, while Turkey's share would increase to only 8.8 percent. In such an eventuality, the Aegean high seas would shrink to a mere 19.7 percent. In other words, it would be Greek Lake. (See Appendix 4)

If these Greek ambitions were realized, Greece would acquire sovereignty over the entire Aegean Sea thereby:

- Threatening Turkey's security interests by transforming the maritime areas adjacent to the Western Anatolian regions of Turkey into Greek territorial waters;
- Impeding Turkey's free passage from these regions to the Aegean high seas and the Mediterranean;
Restricting Turkey's ability to conduct exercises and to take security measures over international air space as well as the Aegean high seas;
- Placing the while of the Aegean continental shelf under Greek control; and
- Reducing greatly Turkey's freedom of research and fishing in the Aegean Sea.

The United Nations Convention on the law of the sea does not establish the breadth of the territorial sea at 12 miles as alleged by Greece. Article 3 of the convention reads as follows:

"Every state has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this convention."

As clearly shown by this article, the 12-mile limit advocated by Greece, is not the unique but the maximum breadth for territorial sea. Furthermore, Article 3 has to be read in the light of Article 300 of the convention which reflects a fundamental principle of international law:

"States parties shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed under this convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this convention in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right."

It is evident that the extension of territorial waters to twelve miles in the Aegean would have the most inequitable implications and, therefore, constitute an abuse of right.
THE CONTINENTAL SHELF

The question of the continental shelf between Turkey and Greece has to be examined in the light of two basic premises:

- International law defines the continental shelf of a coastal state as the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond the territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory.
- According to international law, the continental shelf is to be delimited by agreement (i.e., negotiations) in order to reach an equitable solution, taking into account all the relevant circumstances.

Greek Position: By virtue of the islands, Greece is entitled to the entire Aegean continental shelf. Consequently, there is nothing to negotiate with Turkey.

Turkish Position: The Turkish land mass extends well toward the west of the Aegean in full conformity with the concept of natural prolongation. This extension of the Anatolian land mass under the sea possesses the characteristics of the Anatolian peninsula in all respects. As clearly stated by the International Court of Justice, "The delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles and taking account of all the relevant circumstances." Turkey fully subscribes to this view, which in fact is an expression of international law.

Knowledge of the facts and of the chronological sequence of developments are of paramount importance to an understanding of the question of the Aegean continental shelf.

- From 1960 onward, Greece granted licenses and conducted extensive exploration activities, including drilling, on the Aegean continental
shelf. When Turkish vessels undertook research activities, however, Greece made a great issue of it and applied both to the United Nations Security Council and the International Court of Justice.

- On August 25, 1976, a Security Council resolution called upon the parties to settle the question through negotiations.
- On September 11, 1976, the International Court of Justice decided that areas beyond territorial waters were areas in dispute:

  "... the areas of the continental shelf in which the activity complained of by Greece took place are ex hypotesi areas, which at the present stage of the proceedings are to be considered by the Court as areas in dispute with respect to which Turkey also claims rights of exploration and exploitation."

Later, in 1978, the Court decided that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the Greek application on the substance of the question. These developments were a major setback for Greece.

The conclusion to be drawn from the resolution of the Security Council and the decision of the International Court of Justice is clear: The Aegean continental shelf remains a disputed area until it is delimited through negotiations between the two countries.

In conformity with the Security Council decision, Turkey and Greece signed an agreement in Bern on 11 November 1976. Under this Agreement, the parties decided to hold negotiations with a view to reaching an agreement on the delimitation of the continental shelf. They also undertook to refrain from any initiative or act concerning the Aegean continental shelf.

Following the Bern Agreement the two countries embarked upon a process of negotiations. This dialogue continued until the Greek elections of October
1981 and although it did not bring conclusive results to the bilateral problems, it helped to defuse tension and contributed to an improvement of the climate between Turkey and Greece.

However, the Government of Mr. Papandreou disregarding the Security Council resolution and the Bern Agreement disrupted this negotiation process following its advent to power in October 1981. The PASOK Government, furthermore, purports a unilateral and arbitrary delimitation through an imaginary line that passes between the Turkish land mass and the Eastern Aegean Islands.

This "unilateral delimitation" envisaged by Greece is contrary to the principle of negotiation foreseen by international law. Moreover, the attempts to delimit the Aegean continental shelf by using the equidistance (or median) line between the Eastern Aegean Islands and Turkey reflect total disregard for the principle of equity which is the cornerstone of any delimitation according to international law.

If the Greek Government desires to effect a delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf through agreement as foreseen by international law, then the Turkish Government is ready to resume the negotiation process Greece ruptured in 1981. If, on the other hand, the Greek Government wishes to effect a unilateral delimitation (which is her officially declared policy), it would be in violation of international law, and such a position is totally unacceptable to Turkey.
According to international law, the breadth of national airspace has to correspond to the breadth of territorial sea. This is clearly reflected in Articles 1 and 2 of the Chicago Convention of 1944 on Civil Aviation:

"Article 1 - Sovereignty"

"The contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory."

"Article 2 - Territory"

"For the purpose of this Convention, the territory of a State shall be deemed to be land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of such State."

Greek Position: Greece claims that she has a national airspace of ten miles regardless of her six-mile territorial sea. (See Appendix 5)

Turkish Position: Turkey and other countries reflect Greece's claim of a ten-mile airspace and only recognize and respect a Greek airspace of six miles which corresponds to her six-mile territorial sea. (See Appendix 5)

Greece exploits this unlawful claim to manufacture tension in the Aegean. Outside the six-mile limit, but within ten miles, Greece alleges that Turkey violates Greek airspace.

F.I.R. RESPONSIBILITIES

The second aspect of the Aegean airspace question is the deliberate misinterpretation by Greece of her F.I.R. (Flight Information Region) responsibilities. This is nothing more than a technical responsibility to provide air traffic services in the areas concerned. However, Greece claims
that the non-submission of flight plans by Turkish military aircraft constitutes a "violation" of the Greek F.I.R. Of course, there is no such thing as the "violation of an F.I.R." since F.I.R. responsibility does not imply recognition of sovereignty of the F.I.R. state over the airspace concerned.

Decision A23-11 (Appendix N) taken during the 23rd session of the ICAO Assembly held in Montreal in 1980 reads as follows:

"... 6- The approval by the Council of regional air navigation agreements relating to the provision by a State of air traffic services within airspace over the high seas does not imply the recognition of sovereignty of that State over the airspace concerned."

The Greek Government, however, does not seem to agree with the international community on this point. Here are some examples:

"... The Greek Government does not agree to the establishment of an allied command in Larissa unless it is absolutely clear that the limits of the operational control coincide with the Athens F.I.R., i.e., with the country's frontiers." (Statement by Prime Minister Papandreou, Athens, 23 November 1981).

"Greek Ambassador to Ankara George Papoulias made a demarche to the Turkish Government today for violations of the Greek F.I.R. by Turkish aircraft, government spokesman Dimitris Maroudas said." (Athens, 17 May 1983)

It is quite clear that the main purpose of such statements is to give substance to the so-called "Turkish threat." It is equally clear, however, that the method of formulating unlawful positions and then complaining of their violation can be tolerated neither by Turkey nor the international community. Turkey, as well as other countries, reject the concept of the so-called "F.I.R. violations."
It would be useful to note that unjustified harassment over the Aegean international airspace of Turkish military aircraft by Greek military aircraft under various false pretexts jeopardizes the safety of flight and carries the risk of leading to undesirable incidents with grave consequences.

**Question of Flight Plans**

**Greek Position:** It is mandatory for military aircraft to submit flight plans when crossing into Athens F.I.R.

**Turkish Position:** Military aircraft flying in international airspace are under no obligation to submit flight plans since the Chicago Convention does not apply to military aircraft.

International law and the provisions of the Chicago Convention do not support the Greek view on this point.

Indeed Article 3 of the Chicago Convention reads as follows:

"(a) This Convention shall be applicable only to civil aircraft and shall not be applicable to State aircraft. . . ."

"(d) The contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft, that they will have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft."

In view of the foregoing, the responsibility of having due regard for the safety of civil aircraft flying over the international airspace of the Aegean rests with Turkey and other states whose military aircraft fly in these areas and not with Athens F.I.R. It should be added that Turkey is not the only country that Greece is accusing of not filing flight plans.
THE DEMILITARIZATION OF THE EASTERN AEGEAN ISLANDS

Demilitarization of certain areas to reconcile opposing interests to establish peace and stability is a widespread practice in international relations. Violations of the demilitarized status of the areas determined by international treaties have always led to instability and tension. Such arrangements are designed to strike a balance between opposing interests and unilateral and arbitrary attempts to alter such arrangements undermine this balance.

The demilitarized status of the Eastern Aegean Islands has been a fundamental element of the Aegean status quo ever since the termination of Turkish sovereignty over them. The permanence of the geographical features of the Aegean necessitates the permanence of the qualified sovereignty arrangements over these islands.

Greek Position: As early as 1964 Greece began to militarize these islands by deploying combat troops and establishing permanent military installations. The pretext for this militarization has been the so-called "Turkish threat."

Turkish Position: Both the history of the pertinent international treaties and their provisions regarding the islands in the Eastern Aegean Sea are unambiguous. Proximity to the Turkish coast and the security imperatives of the Anatolian Peninsula have always been factors in the determination of the status of the islands. That is why the authors of all the related international instruments have paid particular attention to reconciling Greek sovereignty over these islands with the security concerns of Turkey.

The past has confirmed the validity of these security concerns: The use of the island of Lemnos as a base for the attack on the Canakkale Straits
(Dardanelles) during World War I and the present aggressive policies of the Greek government in militarizing the islands today.

All the treaties governing the status of the Eastern Aegean Islands attach, as a permanent condition to Greek sovereignty, demilitarization.

- The Decision of 1914 by the Six Powers stipulated a demilitarized status for the islands then being turned over to Greece.

- Articles 12 and 13 of the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty and Article 4 of its annexed Convention confirmed this status. The Convention specifically provided that the islands of Lemnos and Samothrace, situated at the entry of the Canakkale Straits (Dardanelles), be demilitarized on an even stricter basis, thus emphasizing their vital importance for the security of the Straits.

- The 1936 Montreux Convention, which established the regime of the Turkish Straits, did not bring any change to the status of the islands.

- The 1947 Treaty of Paris turned over the islands, commonly referred to as the "Dodecanese," to Greece. This Treaty also sought to reconcile Greek sovereignty over these islands with the security of Turkey by stipulating in Article 14 that "these islands shall be and shall remain demilitarized."

Greek allegations that the islands have been militarized as a defensive measure against a "Turkish threat" constitute a gross distortion of the sequence of the developments. Indeed it is Turkey that has felt the need to take certain defensive measures in the face of the blatant violations by Greece of her obligation to keep the island demilitarized.
It should be added that, contrary to the Greek obligation to demilitarize the Eastern Aegean Islands, Turkey is under no commitment which restricts the size and the areas of deployment of its forces on the Turkish mainland.

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Terrorism holds a particular horror for Turkey and Turks for two modern-day reasons. During the 1960's and 1970's extremist groups on both the left and right, supported by external sources, operated freely in Turkey -- murder, assassination, senseless violence; in mid-1980 an average of 20 Turkish citizens were being killed every day. A military intervention in September 1980 was required in order to bring this anarchy to a halt. Second since the late 1970's, over 45 Turkish diplomats have been murdered outside of Turkey by misguided Armenian terrorists. Such acts of wanton terror can have no justifiable basis.

Turkey has condemned terrorism since its inception as a modern day weapon of extremism. Turkey has joined with and strongly encouraged cooperation among governments in combating this horror.

As a neighbor of Turkey, the Athens government's attitude toward terrorism is worrisome. The prestigious magazine "The Economist" published in London, in its June 1986 issue, described Greece's attitude vis-a-vis terrorism in the following words:

"The Tokyo summit's words about state-sponsored terrorism did not please Greece's Prime Minister, Mr. Papandreou. Greece, he said, will not join in blacklisting of terrorist states."

The article, after explaining Greece's tolerance toward international terrorism and tactics of blackmailing its allies, concluded by saying:
"Just now Mr. Papandreou may seem to be getting what he wants out of everybody. But his conservative critics argue that he has brought such discredit on Greece, by estranging it from its allies, that the Europeans are losing patience."

The "Armenian Reporter" newspaper, published in the U.S., in its issue of May 1, 1986, reports that Greece is welcoming and supporting Armenian radicals and terrorists and proudly describes the activities of the Greek branch of the "Armenian popular Movement."

According to the article, this organization, which openly professes support of the "Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia" (ASALA), benefits from the haven and support provided to it by the Government of Greece. The article also discloses that a recent conference organized by this organization in Athens on April 20, 1986, was attended by prominent members of the Greek Government, including the son of the Greek Prime Minister who is a Cabinet Member.

Reader's Digest, August 1986, issued the following article, titled "Profiteers of Terror: The European Connection," by Nathan M. Adams.

"Greece has resisted nearly every U.S. request to crack down on terrorism, and Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou quickly aligned himself with Quadafi in condemning the United States for its Libyan raid. Terrorist groups that operate freely in Greece include Lebanon's Iranian-controlled Hisbollah (Islamic Jihad) and those led by Abu Nidal and Abul Abbas. Using Athens as a springboard, terrorists hijacked TWA's Flight 847 on June 14, 1985, and last November, the Egyptian Boeing 737 in which 60 were killed. When a bomb exploded a TWA Flight over Greece last April, the person believed responsible was in the Athens airport awaiting a flight to Beirut."
The article continues: "Even when such terrorists are identified by Western intelligence agencies, Greek authorities resist taking effective action. One reason may be Greece's surging arms sales to both Libya and Iran. On July 7, 1984, Libya's ambassador to the U.N., Ali Treiki, visited Athens, where he and Papandreou agreed on the sale of millions of dollars worth of military equipment."

That Athens sees political advantage in either indifference toward, or the blatant support of, international terrorism, is of significant concern to Turkey. Certainly the allied nations of NATO, as well as all other civilized societies of the world, should be forthright in their condemnation of any Greek "softness" in this matter.

THE TURKISH MINORITIES IN GREEK THRACE

Another problem which affects Turkish-Greek relations is the discriminatory policy pursued by the Greek authorities towards the Turkish minority in Western Greek Thrace. The status of the Turkish minority in Greece is regulated by the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 24 July 1923.

According to official figures as accepted during the Lausanne Peace Conference, the overall population of Western Thrace in 1922-23 was 191,699 of which 129,120 were Turks and 33,910 Greeks. In the same period the land owned by the inhabitants of Turkish origin was 84 percent. The latest figures indicate the overall population of the region is around 360,000 out of which about 120,000 are Turks. The fact that the minority has remained more or less stable since 1923, notwithstanding an average birth rate of 28 per 1,000 proves that migration has been a constant process.
As for the land ownership, it had dwindled to less than 40 percent by the mid-seventies. The erosion has been continuing at an accelerated pace since 1976 due to large scale arbitrary land expropriation in accordance with law number 1091/80, concerning administration and direction of the Moslem minority in Western Thrace. This law was adopted by the Greek Parliament on November 12, 1980. According to the provisions of this law, Moslem Turks are not allowed to buy real estate; they are only able to sell land to Christians; permission to construct new buildings or to expand those in existence is withheld; they have virtually no access to loan or credit sources; and find great difficulty in obtaining or in renewing business licenses.

In addition, persistent efforts are continuing to influence educational systems and to remove all knowledge of Turkish culture and language.

Since 1975, some 10,000 persons of Turkish origin have summarily lost their Greek citizenship and have been expelled from Greek territory. They were accordingly denied the right to dispose of their property left in Greece. Such property has been subsequently "liquidated" by the authorities.

**REVIEW OF GREEK-TURKISH ISSUES**

The basis of today's Turkish-Greek dispute is rooted in the depths of history.

Greece has long followed the illusion known as the "Megali Idea" and has sought to apply it as a state policy. This expansionist policy of Greece was stopped with the Turkish War of Independence and by the Lausanne Peace Treaty. Yet, among the main principles which make up the Lausanne Peace Treaty balance, the demilitarization of the Eastern Aegean Islands has for years been violated by Greece. It is known worldwide that Greece has been arming the
Dodecanese and Eastern Islands since 1960's, notwithstanding the explicit provisions of both Lausanne and Paris Treaties.

Starting in the 1930's Greece began a systematic effort to turn the Aegean Sea into a Greek Lake. For this purpose, Greece expanded its airspace to 10 miles in 1931, and in 1936 extended its territorial waters from 3 to 6 miles. It has attempted to turn the F.I.R. into an airspace sovereignty area. The Enosis Thesis put forth in the 1950's, and which makes up the basis of the Cyprus crisis, is but another effort of Greek expansionism.

Finally, in 1981, Greece, through Papandreou, put forth the theme of a "Turkish Threat" at a NATO meeting in the hope of obtaining support for future plans by creating the basis for anti-Turkish platform within the alliance.

Toward this goal, Greece launched a "New Defense Policy" to counter this fictitious threat from Turkey. According to this doctrine:

- The Greek Armed Forces will give priority to defense against Turkey.
- Radar and other defense systems will primarily be oriented towards Turkey.
- Naval Forces targets will be the Turkish Naval Bases.
- The Maritza Army Corps and Islands will be reinforced.
- Intelligence gathering activities will be directed against Turkey.

In parallel with this policy, Greece is strengthening its armed forces as rapidly as possible, and is making great defense expenditures in trying to turn the balance of power with Turkey, especially in the air and at sea in its favor.

Regarding Cyprus, Greece puts forth the precondition of withdrawal of Turkish soldiers from Cyprus in order to have a dialogue with Turkey, while simultaneously increasing its military support to the Greek Cypriots.
Furthermore, Greece, a NATO nation, signed a Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation Agreement with Bulgaria, one of the Warsaw Pact nations, and the number one satellite of USSR, on 11 September 1986. (See Appendix 6)

It is necessary to evaluate Turkish-Greek relations from the standpoint of the philosophy of Alliance. The problem is that the Alliance, including the United States, remains an audience to the unstable and dangerous activities of one of its members pursuing a policy against another member, upsetting the military structure and plans of the Alliance as if it were a member of the camp opposing the Alliance. What actually disturbs Turkey are not decisions and acts taken by Greece, but the disinterest and indifference of Turkey's allies.

Greece engages in numerous destabilizing activities within the alliance, attempts to damage the unity and solidarity of the alliance, declares an ally as its enemy and finally adopts a political philosophy similar to those of Soviet Russia and Bulgaria, which are the main cause for establishing the Alliance.

MODERNIZATION OF TURKISH ARMED FORCES

Following are the basic deficiencies of the Turkish Armed Forces.

Lack of mobility is the main problem in the infantry units. As the flat, plains terrain in the vicinity of Thrace and the Turkish Straits necessitate a quick, cross-country capability, this shortage is critical.

Turkish armored units are slowly being modernized with diesel engines, 105mm guns, stabilization and night fighting capability. This project is continuing.
The Turkish Army badly needs a modern anti-tank system for use by infantry forces.

Turkish artillery is antiquated and lacks modern range, fire control, surveillance and target acquisition capabilities. The low level air defense capability of the ground forces is almost nonexistent.

Battlefield command-control and communications systems are generally out of date.

Programs to modernize surface combatant ships and submarine forces have been very slow and very expensive.

Maritime air squadron should be modernized and are in the need of ECM and ECCM capabilities.

Turkish air forces modern aircraft acquisition programs must include critical avionics and weapons systems.

The weapons systems, along with certain major equipment and material, which Turkey needs to modernize its Armed Forces strengthen it in the conventional field are provided from certain allied countries, mainly from the U.S. and the FRG.

The main sources utilized by Turkey for these foreign purchases are:

1. The U.S. military assistance in the form of Military Assistance Program and FMS credits (Military Assistance Program 1984 through 1987 is shown in Appendix 7).

2. The Federal Republic of German Military assistance in the form of NATO defense assistance (130 million DM in one and a half year slices).

3. The portion of the Turkey budget reserved for defense spending (more than 25% of General Budget).

Turkey is grateful for the assistance provided by its friends and allies. However, it is important to note that more than two thirds of this aid is made
up of FMS credits with conditional repayment, credits which Turkey started to receive in the year 1954. For example, in the military assistance plan of the year 1986, while MAP is 205 million dollars, the FMS credit is 410 million dollars. It is not anticipated that in the near future there will be important changes in this percentage.

Taking this as a basis, if Turkey continues to receive this amount of aid up to the year 2005, it will face an obligation to repay with a geometric increase, starting in 1984, with a total debt of 500 million dollars, including both interest and principal, reaching 1 billion dollars in the 1990's and approximately 2 billion dollars in the year 2000. According to these calculations we can see that as of 1987, Turkey will use a sizeable amount of the aid it receives from the U.S. to pay back its debts. In the following years, the main problem of the Turkish Armed Forces will focus on this point. In fact, even today it is possible to realize only the maintenance and partial modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces through U.S. military assistance and national sources allocated to defense.

Regarding the level of military assistance provided by the U.S. to Turkey, rather than the actual defense needs of Turkey, maintaining a balance between Turkey and Greece has been the basic criterion. The U.S. Congress, by the pressure of Greek Lobby, has kept a security assistance balance based on 7/10 ratio, Greek to Turkish.

With this stance, it is envisioned that for every 7 tanks Greece has, Turkey has to have 10. In other words, Turkish defense structure will be adjusted and formed according to Greece's force structure and requirements. It is interesting to note that the same pattern is applied to the amount of
German Military Aid. The irrational insistence on this aid ratio constitutes a principal delaying factor for the modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces.

In determining the amount of security assistance the following questions should be asked:

(1) Which country among the aid recipient is most exposed to the Soviet threats?

(2) Which country has common frontiers with the Soviet Union and other WP Nations?

(3) Which country most heavily and directly contributes to Western defense and provides the most important installations to the United States?

(4) Which country, in Soviet eyes, is the highest military target because of its proximity to vital areas of the Soviet Union?

(5) Which country is considered to be critical for the purpose of simultaneously controlling the eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf area?
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

NATO by providing general East-West balance of power and stability among its members renders service to the preserving of the world peace and security of its members, including Turkey.

The Southern Flank is vital for NATO not only from military standpoint, but also economically.

Turkey, one of the most important NATO countries, plays a vital role in defending the Southern Flank of NATO and contributing to stability in the Middle East by safeguarding the Turkish Straits (Bosporus, Sea of Marmara, and Dardanelles), maintaining the largest Armed Forces in NATO and by fully supporting and enhancing NATO's objectives.

A NATO-WP War in the Southern Flank, must be won in Greece-Turkish Thrace so as to retain control of the Straits. Should the Sea of Marmara and Dardanelles be lost it is not possible to defend in the Aegean Sea, against the continuously reinforced Soviet naval, land and air forces.

Turkey is the most important U.S. ally, from a strategic point of view, in the entire Mediterranean area. Since 1947, successive Turkish governments have provided the United States with extremely valuable military and intelligence facilities from which to monitor Soviet weapons tests and gather other sensitive information. After the fall of the Shah in Iran in 1979 and the revolutionary regime's decision to close U.S. military facilities there, Turkey's importance in support of U.S. national security objectives in the region increased significantly. The loss of U.S. military and
intelligence facilities in Turkey would directly affect the defense of North America, and Turkey is therefore an extremely important asset for United States. It is clear from these factors that Turkey's contribution to Western defense and U.S. security is indeed "invaluable and irreplaceable."

Turkey's relationship with NATO would be significantly improved if the following two problems were resolved:

(1) Turkey has large pools of trained fighting men, whose combat proficiency, discipline, tenacity, and plain ruggedness are acknowledged by all NATO nations including the United States. The principal weakness of the Turkish Armed Forces is the inadequacy of its equipment and weapons systems. Turkey faces threats from vastly superior forces. The conventional balance in the area is totally in favor of the WP. This state of affairs stems from the inadequacy of military assistance to Turkey; very much abetted by the U.S. congressionally mandated continuation of the 7/10 ratio; I believe that force comparison must be done between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, not between two NATO countries, Turkey and Greece. It is very difficult to understand the supporting rationale of the 7/10 ratio continued by U.S. Congress. The amount of security assistance should be determined according to the nations importance and direct contribution to the security interests of the U.S. and NATO.

(2) Turkey has significant differences with Greece.

Greece is determined to pursue its Megali Idea (Grand Design). Greece is trying to turn the Aegean sea into Greek Lake and militarize illegally the Eastern Aegean Islands and Dodecanese Islands. It has not given up the idea to annex Cyprus to Greece. It is pursuing these illegal activities under the cover of a fictitious Turkish Threat. Greece has been at the least
sympathetic, at the worst blatantly supportive of international terrorist elements, including Armenian terrorists who are directly targeting Turkish diplomatic representatives.

With its present political stances, Greece is less supportive of NATO, and obviously more in line with its regional Warsaw Pact neighbors.

The Alliance, including the United States, remains a silent audience to the unstable and dangerous activities of one of its members pursuing a policy against another member, upsetting the military structure and plans of the Alliance, and often acting as if it were a member of the camp opposing the Alliance.
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APPENDIX 2

Cyprus at the beginning of 1984

Source: United Nations
TERRITORIAL WATERS

The breadth of territorial sea is a vital element of the delicate balance of interests in the Aegean Sea and has bearing on many other issues. Under the present six-mile limit, Greece possesses approximately 43.5 percent of the Aegean Sea and Turkey 7.5 percent. The remaining 49 percent is high seas.
Greek Position: The Greek Government asserts the right to extend unilaterally territorial waters from their present breadth of 6 miles to 12 miles.

Turkish Position: The Turkish Government has reiterated that such a situation would be totally unacceptable. Should Greece resort to even a partial extension of the territorial sea or the declaration of other kinds of maritime jurisdiction areas in the Aegean, Turkey would take all the necessary measures to safeguard its legitimate rights and interests in this sea.

Were the limits of territorial waters extended to 12 miles, Greece, by virtue of her islands, would acquire approximately 71.5 percent of the Aegean Sea, while Turkey's share would increase to only 8.8 percent. In such an eventuality, the Aegean high seas would shrink to a mere 19.7 percent.

THE SITUATION THAT WILL ARISE IN THE AEGEAN SEA, IF TERRITORIAL WATERS ARE EXTENDED TO 12 MILES

Turkish Territorial Waters  
(Approx 8.76 %)

Greek Territorial Waters  
(Approx 71.53 %)

High Seas  
(Approx 19.71 %)
AEGEAN AIRSPACE QUESTIONS

Breadth of National Airspace

According to international law, the breadth of national airspace has to correspond to the breadth of territorial sea. This is clearly reflected in Articles 1 and 2 of the Chicago Convention of 1944 on Civil Aviation:

"Article 1 - Sovereignty"
"The contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory."

"Article 2 - Territory"
"For the purpose of this Convention, the territory of a State shall be deemed to be land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of such State." (emphasis added)
PROCLAMATION OF FRIENDSHIP, GOOD NEIGHBORLINESS
AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GREEK REPUBLIC AND THE
PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY OF BULGARIA

THE GREEK REPUBLIC AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA

-- with the deep conviction that the relationship of friendship
and cooperation between the two neighboring countries
corresponds to the interest of the Greek and Bulgarian people
and represents an important contribution to the cause of the
establishment of peace and security in the Balkans and in
Europe,

-- with the awareness that the differences of sociopolitical
regimes should not represent an obstacle for the maintenance
and the promotion of the relationship of friendship, good
neighborliness and cooperation between the two countries,

-- wishing to further mutually advantageous cooperation and to
establish a relationship of 'good neighborliness, common
understanding and friendship between the two peoples,

-- inspired by the aims and the principles of the Charter of the
U.N. and the Final Act of the Conference for the Security and
Cooperation in Europe,

-- Aiming to establish on a solid basis the future development
of their relationship,

DECLARE THE FOLLOWING:

1. The two countries reassure officially that the basis of
their relationship now and in the future will be the faithful
respect of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe, of existing international agreements and of the
generally accepted rules of international law.

The two countries will aim so that in the future the links of
friendship and good neighborly relations will be tightened and
the development of the mutually beneficial cooperation in all
areas of common interest will be realized.

2. The two countries undertake the obligation to not encourage
actions or take measures which would turn against each other,
nor to allow the use of their territory for such actions or
aims.

3. Using to a maximum extent the possibilities which are
offered by their economic, scientific and technical expertise
and their geographical position, the two countries will
stabilize and develop even further their economic, scientific
and technical cooperation in commerce, industry, agriculture,
transport, communications, the protection of the environment
and also in other sectors of the national economy on the basis of mutual interest and within the framework of national laws and the international obligations.

THAT EACH HAS ASSUMED,

4. The two countries will continue to develop their relationship in the fields of culture, the arts, science, education, sports and mass media on the basis of bilateral agreements in an effort which will tend towards the greatest possible mutual and balanced flow of information, cultural relations and persons, thus encouraging greater acquaintance and understanding between the two countries and consequently, the stabilization of confidence and friendship between the two peoples. Within this framework the two countries will continue to encourage the flow and contacts between their citizens on an individual or collective basis, professional, trade union, or tourist.

5. The two countries, pursuing an already established tradition in their relationship, will continue the periodical consultations between their political leaders on issues of common interest, either bilateral or international. In their efforts to create the most appropriate climate for the above contacts, the two countries will encourage links between representatives of their bodies politic and between their parliamentary representatives. If a situation might arise which on the basis of mutual estimation might create a danger for the peace and security of each country, the two countries will immediately get in touch with each other in order to exchange views so as to avert this danger.

6. The two countries will coordinate their efforts to cooperate with other Balkan states in order to improve the climate of trust and cooperation so that the Balkans may become an area of stability, peace and detente. Towards this goal they will encourage multi-dimensional Balkan cooperation in the fields where there exist common interests and will continue their efforts in order to bring about the idea of transforming the Balkans into a nuclear free zone. Also within the framework of the efforts towards a total elimination of chemical weapons, the two countries support the idea of transforming the Balkans into a zone free of chemical weapons.

7. Emphasizing that a mutual foundation of their foreign policy is a strict adherence to the principles mentioned in Article 1, Para 1 of the above Declaration, the two countries assure that the guideline of this policy is the effort for dialogue, detente and cooperation between states, an effort which represents the only realistic path in order to establish trust, disarmament, security and peace in Europe and worldwide.
8. Being true to the above principles and guidelines of their foreign policy the two countries, depending on their possibilities, will encourage every effort that will eliminate centers of military confrontation and tension, that will lead to peaceful settlement of crisis, that will eliminate every type of colonialism or racial discrimination and the policies of violence and faits accomplis in international relations. In connection with the above they underline the role of the United Nations, which they will seek to strengthen, particularly as concerns the maintenance of international peace and security and the peaceful solution of differences, and they also stress the need to respect the decisions of the above organization by all its members and particularly by those affected by its decisions.

9. The two countries will contribute with all the means available to them and to the extent of their capacity to prevent the danger of war and mainly nuclear war. They will cooperate energetically in order to eliminate the competition in armaments on Earth and to avert its expansion into space. Furthermore, they will cooperate in an effort to limit armaments both nuclear and conventional at the lowest possible level on the basis of equality and mutual security and with the final aim of a general and total disarmament under strict and effective international supervision. The two countries support the total stoppage of nuclear testing as a first step in the direction of eliminating nuclear weapons.

10. The two countries state that the above Declaration is not directed against any third country and does not affect the rights and obligations which stem from existing agreements and arrangements in which they participate.
# APPENDIX 7

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<th>Type of Assistance</th>
<th>Admin. Prop.</th>
<th>Admin. Approp.</th>
<th>Total Prop.</th>
<th>Total Approp.</th>
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<th>FY 85</th>
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<td>585</td>
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6-81
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