Building Confidence and Security in Europe

The Potential Role of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures

Y. Ben-Horin, R. Darilek, M. Jas, V. Lawrence, A. Platt
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PREFACE

This report summarizes the results and constitutes one of the main products of a RAND research project on "Confidence- and Security-Building Measures" (CSBMs), sponsored by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The other main product was a briefing that likewise summarized these results. The objectives of the project were to examine and assess the U.S./NATO package of CSBMs that was tabled in January 1984 at the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe—identified throughout this report by its original, shorter title, the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE)—in Stockholm, to analyze how that package relates to both stated and unstated Western objectives for CSBMs, and to identify possible future options for negotiation of the package in the CDE.

Throughout the study, the authors benefited greatly from several pointed discussions, as well as regular exchanges, with Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy Douglas Feith and his staff—in particular, Jim Hinds, John Matheny, and Suzanne Parry—in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Nevertheless, the views expressed in this report are those of the authors only. They do not necessarily represent the position of the U.S. government or the project's sponsor.

This project was conducted in the International Security and Defense Policy Program of RAND's National Defense Research Institute, an OSD-sponsored Federally Funded Research and Development Center.

In September 1986, while this report was in the process of being published, the Stockholm Conference reached agreement on a negotiated package of CSBMs. Since the analysis in this report provides a baseline against which Stockholm's outcome can be compared and, ultimately, evaluated, the "Document of the Stockholm Conference" has been included here as Appendix C. As a first step in making comparisons, it should be noted that:

- The package of CSBMs adopted at Stockholm does not contain the information and communication measures analyzed in this report.
- The Stockholm package does include some "constraining provisions;" these are not addressed here, largely because NATO
participants originally refrained from proposing such measures for negotiation at Stockholm.

- Otherwise, the CSBM package adopted at Stockholm generally resembles the package proposed by NATO and analyzed in this report, although significant differences exist over important details (e.g., over how the on-site inspection measure should be implemented).

A first-cut, side-by-side summary of the main elements in each package is included in chart form in Appendix D.
SUMMARY

Since the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) convened in January 1984 at Stockholm, where negotiations began on various confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), six of which were proposed by the United States and its NATO allies, a number of U.S. and European officials have publicly and privately enunciated a wide range of Western objectives. As a result, both the stated and the unstated objectives for CSBMs in the CDE are numerous and diverse. Nevertheless, these objectives can be organized into a consistent pattern, and the NATO CSBMs as originally proposed in Stockholm can be assessed for their contribution both individually and collectively toward achieving three “core” objectives:

1. Inhibiting the Soviet employment of force for the purpose of political intimidation.
2. Lessening the risk of war by misunderstanding and miscalculation (i.e., military action/reaction leading to unintended escalation).
3. Making a successful Soviet surprise attack in Europe more difficult (whether from a standing start, off the march, after mobilization, or after demobilization).

In addition, at a more general level, any possible package of measures can be considered in the context of other, less often verbalized politico-military objectives. These include fostering common assessments within NATO of East-West security issues, facilitating united allied responses to Soviet behavior, promoting Western public and parliamentary support for common security policies, and, above all, doing nothing that would have the effect of degrading NATO’s security and cohesion.

How do the original NATO proposals for CSBMs on information about military forces, forecasts of their activities, notification of those activities, observers at them, inspection of them, and communication about them measure up in terms of both the “core” objectives and the more generalized objectives? The analysis in this report, which consists of an in-depth examination of each of the CSBM measures, of the NATO package of CSBMs, and of the implications of both, suggests a mixed picture. For example, Measure V of the NATO package provides for the use of national technical means and of on-site inspections for verifying agreed-upon measures. On the basis of the analysis pre-
sented here, this measure is considered likely to make a positive contribution toward achieving the objectives of complicating surprise attack by the Soviet Union and lessening misunderstanding and miscalculation—provided the measure is ultimately adopted in a form closely resembling its present form.

On the other hand, Measure VI of the NATO package calls for the establishment of dedicated communications links among participating states to facilitate the expeditious exchange of information concerning agreed-upon measures. Analysis of this measure suggests that it is likely to have little impact on inhibiting Soviet employment of force for the purpose of political intimidation and that it could, depending on the measure's final form, discernibly undercut the Western "core" objective of complicating Soviet surprise attack possibilities. As for Measure II, which calls for the provision of an annual calendar of notifiable military activities, Measure III, which calls for the notification of major military activities within the CDE zone, and Measure IV, which provides for the invitation of observers to all notifiable activities, the analysis suggests that they all may prove to be significantly less valuable in practice than many in the West originally thought.

The overall assessment of the original NATO package is that, if adopted as proposed by the Western allies, with Measures I, III, and V being the key parts of the package, it would make a marginally positive contribution to the achievement of all three "core" objectives. This judgment, however, would be less sanguine if preventing surprise attack was accorded top priority among the three "core" objectives.

A key finding of this report is that for most of the NATO-proposed measures there is a critically important, inherent ambiguity that arises when CSBMs are expected to meet the objective of lessening miscalculation and misunderstanding, on the one hand, as well as the objective of complicating surprise attack possibilities on the other. What one side views as necessary protective measures—for example, the deployment of tanks to forward defense positions or the movement of troops out of garrisons—the other side may view as necessary preparations for an offensive move in its direction. As a result, the twin dangers of overreaction and underreaction arise. Those who worry that misunderstanding and miscalculation will cause another world war find in the inherent ambiguity of such military activities the need to emphasize and prevent the chances of unintended war. Meanwhile, those who fear that the next war will begin with a Warsaw Pact attack that will take NATO by surprise tend to focus on the opportunities for deception that lie in this ambiguity. The ability of CSBMs to resolve this tension between the tendency either to overreact or to underreact is limited. Since they are defined in terms of military activities, CSBMs
are subject to the same ambiguities as the activities they involve and probably cannot, by themselves, dispel ungrounded suspicion or prevent their own use for deceptive purposes (e.g., to lull a gullible enemy into a false sense of confidence).

Given what is judged here to be the marginal impact of the original NATO CSBM package on the achievement of the West’s three “core” objectives, the allies face three basic choices:

a. Leave the package as it is and recognize its limitations.

b. Either upgrade all the measures to better meet the objectives or identify subpackages of measures that may achieve as much or more with less risk.

c. Redefine the objectives, then modify the measures to fit the modified objectives.

Option a requires no further analysis, whereas various packages of measures can be assembled to accomplish Option b. Measures I (Information), III (Notification), and V (Inspection), for example, could provide the same contribution as the full package, but with less risk. Measures II (Annual Forecasts) and IV (Observation), on the other hand, would constitute a bland package that might be fairly easy to negotiate. A combination of only Measures III (Notification) and VI (Communication), however, could prove potentially risky for the West, considering the possible problems associated with Measure VI.

As for Option c, this study suggests that the major problem facing many NATO countries at present is not one of perceiving dangers that do not exist but, rather, one of interpreting as benign an increasingly threatening military situation in order to avoid difficult political and military choices. Accordingly, the study suggests that the United States and NATO might wish to consider refocusing their objectives in Stockholm so as to accord primacy of place to making the possibility of a successful Soviet surprise attack more difficult. Noting the apparent impracticability in this regard of any efforts in Stockholm to actually constrain the Soviets’ ability to launch such an attack, the report observes that the best way for NATO to frustrate a surprise attack may be for it to concentrate on facilitating a prompt, unified response to any and all threatening Soviet activities. To accomplish this objective, consideration is given, among various options, to a modified package of measures—i.e., the combination of Measures II and III (adding the necessary definitions and thresholds for notification from Measure III to the current Measure II on forecasts) with an altered Measure V on inspections. This option would provide for:
• A minimum number of inspections, keyed to forecasted activities (to discourage overforecasting).
• Inspections for all unforecasted activities (to discourage underforecasting).
• Exclusion from inspection of “garrisons” for housing forces—however, because they are relatively small, specifically delimited areas, such garrisons would become the standard for definition of all excluded sites (to prevent large swaths of territory from being excluded).

Such an alternative core package theoretically holds the promise of achieving more for the West than the original package of six measures, with less attendant risk and political friction. Nonetheless, more dynamically oriented analyses (preferably involving gaming) should be undertaken, the report concludes, before this theoretical promise can be presumed to apply in practice.
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I. INTRODUCTION

This study addresses the potential contribution of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) toward their self-proclaimed objective, namely, the building of confidence and security in Europe. In January 1984, the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) convened in Stockholm to negotiate CSBMs. The negotiations originated, however, in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which was agreed to by thirty-five nations (the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union, and all European States except Albania). In the fall of 1986, the CSBM negotiations at Stockholm were to report their results to the third CSCE review meeting, which was convening before the end of the year in Vienna.

The Helsinki Final Act included some modest confidence-building measures (CBMs) that sought to reduce the dangers of armed conflict arising from miscalculation or misunderstanding by providing for voluntary compliance with various rubrics applying to certain military activities within the CSCE zone (which includes most of Europe but only a 250-kilometer strip of the western Soviet Union). These Helsinki CBMs are concerned with the normal activities of conventional ground forces, rather than with restrictions on the numbers or types of forces. They can be thought of as a form of "operational arms control," as opposed to the kind of "structural arms control" characterized by the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations, which involve bilateral (or bloc) reductions in numbers of troops and/or weapons.

As experience with the Helsinki CBMs has grown, so has the interest in developing CBMs further—especially in recent years and particularly among the Neutral and Nonaligned (NNA) states. By the time of the Madrid CSCE follow-on meeting in 1980, even the Soviet Union was strongly in favor of establishing a new conference on disarmament in Europe, although the Soviets' interest lay primarily in separating the new negotiations from the human rights aspects of CSCE, in pushing for acceptance as CSBMs of pet declaratory statements that would, for example, purport to ban the first use of nuclear weapons, and in limiting the geographical scope of the talks. With very strong pressure from the NNAs and NATO (led by France), a mandate for a CDE linked to the CSCE process and applicable to all of
Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals" was finally agreed to by the superpowers and thirty-three other nations at the end of the Madrid CSCE review meeting in 1983. Thus, the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (more generally referred to as CDE, as the French had originally proposed naming it) opened on January 17, 1984 and met over the next three years in Stockholm.

Charged with addressing a range of problems associated with the operational aspects of ground force deployments in Europe, one goal of the CDE participants from the outset was to foster a sense of predictability and mutual understanding about the routine military activities member states conduct to maintain their security. The focus of the CDE to date, therefore, has been on the nature of the activities of ground forces, not on the numbers of troops or types of weapons deployed in the CDE zone. Reflecting a significant Soviet concession, that zone currently extends from the Atlantic to the Urals—i.e., throughout the European USSR; it is no longer confined to the 250 kilometer slice of Soviet territory encompassed by the smaller CSCE zone. After the CDE concludes in the fall of 1986 and reports to the CSCE review conference in Vienna, the latter can be expected to consider—at the request of Warsaw Pact and NNA participants in particular—mandating a second phase of the CDE that could address disarmament issues as well as CSBMs.

This report addresses the package of measures tabled by the NATO countries at the CDE in January 1984. It focuses on the interrelationships between these measures and Western objectives for CSBMs. First, the report surveys and discusses various publicly stated U.S. or NATO objectives for CSBMs, distilling these down to three "core" objectives: inhibiting political intimidation, reducing misunderstanding/miscalculation, and making surprise attack less likely. Other, unstated objectives are addressed as well. Then the current NATO package, which consists of six measures, is described, analyzed, and evaluated in the context of these various U.S./NATO objectives for CSBMs.

The analyses and evaluations produced here have been conducted independently of any particular scenario. The work is based on careful review by the authors of the politico-military origins and developmental history of the original NATO CSBMs, including a survey of relevant classified and unclassified literature; on interviews with key actors in the CDE process; on systematic examination of each of the CSBMs and its implications; and, ultimately, on informed evaluation of both the individual measures and the package as a whole, supplemented by the views of experts in the field. Finally, building upon its
analyses and evaluations, as well as upon considerations regarding the evolution of Soviet thinking about the CDE, the report identifies several potential options available to the West for the future development of CSBM packages within the CDE.
II. U.S./NATO OBJECTIVES FOR CSBMs

Both in public and in private, numerous American and European officials and agencies have expounded upon NATO's objectives in the CSBM negotiations in Stockholm. They have usually done so, however, in general and imprecise terms. Moreover, their statements do not contain a clear indication of priorities among various competing objectives, much less a systematic effort to explain how these different goals actually relate to one or more of the measures in the NATO package.

A variety of objectives for the confidence and security building measures tabled by NATO at the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe have thus been posited. These objectives have been put forward by various sources, and often have reflected the particular perspective of the person or group articulating them. To help place these various objectives in context relative to the NATO package of measures originally tabled in Stockholm, a brief historical review of the most salient objectives and their origins seems appropriate.

THE CDE MANDATE

In May 1978, the French proposed to the First Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations that a new Conference on Disarmament in Europe be established. France had several objectives in mind when this proposal was presented. From the French point of view, the major problem areas were twofold: (1) the possibility of surprise attack by conventional military forces launched from what appeared to be routine military training maneuvers and (2) the use of such forces to intimidate nations with sudden, unusual military maneuvers potentially leading to confusion and inaction on the part of national leaders. To counter these dangers, the French proposed a two-step approach to the problem: first, the peacetime activities of military forces should be regulated and, afterward, the forces would be reduced in size and strength.1 At the urging of the United States and other NATO allies, the French focused the first part of their approach on the need to negotiate CBMs that would be more meaningful than those adopted at Helsinki in the CSCE Final Act of 1975. To achieve

this objective in a new CDE, it was decided that any confidence-building measures to be negotiated in that forum would have to be militarily significant, verifiable, and mandatory rather than voluntary. Furthermore, the measures would have to apply to the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. If all the states of Europe were to be treated equally, as the French proposed, then the Soviet Union could not have its European territory treated as a sanctuary, immune from compliance with the CBMs. At the Madrid CSCE review meeting, where the mandate for a CDE was first formally proposed and negotiated, such CBMs were renamed Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) to distinguish them from their weaker, essentially voluntary Helsinki predecessors.

When first proposed by the French, the CDE was intended to be independent of the CSCE process, but as discussions proceeded in NATO, France came around to the view that a CDE should be tied to CSCE to prevent any degradation of the CSCE process, which includes human rights as well as security provisions. Once the Madrid CSCE review meeting began and negotiations for a CDE started in earnest, the mandate that resulted was largely the one proposed by France in concert with its NATO allies. One exception was the original French requirement that the measures be legally binding. It was finally agreed in Madrid that the measures would be politically binding, and the West downplayed insistence on the legal status of the measures to avoid denigrating the Helsinki CBMs or other Final Act commitments. Although the latter were essentially voluntary, the West maintained that they were no less important than any commitments a CDE might produce. By making the CDE part of the CSCE process, the results of the CDE deliberations were also made subject to review at the third CSCE review meeting, scheduled for November 1986 in Vienna.

According to the mandate for the CDE agreed to at Madrid in 1983, the objective of CSBMs in the CDE is as follows: "as a substantial and integral part of the multilateral process initiated by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, with the participation of all the States signatories of the Final Act, to undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or

2Dehaine, ibid.

use of force in their mutual relations." Since the CDE thus derives, in part, from the CSCE Final Act and must report back to the next review meeting in Vienna, it follows that the objectives outlined for the CBMs adopted in the Final Act also apply to any CSBMs negotiated in the CDE; these objectives include "reducing the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to apprehension, particularly in a situation where the participating States lack clear and timely information about the nature of such activities."

OBJECTIVES OF THE NATO CSBM PROPOSALS

In a statement at the opening of the CDE in Stockholm on January 17, 1984, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz declared that the goal of the conference was to reduce the danger of surprise attack and to lessen the possibility of war by miscalculation or misunderstanding. He also suggested the conference should look for ways

- To inhibit the use of military might for intimidation or coercion;
- To put greater predictability into peaceful military exercises in order to highlight any departures that could threaten the peace;
- To enhance our ability to defuse incipient crises.

In addition, the United States and its allies would seek to increase the transparency of military activity in Europe. Three days later, President Reagan stated that the primary purpose of the Stockholm conference was "to reduce the risk of surprise attack or war by accident or misunderstanding."

When the NATO allies tabled their package of confidence and security-building measures at Stockholm in early 1984, the objectives listed for the package included those of creating greater openness and more predictability in military activities. The achievement of these objectives was linked to the attainment of such other goals as reducing the risk of surprise attack, diminishing the threat of armed conflict in

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6Department of State Bulletin, March 1984, p. 34.
7Department of State Bulletin, March 1984, p. 42.
Europe resulting from misunderstanding and miscalculation, and inhibiting the use of force for political intimidation. The 1983 Annual Report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, published in early 1984, reaffirmed that the goal of the Western CDE participants should be to reduce both the high level of tension and the risk of surprise attack in Europe through the successful negotiation and approval of mutually acceptable CSBMs. The report also added some new objectives. It said, for example, that the United States would seek measures that would

- "Enhance knowledge and understanding about military forces and activities between states and/or confronting alliances,”
- Reduce “the risk of military confrontation by accident or miscalculation,”
- “Provide early warning about impending military operations,”
- “Increase stability.”

In a speech delivered in January 1985, one year after the CDE negotiations had begun, the U.S. Ambassador to the talks, James Goodby, enlarged the list of objectives somewhat by including the “need for accurate perceptions of the intent of military operations” as a remedy for miscalculation and a deterrent against surprise attack.

In addition to the foregoing objectives for the CSBM package, various other objectives or criteria have been identified during the course of the package’s development. These go beyond the objectives listed in the NATO package and the criteria stated in the CDE mandate; they include somewhat more detailed politico-military criteria for any CSBMs agreed upon at Stockholm, such as the ability or need to

- Provide additional warning indicators;
- Permit acceptable remedial action in case of noncompliance with agreed provisions;
- Facilitate or, at least, not complicate NATO’s decisionmaking processes and flexibility to react to threats;
- Avoid unacceptable reduction of alliance security through loss of significant military capability;
- Allow for the introduction of new technology;

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10 Ibid.
• Assure noninterference with essential defense requirements and legitimate military activities.

As this list demonstrates, the distinction between "criteria" and "objectives" is not clear cut; these terms are used interchangeably by both U.S. and NATO officials and by Western leaders more generally.

According to U.S. and NATO statements, moreover, the best way to achieve desired objectives and criteria through CSBMs is to increase the openness and "transparency" of military activities in Europe, thereby allowing "normal" patterns of military exercises and activities to be identified. Enhanced predictability of military practices in Europe is thought to lead to reduced tensions and suspicions between states. Deviations from the "normal" patterns of military activities would be cause for concern, requiring an explanation from the state conducting the unusual activities, and would likely induce enhanced vigilance on the part of observing states that could result in potential deterrence of a surprise attack or the use of force for political intimidation.

UNDERSTANDING U.S./NATO "CORE" OBJECTIVES

We have sought to organize the various objectives for CSBMs into a pattern or theory that seems to us to be implicit in and to cut across most of the statements surveyed above. Figure 1 represents this effort. The implicit theory of the U.S./NATO approach, as we see it, is that a CSBM package that satisfies various "design" criteria—some of them fairly specific and others more general—will lead to the attainment of certain "core" objectives, identified as such in Fig. 1, which in turn will promote broader, more "ultimate" objectives over time.

In the main, the analyses and evaluations pursued in this study focus on the presumed causal connection between the measures and the posited "core" objectives. We consider the potential contribution of the original NATO CSBM proposals, both individually and as a package, to the attainment of these objectives. The analysis also considers the potential bearing of the various measures on other, unstated U.S./NATO objectives. The first and foremost of these "other" objectives can be summarized in the injunction "above all, do no harm," an aphorism reflecting an underlying concern in both the military and political realms that a carelessly drafted CDE agreement could end up degrading NATO security rather than enhancing it. In a more positive vein, other unstated objectives include enhancing, where possible, both NATO military intelligence and Western political cohesion. This last
objective could best be served by a carefully formulated CSBM agreement that

- Fostered common Western assessments of East-West security issues;
- Facilitated united NATO responses to Soviet behavior;
- Promoted public and parliamentary support in NATO countries for adequate defense efforts over time.

An agreement that promoted such salutary politico-military objectives in peacetime would also be expected to perform similarly in a crisis, facilitating NATO political decisionmaking and enhancing military warning then as well.

Western officials and agencies who have discoursed on the CDE typically have used broad, imprecise terms when addressing NATO's objectives for CSBMs, even when referring to the same objectives. In our view, NATO's three “core” objectives for CSBMs can best be understood as follows:
Inhibit the use of force by the USSR for the purpose of political intimidation/coercion. The intention here is to make more costly to the Soviets and therefore to render less likely their flexing of military muscle for political purposes, as they did vis-à-vis Poland in 1981 with the military exercise Zapad-81. Ideally, CSBMs might even render less likely such further military activities (beyond the mere flexing of muscles) as the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Lessen the likelihood of misunderstanding/miscalculation by any participant regarding the military activities of an adversary. Misunderstanding and miscalculation are used interchangeably here to denote a cycle of military action and reaction that leads to unintended escalation. This is a purposefully narrow interpretation that focuses on situations where benign intent is liable to be misinterpreted and lead to overreaction. The objective is sometimes referred to as reducing the likelihood of “false-positive” warning of war, where positive denotes offensive intent.

Make the achievement of surprise attack by the Warsaw Pact less likely. This is often referred to as reducing the likelihood of “false-negative” warning, where negative denotes the belief that nothing hostile is afoot. In practical terms, surprise is achieved when one side is inadequately prepared for offensive activities initiated by another side. Accordingly, surprise can occur at virtually any time: under normal peacetime conditions during routine exercises, in the midst of a crisis, or as the crisis begins to wind down. Thus, an adversary’s forces can launch a surprise attack from a standing start, off the march, after mobilization, and even during a period of demobilization and the apparent deescalation of a crisis.

The dangers inherent in being attacked by surprise can theoretically be prevented or countered through one or both of the following:

- Operational restrictions that make it difficult for a hostile party to mobilize and deploy the forces necessary to carry out a surprise attack.
- Adequate reaction to warning derived from:
  - Divining intentions through exceptional circumstances (e.g., fortuitously placed spies);
  - The collection and timely assessment of intelligence and warning (I&W) indicators regarding a mounting capability for and possible intention to attack;
  - Ambiguous situations, where grounds for suspicion exist but capabilities and intentions are less clear.
Operational restrictions of various kinds—e.g., limits on specified military activities, up to and including demilitarization of crucial areas—might conceivably be very useful for making the achievement of surprise attack by the Warsaw Pact less likely. But none of these is being proposed by NATO at this point, nor does it seem likely that any such significant restrictions will be agreed on at Stockholm in the near future.

Instead, the approach to CSBMs currently being pursued in Stockholm by NATO and other participants aims at producing agreement on measures that improve the prospects of adequate reaction to warning. Hence, the analysis that follows focuses primarily on what it takes, within the context of NATO's original CSBM package, to ensure adequate reaction to intelligence and warning (I&W) indicators of capability and intent (CSBMs themselves may provide such indicators), even though they are ambiguous. As for divining hostile intentions, that is, of course, extremely useful whenever possible. Ideally, blatant violation of a CSBM could provide the exceptional circumstances needed to confirm such intentions. But this can never be confidently anticipated nor counted on by a prudent planner, for intentions are considerably more susceptible to change and disguise than are capabilities.

Ambiguous indicators of intent are no less a problem for avoiding war by misunderstanding or miscalculation than they are for avoiding surprise attack. In fact, an inherent tension exists between these two objectives, a tension that is grounded in the nature of military activities themselves. Few (if any) military activities are inherently unambiguous. What one side views as strictly defensive measures, the other side may perceive as necessary preparations for an offensive move in its direction. There may be nothing or, at least, not enough in the actual deployments themselves—e.g., the movement of tanks out of garrisons on either side, or the deployment of troops to general defense positions—to indicate whether the intent is strictly defensive or primarily offensive. These same actions might have to be taken for either purpose. Hence, unambiguous intent cannot immediately be gleaned from inherently ambiguous military actions.

As a result, the twin dangers of overreaction and underreaction—of "false-positive" and "false-negative" warnings, as noted above—figure prominently in most conceivable scenarios of war by misunderstanding/miscalculation and of war by surprise. Those who look at the latter possibility tend to emphasize the opportunities for deception that lie in the inherent ambiguity of military activities, while those who focus on possibilities for misunderstanding and miscalculation find in that ambiguity a need to highlight the dangers of unintended war, particularly in the nuclear age. Recalling lessons learned
from World War II, those who worry most about the possibility of surprise attack typically focus on NATO's relatively cumbersome decisionmaking processes and the alliance's corresponding susceptibility to underreaction, especially to ambiguous but nonetheless real indicators of hostile intent. Those who worry most about misunderstanding and miscalculation, on the other hand, often resurrect popular (albeit debatable) analogies to World War I; they emphasize the danger of overreaction and the possibilities for miscalculating or misunderstanding actual intent that derive, in part, from some countries' offensively oriented military postures, training, and doctrine.

A key question for adherents of both points of view is whether CSBMs can help dispel the tension between their differing perspectives and resolve the dilemma attendant upon the need to respond, one way or another, to inherently ambiguous military activities. Those who concentrate on avoiding war by misunderstanding and miscalculation tend to assume that CSBMs can perform this task, primarily by increasing the number of genuine (versus "false-positive") indicators of intent. Those most interested in avoiding surprise attack tend to worry that CSBMs might actually build a false sense of confidence and security by increasing the available possibilities for deception—"false-negative" indicators of peaceful intent (see Fig. 2).

This question takes on added significance when the relationships between the types of information that might plausibly be generated by CSBMs and the likely dynamics of NATO decisionmaking in a crisis are taken into account. The clear violation of various CSBMs, especially if combined with other I&W indicators demonstrating that preparations for hostilities are under way, poses few problems. In a perfectly clear case, NATO can be expected to react appropriately—i.e.,

Avoid war by Misunderstanding vs Surprise attack Miscalculation

Problems

- Over reaction
- Under reaction
- Unintended war
- False positive indicators
- Hair trigger procedures
- WW I

F. i.e. Deception
F. i.e negative indicators
Cumbersome alliance decisionmaking
WW II

Questions Can CSBMs resolve the dilemma? Is this a real dilemma for NATO?

Fig. 2 - Inherent tension between objectives
to begin deploying, even mobilizing in anticipation of an impending attack. The same holds true, of course, in the case of clear compliance with the CSBMs and the lack of other I&W indicators of hostile intent: NATO can be expected to respond appropriately by remaining relatively calm and refraining from overreacting to events.

The problems mount quickly, however, in anything less than a perfectly clear case. Will NATO respond with appropriate deployments and mobilizations in the absence of a clear CSBM violation, even though the other I&W indicators seem ominous? Some NATO allies will probably argue that it should—particularly those allies with independent intelligence assets that they trust more than CSBMs to indicate what the Soviets actually have in mind. Other allies, however, may prove reluctant, especially if they lack independent intelligence, receive it from others but remain unconvinced, and focus, as a result, on the lack of a clear CSBM violation to argue against prompt, reactive decisionmaking. In such a situation, CSBMs could prove more of a hinderance than a help, and matters could conceivably go from bad to worse if the Soviets took pains to abide by such measures, while simultaneously making moves that set off other I&W indicators of hostile intent. The tension between fear of surprise attack and fear of war by miscalculation could become acute in NATO, with the result that prompt, effective decisionmaking proves to be impossible.

Because they are defined in terms of military activities that tend to be ambiguous, CSBMs themselves are subject to much the same ambiguities. In and of themselves or even combined, such measures do not necessarily provide proof positive of intent, since they can be used both to help dispel ungrounded suspicions in some circumstances and to add an extra layer of opportunity for deception in others. Hence, the measures, like the activities they encompass, can go either way. By themselves, they probably cannot eliminate the tension between the two “core” objectives discussed above: lessening the possibility of war by misunderstanding/miscalculation and making surprise attack less likely. Nevertheless, it is still possible that CSBMs, in conjunction with other intelligence and warning indicators, can add constructively to the tools available for managing tension and producing well-informed, “correct” (i.e., appropriate to the circumstances at the time) decisionmaking. And it is this possibility, considered here as an hypothesis that merits further scrutiny, that the further course of this study seeks, in part, to assess.
III. THE ORIGINAL PACKAGE

NATO's original proposal in Stockholm consisted of a package of six measures. It can be found in Appendix A. A subsequent NATO elaboration of the six measures can be found in Appendix B. The first three measures involved the exchange of information, whereas the last three provided for the means to observe, verify, and communicate that information. Put another way, Measures I, II, and III can be thought of as "independent" measures, in the sense that each could be implemented without reference to any other (with the possible exception of Measure II, which did not include its own definition of "notifiable" activities). In contrast, Measures IV, V, and VI tend to lose the justification for their existence in the absence of at least some sort of measure providing for information to be exchanged—information that then needs to be observed, verified, or communicated.

MEASURE I: EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

Description

According to the original NATO proposals, at the beginning of each calendar year, participating states must:

- Designate the normal headquarters location (coordinates) and composition of major ground formations and main combat units;
- Designate the headquarters location (coordinates) and composition of land-based air formations; and
- Define regulations on the presence and activities in the zone of accredited military personnel from participating states.

Discussion

Despite improvements over previous formulations, the version of Measure I that was introduced with the NATO package of CSBMs in Stockholm contained elements of ambiguity that had yet to be resolved. The measure called for an exchange of information regarding the composition and location of ground and air forces deployed in the CDE area. However, definition of "major ground formations" and of "main combat units" remained problematic, since it had not yet been determined at what level of detail (division, regiment, or other unit of force) such information would be reported.
A representation of the central European front would be decidedly less "cluttered" if only division headquarters were included. A more congested picture would result from including units subordinate to divisions as well, such as brigades for the West and regiments for the East. Figure 3 depicts the less cluttered view in terms of Warsaw Pact division headquarters, and the more congested and detailed alternative by showing not only NATO divisions but also subordinate command headquarters in Central Europe.

The requirement to designate headquarters according to their geographic coordinates was another issue in question. Point coordinates need not encompass the overall area in which a division and its subordinate units are located. A U.S.-type division in Germany, for example, usually has three brigades attached to it. Although these brigades may be in the same area as their division's headquarters, most have their own headquarters located some distance away. A Soviet division commonly consists of four maneuver (tank or motorized rifle) regiments, although they are smaller than the average U.S. brigade. Their regiments are usually removed geographically from division headquarters. Thus, if only the coordinates of a Soviet division's headquarters were designated (Fig. 3 approximates this possibility in Eastern Europe), its constituent regiments—the bulk of its combat power—would be exempt from the information requirement and could move around autonomously without specifying their locations or contravening the information requirement. In addition, there is the issue of independent brigades and regiments: both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces have mobile units of this type that have no fixed administrative headquarters.

A more specific designation of brigade/regiment locations in this measure, therefore, may be required to ensure compliance. Without such a designation, it can be argued that those locations cannot be effectively defined, particularly if there is a related notification measure based on divisions and their subunits being "out of garrison" or away from "normal peacetime locations." Accordingly, inclusion of the locations of major subunits in some fashion would seem to be important; the original NATO package of measures, however, did not provide for such inclusion in clear, unambiguous terms.

Evaluation (See Fig. 4)

A. Inhibiting political intimidation: We see no way in which the exchange of information called for by Measure I could have any bearing on the objective of inhibiting Soviet political intimidation. The provision of annual lists identifying the locations of Soviet military
forces is not likely to affect how those forces might be used. If anything, such lists could serve to intimidate uncooperative neighbors and allies by reminding them on an annual basis of the massive size and ubiquitous disposition of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe.

**B. Lessening misunderstanding/miscalculation:** The exchange of information on unit locations under the provisions of Measure I could make a limited contribution toward the objective of lessening miscalculation. It provides for a detailed locational baseline that should be useful in evaluating any changes in force deployments or dispositions. Information supplied under this measure could, for example, provide helpful reference points for national technical means (NTM) of intelligence gathering and verification, as well as for the other measures in the NATO package.

**C. Making surprise attack less likely:** By itself, exchange of the information contemplated in Measure I would not have direct bearing on the problem of surprise attack. As noted above, the mere act of providing annual lists of forces is not likely to affect how the forces might be used, although variations in baseline force dispositions from year to year or within a year could conceivably arouse legitimate suspicions.

**D. Other objectives:** A yearly exchange of information, such as called for under Measure I might contribute to countering Soviet public relations efforts in Western Europe and in the United States. Although the information that the Soviets would be required to provide each year would not likely add anything fundamentally new to the knowledge of NATO military intelligence or Western political leaders, it could provide Western governments with a convenient means for confirming their claims about Soviet military power among skeptical
domestic audiences. At the very least, the Soviets could be expected to be uneasy over the prospect of the yearly publication on the front pages of major Western newspapers of detailed, ominous-looking lists or maps depicting the USSR's extensive military deployments throughout Eastern Europe. Soviet-supplied information on Soviet forces throughout Europe, including the Soviet homeland, might prove especially embarrassing for the USSR in Eastern Europe as well. Such information is likely to provide the Soviet Union's East European allies with fresh and—from the Soviet Union's point of view—potentially dangerous military data regarding Soviet deployments in the USSR's westernmost military districts.

MEASURE II: ANNUAL CALENDAR (FORECASTS) OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES

Description

Measure II requires each participating state to submit by November 15 an annual forecast of all the notifiable military activities it is planning for the following calendar year. The forecasts must include the designation or name of the exercise, the general purpose, geographic location, and duration of the activity, the 30-day period in which the activity is to begin, the names of the participating states engaged in the activity, and the numbers of troops and types of forces to be involved.

Discussion

The annual forecast of military activities called for in Measure II, as originally formulated, specifies no thresholds for the “notifiable” activities to be included in the forecast. Instead, the measure assumes that definitions and parameters specified in Measure III will apply. It is not clear how well Measure II would function without Measure III. One specific problem is that of alerts, i.e., military exercises called without prior notice to test readiness or to respond to unforeseen contingencies. These are not covered by Measure II, nor are they subject to prior notification in Measure III. Alerts could be an effective means of sidestepping the attempts of CSBMs to “normalize” military activities in Europe.

In the absence of adequate means for encouraging straightforward provision of accurate information and for discouraging manipulation of the information supplied, Measure II could be used to overload and deceive an opponent. Military activities could be notified in forecasts and cancelled, with no warning or explanation required, just as alerts
can be called without prior warning, thus allowing a nation to operate outside the spirit, if not the letter, of the CSBM regime.

**Evaluation (See Fig. 5)**

**A. Inhibiting political intimidation:** The yearly publication of exercise forecasts could conceivably contribute to the inhibition of political intimidation, particularly in conjunction with an effective measure requiring notification of military activities. Unless they benefit from coincidence, or pack their annual forecasts with more activities than they normally conduct, it is most likely that in order to call "military maneuvers" for the purpose of intimidation the Soviets would have to go outside the prenotified annual forecast of such exercises, thereby implicitly acknowledging the extraordinary nature of their behavior. This would remove the facade of "routine exercises" that they have used in the past to cover exceptional military activities, and thus could conceivably be a source of some inconvenience or embarrassment to them vis-à-vis both their East European allies and Western Europe. Whether any such embarrassment would weigh significantly in their calculations and therefore actually give them pause in mounting such activities is doubtful, but it cannot be dismissed entirely.

**B. Reducing misunderstanding/miscalculation:** Measure II may contribute in obvious ways to lessening misunderstanding and miscalculation. The holding of an exercise that was forecast in a yearly calendar of future events may appear less ominous when it actually happens than it might have appeared in the absence of such

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Potential Contribution</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inhibit political intimidation</td>
<td>Some—particularly in conjunction with Measure III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lessen misunderstanding/miscalculation</td>
<td>Mixed — can lead to misinterpretation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make surprise attack less likely</td>
<td>None—given likelihood of permissible exceptions or negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Facilitates focusing of intelligence efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PR value—mixed, given larger NATO exercises</td>
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Fig. 5—Evaluation of Measure II: Forecasts
annual forecasting. And, if the intent of a forecasted exercise is indeed benign, this could help dispel or prevent unfounded apprehension.

Insofar as one side or the other routinely responds to ambiguous warning, this measure may help moderate the response, at least until such time as other causes for alarm should arise. This would benefit all parties concerned, since all are clearly interested in avoiding unintended escalation, which could lead to nuclear war.

The actual value of Measure II’s contribution to reducing misunderstanding/miscalculation, however, would probably be very limited. NATO is currently not likely to overreact to routine Soviet exercises. For Soviet activities to cause serious alarm in NATO or engender significant military countermeasures on its part, they would most likely have to be on such a scale, or take place under such circumstances, that their earlier appearance in a yearly forecast would not make much difference. Thus, for example, a large-scale exercise that was forecast in an annual calendar may take place in the midst of an unexpected crisis. Whatever the original intent, any responsible military or political leader would have to consider such military activity as a cause for concern. On the one hand, in such situations Measure II might help serve the objective of lessening miscalculation by providing one or both sides with an additional opportunity to signal nonbelligerency: a previously forecast activity about to take place in an unexpectedly sensitive crisis could simply be cancelled.

But on the other hand, if neither side availed itself of such an obvious opportunity for the deescalation of a crisis, the actual occurrence of a forecasted activity might cause even greater alarm than warranted. Likewise, Measure II could give rise to unnecessary alarm by casting military activities that were not included in the yearly forecasts, but were notified later, in a more ominous light than actually warranted. The likely contribution of this measure to the objective of dispelling unfounded suspicion, therefore, must be judged to be mixed.

C. Making surprise attack less likely: Insofar as an annual forecast of military activities might mitigate tendencies toward overreacting to false alarms, or “false-positive” indicators of impending attack, this measure might actually have a dampening effect on such tendencies in the event of a “true positive.” In other words, the measure might actually lead to the opposite tendency—and in NATO’s case, it could be argued, the greater danger—of providing a “false-negative” indicator of attack. An apparently routine, previously forecast activity would be a natural cover for malign intentions, especially
if the departure from routine occurred after a long period of successful implementation of such procedures.

By itself, therefore, Measure II is likely to be irrelevant to the objective of diminishing the element of military surprise—or it could be worse than irrelevant. In any event, no state with real security concerns, let alone the Warsaw Pact and NATO, could agree to limit itself to conducting only those activities they had included on an annual calendar supplied in advance. Given the high likelihood of various kinds of permissible “exceptions” to any straitjacket of an annual forecast—exceptions for which the NATO package itself provides via Measure III—it is difficult to envisage how Measure II per se could eliminate the possibility of achieving surprise, let alone constrain the Warsaw Pact from planning or executing a surprise attack if it found it necessary and otherwise possible to do so.

Forcing the Warsaw Pact to have recourse to an “exceptions” procedure for unforecasted military activities could have some alerting effect on NATO decisionmakers, particularly in a crisis. However, if the Pact had previously managed both its forecasts and its exceptions to maximize their unpredictabilities—e.g., by consistently forecasting more activities than actually take place and by consistently utilizing various exceptions provisions for activities that do take place—any alerting effect on NATO could be considerably diminished.

D. Other objectives: The availability of a forecast of military activities planned for the coming year by the other side could facilitate focusing intelligence efforts and assets on the right times and places. But even this limited benefit could be significantly diluted if, for example, an adversary submitted deliberately inflated forecasts, as the Soviet Union has regularly done for its ships transitting the Bosphorus Straits under the terms of the Montreux Convention. (The USSR deliberately overestimates the number of transits it is obliged to prenotify, then takes advantage of those opportunities that it wishes.)

As in the case of Measure I, public acknowledgment by the Soviet Union in Measure II of the extent and intensity of its military activities throughout Europe might prove embarrassing for the USSR in both Eastern and Western Europe. On the other hand, so far as political debates on military matters within West European societies are concerned, the relatively large size of many NATO exercises—and even the overall scale and intensity of both sides’ activities—may result in increased alarm and opposition to defense efforts in the West, rather than a heightened appreciation of the Soviet threat.
MEASURE III: NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE CDE ZONE

Description

All participating states will notify at least 45 days in advance (and in the same detail as indicated above for Measure II) the following activities in the CDE zone:

- Out-of-garrison land activities involving one or more divisions (or more than 6000 troops) carrying out a common activity;
- Mobilization activities involving the major combat elements of three or more divisions or more than 25,000 troops; and
- Amphibious activities involving three or more battalions or 3000 troops carrying out a landing in the CDE zone.

In addition, alert activities involving forces that meet the above thresholds will be notified at the time they begin.

Discussion

This notification measure is probably the most “independent” (as discussed above, at the outset of this section) of the six proposed by NATO. An extension of the Helsinki CBMs relating to the notification of military maneuvers and movements, this measure specifies a greater level of detail for its reporting requirements than its predecessors. To function most effectively, the new measure would require a clear definition of what is meant by “out of garrison.” To verify compliance with this measure (i.e., whether a unit was “out”), for example, would require identification of the “garrison” location of various subunits (regiments/brigades), as well as the headquarters location of the major combat units (divisions). The requirement for concurrent notification of military alerts may be viewed as a loophole, although this loophole would work as well for NATO as for the Soviet Union.

Evaluation (See Fig. 6)

A. Inhibiting political intimidation: Like Measure II, Measure III could raise the political costs for the Soviets of using “military maneuvers” for the purpose of political intimidation. The longer the period of pre-notification required (45 days in the original NATO proposal), the more likely it is that the Soviets would need to resort to the “alert” exception clause if they wished to intimidate allies or adversaries militarily in the midst of a political crisis, as they intimidated Poland in 1981 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Although calling a previ-
Objective | Potential Contribution
--- | ---
Inhibit political intimidation | Some—but adds vehicle for intimidation
Lessen misunderstanding/miscalculation | Some—provides reference point for NTM and other measures
Make surprise attack less likely | Mixed—potentially subject to misuse; risks delaying NATO response; may put Soviets in bind: must notify or violate
Other | Facilitates focusing of intelligence efforts

Fig. 6—Evaluation of Measure III: Notification

ously unnotified military activity an “alert” would not constitute a violation of the agreement, it would constitute public acknowledgment of a kind that the Soviets have been loath to make in the past. Again, as with Measure II, it is difficult to assess the precise degree of embarrassment that this might cause Soviet leaders or, more importantly, whether such embarrassment would actually inhibit their actions in any practical way. Indeed, simply pre-notifying an impending military exercise during a crisis might prove to be an appealing vehicle for intimidation.

B. Reducing misunderstanding/miscalculation: Like Measure II, Measure III could contribute to lessening misunderstanding/miscalculation by providing reference points for both sides' national technical means—to help them clarify ambiguous military activities—as well as for other measures in the CSBM package (especially Measures IV and V but potentially Measure VI also). On the other hand, this notification measure could conceivably be abused in the manner discussed above for Measure II—i.e., by deliberate inflation through excess pre-notification of activities that, in the end, are cancelled before they actually take place. Such a deliberate pattern of misrepresentation would only increase the chances for misunderstanding/miscalculation.

C. Making surprise attack less likely: The impact of Measure III on the problem of surprise attack is likely to be mixed. As with Measure II, a pre-notified (or forecast) activity could be a convenient cover for offensive military operations. Although this proposition may be widely recognized and readily accepted in theory, NATO would have to consider the danger that one or more allied leaders would tend to see any notification by the Warsaw Pact as a signal of benign intent. That
is, the very fact that the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact played by CSBM rules might draw an ally's attention, possibly reinforcing a disposition not to react. This could be dangerous if in fact the Soviets were preparing for an attack while seeking to deceive members of the NATO alliance sufficiently to hamper or delay effective decisionmaking and countermeasures.

Note here that "deception" per se is not the key issue: the Soviets may or may not have intended all along to launch an attack. What matters is whether their capability to do so is increased with this measure and whether NATO's ability to respond to ambiguous warning is diminished. The danger of this measure to NATO is that the alliance as a whole, or some of its individual members, may act foolishly. The foolishness would lie not in the failure to recognize a Soviet deception, which may or may not exist; rather, the foolishness would lie in a heightened disinclination to take adequate precautions in the face of ambiguous warning.

But Measure III may also place the Soviets in a bind. Although NATO may act in a foolish manner, the Soviets cannot count on this and must take seriously the possibility that NATO will pay attention not only to the fact of notification but also to its content. In some situations, this content may reinforce and perhaps even add to U.S. intelligence information, which some NATO allies might have been inclined to view skeptically. In such cases, NATO's response to potentially aggressive Soviet activities may be more prompt and decisive than if lingering doubts about the claims of U.S. military intelligence data were allowed to fester.

Hence, the Soviets' dilemma: if they violate an agreed-upon notification measure, they risk being widely exposed and heightening suspicion even more than they would have by notifying the event. But if they do not violate the measure, play instead by the agreed rules, and notify as required, such notification might itself facilitate cohesive NATO decisionmaking and make more likely an adequate response by the alliance to ambiguous warning. Since neither the Soviets nor the United States can be certain in advance what effect Soviet compliance with a notification measure or lack thereof might have, the net contribution of Measure III in this regard must be considered uncertain, or "mixed."

Finally, Measure III could on certain occasions be the source of delay or indecision on NATO's part because some NATO leaders, concerned with signalling alarm, might be marginally more reluctant to call an alert, as provided for in this measure, than they would if no such measure existed. Even in those situations that may seem to require a modicum of stepped-up readiness, some allied leaders might
be more concerned about the implications of NATO's sounding an
alarm (and causing the Soviets to react) than about ambiguous warn-
ing. And political reluctance to declare an alert of a size requiring
notification could inhibit NATO leaders from deciding to take neces-
sary, precautionary military steps in sensitive situations simply because
the Soviets have not done so themselves. NATO's ability to take such
steps could conceivably be less problematic in the absence of this mea-
ure.

D. Other objectives: Measure III, like Measure II, could facilitate
the focusing of NATO intelligence efforts.

MEASURE IV: INVITATION OF OBSERVERS FROM ALL
PARTICIPATING STATES TO ALL NOTIFIABLE
ACTIVITIES
Description
Measure IV requires each state to invite observers from all the other
participating states to each notifiable activity and to alerts lasting
more than 36 hours. The observers will be permitted to observe all
phases of the activity, use their own optical observation equipment,
and have access to telecommunications facilities.

Discussion
The detailed provisions for observers outlined in Measure IV resem-
ble those that have been in effect since 1975 for the Helsinki CBMs.
This suggests, on the one hand, that the measure could be imple-
mented with little difficulty but, on the other, that the problems
observers have had gaining access under the Helsinki Final Act would
still persist, since in both cases observers' activities are subject to the
discretion of their host governments.

Evaluation (See Fig. 7)

A. Inhibiting political intimidation: The nondiscretionary
requirement to invite observers to major military exercises could rein-
force whatever limited contribution Measures II and III might make
toward inhibiting the use of "military maneuvers" for political intimi-
dation. To the extent that the Soviets would be embarrassed by having
to make a public acknowledgment of such nonroutine activity on their
part, the added visibility that the presence of observers might entail
could discomfit them further. As noted regarding Measures II and III,
**Objective** | **Potential Contribution**
--- | ---
Inhibit political intimidation | Some — reinforces effect of Measure III
Lessen misunderstanding/miscalculation | Positive — provides opportunity for reassurance
Make surprise attack less likely | None (or negative) — provides headaches for hosts but also opportunities for deception/delusion
Other | None

Fig. 7—Evaluation of Measure IV: Observers

it is an open question whether any such requirement would actually affect Soviet behavior if Moscow were intent, for example, on intimidating a recalcitrant member of the Warsaw Pact. In fact, the Soviets might calculate that the presence of observers from the country to be intimidated could actually enhance the intimidation.

**B. Reducing misunderstanding/miscalculation:** A functioning system of observers along the lines envisaged in Measure IV could provide a useful vehicle for communication of benign intent in a crisis. Using this additional instrumentality, one or both sides concerned with signalling nonhostile intent could grant observers wider latitude in what they were permitted to observe, so as to dispel unfounded concerns or suspicions. Of course, this is possible today—attachés can be invited to observe, for example. But it may prove difficult to establish on an *ad hoc* basis, particularly during a crisis. The grant of greater latitude to a great number of observers may only be practical in the context of a regularly functioning CSBM agreement that provides, in advance, an internationally agreed vehicle for enhanced observation in a crisis.

**C. Making surprise attack less likely:** Measure IV is not likely to bear significantly on the problem of surprise attack. Given the discretionary control that a host country will have over invited observers, it is unlikely that their presence would constitute more than an inconvenience or “headache” (one that could always be managed, if necessary) to a host that sought to control what they observed completely, even a host nation that was preparing a surprise attack. Such a host nation might see opportunities in this measure for deception—for manipulating what observers were allowed to see to maximum
effect. In fact, it could be a dangerous delusion for NATO leaders to place too much credence in the reports of their observers, although the possibility remains that some NATO leaders might delay decisionmaking processes until their observers at a notified activity had at least filed reports.

MEASURE V: USE OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS (NTMs) AND ON-SITE INSPECTIONS FOR VERIFICATION

Description

Participating states may use national technical means for the purposes of verification of the agreed-upon measures, and no states are to interfere with the NTMs of any other state. In addition, on-site inspections to verify compliance may be requested. Each state will be permitted up to two on-site inspections of another state's territory per year for the purpose of monitoring compliance with the agreed CSBMs. The receiving state must permit inspection of the designated area within 24-36 hours of receipt of a request to inspect and may accompany the inspectors while they are in the receiving state's territory.

Discussion

Measure V allows for participating states to use on-site inspections as well as available national technical means of verification to assure compliance or to detect noncompliance with the agreed measures. The measure also allows for "restricted areas" to be exempt from inspection. For this measure to work, such exceptions to the basic inspection requirement must be kept to a minimum. In the past, the East has used restricted areas in Eastern Europe to severely limit the areas accessible to Western military liaison teams. The measure does specify that areas normally closed to the general public qualify as exceptions, and it clearly has small areas (e.g., garrisons) rather than large ones (e.g., training areas) in mind, but further definition will surely be necessary in view of the extremely restrictive public access practices that are characteristic of the East.

In addition to definitional issues, other problems will dog the implementation of this measure. These include not only formidable logistical problems—how to launch near-real-time inspections within the enlarged CDE area—but also problems of coverage and access that go beyond those posed by restricted areas: How many inspectors are required to do a good job? How large an area can they cover effectively in what period of time? What sort of transport, evidence-
gathering equipment, and communications should they use? How is the host likely to react if they use disputed equipment? How can an uncooperative but determined host foil the best laid plans of a good inspection team? What can the inspectors or the states that dispatched them do to counter the foils? How definitive are inspectors' reports likely to be, or be considered? To what extent can they be influenced by a host nation's deception? All such questions pose serious challenges to be overcome before the inspection regime envisioned in Measure V can be fully realized.

As with Measure IV, Measure V implies agreement on some other measure that needs to be verified, such as Measures I, II, or III. (If no new measures were adopted at Stockholm, the verification methods specified in Measure V could conceivably be applied to the existing Helsinki CBMs.) Another implication of this measure concerns its "signalling" aspects: refusal to grant an inspection can be viewed as strong evidence of a violation, and refusal to agree to an on-site inspection measure suggests an unwillingness to accept the concept of effective CSBMs.

Evaluation (See Fig. 8)

In its original broad formulation, and assuming that "exceptions" and other forms of restrictions on inspectors are carefully delimited, Measure V is the most likely of the six in the NATO package to contribute positively to the West's three "core" objectives for CSBMs.

A. Inhibiting political intimidation: Regarding this objective, Measure V can be expected to make a positive contribution in a manner similar to that suggested for Measure IV, only more so. Given

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Potential Contribution</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inhibit political intimidation</td>
<td>Some — raises political cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lessen misunderstanding</td>
<td>Positive — provided exceptions are limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscalculation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make surprise attack less likely</td>
<td>Positive — puts Soviets in bind, permit or deny inspection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Facilitates intelligence gathering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enhances alliance cohesion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Complements NTM</td>
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Fig. 8—Evaluation of Measure V: Inspection
the considerably greater freedom that inspectors would have, compared
to that of observers, this measure could raise the costs to the Soviets of
using military force for political intimidation and make it more difficult
for them to avoid the scrutiny of the international community
while carrying out potentially intimidating military maneuvers.

Of course, if the purpose of the maneuvers was to intimidate the
international community, the presence of inspectors, in addition to
mandatory observers, would actually help amplify the message being
sent. This might also be true of intimidation directed toward a single
state. It is conceivable, for example, that a state that is trying to
intimidate might actually welcome an inspection by the state it is try-
ing to intimidate as a way of clearing up any ambiguities in the mes-
 sage and of signaling intended intimidation even more clearly.

B. Reducing misunderstanding/miscalculation: Measure V,
again like Measure IV, would provide a convenient means for ascer-
taining benign intent in tense situations. Its usefulness, however,
would be less dependent than that of Measure IV on the sensitivity
and active good will of the party whose behavior had given rise to con-
cern. The ability to inspect free of control by the host state would be
particularly useful as a means to confirm or deny information provided
under the auspices of Measures II and III. On the other hand, even
with the best will in the world on both sides, if inspection teams are
limited by size, geography, equipment, or adequate access to an
inspected state's territory, their reports on an ambiguous situation are
likely to be equally ambiguous and inconclusive. This points again to
the need to solve those serious challenges, discussed above, that could
vitiate potentially beneficial effects of this measure if not successfully
surmounted.

C. Making surprise attack less likely: Measure V could be
highly useful in sharpening the dilemma with which NATO would hope
to confront the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact under Measure III.
Indeed, even if the Soviets found a way to get around the provisions of
Measure III or simply decided to violate the measure in the hope that
NATO members would delay responsive activity for a while, the USSR
would still have to face the strong possibility that one or more NATO
members would demand an inspection under Measure V. To deny such
a request would constitute a clear signal to the West and would com-
pound suspicions within NATO ranks about the nature of Soviet
activities.

Any number of excuses could and probably would be adduced by the
Soviets, or their Warsaw Pact colleagues, to account for any delay or
denial of an inspection. And the impact of these excuses on NATO
could be negative rather than positive, as allies reluctant to escalate a
controversy counseled further talk instead of reaction. Simply awaiting the results of inspections that have been permitted, without delay, can produce the same effect—namely, CSBM-induced delays (versus speed-ups) in NATO's responsiveness to threats. What will actually happen in specific circumstances, however, is difficult to predict with certainty: will NATO respond to, temporarize over, or completely ignore (because it will focus on more telling indicators) CSBM violations in a real crisis? Short of experiencing such a crisis itself, a more dynamically oriented study, one that incorporates results gained from gaming this question, is necessary to answer it more definitively. In the meantime, we conclude here that Measure V, in principle, provides NATO with a useful tool for dispelling potential ambiguities, but NATO must hone that tool further through negotiations, then act in timely fashion on what the negotiations produce, for the measure's full potential to be realized.

D. Other objectives: A right to wide-ranging inspections would undoubtedly facilitate intelligence gathering by both sides. Especially important to the United States would be the ability to investigate ambiguous time-urgent concerns: to confirm or deny intelligence information derived from NTMs and to share the results of information derived from inspections widely, in order to enhance alliance cohesion.

MEASURE VI: DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS LINKS AMONG STATES

Description

The participating states "will" establish dedicated communications links and "may" use them to facilitate the expeditious exchange of information called for in the preceding measures and permit rapid communication in times of possible crisis.

Discussion

This measure, widely favored by neutral and nonaligned nations, suggests that participating states, after establishing some form of dedicated communications links among themselves, should use them to deal with the routine exchange of information required by agreed-upon CSBMs and should recognize the further possibility that these same communications links could also be used in crisis. The measure as originally presented was perhaps the least well defined of any of NATO's proposed measures and was to be fleshed out only after the other measures had been adopted or rejected. Nevertheless, the vague yet
hortatory tone of the measure's language hints at the possibility of a multinational "hotline" or consultative arrangement—not simply a system for the expeditious handling of routine CSBM information. Without adequate specifications and safeguards, an interstate communications system could become a dangerous tool for deception, or simply confusion, rather than for building confidence or security.

**Evaluation (See Fig. 9)**

A. **Inhibiting political intimidation**: Dedicated or added communication links are not likely to have any bearing on the problem of inhibiting political intimidation.

B. **Reducing misunderstanding/miscalculation**: Dedicated communication links could provide an additional opportunity for clarification of benign intent in uncertain and tense situations. This feature of the measure might be particularly appealing to those who believe in the usefulness of already existing "hotline" devices and procedures. But a single multinational hotline or a plethora of bilateral hotlines could make for as much confusion as clarification, especially in time-urgent and tense situations, even if the intent of all communications on such lines is perfectly benign.

C. **Making surprise attack less likely**: Dedicated communication procedures are not likely to make surprise attack more difficult to carry out or less likely to succeed. Indeed, the obverse might be true: an obvious danger of "hotlines" is that they could serve as additional vehicles for deception.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Potential Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inhibit political intimidation</td>
<td>None – but could provide additional vehicle for intimidation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lessen misunderstanding/miscalculation</td>
<td>Mixed – provides opportunity for clarification but also for confusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make surprise attack less likely</td>
<td>None (or negative) – potential vehicle for deception or cause of paralysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Satisfies some NATO allies and NNAs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 9—Evaluation of Measure VI: Communication
THE PACKAGE AS A WHOLE

Figure 10 summarizes our evaluation of the potential contributions of the original NATO package to the "core" objectives identified at the outset of this analysis. Assessment of the value of the package as a whole is necessarily contingent on the relative weighting of those objectives. We have not weighted these objectives differently here but, rather, have assumed for this evaluation that each is approximately equal to the others in relative importance. Accordingly, it appears that the overall value of the current NATO CSBM package is marginally positive in its substantive impact on the three "core" objectives taken together. In several cases, however, the contribution is likely to be a mixed one, involving substantial risks as well as potential benefits. Not surprisingly, this double-edged problem appears to be more acute the more important and sensitive one considers a particular objective to be.

A. Overall, the package appears to carry few significant risks regarding the objective of inhibiting political intimidation. However, its potential contribution toward that objective appears, even at best, to be marginal.

B. The measures in the original NATO package are likely to make a more important contribution to lessening misunderstanding and
miscalculation by dispelling ungrounded suspicions—that is, by reducing the likelihood of "false-positive" alarms in tense situations. To date, however, overreaction to "false-positive" alarms has not been NATO's primary inclination nor, it would seem, a very likely problem as long as current NATO attitudes and procedures hold sway. The usefulness of the original NATO proposals in this regard may become more significant if and when NATO adopts more effective procedures for adequate minimum response to ambiguous warning. It could then become important to use such signalling devices as might be provided by measures like these to aid in identifying and tailoring what those adequate but minimum responses might actually be.

C. The potential risks entailed by the measures in the original NATO package are greatest when it comes to making it less likely that the Warsaw Pact will be able to achieve surprise in an attack upon NATO. "False-negative" indicators of alarm and the danger of underreacting, it can be argued, are more serious problems for NATO at present than the kind of "false-positive" alarms that could propel the Western alliance into war prematurely and unnecessarily. From the perspective of this objective alone—making surprise attack less likely—the original package might even be judged less than positive in terms of its contribution, given the uncertainties and the possible contribution of "none or less" identified for Measures II, IV, and, especially, VI. Those who believe that reducing the risk of surprise attack should have top priority among NATO's "core" objectives, therefore, will find the package disappointing in this regard. Those whose priorities differ are likely to be more satisfied.

D. Overall, the original package could also make some small but useful contributions to related NATO objectives, such as facilitating the focusing of intelligence-gathering efforts, providing some useful counters to Soviet propaganda campaigns in Western Europe, and enhancing Western public relations efforts in both Western and Eastern Europe.
IV. OPTIONS

The foregoing analysis suggests that the original NATO CSBM package is deficient in two important respects. First, it is not likely to make more than a marginal contribution to the "core" objectives identified in Sec. II of this report. Second, it carries risks that could in fact do these objectives disservice.

Given this judgment, NATO's options would appear to be as follows:

1. *Leave the package as it is and recognize its limitations.* Under this option, careful attention would be given to the potential risks inherent in the gap between the rhetoric often employed in connection with CSBMs and the likely results of agreement upon them at the Stockholm conference. There is a strong possibility that governmental and public rhetoric would significantly exceed the military significance of any package ultimately agreed upon in Stockholm. This could amplify unrealistic Western expectations about the utility of CSBMs in preventing surprise attack, particularly among those NATO nations inclined to put the best face on ambiguous Soviet behavior in order to avoid hard military choices.

2. *Upgrade or redesign the measures to better meet the "core" objectives.* This choice would require tightening up on the original measures—e.g., by supplying more specific details to eliminate ambiguities and improve the prospects of implementation in the manner desired. The option could also involve consideration of stringent "constraint" measures of a kind that have been discussed before in other contexts and proposed by some non-NATO participants for Stockholm (e.g., constraints on the deployment of manpower and armaments in certain areas). Since such measures or upgrading current measures appeared implausible or unrealistic in the near term at Stockholm, we have not pursued this option further here.

3. *Identify subsets of the original package:* (a) those that could most threaten NATO; (b) those that may promise the alliance as much as the original package (or more) with less risk. The latter subsets might serve as alternatives or fallback positions in the course of further negotiations.

4. *Refocus the objectives while modifying the measures in the original package so as to gear them more specifically toward the altered objectives.*
In this section, we shall briefly consider the third and fourth options since these two appear to offer the most promise for NATO in the foreseeable future. But first we should take into account some of the options facing the U.S. and NATO’s principal negotiating adversary in Stockholm, namely the USSR.

THE SOVIET APPROACH TO STOCKHOLM

To some extent, of course, the prospective Western approach to the CDE will be shaped by the posture of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. During most of the period since the CDE began in January 1984, the Soviets have, as is their custom, emphasized declaratory measures. Primarily aimed at appealing to European public opinion and increasing tensions within the Atlantic Alliance, or so it would seem, these measures consist of general, nice-sounding pledges not to do something. The original Soviet proposal in Stockholm, for example, specifically included five such declarations of good will, calling on all of the states participating in the Stockholm Conference to:

- Undertake an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons;
- Pledge not to be the first "to use military force against each other at all;"
- Commit themselves to freeze or reduce military budgets;
- Ban chemical weapons in Europe;
- Endorse the creation of nuclear-free zones in the Balkans, the Baltic, and in Central Europe where there would a zone free of battlefield nuclear weapons.

Besides these proposed declaratory measures, the Soviets advanced one comprehensive “military-technical” measure in Stockholm that bore some resemblance to the NATO package of measures. The Soviet measure called for: prior notification of major ground troop exercises (more than 20,000 men) in Europe and the adjoining ocean regions and air space; numerical limitations on ground force military exercises, conducted independently or jointly with naval and air force components, in Europe as well as in the adjacent ocean area and air space; the development of observer exchanges at major military exercises; and agreement on adequate forms of verification.

As the talks in Stockholm grew more serious in the course of 1985, the Soviets became increasingly realistic. They seemed to put less emphasis on their patently nonnegotiable declaratory measures and more emphasis on negotiating with the West on the details of a
"military-technical" measure. And as the CDE moved toward the Vienna Review Conference in November 1986, it seemed likely that the negotiators in Stockholm would increasingly focus on the details of concrete confidence and security-building measures as well as on the exact language to be contained in a declaratory statement on the non-use of force.

The assumption that such give-and-take would dictate the course of events in Stockholm and afterwards provided yet another reason for examining the third and fourth options listed above. These options—(3) maintaining NATO's original objectives in Stockholm but negotiating one or another subpackage of CSBMs and (4) refocusing the original objectives, then modifying the measures—appeared to offer the United States and NATO their best hope for the future in the context of the CDE.

**MAINTAIN ORIGINAL OBJECTIVES WHILE NEGOTIATING A SUBPACKAGE OF CSBMs**

As talks proceeded at the negotiating table with the Warsaw Pact and NNA nations as well as within NATO, the original Western proposals at Stockholm underwent some transformation through modifications to one or more of the original measures, through deletion of certain measures, and through the addition of new measures (see Appendix D). It is conceivable that the West, as part of its future negotiating strategy, may opt to reduce the scope of its original package and negotiate additional agreements based on only a few of the original six measures. Although numerous combinations are conceivable, three "generic" possibilities seem particularly instructive:

- **Measures I, III, and V (See Fig. 11)**

  Our analysis suggests that these measures are the "drivers" of the original package insofar as it holds the promise of obtaining or at least approximating NATO's original "core" objectives. Measure I would provide agreed points of reference necessary for determining violations of other measures: between them, Measures III and V hold some promise of making a positive contribution toward inhibiting political intimidation by the Soviet Union and lessening misunderstanding and miscalculation by all parties. Measures III and V together also appear to have the most potentially positive bearing on the problem of surprise attack. The potential lulling effect on NATO of Measure III is the most significant downside feature
of this core package. (The problems associated with implementing Measure V, as discussed above, cannot be completely discounted either.) Such a subpackage, however, holds the promise of achieving almost as much as the full package without the additional risks (e.g., those associated with Measure VI) currently attendant upon the package as a whole.

- **Measures III and VI** (See Fig. 12)
  This appears to be the most risk-laden subpackage. In its original general formulation, Measure VI seems to make the least contribution to NATO's core objectives and, combined with Measure III, it carries with it significant risks for NATO vis-à-vis the original core objectives. A negotiated outcome along these lines should be viewed with extreme caution.

- **Measures II and IV** (See Fig. 13)
  This would appear to be the blandest subpackage. As such, it would probably contribute little to the achievement of NATO's core objectives. However, this subpackage also carries with it few risks of damage to NATO's vital interests, since adoption of Measures II and IV, perhaps as evolutionary adjuncts or
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>I Information</th>
<th>II Forecasts</th>
<th>III Notification</th>
<th>IV Observers</th>
<th>V Inspection</th>
<th>VI Communication</th>
<th>Package (III-VI)</th>
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<td>Some</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Positive</td>
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<tr>
<td>Make surprise attack less likely</td>
<td>None by itself</td>
<td>None or neg</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Non- or neg</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Some</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>Focus intelligence</td>
<td>mixed PR</td>
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<td>Western cohesion</td>
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Fig. 12—Potential contributions of Subpackages III + VI

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<th>II Forecasts</th>
<th>III Notification</th>
<th>IV Observers</th>
<th>V Inspection</th>
<th>VI Communication</th>
<th>Package (II-IV)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inhibit political intimidation</td>
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<td>Some</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>Some</td>
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<td>Marginal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lessen misunderstanding miscalculation</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Some</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make surprise attack less likely</td>
<td>None by itself</td>
<td>None or neg</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>None or neg</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Some</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>PR value</td>
<td>Focus intelligence</td>
<td>mixed PR</td>
<td>Focus intelligence</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Intelligence cohesion</td>
<td>Western cohesion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 13—Potential contributions of Subpackages II + IV
"improvements" to the existing Helsinki CBMs, would likely raise few unrealistic expectations of what such a package could actually accomplish and thus have a minimal effect, positive or negative, on the NATO countries.

**REFOCUS OBJECTIVES AND MODIFY MEASURES**

NATO's central objective in the CSBM talks at Stockholm may at some point be reduced to no more than achieving a bland agreement—i.e., any agreement that is not harmful to its interests. In such a case, it may be best to concentrate on achieving two of the three core objectives discussed in this report—inhibiting political intimidation and lessening misunderstanding and miscalculation—and to give up, in effect, on the third, reducing the risk of surprise attack. If NATO's goals for Stockholm are ultimately reduced to this option, the Western allies may well aim for concluding a subpackage constructed around Measures II and IV.

Alternatively, NATO could decide to concentrate on achieving what might be considered the most important "core" objective—making the achievement of surprise attack less likely. This objective might be pursued by seeking to impose operational restrictions or "constraints" on Soviet and Warsaw Pact abilities to launch such an attack. For example, significant constraints could be imposed on the deployment of manpower and weapons in certain areas. Alternatively, the same objective could be pursued through measures and procedures that attempt to facilitate prompt, unified, and adequate NATO responses to what is most likely going to be ambiguous warning in any event. In practice, at least for the immediate future, the latter course appears to be the more realistic option for the Stockholm Conference.

Two variations of the original NATO proposals could form the basis of revised subpackages that have been refocused so as to concentrate on the objective of improving NATO's response to a potential Soviet surprise attack—as opposed to the objective of constraining the Soviets' ability to launch such an attack in the first place.

- A combination of Measure II and certain aspects of Measure III with Measure V and certain aspects of Measure IV.

Measures II and III as originally proposed would be merged into a single measure that would require annual forecasts of notifiable activities and would incorporate all the specifications required to define what those activities might be. All the new measure would call for, however, is an annual forecast; it would permit unforecasted activities to occur,
but it would not provide for prenotification of them (as in Measure III), only concurrent notification (as Measure III requires for alerts).

The specifications contained in the original Measure I could also be incorporated into this combined measure, although two important changes might be made in the process. One would be to provide annual lists of force structures and units, as originally proposed, without necessarily having to provide the specific location of each unit as well. The second change, which would complement the first, would be to provide a separate annual list of sites to be excluded from inspection. Such sites, for which provision has been made in Measure V, would probably include ammunition depots, nuclear or chemical storage facilities, defense industries, and other similarly sensitive places; they might also include the garrison locations of specific units, since these locations are not subject to inspection under the terms of NATO's proposal (only units "out of garrison" are to be inspected or observed).

Indeed, garrison locations could help define the standard for an excluded site. To qualify for exclusion, in other words, a site would have to resemble a garrison in various ways—for example, its size would be limited; public access to it would be routinely restricted; it would generally consist of contiguous, fenced territory; and the premises would normally house personnel or equipment. A list of such excluded sites could be provided simultaneously with, but separately from, the annual list of force structures and units. This way, the latter would not be directly identified with specific locations, although the locations themselves would have been provided—along with other locations likewise defined only by their geographic coordinates—on the list of excluded sites. Perhaps such a system of dual listing can help solve some of the definitional problems associated with Measure I that were discussed above in Sec. III.

Furthermore, the on-site inspections proposed in Measure V could be keyed to the number of activities forecasted by a given participant. The greater the number of such activities, the more inspections would be allowed the other participants. Hence, there would be disincentives—the additional inspections incurred—to inflating the number of forecasted activities. (As discussed in Sec. III, this is a potential problem with Measures II and III.) To hedge against the opposite extreme—a plethora of ad hoc activities that had not been included in the forecast—additional inspections would also be incurred for all unforecasted activities, perhaps on a one-for-one basis. The hope here is to create a healthy antagonism between too many and too few forecasted activities, using the prospect of added inspections as the vehicle for inducing self-restraint. Moreover, by defining a garrison as a designated unit's fenced location and making this the standard for an
excluded site under the terms of an on-site inspection, as discussed above, a useful and manageable inspection regime might be made possible.

- **A simplified but upgraded Measure III.**

It is common to refer to the alert “exception” in Measure III as a great loophole that, by some accounts, vitiates the measure. Yet it is inconceivable that any nation with real security concerns could ever credibly divest itself, indefinitely and in advance, of the right to mobilize or deploy forces on very short notice in what it may consider an emergency situation. Since it would be futile to attempt to design measures that would somehow get around this reality and close the “loophole,” it may be simpler, safer, and of greater practical utility to key on the supposed loophole and make it the centerpiece of a new subpackage. This could be accomplished by

- Dispensing with pre-notification altogether
- Requiring only notification at commencement of all “notifiable” military activities
- Requiring greater detail on the purpose and composition/structure of such activities

Substantial advance notification of Soviet military activities is, in practice, of limited value to NATO, which would in any case have to wait for the actual unfolding of a Warsaw Pact military activity in order to judge its significance and potential threat. Instead, it is perhaps the degree of detail required of the Soviets via established notification procedures that would be of most use to NATO. The prospect of having to provide significant amounts of detail would place the Soviets in a different kind of bind over whether to notify promptly, in detail, or to violate an agreed-upon measure.

If such is the case, concurrent notification of activities as they are about to take place—essentially, the alert “exception” in the current formulation of Measure III—could provide much that is of substantive value in advance notification with fewer potential risks. For example, the simpler and less ambitious the appearance of a measure, the less likelihood there is that NATO leaders and their parliaments and publics will entertain exaggerated expectations of it or of the impact of CSBMs in general on reducing the risk of surprise attack. With concurrent notification, which shortens the timelines for decisionmaking, the chances are greater that attention will be on the true nature of the activity, rather than on the fact of CSBM notification, thus reducing the risk of complacency that could be most dangerous in times of crisis.
In addition, NATO leaders might be somewhat less inhibited in taking necessary precautionary measures in times of crisis if such steps were not labelled "alerts" by international agreement. Instead of casting them, by inference, in an extraordinary and potentially escalatory light, they would simply become "notifiable" activities for which there were standard, not extraordinary, procedures; hence, they might be politically easier for NATO to resort to in times of crisis.
Since the negotiations began in 1984, there has been a good deal of discussion and debate, inside and outside NATO governments, over how the conclusion of an agreement on CSBMs in Stockholm can help build confidence and security in Europe. Some have urged negotiation of a CSBMs agreement that has as its centerpiece the reduction of miscalculation and misunderstanding among the signatories. Others have argued that Western efforts in Stockholm should concentrate on the objective of making the possibility of Soviet surprise attack less likely. Still others have stressed the importance of measures that might impede Soviet employment of force for the purpose of political intimidation. Of course, there have also been those who want to realize all three of these “core” objectives simultaneously, and other objectives as well, through successful negotiation of confidence and security-building measures.

Whatever the outcome in Stockholm, an inherent tension will remain between the objectives of reducing miscalculation and misunderstanding as potential causes of conflict and making a potential Soviet surprise attack less likely to come as a surprise. How the different participants collectively decide to weight these two objectives will largely determine what sort of package or subpackage of measures emerges from Stockholm. If heavy emphasis is placed on reducing the possibility of misunderstanding/miscalculation in order to lessen the likelihood of overreaction and the possibility of unintended nuclear war, there will undoubtedly be a focus on measures designed primarily to enhance information flow and communications among signatories, particularly in crisis situations. On the other hand, if heavier emphasis is placed on reducing the chances of being surprised by an attack, concerns about potential notification and communications measures being used for deceptive purposes will tend to predominate, as will a concomitant interest in a strong measure for verification. Such a measure, in combination with stringent information measures, would signal a predominant interest in reducing the chances of underreaction to potentially dangerous situations.

Given the Western alliance’s rather cumbersome decisionmaking processes and defensive force posture, logic suggests that those in NATO who favor emphasizing the surprise attack objective stand a good chance of prevailing in any argument over the relative importance of CSBM objectives. The major problem facing Western countries
appears to lie less in a mistaken overreaction to Warsaw Pact military activities—a NATO surprise attack on Eastern forces hardly seems conceivable—than in the West’s interpreting as benign a changing military situation in the East that could become increasingly threatening. Accordingly, it may prove useful for NATO decisionmakers to turn their attention to rendering the element of surprise less likely in any potential Soviet attack.

They can do this by concentrating on ways to facilitate prompt, unified allied responses to any and all potentially threatening Soviet activities. To do this and at the same time minimize the down-side risks identified above for some of the NATO-proposed measures in Stockholm, the United States and its allies may have to consider modifying the original package of NATO measures. As discussed above, one particularly promising modification of this package, which might protect both U.S. and NATO security interests in Stockholm, would be to combine Measures II and III (adding the necessary definitions and thresholds from Measure III to Measure II’s annual forecasts) and, \textit{inter alia}, keying the inspection provisions in Measure V to the number of activities forecasted by any given nation.

Whether such a modified package, with all the details worked out, would actually make a Soviet surprise attack less likely by making NATO’s response less uncertain is an important question that merits further study. More dynamically oriented research methods involving surprise attack scenarios, for example, could be helpful in shedding light on this question. In particular, gaming the question and analyzing the results could be potentially quite valuable, for gaming offers the promise of capturing the interactive, competitive elements associated with CSBMs. Whatever the particular format, however, additional analyses are necessary if one is trying to assess the degree to which CSBMs could be used operationally to conceal or clarify ultimate military intentions, as well as to restrict or constrain (implicitly or explicitly) military activities. This report has provided useful starting points for such analyses, we trust, as well as helpful insights into the nature and purposes of CSBMs.
Recalling that the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is an integral part of the process initiated by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and that, according to the Madrid Concluding Document, the objective of the first stage of the Conference is to adopt a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures;

The above-named States are determined to work for the adoption of measures that would create greater openness and more predictability in military activities in order to reduce the risk of surprise attack, diminish the threat of armed conflict in Europe resulting from misunderstanding and miscalculation, and inhibit the use of force for the purpose of political intimidation;

\footnote{Reissued as submitted by the authors.}
Implementation and verification of such measures, as well as respect for existing international commitments, would enhance stability, contribute to the preservation of peace and could open up prospects for new progress in disarmament;

With these goals in mind and in conformity with the mandate for the Conference the above-mentioned States propose the following confidence- and security-building measures:

I. MEASURES OF INFORMATION

Measure 1: Exchange of Military Information

At the start of each calendar year, the participating States agree to exchange information on the structure of their ground forces and land-based air forces in the zone of application for agreed CSBMs as agreed in the mandate for the Conference.

Information will also be given on the existing regulations in the CDE zone for accredited military personnel.

Clarification of information may be sought by appropriate means.

The information thus exchanged will form a basis for further measures dealing with military activities.

II. MEASURES DESIGNED TO ENHANCE STABILITY

Measure 2: Exchange of Forecasts of Activities Notifiable in Advance

The participating States will exchange annual forecasts of all military activities in the CDE zone which would be notifiable in advance under any other CSBM. Amendments to the forecast need not be given if a notifiable activity is either an addition to or a change from the forecast; such information will be provided in the actual notification for that activity.

Clarification of information contained in the annual forecast may be sought by appropriate means.
Measure 3: Notification of Military Activities

Notification will be given by the participating States 45 days in advance of the following activities in the CDE zone:

Out-of-garrison land activities. When one or more ground force divisions or equivalent formations or 6000 or more ground troops not organized into a division, or forces comprising more than a specified number of main battle tanks, or armoured personnel carriers/mechanized infantry combat vehicles are carrying out a common activity under a single command, whether independent or combined with air and/or amphibious support.

Mobilization Activities. When 25,000 or more troops or the major combat elements of three or more divisions are involved.

Amphibious Activities. When three or more battalions or 3000 amphibious troops carry out a landing in the CDE zone.

When a notifiable out-of-garrison land activity, mobilization activity, or amphibious activity is carried out on short notice as an alert activity, it will be notifiable at the time it begins, that is, when troops are ordered to carry out the activity.

All notifications will be made in a standardized format to be agreed on.

Compliance with the arrangements agreed under this measure will be subject to various forms of verification including the invitation of observers and inspection. Questions concerning compliance with the arrangements agreed under this measure can be dealt with by appropriate means.

III. OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION MEASURES
Measure 4: Observation of Certain Military Activities

The participating States agree to invite observers from all other participating States to all prenotified activities and to alert activities of longer than a specified period conducted in the CDE zone on their territory. The host State shall ensure that observers are provided the opportunity to form a judgment, supported by direct observation in the area of activity, as to the routine nature of the activity.
Measure 5: Compliance and Verification

A. National Technical Means.
   Participating States agree not to interfere with national technical means. In using their national technical means for the purpose of verification, participating States will respect generally recognized principles of international law.

B. Monitoring of Compliance.
   Subject to limitations and modalities to be agreed, participating States may request inspection concerning compliance with agreed CSBMs.

   These provisions provide participating States with the opportunity to monitor and thus verify whether notified activities are nonthreatening and correspond to the details given in notifications, and that all notifiable activities are properly notified.

Measure 6: Development of Means of Communication

   Arrangements should be made which will enhance the means of communication between participating States.
Appendix B

NATO PROPOSAL: CSCE/SC.1/AMPLIFIED

MEASURE I: EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION

1. Each participating State will annually exchange information concerning its military command organization, and its regulations for accredited military personnel, in the zone. Such information will be provided to all other participating States and will be exchanged no later than the first day of January of each calendar year, and will be effective as of that date.

2. For each participating State, such information will be provided in writing, and will include the following:

   (a) In chart form, the command organization in the zone, including designation, normal headquarters location in exact geographic terms, and composition of its ground and land-based air forces down to: (i) major ground formations and main combat units; and (ii) land-based air formations, specifying wing, air regiment or equivalent formations; and
   
   (b) Its regulations governing the presence and activities in the zone of military personnel accredited to it from participating States.

3. Clarification of such information may be requested through consultation by appropriate means.

MEASURE II: EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS OF ACTIVITIES NOTIFYABLE IN ADVANCE

1. Each participating State will exchange annual forecasts of its military activities within the zone for which notification is required by Measure III. Such forecasts will be provided to all other participating States. The forecasts, organized into calendar year quarters, will be exchanged for each calendar

---

year, and will be issued not later than the fifteenth day of
November for the following calendar year.

2. If a participating State adds a military activity to those that
have been forecast, such additions or changes will be provided
in the notification for that activity pursuant to Measure III.

3. A participating State will present forecasts in writing orga-
nized into calendar year quarters, in the following format, for
each military activity planned:
(a) Designation of the activity, including, if applicable, the
name of the exercise.
(b) The general purpose of the activity.
(c) The thirty-day period during which the activity is planned
to begin.
(d) The names of the participating States that will be
engaged in the activity.
(e) The geographic coordinates of the area where the activity
is planned to take place.
(f) The duration of the activity.
(g) The number of the troops, to include amphibious and air-
borne troops, directing staff, and umpires that will be
engaged in the activity.
(h) The type of forces that will be engaged in the activity.

4. Clarification of information contained in an annual forecast
may be requested through consultation by appropriate means.

MEASURE III: NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY
ACTIVITIES

A. General

1. Each participating State that plans to carry out a military
activity, that is, an out-of-garrison land activity, a mobiliza-
tion activity, or an amphibious activity in the zone, will give
notification 45 days before such activity begins. If a military
activity is conducted as an alert, notification will be given in
accordance with Section E of this measure. Notifications will
be provided to all other participating States.

2. A participating State on whose national territory a military
activity is planned to take place will give notification of the
entire activity conducted on its territory even if the forces of
that State are not engaged in the activity. This will not limit
the obligation of other participating States whose partici-
pation amounts to a military activity on its own to notify these activities.

3. Compliance with the provisions of this measure will be evaluated on the basis of information exchanged in accordance with Measures I-III of this document and will be subject to verification by appropriate means. Participating States will be invited to send observers to military activities within the zone, as provided in Measure IV of this document. Furthermore, participating States will be permitted to inspect such military activities or possible military activities for the purpose of monitoring compliance, as provided in Measure V of this document.

B. Out-of-Garrison Land Activities

1. An “out-of-garrison land activity” is an activity in which:
   (a) One or more ground force divisions, equivalent formations, or formations which are temporarily organized into a structure comparable to a division formation, are engaged, if:
      (i) one-half or more of the major combat elements of the division or equivalent formation, that is, tank, infantry, motorized rifle, airborne brigades or regiments or equivalent-sized formations, and at least one supporting artillery or engineer or helicopter element are out-of-garrison at the same time and carrying out a common activity under a single command; or
      (ii) 6000 or more of the troops of the division or equivalent formation are out-of-garrison at the same time and carrying out a common activity under a single command; or
      (iii) (X) main battle tanks or (Y) armored carriers (AC) of the division or equivalent formation are out-of-garrison at the same time and carrying out a common activity under a single command; or
   (b) The combat elements of ground forces not organized into division formations are engaged, if:
      (i) 6000 or more troops are out-of-garrison at the same time, and carrying out a common activity under a single direct operational command; or
      (ii) (X) main battle tanks or (Y) armored carriers are out-of-garrison at the same time and engaged in a
common activity under a single direct operational command.

2. Ground forces garrisoned inside of the zone will be considered to be out-of-garrison when they are away from their normal peacetime locations and are in the zone. Ground forces normally garrisoned outside of the zone will be considered to be out-of-garrison when they leave their arrival base within the zone to engage in a military activity on land within the zone.

3. A participating State will give notification of an out-of-garrison land activity whether the activity is independent or combined with air or amphibious support.

4. A participating State will give notification at the start of ground force movements in the case of an out-of-garrison land activity to carry out an activity outside the zone from a point of embarkation inside the zone.

C. Mobilization Activities

1. A “mobilization activity” is an activity involving a recall of units in which:
   (a) 25,000 or more troops, either reservists or in combination with regulars, are involved in the same activity in the zone; or
   (b) The majority of the major combat elements, that is, tank, infantry, motorized rifle, airborne brigades or regiments or equivalent sized formations, of each of three or more divisions or equivalent formations are involved in the same recall activity in the zone.

D. Amphibious Activities

1. An “amphibious activity” is any landing from the sea onto the land in which:
   (a) A formation equivalent to three or more battalions, whether marine, naval infantry or ground forces, lands in the zone; or
   (b) 3000 or more combat troops land in the zone.

2. If the troops engaged in the landing, as defined in paragraph one, embark in the zone, then the date and place of embarkation will be included in the notification. If the area of landing is changed or decided upon after the initial notification, then
that additional information will be given as soon as the area of landing is determined.

E. Alert Activities

1. Each participating State carrying out a military activity as an alert will give notification at the time its troops are ordered to carry out the activity.
2. Except as specifically provided, a military activity conducted as an alert will be subject to the same provisions as military activities generally.

F. Contents of Notification

1. A participating State will present notification of a military activity in writing, in the following format:
   (a) Description of the activity in the zone, including, if applicable, the name of the exercise.
   (b) The name of the headquarters conducting the activity.
   (c) The general purpose of the activity, including the relation of the activity to that of any other military activity for which notification is given under this measure.
   (d) The dates and duration of the different phases of the activity in the zone, including the beginning of out-of-garrison deployments, the active exercise phase if applicable, and the recovery phase during which troops are returned to normal peacetime locations, if the recovery phase is to occur immediately after the activity.
   (e) The names of the participating States engaged in the activity.
   (f) Boundaries of the geographical area in the zone where the activity will take place, including a map trace or geographic coordinates.
   (g) The number of troops to include amphibious and airborne troops, directing staff and umpires engaged. If more than one participating State engages in an activity, then the number of troops, staff and umpires for each participating State will be specified.
   (h) The designation of the ground force divisions engaged in the activity.
(i) The type of other forces engaged in the activity, including ground based tactical air forces and naval ship-to-shore combat forces, i.e., those executing amphibious operations, air support of ground troops or ship-to-shore gunnery, if part of a military activity in the zone.
(j) Clarifying information if the activity is one for which no forecast was made pursuant to Measure II of this document or if the activity is one for which a forecast was made but the information provided in the forecast has been changed.

MEASURE IV: OBSERVATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES

1. Each participating State will be permitted to send observers to military activities. Observation of a military activity will include observation of all forces participating in the activity, including the forces of participating States other than the host State.

2. **Invitations.** At the time notification of a military activity is given pursuant to Measure III of this document, the host State will invite the other participating States to send observers to the activity. A host State need not invite to a military activity observers from a participating State which has given notice to the host State that it does not desire to receive such invitations. A participating State which has given such notice should thereafter receive invitations at any time if it gives notice to the host State of its desire to receive such invitations. A host State need not invite observers to a military activity from a participating State which does not maintain diplomatic relations with the host State.

3. **Duration.** The host State will permit observers to begin observation of a military activity at the time that activity commences. The host State need not permit observation once the end of the activity is reached as indicated in the notification or once the criteria for a military activity pursuant to Measure III of this document are no longer met, whichever occurs first.

4. **Alerts.** The participating States need not invite observers to a military activity carried out as an alert unless the alert has a duration of more than 48 hours. If an alert activity has a duration of more than 48 hours, the other participating States will be permitted to observe the alert 36 hours after it begins.
5. **Observer personnel.** A participating State will be permitted to send no more than two observers to a military activity. Each participating State will provide the names of its observers to the host State at the earliest possible time. Whenever possible, at least one of these observers will be from the military personnel of that participating State accredited to the host State.

6. **Protection and immunities.** When in the territory within the zone of any participating State, observers will be granted those diplomatic privileges and immunities necessary to enable them to perform their tasks fully and unhindered at all times. (Details to be decided in the course of negotiations.)

7. **Coordination and arrangements.** Invitations to observe a military activity will be issued through diplomatic channels at the time of notification of the activity. Arrangements for observation will be coordinated between the host State and the observing State through the embassy of the observing State to the host State, unless those States agree to use another channel.

8. **Coordination with other participating States.** Host State responsibilities, other than the responsibility to invite observers, may be delegated by the host State to another participating State engaged in the military activity on the territory of the host State, if that participating State agrees to assume the responsibility. In such cases, the allocation of responsibilities will be specified in the invitations to observe the activity.

9. **Logistics.** The host State will provide appropriate facilities and hospitality for observers at the site of a military activity being observed.

10. **Transportation.** The host State will provide transportation for observers in the area of the military activity. If requested by an observing State, the host State will provide transportation for observers from the embassy of the observing State or its nearest consulate to the area of the activity. The observing State may use its consular or diplomatic vehicles to transport its own observers to a location designated by the host State, where the observers will transfer to vehicles of the host State. The transfer point will be near a location suitable for observation of the activity.

11. **Communications.** Observers will have access to telecommunication facilities that will allow timely contact with their embassies or nearest consulates.
12. **Scope of observation.**

(a) For each military activity, the host State will:
   (i) guide the observers in the area of the activity;
   (ii) allow the observers to use personal optical observation equipment necessary to perform their duties;
   (iii) give detailed briefings of exercise scenarios;
   (iv) inform the observers of the progress of the activity and provide an opportunity to view directly all formations engaged in the activity;
   (v) provide other information and observation opportunities sufficient to allow the observers to form a judgment as to the nonthreatening nature of the activity.

(b) In addition, the host State will:
   (i) in the case of out-of-garrison land activities, allow the observers to observe all phases of the activity, including associated air landings, and rail, port and road movements, in the zone between the garrison and the area of out-of-garrison deployment;
   (ii) in the case of an amphibious activity, allow observers to observe sea landings and associated air landings from a location on land;
   (iii) in the case of a mobilization activity, allow observers to observe the arrival at garrisons of personnel and vehicles, and
   (iv) allow the observing State all the rights of observation provided for each type of activity when different types of military activities are combined.

**MEASURE V: COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION**

1. Each participating State will use available national technical means of verification in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. No participating State may interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other participating States operating in accordance with paragraph 1.

3. **Inspections.** Each participating State will be permitted to inspect a military activity or possible military activity within the zone for the purpose of monitoring compliance with agreed CSBMs. A participating State requesting such an inspection will cite the circumstances occasioning its request, and the participating State receiving the request will comply with the
request. Any possible dispute as to the validity of this citation will not prevent or delay the conduct of an inspection.

4. **Inspection quota.** No more than two per participating State per calendar year. An inspection will not be counted if, due to *force majeure*, it cannot be made or is discontinued.

5. **Method of inspection.** A receiving State will permit inspections from the ground, air or both.

6. **Area for inspection.** Except as stipulated in paragraph 7, below, an inspecting State is permitted to designate any area for inspection within the territory of a participating State within the zone. Such an area is referred to as a "designated area." In a designated area, the inspecting State will be permitted access, entry and unobstructed survey.

7. **Exceptions.** The receiving State will not be required to permit inspections of any restricted areas. These areas should, however, be as few in number and as limited in extent as possible. In particular, the receiving State will also not be required to permit inspections within:

   (a) defense installations, for example, naval bases, dockyards, garrisons, military airfields, firing ranges, buildings or defense research development or production establishments to which access by the general public is normally restricted or denied;

   (b) naval vessels, military vehicles or aircraft.

8. **Communications channels.** The participating States will use diplomatic channels for communications concerning inspections unless the receiving State and inspecting State agree otherwise.

9. **Coordination.** In its request, the inspecting State will notify the receiving State of:

   (a) the location of the designated area, by giving the geographical coordinates of the area;

   (b) the mode of transportation to and from the designated area;

   (c) whether the inspection will be from the ground, the air, or both;

   (d) information for the issuance of diplomatic visas to inspectors entering the receiving State.

10. **Timing.** An inspection will proceed in the following sequence:

    (a) within 12 hours after the issuance of an inspection request, the receiving State will reply to the inspecting
State, make necessary administrative arrangements for the inspection, and transmit coordinating information, including the points of entry to its territory. The receiving State will ensure that the inspection team is able to reach the designated area without delay from the points of entry.

(b) within not less than 24 hours nor more than 36 hours after the issuance of an inspection request, unless otherwise mutually agreed, the inspection team will be permitted to enter the territory of the receiving State;

(c) the inspecting State will inform the receiving State of any delay in its arrival within 36 hours at the points of entry to the territory of the receiving State and indicate the extra time needed to arrive at the points of entry;

(d) within 48 hours after the arrival of the inspection team at the designated area, unless otherwise mutually agreed, the inspection will be terminated.

11. **Report of an inspection.** The inspecting State will prepare a report of its inspection and will provide a copy of that report to all participating States.

12. **Third parties.** The forces of the participating States other than the receiving State within the designated area will be included in an inspection at the discretion of the inspecting State. All participating States will facilitate the passage of the inspection teams through their territory.

13. **Inspection team.** An inspection team will consist of no more than four inspectors, in addition to aircraft crew and one accompanying driver for each land vehicle supplied by the inspecting State. The personnel of the inspection team may be brought into the receiving State by the inspecting State for the purpose of the inspection, or be drawn from the personnel of the diplomatic and consular facilities of the inspecting State in the receiving State.

14. **Transportation.** The inspecting State may provide its own transportation, or, upon request, the receiving State will provide transportation. The inspection team is permitted, unless otherwise mutually agreed, one aircraft and two land vehicles.

15. **Logistic support.** Upon request, the receiving State will furnish adequate food and lodging for the inspection team. The inspection team may provide their own tents and rations, or may make use of civilian facilities.

16. **Communications.** The inspection team will have access to and may carry telecommunications equipment, the type of which will be subject to the approval of the receiving State.
17. **Equipment.** The inspection team will have the unrestricted use of its own maps, personal optical viewing devices, cameras and tape recorders. The use of other sensors or information-gathering devices for ground inspections is prohibited.

18. **Protection and immunities.** When in the territory within the zone of any participating State, inspectors will be granted those diplomatic privileges and immunities necessary to enable them to perform their tasks fully and unhindered at all times. (Details to be decided in the course of negotiations.)

19. **Travel with inspectors.** The receiving State will be permitted to accompany the inspection team during the period that the team is in the designated area. A representative of the receiving State may travel on each of the vehicles of the inspecting State while the vehicles are moving on land within the territory of the receiving State, and on the aircraft of the inspecting State from the time of the first landing of the aircraft on the territory of the receiving State until the time of the final takeoff of the aircraft from the territory of the receiving State.

20. **Modalities for inspection.** (Other modalities for inspection to be inserted here.)

**MEASURE VI: DEVELOPMENT OF MEANS OF COMMUNICATION**

1. The participating States will establish dedicated communications links.

2. The participating States may use such dedicated communications links to quickly and directly contact each other for the expeditious handling of the flow of information required by the agreed CSBMs.

3. Under certain circumstances, the participating States may use such dedicated communications links for communications on matters of urgency related to agreed CSBMs. The sixteen sponsors of this document note that this measure should be agreed insofar as the CSBMs agreed at the conference warrant such a measure.
Appendix C

DOCUMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE: CSCE/SC.9

CSCE Distribution
RESTRICTED

CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

STOCKHOLM 1984

PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY THE DELEGATION OF SWEDEN


(1) The representatives of the participating States of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Yugoslavia, met in Stockholm from 17 January 1984 to 19 September 1986, in accordance with the provisions relating to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe contained in the Concluding Document of the Madrid Follow-up Meeting of the CSCE.
(2) The participants were addressed by the Prime Minister of Sweden, the late Olof Palme, on 17 January 1984.

(3) Opening statements were made by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and other Heads of Delegation. The Prime Minister of Spain as well as Ministers and senior officials of several other participating States addressed the Conference later. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden addressed the Conference on 19 September 1986.


(5) Contributions were made by the following non-participating Mediterranean States: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia.

(6) The participating States recalled that the aim of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is, as a substantial and integral part of the multilateral process initiated by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations as well as in their international relations in general.

(7) The participating States recognized that the set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures which are adopted in the present document and which are in accordance with the Madrid mandate serve by their scope and nature and by their implementation to strengthen confidence and security in Europe and thus to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force.

(8) Consequently the participating States have declared the following:

REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE

(9) The participating States, recalling their obligation to refrain, in their mutual relations as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,
accordingly reaffirm their commitment to respect and put into practice the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force, as laid down in the Final Act.

(10) No consideration may be invoked to serve to warrant resort to the threat or use of force in contravention of this principle.

(11) They recall the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations.

(12) They will refrain from any manifestation of force for the purpose of inducing any other State to renounce the full exercise of its sovereign rights.

(13) As set forth in the Final Act, no occupation or acquisition of territory resulting from the threat or use of force in contravention of international law, will be recognized as legal.

(14) They recognize their commitment to peace and security. Accordingly they reaffirm that they will refrain from any use of armed forces inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, against another participating State, in particular from invasion of or attack on its territory.

(15) They will abide by their commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force in their relations with any State, regardless of that State's political, social, economic or cultural system and irrespective of whether or not they maintain with that State relations of alliance.

(16) They stress that non-compliance with the obligation of refraining from the threat or use of force, as recalled above, constitutes a violation of international law.

(17) They stress their commitment to the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes as contained in the Final Act, convinced that it is an essential complement to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force, both being essential factors for the maintenance and consolidation of peace and security. They recall their determination and the necessity to reinforce and to improve the methods at their disposal for the peaceful settlement of disputes. They reaffirm their resolve to make every effort to settle exclusively by peaceful means any dispute between them.
(18) The participating States stress their commitment to the Final Act and the need for full implementation of all its provisions, which will further the process of improving security and developing cooperation in Europe, thereby contributing to international peace and security in the world as a whole.

(19) They emphasize their commitment to all the principles of the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States and declare their determination to respect and put them into practice irrespective of their political, economic or social systems as well as of their size, geographical location or level of economic development.

(20) All these ten principles are of primary significance and, accordingly, they will be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into account the others.

(21) Respect for and the application of these principles will enhance the development of friendly relations and cooperation among the participating States in all fields covered by the provisions of the Final Act.

(22) They reconfirm their commitment to the basic principle of the sovereign equality of States and stress that all States have equal rights and duties within the framework of international law.

(23) They reaffirm the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Respect for and the effective exercise of these rights and freedoms are essential factors for international peace, justice and security, as well as for the development of friendly relations and cooperation among themselves as among all States, as set forth in the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States.

(24) They reaffirm that, in the broader context of world security, security in Europe is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean area as a whole; in this context, they confirm their intention to develop good neighbourly relations with all States in the region, with due regard to reciprocity, and in the spirit of the principles contained in the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, so as to promote confidence and security and make peace prevail in the region in accordance with the provisions contained in the Mediterranean chapter of the Final Act.
(25) They emphasize the necessity to take measures to prevent and to combat terrorism, including terrorism in international relations. They express their determination to take effective measures, both at the national level and through international cooperation, for the prevention and suppression of all acts of terrorism. They will take all appropriate measures in preventing their respective territories from being used for the preparation, organization or commission of terrorist activities. This also includes measures to prohibit on their territories illegal activities, including subversive activities, of persons, groups and organizations that instigate, organize or engage in the perpetration of acts of terrorism, including those directed against other States and their citizens.

(26) They will fulfill in good faith their obligations under international law; they also stress that strict compliance with their commitments within the framework of the CSCE is essential for building confidence and security.

(27) The participating States confirm that in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the Charter of the United Nations and their obligations under any treaty or other international agreement, their obligations under the Charter will prevail, in accordance with Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations.

(28) The participating States have adopted the following measures:

PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES

(29) The participating States will give notification in writing through diplomatic channels in an agreed form of content, to all other participating States 42 days or more in advance of the start of notifiable military activities in the zone of application for confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs).

(30) Notification will be given by the participating State on whose territory the activity in question is planned to take place even if the forces of that State are not engaged in the activity or their strength is below the notifiable level. This will not relieve other participating States of their obligation to give notification, if their involvement in the planned military activity reaches the notifiable level.

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1 In this document, the term notifiable means subject to notification.
2 See Annex I.
(31) Each of the following military activities in the field conducted as a single activity in the zone of application for CSBMs at or above the levels defined below, will be notified:

(31.1) The engagement of formations of land forces\(^3\) of the participating States in the same exercise activity conducted under a single operational command independently or in combination with any possible air or naval components.

(31.1.1) This military activity will be subject to notification whenever it involves at any time during the activity:

- at least 13,000 troops, including support troops, or
- at least 300 battle tanks
if organized into a divisional structure or at least two brigades/regiments, not necessarily subordinate to the same division.

(31.1.2) The participation of air forces of the participating States will be included in the notification if it is foreseen that in the course of the activity 200 or more sorties by aircraft, excluding helicopters, will be flown.

(31.2) The engagement of military forces either in an amphibious landing or in a parachute assault by airborne forces in the zone of application for CSBMs.

(31.2.1) These military activities will be subject to notification whenever the amphibious landing involves at least 3,000 troops or whenever the parachute drop involves at least 3,000 troops.

(31.3) The engagement of formations of land forces of the participating States in a transfer from outside the zone of application for CSBMs to arrival points in the zone, or from inside the zone of application for CSBMs to points of concentration in the zone, to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated.

(31.3.1) The arrival or concentration of these forces will be subject to notification whenever it involves, at any time during the activity:

- at least 13,000 troops, including support troops, or
- at least 300 battle tanks
if organized into a divisional structure or at least two brigades/regiments, not necessarily subordinate to the same division.

\(^3\)In this context, the term land forces includes amphibious, airmobile and airborne forces.
(31.3.2) Forces which have been transferred into the zone will be subject to all provisions of agreed CSBMs when they depart their arrival points to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated within the zone of application for CSBMs.

(32) Notifiable military activities carried out without advance notice to the troops involved, are exceptions to the requirement for prior notification to be made 42 days in advance.

(32.1) Notification of such activities, above the agreed thresholds, will be given at the time the troops involved commence such activities.

(33) Notification will be given in writing of each notifiable military activity in the following agreed form:

(34) A—General information
(34.1) The designation of the military activity;
(34.2) The general purpose of the military activity;
(34.3) The names of the States involved in the military activity;
(34.4) The level of command, organizing and commanding the military activity;
(34.5) The start and end dates of the military activity.

(35) B—Information on different types of notifiable military activities
(35.1) The engagement of land forces of the participating States in the same exercise activity conducted under a single operational command independently or in combination with any possible air or naval components:
(35.1.1) The total number of troops taking part in the military activity (i.e., ground troops, amphibious troops, airmobile and airborne troops) and the number of troops participating for each State involved, if applicable;
(35.1.2) Number and type of divisions participating for each State;
(35.1.3) The total number of battle tanks for each State and the total number of anti-tank guided missile launchers mounted on armoured vehicles;
(35.1.4) The total number of artillery pieces and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm calibre or above);
(35.1.5) The total number of helicopters, by category;
(35.1.6) Envisaged number of sorties by aircraft, excluding helicopters;
(35.1.7) Purpose of air missions;
(35.1.8) Categories of aircraft involved;
(35.1.9) The level of command, organizing and commanding the air force participation;
(35.1.10) Naval ship-to-shore gunfire;
(35.1.11) Indication of other naval ship-to-shore support;
(35.1.12) The level of command, organizing and commanding the naval force participation.

(35.2) The engagement of military forces either in an amphibious landing or in a parachute assault by airborne forces in the zone of application for CSBMs:

(35.2.1) The total number of amphibious troops involved in notifiable amphibious landings, and/or the total number of airborne troops involved in notifiable parachute assaults;

(35.2.2) In the case of a notifiable amphibious landing, the point or points of embarkation, if in the zone of application for CSBMs.

(35.3) The engagement of formations of land forces of the participating States in a transfer from outside the zone of application for CSBMs to arrival points in the zone, or from inside the zone of application for CSBMs to points of concentration in the zone, to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated:

(35.3.1) The total number of troops transferred;
(35.3.2) Number and type of divisions participating in the transfer;
(35.3.3) The total number of battle tanks participating in a notifiable arrival or concentration;
(35.3.4) Geographical coordinates for the points of arrival and for the points of concentration.

(36) C—The envisaged area and timeframe of the activity
(36.1) The area of the military activity delimited by geographic features together with geographic coordinates, as appropriate;
(36.2) The start and end dates of each phase (transfers, deployment, concentration of forces, active exercise phase, recovery phase) of
activities in the zone of application for CSBMs of participating formations, the tactical purpose and corresponding geographical areas (delimited by geographical coordinates) for each phase;

(36.3) Brief description of each phase.

(37) D—Other information

(37.1) Changes, if any, in relation to information provided in the annual calendar regarding the activity;

(37.2) Relationship of the activity to other notifiable activities.

OBSERVATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES

(38) The participating States will invite observers from all other participating States to the following notifiable military activities:

(38.1) The engagement of formations of land forces\(^4\) of the participating States in the same exercise activity conducted under a single operational command independently or in combination with any possible air or naval components.

(38.2) The engagement of military forces either in an amphibious landing or in a parachute assault by airborne forces in the zone of application for CSBMs.

(38.3) In the case of the engagement of formations of land forces of the participating States in a transfer from outside the zone of application for CSBMs to arrival points in the zone, or from inside the zone of application for CSBMs to points of concentration in the zone, to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated, the concentration of these forces. Forces which have been transferred into the zone will be subject to all provisions of agreed confidence- and security-building measures when they depart their arrival points to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated within the zone of application for CSBMs.

(38.4) The above-mentioned activities will be subject to observation whenever the number of troops engaged meets or exceeds 17,000 troops, except in the case of either an amphibious landing or a parachute assault by airborne forces, which will be subject to observation whenever the number of troops engaged meets or exceeds 5,000 troops.

\(^4\)In this context, the term land forces includes amphibious, airmobile and airborne forces.
(39) The host State will extend the invitations in writing through diplomatic channels to all other participating States at the time of notification. The host State will be the participating State on whose territory the notified activity will take place.

(40) The host State may delegate some of its responsibilities as host to another participating State engaged in the military activity on the territory of the host State. In such cases, the host State will specify the allocation of responsibilities in its invitation to observe the activity.

(41) Each participating State may send up to two observers to the military activity to be observed.

(42) The invited State may decide whether to send military and/or civilian observers, including members of its personnel accredited to the host State. Military observers will, normally, wear their uniforms and insignia while performing their tasks.

(43) Replies to the invitation will be given in writing not later than 21 days after the issue of the invitation.

(44) The participating States accepting an invitation will provide the names and ranks of their observers in their reply to the invitation. If the invitation is not accepted in time, it will be assumed that no observers will be sent.

(45) Together with the invitation the host State will provide a general observation programme, including the following information:

(45.1) the date, time and place of assembly of observers;
(45.2) planned duration of the observation programme;
(45.3) languages to be used in interpretation and/or translation;
(45.4) arrangements for board, lodging and transportation of the observers;
(45.5) arrangements for observation equipment which will be issued to the observers by the host State;
(45.6) possible authorization by the host State of the use of special equipment that the observers may bring with them;
(45.7) arrangements for special clothing to be issued to the observers because of weather or environmental factors.

(46) The observers may make requests with regard to the observation programme. The host State will, if possible, accede to them.

(47) The host State will determine a duration of observation which permits the observers to observe a notifiable military activity from the time that agreed thresholds for observation are met or
exceeded until, for the last time during the activity, the thresholds for observation are no longer met.

(48) The host State will provide the observers with transportation to the area of the notified activity and back. This transportation will be provided from either the capital or another suitable location to be announced in the invitation, so that the observers are in position before the start of the observation programme.

(49) The invited State will cover the travel expenses for its observers to the capital, or another suitable location specified in the invitation, of the host State, and back.

(50) The observers will be provided equal treatment and offered equal opportunities to carry out their functions.

(51) The observers will be granted, during their mission, the privileges and immunities accorded to diplomatic agents in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

(52) The host State will not be required to permit observation of restricted locations, installations or defence sites.

(53) In order to allow the observers to confirm that the notified activity is nonthreatening in character and that it is carried out in conformity with the appropriate provisions of the notification, the host State will:

(53.1) —at the commencement of the observation programme give a briefing on the purpose, the basic situation, the phases of the activity and possible changes as compared with the notification and provide the observers with a map of the area of the military activity with a scale of 1 to not more than 500,000 and an observation programme with a daily schedule as well as a sketch indicating the basic situation;

(53.2) —provide the observers with appropriate observation equipment; however, the observers will be allowed to use their personal binoculars, which will be subject to examination and approval by the host State;

(53.3) —in the course of the observation programme give the observers daily briefings with the help of maps on the various phases of the military activity and their development and inform the observers about their positions geographically; in the case of a land force activity conducted in combination with air or naval components, briefings will be given by representatives of these forces;
(53.4) — provide opportunities to observe directly forces of the State/States engaged in the military activity so that the observers get an impression of the flow of the activity; to this end, the observers will be given the opportunity to observe major combat units of the participating formations of a divisional or equivalent level and, whenever possible, to visit some units and communicate with commanders and troops; commanders or other senior personnel of participating formations as well as of the visited units will inform the observers of the mission of their respective units;

(53.5) — guide the observers in the area of the military activity; the observers will follow the instructions issued by the host State in accordance with the provisions set out in this document;

(53.6) — provide the observers with appropriate means of transportation in the area of the military activity;

(53.7) — provide the observers with opportunities for timely communication with their embassies or other official missions and consular posts; the host State is not obligated to cover the communication expenses of the observers;

(53.8) — provide the observers with appropriate board and lodging in a location suitable for carrying out the observation programme and, when necessary, medical care.

(54) The participating States need not invite observers to notifiable military activities which are carried out without advance notice to the troops involved unless these notifiable activities have a duration of more than 72 hours. The continuation of these activities beyond this time will be subject to observation while the agreed thresholds for observation are met or exceeded. The observation programme will follow as closely as practically possible all the provisions for observation set out in this document.

ANNUAL CALENDARS

(55) Each participating State will exchange, with all other participating States, an annual calendar of its military activities subject to prior notification, within the zone of application for CSBMs, forecast for the subsequent calendar year. It will be transmitted every year, in writing, through diplomatic channels, not later than 15 November for the following year.

As defined in the provisions on Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities—
(56) Each participating State will list the above-mentioned activities chronologically and will provide information on each activity in accordance with the following model:

(56.1) —type of military activity and its designation;
(56.2) —general characteristics and purpose of the military activity;
(56.3) —States involved in the military activity;
(56.4) —area of the military activity, indicated by appropriate geographic features and/or defined by geographic coordinates;
(56.5) —planned duration of the military activity and the 14-day period, indicated by dates, within which it is envisaged to start;
(56.6) —the envisaged total number of troops engaged in the military activity;
(56.7) —the types of armed forces involved in the military activity;
(56.8) —the envisaged level of command, under which the military activity will take place;
(56.9) —the number and type of divisions whose participation in the military activity is envisaged;
(56.10) —any additional information concerning, *inter alia*, components of armed forces, which the participating State planning the military activity considers relevant.

(57) Should changes regarding the military activities in the annual calendar prove necessary, they will be communicated to all other participating States no later than in the appropriate notification.

(58) Information on military activities subject to prior notification not included in an annual calendar will be communicated to all participating States as soon as possible, in accordance with the model provided in the annual calendar.

**CONSTRAINING PROVISIONS**

(59) Each participating State will communicate, in writing, to all other participating States, by 15 November each year, information concerning military activities subject to prior notification involving

*As defined in the provisions on Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities.*
more than 40,000 troops,\(^8\) which it plans to carry out in the second subsequent calendar year. Such communication will include preliminary information on each activity, as to its general purpose, timeframe and duration, area, size and States involved.

(60) Participating States will not carry out military activities subject to prior notification involving more than 75,000 troops, unless they have been the object of communication as defined above.

(61) Participating States will not carry out military activities subject to prior notification involving more than 40,000 troops unless they have been included in the annual calendar, not later than 15 November each year.

(62) If military activities subject to prior notification are carried out in addition to those contained in the annual calendar, they should be as few as possible.

COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION

(63) According to the Madrid Mandate, the confidence- and security-building measures to be agreed upon “will be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content.”

(64) The participating States recognize that national technical means can play a role in monitoring compliance with agreed confidence- and security-building measures.

(65) In accordance with the provisions contained in this document each participating State has the right to conduct inspections on the territory of any other participating State within the zone of application for CSBMs.

(66) Any participating State will be allowed to address a request for inspection to another participating State on whose territory, within the zone of application for CSBMs, compliance with the agreed confidence- and security-building measures is in doubt.

(67) No participating State will be obliged to accept on its territory within the zone of application for CSBMs, more than three inspections per calendar year.

(68) No participating State will be obliged to accept more than one inspection per calendar year from the same participating State.

\(^8\)As defined in the provisions on Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities.
(69) An inspection will not be counted if, due to force majeure, it cannot be carried out.

(70) The participating State which requests an inspection will state the reasons for such a request.

(71) The participating State which has received such a request will reply in the affirmative to the request within the agreed period of time, subject to the provisions contained in paragraphs (67 and 68).

(72) Any possible dispute as to the validity of the reasons for a request will not prevent or delay the conduct of an inspection.

(73) The participating State which requests an inspection will be permitted to designate for inspection on the territory of another State within the zone of application for CSBMs, a specific area. Such an area will be referred to as the "specified area." The specified area will comprise terrain where notifiable military activities are conducted or where another participating State believes a notifiable military activity is taking place. The specified area will be defined and limited by the scope and scale of notifiable military activities but will not exceed that required for an army level military activity.

(74) In the specified area the representatives of the inspecting State accompanied by the representatives of the receiving State will be permitted access, entry and unobstructed survey, except for areas or sensitive points to which access is normally denied or restricted, military and other defence installations, as well as naval vessels, military vehicles and aircraft. The number and extent of the restricted areas should be as limited as possible. Areas where notifiable military activities can take place will not be declared restricted areas, except for certain permanent or temporary military installations which, in territorial terms, should be as small as possible, and consequently those areas will not be used to prevent inspection of notifiable military activities. Restricted areas will not be employed in a way inconsistent with the agreed provisions on inspection.

(75) Within the specified area, the forces of participating States other than the receiving State will also be subject to the inspection conducted by the inspecting State.

(76) Inspection will be permitted on the ground, from the air, or both.
(77) The representatives of the receiving State will accompany the inspection team, including when it is in land vehicles and an aircraft from the time of their first employment until the time they are no longer in use for the purposes of inspection.

(78) In its request, the inspecting State will notify the receiving State of:

(78.1) —the reasons for the request;

(78.2) —the location of the specified area defined by geographical coordinates;

(78.3) —the preferred point(s) of entry for the inspection team;

(78.4) —mode of transport to and from the point(s) of entry, if applicable, to and from the specified area;

(78.5) —where in the specified area the inspection will begin;

(78.6) —whether the inspection will be conducted from the ground, from the air, or both simultaneously;

(78.7) —whether aerial inspection will be conducted using an airplane, a helicopter, or both;

(78.8) —whether the inspection team will use land vehicles provided by the receiving State or, if mutually agreed, its own vehicles;

(78.9) —information for the issuance of diplomatic visas to inspectors entering the receiving State.

(79) The reply to the request will be given in the shortest possible period of time, but within not more than twenty-four hours. Within thirty-six hours after the issuance of the request, the inspection team will be permitted to enter the territory of the receiving State.

(80) Any request for inspection as well as the reply thereto will be communicated to all participating States without delay.

(81) The receiving State should designate the point(s) of entry as close as possible to the specified area. The receiving State will ensure that the inspection team will be able to reach the specified area without delay from the point(s) of entry.

(82) All participating States will facilitate the passage of the inspection teams through their territory.
(83) Within 48 hours after the arrival of the inspection team at the specified area, the inspection will be terminated.

(84) There will be no more than four inspectors in an inspection team. While conducting the inspection the inspection team may divide into two parts.

(85) The inspectors and, if applicable, auxiliary personnel, will be granted during their mission the privileges and immunities in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

(86) The receiving State will provide the inspection team with appropriate board and lodging in a location suitable for carrying out the inspection, and, when necessary, medical care; however, this does not exclude the use by the inspection team of its own tents and rations.

(87) The inspection team will have use of its own maps, own photo cameras, own binoculars and own dictaphones, as well as own aeronautical charts.

(88) The inspection team will have access to appropriate telecommunications equipment of the receiving State, including the opportunity for continuous communication between the members of an inspection team in an aircraft and those in a land vehicle employed in the inspection.

(89) The inspecting State will specify whether aerial inspection will be conducted using an airplane, a helicopter or both. Aircraft for inspection will be chosen by mutual agreement between the inspecting and receiving States. Aircraft will be chosen which provide the inspection team a continuous view of the ground during the inspection.

(90) After the flight plan, specifying, inter alia, the inspection team's choice of flight path, speed and altitude in the specified area, has been filed with the competent air traffic control authority the inspection aircraft will be permitted to enter the specified area without delay. Within the specified area, the inspection team will, at its request, be permitted to deviate from the approved flight plan to make specific observations provided such deviation is consistent with paragraph (74) as well as flight safety and air traffic requirements. Directions to the crew will be given through a representative of the receiving State on board the aircraft involved in the inspection.
(91) One member of the inspection team will be permitted, if such a request is made, at any time to observe data on navigational equipment of the aircraft and to have access to maps and charts used by the flight crew for the purpose of determining the exact location of the aircraft during the inspection flight.

(92) Aerial and ground inspectors may return to the specified area as often as desired within the 48-hour inspection period.

(93) The receiving State will provide for inspection purposes land vehicles with cross country capability. Whenever mutually agreed, taking into account the specific geography relating to the area to be inspected, the inspecting State will be permitted to use its own vehicles.

(94) If land vehicles or aircraft are provided by the inspecting State, there will be one accompanying driver for each land vehicle, or accompanying aircraft crew.

(95) The inspecting State will prepare a report of its inspection and will provide a copy of that report to all participating States without delay.

(96) The inspection expenses will be incurred by the receiving State except when the inspecting State uses its own aircraft and/or land vehicles. The travel expenses to and from the point(s) of entry will be borne by the inspecting State.

(97) Diplomatic channels will be used for communications concerning compliance and verification.

(98) Each participating State will be entitled to obtain timely clarification from any other participating State concerning the application of agreed confidence- and security-building measures. Communications in this context will, if appropriate, be transmitted to all other participating States.

(99) The participating States stress that the confidence- and security-building measures are designed to reduce the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities and emphasize that their implementation will contribute to these objectives.

(100) Reaffirming the relevant objectives of the Final Act, the participating States are determined to continue building confidence, to lessen military confrontation and to enhance security for all. They are also determined to achieve progress in disarmament.
(101) The measures adopted in this document are politically binding and will come into force on 1 January 1987.

(102) The Government of Sweden is requested to transmit the present document to the follow-up meeting of the CSCE in Vienna and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Government of Sweden is also requested to transmit the present document to the Governments of the non-participating Mediterranean States.

(103) The text of this document will be published in each participating State, which will disseminate it and make it known as widely as possible.

(104) The representatives of the participating States express their profound gratitude to the Government and people of Sweden for the excellent arrangements made for the Stockholm Conference and the warm hospitality extended to the delegations which participated in the Conference.

Stockholm, 19 September 1986
ANNEX I

Under the terms of the Madrid mandate, the zone of application for CSBMs is defined as follows:

"On the basis of equality of rights, balance and reciprocity, equal respect for the security interests of all CSCE participating States, and of their respective obligations concerning confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe, these confidence- and security-building measures will cover the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area\(^1\) and air space. They will be of military significance and politically binding and will be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content.

As far as the adjoining sea area\(^2\) and air space is concerned, the measure will be applicable to the military activities of all the participating States taking place there whenever these activities affect security in Europe as well as constitute a part of activities taking place within the whole of Europe as referred to above, which they will agree to notify. Necessary specifications will be made through the negotiations on the confidence- and security-building measures at the Conference.

Nothing in the definition of the zone given above will diminish obligations already undertaken under the Final Act. The confidence- and security-building measures to be agreed upon at the Conference will also be applicable in all areas covered by any of the provisions in the Final Act relating to confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament.

Wherever the term "the zone of application for CSBMs" is used in this document, the above definition will apply."

\(^1\)In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is understood to refer also to ocean areas adjoining Europe.

\(^2\)In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is understood to refer also to ocean areas adjoining Europe.
ANNEX II

CHAIRMAN’S STATEMENT

It is understood that, taking into account the agreed date of entry into force of the agreed confidence- and security-building measures and the provisions contained in them concerning the timeframes of certain advance notifications, and expressing their interest in an early transition to the full implementation of the provisions of this document, the participating States agree to the following:

The annual calendars concerning military activities subject to prior notification and forecast for 1987 will be exchanged not later than 15 December 1986.

Communications, in accordance with agreed provisions, concerning military activities involving more than 40,000 troops planned for the calendar year 1988 will be exchanged by 15 December 1986. Participating States may undertake activities involving more than 75,000 troops during the calendar year 1987 provided that they are included in the annual calendar exchanged by 15 December 1986.

Activities to begin during the first 42 days after 1 January 1987 will be subject to the relevant provisions of the Final Act of the CSCE. However, the participating States will make every effort to apply to them the provisions of this document to the maximum extent possible.

This statement will be an annex to the Document of the Stockholm Conference and will be published with it.

Stockholm, 19 September 1986
ANNEX III

CHAIRMAN’S STATEMENT

It is understood that each participating State can raise any question consistent with the mandate of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe at any stage subsequent to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting.

This statement will be an annex to the Document of the Stockholm Conference and will be published with it.

Stockholm, 19 September 1986
ANNEX IV

CHAIRMAN’S STATEMENT

It is understood that the participating States recall that they have the right to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance; they also have the right of neutrality. In this context, they will not take advantage of these rights to circumvent the purposes of the system of inspection, and in particular the provision that no participating State will be obliged to accept on its territory within the zone of application for CSBMs, more than three inspections per calendar year.

Appropriate understandings between participating States on this subject will be expressed in interpretative statements to be included in the journal of the day.

This statement will be an annex to the Document of the Stockholm Conference and will be published with it.

Stockholm, 19 September 1986
It is understood that the participating States recall that they have the right to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance; they also have the right of neutrality. In this context, they will not take advantage of these rights to circumvent the purposes of the system of inspection, and in particular the provision that no participating State will be obliged to accept on its territory within the zone of application for CSBMs, more than three inspections per calendar year.

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Stockholm, 19 September 1986
Appendix D

A SUMMARY OF THE MAIN ELEMENTS IN BOTH THE NATO AND THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENTS
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**Building Confidence and Security in Europe: The Potential Role of Confidence-and Security-Building Measures**

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**ABSTRACT**

see reverse side
This study addresses the potential contribution of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) toward their goal of building confidence and security in Europe. First, the report surveys and discusses various publicly stated U.S. or NATO objectives for CSBMs, distilling these to three core objectives: inhibiting political intimidation, reducing misunderstanding/miscalculation, and making surprise attack less likely. It then describes the current NATO package, which consists of six measures presented in January 1984 at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), analyzing and evaluating it in the context of U.S./NATO objectives for CSBMs. Finally, it identifies several potential options available to the West for the future development of CSBM packages within the CDE. A key finding is that for most of the NATO-proposed measures there is a critically important, inherent ambiguity that arises when CSBMs are expected to lessen miscalculation and misunderstanding, on one hand, as well as complicate surprise attack possibilities on the other.
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