A RESEARCH REPORT ON PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF EXTREME BEHAVIOR

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January 1987

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U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
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A Field Operating Agency under the Jurisdiction of the
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Research accomplished under contract
for the Department of the Army
University College, Cork (Ireland)

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This paper comprises three broad sections. The first discusses and reviews psychological approaches to the identification and definition of terrorism, including its consequences, violence associated with it, the relationship between terrorism and mental health, and the notion of state and non-state terrorism. Different types of terrorism are identified, and a list of the elements which may constitute the boundaries of terrorism are presented. (OVER)
ARI Research Note 87-03

20. Abstract (continued)

The second section of the report reviews the psychological literature on terrorism, examining the concept of terrorist motivation, the psychological profiling of terrorists, and psychological accounts of the process of terrorism, to include the concept of identification, and the influence of the group.

The third section introduces and develops a behavioral approach to the analysis of terrorism, and indicates avenues for future research.
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Introduction

This paper seeks to analyse and discuss from a psychological perspective, some of the issues related to violent politically extreme behaviour. It takes as its focus the contemporary problem of terrorism, and through a discussion of its conceptual base, and a review of the psychological literature addressing the problem, it offers an alternative approach to conceptualizing the problem, with suggestions for further research.

The approach taken is a personal one, in that it reflects the experience and interests of the author. It takes as its focus an essentially behavioural approach to psychology, and views the area from that perspective. However, it is quite clear that no single discipline can offer a complete account of so complex an issue as terrorism, and therefore views from a political or sociological context have been included. The relationship between political belief, ideological commitment and behaviour is complex and obscure. This account has not considered this issue in any great detail, and this clearly remains an area where more research and information is needed.

The notion of Terrorism is complex, and many authors have referred to the variety and inconsistency of definitions in the literature. Whilst this account does consider definitional issues, it does not seek to provide a psychological definition. The utility of such a definition may be limited anyway, given the need for interdisciplinary approaches. Implicit in much of the following discussion, however, is a notion of terrorism as acts of violence or potential violence, such as bombings, assassination, etc. where the terrorist is not directly in contact with the victim. The hostage situation, as an example of victim-terrorist interaction, is not discussed in detail, other than by way of example.

A number of individuals have contributed to this review; notable amongst them is Ch. Supt. W. Wilson, whose assistance is gratefully acknowledged.
**Concepts and Definitions**

Despite the importance of the area, and the extent of contemporary concern, the general academic literature on terrorism reveals little consensus as to the origins, features or necessary social or psychological attributes of the terrorist and his actions. This surprising state of affairs might strike the academic as unusual, but it is a matter of concern to practitioners who might reasonably expect some assistance from the academic community in the way in which they might conceptualise and ultimately manage terrorist incidents. It is an issue of concern to the Security Services, for they more often than not, are the front line participants who may well experience terrorist action either directly, or as a result of attending an incident, and who probably at first hand have to deal with the primary effects as well as the secondary social disruption associated with terrorism. Recently, Norton (1986) has graphically described and identified the challenges of terrorism to the police service, for example, both in terms of forward planning and preparation, and operational readiness.

Probably the most significant discipline based analyses of terrorism have their origins in Political Science (Rapoport, 1984). Given the political agenda of most terrorist acts and organizations, this is not really surprising. Nor is it surprising that Sociological accounts often serve to supplement political analyses. The dominance of these two disciplines is at its most apparent when considering definitional problems, and they have lead much of the conceptual debate. This paper, however, addresses the problem from a psychological perspective. This is not to say that discipline based analyses can stand isolated; quite clearly, the complex nature of terrorism demands an interdisciplinary approach. However, each discipline can offer to the problem its own perspectives; this paper explores some psychological perspectives on terrorism, and seeks to evaluate the contribution made by the limited psychological literature in this area.

From that psychological perspective, one of the difficulties in the analysis of terrorism centre around the problems of identification and definition of
both terrorism and the terrorist. Our notions of what constitutes terrorism are confused, and the word and concept are used in a variety of ways. Schmid (1983) has discussed conceptual issues in the definition of terrorism in a comprehensive way, and in his review of the area a clear theme emerges of a preoccupation with attempts to identify common qualities, which seem to hinge around notions of the 'specialness' of terrorism; this seems to characterize sociological and psychological accounts alike. But is terrorism necessarily special or different from other activities in psychological terms? Are there important areas from a psychological perspective in which the terrorist shares attributes with other activities? Perhaps some of the conceptual confusions derive from the attempt to set terrorism apart from other aspects of life, and in having set it aside, seeking to identify origins, causal accounts, etc., different from those we use to describe other behavior. It may be that at least from a psychological perspective, there is utility in conceptualizing terrorism in the way we might conceptualize other infrequent and worrying behaviours.

Terrorist activity takes many different forms - bombing, assassination, kidnapping, etc. The following discusses from a psychological perspective some issues of relevance to their conceptual analysis. The discussion addresses the broader spectrum of terrorist activity, but largely excludes those activities associated with hostage taking. This is mainly because the hostage situation seems to represent a qualitatively different kind of activity from others that characterize terrorist action - it involves direct personal contact with victims, and is more readily confounded with overt and explicit criminal activity.

The problem of identification and definition
There seems to be general agreement across a broad political spectrum that Terrorism constitutes perhaps the greatest threat to the liberal democracies. Each new report of atrocity in Ulster, The Lebanon or elsewhere in the world generates a sense of unease and concern that extends beyond the country where the event occurs to encompass us all. In one sense our fears are groundless, for as we will note later, we are unlikely personally to encounter a terrorist act. But the threat undoubtedly remains, and its reality lies not perhaps in its effects on the individual, but in the effects on the political process and government. Yet we have
relatively little knowledge of the process of terrorism, its determinants or controllers. Our fears grow, but the source of our fears remains shrouded in mystery. We are even unsure and uncertain about what actually constitutes the problem.

There is considerable disagreement as to what constitutes the attributes of terrorism, and before embarking on a psychological analysis of the problem, we must first consider what is usually meant by reference to 'terrorism' and the 'terrorist'. In psychological terms, definitional problems are often approached from an attempt to 'operationally' define an issue. In the case of terrorism, however, such an approach lacks utility, for as we will see, the concept is complex and refers to situations that in themselves as actions are not necessarily unique. It may well indeed be the case that assumptions about uniqueness have in fact contributed to our problems of analysis.

The following identifies a number of circumstances where the quest for 'uniqueness' and 'specialness' may have complicated the analysis. It is important to note, however, that in examining the ascription of 'specialness' to terrorism, there is no intention to reduce it to the mundane, but rather to clear the way for an alternative emphasis and way of conceptualizing it within a broader psychological context. Many aspects of contemporary life cause us concern: they benefit from systematic critical analysis rather than analyses based on assumptions. In the case of terrorism, it is of great importance that we retain objectivity in analysis and avoid the complications of implicit moral judgements (Wardlaw, 1982). That terrorism represents a major challenge to the democratic states can hardly be doubted. The following considers whether that challenge can be best seen in terms of the uniqueness of terrorism, or as an array of problems and concerns, perhaps uniquely drawn together by terrorism, but not unique in themselves.

The consequences of terrorism in psychological terms
Terrorist activities result in some form of consequence. Very often the immediate (and perhaps definitive) consequence is a violent act of some form, which may be aimed at a variety of targets. Indeed, Schmid (1983) details some twenty inter-related purposes and functions attributed to terrorist acts, which identify audiences as diverse as the terrorist groups
themselves, the public, political leaders, the security services, etc.

As the usually passive recipient or observer of terrorist activity, members of a society are unquestionably affected by terrorist action. The nature of that effect, however, may bear further analysis. Different authors have tended to emphasize different kinds of effects. For example, effects on public opinion have been emphasized by Bassiouni (1979), the demoralization of society by a number of authors (eg. Wilkinson, 1976; Crenshaw, 1978). The word 'terrorism' itself carries with it reference to terror, which in psychological terms may be characterized as an extreme, perhaps debilitating, emotional state. Some authors taking this notion, have developed it, and characterized the effects of terrorism in the dramatic terms of fear (Crenshaw (1978) for example); Thornton (1964) similarly makes reference to extreme states as the consequence of terrorism, and draws attention to three levels of response induced in the audience of terrorism - fright, anxiety and despair. Consistent with this view on the consequences of terrorism, Wilkinson (1977) identifies as the central problem in defining terrorism the subjective nature of terror, presumably in the observer as a consequence of a terrorist act.

There is however remarkably little systematic analysis on the effects on the individual in society of terrorism in this context, and we have very little idea of what the effects of such 'terror' might consist of, other than at a general, essentially political, level (Freedman, 1982). Some analyses that are offered typically seek to describe pathogenic effects on particular populations (eg. Fields, 1979); others seem to make assumptions that the individual effects of an act of terror on a victim have in some sense a parallel effect on non-participants at a social level. Greisman's analysis of identification in the ascription of social meaning to terrorism (Greisman, 1977) seems close to this kind of approach.

Perhaps, however, a useful distinction might be drawn between the effects of terrorism on those involved directly in some sense, and the effects of terrorism on the general public. That those victimized may well be subject to 'terror' (in a psychological sense) is probably the case. In this context, the victim of the hostage situation seems to have received most attention. Symonds (1980) for example, reviews the responses of victims to being taken hostage, and identifies 4 stages of response: shock, denial,
traumatic depression and recrimination, and resolution and integration. An example of this can be seen in Ochberg (1978) who describes the effects on Gerard Vaders, a hostage held for 13 days during the Moluccan train siege in Holland in 1975. Vaders appeared to show the stages of response described above, with psychological problems persisting after his release. Hillman (1981) identifies similar consequences amongst a group of prison officers held hostage in New Mexico in 1980. There seems to be little doubt that this experience of terrorism (being held hostage) has considerable psychological consequences, which may persist (Harkis, 1986).

Perhaps the most famous consequence of being taken hostage is the so-called 'Stockholm Syndrome' - the development of a relationship, an 'affectionate bond', as the hostage situation develops, between the captor and captive (Strentz, 1930). Its development can be facilitated by important facilitatory features of personal interaction such as eye contact and verbal interaction, as well as dependency on the captor for survival, etc. An extreme example of this, amounting to apparently total conversion to the kidnappers' cause, can be seen in the case of Patty Hearst, who after kidnapping by the SLA (Symbionese Liberation Army) in 1974, became apparently a fully fledged member of the group, taking part in action, etc. (Hacker, 1976). We should note, however, that the Stockholm Syndrome is not an inevitable consequence, and did not seem to develop in the siege of the Iranian Embassy in London in May 1980 (Wardlaw, 1983). It is thought that this may be because the hostage victims were not passive, and were as ideologically committed as their captors.

But can the kinds of effects of terror described above be ascribed to the public in general as the audience of terrorism? Clearly not. It is difficult to detect in the public response to, for example, hostage taking, any of the apparent characteristics of victim development noted above. Certainly, terror as an extreme emotional state experienced by the victim has no obvious psychological parallel on members of the public audience to the terrorist acts. Perhaps the closest state to 'mass terror' in the sense referred to above is that characterized by 'the General Adaptation Syndrome' (Selye, 1956). But this seems to refer to a qualitatively different state of affairs to the effect following a terrorist incident, however dramatic, on its audience. The General Adaptation Syndrome may
be said to reflect intense anxiety and terror. It has been characterized as having three stages: the alarm reaction, the stage of resistance and the stage of exhaustion. At an individual level a soldier going into combat might show these stages as a period of intense alarm prior to combat, a period of extreme alertness and resistance to stress during the resistance stage, and a period of collapse and exhaustion following combat. Bloch (1969) for example describes graphically the pathogenic consequences of this in combat soldiers in Vietnam. The processes involved here may well be somewhat similar to the stages of development of the victim of the hostage situation, noted above (Symons, 1980). Related reactions typically viewed on a larger social scale are shown by the victims of disasters, such as earthquakes, etc., in what is known as the Disaster Syndrome (Janis, 1971). It is possible to identify states of insurgency induced 'terror' in populations created to assist the initiation of political change. Seyboult (1986) for example describes the creation and effect of mass terror on the Chinese population during 1942-43. But such dramatic effects clearly do not characterize the consequences of terrorist actions on the general public in the Western Democracies.

It is of some significance to note that most members of the public never encounter any direct form of terrorist action, other than via the media. The statistical probabilities of encountering a terrorist incident are very low, and this is even the case amongst what might be thought to be relatively vulnerable sections of the community (airline passengers, for example). Thus, members of the public are unlikely to be the direct victims of terrorism; nor in the course of our daily lives do we see people smitten by 'terror' (in any psychological sense) after the latest terrorist outrage, other than perhaps as participants.

That terrorism has an effect on the public however cannot be denied, and it may well be that fear, or panic in extremis, in some sense might characterize that effect; the role of the media in this cannot be overemphasized (Schmid and de Graf, 1982). Incidents such as the car bomb which exploded outside of Harrods Department Store in London on Saturday, 17 December, 1983, which killed 6 and injured 97, undoubtedly influenced pre-Christmas shopping that year. But any effect seems to be inappropriately characterized in terms of terror. The effects on West End shopping of the Harrods bombing, for example, did not appear to extend
beyond the Christmas period. Perhaps a part of the problem is that we are
ebeguiled by the term itself. The involvement of terror on an audience as a
consequence of terrorism is clearly not an obvious occurrence, and an
inappropriate preoccupation with it may serve to obscure from our view
other processes that may have elements in common with the effects of
terrorism, which might progress our understanding.

Indeed, the consequences of terrorism might well have much more in
common with other kinds of fears people have of low probability violent
events, such as mugging, violent burglary, or just a general fear of
victimization, rather than some particular special quality of terrorism
itself. Fear of mugging for the elderly, for example, is unquestionably
prevalent (Mayhew and Hough, 1983), and such fears undoubtedly influence
the life styles of many elderly people. Yet as a group, the elderly whilst
both being perceived as vulnerable and perceiving themselves as
vulnerable, are in fact statistically a relatively safe group with respect to
violent crimes like mugging, and their fears are not a reflection of the
statistical probability in general of themselves being victimized. The
media would also seem to play an important role in this, although it should
be noted that the relationship between, for example, TV viewing and
assessment of risk from violent events (flooding, cancer, terrorist
violence) is far from straight forward (Gunter and Wober, 1983). This area
clearly needs more investigation. To concentrate on special qualities in
the effects of terrorism, however, may well hide the similarities
terrorism may well have, in terms of its effects on the public, with other
kinds of events like violent crime.

In seeking to account for the public effects of terrorism, it may well be
that the focus should not be on the terrorist act (which by its nature is
extranormal, usually dramatic and probably bloody), but on the broader
context of the analysis of the effects of events on public opinion and the
political process. Analyses of the effects of the media are clearly relevant
here. It may also be that the recent resurgence of interest in the work of
Le Bon and the social psychology of the crowd (eg. Moscovici, 1985;
Graumann and Moscovici, 1986) may offer some insights into the effects
that terrorism, and other similar activities, might have on mass
behaviour. (Such accounts may well also offer insights into the nature of
the terrorist group, and the dynamics of terrorist decision making).
Likewise Touraine (1981) may offer valuable insights into the effect of such mass behaviour on 'the public', and the effect that 'the public' might have on the political process. If we move away from the naive assumption of a 'special' consequence, it then becomes possible to place this aspect of terrorism within a more general analytical framework, which may in turn offer us help in dealing with the problem. Thus, whilst the label 'terrorism' seems to identify some unique dramatic qualities in terms of effects on the public processes of society, on inspection those effects are complex and seem to refer to qualities that may not be unique; perhaps terrorism differs with respect to quantity and intent in this sense, rather than quality.

Violence and terrorism
Whatever the status violence might have as an essential quality of terrorism, in the public mind at least there is a clear association between violence and terrorism. For some authors the involvement of violence in terrorism would indeed be one of its essential attributes (Hutchinson (1982) for example), along with other notions such as qualities of randomness (Kupperman and Trent, 1979), and a lack of relationship to 'the just desserts' of the individual victim (Friedlander, 1980). In terms of the discussion above, there is a clear link to be made between the term terror and violence, with one assumed to be the inevitable consequence of the other. Most of the terrorist incidents that come to our attention, via the media, often involve some form of violence, either directly in an incident like a bombing, or indirectly through a potential for violence as in a 'find' of weapons, etc.

Schmid (1983) discusses the relationship between violence and terrorism, and indicates, in his discussion of the many different accounts of violence from workers in the field, the lack of agreed attributes. It may be, however, that the problems encountered in this context, as with the problems of terror discussed above, have their origins in the attempt to identify some special quality to terrorist violence that will serve to identify it, and distinguish it from other violent acts. In seeking to do this, many definitions seem to focus on the instrumental quality of terrorist violence as an essential attribute; Arendt (1970) will serve as a typical example when in referring to terrorist violence he notes that it "...is distinguished by its instrumental character". In a more specific
sense, Schmid and de Graaf (1982) argue coherently for communication as an important instrumental element in terrorist violence.

But violence and aggression is not a special attribute of the terrorist. Many very different and varied individuals commit violent acts in many different circumstances. Furthermore, such violence is often commonly instrumental in character. Indeed, one of the few psychological analyses of the aetiology of aggression and violence that continues to be of note makes reference to its instrumental character as an important explanatory tool in understanding the development or learning of aggression and violent behaviour (Bandura, 1973). Whilst it may be argued that we lack a clear understanding of the nature and determinants of violent behaviour, we can be quite certain that instrumental violence is not a special attribute of terrorism. Terrorism may differ only in intended focus and consequence (given its likely political agenda) from other forms of violence, rather than in any qualitative way. The consequences of a failure to recognize this can be seen in van der Dennen's (1980) analysis of terrorist violence. By failing to recognize the importance of consequence for the individual in understanding any violent behaviour he illustrates the difficulties that can be encountered in seeking to identify a special category of violence (special to the terrorist) that has qualities of purposiveness, that in some way distinguishes terrorist violence from other, presumably more reflexive violence.

Schmid (1983) points to one origin of this problem by drawing our attention to the way in which many authors in this area make an assumption (explicitly sometimes, but more often than not implicitly) of the frustration-aggression hypothesis (Dollard et al., 1939) to account for aggression. By relating aggression to frustration, this theory can appear to suggest a reflexive character to aggression, which appears to diminish the role of the consequences, or the instrumental qualities, of aggression. Terrorist violence is clearly not reflexive, but it is only necessary to place it in a special category of explanation if we fail to appreciate alternative approaches to the problems of understanding aggression and violence. We should note, however, that in spite of the relatively naive use of the frustration-aggression hypothesis by many authors in this area, there may be grounds for including frustration as a factor in the development of terrorist aggression (Berkowitz, 1971; Margolin, 1977),
although not necessarily yielding to it a dominant explanatory role.

Violence, therefore, is not the particular prerogative of the terrorist, neither is its purposiveness. It may be that the aim of terrorist violence may distinguish it from the mugging, for example; but this hardly yields the necessary attributes of specialness in this sense. Both mugging and terrorism are extra-normal in character, but are not necessarily pathological. The social context of terrorism is clearly important, in that it contributes to both the essential attributes and the identification of the purposiveness of terrorism. But rather than seek 'meaning' for the violent acts in terms of some inaccessible special quality of violence, perhaps we might find greater utility in looking at what the effect such activities have in terms of their consequences. "A social stimulus, like any other stimulus, becomes important in controlling behaviour because of the contingencies into which it enters" (Skinner, 1953) is a view that might have as much relevance in analyzing the effects of terrorism (as a social stimulus), as it does in the analysis of social interaction and facilitation.

c. Violence, fanaticism and mental health
Margolin (1977) noted that much psychological research in the area of terrorism has been characterized by two contradictory assumption, both of which seem again to draw upon the notion of specialness. Some psychologists have characterized the terrorist as the psychotic, the extreme abnormal individual, the fanatic. Others have emphasized his rational qualities. the cool, logical planning individual who's rewards are ideological and political, rather than financial. The former view perhaps reflects a concern with the events and outcomes of terrorist action, the latter with the terrorists' sometimes sophisticated rhetoric and political analysis.

The notion that the terrorist is in some sense mentally ill is one that has wide currency. Presumably, because of the general (but not necessary) involvement of purposive but (as far as the recipient is concerned) motiveless violence in terrorist action, we feel that the terrorist is not just extra-normal but abnormal, that his behaviour is pathological and therefore he is in some sense mentally ill. By taking this perspective, we of course also place the terrorist within a clinical context. In some ways, these kinds of views parallel those held about crime and deviance in
general - because these behaviours are out of the ordinary and inflict damage on people and society, the individual undertaking such acts must be in some sense disturbed, and therefore ill. Terms such as psychopath or sociopath are then used in the case of the terrorist to diagnose and identify this presumed abnormal behaviour state.

A characteristic of many terrorist acts which make them very disturbing to us is that they 'break the rules of engagement'. (A better way of expressing this may be to say that the terrorist operates to different rules of engagement, for many terrorist acts are suggestive of rule following). Most of us have grown up in a world where conflict is regulated by broadly accepted rules - the Queensbury Rules, The Geneva Convention - which seek to place limits on the extent and focus of conflict. A failure to follow 'accepted' norms is not in itself sufficient grounds for ascription of mental illness; indeed, in some contexts such failure might be termed 'innovation', and therefore applauded! The very fact of not following these accepted rules, of course, constitutes one of the terrorists major weapons (however this might be legitimised and rationalised by revolutionary theorists, such a Marighela, 1974).

Because the terrorist is a distant and rather shady figure, and because he does things which are outside the 'normal' rules of conflict (by inflicting casualties on innocent bystanders, for example) it is very easy for us to seek to explain his actions by making reference to some form of illness that sets him aside from other people, and helps therefore to 'explain' his unusual acts. We are used to this kind of explanation, and the trivialising of terms like illness, and the inappropriate use of 'psychological' explanations of deviant behaviour which has characterized much criminological thinking over recent years, has well prepared the public for placing terrorism within the ambit of mental illness. Thus terms like 'sociopath' and 'psychopath' recur in the terrorist literature.

'Sociopath' and 'Psychopath' and similar terms present, however, considerable difficulties in understanding, and they reflect a view of human behaviour that subsumes deviance within a medical, rather than social or psychological, model. This has implications for members of the security services who are faced with terrorist acts in some form. Describing terrorism within a medical framework makes assumptions
about motivation, etc., which may be inappropriate and counter-productive. It also places terrorist behaviour within the context of 'illness' and as such, somehow outside the normal rules of behaviour and the process of law.

The latter point raises an important issue. Within a legal context, the notion of intention is of fundamental importance in determination of guilt, and we have well developed concepts that limit the extent to which limits on capacity to form judgements amend the ascription of intention in any particular situation. Foremost amongst the limiting factors is the limit placed on intention by mental illness. Within this context, the legal concept of mens rea is a fundamental element in the determination of guilt of a crime. In simple terms, mens rea refers to the necessary intention associated with an act before guilt can be established; a 'guilty mind' must be established. Quite clearly, the insane or incapable may commit acts which for ordinary people would constitute a crime, but we probably would not want to regard them as guilty and deserving of punishment, by virtue of the nature of their affliction. In a similar context, accidental commission of a crime where negligence is not at issue would seem to be an inappropriate event to occasion conviction or punishment. The important point to note is that to sustain a conviction for an offense, both actus rea (the offense) and mens rea (guilty mind) must be established (Cronbag, 1985). Placing the terrorist within the context of the mentally ill immediately, of course, raises issues as to mens rea in any attempt at prosecution, and by extension in the way we think about terrorism. The appropriateness or otherwise of this issue in particular cases is, of course, a matter for analysis within the particular context, but clearly locating terrorism in general within the ambit of mental health raises this issue.

Although this is a slight digression from the main thrust of the argument, it is worth noting that the problems associated with terrorism within this context, however, are not confined to the determination of mens rea alone, for there are circumstances where because of our uncertainty about the notion of terrorism, there can be other doubts about mens rea, or even actus rea. This can be best illustrated with respect to international law, and the notion of extradition for terrorist offenses between countries. Hannay (1980) has discussed this issue, and drawn attention to the
problems of dealing with terrorism in international extradition treaties. Most such treaties exclude extradition for 'political offenses'; the interpretation of 'political' is however usually left to the courts to decide. The case of Castoni in 1890 has generally been regarded as a guide in this respect in most English speaking common law countries. In this case, the courts decided that however deplorable, cruel or irrational the act, the furthering of a political goal was sufficient to establish the necessary political intention sufficient to avoid extradition. In 1978, a U.S. court appeared to rely on this interpretation to deny extradition to the U.K. of an I.R.A. activist accused of committing bombings in the U.K. However, subsequent rulings have tended to follow another test case established in 1894, where an English court tempered the Castioni ruling, by asserting that violent acts against private citizens rather than political entities cannot be regarded as political offenses. The fact that political intention remains ground for denying extradition illustrates the ambivalent position society takes in making judgements about violent terrorist acts. It would seem that on occasions, political intention seems to abrogate mens rea.

The third edition of the American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-III) includes the terms psychopath, sociopath and antisocial personality to describe individuals who come into conflict with society because they refuse to conform to established rules of conduct. Cleckley (1964) has identified some 16 characteristics of psychopathic behaviour which include such things as superficial charm and intelligence, poor judgement and failure to learn from experience, lack of remorse or shame, unreliability, absence of delusion, pathologic egocentricity and incapacity for love, unresponsiveness in general interpersonal relations, sex life impersonal, trivial and poorly integrated, etc. Other authors (eg Gray and Hutchinson, 1964) have largely confirmed this listing of the attributes of psychopathy.

Some characteristics of the terrorist clearly do fall within the above listing, and this has led some authors to concentrate on the relationship between aspects of terrorism and presumed deviant characteristics of the individuals concerned. Thus Lanceley (1981) describes the Antisocial Personality as hostage taker. In this paper, Lanceley discusses the practical consequences for hostage negotiation of the kinds of behavioural repertoires demonstrated by the antisocial personality, and considers, for
example, the effects of such states on the probable consequences of stalling tactics, the development of the 'Stockholm Syndrome', etc. If the typology suggested by Lanceley offers predictive utility, clearly this kind of approach has value. However, not all hostage takers fall within this category, and it may well be positively harmful for the assumption to be made that this kind of approach characterizes all kinds of hostage takers. These reservations may be particularly appropriate with respect to politically motivated hostage situations.

When more general statements about the relationship between psychopathy and terrorism are attempted, the difficulty of the undertaking becomes clearer. Cooper (1978) in his discussion of psychopathy and terrorism concludes that whilst the psychopathic behaviour and some forms of terrorist action have elements in common, there are sufficient important differences between them to lessen the utility of this point of view. He notes that "Terrorism, like any other serious undertaking, requires dedication, perseverance and a certain selflessness. These are the very qualities that are lacking in the psychopath". Whilst this quotation serves to illustrate the inappropriateness of the notion of psychopathy, it must be pointed out, however, that all these qualities are not necessarily evident in all terrorist either. It is probably necessary to examine the role of the particular terrorist in question before necessarily accepting these attributes.

Many authors, however, refer to the psychopath's inability to profit from experience; this alone may well serve to distinguish most political terrorists from the psychopath. Another, and rather important difference between the psychopath and the terrorist is that whilst the psychopath and the terrorist are both manifesting behaviour outside of the normal moral and legal framework, for the psychopath, the purposiveness of the behaviour, if it exists, is essentially personal. In most cases, this is not the case (at least ostensibly) with the terrorist who often has a very coherant and consistant rationale for his actions. It may be important to distinguish here, however, between the rationale and motives of the terrorist leader, and those of the active terrorist. It may also be appropriate to distinguish between post hoc rationalization and actual influencing conditions at the time.
In summary, Taylor (1985) discussed this issue, and indicated the difficulties encountered in trying to bring the notion of terrorism within the ambit of mental illness. One of the more worrying consequences of attempting to locate the terrorist within the ranks of the mentally ill is the assumptions this makes about terrorist motivations. It has the dangerous consequence of placing terrorist behaviour outside of the realms of both the normal rules of behaviour and the normal process of law. Taylor concluded that the notion of mental illness is not one that has particular utility with respect to most terrorist actions. Just because the behaviour of the terrorist seems extra-normal, it need not necessarily follow that the explanation of that behaviour must be expressed in terms like abnormality.

This is not to say, of course, that some acts that seem to be of a terrorist nature are not committed by individuals who are mentally ill, or that some members of terrorist groups are not extra-normal in this sense. For example, Hacker (1976) describes a client of his (Kurbegovic) who during 1973 and 1974 was responsible for a series of violent incidents involving fire raising, bombing, etc. After initial conviction for these offenses, Kurbegovic was finally dealt with as criminally insane. The obvious pathology of Kurbegovic, however, contrasts starkly with the lack of pathology in other cases (the Baader-Meinhof group, for example (Rasch, 1979)).

In contrast to the image of the mentally ill terrorist, the image of the cool, distant and calculating individual more easily accommodates the notion of the fanatic as terrorist. It might be argued that the notion of the fanatic also draws on a concept of specialness, again emphasizing his extra-normal character in a different context. It may not be easy to distinguish between the psychopathic and the fanatic explanations, other than perhaps in terms of the extent of presumed 'deception' over motives that the fanatic might be able to achieve, and perhaps differences in the degree of articulation of beliefs. It is also very difficult to distinguish the point at which firmly held beliefs become fanatical.

But if fanaticism is a meaningful account of some forms of terrorism, is it an account unique to terrorism? Of course not. Whatever the aetiology of fanaticism might prove to be, whether it reflects a 'pathology of
perfection' (Watzlawick, 1977), elitism (Walman, 1974) or a flight from fallibility (Perkinson, 1977), it is not something unique to terrorism. Eckman (1977) describes 'the fanaticism' of the athlete, who whilst performing in a different arena to the terrorist, in a psychological sense arguably shows common attributes. As Milgram (1977) points out, fanaticism, (like terrorism) is a pejorative term, and "is applied to the state of mind of those who are wholeheartedly committed to a set of beliefs and are condemned for it. " But similar belief systems might attract terms such as "passionate involvement, undaunted commitment, and profound religiosity" (Milgram, 1977) if we felt in some sense agreement with those beliefs. The acts of self-immolation described by Crosby et al. (1977) might fall within the category of fanatical, but societies reactions to them as political protests differs from that associated with terrorism. This is not to say that study of the fanatic will not perhaps inform the study of the terrorist; nor is it to say that such behaviour is not in some sense pathogenic. But again, it seems to indicate a situation where what appear to be essential attributes of the terrorist turn out to be shared by others not necessarily referred to as terrorists.

The current spate of Middle-Eastern suicide bombings, largely attributed to Islamic Shi'ite groups (Kramer, 1985) illustrates the difficulties in analysis of particular incidents from the perspectives outlined above. Such bombings from an operational perspective are unquestionably successful (in reaching their chosen target, and causing considerable damage), and in some ways it might have been predicted this kind of operation would have been more widely adopted. Self-destruction is not, however, a feature of much terrorist activity; only 9% of terrorist bombing victims from 1977 to 1983 were thought to be suspected terrorist bombers, for example (U.S. Department of State, 1983), and suicide attacks are very rare outside of the middle-east.

To the Western observer, such acts can as readily be ascribed to either 'fanaticism' or 'mental illness'; they seem to embody some of the attributes of both. The often violent and extreme rhetoric of the participants seem to the Western ear bizarre and abnormal. Viewed from the context of Shi'ite culture and its Islamic context, however, such acts of self destruction do not seem so pathogenic, and have a clear and appropriate cultural and religious context (see Lewis, 1968). They may in
fact have much in common with related Japanese suicide acts, such as the Kamikaze pilots of the second world war. They perhaps reflect a different view of self-destruction than the prevailing Judeo-Christian view of the West. Morris (1975) examines in some detail Japanese notions in this context, and considerable areas of similarity between Shi'ite and traditional Japanese views on 'service' and death are apparent. The Shi'ite terrorist, like the Kamikaze, belongs in a social, religious and mystical context that legitimates and sustains such behaviour. Furthermore, in both cultures forms of martyrdom can be identified which support contemporary activity. It may be that these forms of 'terrorism' more properly belong within the context of pre-nineteenth century terrorism, of the form referred to by Rapoport (1984) as 'sacred terror', or 'holy terror' (Rapoport, 1986). Martyrdom like that of the contemporary Shi'ite was not unknown amongst the Assassins, for example and may well share common religious origins (Lewis, 1968; Rapoport, 1982). That those religious origins also impinge on the politics of the contemporary world (the perspective from which we tend to view these acts) also has historical precedents.

The above illustrates the need to take the cultural context into account when judging the nature of terrorist acts, especially in the ascription of labels such as abnormal and fanatic. Purposeful self-destruction may be relatively rare in our society, although not unknown (Crosby et al., 1977). But in societies which legitimise such activity, it seems inappropriate to regard such behaviour as evidence of mental illness, nor, given its particular broader social context, of fanaticism.

Terrorism as a label
The label terrorism is as much a term of abuse as it is a descriptive term. It is used in all sorts of inconsistent and varied situations, and such promiscuous use, allied to the emotive and complex content of the term noted above greatly adds to the problems of analysis. It is an attention getting term for the media, who sometimes use the term terrorism to describe any violent act ("Husband terrorizes wife" in an account of domestic violence, for example). It has become in Jenkins terms (Jenkins, 1980) "....a fad word, used promiscuously and often applied to a variety of acts of violence which are not strictly terrorism...."

Scanlon (1984) describes an incident which illustrates this added
complexity of use. In 1981 in Calgary, Canada, a man took his wife and children 'hostage' as part of a well prepared and planned protest against the actions of a local bank. It would appear that his family took part in that preparation and planning. The local police took the incident seriously, but it seems unlikely that he actually intended harm to his essentially co-operative family; rather he sought publicity (which he amply received). This incident lacked as far as can be seen a general social or political context, and addressed the individuals dispute alone. It was violent only in potential, and arguably had willing hostages. Is this properly described as a terrorist incident? The police response to it certainly was appropriate to a terrorist incident. Does it perhaps illustrate a confusion of tactics and intent implicit in the term terrorism itself? Or is the problem really again something to do with the assumption of 'specialness' in the concept, and that the promiscuous use of the term is only possible because a specialness is implied which seems to remove the act in question from other kinds of explanations?

Specialness?
Without necessarily eliminating all of the notion of uniqueness in the concept of terrorism, the above serves to at least raise some doubts from a psychological perspective about the specialness of terrorism in a number of important areas. Perhaps the important point to make is that whilst terrorism may well be special in the mix of attributes it displays, those attributes themselves are not necessarily unique to terrorism - they are shared by other kinds of situations or events. If this is the case, it follows that the quest for 'specialness' is unlikely to succeed, nor more importantly, will explanations premised on the assumption of specialness. Most authors acknowledge the extreme diversity of terrorist events, and in view of the above discussion, it may be that by seeking to provide overall explanations of such diverse activities, we miss the opportunity for analyses of greater utility.

From a rather different historical and comparative perspective, the technologically related specialness so often ascribed to modern terrorism can also be questioned. In an important paper by Rapoport (1984) the links and similarities between contemporary terrorism and the historical terrorism associated with religious groups are discussed. In doing so, he questions assumptions of the relationships between modern technology
and the incidence of terrorism. In a comment relevant to the above discussion, he notes that "When the history of modern terrorism is written, the cyclical character of modern terror will be conspicuous", and he relates such cyclical changes "not so much to technological changes as to significant political watersheds..." (Rapoport, 1984).

State Terrorism

If the notions of specialness referred to above do complicate our analysis of the problem, issues related to State Terrorism may also serve to disabuse us of some of our assumptions. Many authors note that the purpose of terrorism is to produce political change, and it follows therefore that terrorist actions can be committed by a variety of agencies concerned with the management of the political process in order to produce, or attempt to produce, or to forestall such political change. In this way state agencies, just as much as secret societies, may commit terrorist acts in an attempt to produce or maintain political objectives. The relationship between state terrorism and other forms of terrorism is not clear.

Hacker (1976) describes state terrorism as terrorism from above, and asserts that as a matter of principle, it is totalitarian. It would certainly appear that state terrorism is most easily perpetrated in the context of authoritarian or military regimes, where the terrorist acts seek to maintain a ruling group in power. One of the most excessive examples of such state terrorism in recent times was in Uganda under the rule of Idi Amin. With the assistance of his 'Public Safety Unit', between 50,000 and 250,000 Ugandans out of a population of 10 million are thought to have disappeared, the result of torture, assassination, etc. The world has, of course, a long history of states maintaining coercive control over their citizens, and in a historical context, the excesses of Amin present little problem of recognition. It becomes more difficult, however, when the target of terrorism is not the broad population of the country, but a specific section of that population. It becomes an especial problem when that population is defined politically.

It is worth noting that the customary (and broadly accepted) objectives of policing in the democracies may add to this problem. In general, it is
broadly accepted that one of the fundamental requirements of a police force is that it 'keeps the peace'. This involves not only the detection and pursuit of criminals, but the proactive prevention of crime. Public order, when seen as crime presents particular problems in this context, for whilst the right to protest is an essential attribute of most democratic states, there is no right to undertake violent protest, or incite others to violence. In states of civil unrest, and times of political protest, there is a very thin line to be drawn between appropriate policing to control civil unrest, and coercive (and perhaps terroristic) state repression. The role of the civil powers in the management of terrorism (the police as opposed to the military) is something that badly needs further investigation.

A dramatic example of state terrorism applied to a specific political end can be seen in the recent history of Argentina. It is estimated that during the period of military rule from 1976 to 1983 some 20,000 people were arrested, 2 million fled the country, and at least some 11,000 'disappeared'. This extensive period of coercion was ostensibly directed at Communists, and members of the terrorist organization, the Montoneros. There appears to be good evidence (Simpson and Bennet, 1985) that this period was characterized by an organized programme of arrest, torture and murder, expressed in terms of anticommunism and Christian virtues.

The establishment of State Terrorism as policy may well result in it providing its own justification (Hacker, 1976). The logic of State Terrorism was illustrated by the Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs, Admiral Cesar Guzetti, at the United Nations in August, 1976. "My idea of subversion is that of the left wing terrorist organizations. Subversion of terrorism of the right is not the same thing. When the social body of the country has been contaminated by a disease which eats away at its entrails, it forms antibodies. These antibodies cannot be considered in the same way as the microbes. As the government controls and destroys the guerrillas, the actions of the antibodies will disappear. This is already happening. It is only the reaction of a sick body." A slogan was painted at a notorious prison, the Villa Joyosa, where many executions appear to have been carried out. "We will carry on killing until people understand" (Simpson and Bennet, 1985). It is doubtful that the essence of terrorism, state or non-state, could be better expressed.
Perspectives

A substantial difficulty encountered in the analysis of terrorism stems from the perspective of the reader. 'One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter' is an oft quoted cliche that nevertheless illustrates the difficulty. From some perspectives, the actions of a terrorist may seem a legitimate action of defense, or an attempt to control criminal threats or acts. From other perspectives, such legitimate defense may be oppression. Therein, of course, lies one of the major paradoxes and difficulties facing any observer of terrorist action. It also constitutes one of the great strengths of non-state terrorism, for in attempting to control the threat of terrorism, a government can be deliberately lead into situations where controls applied become increasingly coercive, and increasingly impinge on members of society who have no direct involvement with the terrorist organization. The legitimate response to terrorism by a government can itself become terrorist. The logic of escalation is well expressed above by Admiral Guzetti. The introduction of the 'Diplock Courts' in Northern Ireland (courts which sit without juries under a single judge) similarly illustrate a logical response to the problem of intimidation of jurors, which nevertheless seems to infringe one of the important elements of living in a democracy - the right to be judges in a trial by fellow citizens.

The earlier discussion drew attention to problems of 'specialness' associated with terrorism. In terms of both the police and military response to terrorism, the assumption of specialness can have important operational consequences, and may exacerbate the problems outlined above. The setting aside of terrorism as 'special', from those activities the police for example normally deal with can become the justification in turn for, and may well even predispose, extra-normal and special responses by the police to deal with the problem. It is not by any means clear however that the police response to terrorism should qualitatively differ from the response to other kinds of societal damaging behaviour. Epstein (1986) describes the qualities of successful anti-terrorist policing, for example, in terms that look very similar to the qualities of successful policing in any policing environment - patrolling, investigation, intelligence gathering, human relations, police self-regulation. It may well be that the nature and extent of the effort may differ from that normally undertaken, as might the balance of effort between the various areas; similarly, measures to ensure self-protection may become more
important and evident. But there is no necessary reason for qualitative differences in response which take the form of, for example, excessive violence or repressive measures against a community, etc. The identification of the problem as different in principle from other demands on police time can legitimate responses that actually contribute to the furtherance of the ends of the terrorist, by unnecessary violence and harassment victimizing and radicalising an otherwise uncommitted community.

**Kinds of Terrorists and Illegality**

Wilkinson (1977) has identified four kinds of terrorist action which are helpful in placing some order on the situation. He describes Criminal Terrorism, Psychic Terrorism, War Terrorism and Political Terrorism. The types vary according to the kinds of governing principles underlying the terrorist movements but the methods used (which constitute one of the defining attributes) remain the same. **Criminal Terrorism** is characterized by the systematic use of terror for material or monetary gain. Many of the examples of the promiscuous use of the term may well fall within this category. **Psychic Terrorism** is characterized by religious or magical ends (as practised by a religious cult to enforce compliance with beliefs, for example). **War Terrorism** involves the use of terrorist action in pursuit of war ends. **Political Terrorism** involves the use of, or threat to use, violence for political goals. Quite clearly, these categories are not mutually exclusive.

In some ways, the kinds of terrorism referred to by Wilkinson as Political Terrorism and War Terrorism seem to contain within them the essential elements of terrorism as commonly used (given the promiscuity of use). Criminal Terrorism, because it lacks the political and change elements which might be thought to characterize terrorism may well at first sight seem to be easily discernable from War and Political Terrorism. Hence crimes like extortion or kidnapping, whilst often described as 'terroristic' might not be properly regarded as examples of terrorism. There may well be problems here, however, in that the ordinary criminal may well seek to justify his actions by reference to some broad 'political' generalizations. Even a general reference to 'they can afford it' by the burglar might suggest a degree of political justification to an otherwise straightforward criminal act. The ordinary criminal might also, seeing the
relative success of terrorist tactics, adopt those tactics for his own ends. This is sometimes referred to as 'Quasi-Terrorism' (Kobetz and Cooper, 1978); the distinctions here may be difficult to make.

Very often, the dividing line between terrorism and acquisitive crime can be difficult to make. Non-state terrorist organizations may well have difficulties in raising sufficient finance to maintain their organization or activities; thus bank robberies for money, raids on arsenals for arms, etc., may become part of the hinterland of terrorist activity, and whilst such crimes may not themselves have political aspirations, they may well be a necessary foundation on which other acts might be built.

The relationship between terrorism and illegality is complex. In one sense, terrorist acts which merit the term are by definition illegal. But illegality of another form can characterize terrorism. The terrorist functions within a broader non-terrorist community in some sense. Very often, the terrorist must exercise some control over that community to protect himself and his organization. In exercising that control, he may well develop systems which involve the coercive control of that community, which will almost certainly be illegal with respect to broader societal rules. However, such illegal coercive control may well have attributes in common with the 'normal' criminal justice system, and might even be premised on a notion of 'justice' in a sense which the broader society might recognise.

Evidence related to this kind of issue is difficult to obtain. However, Morrisey and Pease (1982) describe what they refer to as the 'Black Criminal Justice System in West Belfast' which illustrates this issue. In the same sense that there exists a 'Black Economy' (an economy that refers to a system of exchange, theft and purchase of goods and services outside of the official economy), they describe the existence of a parallel terrorist based criminal justice system. The Provisional I.R.A. have been active in West Belfast for many years, and the area has been subjected to intermittent civil unrest for many decades, a period characterized by political crises, communal rioting and challenge to the legitimacy of the state. The extent of 'normal' policing is limited (but see Taylor (1982) for a discussion of this), and the inhabitants of the area as well as experiencing a high degree of social disadvantage, have little recourse to, or confidence in, the normal organs of the state to effect crime control.

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The Black Criminal Justice System seems to be an attempt to exert (at one level at least) some degree of social control.

The following, issued from the Republican Press Centre, Belfast, on 5 June, 1982, illustrates the kinds of thinking underpinning the role of the terrorists in this area:

"Belfast Brigade would like to make it clear that the physical punishment of criminals by shooting is only undertaken as a last resort. We take no pleasure in having to turn our weapons away from the imperialist enemy onto young Irishmen, who have, for whatever reason, turned to crime. Other forms of deterrent are used by us in dealing with the problems posed by the 'hoods'. However, our policy is one of trying to persuade young people that their criminal actions are in a majority of cases a consequence of the repressive and deprived society they have grown up in.

We point out to them that their actions only further increase the suffering resulting from poverty, bad housing and unemployment, discrimination, etc. already so widespread within the Nationalist community, and we explain how the British State makes use of their criminality as a counter revolutionary force in opposition to the national liberation struggle. Unhappily, in spite of the methods we already employ, the ongoing debate we have with youth and our actively seeking new and effective alternatives, we are forced on occasions to make use of the weapons of physical punishment."

Such physical punishment may well include death. On 22nd April, 1982, the Provisional I.R.A. shot dead a 19 year old man; the Republican Press Centre issued the following statement: "In spite of repeated warnings, and having been punished last year, Devlin continued to engage in armed robberies, hijackings and the physical intimidation of the nationalist community". A more common form of punishment which has attracted media attention is 'knee capping', although other forms of punishment are also used, such as forms of community service, curfew, etc. Morrissey and Pease draw our attention to parallels that can be seen to exist between the 'official' system and the 'black' system. These include the determination of sentence taking into account the severity of the offense, the recognition of mitigating factors, and prior offenses.
The above draws together a number of different issues related to the notion of terrorism. Its illegality is often related to its denial of the legitimacy of the State, and its processes. The development of alternative structures is clearly an element in that denial, where its very illegality serves to reinforce the inadequacy of the state.

**Political Terrorism**

The essence of terrorism as it seems to impinge on us and worry us lies above all in its political aspiration. It is widely assumed that a vital quality of this aspiration has its origins in psychological mechanisms, rather than physical action (e.g. Comay, 1976). However, the mechanisms that might be involved remain obscure, and analyses rarely extend beyond the level of speculation. Wardlaw (1982) seeks to refine our notions in this context by distinguishing between political terror and political terrorism. In his view, the essential difference between them lies in their relationship to an expressed policy of political change. Political terrorism he characterizes as a sustained and organized policy employing terror of some form within an ideological context. Political terror in contrast occurs as isolated acts, perhaps in the form of indiscriminate or arbitrary violence. The distinction between the two is useful, but is essentially post hoc, requiring the recognition of links between events, often on the part of the perpetrators of those events. It may well also be the case that political terror becomes political terrorism through the process of media (or other) incrementation.

Three types of political terrorism can be identified (Wilkinson, 1974). **Sub-revolutionary Terrorism** describes terrorism aimed at the production of limited change, designed perhaps to force a government to change its policy on particular issues, or to punish a public official or agency for some action. The damage to property that has characterized the Welsh Nationalist protesters, for example, might fall within this category. Groups such as Meibion Glyndwr (Sons of Glyndwr) and Cadwyr Cymru (Defenders of Wales) have claimed responsibility for a series of arson attacks on holiday cottages in rural Wales since 1979. Over 80 attacks, of increasing sophistication, have been carried out in protest against the summer use of second-home property in Wales, mainly by visiting English people. Such arson attacks have not yet injured anyone, and can best be seen as a protest aimed at changing the planning process that allows the
purchase of second homes, and deterring the purchase of second homes.

However, terrorism that at any one particular time addresses limited issues such as the above might also become part of a more coherent and extensive programme of political change, when the limited objectives fail to be reached, or if they are reached and other more ambitious objectives become possible. Where this is the case, it represents a second form of political terrorism, Revolutionary Terrorism. Wilkinson defines this as the use of 'systematic tactics of terroristic violence with the objective of bringing about political revolution'. He suggests that it is characterized by a number of attributes: it is essentially a group activity, rather than an individual acting on his own; the actions are informed and justified by a revolutionary ideology; leadership functions are exercised within the group; and as terrorist campaigns develop, an alternative political structure develops to organise and direct its actions, and to plan actions in relation to the terrorist's ultimate goals. An important attribute of political revolutionary terrorism as defined here is its emphasis on organization, and its alertness to the consequences of its actions in furthering the movements objectives. The activities of the Provisional I.R.A. in Northern Ireland, for example, clearly fall within this category, given its sophisticated alternative political and social structures (as illustrated, for example, by Morrissey and Pease (1982)).

The third form of political terrorism identified by Wilkinson is Repressive Terrorism. This is characterized by the systematic suppression of individuals or activities regarded as undesirable. We have already noted what might be regarded as an example of this within the context of the Provisional I.R.A.'s activities in the area of criminal justice. But this form of terrorism seems to be most obviously evident in state activity, and might be thought to be an important element in what has already been referred to as State Terrorism. In this sense, it is often characterized by the use of specialist units to undertake the repressive measures - the Tonton Macoutes in pre-1986 Haiti, the SS of Nazi Germany in the Second World War, etc.

The complex interrelationship between repressive terrorism and revolutionary terrorism has already been noted. In this context, it is not really possible to separate coercive law enforcement as a means of
controlling society from its consequences. Skinner (1953) has drawn our attention in psychological terms to the by-products of 'aversive' or coercive control, and Cronbag (1984) has discussed this issue in the context of the law as an instrument of aversive control. "The aversive stimuli....generate emotions, including predispositions to escape and retaliate". The consequences of such aversive and coercive control (aversive stimuli referred to above) can be profound and important, and add further to our confusion in analysing the nature of repressive political terrorism, whether it be state sponsored or the result of political revolutionaries.

Wilkinson's analysis of kinds of terrorism is undoubtedly useful. A given terrorist act, however, may not necessarily fit within one of the various categories, and in particular when looking at the effects of terrorism, confusion can exist between revolutionary and repressive terrorism. A source for such confusion can arise if the creation of repressive terrorism is an objective of revolutionary terrorism (as indeed it might well be). As Wilkinson has noted, the terrorist group is often small, and rarely can be said to command popular support. Indeed, in the liberal democracies it may be asserted that the terrorist group by definition does not command popular support (as evidenced by failure to gain popular representation). Other means of obtaining power would be available if they did command popular support. A problem faced by any terrorist group is the propagation of its ideas and the mobilisation of popular support - repressive terrorism may play an important part in the strategy of gaining such public support. Given the importance of the media in publicizing terrorist actions, widespread dissemination of ideas and propaganda can be relatively easily achieved. The Weathermen, a splinter group in the U.S.A. of the Students for a Democratic Society, attained enormous publicity for their cause through bombings in public places such as the Pentagon and The Capitol. The massive media attention they attracted included placing an article opposite the editorial page of the New York Times. They attained widespread media coverage, and their message was undoubtedly widely dispersed; but they failed to achieve any significant degree of popular support. One reason for this may be that their actions failed to elicit large scale repressive change in American Society.

Concluding Comments
The above discussion has largely centered around the problems that the notion of 'specialness' ascribed to terrorism can bring from a psychological perspective. The consequences of terrorism, the violence associated with terrorism, the relationship between mental health and terrorism in the context of state and non-state terrorism are considered as factors in the ascription of specialness.

A number of themes can be discerned which complicate and obscure the analysis. The assumptions of abnormality and mental illness associated with the terrorist seem inappropriate, and serve to deflect the development of accounts of terrorist behaviour away from explanations of other forms of behaviour. Similarly, reflections on the nature of terrorist violence, reflecting an assumption of frustration as the basis of aggression and violence, likewise serve to divert explanations away from accounts available for other forms of violent behaviour, into some special realm of 'terrorist explanation'. These issues are again referred to later.

The importance of the political context of terrorism is apparent. The term 'Political Terrorism' has been used to describe the kinds of actions that are of principal interest, and within that broad category, what Wilkinson refers to as Revolutionary Terrorism seems to be the area of most relevance. The complexity of the issue cannot be overstressed, however, and we should note Schmid's (1983) comment that "....we cannot offer a true or correct definition of terrorism. Terrorism is an abstract phenomenon of which there can be no real essence which can be discovered or described". Workers in this area have to accept that the boundaries of definition of the concept of terrorism are blurred. As a means of addressing this problem, Schmid (1983) usefully lists a number of qualities of terrorism derived from a survey of definitions of terrorism. They are listed below, and whilst they do not constitute a clear definition, they serve for the purpose of this paper to establish in probably the most useful way the boundaries (if rather fuzzy) of the concept:

1. violence, force;
2. political;
3. fear, terror emphasized;
4. threat;
5. (Psych.) effects and (anticipated) reactions;
6. victim-target differentiation;
7. purposive, planned systematic, organized action;
8. method of combat, strategy, tactic;
9. extranormality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints;
10. coercion, extortion, induction of compliance;
11. publicity aspect;
12. arbitrariness, impersonal, random character, indiscriminateness;
13. civilians, noncombatants, nonresisting, neutrals, outsiders as victims;
14. intimidation;
15. innocence of victims emphasized;
16. group, movement, organization as perpetrator;
17. symbolic aspect, demonstration to others;
18. incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of violence;
19. clandestine, covert nature;
20. repetitiveness, serial or campaign character of violence;
21. criminal;
22. demands made on third parties.
Psychological Approaches to Terrorism

Psychological accounts of terrorism can be characterized as being of relatively limited utility. In the main authors have tended to either address issues related to individual 'motivations' of terrorists, (presumably on the assumption that the individuals who commit such acts can be identified in terms of their psychopathology in some way), or attempt to identify generalizable personal characteristics. There has been little attention paid to other ways of conceptualising terrorism or the terrorist. Indeed, it may be said that many of the criticisms and gaps in psychological approaches to terrorism identified by Margolin (1977) still remain, as far as the publicly available literature is concerned. The following is confined to published material in the public domain.

Problems for Research
The relative lack of systematic psychological research in this area may at first sight seem rather odd and unexpected, given the extent of contemporary public concern about the area. This lack of research, however, becomes a little less surprising when a number of factors are taken into account. The issue of terrorism impinges on many areas of substantial concern to government, and much research in this area is government or security force related and funded, and not therefore necessarily made available to the general public, or the academic community. The reasons for this are not necessarily obvious. It presumably reflects a concern that the fruits of research may be of value to the terrorist, by alerting dissident groups to tactics, thinking, etc. that might jeopardize police or security force action, or by alerting terrorist groups to areas of interest, weakness, etc. Where research may have direct operational relevance, this is of course understandable: but it does mean that such research undertaken in this way is not exposed to the criticism of peers, etc., and may result in relatively limited conceptual development.

Another reason for the limited quantity and quality of much published research, and perhaps of greater significance than the above, lies in the very nature of terrorist actions and its association with violence and illegality. Kellen (1979) noted that there is a dearth of primary source
material, and this is presumably related to essential features of the process of terrorism. The only terrorist available to the researcher for interview or investigation is one who has been caught and imprisoned, and/or reformed. Clearly attempts to generalize on the basis of such samples must be of limited value, and any evidence derived from such sources must be viewed with some suspicion. It might further be expected that psychological investigations of terrorism would be characterized by the use of experimental, or at least empirical, methodologies. Yet for the same reasons as noted above, such work is difficult in the extreme to conduct. Likewise, systematic observational studies are almost impossible to conduct.

Another area of difficulty for research concerns the general lack of conceptual clarity in the analysis of terrorism. The earlier discussion has identified from a psychological perspective some of the problems in the identification of terrorism and the terrorist. Given conceptual confusion and the lack of agreed attributes, it is not surprising that psychologically based investigations are lacking. This coupled with the often implicit assumptions underpinning notions of terrorism (about mental illness, for example (Taylor, 1985)) adds to the problems of the research process.

**Motivation**

Much of the psychological literature that is available tends to address the general issue of terrorist motivation. Most of the work seems to make assumptions (often implicit) of the kind referred to by Margolin (1977) of the terrorist as fanatic, or the terrorist as the cool rational planner; they might also be said to reflect intuitive assumptions about the nature of terrorism, rather than empirical observation or analysis. A number of emphases can be discerned from the literature, but the predominant area of concern is the identification of motivating states of one form or another. Underlying much of this work is the assumption that if it is possible to identify consistant personality or other factors which characterise terrorists, it may then be possible to devise managerial strategies, identify in advance potential activists, etc. The conceptual complexity of the notion of terrorism and of motivation would seem to suggest that the identification of common attributes in this sense would be unlikely.
However, in attempting to describe the individual motivating states of terrorists, various authors have in the main sought to establish broadly accurate generalizations, applicable to a range of settings and individuals. As Bass et al. (1980) state, "...if we understand motivations we can infer actions and targets....". Thus authors adopting this approach must be judged by the adequacy of their generalizations in the light of the considerable conceptual difficulties in defining terrorism. The concern with the 'why' of behaviour in this context is only meaningful if it allows of generalizations.

Broadly speaking, a number of different conceptual orientations can be said to characterise work in this area. Some authors have focused on 'causes' of terrorist behaviour, in terms of childhood or societal pathology which are often expressed in psychoanalytic terms, some have sought explanations in terms of broad socially defined motivating states, whilst others have attempted to identify more psychologically accessible states. Many discussions, however, make assumptions (often implicitly) about mental health, and often seem to assume a medical model of explanation (Taylor, 1985).

A number of authors have attempted to develop psychoanalytically orientated accounts of terrorist motivation. These often focus on the violence of terrorism, and draw on concepts such as 'regressive hope' derived from the mother complex (von Raffay, 1980), repressed hate related to parental abuse (Kent and Nicholls, 1977), blockage of functional empathy (Clark, 1980), etc. Other analytically orientated authors have proposed related explanations in social terms; the brutality exhibited by terrorists mirroring the subtle and covert brutality in everyday life (Giegerich, 1979), for example. The utility of these kinds of post hoc analyses is difficult to evaluate.

Typical of attempts to describe the origins of terrorist behaviour in terms of a less strictly analytical approach to childhood pathology is Fields (1979). Fields suggests that early exposure to terrorism can lead to the development of terrorism in the adult. Thus, the child living in an environment where terrorists are active, in some parts of Northern Ireland
for example, is more likely to develop into an adult terrorist than the child brought up elsewhere. This clearly cannot be the only factor, however, for it is the case that relatively few people who grow up in, for example, parts of West Belfast, actually become terrorists. Fields argues that where an indigenous culture has imposed on it a legal system and institutions from an alien group (presumably the British, or Northern Ireland non-nationalists in this case), children growing up in that environment suffer serious disruption in moral judgement. Implicit in this view seems to be the notion that the child, as a victim, reacts to his upbringing by espousing terrorism.

Fields work is based on a psychometric assessment of children in Northern Ireland, rather than actual adult terrorists, and the work suffers accordingly from a lack of validation with adults. It also suffers from problems common to many accounts of this form of investigation: a failure to distinguish between correlation and causation. Whilst the correlational evidence of large scale psychometric assessment might indicate avenues for further exploration, it clearly does not offer sufficient grounds for causal inference. Significantly, Fields also fails to offer explanations of the mechanisms whereby such childhood influences become apparent - are we dealing with imitation, defective motivation, or what? Explanations of this form can be seen to have limited utility.

Knutson (1984) presents a typical view of a related but alternative explanation of the origins of terrorism in terms of social pathology. Knutson suggests that terrorists acts stem from feelings of rage and helplessness engendered by the belief that society permits no other access to information dissemination and policy creation other than through terrorism. In psychological terms, therefore, the violence of terrorism results from what is presumably essentially a form of frustration, a kind of more general explanation of violent behaviour already encountered. Knutson's approach is essentially political in character, rather than psychological, and the explanation offered is consistent with the notion that political ideologies can be represented as motivating states. However, aside from the reference to frustration and its links with aggression (Dollard et al., 1939), we are left with little useful additional information as to why the terrorist becomes violent (as opposed to many
others who experience political frustration without recourse to violence).

Other authors have offered related kinds of explanations within limited psychological frameworks. Kampf (1980) discusses the attraction of extremism to 'affluent youth'. He suggests that problems have arisen because of people's failure to adjust to the expansion of material wealth and knowledge. Permissiveness, the erosion of traditional values, the breakdown of family life, etc. to Kampf represents the context in which extremism, and terrorism, might develop. The process offered is again one focusing on frustration, and resultant aggression. It is an account orientated to one section of the community (the relatively young affluent) and makes assumptions about some stable form of society in the past against which permissiveness, modernity, etc., represents an maladaptive reaction.

Hassel (1977) similarly focuses on the young relatively affluent sections of the community, and on an explanation again emphasizing the effects on contemporary societal change. Once more, the violence of terrorism is linked to frustration, on this occasion the frustration of achieving peaceful societal change. He extends the analysis somewhat, however, by locating the psychological foundations of terrorism in sadism, masochism and necrophilia. Furthermore, the goal of attaining societal change through violence becomes, according to Hassel, lost with the substitution of the means of change (violence) as the goal.

In a sense, many of these different kinds of explanations, typical of a relatively sizable fraction of the literature (see Schmid, 1983) are essentially commonsense accounts, rather than psychological. They make reference to broad concepts (social or political frustration, societal context of childhood as psychoanalytic accounts of childhood pathology) which are not readily, on examination, translatable into more detailed psychological concepts. They suffer, accordingly, from a lack of specificity, and a failure to address what may be the most important problem from their essentially political perspective - why it is that so few people exposed to the presumed pathogenic conditions actually become terrorists.
They also suffer from problems of focusing on particular populations, and attempting to generalize what are essentially rather specific accounts, to broader populations. The problems of this undertaking can be illustrated by reference to what is known about the scale and incidence of terrorist incidents. If we examine known bombing incidents, for example, from 1977 to 1983, over 2,000 incidents are thought to have occurred, of which in some 68% of incidents can the ethnic identity of the perpetrators be identified (U.S. Dept. of State, 1983). Americans, Palestinians, Lebanese and West Germans are the most numerous ethnic groups. No information is available as to the socio-economic class, income or age of participants, but whilst it might be reasonably be assume to be a youthful pursuit, the diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds of the likely participants clearly present enormous difficulties in attempting to make generalizations about common precipitating states.

Another approach to the problem of terrorist motivation, developing a somewhat more psychological account is offered by Watzlawick (1977), who focuses on the notion of utopianism as an underlying element in terrorism. Rather like Hassel, Watzlawick contrasts the desire to achieve political change with reality, and postulates as a mechanism which might provide the context to terrorism this discrepancy. This again appears to be a version of the frustration-aggression hypothesis encountered above. However, he supplements this by drawing attention to other attributes of perfectionalism, notably its tendency to become the justification for atrocity, and its links with fanaticism. In particular he draws attention to a sequence of states that might characterise fanaticism: simplification, the desire to change the world based upon having found 'the truth', belief in destroying the existing order, belief that the ends justify the means, and selective compliance.

Watzlawick's account has a number of interesting attributes in psychological terms. It locates its explanation firmly within the social context of the individual, but it also offers mechanisms by which at least some of the activity of terrorism might be interpreted, which whilst not necessarily themselves expressed in psychological terms, nevertheless might be amenable to more explicit psychological specification. This account also has much in common with Rapoport (1984) referred to above.
However, by linking the notion of terrorism with fanaticism, there may be an implied assumption of some form of psychopathology, which as we have already noted, is not necessarily warranted.

A more explicit psychological account of an aspect of terrorist motivation is offered by Slochower (1982), who proposes that terrorist action provides feelings of self-destruction and individualism, which in turn effect the terrorists feelings of insecurity. It might be argued that supposed feelings of insecurity weaken the restraining forces which in more secure individuals control and limit the expression of violence. A similar kind of approach was proposed by Kelman (1973) who drew attention to other forces that might reduce the potency of those restraining forces: authorization, routinization, and dehumanization. These views might have particular utility within the context of the terrorist group, as discussed below.

A characteristic of many of the attempts to offer psychological generalizations about terrorist motivation is often reference, sometimes explicitly, but often implicitly, to assumptions about abnormality or deviance. The discussion above have suggested that this is not necessarily a useful orientation (see Taylor, 1985; Shaw 1986).

Much of the work noted above has tended to make explicit or implicit assumptions of at least abnormality and often psychopathology. But not all authors have adopted these assumptions about psychopathology however, (reflecting Margolins point about assumptions), and have in contrast taken assumptions of rationality as a starting point. The concept of rationality in psychological terms is far from clear, but at least such approaches do not draw on assumptions of psychopathology, and therefore specialness.

Hilke and Kaiser (1979), for example, are sceptical of accounts of special characteristics of terrorist motivation, and suggest that terrorist violence is rational in the sense of being a means to an end, and in psychological terms, not necessarily abnormal. Margolin (1977) offers a similar kind of account, emphasizing not so much the normality of terrorist behaviour (which it clearly is not), but its susceptibility to the normal rules of controlling behaviour. This is an important point, and in
conceptual terms represents a considerable advance on those views already discussed.

Individual Accounts
A problem of much of the work reviewed so far is its limited scope, either in terms of inadequate (or no) empirical verification of proposals, or in terms of limited target populations. Two substantial pieces of work from the Rand Corporation, however, have attempted more explicit and systematic accounts of terrorist motivation.

Bass et al. (1980) in discussing the motivations and possible actions of potential criminal adversaries of the U.S. Nuclear programmes, presents a useful systematic matrix of adversaries, motivations and possible actions. Bass et al. assume three kinds of primary conscious motivating conditions for such criminal acts: ideological, personal and economic. In so far as the notion of terrorism of concern here emphasizes political change, the area of most interest in Bass et al.'s typology is therefore ideological motivation, although as they point out, in particular situations it may well be possible to identify multiple motivating states. They also identify what they refer to as more subtle, or unconscious, motivations such as self-aggrandisement, hostility to authority and the thrill of risk taking, although they do not further develop this point.

Within the context of ideological motivation, they identify three kinds of adversaries: political terrorists, anti-nuclear extremists, and philosophical or religious extremists. They then go to describe kinds of crimes or actions against nuclear facilities under the following broad headings: destruction or disablement of nuclear facilities, the acquisition of nuclear material or information, and the disruption of nuclear programmes. An analysis of actual crimes that have occurred is then conducted with reference to this matrix. They note, for example, that political terrorist groups have claimed credit for low level sabotage, in the form of token bombings, at nuclear facilities in the U.S.A. and Europe. Although they report no attempts by terrorists to steal nuclear material or weapons, they note that two West German Terrorist groups have contemplated the theft of nuclear material. The threat posed by terrorist theft of nuclear material has been discussed by a number of authors, most
recently Jenkins (1985). The probability of this kind of terrorist action is thought to be low, although State involvement, as opposed to independent politically motivated groups, seems to be more likely. Intimidation and assault on workers in the nuclear industry is more widely reported, as are incursions into nuclear facilities. Attempted damage to nuclear facilities by anti-nuclear groups are of course much more widely known, with incidents reported from most Western nations with nuclear facilities. It is doubtful, however, whether many of these events should properly be seen as examples of terrorist activity within the terms of terrorism used here.

The typology offered by Bass et al. is not primarily oriented to understanding, in psychological terms, terrorist motivation, but rather organizing and categorizing for the policy maker the risk potential arising from different conditions. They do serve, however, to introduce a systematic structure which may be useful for further analysis.

A more explicitly psychological account, drawing on more adequate evidence, is offered by Kellen (1979) in a further Rand Report. In many ways, Kellen's report is the most detailed publicly available discussion of terrorist motivations, and for that reason it will be discussed at length. It is based on reported interviews with four ex-terrorists, (Michael Baumman, founder of the West German '2nd of June Movement'; Hans-Joachin Klein, a member of an offshoot of the Baader-Meinhof group; Zvenko Busic, a Croatian nationalist; and Kozo Okamato, a member of the Red Army Faktion, and participant in the Lod Airport massacre in 1972), although it is supplemented by reference to accounts of other terrorists. These accounts are closer to case histories, rather than empirical investigations, but nevertheless they do offer the opportunity for describing and identifying psychological and social characteristics of the people concerned, in a way not possible in the other literature reviewed. This approach, given its methodological limitations, clearly has some utility.

Kellen draws attention to an important aspect of the process of embarking on a terrorist career. He notes that there are in a sense two decisions to make for the potential terrorist - the decision to break with society in some sense, and the decision to join a subversive or terrorist group. Our
society has a long tradition of having groups of people who reject its values - nuns, monks, etc. represent an extreme institutionally approved form - and many people in some sense or another become distant from or marginal to society. However, few take the further step of joining a subversive group. It might be argued that there is a further step involved in this process, however, and that is the involvement in violence, which need not necessarily be a feature of association with a subversive group.

It is interesting to note that no particular pattern of childhood experience characterise the terrorist's considered by Kellen. Baumman describes himself (Baumman, 1979) as a 'normal person', from a working class family. He was born in 1947, in East Germany, moving to West Berlin when he was 12. He lived in a rather featureless and undistinguished working class housing estate, and worked as an apprentice in the building trade. He left this job because, by his own account, he could not face the monotony of it. "I did all sorts of shit jobs until around 1965 when my story began to be not so conformist anymore. Actually with me it all began with rock music and long hair". There then followed what seems to be an increasing moving away from society, and an increased exposure to the political ideologies of that time, an exciting and embracing period.

Around that time many people began to question the values of contemporary society, and Baumman appears no different from many teenagers of that time. He describes, however an increasing drift towards political radicalism and eventually violent terrorism. It is very difficult to judge whether this drift reflected something within Baumman (insecurity, for example, in the way that Sluchower (1982) describes), or whether the society in which he mixed 'drew him along' by virtue of its attractions. These attractions would undoubtedly include the membership of a small tight group, etc., but also a distinctive and for many highly attractive life style. "If you had long hair, there were always an incredible number of chicks hanging onto you, all these factory girls. They thought it was great, a guy like that...."

Hans-Joachin Klein, in contrast, was not working class; his father was a low ranking police officer. He, unlike Baumman, did appear to have an unhappy childhood, and describes considerable friction with his father. His
mother died in Ravensbruck Concentration Camp, and he never knew anything of her. He was brought up by his father, who is described as domineering and demanding. In particular, he describes frequent beatings, which persisted into his late teens. A landmark in his relationship with his father occurred when he was 20, when as a result of his father attempting to take away from him a gift from a girl friend "... At that moment, I hit him for the first time, a good wailop. From that moment on, he no longer had the courage to touch me".

Klein's childhood as described was clearly unpleasant. He experienced many of the events which might well be associated with subsequent problems in adult life. However, in this respect, Klein is not unique, and other also experience unfortunate upbringings. But like Baumman, Klein describes a gradual drift towards terrorism, starting with separation from society, contact with politically active groups, etc. It may well be that a period in the Army (as part of his National Service) contributed to his marginalisation from society.

Like Baumman however, the third terrorist Kellen considers, Kozo Okamato, does not seem to have had a disturbed or unusual childhood. Unlike Baumman or Klein, he appears to have been academically successful and attended University. He was not known to be particularly politically active in extremist groups whilst at University, although he was a member of a radical environmentalist group. His contact with, and introduction to, terrorism appears to have come through his brother, Takeshi. Takeshi himself subsequently, with others, hijacked a plane and forced it to land in Korea; it was he who introduced Okamato to the Red Army Faktion. The fact that his brother was so intimately involved with extremist politics may suggest a degree of family exposure to such political ideas, but there is no evidence of the gradual marginalisation from society that seems to have characterised both Baumman and Klein. In this case, it would presumably be argued that the most important influence was family membership and family influences, rather than the kinds of personal experiences which might lead to rejection of society.

Whilst Klein, Baumman and Okamato were all members of what might be described as essentially left wing terrorist groups, espousing in some way
or another a form of internationalism, Zvenko Busić, the fourth of Kellen's terrorist was a Croat, an ethnic group oppressed and suppressed (by his own account) by the Yugoslav Government. In a sense, Busić's childhood might be characterised as being set apart from society, in so far as he describes his own great interest in, and commitment to, Croatian nationalism. Neither his father or mother are described as being particularly nationalistic, however, although they are described as religious. None the less, there clearly emerges from his own account a sense of support for his nationalism from within the family. Busić attended University in Yugoslavia, and then moved to the University of Vienna, critical of anti-Croatian experiences in Yugoslavia. He was unable to support himself in Vienna, however, and went to the U.S.A., where he gained manual work. He was clearly even at this point unusual, in that he had developed the habit of carrying a gun "for self defense", which led to some trouble with the police. He returned to the University of Vienna, but was subsequently expelled by his account from both the University and Austria. This resulted, it appears, from involvement in anti-Yugoslav demonstrations and actions. Clearly, therefore, at this point, Busić had become politically involved in Croatian Nationalist activities, and he subsequently describes contact with other terrorist groups in Berlin and Ireland.

From the above it is clear that at least for these 4 individuals, there is no particularly obvious series of common childhood experiences, parental relationships, etc. A process of movement away from society can be seen, however, and similarly a gradual increased contact with extremist groups, once that context had been created. This might be argued to be the case for Okamato as well as the others, although for Okamato it might be a process that in some sense took place within the family.

Klein, Baumann and Okamato all identify a point at which a particular incident seems to have finalized a process of movement away from society to membership of an active extremist group. For Baumann, that point occurred in 1967 during a visit of the Shah of Iran to Berlin, when a student friend Named Bruno Ohnesary, was killed by a policeman. That incident had a profound effect on Baumann, and seems to have had an important effect in confirming his radicalisation. "That gave me a
tremendous flash, one cannot really describe it, it really shook me to the bones”.

Klein similarly identifies critical points that seem to enhance and confirm his progress to terrorism. The first has already been noted, when at the age of 20 he struck his father. The second was the sight of the police beating a young girl during a riot. He describes himself flying into an uncontrollable rage and himself assaulting the police officer, for which he himself was beaten up (it may be tempting to speculate on the significance of his father’s occupation as a policeman as a contributing factor to this incident). The third, and apparently decisive step on his way to terrorism was the death in prison as a result of hunger strike, of Holgar Meins. Meins was a member of the Red Army Faktion, and had been arrested with Andreas Baader on June 1, 1972. She died in prison on November 9, 1974, having gone on hunger strike during September of that year. “I put that first pistol of mine into my pocket the night I heard Holgar Meins had died in prison.”

In the case of Okamato, the decisive influence of his brother’s introduction of him to the Red Army Faktion seems to have been a similar critical incident. This differs from the experience of the others noted, however, in that his subsequent involvement in terrorist action, the Lod Airport massacre, seems to have resulted from his acceptance of the authority and leadership of the Red Army Faktion.

No such similar incident can be identified for Busic, however. On the other hand, we should note that whilst Busic was responsible for the death of a New York policeman resulting from the explosion of a bomb planted by Busic, he did not appear to intend to kill or injure, but rather gain publicity through hijacking a T.W.A. plane and distributing leaflets. This contrasts with the others who were personally involved in violent encounters with the security forces. Okamato was, for example, the only survivor of a group of 3 who killed 26 people and injured 80.

Kellen draws attention to a number of features which seem to characterise these particular individuals’ involvement in terrorism:

a. a decision to actively fight society with violence inside a like minded
b. dissolutionment with ordinary life;
c. perhaps the possession of special skills (Klein, for example, had acquired skills with explosives whilst in the army. Andreas Baader had a considerable interest, and more particularly skills, with weapons).

A critical element which emerges from Kellen's case histories is the provision of opportunity to join the terrorist group. Whilst it must be accepted that such groups in some sense have an origin, and may well coalesce around a leader, most terrorists become members of existing groups, or found their own after membership of another group. A vital element, therefore, is the existence and accessibility of a group within the individual's social context. Furthermore, that group must also both offer membership, and in turn accept the individual into membership. (See discussion later).

Once a member, other forces familiar to investigators of group processes become important. In an otherwise disordered life, membership can provide support, entertainment, friendship, purpose and sex. The very nature of the terrorist group emphasizes closeness, control over action, etc. all of which both binds and confirms the member. Given a rejection of 'bourgeois' life, the life of a terrorist group can provide the almost opposite life style, a living through of ideals. Whilst the stresses of terrorist action may be considerable, the pleasures of the life should not be discounted, especially when contrasted with unemployment, poor housing, or demands which the individual cannot or will not fulfill.

Kellen's account has been discussed at some length because it may represents a fruitful way of approaching the problem. As a series of essentially case histories, its most useful attribute is its concern with the individual, and the analysis in relative detail of his actions, from which generalizations can be made. We should note, however, that other authors have used the same or similar evidence to draw alternative kinds of conclusions especially with respect to the effects of early childhood experiences. Ulrike Meinhof's parents died, leaving her to be brought up by a politically active woman; Andreas Baader was brought up in an otherwise all female household; Bernward Vesper grew up in tyrannical surroundings,
the son of a well known nazi apologist (Miller, 1983). This has certainly led some authors to speculate on such childhood pathology as a critical variable in the development of the terrorist. Whilst such evidence is undoubtedly suggestive, it does not seem to be, however, conclusive evidence that such events are necessarily pathogenic in this sense. Other terrorists do not seem to share such backgrounds (eg. Baumman, Okamato), and of course many people who do not have any connection with terrorism have similar, or even worse, backgrounds. Whilst it is not possible to dismiss it as a contributing factor, assertions about predispositions based on notions of childhood pathology must be treated with scepticism. The value of the general approach, however, lies with the relatively detailed accounts of events, enabling access to potential personal, rather than social, factors.

A related but more systematic approach to the problems of description of the individual psychological context from a different perspective can be seen in the attempts at 'psychological profiling' of terrorists. This technique has its origins in the F.B.I.'s work in criminal investigation. It is based on extensive scene of crime analyses of the victim, the crime and its environmental context. It seems to be of most value in criminal investigations in dealing with the bizarre, or unusual serial crimes such as multiple murders (Porter, 1983), where it has had considerable success particularly where there are signs of psychological dysfunction (Pinizzotto, 1984). In evaluating the utility of this approach, the discussion on the relationship between mental health and terrorism above is clearly relevant. These techniques have been used in the context of the analyses of terrorist incidents, and terrorists, and one area of great utility which has been developed, which is somewhat tangential to this discussion, lies in the analysis of the hostage taker (Reisser, 1982). The profiling of the hostage taker can assist the negotiating team in the management of the hostage situation, through providing information about the content, emphases and timing of negotiating strategies. A number of sophisticated psychological profiles relevant to particular classes of action such as hostage situations have been constructed. The U.S. Federal Aviation Administrations hijackers profile programme is another example (Pickrel, 1977), which appears to be successful.
In contrast to the above, Horowitz (1973) proposes a non-empirically based profile of the terrorist, emphasizing essentially sociological features such as the terrorist makes little distinction between strategy and tactic, and principle, the terrorist possesses self-fulfilling prophetic and self-destructive element, the terrorist is usually young, middle class, male, economically marginal, etc. In contrast to the empirically based attempts at profiles, this clearly seems to lack specificity and utility.

Heyman (1982) reports the use of an empirically based form of psychological profiling to assist in the interrogation of a terrorist apprehended by the Italian police. Based on the results of psychological tests administered to the terrorist, an account of relevant important qualities of that individual was created (highly intelligent, determined, etc.) which was used both by the interrogation team, and also as an aid to analysis of the group to which he belonged. Heyman also introduces an extension of the use of the concept of profiling from the measurement of personal characteristics, to the analysis of terrorist writings, with a view to the identification of useful individual qualities. He then goes on to illustrate how such analyses of written material may have operational significance, in determining how the terrorist group might be managed. He illustrates, for example, how the analysis of written material might help in understanding the groups capacity to withstand stress, which in its turn would have clear operational significance in, for example, hostage negotiating situations. To illustrate the flexibility of the approach he contrasts analyses of two different groups.

The analysis of the writings of terrorist groups can, in fact yield valuable insights into terrorist rationale, and cognitive processes. Miron and Douglas (1979) for example describe the analysis of threat messages in hostage situations as an aid to their management. Miller (1983) gives one of the most sophisticated psycholinguistic account of the analysis of the writings of terrorists. He notes that the analysis of texts can indicate both political and psychological 'signatures' or messages of texts. He confines himself largely to the analysis of the German terrorist movements (Baader-Meinhof and the Red Army Faktion, etc.) and he analyses the various terrorist communications as propaganda, and also as avenues to explore terrorist 'thinking'. Whilst the authorship (single or
multiple) of the texts are largely unknown, given the problematic nature of any investigation in this area, Miller's work represents an approach to laying the foundation of a 'cognitive psychological' investigation of terrorist movements. Steinke (1985) describes further uses of this technique within a German context.

Work in this area may be of considerable practical importance. Dror (1985) draws our attention to the relatively limited array of operational strategies used by most terrorist groups, as opposed to the range of possible strategies available. He suggests one of the reasons for this may lie in both the cognitive and group characteristics of the terrorist and the group he belongs to. Analyses of terrorist communications may obviously assist in better understanding this notion. (We should note, however, that a recent discussion of future trends in terrorism (Jenkins, 1985) notes the same 'conservatism' of terrorist tactics, but attributes it to the success of present tactics in achieving terrorist aims).

Such linguistic analyses can yield provocative insights into the dynamics of terrorist action. Lichter (1979) notes that some authors have drawn parallels, based on linguistic analyses, between contemporary German terrorist groups and early Nazi activity in the 1920's, especially in the context of the authoritarian nature of the movements. Merckl (1975) for example undertook a content analysis of autobiographical statements of a large number of early Nazi's. He notes several parallels between the self description of early nazi's and the 'new left' terrorist groups, including "antimaterialist self-righteous idealism, a sense of being special or different, a rejection of bourgeois origins in favor of lower class sociality, and finding strength in the role of the social and political outcast".

Such accounts clearly draw on notions of authoritarianism introduced and developed by Adorno et al. (1950), but represents an interesting extension of the notion to left wing groups, as opposed to the essentially right wing fascist context of Adorno's writings. Lichter (1979) reports a study which offers some empirical support to this view, in terms of analyses of various projective tests. Whether or not these views extend beyond the German terrorist groups of the 1960's and 70's remains to be seen.
Terrorists in general

A rather different analysis to the essentially individual approach that characterises forms of psychological profiling, is to seek to establish generalizations about the nature of terrorism from what might be known about large numbers of terrorists sharing some common attribute (nationality, gender, etc.). Because of the nature of the evidence used, this approach tends to focus on relatively simplistic psychological variables or concepts. It is an approach characterised by attempts at generalizations based on median or 'average' attributes of people. Russell and Miller (1977) complied evidence from eighteen Middle Eastern, Latin American, West European and Japanese groups, using data derived from news reports of the period 1966-1976. A number of consistencies were apparent, although these were more in terms of contextual issues (such as age, etc.) rather than in psychological variables. However, such studies may have utility in setting the scene for more focused studies. They found that the usual age for group membership was 22-25; only in Japanese, Palestinian and West German groups was the likely age of membership over 25. For the Baader-Meinhof Group, and the Movement Two June Group, over 100 members reflected an average age of 31.3, whereas for the P.L.O. and the Japanese Red Army, the average age was in the late 20's. The age of the leadership of terrorist groups, as distinct from their ordinary membership, is however higher. Mario Santucho, the founder and leader of the Revolutionary Army of the People (Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo) was 40 at the time of his death in July, 1976. Ulrike Meinhof was 42 when she committed suicide in 1976.

Membership of the groups studied by Russell and Millar were predominantly male - over 80% of significant terrorist operations were directed, led and executed by Males. The Uruguayan Tupamaros groups made most use of females amongst Latin American groups, but the most notable role for females seems to be in support activities, like intelligence collection, couriers, nurses, etc. (but see discussion later on the female terrorist). An exception to this can be seen in the Baader-Meinhof group, however, where women contributed in the region of one third of the group membership, and played an active part in group activities. It should also be noted that from time to time, women have occupied important, and leading,
operational roles in terrorist groups. Leila Khalid, for example, had an important role in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Fusako Shigenobu was a leader of the Japanese Red Army.

Most terrorists appear to be unmarried, and often where a participant is married, he tends to sever family ties on embarking on a terrorist career. Depending on whether the groups operate in rural or urban environments, so the terrorists tend to have their origins in appropriate rural or urban backgrounds. Given that the urban terrorist seems to cause us most concern, so membership of such groups is predominantly urban, with mainly middle class, well educated backgrounds. Many groups indeed seem to be associated with University students, and Russell and Millar identify some two-thirds of terrorist group members as having some form of University training. Some 80% of the Baader-Meinhof group, for example, had some University experience. Given this apparently important role for students in terrorist activity, not surprisingly Russell and Millar identify Universities as the major recruiting ground for terrorists.

Thus in statistical terms, Russell and Millar draw the following composite of the typical terrorist. The individual is likely to be single, male, aged 22-24 with some university experience, probably in the humanities. He is likely to come from a middle- or upper-class family, and was probably recruited to terrorism at University, where he was first exposed to Marxist or other revolutionary ideas.

How useful is this composite picture? Its utility depends largely upon assumptions of uniformity amongst terrorist groups, and the acceptance of uniform characteristics in the data base from which the summaries are drawn. We know already, however, that not all terrorist groups conform to the above composite picture. Certainly, the Irish Terrorist Groups (particularly the Provisional I.R.A.) do not appear to share the class background nor educational background outlined above.

Cooper (1977) presents a study which in some respects is similar to Russell and Millar, in that it seeks to offer an overview of terrorist behaviour, from perhaps a more explicitly psychological perspective. Whilst it is expressed at a rather general level, and is not particularly
explicit in citing evidence for the points made, nevertheless it does raise a number of issues relevant to this general discussion. He notes that terrorism is rarely a full-time occupation, which might serve to distinguish the terrorist from the mercenary or soldier of fortune (an analogy which is sometimes made with respect to the international dimension of terrorism). He also notes that there may well be an aspiration, at least for some terrorists, to more legitimate political expression; terrorism (in their case) being a step (albeit unconventional) on the route to political power. It is difficult to evaluate this assertion, although it is of course frequently noted that a number of contemporary political leaders may well have their origins in some terrorist group associated with a struggle for independence.

A further point which Cooper makes is that "...the terrorist has to work very hard, psychologically and practically, at what he aspires to become". The terrorist relatively rarely has military training, and often comes from family backgrounds which would ill prepare him for a life of privation. Cooper's point also extends to the nature of the terrorist act, however. He emphasizes the ordinariness of the terrorist, and the fact, therefore, that he has to learn to kill, or to at least distance himself from the consequences of the acts he initiates. In this respect, he appears to be like the soldier, who also has to learn to kill or otherwise involve himself in violence. In this respect, it is also worth noting that in general, whilst the terrorist may well be responsible for some quite terrible and ruthless acts of violence, they are rarely barbaric in the sense that the Mafia, for example, might mutilate or deliberately personally maim its victims. Clearly this is not necessarily the case, as can be seen by the kinds of atrocities committed by the Mau Mau in Kenya, for example. Barbarianism in killing or injury is, Cooper suggests, more typical of 'repressive terrorism' used to coerce and control. This may, of course, characterise the response of the state (as in Argentina during its last period of military rule, for example), but it can also be seen in the efforts of terrorist groups to maintain control over their own members (the characteristic punishment shootings, knee cappings and savage beatings of the Irish terrorist groups, for example). By stressing the 'humanity' of the terrorist,(although we should remember that we are using the term 'humanity' in a restricted sense), Cooper serves to remind us of an
alternative perspective to terrorism from that which emphasizes abnormality or psychopathology. In the same context, Jenkins (1985) draws attention to the relatively limited scale of most terrorist activity, and especially fatalities. Given the potential for mass slaughter, few incidents (less than 1% of all terrorist activity in the last decade) has involved the death of large numbers of victims in a single incident. It might therefore be more appropriate to think of scale in a symbolic, rather than numerical, context. This discussion is of course all very well at a conceptual level, but we must not lose sight of the fact that whilst the victim may be incidental and of relatively limited scale, he or she remains a victim.

Perhaps the most important characteristic Cooper draws attention to is the loneliness and isolation of the terrorist from society. This essential loneliness, he argues, inevitably focuses the terrorist within a political context, imposing a natural limit and constraint on the scope of terrorist action. Whether such isolation precedes involvement in terrorist activity, or is a result of it, is difficult to assess. At a general level, these observations are unquestionably of value, and certainly help to inform our analysis of terrorism. At the more individual level, however, they do seem to suffer from some of the problems associated with Russell and Millar's approach.

Categories of Terrorist
A further related, but alternative approach to the above, is to attempt to develop profiles of particular groups of terrorists, thus making more possible relatively specific generalizations. One such attempt has been published by Galvin (1983) for female terrorists. The role of women in terrorist movements has been a matter of interest, and Galvin makes the important initial point that the role of the female terrorist is conditioned by both her membership of a terrorist group and her femininity. Thus, whilst those attributes of female regarded as characteristic, such as softness, delicacy, and less restraint than males, do not preclude or even seem to be relevant in terrorist membership or action, nevertheless, female characteristics may well be important in affecting the dynamics of the terrorist group, or reflected in the process of group membership. In particular, unlike men, women in most contemporary societies do not in
the nature of things acquire skills with weapons, or gain experience of combat (or surrogate combat) through membership of youth groups, army service, etc. At a simple level, we tend not to expect female children to play with guns, etc. as we do male children - the process of sex-role stereotyping. Thus whilst for many men, it might be argued that terrorism reflects a progressive development (in some sense) of either natural or encouraged aggression, this is more difficult to argue for women. In the light of this, it may be argued, therefore, that female terrorist membership is a more active process for women than for men.

A common route of entry into to terrorism for female terrorists, Galvin notes, is through political involvement, and belief in a political cause. There appears to be some evidence that women are more idealistic than men, and therefore it might be argued that failure to achieve change, or the experience of death or injury to a loved one, may well give rise to extreme frustration and desire for revenge, impelling at least some women towards extra-normal activities. Galvin also argues that the female terrorist enters into terrorism with different motivations and expectations than the male terrorist. In contrast to men who Galvin characterises as being tuned into terrorism by the promise of 'power and glory', females embark on terrorism "...attracted by promises of a better life for their children and the desire to meet peoples needs that are not being met by an intractable establishment". This, combined with the frustrated idealism referred to above might be helpful in explaining why the female terrorist seems to be more persistent than their male colleagues.

Another significant feature which Galvin feels may characterise the involvement of the female terrorist is the "male or female lover/female accomplice......scenario". The lover, a member of the terrorist group, serves to introduce the female into the group. This may represent a form of 'secondary' terrorism, where the individual is not required necessarily to undertake actual terrorist action, but rather to serve in a support role, of the form noted by Russell and Millar (1977). Aiding and comforting may characterise this form of terrorist membership, and it should of course be noted that this role serves a very important purpose, in providing and defining a substance and context to the terrorist group, materially
contributing to the dynamics of group membership. Implicit in this route of membership is a form of subservience and subordination to the group member, however, and such female secondary terrorists might well be subjected to some form of exploitation, either sexual or operational, in the sense of being used as decoys, etc.

Women in themselves can have value in a terrorist organization however, as Galvin notes. Attack by women can be rather less expected than by men, a factor which may have operational significance for the terrorist group. Pregnancy, care of children, etc., may well be significant in giving security forces a fake sense of ease in, for example, an ambush or attempt at bomb planting. "A woman, trading on the impression of being a mother, nonviolent, fragile, even victim like, can more easily pass scrutiny by security forces....." (Galvin, 1983). We make judgements on the basis of non-verbal features of individuals (eg. Argyle, 1967) and the security forces are no less subject to this than others. This may well constitute one of the most operationally important attributes of the female terrorist.

Women have also been used as sexual 'bait', both drawing men into the terrorist group, and also of course, drawing targeted individuals into ambushes. Female sexuality can be argued, for example, as a significant factor in the recruitment of Michael Baumann into terrorism, and similarly Joe Remiro into the Symbianese Liberation Army (S.L.A.). The availability of sexual favors certainly seem to play a role in sustaining membership of the terrorist group, and it might be argued that in some cases, sex itself seems to unify and consolidate group membership. Thus with respect to the S.L.A. Pattie Hearst says "Free sex was one of the principles of the cell. It was obvious.....that revolutionaries operating underground could not go out on the street and find sex in the usual way. Therefore, everyone in the cell had to take care of the needs of others. No one was forced to have sex in the cell. But if one comrade asked another, it was 'comradely' to say yes." (Hearst, 1982). In this context, the female terrorist can be seen to occupy a quite pivotal role.

As a means of better understanding the activity of terrorist groups, the kind of approach developed by Galvin has obvious utility. Because it addresses a major focused aspect, it is possible to develop more specific

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descriptions and analyses than the kind of statistical summary offered by Russell and Millar (1977). A similar kind of approach was taken by Clark (1983) in his analysis of the Basque separatist group, E.T.A. (Euzkadi ta Askatasuna). Clark undertook a detailed study of the ETA organization and membership, based largely on secondary studies, newspaper accounts and officially released information, as well as interviews with ETA members. Within the context of studies of this kind, it represents one of the most adequate and comprehensive analyses. It is useful to contrast this study, in fact, with the kind of more journalistic analysis of terrorist groups. McNight (1974), for example, whilst appearing to undertake a psychologically oriented approach to such an analysis, in practice produces little more than a superficial sensationalised discussion.

Rather in the same vein as Russell and Millar, Clark reveals that the age of entry into ETA is around the mid to late 20's; its membership is predominantly male from typically a working class or lower middle class background. The data presented on socio-economic background is limited, but it would appear that relatively few members were unemployed, or living on unemployment compensation (given the relatively high levels of Basque unemployment in general, this is unusual). Very few seem to have upper class backgrounds, and also relatively few come from the middle classes. It is also a matter of interest to note that Clark found in his sample no ETA member with farming occupations, or from farming backgrounds. Although ETA is commonly associated with a distinctive ethnic and nationalistic perspective, Clark found only 4 or 5 out of 10 members were the offsprings of two Basque parents (which is below the average for the Basque population as a whole), with a considerably higher percentage of ETA members having only 1 Basque parent than the Basque overall population (80% as opposed to 60% for the Basque population as a whole). He also notes that the families of ETA members were not necessarily nationalistic (although many were). Nor had the families of Clarks sample been subjected to particular oppression. This seems to suggest that the family, in this context, is not necessarily the focus for nationalistic expression, and that at least in some cases, extra-family influences may be important. ETA does, however, tend to recruit from Basque speaking areas, and in particular, from small cities, rather than metropolitan areas.
Actual recruitment to ETA seems a gradual process, and once joined, members tend to live relatively conventional lives, punctuated by bursts of terrorist activity. In this respect, therefore, the life of an ETA member differs from the communal living that seems to have characterised some of the European or American terrorist groups (the S.L.A. for example). For many, language, or the problems associated with the propagation of the Basque language (Euskera) served as their introduction to the politics of Basque nationalism. Actual membership of ETA is described by Clark as following a 'searching' phase: "During their teen-age years, they wondered restlessly... in a search for solutions to the crises that afflicted them as individuals and their culture as a group." He argues that this searching process may (almost randomly) lead to some form of negative interaction with authority, thus confirming the rebel into the revolutionary - a rigid and inflexible (and perhaps prejudiced) police force would contribute to this process. Thus like the account of Kellen referred to above, we see a process of movement away from society, which is to some extent, self-sustaining. Unlike the European terrorists described by Kellen, however, ETA is a relatively large and organized group, and membership acquires more formal properties than that of the essentially ad hoc revolutionary cell (as is also the case in the Provisional I.R.A.). Thus Clark describes membership in terms of approaching the recruit by existing members, with a gradual (perhaps lasting for several months) introduction to the organization, with a related gradual escalation in involvement. It is interesting to note that Clark's sample themselves resisted initial membership approaches, some times for as long as 18 months to 2 years. Contrary to Kellen, Clark failed to find evidence of single 'catalytic' incidents that were associated with conversion and membership.

Membership of ETA seems to affect the family and social life of its members. Normal social and family life often seem to suffer, but associated with this was a rather paradoxical increase in the importance of Basque culture and context, presumably to support the activities of the member. Clark does not describe the family, however, as the principal support for the ETA member; rather other ETA members seem to provide that supportive context. There seems to be little evidence of female companionship, or involvement in their lives. However, given the above,
active membership of ETA seems to be relatively shortlived. Clark estimates that active membership is generally less than 3 years.

Clark's account demonstrates the virtues of relatively simple in-depth descriptive studies of specific terrorist groups. Clearly the dynamics of ETA membership are conditioned by its context, and the focus and development of the individual member of ETA will reflect that context. Although such a study is inevitably limited, it reveals aspects in common with those accounts already noted; but it also reveals interesting significant differences in emphasis. Comparative studies addressing more psychological issues of similar terrorist organisations clearly need to be undertaken.

Processes of Terrorism
An alternative psychological approach to those discussed above is to seek to describe the terrorist not in terms of some fixed pathology or set of attributes, but in terms of the dynamics of the development of terrorism. There appears to be a broad consensus that approaches to the identification of the 'terrorist personality', however expressed, are of little value. As we have noted, unique pathologies, life experiences or attributes, do not seem to particularly differentiate the terrorist from other non-terrorists who may well share those pathologies. Perhaps, therefore, the process of the development of terrorism will offer more insights. This is discussed below in terms of two focuses: the process of identification, and the role of the terrorist group. The literature in these areas directly relating to terrorism is, however, sparse, and such that there is generally lacks an empirical base.

Schmid (1983) notes the inadequacy of many psychological accounts of terrorism. He refers to the central issue which seems to have eluded psychological accounts in this area - what determines the "...choice of some individuals for terrorism..." given the failure to identify unique psychological 'pathologies' of terrorism? He offers one explanation in terms of the social psychological process of 'identification'. This approach does not seem to have attracted a literature to support the notion, but at one level, it certainly can be seen to have some utility. If a process analogous to that thought to operate in the development in childhood of
such things as sex-role appropriate behaviour is proposed, then the existing terrorist might be thought to act as a role model for a new terrorist. Weinreich (1979) has discussed this issue in the context of ethnicity and racial prejudice which may have some relevance to this discussion. Whether the processes that might be envisaged to operate here are different from the notion of imitation, as a form of social learning, remains to be seen. Shaw (1986) describes a similar kind of process, which he terms the 'personal pathway model' to terrorism, which draws on concepts like identification to describe the development of terrorist. He expresses this in terms of two principle features: socialization and narcissistic injury, and he uses examples of terrorist life events to illustrate the model.

The notion of identification may well have a role in the development and maintenance of the terrorist. In the discussion of the development of terrorists by Kellen (1979) qualities that might be interpreted in terms of identification can be discerned. Baumann, for example, draws attention to the importance of the attempt on the life of the student activist, Rudi Dutshke, as an important impetus to his development as a terrorist: "...The bullet might just as well have been for me ....I now felt I had been shot at for the first time. So it became clear to me....we must now fight without mercy...". Identification in this context may also have elements in common with revenge as a causal element in terrorism. Trotsky (1974) draws attention to the importance of revenge as a precondition for the development of terrorism "....Before it is elevated to the level of a method of political struggle, terrorism makes its appearance in the form of individual acts of revenge........The most important psychological source of terrorism is always the feeling of revenge in search of an outlet".

Where the terrorist might be said to identify with the victims of inequality, or injustice, then revenge certainly may be apparent in the rhetoric of terrorism. Whether it represents a valid psychological explanation, however, remains more obscure. The notion of revenge as a psychological force seems to have most in common with notions of frustration, and presumably the links between revenge and violence are similarly like the presumed links between frustration and aggression. Whether explanations in terms of revenge are anything more than a
particular class of frustration-aggression explanations remains to be seen.

Allied to the above forces must be the influence of the immediate social context in which the terrorist finds himself - and in particular, the terrorist group. Indeed, it may not always be possible to separate out the different influences, given the importance of the social support provided by the group. Kellen draws our attention to the importance of the group in maintaining and focusing terrorist action. Thus the group is responsible for, or sets the scene for, many of the attractions of the terrorist life: comradeship, purpose, entertainment, etc. Post (1984) has discussed this in the context of psycho-dynamic theory, in terms of the terrorist group becoming representative of 'the family'. Whether or not this force is viewed in psychodynamic terms, the power of the group, and its pressure to conform, etc. cannot be overestimated. The illegality of terrorist behaviour serves of course to emphasis the dependence of the individual on the group, thereby reinforcing its importance, through for example the need to maintain security by limiting information flow within the group, as well as maintaining discipline. Wolf (1978) discusses the utility in this context of various forms of terrorist group organizational structures.

Dror (1985) draws attention to the organizational features of terrorist groups that facilitate or modify change. He proposes that the terrorist group is subject to organizational forces analogous to those encountered in any other organization. Thus, the mechanisms of change, the process of decision making, the relationship between organizational structure, its conservatism, etc. may be subject to analysis from existing perspectives in organizational psychology. This can be seen in the structures developed to maintain security (the cell system for example) which places constraints on information flow, which whilst desirable from the point of view of security, constrains the structure for efficient decision making (Wolf, 1978). Analyses, other than at a journalistic level, tend not to be available in the literature, and it is difficult in consequence to assess this view.

A useful article by Wright and Wright (1982) reviews the related notion of 'violent groups' which is of value in this context. Drawing on evidence from
a range of sources (cults and religious groups, but not necessarily terrorist groups) they draw attention to the kinds of psychological processes involved in the creation of group 'norms' and 'identity' as elements in the development of group control over the individual. Perhaps the most dramatic example of the force of such pressures is the 1978 mass suicide of the religious community led by the Rev. Jim Jones in Guyana. The importance of the leader in this context is of course important. Kellen (1979) also draws attention to the role of the terrorist group (discussed above) as does Cooper (1977)(again noted above). Strentz (1981) discusses in some detail the relationship between the leader and others in the terrorist group, drawing largely, but not exclusively, on experience of the SLA. He also draws a distinction between 3 kinds of participants in terrorist groups: leaders, opportunists and idealists. More extensive comparative studies are necessary before the essentially limited analyses typified by Strentz can be evaluated.

There may be important analogies to be drawn here between crowd dynamics (Moskovici, 1985) and the process of group action. The process of 'entrapment' (Brockner and Rubin, 1985) is also of relevance in this context ("a decision making process whereby individuals escalate their commitment to a previously chosen, though failing, course of action in order to justify or "make good on" prior investment" Brockner and Rubin, 1985). It may well be argued that the terrorist generally speaking does not fail (although what constitutes 'failure' in this context would of course be a matter for considerable debate), but there may be areas of commonality of process analogous to 'entrapment' that would bear further investigation. It is not clear whether the terrorist group embodies forces other than those evident in other forms of groups; evidence on this is limited, but it seems unlikely that there are such special forces (as opposed to activities).

None of the above, however, offer adequate embracing explanations of why some individuals in a given context and with relatively common experiences become, or do not become, terrorists, although they may well offer help in explaining the maintenance, as opposed to the initiation, of terrorist behaviour. It may be, however, that the problem again stems from an implicit assumption of the specialness of terrorism, and consequent
search for special causes for becoming a terrorist. Perhaps there are no special causes, in the sense of a common class of explanations, as there probably are no 'special' causes for many complex forms of behaviour. Rather a complex of circumstances, dependent on the chance occurrence of events within facilitating contexts, represents the individual's causal story; each individual perhaps having a different unique story. This would seem to be consistent with the kinds of explanations we adopt for other behaviour.
A Behavioural Approach

The above discussion has indicated some of the difficulties in the concept of terrorism from a psychological perspective. A major problem can be identified as the assumption from a psychological point of view of the 'specialness' of terrorism and the terrorist which has influenced both conceptual discussion and research. This can be seen in a number of ways, ranging from the attempts at the description of terrorist personal attributes, to attempts to identify common pathogenic developmental characteristics. In general, these approaches have had little utility.

It is possible to consider the issue of terrorism from a psychological perspective in at least two ways, neither of which are necessarily mutually exclusive, but which may lead to differences in approach. The first is to adopt a broader political and cultural dimension, and in doing so, seek to explain these causative forces in psychological terms at an individual level, the kinds of economic, political and sociological forces which seem to be associated with political terrorism. To embark on this would be to perhaps seek one view of 'the causes' of terrorism, and the utility of the approach would be demonstrated by success in identification of such 'causes', and presumably thereby help our understanding. This raises all sorts of difficulties, however, about the relationship between individual action, and the broader social context; it also requires ways of conceptualising in psychological terms the qualities of (for example) political dissent, etc. Much of the available literature, as reviewed above, falls within this approach, and in general fails to fulfill its promise.

The second approach is to take a more focused view, which encompasses much more limited objectives. Rather than seeking to identify some socially determined generic basis of terrorism, or the terrorist, the focus might alternatively be on objectives related to control and prediction of incidents. Such an approach may well have regard to the broader social context of terrorism, but would be both orientated to, and judged, not in terms of explanations derived from other contexts (other disciplines, for example), but in terms of prevention, prediction or control of actual incidents. In achieving this essentially 'psychological explanation', it
might also fulfill the kinds of objectives for the development of a 'forensic psychology' described by Kaplan (1985), in terms of having as a primary orientation operational relevance. As Wardlaw (1983) notes, the measures adopted by the security forces to deal with terrorism tend to rely on ultimately limited physical technological solutions; there is a clear need to develop non-technologically orientated methods of addressing the problems of terrorism. The contribution of psychology in this sense to such incidents as hostage negotiation, etc., are relatively well known and developed; but systematic empirical operationally orientated psychological analyses of terrorist activity outside of the hostage-like situation is relatively underdeveloped, but may well have great utility. The following outlines one kind of way this second approach might be developed, within an existing conceptual framework.

Whilst terrorism is not a particularly new phenomena (see for example Rapoport, 1984), systematic study of it is. The progress of that study, however, bears a resemblance to the study of other examples of troublesome behaviours, such as crime. It may in fact be useful to examine the development of thinking on crime as offering useful analogies for the analysis of terrorism.

Until relatively recently, psychological thinking about crime was dominated by attempts to identify particular personal attributes of individuals that might be associated with a propensity to commit crime. Thus, the notion of the criminal personality became prevalent, and associated with that concept were efforts made to identify generic qualities of criminals (eg. Eysenck, 1970). Parallels can be drawn between accounts of terrorism, and the early accounts of crime, in that they both seek some form of particular and essential attribute to distinguish the criminal or the terrorist from other categories of people. The greatest difficulty with this approach to crime, however, is the repeated failure of such analyses of criminals to identify pathologies of the criminal condition that do not occur in the general non-criminal public. The failure to identify generic properties of criminals inevitably calls into question the utility of this approach. This increasingly appears to be the case for similar explanations of terrorists.

Such approaches to crime also have little utility in terms of crime control.
Even if attributes of the potential criminal were identifiable, it is difficult to see what might be done with such knowledge, in terms of crime control. The potential (or even high probability) to commit an offence is not sufficient grounds for action. Knowledge of the determinants of criminal behaviour might be thought, however, to have a role in the development of effective strategies for crime control, through rehabilitation of convicted offenders. Authors such as Brody (1976) and Martinson (1974) however began a process of challenge to these assumptions by demonstrating in empirical terms the inadequacy of rehabilitative strategies to change subsequent criminal behaviour. This challenge has resulted in a major re-appraisal of approaches to the control of criminal behaviour.

As part of this re-appraisal, there has been growing interest in what is termed the 'situational' approach to crime prevention (Hough et al., 1980; Bennet and Wright, 1984). This approach has as its focus not the understanding of the broader concept of crime and the criminal, (although the analysis may contribute to that), but seeks solutions to the problems of crime by better understanding the immediate environmental context in which crime is committed. Bennet and Wright, for example, instead of discussing crime in general, focus on the problems associated with a particular crime (residential burglary). Through survey and empirical investigation of incidents, and using convicted offenders as subjects, they were able to demonstrate active and systematic relationships between particular kinds of environmental cues or cue clusters (lights in houses, car in drive, availability of cover, etc.) and the decision to commit burglary at a particular property. Such environmental accounts of crimes like burglary are also consistent with the more general kind of analysis of policing offered by Sykes and Brent (1984), and lend empirical and conceptual support to other situational crime control notions, such as neighbourhood watch, as a technique of crime control.

Like terrorism, crime is varied, committed under a range of circumstances, and is in some circumstances purposive. It often results in victims that may well have little knowledge of, or contact with, the criminal. Without necessarily making assumptions about the criminal nature of terrorism, it seems possible in the context of improved methods of control to draw analogies between the processes of crime, and the
processes of terrorism. It is not necessary to assume that they may be aspects of the same essence to see that there may be utility in thinking about them in the same way. Thus for the police officer or others who have to deal with the problems of both crime and terrorism, the lack of agreed conceptual definitions need not necessarily hinder the development of methods of management. Whilst in one sense situational accounts of crime do not address questions about the social meaning of crime, they do help us to understand the environmental factors that contribute to the commission of crime. By placing the analysis of crime within the context of other non-criminal behaviours, and by seeking answers to the determinants of the particular criminal acts not in some special inaccessible world of criminal social meaning, but in terms of the kinds of explanations of behaviour we would seek in other contexts, we make the problem more accessible to solutions. It may be that this approach would have particular utility in the analysis of terrorism for the security services.

The situational approach to crime prevention lends itself well in psychological terms to behavioural interpretations. The various cues, etc., available to the burglar might be said in behavioural terms to 'set the occasion' for the response of burglary, or in more technical terms, to act as a discriminative stimulus (Skinner, 1953). A behavioural approach is a useful one to take in this context, for given that the burglar is under the control of such discriminative stimuli, recognition by the householder that his property (and its surrounds) constitutes a discriminative stimulus for the burglar offers the householder (or others interested in crime prevention) a means of effecting some control over the burglar (and thereby preventing the occurrence of burglary). He can do this by changing the discriminative stimuli which are either a part of, or evident in, his property. Conceptualising the problem in this way enables the investigator (and the householder) to draw upon an existing well developed conceptual system for analysis and action.

The same may well apply to the psychological analysis of terrorism. Instead of pursuing an elusive common account of 'the terrorist', whether it be in terms of the terrorist personality, his psychopathology, or in terms of other structures like identity, perhaps we should seek to achieve a functional analysis of terrorist behaviour (Skinner, 1953; Yule and Carr.
1980). Such a behavioural approach may have utility for the security services by removing the discussion from the inaccessible realms of extra-normality (with the implied assumption that extra-normal strategies are needed to deal with it) and offering a conceptual framework for further research in which to address practical problems. It also serves to complement and extend the 'physical technology' orientation of much of the contemporary approach to terrorism (Wardlaw, 1983) by developing a 'parallel' behavioural technology.

A behavioural approach does not necessarily immediately offer solutions, and certainly at first sight, does not necessarily inform socially based analyses of terrorism (although in the same way that analogous approaches to crime control may well contribute to the conceptual analyses of crime, so might the approach to terrorism proposed here contribute to the conceptual analysis of terrorism). But it does at the very least place the argument and analysis within a systematic empirical framework of known utility. There are, for example, clear links that can be identified between the above and the kinds of analyses of physical deterrence of terrorist related intrusion in nuclear facilities described by Karber and Mengel (1978). However, locating the discussion within a broader behavioural context facilitate's the extension of the discussion beyond physical vulnerabilities.

There is a broad consensus that psychological approaches to terrorism have as yet yielded relatively little utility in furthering our understanding of the terrorist and his actions (Schmid, 1983; Margolin, 1977). Yet it is also clear that the future potential for further analysis and the development of systematic management strategies for terrorism lies with the behavioural sciences (Wardlow, 1982). Perhaps one reason why at least psychological analyses have not yielded their full potential may lie with the search for unique explanations, rather than developing accounts within existing frameworks. Perhaps a behavioural approach will have more utility.

**Opportunity**

The approach outlined above draws on the kind of conceptual approach to crime control referred to as 'situational crime control'. Within the context of criminal behaviour, research in this area has tended to focus on crimes
where there are many potential targets of relatively equal utility to the offender. Residential burglary has attracted most attention, mainly because it is worrying crime, and also because it has a high frequency of occurrence. Research on burglars has tended to develop the notion of kinds of burglars (related to the kinds of targets they select), and for at least the most numerous category of burglar, the notion of the opportunistic offender (eg. Maguire, 1982; Bennet and Wright, 1984). Most residential burglaries are relatively unplanned, and effected rapidly with minimal preparation, and it would appear that the burglar makes use of those environmental cues that present themselves to him to make the decision to offend. He has little or no detailed knowledge of the goods available to steal in the property chosen. The situational approach to crime control described above, therefore, is sometimes associated only with opportunistic crimes.

At first sight, this would not seem to characterise what we know of the nature of terrorist incidents. They tend to be relatively well planned with well developed strategies for removal of weapons, etc. The choice of target is usually far from random, in the sense that its symbolic qualities are usually well identified, and often the media support for incidents is well developed and orchestrated. The actual victims, as opposed to the target, may well be opportunistic, in that the victim (as opposed to target) is often incidental to the terrorist action. Where the victim is important (as in assassination) incidents again usually show extensive planning.

The relatively limited research in the area of situational crime control has tended to focus on crimes with a high degree of opportunistic identification of targets. The notion of opportunity is of course quite complex; within the context of crime, various meanings to opportunity have been given. Gladstone (1980) for example has limited his concept to opportunity reduction, as making crime more difficult to commit. Other authors, however, have taken a broader view of opportunity. In the sense in which it will be used here, the notion of opportunity has considerable links with the use of opportunity made by the 'anomie' theorist, such as Merton (1957) and Cloward and Ohlin (1961). Mayhew et al. (1976) extend this concept, and have made the useful distinction between socio-economic opportunity (as in anomie theory) which attaches to people, and environmental opportunity, which relates to properties of objects or
events. Following this distinction through in the analysis of terrorism and extending the analysis in behavioural terms may well have utility, and in the sense used by Mayhew et al., it clearly does not necessarily follow that notions of environmental control are limited to opportunistic activity in a narrow sense, simply related to 'properties of objects'. In an analysis of environmental factors influencing terrorist behaviour, events outside of the immediate context of the incident concerned clearly are of relevance. However, conceptualising the issue in this way makes both the immediate and the broader contextual factors amenable to systematic identification and exploration.

**Contribution**

In the light of the above, what way might a behavioural approach contribute to the analysis of problems? Perhaps its principal contribution would be to locate the analysis within an empirical context, establishing a base not only for descriptive accounts, but also enabling systematic analysis through experiment and modeling. This may well in fact contribute to the kind of conceptual analysis called for by Schmidt (1983). He notes that the concept of terrorism has been "...subjected to a double standard based on definition power and in-group - out-group distinction", the result of factors such as its derogatory power, its emotive nature, and (although he doesn't explicitly refer to it) the attempt at specialness. A functional analysis of terrorist behaviour would enable us to focus on, for example, the use and consequence of violent acts, which may offer utility in understanding, for example, more clearly the instrumental character of terrorist violence. An extension of this analysis to encompass media coverage of terrorism, for example, might have great utility.

Given the above analysis, a wide range of directions for further investigation become possible. In a more specific context to the example discussed above, another, and possibly fruitful, direction for research can be seen in the following. A focus on cues like those discussed by Bennet and Wright (1983) might well offer utility in the management of terrorist acts. We can conceptualise a complex relationship between discriminative environmental properties and terrorist activity. In one sense, we can think of the terrorist as being under the control of discriminative stimuli in, for example, the choices he makes in identifying targets, etc. A better
understanding of the determinants of such choices, and the extent to which such choices can be modified by environmental change would constitute an important area of investigation. Such an analysis could extend beyond the relatively limited immediate environmental context, as discussed above.

On the other hand, on analysing the same situation from a different perspective, the policeman, or member of the security service, is under a form of environmental control in his recognition of cues that indicate potential terrorist threat (the suspicious vehicle, recognition of environmental incongruity, etc.). An analysis of the role such cues might have in the discriminative control of the police officer would offer clear utility in terms of risk analysis and prediction, as well as providing a systematic basis for training initiatives. It may well also offer the opportunity for the systematic analysis of the elusive concept of 'experience'.

Indeed, a better understanding of the process underlying such discriminative control may well assist in our analysis of the concept of terrorism itself, by providing an empirical base for taxonomic discussions, etc. By placing the analysis of terrorist behaviour within the same general framework used to analyse other behaviour, it may be possible to develop a rationale for control and management of terrorism, without denying the extra-normal qualities of terrorist violence and action.
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Supplementary notes on "Psychological Aspects of Extreme Behaviour"

The following comments and notes supplement the report "A research review of Psychological Aspects of Extreme Behaviour", prepared under Contract No. DAJA 45-84-0400.
The following are notes on the results of a series of investigations undertaken by the author. The notes are presented to supplement the discussion in the report "A research review on Psychological Aspects of Extreme Behaviour", and offer some reflections on issues raised within the report. They are based on analyses of interrogation transcripts of a number of suspected or confessed terrorists in Northern Ireland, and extensive discussion with police officers and others responsible for assessment of interrogation information, etc. Materials were selectively made available, and had the following attributes:

a. they included discussions, (of varying levels of adequacy), of recruitment practices into a terrorist group;
b. they included 'reasonably accurate' accounts of both terrorist activity and their social environment (subject to certain constraints);
c. they reflected the membership of the various terrorist groups operating in Northern Ireland;
d. they included male and female participants;
e. a total of 10 individuals were specifically referred to, who were active between 1976 and 1983, as well as others discussed in a more general context.

The following is presented to indicate areas of interest, and suggestions for further development. The inadequacy of the sampling arrangements, the unsystematic nature of much of the interviewing procedure adopted, and the lack of empirical evidence clearly modifies the value of much of the material. On the other hand, some issues of interest are apparent, and are consistent with other reports in the literature. In the absence of systematic comparative studies, it is difficult to distinguish generic from the particularly Irish features of the terrorists concerned.

Summary of results

1. 4 broad categories of origins to terrorist involvement can be identified:
   a. Family history and context. A large number of terrorists in Northern Ireland have a history of family involvement. (family convicted for
terrorist offenses), often stretching back for several generations. [C. - "My uncle talked to me about joining the Junior Officials"]
b. Environmental Context. All grew up in, and were part of, a community that was subject to civil dissent. This is clearly related to 1. above.[D. - Associated with 'auxiliaries' before being approached to join.]
c. Intellectual and/or political commitment. This was often expressed as attending meetings to protest at social conditions, etc. (which had no direct relationship to a terrorist group, but served to establish context and specific contact).[E. - "Becoming involved in the H-Block organizations gave me a sense of responsibility and importance. I naturally became involved after that."]
d. Significant Event. Given the above, the actual determinant which gave rise to seeking membership of a terrorist group was often (by their own post hoc account) a critical event. Sometimes this was a serious incident (a friend killed, or seriously injured, sometimes whilst on a terrorist activity, sometimes as a bystander to some other event), but sometimes it was in itself a relatively minor incident (what in police terms would be regarded as minor harassment at a vehicle check point, or minor damage sustained in searching a house).[C - "my mate was shot by the army. I joined the next day. F - 'They turned the house over. That did it'"

By their own account, some suggest that the significant difference between themselves (as active terrorists) and those who shared all or some of a. to c. above (but were not involved in terrorism) was some form of critical incident, which precipitated a more direct involvement. This has received attention by other authors, but it would clearly merit further attention in three senses:

i. are there common qualities to such incidents that can be identified? (given the variety, this seems unlikely, but it may well be the case that the process of the incident, rather than its precise reason, is critical);
ii. what training and policy implications do they have for security forces given that they all in some sense involved contact with either the army or the police;
iii. is this something related to the mixture/confusion of roles of civil vs. military power.

2. Membership.
Once embarked on a terrorist career, the group to which they belonged played an important role in their lives. The extent of initiation to the group varied depending on the particular terrorist organization (Provisional I.R.A. being the most extensive and systematic). [E - initially did vigilante work in the neighbourhood, looking for anti-social acts (known locally as 'the sweeney'). He then took part in a robbery to raise funds, and only then became involved with an active service unit]. The amount and extent of ideological preparation varies enormously between groups. Similarly, the degree of training made available, support services, etc. were a function of the group. The organisational structure of the Provisional I.R.A. is well known; a consequence of it is that in that organisation the individual active member appears to be left largely to his own devices in this respect until he receives instructions to undertake some action. This emphasizes the relationship between the political and strategic planning elements in the groups and the active participants, and the coherence of political and terrorist leadership. It also emphasizes the extent of planning and preparation necessary to move weapons, materials, etc. in preparation for action. Routes of communication are well defined, however. The distinction between planning and action is not so evident or so well developed in other Irish terrorist groups, especially the loyalist groups.

For the active participant, his social life is closely related to his community, and it is likely that his involvement is known in his locality. Members drink and socialize in a limited number of locations within a fairly tight circle of acquaintances. They do not live in an atmosphere of extreme caution, nor is the 'cause' the sole dominant organiser of their lives. The only time extra caution is exercised is when they are on a mission, or in a strange and possibly hostile environment.

The evidence available was not sufficient, or appropriate, to indicate in detail the psychological qualities or features of group dynamics operating; in any case, the different group structures were such that generalizations would be difficult to make.

3. Action.
All made reference in some way to the excitement of action, and to its role in binding the participants together. The element of excitement and
interest is always present, and the only time dissent is expressed is when the calendar is blank, leadership lacking, or lack of success. Some made reference to a gradual introduction to violence, through support roles to actual participation in an incident. Incidents were in the main planned, although not necessarily in great detail. Attacks on police officers were in a sense often opportunistic. A location would be selected where a mobile-patrol (for example) would be known to pass. The events of the moment would, however, determine the character of the action. Factors which seem to be important consequences of involvement in terrorist activity include status (for the hierarchy), excitement, power and ideological fulfillment (this later seems to be of less importance now than earlier). Financial rewards are minimal, and seem to be of little significance. When detailed for a job, the job takes precedence over normal social activity. The individual would not normally know the nature or location of the job until on his way.

Membership of the organisation becomes 'a way of life' to the extent that the main objectives and rationale for the movement may become overlooked. Membership seems to develop in one of two directions - political/propaganda/cultural/educational, or physical force. Rarely are the same individuals involved in both sides of the movement. The experienced activist seldom expresses much concern for his action, seldom talks about them unless with friends in a social context, and regards what he does as normal (perhaps the result of progression in violence, and perhaps because his social environment condones it). Remorse is rare, and status conferment depends on the caliber and number of actions he has been involved in, preferably in a variety of areas.