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THE INF CONTROVERSY: A CONFLUENCE OF
FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC INTERESTS

by

Phillip Joseph Gick

September 1986

Thesis Advisor:

Frank M. Teti

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The INF Controversy:
A Confluence of Foreign and Domestic Interests

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

--The study examines national interest theory in the light of the INF controversy. The perceptions and positions of the United States, the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom, and several non-nuclear members of NATO are examined and analyzed. The analysis is concerned with alliance and transnational considerations, military capabilities, and domestic political constraints. Where necessary the historical and cultural perceptions, as well as the strategic requirements of the nation involved, are factored in. The study concludes with an overview of the options available to the nations involved in the INF controversy. --

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Phillip J. Gick

I. INTRODUCTION

On 12 December 1979 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) adopted a "twin-track" approach of upgrading the alliance's intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe, while simultaneously seeking a negotiated resolution to the imbalance in such forces, which was perceived by the alliance as being precipitated by Soviet deployment of new INF systems. The decision was predicated on two factors, one repeatedly cited as a major reason for the decision, "credibility", the second one more implicit, "stability". It was properly concluded that, if the alliance wished to maintain its short term credibility and its long term stability, a response, that was potent in its own right and yet insufficient to pose an independent offensive nuclear threat to the Soviet Union, was required.

To understand why the December 1979 NATO decision was the proper one, one must understand the historical backdrop, especially with respect to nuclear weapons in general and nuclear systems in Europe in particular, as well as the current setting and how these impacted upon the national interests of the various states involved. But before the details of the INF controversy are addressed, thereby enabling an assessment of the December 1979 NATO decision and a prognosis concerning INF's future, the broad and often misunderstood term, the national interest, needs to be defined as it will be applied in the analysis.

This analysis will, therefore, review: 1) the basic concepts or precepts that strongly influence, if not determine, a state's national interests, 2) what the perspectives, needs and positions are of the various states involved in the INF controversy, 3) (where it is pertinent) the evolution of those positions, 4) how, in the case of some states involved in the INF controversy, the national interests are significantly impacted by domestic considerations, 5) the history of nuclear capabilities in Europe, and 6) the capabilities of the INF systems in question and how they fit within the context of the overall nuclear capabilities of the various states involved. The military usefulness of the systems involved in INF are clearly not the sole consideration of the states involved--for many not even the primary consideration. To fully comprehend this one must acquire an understanding of the perceptual and cognitive origins of the diverse state interests involved in the INF controversy, which lie in the early post World War II years.

The INF controversy cannot, therefore, be viewed in isolation. It must be seen in the context of the larger, overarching confrontation, at various levels, that has and continues to go on continuously between the two superpowers, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). This jockeying takes on special significance in Europe.

The Soviet Union by most assessments is extremely concerned about its own security. In light of this it has sought and maintained in the post World War II period buffer states on its

periphery. The nations of Eastern Europe are the most prominent manifestation. But the Soviets have also shown a desire and a capacity to expand its influence and sway beyond those areas contiguous with its border when such can be accomplished with a minimum of risk and expense.

The US, on the other hand, has displayed those traits most often associated with a status quo power, particularly in opting for a strategic defensive posture (i.e., containment) vis a vis the Soviet Union. Key elements to the world stability, as we know it today, are the Western European democracies. It is, therefore, central to US policy that Western Europe remain not only free from Soviet domination, but also Soviet intimidation.

Western Europe, although linked to the US militarily through NATO, is a grouping of independent, sovereign states. NATO, therefore, is a complex grouping of nations, that have evolved certain roles within the alliance which are based upon not only the magnitude of the threat from the Soviet Union, but also upon its proximity (temporally and spacially), as well as such things as geography, economics, and domestic political relationships and structures.

As all this would indicate, the number of weapons decided upon, 108 Pershing II's and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), was more of a political, than a military decision and took into account conflicting NATO goals. The European members of NATO are torn between two phobias: a fear the United States (US) will not display leadership and resolve, while also being

alternately concerned by what Europeans perceive as an occasional lack of restraint on the US's part. They want a strong US, but not one that will drag them into a military conflict. A similar conflict exists in European recognition of the need for a strong defense, without undue financial demands, but not a defense that will be seen as threatening to the Soviet Union. To properly assess how NATO approached these conflicting goals and begin to comprehend Soviet concerns requires an understanding of national interest concepts.

II. NATIONAL INTEREST THEORY

A. WHAT THE TERM NATIONAL INTEREST IS MEANT TO CONVEY

The "national interests" of a state are addressed by its external policies, as opposed to its internal policies, which, in the case of a democracy, such as the US, are couched in terms of the "public interest". This categorization of external concerns being part of a state's national interest is a generally accepted concept.¹

In virtually all works analyzing this subject, a second broadly accepted principle, the concept of the actual survival of the state, is considered in the national interest.² It is generally accepted that any subject or incident that threatens this survival clearly falls in the category of the national interest. The definition of what specifically constitutes a threat to that survival varies from analyst to analyst. Donald Nuechterlein says that it is a threat to "the very existence of

¹See Donald E. Nuechterlein, "The Concept of 'National Interest': A Time for New Approaches," Orbis 23 (Spring 1979): 76; and Glendon Schubert, The Public Interest (Glencoe, Illinois: The Chicago Free Press, 1960), p. 28.

²See Alexander L. George and Robert Keohane, "The Concept of the National Interest: Uses and Limitations," in Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, Appendices, vol. 2, pp. 67-68, cited in Fred A. Sondermann, "The Concept of the National Interest," Orbis 21 (Spring 1977): 16-23; Hans J. Morgenthau, "Another 'Great Debate': The National Interest of the United States," The American Political Science Review (December 1952): 973, cited in Fred A. Sondermann, "The Concept of the National Interest," Orbis 21 (Spring 1977): 16-23; and Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interests in America's Foreign Relations (Chicago: University of

the nation state . . . either as a result of overt military attack on its territory or from the imminent threat of attack. . . .³

B. NUECHTERLEIN'S NATIONAL INTEREST MATRIX

Nuechterlein's approach to the evaluation of a state's national interest is incapsulated in his national interest matrix, see Table 1 on the following page. He lists four fundamental interests of national foreign policy: 1) defense, 2) economic, 3) world order, and 4) ideological [See Appendix A for definitions]. These categories correspond very closely to those identified by John Chase.⁴ Other analysts have identified these same interests to varying degrees and in somewhat different formats.⁵ Nuechterlein's categorization of interests should not, therefore, be viewed as all encompassing or definitive, but as highly representative of work in this field.

Chicago Press, 1953), p. 10, cited in Fred A. Sondermann, "The Concept of the National Interest," Orbis 21 (Spring 1977): 16-23.

³Nuechterlein, 79.

⁴The four categories or aspects of US national interest that Chase suggested "'actually guided and motivated the development of our foreign policy' [were]: (1) to deprive potential aggressors of bases from which they might launch attacks against the United States; (2) to support self-government and democracy abroad; (3) to protect and advance commerce; and (4) to help establish and maintain a favorable world balance of power." John L. Chase, "Defining the National Interest of the United States," Journal of Politics (November 1956): 720-724, cited in Fred A. Sondermann, "The Concept of the National Interest," Orbis 21 (Spring 1977): 16-23.

⁵See Alexander L. George and Robert Keohane, "The Concept of the National Interest: Uses and Limitations," in Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, Appendices, vol. 2, pp. 67-68, cited in Fred A. Sondermann, "The Concept of the National Interest," Orbis 21 (Spring 1977): 16-23; Hans J. Morgenthau, "Another 'Great

TABLE I
 NUECHTERLEIN'S NATIONAL-INTEREST MATRIX⁶

Basic Interest at Stake	Intensity of Interest			
	Survival	Vital	Major	Peripheral
Defense of homeland
Economic well-being
Favorable world order
Promotion of values

The usefulness of Nuechterlein's work is that it goes further than the mere categorization of interests; in it he defines categories of intensity: 1) survival issues, 2) vital issues, 3) major issues, and 4) peripheral issues [See Appendix A for definitions]. The ranking of these intensities enables the decision-maker or analyst utilizing his matrix to move beyond the nominal measurement characteristic of interest categories alone. Although, it does not allow for a finite discernment of how much greater one level is compared to another, it does provide a means for identifying varying levels of concern, by different actors, within the same interest category, concerning the same topic--a very useful tool.

C. SHORTCOMINGS OF NUECHTERLEIN

Unfortunately, Nuechterlein's matrix does not incorporate other important variables, such as the acceptance of a state's

Debate': The National Interest of the United States," The American Political Science Review (December 1952): 973, cited in Fred A. Sondermann, "The Concept of the National Interest," Orbis 21 (Spring 1977): 16-23; and Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interests in America's Foreign Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 10, cited in Fred A. Sondermann, "The Concept of the National Interest," Orbis 21 (Spring 1977): 16-23.

⁶Nuechterlein, 75.

proposed policy by either the populace of a state, particularly important in a democracy, or other elements of the country's elite, which may not have been privy to the decision-making process (i.e., in the US, the Congress; in the Soviet Union, the nomenklatura, in other countries, possibly the military). Nuechterlein does acknowledge the need to consider such variables, which he listed as "Value Factors" and "Cost/Risk Factors", see Table II. But Nuechterlein fails to provide or suggest a mechanism by which these concerns might be factored into his matrix and, thereby, the decision-making process.

TABLE II
NUECHTERLEIN'S VITAL INTERESTS ASSESSMENT FACTORS⁷

Value Factors	Cost/Risk Factors
Proximity of danger	Economic costs of military hostilities
Nature of threat	Estimated casualties from hostilities
Economic stake	Risk of protracted conflict
Sentimental attachment	Risk of enlarged conflict
Type of government	Cost of stalemate or defeat
Effect on balance of power	Risk of public opposition
National prestige at stake	Cost of UN opposition
Attitude of key allies	Cost of congressional opposition

Additionally, the question of how input from those sectors outside the normal decision-making circle is supposed to be garnered for the political leader, who ultimately has to "decide whether an interest is so important that the risk of war must be taken to defend it," is left unanswered.⁸ What makes this more

⁷Ibid., 85.

⁸Ibid., 92.

incongruent is that Nuechterlein infers that input from "the scholar, the intelligence specialist, the dispassionate journalist--all who do not let personal feelings about their country's interests blur their perceptions of why another country might view the world differently and react differently--can help considerably" in the leaders decision.⁹ Contrary to Nuechterlein's assumptions on this topic, no evidence was found during this research which indicated that scholars, intelligence specialists, or journalists are necessarily better equipped to divorce their personal feelings, positive or negative, about the countries in question in a controversy, let alone, about the political elite within their own country at any given time. In the US decisions about the national interest, according to Fred Sondermann, are generally made by the nation's top political leadership, which is generally acceptable to most of the population, most of the time.¹⁰

Nuechterlein's matrix also does not provide a means for distinguishing in terms of long versus short term interests. A decision taken today by a state to realize short term gains may at times not be in the state's long term national interest. For some West European states some opposition parties have opted for policies that are politically expedient and not immediately detrimental to the state's national interests, but which could in

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Fred A. Sondermann, "The Concept of the National Interest," Orbis 21 (Spring 1977): 21.

the long term have adverse repercussions for the national interest (i.e., the country's security).

D. THE UTILITY OF NUECHTERLEIN

In spite of its shortcomings, Nuechterlein's national-interest matrix, when utilized in conjunction with his value and cost/risk factors, does provide the decision-maker and analyst with a framework for assessing to what degree a policy is in a nation's national interest. Analysts need to plan for contingencies in areas and with other states that impact upon materials, locations and populations seen as vital to their nation's interests. With the incorporation of the history, traditions, and culture of other national actors into Nuechterlein's value factors, these plans and assessments could provide valuable assistance to the political decision-makers.

Before this framework can be applied to the IMF controversy and an assessment made, we must ascertain the viewpoints of the various actors involved, the capabilities present (this impacts significantly on the level of the threat) and the evolution of the problem to date (this has a bearing upon the degree of intensity with which each actor views the controversy). We will begin this analysis with the principle actors.

III. THE SOVIETS' PERSPECTIVE

A. CONCERN FOR SECURITY

When reviewing Soviet authors on the subject of INF, one is repeatedly confronted by one phrase--"equality and equal security."¹¹ This Soviet "principle" is extremely important. Y. Kochetkov explains what the Soviets mean thusly, ". . . equal security in the sense that limitations and reductions of nuclear weapons would be carried out in such a manner that the security of neither side would suffer, with all factors of the strategic situation taken into account."¹² To the uninitiated this statement seems quite reasonable. The disagreement arises when the concept is interpreted by each side. Owing to historical precedence and its "unfavorable geostrategic location" the leaders of the Soviet Union maintain that they must consider forces on or near their vast expanse of border other than those of the United States. They contend the United States is not confronted with such threats to its security. Their assessment of equal security, therefore, is not a one for one, weapon for weapon, equality that US leaders envision.

¹¹See Yevgeniy Kochetkov, "The Position of the USSR on Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 469 (September 1983): 136; Eugene V. Rostow, "The Russians' Nuclear Gambit," Atlantic Community Quarterly 22 (Spring 984): 38; and Sh. Sanakoyev, "The Road of Confidence and Security in Europe," International Affairs (Moscow) 4 (April 1984): p. 4.

¹²Kochetkov, 139.

The Soviet perception of nuclear weapons capabilities within Europe and the states that possess them must, therefore, be prefaced by this overwhelming concern by the Soviets for their own nation's security. If all the rhetoric is to be believed, this concern borders on unjustified paranoia. Additionally, it must be recognized that the Soviets see as vital to their security the maintenance of Soviet control over Eastern Europe, a matter second, only to the defense of the Soviet homeland. The Western European states, their nuclear capabilities and that which the United States has stationed in Europe are, therefore, considered by the Soviets in the light of these two overriding concerns.

This goes a long way towards explaining the Kremlin's pre-occupation with the effort to stop NATO's deployment of US Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). The Soviets have consistently maintained that these weapons, deployed in Western Europe, are a strategic threat to the Soviet Union because they can strike the Soviet Union proper. Furthermore, they contend that these weapons pose a first strike capability, due to their accuracy, especially the Pershing II, with its short flight time. The Soviet walk-out, in November - December 1983, of the disarmament talks, at the onset of the actual deployment of these weapons, underscores the importance the Soviets attach to these weapons.

The walk-out also affirms the importance the Soviet Union attaches to Europe. The USSR and the US both have important

historical and economic ties to Europe. Europe, therefore, remains, in many ways, the decisive area of the world for both countries. As far as Eastern Europe is concerned, the USSR has made it abundantly clear that, in the interests of its own security, it will not allow the reversal of the communist revolutions in that area.¹³ Consequently, this leaves Western Europe, as the most decisive area on the continent. The question the Soviets face with respect to this is how best to influence the situation there to their own benefit.

B. COMPETING TENDENCIES

Much of the literature about the formulation of Soviet foreign policy, especially since SALT I, has identified a division amongst the Soviet elite over the proper approach to be applied in world affairs, particularly in Western Europe. In crude terms this depiction conveys, almost, an atmosphere of "dove" versus "hawk". This misconception stems from a significant tendency on the part of Western observers to mirror-image" Western characteristics when viewing events in the Soviet Union. The inclination is to perceive activities, particularly governmental activities, in terms of how they are: 1) conducted and 2) manifested in Western culture. This pattern is then ascribed to similar events in other societies or cultures, such as the Soviet Union. When in actuality, in the Soviet Union it

¹³Leonid Brezhnev quoted in Pravda, 13 November 1968, cited by Robin Edmonds, Soviet Foreign Policy: The Brezhnev Years (Oxford, England: Oxford Univeristy Press, 1983), p. 72.

would be more accurate not to think in terms of factions, but of "competing tendencies" within the elite. Dan and Rebecca Strode refer to these tendencies as "unilateralist" and "diplomacists" approaches.¹⁴ David Ulam refers to them respectively as "speculators" and "rentiers".¹⁵ These competing views of national security policy reflect more "a difference of style and method between decision-makers who share basic objectives" than two permanent groupings or factions.¹⁶

Those of the "diplomacist/rentier" persuasion are seen as viewing patience and prudence as a virtue and believing that some degree of cooperation with the West is necessary, but that in the end the Socialist system will win out. On the other hand, the "unilateralist/speculator" argument concludes that detente is basically a dead issue with the US and that it is the military strength of the Soviet Union that got them where they are today. It is their position that, if the Soviet Union hopes to counter new, determined Western opposition to Soviet designs, the military effort will have to be redoubled.¹⁷

This analysis of policy development appears reasonable, since one can assume that even in an oligarchic system, it would not be

¹⁴Dan L. Strode and Rebecca V. Strode, "Diplomacy and Defense in Soviet National Security Policy," International Security 8 (Fall 1983): 107.

¹⁵Adam Ulam, "Europe in Soviet Eyes," Problems of Communism 32 (May-June 1983): 22-23.

¹⁶Strode, 107.


¹⁷Ibid., 107-108.

unreasonable to expect to find a divergence on the means, even if you anticipated finding agreement on the ends. Numerous articles and speeches can be cited supporting each of the policies. And even if the approach argued for in some of the speeches is attributed to the audience being addressed (i.e., one to a Western audience encompassing "diplomacist" ideas or one at a Soviet military academy advocating "unilateralist" concepts), there is more than enough evidence to support a conclusion that differences do exist amongst the ruling elite about the proper approach to be employed during any given timeframe. This divergence of opinion can spill over from the formulation of foreign policy into the formulation of military doctrine.

C. MILITARY DOCTRINE VS. MILITARY SCIENCE

The Soviets make a distinction between military doctrine and military science. Doctrine is determined by the political elite, which almost certainly will contain some representation from the military elite. "The debate [in formulating doctrine] . . . is precisely over the relative weight to be given foreign policy concerns and military interests...."¹⁸ But once doctrine is established, the military is responsible for developing military science in such a manner to insure the achievement of the "political-military objectives" of the doctrine. Figure 1, on the following page, shows at which levels of the governmental/military structure doctrine and strategy are developed, the path of input in the system, and the flow of authority.

¹⁸Ibid., 100.



Direction of Authority = —————→
 Direction of Input = - - - - -→
 *True subordination is to the Central Committee

Figure 1.19 The Institutional Framework of Soviet Military Thought

¹⁹John J. Dziak, Soviet Perceptions of Military Power: Interaction of Theory and Practice (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1981), p. 59.

Soviet military doctrine and military science must be considered when addressing the subject of nuclear weapons. Like the US, the USSR may hold that the essential purpose of nuclear weapons is to prevent war (doctrine), but once war starts and particularly once the nuclear threshold is crossed, the Soviet plan (military science) "is to conclude the conflict, regardless of its intensity of duration, on terms favorable to the Soviet Union."²⁰

D. EFFECTS OF THE SOVIET APPROACH

Given the general agreement on the ultimate goal by the Soviet elite and only a divergence on how best to realize this goal the question becomes at what rate will the military improvements be pursued and within what parameters. This will in large part be determined by which approach is in ascendancy--the diplomacist/rentier or the unilateralist/speculator mode of operation. The one that has been in ascendancy for several years may be indicated by a speech given by Brezhnev, on 27 October 1982, to much of the military hierarchy. In this speech Brezhnev, a consistent advocate of the SALT process, specifically failed to mention START or INF, but did endorse "the military's claim for top priority in funding" ²¹ On the other hand the new General Secretary of the Soviet Union's Communist Party, Mikhail Gorbachev, may have signalled a turn toward the

²⁰Coit D. Blacker, "Military Power and Prospects," Washington Quarterly 6 (Spring 1983): 60.

²¹Strode, 109.

diplomacist approach with his recent proposals to the West. Time will tell whether or not this is another alternation in approach. In either case, it must be remembered that the approaches taken vary only in degrees and both seek to realize the ultimate success of the Soviet system.

This alternation may have provided the Soviet Union with some unforeseen benefits. As the Soviets see the situation--the West Europeans maintain a dichotomous image of the USSR. The dichotomy, being a vision of the Soviet Union as peaceable and desirous of expanding cooperation, while at the same time dangerous, if the West Europeans allow themselves to be pushed into policies which threaten Soviet interests. The Soviets have attempted to employ this perceived trend among some West Europeans to their advantage from, time to time, in an attempt to weaken European links with America. This was the primary goal of proposals made: 1) by Brezhnev in October 1979, prior to the NATO decision of December 1979, 2) by Andropov in October 1983, just prior to a debate in the Bundestag (parliament) of the Federal Republic of Germany about going ahead with the actual deployment of US INF systems on German soil, and 3) by Gorbachev in October 1985, just prior to the Dutch government's announced date for deciding on whether to accept deployment of US GLCMs on their soil and just a little over a month before a US/USSR summit.²² In such instances, West Europeans are described by the

²²See Raymond L. Garthoff, "Brezhnev's Opening: The TNF Tangle," Foreign Policy 41 (Winter 1979-80): 82; Myron Hedlin, "Moscow's Line on Arms Control," Problems of Communism 33 (May-June 1984): 23; and Robert A. Kittle, "Arms-Control Struggle: Who Wants What," U.S. News & World Report, 14 October 1985, p. 25.

Soviets as unwilling accomplices of the United States in some venture to which the Soviet Union is totally opposed.²³ As noted, this approach has been tried by the Soviet Union on various occasions with respect to the INF controversy.

E. VIEWPOINTS ON ASPECTS OF INF

The Soviets maintain there has been strategic and military parity in Europe between the two blocs for many years.²⁴ They insisted this was true, even before NATO made the twin-track decision, and have consistently contended this parity existed at several stages of their INF build-up.²⁵ They maintain this is possible because they have merely been modernizing their intermediate and medium-range weapons with newer ones of a similar type, not adding additional weapons. They contend they have actually removed proportionally a higher number of the older systems than the new systems they have installed.²⁶ The number of missile launchers and bombers has, in fact, been reduced in some instances, but the number of warheads, the range, and the accuracy have all been increased or improved. See Appendix E for the trends in warheads.

²³Ulam, 25.

²⁴V. Nekrasov, "Under the Cover of a 'Soviet Threat'," International Affairs (Moscow) 2 (February 1981): 66,

²⁵Gunther Gillesen, "Countering Soviet Nuclear Supremacy in Europe," NATO Review 30 (June 1982): 20.

²⁶See excerpt from speech by Leonid Brezhnev, 6 October 1979, quoted by Raymond L. Garthoff, "Brezhnev's Opening: The TNF Tangle," Foreign Policy 41 (Winter 1979-80): 83; and Kochetkov, 141.

Although they insist their new systems are mere upgrades of older, obsolete systems, and is consistent with the status quo ante, the Soviets insist the deployment of US Pershing IIs and GLCMs violates "the principle of parity and equal security." They repeatedly make the same argument that because these systems can strike Soviet territory, function as counterforce weapons against Soviet strategic systems (ICBMs), and can hit vital command, control, and communication (C3) systems, that they are first strike, strategic weapons.²⁷ The Soviets point not only to the deployment of the Pershing IIs and GLCMs as an example of US abandonment of the "the tested principles of equality and equal security," but also to US proposals put forth at Geneva on INF.²⁸

In these negotiations the Soviets point to the items outlined above as examples of the US's failure to negotiate in good faith--those are: 1) parity prior to US deployments, 2) the new US systems represent strategic, first strike capabilities, and 3) new Soviet INF weapons are mere modernization. They say that proposals put forth by the Reagan administration, such as the "zero option" are merely propaganda ploys, because "clearly such

²⁷See V. Abarenkov, "Washington's Big Lie Concerning the Geneva Talks," International Affairs (Moscow) 5 (May 1984): 96; Vladimir Baranovsky, "From Moscow: The Search for Peace in Europe," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 39 (February 1983): 10; Garthoff, 92-93; V. Glushkov, "The West European Military-Industrial Complex and the NATO Aggressive Plans," International Affairs (Moscow) 4 (April 1984): 35; Arthur R. Rachwald, "The Soviet Approach to West Europe," Current History 82 (October 1983): 311; and G. Yevgenyev and A. Aleximov, "The Problem of Nuclear Arms Limitation in Europe," International Affairs (Moscow) 10 (November 1983): 55.

²⁸Kochetkov, 139.

a proposal was unacceptable for the USSR." Additionally, they contend that all subsequent proposals amount to little more than variations on the "zero option" proposal.²⁹ They argue that, in the final analysis, "this US administration is sticking to its old one-sided position and is not showing the slightest desire to take account of the lawful interests of the other side, to reach an honest mutually acceptable agreement."³⁰ The Soviets depict the US as committing a volte-face in negotiations, when they told their NATO allies the "only way to get an agreement out of the Russians was to deploy the missiles."³¹ They characterize a tougher line by the US, which the Soviets say some in Washington presume "can bully the Soviet Union into accepting its propositions . . . [,as] a fallacious approach unlikely ever to bear fruit."³²

Another facet of INF the Soviets are attaching increasing importance to is the need for French and British nuclear capabilities to be included in INF totals. The Soviets argue quite skillfully that the three states, the US, France, and Britain are all NATO allies. And, to the concern of many in the West, particularly in Western Europe, they say it is clear that "the USSR has no intention of making its own security, and that of its allies, dependent on the actions of third states that are

²⁹Abarenkov, 99.

³⁰v. Israelyan, "Two Approaches to the Disarmament Problem," International Affairs (Moscow) 9 (September 1983): 57.

³¹Abarenkov, 100.

³²Israelyan, 57.

not parties to the accord and refuse to limit their nuclear arms."³³ The USSR Defense Minister summed up the Soviet view on the subject of French and British nuclear capability, in an interview with a TASS correspondent, as follows:

The demand that the nuclear weapons of Britain and France be counted on the NATO side is not a bargaining point for us but, an objective need stemming from the interests of ensuring our security . . . the Soviet Union must and will have the equivalent of the above-mentioned weapons in any case.³⁴

Gorbachev's recent proposals attempt to address this Soviet concern by incorporating the new US European INF capability into the strategic negotiations and offering to negotiate with the French and the British separately. Adopting Gorbachev's proposals would mean that much of the US's nuclear capabilities in Europe would be included in the proposed fifty percent cut in strategic systems by both the US and the USSR. Similar Soviet systems (i.e., the SS-20) are omitted from such negotiations.³⁵ At the strategic/long-range level this inflates the number of US strategic warheads. At the INF level this leaves the French and British systems alone to be matched against all Soviet intermediate/medium-range systems.

The Soviet perception of weapon systems parity, which they say existed prior to the deployment of the new US INF capability, is depicted in Table III.

³³Yevgenyev and Aleximov, 59.

³⁴Interview with Marshal Dmitry Ustinov, USSR Defense Minister, in Pravda, 31 July 1983, cited by G. Yevgenyev and A. Aleximov, "The Problem of Nuclear Arms Limitation in Europe," International Affairs (Moscow) 10 (November 1983): 59.

³⁵Kittle, pp. 24-25.

TABLE III³⁶SOVIET VIEW OF INF IN EUROPE
(November 1981)

Soviet View: USSR and NATO in balance

	USA + NATO		USSR
IRBM	18 French		243 SS-20
			253 SS-4/5
SLBM	80 French		18 SS-N-5
	64 British		
Bombers	65 US FB-111	461	} Backfire < Blinder < Badger
	172 US F-111		
	246 US F-4		
	240 US A-6/7		
	46 French		
	Mirage IVA		
	55 British Vulcan		
	986 TOTAL		975 TOTAL

The basic elements of the Soviet position on INF, listed below, stem from Soviet arguments noted above.

- 1) The USSR should be allowed INF missiles in Europe; the United States should not.
- 2) British and French bombers and missiles should be counted either in the United States' INF total or be negotiated against Soviet INF systems, but only after the US INF is removed from Europe.
- 3) Soviet missiles and bombers outside the European part of the USSR should not be included in European INF negotiations; and,
- 4) Much of the US tactical fighter aircraft in the European theater should be included in the US's INF total.³⁷

³⁶David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1983), p. 74.

³⁷Mark B. Schneider, "The Future: Can the Issues Be Resolved?" In Arms Control: Myth Versus Reality, ed. Richard F. Starr (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), p. 124.

IV. THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE

A. VIEWPOINT ON INF

Given the unprovoked change in the status quo brought about by the Soviet deployment of a new generation of INF systems in the mid-to-late 1970s and the Soviet's position in INF negotiations, many US analysts contend that it is not "equal" security the Soviet Union desires, but "absolute" security. They argue that in the ongoing INF negotiations what the Soviet Union is actually seeking is a sanctioning, by the West of a Soviet force equal to all other nuclear forces. To this end, they seek to establish, by treaty, a precedent in Europe for this concept. The US position is that the INF advantage the Soviets enjoyed prior to Soviet deployments of new systems was transformed into an overwhelming superiority in INF systems prior to US INF deployments. Table IV portrays the US position on the status of INF forces prior to the initial deployment of its new INF systems.

B. PAST ACTIONS REFERENCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE

The US position on INF, particularly in the late-1970s and early 1980s has to be viewed against the backdrop of Soviet advances in strategic systems, as well. This is particularly true since, at one time, the US advantage in the size of its central systems compensated for Soviet superiority in intermediate/medium-range systems in Europe. The US, did not

TABLE IV³⁸U.S. VIEW OF INF IN EUROPE
(November 1981)

U.S. View: USSR leads 6 to 1

	USA	USSR	
IRBM	0	250	SS-20
		350	SS-4/5
		100	SS-12/22
SLBM	0	30	SS-N-5
Bombers	164 F-111 in W. Europe	45	Backfire
	63 FB-111 in USA	350	{ Blinder
	265 F-4	2,700	{ Badger
	68 A-6/7		{ SU-17
			{ SU-24
			{ MIG-27
	560 TOTAL	3,825	TOTAL

have any IRBMs or MRBMs deployed in Europe after the early 1960s,³⁹ in spite of a large Soviet force of SS-4 MRBMs, and SS-5 IRBMs.⁴⁰

The same perceptions about the Soviets that led to the withdrawal of US intermediate and medium-range systems from Europe was in part responsible for the Soviets attaining their current superiority in strategic systems. Major General William E. Odom, at the time the assistant chief of staff for intelligence, for the U.S. Army, summarized the Soviet achievement of strategic superiority this way:

³⁸Holloway, p. 74.

³⁹Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Whence the Threat to Peace, third edition (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1984), p. 40.

⁴⁰At one time the number approached 750. Garthoff, 85.

It was widely believed by Western military analysts and defense officials in the 1960s that the Soviet nuclear force structure goals were parity with the United States. Secretary of Defense McNamara . . . did not expect the Soviet land-based ICBM force to grow beyond 1054 [the US number]. . . . by 1975 approximately 1600 ICBM launchers were in the Soviet force. . . .the number dropped to about 1400, but the number of warheads... increased dramatically. ...Accuracy also improved. ...At the same time, evidence appeared that Soviet launchers have a reload capability. ...Such a Soviet force clearly exceeds what Western analysts judge necessary for deterrence.⁴¹

C. CHANGES IN POLICY

The Soviet attainment of strategic parity in the mid-1970s, followed by superiority in many categories in the late-1970s and early 1980s correspond with the US development of new strategies. The "Schlesinger Doctrine", National Security Decision Memorandum 242 (NSDM-242), attempted to move away from the "mutual suicide" of Robert McNamara's mutual assured destruction (MAD) policy. Espoused in January 1974, NSDM-242 envisioned a wider range of scenarios. It evolved into the "countervailing strategy" of President Carter's Directive 59 (PD-59) of July 1980. This restructuring of US strategic doctrine was influenced and shaped by 1) a need to maintain a secure second strike, 2) the requirement for the US deterrent to be credible in Soviet eyes, and 3) the fact that MAD spelled unacceptable damage to the US.⁴²

⁴¹William E. Odom, Major General, U.S. Army, "The Soviet Approach to Nuclear Weapons: A Historical Review," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 469 (September 1983): 125.

⁴²Leon Goure, "The U.S. 'Countervailing Strategy' in Soviet Perception," Strategic Review 9 (Fall 1981): 53.

These changes in US strategy continued to reflect elements of several underlying differences between US and Soviet policy development. In the Soviet Union long term policy goals are clearly understood and, in spite of variations in the approach taken, there is a marked consistency in its policy towards nuclear weapons development, arms control, and Europe. This is an outgrowth of an oligarchic system, with ascendancy to the top echelons of the ruling elite coming only after lengthly apprenticeship at ascending levels of authority and responsibility.

The US, on the other hand, with its highly pluralistic society has often had its top leadership ascend to their positions of power with only limited governmental experience and often no external policy experience. The policy of such leaders frequently fails to be in agreement, not only with that of the opposition party, but often with influential members of their own party. This lack of continuity in leadership has, on several occasions, made for marked departures in policy concerning nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union, and Europe. These changes have, therefore, resulted as much, if not more so, from internal dissatisfaction with the policy in place at the time as from any perceived change in the US's external relationships (i.e., with the Soviet Union or Europe). Although the plethora of academic analysis of the nuclear age, its weapons and the possible ramifications that are hypothesized about their use, the threat of their use, and the abdication of their use, has played a significant role in the shaping and reshaping of American policy,

quite often such policy changes in the US have been shaped to a large degree by politics.

In consonance with this revision of US strategic doctrine in the mid-to-late 1970s and in response to a West European desire for a credible link between its security and US central systems the US concurred in the decision to deploy a new generation of US INF systems in Western Europe, thus insuring NATO's short term credibility. This deployment was intended to deny the Soviets escalation dominance in the INF category. The intent of the US strategy was not meant so much, to assure the US could win a limited nuclear war, as much as it was meant to prevent the Soviets from being able to be assured of winning such a conflict, and thereby maintaining the status quo and enhancing long term stability.

V. NATO DILEMMA

A. EUROPEAN POLITICAL ELITE ON INF

As was noted in the preceding section, the US INF deployment came at the instigation of West European political elite's initiatives. The Western European political elite's assessment of INF in the late 1970s generally did not agree with that of the Soviet Union. Commencing in 1977, the West European political elite became increasingly alarmed by Soviet "modernization" of its INF capability, particularly with the continuing Soviet deployment of SS-20s. After the US's INF deployments were initiated, the Federal Republic of Germany's (FRG) ambassador to NATO at the time and its recently appointed Intelligence Chief, Hans-Georg Wieck, assessed the Soviet's intentions this way; the "Soviet INF deployments were obviously designed to decouple Europe from the nuclear umbrella of the United States."⁴³

Yet some in the West have questioned this concern over the Soviet upgrade of its INF. They point out that the Soviets have enjoyed "superiority" in Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces (LRTNF)⁴⁴ in Europe for some time. They overlook the fact that

⁴³Hans-Georg Wieck, "The Soviet Union and the Future of East-West Relations," NATO Review 32 (April 1984): 21.

⁴⁴"Long Range Theater Nuclear Forces" (LRTNF) was the term used by NATO until 1981 to describe what will be identified in a later chapter of this study as intermediate-range and medium-range systems. In 1981 the Reagan administration, at the insistence of Europeans, adopted the following categories for nuclear systems deployed in Europe: 1) longer-range

throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and part of the 1970s the United States' superiority in strategic forces more than offset any Soviet superiority in European-based nuclear forces. But SALT led to strategic parity. And, at the same time strategic parity was becoming a reality the USSR commenced installation of a new, more effective INF, in the form of SS-20s and Backfire bombers. This perceived change in the status quo concerned the European political elite.

This was most clearly demonstrated in a speech delivered by Helmut Schmidt, the West German Chancellor at the time, on 28 October 1977, to a gathering at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, in London. In this speech he skillfully illuminated European perceptions about arms control and how they viewed the effect of such negotiations upon those aspects of nuclear arms competition that directly impacted upon Western Europe.

SALT neutralizes their [the Soviet Union's and the United States'] strategic nuclear capabilities. In Europe this magnifies the significance of the disparities between East and West in nuclear tactical and conventional weapons It is of vital interest to us all that the negotiations between the two superpowers on the limitation and reduction of nuclear strategic weapons should continue and lead to a lasting

intermediate-range nuclear forces (LRINF), 2) shorter-range intermediate-range nuclear forces (SRINF), and 3) short-range nuclear forces (SNF). LRINF and LRTNF are rough equivalents. It was felt that the term "theater" had decoupling connotations; Europeans wanted to emphasize the fact that Europe was more than just another theater. For the purpose of this paper INF, LRTNF, LRINF are essentially equivalent terms. Specific categories of nuclear weapons are addressed in Chapter 8. David N. Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1983), p. 193 (footnote no. 1).

agreement. The nuclear powers have a special, an overwhelming responsibility in this field. On the other hand, we in Europe must be particularly careful to ensure that these negotiations do not neglect the components of NATO's deterrence strategy⁴⁵

B. WHAT LED TO NATO'S INF DECISION

Subsequent to the speech, an analysis of the current status of NATO versus the Warsaw Pact nuclear capabilities and a review of responses open to NATO were conducted. A list of alternatives was compiled by October 1978. In January 1979 the subject was addressed by the leaders of the US, Britain, the FRG, and France (Carter, Callaghan, Schmidt, and Giscard, respectively) during a summit in Guadeloupe. By the end of March 1979, as a result of US diplomatic missions to the various allies in January and March, the British, West German, and Italian governments had verbally committed themselves to receiving new US INF systems. In April 1979, at West German and Dutch insistence, a NATO study of the feasibility of an arms control initiative coupled with INF deployment resulted in an Integrated Decision Document, which was adopted by NATO on 12 December 1979.⁴⁶

With this decision NATO member nations obligated themselves to the deployment of a new generation of US INF systems, if the US and the USSR failed to negotiate a rollback of the new Soviet INF systems by December 1983. Although it may be argued that the

⁴⁵Helmut Schmidt, "The Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture," *Survival* 20 (January-February 1978), cited by David N. Schwartz, *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1983), p. 1.

⁴⁶Schwartz, pp. 216-238.

real credibility of security rests "on the recognition of mutual vital interests and mutual trust," whenever Europe's sense of security has been undermined or European trust of the US has been in question, since World War II, the reaction has been to seek reassurance in the form of some new manifestation of US nuclear commitment to Europe.⁴⁷ With parity at the strategic level, this need could not be met credibly by US central systems, thus a prime motivation behind NATO's decision to deploy 108 Pershing IIs and 464 GLCMs was a lack of faith in the US obligation to Europe. During the intervening four years, there was much debate on all sides about the original decision and whether the deployment should really take place as planned. But the display of basic West European-American solidarity on the actual deployment of the new US INF systems has, in fact, led to the temporary thwarting of Soviet goals, both long and short range.

Ultimately, the Soviets would like to see the Atlantic Alliance disintegrate and US troops withdrawn, but in the short term they would be pleased to see NATO seriously fragmented or, at the very least, divisive. The Soviets deployed the SS-20 to enhance the Soviets already superior INF position, but this led the West European political elite to conclude a solution that ran counter to these overarching Soviet aims. As anticipated, the West Europeans questioned the validity of the US nuclear shield even more than they had the SALT negotiations. But, rather than

⁴⁷Christoph Bertram, "The Implications of Theater Nuclear Weapons in Europe," Foreign Affairs 60 (Winter 1981-82): 310.

dismiss the US and acquiescence to Soviet demands, European leaders opted for strengthening the alliance that had served Western Europe for thirty years and concluded that flexible response in Europe was only plausible if NATO had an effective nuclear deterrent on the European continent. They rejected the attempted acquisition of "escalation dominance" by the Soviet Union. With the December 1979 decision, "NATO was telling the Soviet Union that its attempt to achieve overwhelming superiority, with the aid of intermediate-range nuclear weapons, would not succeed."⁴⁸ Unfortunately, not all Europeans ascribe to this analysis of the situation.

C. OPPOSITION TO THE DECISION

The same individuals who question West European governmental leader's concern over the Soviet INF upgrade also display a tendency to identify the threat to European peace as the US INF deployments. These Europeans mistakenly think the US wants to "regionalize" the danger of war to Europe, whereas, the truth is that deterrence is only credible, if it is believed that the weapons of deterrence may be used as weapons of war. With strategic parity, the threat to use US central systems to protect Western Europe, if conventional and tactical nuclear weapons failed, was not credible. The NATO decision was made to provide NATO a credible deterrent in Europe and reestablish a more credible link with US strategic systems. In countries such as

⁴⁸Gillessen, 19.

Belgium and the Netherlands, these individuals are sizeable in numbers. But, as the Prime Minister of France, Pierre Mauroy, pointed out in September, 1982, those

certain European countries, . . . that have doubts about it, must be convinced that medium-range nuclear arms, whose deployment has been decided upon, will be added to the [European nuclear] arsenal not in order to wage a war limited to Europe, but quite the contrary, to make it clear to an eventual adversary that such a limited war is impossible.⁴⁹

NATO leaders did attempt to anticipate and allay public fears about deployment of new nuclear weapons in Europe at the same time they made their original decision to deploy. The December 1979 decision established that 1,000 nuclear warheads already in place in Western Europe would be removed in the short term and then as each new INF missile was installed one additional warhead would be withdrawn. In actuality "the United States unilaterally withdrew some 1,000 theater nuclear warheads during 1980 and . . . 1,400 more in 1984. In other words, a total of only 572 GLCMs and Pershing IIs will be replacing the 2,400 . . . taken out."⁵⁰ But this is overlooked or discounted by those who question the deployment.

The population base to support such a popular movement against deployment of new nuclear weapons systems was already

⁴⁹France, Foreign Ministry (French Embassy in the United States), excerpts of remarks by Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy to the Institute of Higher Defense Studies, 20 September 1982, document 82/89 (New York: French Embassy Press and Information Service, 1981), p. 8.

⁵⁰Richard F. Starr, Arms Control: Myth Versus Reality (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), p. x.

present, since a vigorous nuclear disarmament campaign attracted much attention in Western Europe in the early 1960s.⁵¹ Also, the Soviet Union created the International Information Department (IID) in 1978 as an element in their attempts to make their foreign propaganda effort more effective. It quite probably was Moscow's intention to use the organization "to stimulate the rise of West European peace movements in the late 1970's."⁵² The NATO governments have more or less been able to withstand the pressure of these attempts to sidetrack the deployment. Their primary motivations have been to maintain a semblance of solidarity and provide a viable deterrent to the ever increasing Soviet nuclear capability.

D. NATO COUNTRIES NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED

The roles played by the various NATO members to enhance solidarity and insure deterrence have their roots in their pasts, but have been greatly affected by current considerations. Both must be understood in order to understand the positions taken to date by the various members on the INF controversy and possible future actions or inactions. In terms of the INF controversy, NATO, exclusive of the North American continent, can be viewed as consisting of three groupings: 1) the European nuclear powers, 2) the INF site countries, and 3) all others.

⁵¹Stanley Hoffman, "NATO and Nuclear Weapons: Reasons and Unreasons," Foreign Affairs 60 (Winter 1981-82): 327.

⁵²J. A. Emerson Vermaat, "Moscow Fronts and the European Peace Movements," Problems of Communism 31 (November-December 1982): 45.

Of the latter group, the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway, and Iceland have been limited in their participation in NATO nuclear matters by strong pacifist domestic political groups. All broke with unsuccessful, but long neutralist traditions when they entered into the NATO alliance in 1949. They already had developed policies banning the stationing of nuclear weapons on their soil, when the US first offered IRBMs, back in 1957.⁵³ However, these countries, in spite of their domestic bans, have not usually resisted NATO initiatives to deploy such devices elsewhere.

The remainder of the "other states" are part of NATO's southern tier, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey (Spain was not a NATO member in 1979). Basing any of the new INF weapons in Portugal would have had limited effect because of range limitations (not as pronounced, but similar to the IRBMs deployed in Western Europe in the late 1950s). As for Greece, anti-Americanism and an anti-NATO drift were in full swing and growing in 1979, following the return of civilian rule and the Cyprus debacle of 1974. Prime Minister Karamanlis, as he had been during the IRBM controversy of the late 1950s, was constrained by domestic considerations from countenancing any expansion of Greece's role in NATO at the time. The popular sentiment would reach full flower with the accession to power of Andres Papandreou, head of the Greek Socialist Party, PASOK, in 1981, on a platform of withdrawing Greece from NATO and expelling US forces from Greece.

⁵³Schwartz, p. 73.

Turkey was experiencing a domestic upheaval unparalleled, since the founding days of the republic. It was facing an external crisis of growing dimensions in the Islamic Revolution in neighboring Iran. And in its relations with the US, Turkey was still laboring under the shadow of effects surrounding Cyprus. It would take the intervention of the military in 1980, for a third time in the history of the republic, to reestablish some sense of order in Turkey. Given all of of these considerations, Turkey was not seeking to increase its profile with respect to its neighbor to the northeast, the Soviet Union, by accepting the deployment of new US nuclear weapons on its soil.

This left Britain, the FRG, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands (France was not an option given its withdrawal from NATO's military command) as possible sites for the new US INF. As already alluded to all of these nations faced constraints of their own to deployment of such systems on their soil.

VI. INF SITE COUNTRIES: THE HIDDEN COSTS

A. WHO ARE THE SITE COUNTRIES?

Although Britain falls into this category, it, due to its independent nuclear capability, will be addressed in the succeeding chapter. The other four nations that have or are scheduled to receive US INF deployments, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands do not possess their own nuclear capability (although they each have some nuclear capable systems). All indorsed the 1979 NATO Decision to deploy new US INF systems in response to continuing Soviet deployments of new INF systems. The governments of both Belgium and the Netherlands withheld final approval to accept deployment on their soil to a later date. Both have subsequently done so. The nation that played a central role in the INF deployment, as with many of NATO's plans, was the FRG.

B. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

The FRG has been at the center of NATO plans since before its accession into the NATO structure, which took place shortly after attaining sovereign status in 1955. Since that time its role has increased significantly, becoming central to the NATO structure in all facets. The vast preponderance of NATO's military forces are deployed in the FRG. Geographically it is essential for any viable conventional defense of Western Europe. As the "land of the middle", occupying the heart of Europe, Germany has

traditionally been and remains the ideal invasion route between Eastern and Western Europe. In addition to this physical determinancy, the FRG's economic strength, the largest GNP in Western Europe, and its military primacy, the largest army (exclusive of the US) in the alliance, insure it a significant role in alliance affairs.

As noted in the opening paragraph of this chapter the FRG does not possess a nuclear capability of its own. The FRG, as a prerequisite to rearmament, pledged not to develop a nuclear weapons capability on its soil. This was given to allay the fears of its European allies, as much, if not more so, than the Soviet Union. But this has left it, the NATO member most exposed to a Warsaw Pact invasion, completely dependent upon an outside capability for its ultimate security.

In light of this, throughout the alliance's history, the governments in power in the FRG have displayed a willingness to repeatedly accept the deployment of nuclear weapons on its soil. At times, such as during the Multilateral Force (MLF) controversy of the early 1960s, the government has indicated a particular desire for nuclear control sharing. As a result of its importance to the alliance and its desire to be accorded the prestige of the other major alliance members, such as France and Britain, it was awarded a permanent seat in Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). This insures the FRG a role in the alliance's nuclear decisions.

These government positions on nuclear weapons have not been without opposition. The first controversy over nuclear weapons was sparked by the American offer of IRBMs to its NATO allies in December 1957. The SPD led the political opposition, with an up and coming Helmut Schmidt, playing a prominent role in this debate against acceptance. According to public opinion polls at the time, a significant portion of the population opposed such deployments. But Konrad Adenauer, the Chancellor at the time, saw to the approval of such deployments, because of his desire to solidify the FRG's ties to the West through a firm display of support for NATO.⁵⁴ Similar opposition manifested itself in the debate of the late 1970s and early 1980s concerning the deployment of a new US INF on German soil. Recognition of this domestic setting was a factor in Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's insistence that at least one other continental NATO member share in the deployment. He also sought to link arms control negotiations for INF systems with the deployment decision.

It is important to recognize that the role that the FRG has played to date and will play in the future within NATO is shaped, not only by its concern for security, which primarily necessitates the addressment of a multitude of external constraints, but, as with all the alliance members, internal constraints, as well. David Schwartz, in his work NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas, has succinctly identified the conflicting external considerations; given the FRG's unique

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 7-73.

geographic location and its historical legacy, these factors are extremely complex. The FRG

. . . has always had to balance its various objectives delicately: to play an active and constructive role within the alliance without reawakening the suspicions and resentments of its opponents in World War II; to come to a more stable relationship with East Germany without raising American fears of German revanchism; to seek reunification on terms acceptable to the West without destabilizing the postwar balance of power; and to pursue all its goals without antagonizing either enemies or friends.⁵⁵

All of these factors affected the FRG's position on US INF deployments. It did not want to jeopardize its relationship with the German Democratic Republic (DDR), which necessitated considering Soviet desires. At the same time it wanted to insure its own security and NATO solidarity. Schmidt therefore fought for Bundestag (parliamentary) approval of the NATO position on the need for the new INF deployments, but wanted US assurance that the actual basing would be shared. He hoped this would dissipate Soviet wrath somewhat. Even so, the Soviet Union made a significant propaganda effort to stop FRG's 1979 approval of the NATO position and its 1983 acceptance of new INF deployments on its soil. In so doing, it played up the opposition's position.

Internally though, the FRG has enjoyed a remarkable political consensus since 1960 amongst the major parties on the subject of NATO. It was not until after Helmut Schmidt stepped down from his leadership role of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) that

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 6.

there was a divergence between the two largest parties on the US INF deployments.⁵⁶ This was precipitated by the ascendancy of the left-wing within the SPD. It is reflective of a youth-centered, anti-nuclear movement, which has been manifested in the "Greens" political movement within the FRG. This movement has been able to play upon the same fears that were present in the late 1950s debate over deployment of nuclear weapons. But, in spite of this and a significant portion of the population's expressed opposition to deployment of the new INF systems, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) government, openly supportive of the deployment, was returned to office in federal elections in 1983.

Historical precedence, recent elections and current social trends indicate a continuing political majority clustered around the center of the West German political spectrum, embodied in the Free Democratic Party (FDP). The selection of Johannes Rau, a SPD moderate, over Oskar Lafontaine, an anti-nuclear, anti-NATO advocate, as the SPD's chancellor candidate for the 1987 federal elections is a further indication of this. Rau recently spoke in positive terms with the U.S. Ambassador to the FRG, Richard Burt, about West Germany's role in NATO.⁵⁷ This bodes well for a West German government generally highly supportive of NATO

⁵⁶Frederick Painton, "Protest by the 'New Class'," Time, 28 February 1983, pp. 30-31.

⁵⁷"Diplomat: W. German 'Neutralism' Fading," Monterey Peninsula Herald, 4 November 1985, p. 7.

solidarity.⁵⁸ Therefore, as long as the alliance remains dedicated to its 1979 deployment decision, it would be unlikely in the near future for any West German government to demand removal of the US INF.

C. ITALY

A major actor in the deployment decision of new INF systems in Western Europe was the Italian government. Italy was the first member of NATO to unconditionally accept basing of a portion of the INF on its soil (although Italy stressed the need for associated arms control negotiations).⁵⁹ There were both traditional and new factors involved with that decision.

Italy's postwar foreign policy has been shaped by its membership in the EC and NATO. Its membership in the latter provided for Italy's external security and allowed it to concentrate on internal security and economic revitaliation. Italy perceived its obligations to the alliance as twofold: first that of providing a military force, the bulk of which is NATO dedicated, and secondly, but foremost, that of basing facilities for NATO/US forces. In light of this Italy did not pay significant attention to its military until the past decade.

⁵⁸Phillip J. Gick, "The Free Democratic Party in the Federal Republic of Germany: Is the Political Process About to Change?" (Seminar Paper, Naval Postgraduate School, 1985) pp. 35-36.

⁵⁹See Luigi Caligaris, "Italian Defence Policy: Problems and Prospects," Survival 25 (March-April 1983): 69; Schwartz, pp. 229-230; Wayne C. Thompson, Western Europe 1982 (Washington, D.C.: Stryker-Post Publications, Inc., 1982), p. 319.

In 1975 a restructuring and modernization of the military was begun. Although Italy's percent of GNP expenditure on its military has consistently remained one of the lowest, extrabudgetary laws (insulated from inflation) were passed in 1977 to fund the modernization program.⁶⁰ According to this plan, the number of units would be reduced, but readiness increased. In addition to this increased attention to the status of the military, the Italian government began to seek a larger, more active role in international affairs.

In fact, failure to be invited to the 1979 industrialized nations' summit in Guadeloupe may have acted as an additional catalyst to Italy's seeking a larger role in NATO affairs, through its ready acceptance of INF basing on Italian soil.⁶¹ In either case, the Italian decision involved support across the political spectrum. Even the Italian Communist Party (PCI) did not take the Soviet position on the subject. Trying not to undermine its relatively recent position of supporting the NATO alliance, the PCI sought a suspension of both SS-20 deployments and US INF production.⁶² The entire process reflected a

⁶⁰See Caligaris, 68; Stefano Silvestri, "The Italian Paradox: Consensus Amid Instability," in The Internal Fabric of Western Security, ed. Gregory A. Flynn et al (Totowa, New Jersey: Allanheld, Osmun, and Co., 1981), pp. 142-145; and Thompson, p. 319.

⁶¹Schwartz, p. 230; and Thompson, p. 319.

⁶²Interview with Enrico Berlinguer, General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), 26 July 1980, cited in Enrico Berlinguer, "Interview to Oriana Fallaci," The Italian Communists 3 (July-September 1980): 77-80; Silvestri, p. 140.

maturation of the Italian foreign and defense process, from that followed in the early days of the alliance and insured continuing Italian support for deployment, regardless of a change in governments.⁶³

D. BELGIUM

The INF commitment in Belgium has also remained, surprisingly on track, given the country's domestic political chaos. Belgium's political stability is a continuing problem due to the marked ethnic divisions within the country. There are no major national parties in Belgium today. All three of the largest party "groups", the Christian, Socialist, and the Liberals, are divided into regional parties. The largest group is known as the Christian People's Party (CVP) in Dutch-speaking Flanders (56% of the population), whereas in French-speaking Wallonia (32% of the population) it is known as the Christian Social Party (PSC). Although the two are inclined to cooperate in forming governing coalitions, their appeal is strictly to their separate regions.⁶⁴

⁶³In the past such decisions were made by the government alone. In fact most decisions of this nature were made by the select few who were on the Supreme Defense Council (the President, Prime Minister, Foreign, Defense, and Interior ministers, Chief of Staff and the chiefs of the three branches, and anyone else the President selects). An example of the smoothness that has accompanied the acceptance of the INF deployments by the government is found in the fact that Cossiga of the Christian Democrats was Prime Minister at the time the decision to deploy was made, while Craxi of the Socialists was Prime Minister at the time of deployment. See Caligaris, 69; and Schwartz, p. 230.

⁶⁴Thompson, p. 177.

Concern over insuring equity between the two major regions of the country could cause division within a ruling coalition, for domestic reasons, at any time.

This has been a major factor in there having been thirty-three government coalitions formed since 1944. During the most recent elections, on 13 October 1985, the ruling coalition, the two regional Christian parties and the two regional Liberal parties, captured 116 of 212 of the Parliamentary seats. This marked an increase, signalling stronger support for the coalition's austere domestic policy than opinion polls had predicted. The election was also significant for INF deployments, because the returning coalition had accepted the first 16 of 48 planned missiles only seven months prior to the elections. Also significant was the fact that elements of the main opposition party group, the Socialists, had stated during the campaign that they would seek removal of the missiles if elected. The Socialists also increased their strength in the Parliament. The losers in the election were the two nationalist parties and the Communist Party, the latter failing to win a seat in the Parliament for the first time since 1925.⁶⁵

So, even though Belgium has been a leading proponent of European integrationist movements, such as the EC and NATO, since their inceptions, the continuity of its external policy remains

⁶⁵Associated Press, "Belgians Re-Elect Prime Minister; Socialists Gain, Communists Lose," Monterey Peninsula Herald, 14 October 1985, p. 2.

more intimately tied to domestic political divisions than other NATO members. But this is clearly not a new development in Belgium. Although the Belgian government displayed some interest in the US offer of IRBMs made at the December 1957 NATO meeting, in the end domestic political opposition prevented any active involvement.⁶⁶ Therefore, it should be noted that, while Belgium continues to support transnational organizations (both NATO and the EC have their headquarters in Brussels), it has displayed an increasing uneasiness with NATO policy that is viewed as disruptive to good relations with the East Bloc, particularly the Soviet Union. Alliance solidarity, detente and the minimization of East-West tensions all play an important role in Belgian foreign policy.

In spite of domestic difficulties, given Belgium's long and close association within the alliance, there appears reason for optimism about its steadfastness on the INF deployment. Given the results of recent national elections, as long as the alliance remains committed to deployment, particularly the other countries where the the INF is being based, Belgium will most likely remain committed to the deployment of 48 cruise missiles on its soil by 1988.

E. THE NETHERLANDS

The future of the INF question in the Netherlands is even less certain than it is in Belgium. The Dutch are in the

⁶⁶Schwartz, p. 73.

fore-front of the powerful anti-nuclear arms movement in Europe, something that has been played upon repeatedly by the Soviets. The movement has broad support in the Netherlands--religious, labor, and political. Mr. Joop den Uyl, the leader of the main opposition party, the Labor Party (Pvda), explained the philosophy behind the movement this way: "We no longer believe in a balance of power, or balance of terror approach to disarmament. We no longer have the feeling the nuclear umbrella is protecting us."⁶⁷ The movement's intent is for the Netherlands to set an example for unilateral nuclear disarmament, which other smaller nations will in turn adopt. The hope is that such a move will eventually force the two superpowers to eventually do the same. The slogan the movement has adopted incapsulates this concept: "Ban nuclear weapons from the world and start with the Netherlands." The whole phenomenon has come to be referred to by many in the West as "Hollanditis".⁶⁸

This broad and deep concern with nuclear weapons clashes with the Netherlands efforts to maintain solidarity with its NATO allies and NATO's 1979 decision. The Netherlands, like Belgium, has been in the forefront of European integrationist movements. The Netherlands was one of the six charter members of the EC. Besides being a charter member of NATO, it was a signator of its forerunner, the Treaty of Brussels. Because these goals conflict with one another over the subject of INF deployments,

⁶⁷Thompson, pp. 161-164.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 164.

particularly on Dutch soil, the Netherlands, although it indorsed the original NATO decision in December 1979, simultaneously deferred agreement to participate in GLCM deployments for two years in order to assess the arms control process.⁶⁹ This deferment to agree was continued until, 1 November 1985, almost six years after the original decision and eight months after the last of the other four site countries started receiving INF systems on its soil. On that date Premier Ruud Lubber sent a letter to Parliament stating an agreement would be drawn up between the Netherlands and the US for deployment of 48 GLCMs on Dutch soil.⁷⁰ But the government, consciously trying to maintain a precarious balance between the twin goals of nuclear limitation and alliance solidarity and cognizant of the public response to the latest Soviet "arms limitation initiative"⁷¹, also announced that it would correspondingly reduce its participation in NATO's overall nuclear deterrence by withdrawing from four other nuclear projects involving F-16s, land mines, depth charges and Nike-Hercules.⁷²

The austere economic policies of the center-right coalition may have been the prime reason the voters returned the coalition

⁶⁹Schwartz, p. 238.

⁷⁰Associated Press, "Dutch Government OKs Deployment by NATO of 48 Cruise Missiles," Monterey Peninsula Herald, 2 November 1985, p. 1.

⁷¹CBS, "CBS Evening News," 7 October 1985, "Dutch Anti-nuclearists Reaction to Gorbachev's Offer in Paris," Dan Rather.

⁷²"Dutch Government OKs Deployment", p. 1.

to power in the the May 1986 national elections, but the coalition's decisions regarding deployment of INF on dutch soil were also made a major campaign issue by Mr. Uyl.⁷³ The INF deployments in the Netherlands are not scheduled to begin before 1988.. The question appears to be whether the confessional party, the CDA, will be able to retain the traditional role of it and its various predecessors, as a dominant coalition partner. If so, the present policy would appear to be assured, assuming the alliance and its members maintain their stance on deployment. Even if the Socialist Party is part of a coalition, in some future government, the process of coalition building necessitates a broad and generally moderate program. Also, denying deployment, at that point and time would necessitate revocation of a bilateral treaty with another alliance member, the U.S. Given all these factors, there is sufficient reason for cautious optimism with respect to the eventual deployment.

⁷³"Dutch Government OKs Deployment", p. 1; Reuter, "Coalition in Dutch Poll Win," London Times, 22 May 1986, sec. 1, p. 1.

VII. EUROPE'S NUCLEAR POWERS

A. FRANCE AND BRITAIN: UNIQUE NATO MEMBERS

Two NATO nations whose positions, perceptions, and capabilities must be reviewed separately from the rest of the organization for a number of reasons, are France and Britain. Although both France and Britain are part of NATO, in one capacity or another, they maintain their own nuclear capabilities. Both have steadfastly maintained that their systems are the minimum sufficient destructive capacity to insure their own national security and, therefore, must remain under their independent control. For the same reasons they are just as emphatic about their nuclear capabilities not being included in bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

B. FRANCE

The answer to this independent approach and the independent nature of France's nuclear policy lies in the make up of the French national psyche and is reflected in the French development of their nuclear capability. In this case, the mind set preceded the development.

1. The Development of French Nuclear Policy and Weapons

Charles de Gaulle was not the first Frenchman to speak of French "grandeur" or prestige. At least as far back as 1930, a French Ambassador, Jules Cambon, observed the link between national security and such ephemeral concepts as grandeur this way:

Security! The term involves more indeed than the maintenance of a people's homeland, or even their territories beyond the seas. It also means the maintenance of the world's respect for them, the maintenance of their economic interests, everything, in a word, which goes to make up the grandeur, the life itself, of the nation.⁷⁴

Although grandeur may not have been an original concept with de Gaulle, he had insight into the French national psyche. Even after France's defeat in 1940, de Gaulle described the inability of Frenchmen to ever willingly accede to the domination of any other nation, whether subtle or overt, with this phrase: "C'est dans le nature des choses que nous soyons les premiers en Europe' (it is the nature of things that we be first in Europe)" ⁷⁵ In consonance with this type of mindset, de Gaulle recognized

. . . That the French liked grandeur almost as much as he did, which meant glory, victories, power, supremacy universally acknowledged, foreign emulation and admiration, and the pre-dominance of the French language (and culture) over all others; they could not bear to be citizens of a second-rate power, forced to submit, like all other people, to occasional humiliating concessions.⁷⁶

Even so, after World War II, France was completely dependent upon the US for its security. Fortunately for the French, they were in agreement with the US's anti-communist philosophy and containment policy. However, the French and the

⁷⁴Jules Cambon, French Ambassador, quoted by Anton W. DePorte, De Gaulle's Foreign Policy: 1944-1946 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968, cited by Anton W. DePorte and Hugh De Santis, "The Politics of French Security," AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review 4 (1982): 27.

⁷⁵Luigi Barzini, The Europeans (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1983), p. 135.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 145.

US failed to agree that French colonial wars were an integral element in such a policy. It became evident, if not before then, definitively during the Suez Crisis, that the US and French perceptions of the threat were divergent.⁷⁷ This humiliation, as the French saw it, provided the incentive for Prime Minister Guy Mollet to accelerate French nuclear development already underway. By late 1956 plans had been conceived for explosive tests and construction of prototype nuclear weapons.⁷⁸

The Fourth Republic had, therefore, laid the groundwork on nuclear weapons development before de Gaulle returned to power in 1958, when the Fourth Republic collapsed. But de Gulle had to first devise, establish, and implement a governmental structure that would give the French the one man rule they had turned to in their latest crisis, Algeria, and had relied upon so often before, while still providing the people a voice. The constitution he presented the French nation "curbed the power of the Assembly, whose ever-changing moods had been the source of many evils, and of parties. He made the governments difficult to topple and strengthened the executive" ⁷⁹ The renowned Italian Europeanist, Luigi Barzini, summed it up this way,

⁷⁷Edward A. Kolodziej, "French Military Doctrine," in Comparative Defense Policy, ed. Frank B. Horton III, Anthony C. Rogerson, and Edward L. Warner III (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1974), pp. 247-248.

⁷⁸David S. Yost, "France's Deterrent Posture and Security in Europe" (Draft of an Adelphi Paper, Naval Postgraduate School, 1985), p. 10.

⁷⁹Barzini, p. 146.

"de Gaulle gave the French the monarchy many of them longed for under every republic, and, at the same time, the republic many of them longed for under every monarchy."⁸⁰

After tackling the issue of governmental structure de Gaulle turned to the Algerian question, that had precipitated the downfall of the Fourth Republic and brought him out of retirement. But he also pressed ahead with the April 1958 decision of Prime Minister Felix Gaillard to have France's first nuclear explosion take place in 1960.⁸¹ De Gaulle clearly saw the diplomatic possibilities of a French nuclear force.⁸² To justify the resource demands such an undertaking necessitated, he seized upon a common, external threat, for all Frenchmen to focus on, the "Anglosaxons." The traditional foe, Germany was too reduced in size to provide the formidable threat he sought. The Soviets would work counter to his goal of an independent policy, by necessitating continued French acknowledgement of its dependence upon the U.S. The US and Britain, as the threat, also provided de Gaulle with the opportunity to attain revenge for the manner in which he was treated during World War II. Additionally it provided de Gaulle with an easy sell to the French national psyche, because they hated owing the US not only for their reclaimed independence, but also for the financing of their economic recovery, following World War II. And, as Barzini again

⁸⁰Ibid.

⁸¹Yost, p. 10.

⁸²Kolodziej, p. 254.

skillfully notes, "nothing notoriously makes for bad blood between nations and individuals as an undeniable claim for gratitude."⁸³

De Gaulle did not immediately seek a decisive break with the US. His initial move towards a more independent and necessarily divergent (from the US and Britain) foreign policy was the 1958 Eisenhower Memorandum. This was an oligarchical vision of tripartite Western cooperation, consisting of the three leading states of NATO, France, the United States, and Great Britain. The correspondence, primarily between France and the US, continued throughout the remainder of the Eisenhower administration and encompassed discussion of three-power planning and control on a global scale, with each state to exercise an individual sphere of influence. The process came to a halt after the Kennedy Administration took office and its "Grand Design" conflicted with de Gaulle's concepts of "Europe for the Europeans".⁸⁴

This was followed in 1960 by the Fouchet Plan, which was a move away from the integrationist policies present in Europe at the time and towards a more confederal system. In 1962 this process also met with failure and confirmed de Gaulle's suspicions that supranational structures such as the EEC were

⁸³Barzini, pp. 149-151.

⁸⁴Michael M. Harrison, The Reluctant Ally: France and the Atlantic Security (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 86-93.

designed to insure the subservience of the individual European states with respect to the US.⁸⁵

In addition to these rebuffs, during the same time frame, de Gaulle was able to cite the Nassau Agreement, the US sale of Polaris missiles to Britain, in lieu of the scuttled Skybolt system, and the Cuban missile crisis as other reasons to distrust the US. In his view the former confirmed the US's preferential bias for Britain and, if France opted to continue being so dependent upon the US for its future security it could undermine the government. The latter incident, although he was one of the first European leaders to support the Kennedy administration in its decision on Cuba, reinforced his belief that the US could lead France into a conflict that was not in its best interest.

The Algerian problem was reaching a resolution at this time also, which allowed a substantially greater reallocation of resources from conventional military forces to nuclear weapons and delivery systems development. By 1964 France had fielded its first nuclear delivery vehicle, the Mirage IV. By 1968 sixty-two had been delivered.⁸⁶ It was during this same period that the declared policy of France increasingly depicted the US as the greatest destabilizing factor in the international arena.⁸⁷ In March 1966, de Gaulle finally withdrew France from the integrated

⁸⁵Ibid., pp. 103-104.

⁸⁶Yost, p. 37.

⁸⁷Kolodziej, p. 250.

military structure of NATO. Remaining sensitive to the French desire to be perceived as standing alone, he stated France could provide for its own security.⁸⁸ This concept reached its zenith with the "every point of the compass" or "tous azimuts" concept of the Chief of the French General Staff, General Charles Ailleret, published in *Revue de Defense National* in December 1967.⁸⁹

General Ailleret's concept was never adopted as official French government policy. Indications are it would not have been adopted anyway, but the May 1968 protest in France produced a pledge to spend more on domestic needs, while, at the same time, there was increased reason for concern about France's security, given the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. In March 1969, his successor, General Michel Fourquet, rejected the "all points" concept in favor of "an enemy coming from the East".⁹⁰

De Gaulle resigned a month later as a result of the rejection of a referendum on governmental administrative reform he had submitted to the people. George Pompidou, his successor, moderated the anti-American tone of French policy. During his tenure France's first generation IRBM, the S-2, was deployed.

⁸⁸Joyce Lasky Shub, "Introduction," AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review 4 (1982): 3.

⁸⁹Charles L. M. Ailleret, "Directed Defense," in American Defense Policy, 2nd ed., ed. Mark E. Smith and Claude J. Johns (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 336.

⁹⁰Yost, p. 14.

Eighteen silos became operational during 1971 and 1972.⁹¹ The first two SSBNs also achieved operational status while his administration was in office. The first was in 1971, Le Redoubtable, and the second in 1973, Le Terrible.⁹²

Giscard d'Estaing, Pompidou's successor, went even further in his association with the Atlantic alliance. He recognized the importance of the ties between the FRG and the US to the continued viability of NATO. He observed and addressed a growing sentiment of neutralism in Germany. The Pluton tactical missile force, the Jaguar, the third and fourth SSBNs, and the carrier-based, nuclear capable, Super Etendard all became operational during his administration.⁹³ Giscard also took steps to insure the continued upgrade of France's nuclear capability.⁹⁴

While both Pompidou and Giscard sought reduced tension and a closer association with the Western alliance, they were not signalling a desire to reintegrate into the military wing of NATO.⁹⁵ During this same period, the 1970s, the increased credibility of the perception that France's nuclear capability

⁹¹Ibid., p. 39.

⁹²Robbin F. Laird, "French Nuclear Forces in the 1980s and the 1990s," Comparative Strategy 4 (1984): 393.

⁹³See Laird, p. 393; International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 1984-1985 (The Alden Press, 1984), pp. 131-132.

⁹⁴Pascal Fontaine, "Analysis and Perspective: Socialist France in East-West Relations," AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review 4 (1982): 38-40.

⁹⁵Shub, 4.

enabled it to maintain an independent stance led even the parties of the left, the Socialists (PS) and the Communists (PCF), to announce their support of France's nuclear program.⁹⁶ The debate then shifted from the strategic purpose of the force⁹⁷ and to whether the government's economic policy would support the implementation of the five year defense plans.⁹⁸

2. Current Nuclear Policies and Capabilities

With the elections in May and June 1981, the French people voted into office a Socialist President and a Socialist controlled National Assembly. In contrast to Socialist domestic and economic policies, Francois Mitterrand, head of the PS and fourth president of the Fifth Republic, has maintained a remarkable continuity with past French foreign and defense policy. He "has confirmed his fidelity to the Atlantic alliance while reiterating France's determination to set its own course; he has taken steps to expand the French nuclear arsenal while rejecting reintegration into the NATO command" ⁹⁹ Figure 2, on the following page, provides a graphic depiction of the

⁹⁶Anton W. DePorte and Hugh De Santis, "The Politics of French Security," AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review 4 (1982): 28.

⁹⁷Ibid.

⁹⁸Pierre Lellouche, "France and the Euromissiles: the Limits of Immunity," AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review 4 (1982): 319.

⁹⁹Micahel J. Sodaro, "Moscow and Mitterrand," Problems of Communism 31 (July-August 1982): 25.




Figure 2. Evolution of French Nuclear Development




Figure 2. Evolution of French Nuclear Development

date, rate, and continuously increasing level of French nuclear weapons deployment.¹⁰⁰

The evolution of Mitterand's position and that of the PS reflect both internal considerations and external factors. A 1981 poll indicated that 63% of the people believed France needed a nuclear capability to insure its defense and 62% felt the French system provided an effective nuclear deterrent.¹⁰¹ On the other hand, Soviet actions in Afghanistan, pressure for a crackdown in Poland, and deployments of weapons in Europe over the past few years left neither the PS membership nor Mitterand much choice on much of their foreign policy.¹⁰²

The French people as a whole have swung from seeing the Soviet Union not as "the 'model' of justice and socialism" to identifying it as "the living symbol of totalitarianism." And Afghanistan, Poland, SS-20 deployments, and KAL 007 have all contributed to this perception. Conversely, the US is no longer

¹⁰⁰The data for this figure was obtained from a review of all editions to date of the yearbook The Military Balance, produced by the International Institute of Strategic Studies, based in London. The specific years referred to and the respective pages are as follows: 1964-1965, p. 37; 1965-1966, p. 41; 1966-1967, p. 44; 1967-1968, p. 47; 1968-1969, p. 54; 1970-1971, pp. 106-109; 1971-1972, p. 56; 1972-1973, pp. 68-69; 1973-1974, pp. 72-73; 1974-1975, pp. 76-77; 1975-1976, pp. 76-77; 1976-1977, pp. 76-77; 1977-1978, pp. 80-81; 1978-1979, p. 84; 1979-1980, p. 92; 1980-1981, p. 102; 1981-1982, p. 108; 1982-1983, p. 116; 1983-1984, p. 122; and 1984-1985, p. 132.

¹⁰¹Charles Hernu, "France's Defense: Choices and Means," Le Figaro, 30-31 January 1982, quoted in France, Foreign Ministry (French Embassy in the United States), document 82/43 (New York: French Embassy Press and Information Service, 1982), p. 2.

¹⁰²Sodaro, 27.

seen as "the dominant military power, but . . . as a needed ally in the face of an increasingly threatening Soviet Union."¹⁰³ And 66% of those polled in one survey in France said they thought the US would come to Europe's defense.¹⁰⁴

So Mitterand was perfectly in step with the French perception of the threat when, only two weeks after his election, in a meeting with the West German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, he categorically stated that the Soviet deployment of SS-20s had disrupted the balance in Europe and that NATO should counterbalance by rearming.¹⁰⁵ Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy, echoed his position later that year when he addressed the Institute of Higher Defense Studies. He also noted that the SS-20 was a missile "that specifically threatens Europe. It has a destabilizing effect and consequently justifies the existence of an autonomous French deterrent force."¹⁰⁶ He thus turned the tables on the Soviets who were arguing for inclusion of French forces in any negotiated arms settlement.

A year later, addressing the same organization, Mauroy specifically addressed the government's position on being included in such negotiations.

¹⁰³Lellouche, 321.

¹⁰⁴DePorte and De Santis, 31.

¹⁰⁵Fontaine, 36.

¹⁰⁶France, Foreign Ministry (French Embassy in the United States), excerpts of remarks by Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy to the Institute of Higher Defense Studies, 14 September 1981, document 81/84 (New York: French Embassy Press and Information Service, 1981), p. 8.

Before France could consider participating in comprehensive talks it would be necessary for the two superpowers to have already decided to reduce their nuclear weapons in such proportion that the nature of the gap between their potential and our own would have changed. And it would be necessary to have achieved significant progress in eliminating the imbalance of conventional forces in Europe.¹⁰⁷

In consonance with this recognition of an enormous gap between French nuclear capability and that of the two

TABLE v108
FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES
Summer 1985

CATEGORY Type	Weapon #	System Type	Range (km)	Warhead Type	Payload
AIRCRAFT, LAND-BASED:					
Strategic Bombers	34	Mirage	3,200	AN-22	60KT
Tankers	11	KC 135	---	---	--
Tactical Strike Aircraft	45	Jaguar	1,600	AN-52	15KT
	30	Mirage III	2,400	AN-52	15KT
LAND-BASED MISSILES:					
IRBMs	18	S3	3,500	single	1MT
SRBMs	42	Pluton	120	AN-52/51	15/25KT
SEA-BASED:					
Carrier-based Aviation	36	Super Etendard	1,500	AN-52	15KT
SSBN (5)	64	M-20 @	3,000	single	1MT
	16	M-4	4,000	MIRVed	6x150KT

@ Assumes Le Tonnant will be withdrawn to meet refit (with M-4) date of 1987.

¹⁰⁷France, Foreign Ministry (French Embassy in the United States), excerpts of remarks by Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy to the Institute of Higher Defense Studies, 20 September 1982, document 82/89 (New York: French Embassy Press and Information Service, 1981), p. 13.

¹⁰⁸Yost, p. 39.

superpowers, the Mitterand government has dedicated itself to maintaining the French deterrent. All the S-2, IRBMs, were replaced with S-3s by 1982.¹⁰⁹ And the first SSBN with MIRVed, M-4, missiles L' Inflexible, was launched in 1982 and put into service during the summer of 1985.¹¹⁰ Table 5, on the preceding page, shows the current systems and their capabilities. Map 1, on the following page, graphically depicts France's ability to strike the Soviet Union.

The 1984-1988 French Defense Programme identifies what has continued to be a driving concern behind French nuclear weapon systems development throughout its history. "The credibility of French Nuclear Force . . . based on the security of its operation and on its capabilities of penetration and destruction. . . . The maintenance of its credibility presupposes, in[the] face of advancing technology and threats, its continuous modernization."¹¹²


In order to maintain a viable nuclear capability in the future, the present government of France has committed France to a protracted, across the board, upgrade of its nuclear capability. Table VI depicts the multitude of programs currently

¹⁰⁹"Sixth Nuclear Missile-Launching Submarine for Ile-Longue Base," Le Monde, 3 April 1985, p. 10, cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Service--Western Europe (FBIS) (4 April 1985): K3.

¹¹⁰See Laird, p. 390; Military Balance '84-'85, p. 130-137; and "Sixth Sub," K3.

¹¹¹(See following page)

¹¹²France, Ministry of Defence, The 1984-1988 French Defence Programme (Paris: The Information and Public Relations Service of the Armies, 1983), p. 9.



MAP 1.111

THE FRENCH FORCE DE FRAPPE

111 Judy-Ann Carroll, "The French Nuclear Force and Arms Control Negotiations" (Draft Seminar Paper, Naval Postgraduate School, 1985), Appendix F.

TABLE VI 113
FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

<u>TIMEFRAME</u>	<u>SYSTEM MODIFIED</u>	<u>MODIFICATION</u>	<u>RESULT</u>
1985	SLBM	*M-4 with new class sub	*MIRVed 3-stage *Improved range *Improved penetration power
Mid-1980s	Mirage IVA (18)	*Fitted with ASMPs	*Greater speed *Greater range *Improved guidance system
1987-1992	SSBN	*Retrofit Program	*Replace M-20s with M-4s
1988	Mirage 2000N	*Replaces Mirage III and Jaguars *Fitted with ASMPs	*Longer Range *Improved Avionics
1988	Super Etendard	*Fitted with ASMPs	*Greater Speed *Greater Range *Improved Guidance System
1992-1996	Pluton	*Replaced with Hades	*Can carry Neutron Warheads *Improved Range *Larger Warhead *Multiple warhead
1994	SLBM	*M-5 with new class sub	*Improved MIRV *Spin Stabilized
1996	Mirage IVA	*Replaced with SX	*Mobility (?) *Improved yield to wt. ratio

¹¹³See Judy-Ann Carroll, "The French Nuclear Force and Arms Control Negotiations" (Draft Seminar Paper, Naval Postgraduate School, 1985), Appendix C; French Programme '84-'88, pp. 9-10; Robbin F. Laird, "French Nuclear Forces in the 1980s and 1990s," *Comparative Strategy* 4 (1984): 399; and David S. Yost, "France's Deterrent Posture and Security in Europe" (Draft of an Adelphi Paper, Naval Postgraduate School, 1985), pp. 39-45.

underway, that, by the mid-1990s, will provide France with a greatly enhanced nuclear deterrent. The primary element of this deterrent will remain the SSBN fleet, although the upgrade runs the entire spectrum of France's force.

3. Consistent Policy and Nuclear Program to Continue

By the time the mobile SX has been deployed, replacing the venerable Mirage IV, France will have increased its destructive capacity several fold. Table VII reflects the dramatic increase in the number of warheads available today versus those that are predicted to be available in the mid-1990s.

TABLE VII¹¹⁴

PROJECTED TRENDS IN THE NUMBER OF FRENCH NUCLEAR WARHEADS

	1985	Mid-1990s
<u>STRATEGIC FORCES:</u>		
Sea-based	160 *	592
Land-based	46	118 @
TOTAL STRATEGIC WARHEADS	206	710
<u>TACTICAL FORCES:</u>		
Land-based #	117	185
Sea-based	36	53
TOTAL TACTICAL WARHEADS	153	238
TOTAL NUMBER OF WARHEADS	359	948

* Assumes La Tonnant will be withdrawn to meet refit (with M-4) date of 1987.

@ Assumes deployment of 100 SX and no MIRVing of S3s.

Assumes Plutons will not be able to reload.

¹¹⁴See Laird, p. 406; Military Balance '84-'85, pp. 130-137; and "Sixth Sub," K3.

As for the future of French policy, security priorities will not change; the "strategy" by which France seeks to attain its security may be adjusted to accommodate changes in the international environment. Therefore, although France may increasingly view itself as a more integral part of European security than it did, say in 1966, the domestic requirement for maintenance of a perception of independence in foreign and military affairs will continue to provide some constraints on this desire.¹¹⁵ Again, what underlies the shifts that have occurred in French policy since 1966 is their continuing reassessment of the threat. French perceptions of the threat, whether a direct threat from the Soviet Union or an economic and/or diplomatic threat from the United States, have oscillated over the years since World War II, but these shifts have been, and will continue to be, within the limitations of the domestic constraints mentioned above.

C. BRITAIN

Although Britain's nuclear capability is not currently as large as France's, the United Kingdom has a longer history as a nuclear power. And there are other asymmetries between the two nations' nuclear capabilities.

1. The Development of British Nuclear Weapons and Its Affects On Policy

Britain's relationship with the US on the subject of nuclear weapons has been closer than any other nation. This

¹¹⁵Shub, 2.

close relationship has at times been at the expense of relations with other US allies, particularly the French. The British government had the potential of nuclear fission for weapons of war brought to its attention initially by refugee German scientists in 1939.¹¹⁶ This led to the establishment of a scientific study group, known as the Maud Committee, which, as early as 1940, concluded that such a weapon was feasible.¹¹⁷ The British set about researching the development of such a weapon. The US sought to participate in the British effort, but was limited to only the exchange of technical information. Owing to fewer resources (i.e. scientific, technological, and material), the positions were reversed by 1943 and it was not until the Quebec Conference that Winston Churchill was able to obtain US agreement to British collaboration on the Manhattan Project. As a result of this collaboration the US ended the war with atomic weapons and Britain with the technical knowledge from two years of cooperative efforts.¹¹⁸

Following the war, in 1946, the US Congress passed the McMahon Act, which prohibited any such collaboration. Prime Minister Clement Atlee, who had sought continuation of such a joint effort, then proceeded with the independent production of a

¹¹⁶Margret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-1945 (London: Macmillan, 1964), pp. 33-42, cited by David N. Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1983), p. 26.

¹¹⁷Gowing, pp. 45-89, cited in Schwartz, p. 26.

¹¹⁸Schwartz, pp. 26-27.

British nuclear weapon. This effort resulted in Britain's detonation of an atomic bomb in February 1952. This was followed by the development, commencing in 1954, of a fusion device. On 15 May 1957, this resulted in Britain joining the thermonuclear club.¹¹⁹

Britain's initial impetus for development for nuclear weapons was survival, another means of turning the tide of the war against Nazi Germany. Subsequent to World War II, both Labour and Conservative governments sought such weapons as insurance against possible US retrenchment in the early post-war years. Eventually, it was conceptualized and articulated in Britain much earlier than in the US, that these weapons provided a more viable deterrent than a large conventional force, at a relatively inexpensive and affordable price. This was put forth in a paper, "Global Strategy" by the British Chiefs of Staff in 1952. The policy was not implemented until after the Suez crisis, following which both the army and navy were substantially reduced.¹²⁰

The 1957 White Paper on Defense, by Minister of Defense Duncan Sandys, called for British reliance upon thermonuclear weapons, thus enabling a major reduction in conventional forces. It also called for focusing development efforts on a long-range

¹¹⁹See William L. Langer, ed., An Encyclopedia of World History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972), p. 1173; and Schwartz, pp. 27-28.

¹²⁰Schwartz, p. 30.

ballistic missile. Another reason an independent British nuclear capability was cited as desirable was the unreliability of the US guarantee when only British vital interests were at stake (i.e. the Suez crisis).¹²¹

To repair the rupture in Anglo-American relations, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan met with President Eisenhower in March 1957 in Bermuda. It was at this meeting that the US established the precedent of providing Britain with nuclear delivery vehicles. Although US motivation was multi-faceted, obtaining forward basing for IRBMs capable of hitting the Soviet Union, while sharing the cost and improving relations with Britain, so were British motivations. The Thor, IRBM, was provided under a dual key arrangement. In exchange for basing it in Britain, Eisenhower committed himself to seeking amendments to the MacMahon Act that would allow the British to have access to US nuclear weapons technology data. This could help in development of Britain's long-range ballistic missile, dubbed the Blue Streak, which had been addressed in the Defense White Paper. It also reestablished closer US-British ties.¹²²

It is also at this time that close Anglo-American relations begin to have a more significant impact upon Anglo-French and French-American relations. France, also deeply resentful over the US actions during the Suez crisis, saw the Thor agreement as an additional slight to France.¹²³

¹²¹Ibid., p. 48, 60.

¹²²See Langer, p. 1173; and Schwartz, pp. 60-61.

¹²³Schwartz, pp. 60-61.

In spite of access to American technical data, facilitated by a 1958 amendment to the McMahon Act¹²⁴, Britain cancelled development of its silo-based ballistic missile system, Blue Streak, in April 1960. Prior to this announcement the British had sought and obtained authorization to purchase an American air-to-surface missile (ASM), Skybolt. This was concluded in March 1960, at Camp David, by Prime Minister Macmillan and President Eisenhower. The system was still in development and therefore it was agreed either nation could withdraw from the agreement, but the US would not cancel the program without prior consultation with Britain.¹²⁵

Development of the system eventually failed because the system would not be cost-effective to produce. The British had been kept abreast of the systems fate, but its actual cancellation, in November 1962 was leaked to the press before the British government was able to address the subject publicly. It, therefore, appeared the US had reneged on the arrangement. This development placed Macmillan in an extremely tenuous position, which President Kennedy recognized. During a previously scheduled meeting, held in December 1962, in Nassau, Macmillan made it clear the only solution to his predicament was the US Polaris missile. It was agreed by both that Britain would purchase the missile, which would then be pledged to NATO and

¹²⁴Ibid., p. 28.

¹²⁵Ibid., pp. 96-97.

withdrawable only "if 'supreme national interests' were at stake".¹²⁶

The Nassau Agreement, while it further cemented Anglo-American ties, signalled a near-break in French-American ties. DeGaulle's action following the agreement may or may not have been different, if such an agreement had not been concluded, but failure to notify him prior to announcement of the agreement and the offering of Polaris to France after the fact confirmed his worst suspicions. He responded quickly. He rejected the offer of Polaris missiles, refused to participate in any NATO-wide nuclear force, and vetoed British entry into the EEC.¹²⁷

In spite of the diplomatic complications associated with the Nassau Agreement, the Polaris, SLBM, provided Britain with a strategic nuclear deterrent "on the cheap". This was important because in Britain defense debates have repeatedly centered on financing. Britain's failure to keep its military commitments within limits its economy can support has been a continuing problem. This accounts for the early attractiveness to the British of nuclear weapons versus a large conventional force (reflected in the 1952 paper, "Global Strategy", and the 1957 Defense White Paper, both mentioned above).

Polaris was delivered on time and at a lower cost than programmed. Once in operation, its cost was less than 2% of the

¹²⁶Ibid., p. 97, 103.

¹²⁷Ibid., pp. 105-106.

defense budget during the 1970s. Unfortunately, this bred the impression that the decision for Britain to remain a nuclear power entailed no financial sacrifice. In contrast nuclear development in France takes 20% of the defense budget on a regular basis.¹²⁸

2. Current Nuclear Policy and Capabilities

Although both maintain their own nuclear capability, Britain, unlike France, is closely linked to NATO. As John Nott, Secretary of State for Defense at the time stated:

It has been the policy of successive [British] Governments to align our nuclear forces ever closer with NATO. Today, all British nuclear forces, without exception, are assigned to the Alliance . . .--this underlines our commitment to the nuclear defense of NATO. . . .While fully NATO-committed they are under separate [British] control. . . .The Soviets have to calculate not only what the reaction of one nuclear power [the US] might be if they attacked NATO, but of two nuclear powers.¹²⁹

The last point, however, clearly indicates that the United Kingdom reserves to itself the final decision of where and when its nuclear capability will be used. In consonance with this, the British, like the French, "judge it unacceptable that . . . [their] strategic forces should be included in . . . negotiations."¹³⁰ They feel that having their forces included with the US forces would undermine the premise their nuclear capability is based upon.

¹²⁸Lawrence Freedman, "Britain: The First Ex-Nuclear Power?" International Security 6 (Fall 1981): 84.

¹²⁹John Nott, "Decisions to Modernize UK's Nuclear Contribution to NATO Strengthens Deterrence," NATO Review 29 (April 1981): 1-2.

¹³⁰Ibid., 2.

This premise was clearly stated in the preface to The United Kingdom Trident Programme:

Deterrence . . . is a matter of showing that the risks involved in starting a war are seen by a potential aggressor as far greater than any possible gains he could hope to achieve. The striking power of our nuclear forces provides the risk of appalling damage . . .--more damage than we believe any rational being could regard as acceptable as the price to be paid for military adventure And the presence of an independent deterrent under the absolute control of the British Prime Minister greatly multiplies the risk to any potential aggressor of starting a war in Europe.¹³¹

The ability to deliver unacceptable damage to an aggressor, independence of action, and yet close ties to NATO--all touched upon in the passage above and repeatedly intertwined in British nuclear policy statements--are cited as the need for a continued nuclear capability by the present government. Britain has decided to meet this perceived need, in the future, in much the same manner it established its current capability. It is replacing its air delivery platforms, the Vulcan, Buccaneer, and Jaguar, all European built, with the strike variant of the Tornado, the GR1, an aircraft built jointly by Britain, the FRG, and Italy.¹³² But the emphasis in upgrading the nuclear capability has been aimed at the replacement for the British SLBM, the Polaris. The British built their own SSBNs and produced their own warheads, but purchased the launchers from the US. They have recently modernized the system with the Chevaline

¹³¹United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, The United Kingdom Defence Programme, Defence Open Government Document 82/1 (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1982), preface.

¹³²Nott, 5.

Project, which should insure the systems viability into the 1990s, but the replacement for the entire system is to be the Trident II (D-5). As with the Polaris system, the United Kingdom will purchase the launchers from the United States, but produce the submarine and warheads in Britain. The British "Government believes...the United Kingdom Trident submarines, and the Trident II missile system, are the most cost-effective way of maintaining well into the next century an effective independent strategic nuclear deterrent force"133 So long as the current government is in power it is highly unlikely there will be any departure from the policy of replacing Polaris with Trident.

3. The Future of British Policy

Although the main opposition party's platform has called for unilateral nuclear disarmament and no US nuclear systems based in Britain, since a party conference held in November 1980¹³⁴, Labour did not succeed in ousting the present government during national elections in 1983. A change in governments is more likely to be the result of domestic discontent. If a Labour government should come to power with a platform calling for unilateral nuclear disarmament, it is not at all clear what the result would be. Labour's platform in the October 1964 elections called for the renunciation of Britain's independent Strategic nuclear capability, but found reasons to reverse this position

¹³³Trident Programme, preface.

¹³⁴Freedman, "Ex-Nuclear Power," 99.

once in power. It has been surmised that this was "the result of cost considerations, domestic political liabilities, and a stubborn bureaucracy."¹³⁵ Similar constraints would be present for any Labour government coming to power today. The same nuclear disarmament forces present today were present in the early-to-mid 1950s. It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude that any Labour Government coming to power today would not significantly change Britain's nuclear policy.

This probability is enhanced by the fact that the majority of Britains' and the bulk of British political elite see Britain's primary external ties now being associated with Europe. In defense matters this means NATO is the focal point for British policy. With respect to this, Britain's nuclear capability plays a dichotomous role: dedicated to NATO, but under the sole control of the British Government.

D. NATO'S VIEWPOINT ON INF

From NATO's viewpoint the INF deployment decision generally strengthens deterrence for the following reasons: 1) US nuclear forces in Europe provide a link to US strategic forces; 2) GLCMs and Pershing IIs are less vulnerable to attack than present systems; 3) because the response is credible, the limitation of war in Europe is more likely; 4) the new INF systems are not a

¹³⁵Andrew J. Pierre, Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force, 1939-1970, (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 283-292, cited by David N. Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1983), p. 173.

true first strike, because GLCMs are too slow and the number of Pershing IIs being deployed are insufficient to be an effective first strike.¹³⁶ The actual deployments which started in December 1983 signalled NATO's faith in its original decision.

The deployment indicated that, although the Western Alliance is composed of democratic and sovereign nations which retain their own prerogatives to question alliance decisions, a right exercised extensively in the four year interval between decision and deployment, the alliance remained committed and basically united. The alliance was not going to undermine its own defenses unilaterally. The USSR was going to have to conclude a bilateral agreement with the US to redress the perceived imbalance.

¹³⁶Bertram, 308-309.

VIII. NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES

A. HISTORY IN EUROPE

The positions of the various nations involved in the INF controversy have been addressed. Before attempting to sort out these various positions on INF, we need to briefly review the historical background of nuclear weapons in Europe, current nuclear capabilities, and touch on projected improvements in these capabilities by all parties.

Land-based nuclear missiles have been present in Europe for well over thirty years. The Soviet Union first deployed R-1 rockets, an updated German V-2, with a range of approximately 300 km in the late 1940s or early 1950s.¹³⁷ The US introduced the Honest John, with a range of 40 km, in 1953.¹³⁸

The US introduced such weapons, in lieu of maintaining a conventional force comparable to that of Soviet Union. But the Soviet Union achieved superiority in IRBMs and MRBMs by at least the early 1960s, if not before. This came about for a number of reasons. First of all, it is clear that the US government knew the Soviets would be left with a superiority in intermediate/medium-range systems in Europe when it withdrew its IRBMs, the Thor and Jupiter (in 1963) and its MRBMs, the Matador (in 1962),

¹³⁷Mark E. Miller, Soviet Strategic Power and Doctrine: The Quest for Superiority (Washington, D.C.: Advanced International Studies Institute, 1982), p. 13.

¹³⁸Whence the Threat to Peace, p. 8.

the Redstone (in 1964), and the Mace (in 1966),¹³⁹ but was relying upon strategic superiority as a counter capability. Secondly, the Soviet Union during the 1957-1958 timeframe, decide to deploy only a token number of their first generation ICBM, the SS-6, because the guidance system was so rudimentary that it was impractical. Instead the Soviets decided to put their major effort into MRBMs and IRBMs. This would significantly enhance their capabilities in Europe and Asia, where, among other things, the US had its forward bases.¹⁴⁰ For an overview of the history of land-based ballistic and cruise missile deployments in Europe see TABLE VIII, on the following page.¹⁴¹

B. CATEGORIES

Currently, there are many nuclear weapons systems in Europe. Before one can begin to discuss the various systems, they must be categorized. The following categories were selected: 1) long-range, 2) intermediate-range, 3) medium-range, and 4) short-range. Although the last three of these categories are used in The Military Balance, research for this analysis has failed to identify a source with weapons compared in this manner. The term

¹³⁹Ibid.

¹⁴⁰Miller, pp. 50-54.

¹⁴¹See International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 1984-1985 (The Alden Press, 1984), pp. 133-134; Miller, pp. 12-13; Whence the Threat to Peace, p. 8; United States, Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1985, fourth edition (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 40; and Yost, pp. 39-45.

TABLE VIII

THE EVOLUTION OF LAND-BASED BALLISTIC
AND CRUISE MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS IN EUROPE

UNITED STATES			USSR			FRANCE		
system	date	range	system	date	range	system	date	range
			R-1	1949	300			
			R-2	1951	600			
Honest John	1953	40						
Corporal	1954	125						
Matador	1954	1200						
			SS-3	1955	1000			
			SS-4	55-59	1200			
			Sandal					
			SS-5	55-61	2300			
			Skean					
Redstone	1956	800						
			SS-1	1957	185			
			Scud					
			FROG-7	1957	45			
Thor	1958	3200						
Jupiter	1959	3200						
Mace	1959	900						
Sergeant	1963	140						
Pershing IA	1963	740						
			Scale-board	1969	500			
Lance	1972	130				S-2	1971	3000
						Pluton	1974	120
			SS-20	1977	5000@			
			SS-21	1978	120			
			SS-22	1979	900			
			SS-23	79-80	500			
						S-3	1980	3500
Pershing II	1983	1800*						
GLCM	1983	2600						
Pershing IB	1987	800	SSC-X-4	1987	3000			
						Hades	1992	350
						SX	92-94	4,500

@ Jane's Yearbook 1984-1985 indicates some authorities believe one version of the SS-20 has a range of 7,400 km, while the Soviets maintain a capability 4,000-4,500 km. The 'standard' found in essentially all analysis assign a range of 5,000 km.

* In Whence the Threat to Peace the Soviet Union contends the Pershing II has a range of 2,500 km, but all the other sources assign a range approximately equal to the 1,800 km cited in Military Balance 1984-1985.


"long-range" has been used in this analysis for the remaining category, instead of ICBM. The definition of "intercontinental" may actually be appropriate for some of the systems in the other categories. At one time The Military Balance denoted distances in miles, but now reflects them in kilometers. The only significant difference found between the old and the new methods is in the determination of what constitutes ICBM (long-range) and intermediate-range. Under the old system, 4,000 miles was the point at which something became classified as an ICBM (long-range). Under the current system, 5,500 km (3355 miles) is the point at which something is termed an ICBM (long-range) weapon. The ranges used in this analysis are as follows: 1) long-range (over 5500 km), 2) intermediate-range (2,400 to 5,499 km), 3) medium-range (800 to 2,399 km), and 4) short-range (less than 800 km). All weapons have had this criterion applied to them except submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Generally speaking, all SLBMs belonging to the United States and the Soviet Union were included in SALT I and II. Therefore, these weapon systems have been retained in the long-range category regardless of their range. All aircraft are categorized with a round-trip sortie with no refueling as an additional criterion. Therefore, a bomber with a maximum unrefueled range of 8,000 km would be classified with ballistic missiles with a range of 4,000 km, an intermediate-range system.

Given these guidelines, the following groupings of weapons systems were compared: 1) US versus USSR nuclear delivery

vehicles worldwide, 2) NATO (without US delivery systems) versus The Warsaw Pact (without USSR delivery systems), and 3) NATO versus The Warsaw Pact (considering only those nuclear delivery systems deployed for use in Europe). See Appendices B, C, and D for these detailed comparisons. For a quick overview of the current nuclear capabilities in Europe and a concise synopsis of the trends in the past decade, see Appendix E.

As for past, present, and projected IRBM, MBRM, and cruise missile development and deployments in Europe, see Figure 3 on the following page.¹⁴² Since Britain has no land-based missiles of this type and because a significant portion of France's nuclear capability are its SLBMs, these systems have been included in this comparison also. But this should not be taken to infer that these systems are to be included in INF negotiations or calculations.

¹⁴²See Wynfred Joshua and Walter F. Hahn, Nuclear Politics: America, France, and Britain, The Center for Strategic Studies' Washington Papers series, vol. 1, no. 9 (Beverly Hills, California: SAGE Publications, Inc., 1973), pp. 22-37; Laird, 392; Soviet Military Power '85, p. 40; and Yost, pp. 39-45.



BY THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS




Figure 3. IRBM, MRBM, AND Cruise Missile Development




Figure 3. IRBM, MRBM, AND Cruise Missile Development.

IX. PERCEPTIONS OF INF CAPABILITIES

A. US/USSR NUCLEAR MIX

Having reviewed the multitude of nuclear systems each of the major nuclear nations possess, the plethora of nuclear capable delivery systems at the disposal of the two military blocs in Europe, and the stated positions of all these actors, it is time to resolve which systems to consider "equivalent" to which and who's weapons should be counted against whom's. The categorization that was applied in the preceding section goes a long way towards achieving the first of these two objectives.

The range criteria outlined in that section appears appropriate for determining, in general, what systems are equivalent. Additional criteria within those constraints might include limits on the number of nuclear warheads and megatonnage. If one of the goals of all participants is to limit destruction, then such parameters could begin to seriously address this desire. The maintenance of each participant's national security could be realized through modernization and innovation of the many remaining variables.

It would be up to the discretion of each actor to determine the mix of delivery systems that best met their needs (i.e. a high proportion of sea-based versus land-based systems or vice versa). Each nation would also decide whether to have numerous launchers with single warheads or a smaller number of launchers with a huge reliance upon MIRV capability or a mix. Another



MAP 2.143
NATO GLCM AND PRSHING II COVERAGE

143 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Force Comparisons (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 36.

decision left to the individual nations is whether to rely upon rapid response afforded by ballistic missiles (both sea and ground based) or opt for the stealth qualities of cruise missiles or new generation aircraft. Agreement on some of these concepts has already been achieved, either conclusively or tacitly (i.e., both sides have acknowledged future negotiations must take into account the number of warheads; also the US's greater reliance upon seaborne nuclear capability versus the USSR's land-based preference). But numerous specific issues remain unresolved and these vary somewhat between the different range levels.

B. US INF STRATEGIC?

One of the specific sticking points on INF negotiations is whether or not GCLMs and Pershing IIs are strategic systems. The Soviets contend they are because they can strike the Soviet Union proper from where they are deployed; see Map 2 on the preceding page. The West counters that the systems are merely intended to interdict the second echelon capability of the Warsaw Pact/USSR in the event of an attack against NATO. The primary targets being C3 and transportation centers and links.¹⁴⁴ Both arguments suffer when viewed from the perspective of the status quo ante.

NATO has had nuclear capable delivery vehicles that could strike the Soviet Union since the late 1950s. If the sole criteria for a system being classified as strategic is its ability to deliver a nuclear strike against the Soviet Union from

¹⁴⁴Werner Kaltefleiter, "Structural Problems in Negotiations: A View From Europe," In Arms Control: Myth Versus Reality, ed. Richard F. Starr (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), p. 124.

where it is deployed, why then did the Soviet Union, which is renowned for its tenacity in negotiations,¹⁴⁵ sign two Strategic Arms Limitations Treaties without all such systems being included? The reason lies in the fact that the Soviets had their own intermediate and medium-range systems, which also were not included in the agreements, with which they could counter such systems. They also knew that they were all but ready to deploy a new generation of such systems that would provide them with superiority in this category.¹⁴⁶ Therefore, this particular aspect of their argument against the two systems raises questions about the Soviet Union's motivation. Is theirs a desire for security or superiority? The GLCMs and Pershing IIs are clearly in a similar category as previous intermediate and medium-range systems.

As for the West's argument that they pose only a threat to C3 and transportation centers and links, the systems do have the range to strike beyond the area of a second echelon. The West already possessed systems that could reach to the depth of second echelon elements. The systems were clearly a response to the threat posed by the new Soviet INF systems, such as the SS-20, the SS-22, and the Backfire bomber. All of these systems could be employed from the Soviet Union against the farthest reaches of

¹⁴⁵See Eugene V. Rostow, "The Russians' Nuclear Gambit," Atlantic Community Quarterly 22 (Spring 1984): 36; Edward L. Rowny, "Negotiating with the Russians," Atlantic Community Quarterly 18 (Fall 1980): 301; and Starr, p. xii.

¹⁴⁶See Holloway, pp. 69-70; Miller, p. 233; and Soviet Military Power '85, p. 40.

the Western Alliance and the only real counter available to the West was the US central systems.¹⁴⁷ This was unacceptable to the West and incongruent with flexible response. The systems are not strategic in the sense they should be calculated against ICBMs, but warrant separate agreements placing limits on both sides' quantity, thereby establishing some parameters at this level.

C. US INF A FIRST STRIKE?

A second thorny issue is whether these two systems (GLCMs and Pershing IIs) pose a first strike capability. Again, the stated positions of both sides bears questioning. The Soviet Union contends that because these weapons can be employed against their strategic systems (ICBMs and C3 centers),¹⁴⁸ they are de facto first strike systems. The West argues that the GLCMs are too slow and the Pershing IIs too few in number to provide a first strike capability.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷These new Soviet systems lacked a viable counterpart in NATO. In a conflict in Europe, France and Britain would be unlikely to launch their limited nuclear systems to thwart a Soviet advance unless their homelands had been directly threatened by a serious attack. More important, it was even less likely that the Soviets would be deterred by threats to do so emanating from these states. At the same time, it was seriously questioned whether the US would risk an attack on the US to stop a purely European conflict. It was felt that to be able to effectively respond to any level of escalation posed by the Soviets in the European theater or to have the continuum of choices envisaged by the alliances' flexible response doctrine NATO should have a dedicated nuclear capability in the intermediate/medium-range category.

¹⁴⁸Glushkov, 35.

¹⁴⁹NATO Force Comparison, p. 30.

The Soviets' argument, that the sole criteria that makes a system a first strike instrument is its capability to strike strategic systems, suffers under analysis, much as their argument concerning the strategic nature of these same systems. The Soviet Backfire bomber has the range to hit strategic targets in the US without refueling if forward recovered,¹⁵⁰ but it is unlikely to be employed in such a manner. The Soviets have other, better suited, systems for this purpose and the Backfire was developed for other purposes. The new US INF systems in Europe are also unlikely to be employed as a first strike.


The GLCMs, although they fly at low altitudes, are slow and, therefore, would be in flight for several hours before being able to strike Soviet strategic systems.¹⁵¹ The longer flight time to such targets would significantly increase the possibility of detection. And, since they remain within the earth's atmosphere on a more or less level trajectory for the entire flight, they are subject to all the air defense countermeasures available to the Soviets.¹⁵² As for the Pershing IIs, although having an extremely short flight time, 8-10 minutes by Soviet estimates,¹⁵³ they are deployed in too small a number to destroy a significant amount of the Soviet strategic capability, thereby accomplishing a crushing first strike alone.

¹⁵⁰Soviet Military Power '85, p. 85.

¹⁵¹See Bertram, 309; and NATO Force Comparison, p. 30.

¹⁵²Ronald T. Pretty, ed., Jane's Weapon Systems 1984-1985 (London: Jane's Publishing Company Limited, 1984), p. 79, 81.

¹⁵³Whence the Threat to Peace, p. 65.




154 NATO Force Comparison, p. 35.
 MAP 3.154
 COVERAGE OF EUROPE FROM SS-20 BASES EAST OF THE URALS

The eventual total of 108 Pershing IIs could only reasonably be employed for a credible first strike in combination with US central systems (i.e., ICBMs, SLBMs, and B-52s), which is highly unlikely and something the Soviets would probably detect through heightened readiness. However, such a short flight time could make launch on warning retaliations highly improbable, if not impossible for those Soviet systems targeted by Pershing IIs in such a scenario. Therefore, of the two systems, the Pershing II is the only one a plausible case could be made for "first strike capability". A negotiated, phased reduction by both sides, with the West agreeing to have their initial reductions to come in this weapon system, is worth consideration. But any such agreement would have to entail agreed upon reductions in those Soviet systems, particularly the SS-20, which threaten all of Western Europe, even from locations east of the Urals, as shown on Map 3 on preceding page.

The new US INF systems should not then be classified with strategic weapons unless a multitude of systems, not previously addressed as strategic are also included. Also the GLCMs pose no first strike threat in the traditional sense of a rapid, hard to impede weapons system. The Pershing II, on the other hand, although unlikely to be employed in a first strike, has the quick strike time and the hard to stop, high trajectory of intercontinental systems. In a treaty that would achieve "balanced levels"¹⁵⁵ between the US and the Soviet Union within

¹⁵⁵This is not the same thing the Soviets are speaking of when they talk about "equal" reductions. With a numerical advantage the Soviets would like to see such reductions. It



MAP 4.156
 TARGET AREAS OF THE SS-20, PERSHING II AND GLCM

would actually increase their force ratio (i.e. if ratio of weapons was 9 to 6 and both sides reduced by 3, the Soviets would go from a force level one and a half times the size of the US to one twice the size, or 6 to 3). The US should accept only agreements that reduce the levels of each to the same equivalent or "balanced level."

156NATO Force Comparison, p. 37.

intermediate/medium-range weapon systems, it would be appropriate to eliminate these weapons first.

D. SS-20 STRATEGIC?

A question that has not received nearly as much attention as the one concerning the first strike/strategic potential of the US GLCMs and Pershing IIs is the question of the SS-20's strategic potential. From where they are currently stationed in the eastern USSR (in the vicinity of Mongolia), they can strike a significant portion of Alaska.¹⁵⁷ This is pictorially shown on the preceding page; see Map 4. These systems are mobile and, therefore, could readily be deployed to the far eastern or even the Arctic regions of the USSR, from which all of Alaska and a sizeable portion of the Pacific Northwest would be within the range of the SS-20. Additionally, a vast amount of the literature in the West, concerning the SS-20, ascribes to the conclusion that it is a two stage version of the three stage SS-16, ICBM.¹⁵⁸ Some analysts argue that "with relatively simple technology, the SS-20 could be converted into an SS-16 missile".¹⁵⁹ But, in all fairness, the question is essentially the same for this weapon as the GLCMs and Pershing IIs. If it is to be classified as strategic simply because it can strike a

¹⁵⁷See NATO Force Comparison, p. 37; Soviet Military Power '85, p. 37.

¹⁵⁸See Jane's '84-'85, the "Strategic Weapon Systems section on the USSR, p. 8; Kaltefleiter, p. 66; Miller, p. 233.

¹⁵⁹Kaltefleiter, p. 67.

portion of the US, other systems, not currently listed as strategic, would have to be included (i.e., Tomahawk cruise missiles).

The primary difference here is that the SS-20 flirts, much more closely than any other current system, with the fine line between long-range and intermediate-range. But this is to be expected of the Soviets. That does not mean it should not be addressed either through agreement or through development of comparable weapons. The Pershing II deployed in a European theater, although a medium-range system, may be a functionally comparable system.

E. INCLUDE FRENCH AND BRITISH SYSTEMS?

The last remaining sticking point is the question of which nations' systems should be included in European INF agreements. The Soviets have become more and more adamant about this. The French and British positions are clear--they will not consent. The US has agreed in the past to consider these forces, but in another forum, outside the INF negotiations.¹⁶⁰

Should the US then reconsider the inclusion of these systems in its count? NO! The Soviets have employed the same arguments before. In the SALT I Interim Agreement, although there was no explicit recognition within the document, the Soviets were allowed 2,347 strategic systems to the US's 1,710. Many say the disparity included more than just compensation for the US's lead

¹⁶⁰Starr, p. x-xi.

in MIRVed warheads, that it was tacit recognition of the French and British systems.¹⁶¹

The Soviets continued to seek formal recognition and numerical compensation for these forces in SALT II. But in the Vladivostok Agreement the Soviets agreed with the US "to the principle of equal numerical ceilings . . . of 2,400 launchers for each side [the US and the USSR], of which 1,320 could be MIRVed." This concept was essentially retained in SALT II.¹⁶²

The Soviets now seek to equate the French and British systems with the SS-20. But, during the mid-1960s when the SS-20's development was initiated¹⁶³, the Soviets did not consider these systems "in a position to change the balance of power in the world."¹⁶⁴ Also, the French and British systems currently under development, which the Soviets would now like to link the SS-20 to¹⁶⁵, were not even in the development stages in the mid-1960s. Therefore, the SS-20 should not be thought of as a response to these new French and British systems, which is contrary to the popular notion the Soviets now like to foster--that their weapons

¹⁶¹Kaltefleiter, pp. 64-65.

¹⁶²Yost, p. 271.

¹⁶³See Holloway, pp. 69-70; Miller, p. 233; Soviet Military Power '85, p. 40.

¹⁶⁴Nekrasov, "Contrary to the Times and Good Sense," Pravda, 19 January 1963, cited in Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Nuclear Proliferation and Soviet Arms Control Policy," Orbis 14 (Summer 1970): 322.

¹⁶⁵Yevgenyev and Aleximov, 59.

developments are merely in response to Western initiatives.¹⁶⁶
The SS-20, like many other Soviet weapons developments, was a display of Soviet initiative rather than reaction.¹⁶⁷

The Soviets also use the subject to try and sew further dissension amongst the alliance members. They do not demand that the French and British systems be reduced, but that at least their numbers be included in the US's count. But the bulk of the French and practically all the British nuclear capability lies in their SLBM's. These SLBM's are essentially the same as Soviet and US systems--considered in the SALT negotiations as "strategic." Also, seldom more than half of such systems are ever readily available and they are not easily reloaded. The Soviets wish to compare them to the SS-20, all of which are

¹⁶⁶Whence the Threat to Peace, p. 7.

¹⁶⁷Contrary to the popular misconception that the Soviets like to perpetuate, the Soviets have often led nuclear arms development. The Soviets were the first to develop and deploy ballistic missiles [the R-1, first test flight in 1947, deployed 1949/50]. They developed intercontinental missiles first [the SS-6, first tested in 1953/54, deployed in 1957]. They detonated the first deliverable thermonuclear device in 1953. The Soviets were the first to develop and launch SLBMs, SS-N-4 [first launched in the 1954/55 timeframe and deployed by 1958]. More recently the Soviets were the first to test anti-satellite weapons. Like these innovations, the SS-20, whether a modification of the SS-16 or a separate development, was not prompted by similar measures in the West. The Soviets started development in approximately 1965. Although the SS-16 was originally intended as a replacement for the SS-13, ICBM, the Soviets clearly intended to produce a mobile, land-based IRBM/MRBM capability, as evidenced by the failed development in the mid-1960s of the SS-15 and SS-14. These systems were based on the SS-13. Their failure coincided with the approximate date of the initial development of the SS-16. See Holloway, p. 68-69; Miller, p. 233; and Soviet Military Power, p. 40.

readily available and quickly reloaded.¹⁶⁸ There are a number of other reasons why these systems should remain outside bilateral negotiations between the Soviets and the US on INF:¹⁶⁹

- 1) No clear cut precedent for counting third party systems.
- 2) France and Britain refuse to be a party to such negotiations until US and Soviet nuclear force levels are reduced to French and British force levels.
- 3) The US does not control British and French forces.
- 4) French and British forces are central systems established to provide a deterrent for the two nations and are not conceivably going to pose a unilateral launch threat to Soviets. "Soviet spokesmen concede that [these] nuclear forces do not constitute a significant military threat to the Soviet Union. . . ." ¹⁷⁰
- 5) Only the US central systems provide the ultimate deterrent to the Soviets and the only credible linkage to those systems are the US's INF systems.
- 6) If the French and British nuclear forces were included in an elimination of all European INF systems, it would leave the Soviets with mobile "Asian" INF assets that could be employed against Western Europe.
- 7) Acceding to the Soviet proposal for French and British inclusion would be tantamount to accepting Soviet authority for nuclear superiority. Surrendering to the Soviet demand for global "parity" with the US and regional "parity" with France and Britain (with the US having no European INF) actually amounts to giving the USSR the right to absolute superiority over each nation individually.¹⁷¹

The US should not include British and French nuclear forces in its count in a bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union. The

¹⁶⁸Yost, pp. 272-273.

¹⁶⁹Ibid, pp. 273-276.

¹⁷⁰Rostow, p. 37.

¹⁷¹Pierre Lellouche, "France and the Euromissiles: The Limits of Immunity," Foreign Affairs 62 (Winter 1983-84): 330.

French and British clearly are not going to be a party to any multilateral negotiations on nuclear weapons until there are drastic reductions in the nuclear capabilities of the two superpowers. And there is no rational reason for the Soviets to feel threatened by French and British nuclear forces. No nation with a few of hundred nuclear weapons is going to launch a preemptive attack against a nation with well over 10,000 nuclear weapons.

X. CONCLUSION: THE NATIONAL INTERESTS INVOLVED IN INF,
A RETROSPECTIVE

This study has attempted to show the INF controversy as a manifestation of the confluence of foreign and domestic interests of the United States, the Soviet Union, and a multitude of West European states. The analysis has considered: 1) the basic concepts or precepts that strongly influence, if not determine, a state's national interests, 2) what the perspectives, needs and positions are of the various states involved in the INF controversy, 3) (where it is pertinent) the evolution of those positions, 4) how, in the case of some states involved in the INF controversy, the national interests are significantly impacted by domestic considerations, 5) the history of nuclear capabilities in Europe, and 6) the capabilities of the INF systems in question and how they fit within the context of the overall nuclear capabilities of the various states involved. Given what has been revealed in this investigation, it would seem that a negotiated settlement of the INF controversy could clearly improve the external environment for the states involved. Such a settlement could reduce the level of anxiety for all. It would enhance the stability of West European governments and, thereby, their ability to address other issues. It would significantly detract from the perception that the US was aggressive in its conduct in the world, particularly with the Soviet Union. This, in turn, would provide the leaders of these states with greater latitude and

domestic support to stand behind other US initiatives, that they may be in favor of, throughout the world.

Unfortunately, the US (that is the media and, therefore, the bulk of the public) expects too much from arms control. Eugene Rostow assesses it this way:

Throughout the West, many well-intentioned people insist in believing that the impasse in Geneva nuclear arms negotiations is based on mutual misunderstanding The Soviet leaders are not crude peasants who need a little reassurance about how well-intentioned the US really is. They understand the difference between Soviet and American foreign policy very well indeed.¹⁷²

The US would, therefore, be foolish and actually endanger NATO's short term credibility and the long term stability of Western Europe, as we now know it, if it capitulated to Soviet demands on INF. The intensity of the controversy, as it is seen by each of the actors, is assessed using Nuechterlein's national interest matrix; see Table IX.

For NATO as a whole and France, Britain and the INF site countries specifically, the INF controversy is a vital issue with respect to their defense interests. This accounts for the stance of the various government leaders on INF, in spite of domestic opposition. The threat posed by Soviet European INF capabilities is both highly credible and excessively massive. At various times (i.e., the Soviet walkout of the INF negotiations in November-December 1983) the threat has even appeared almost imminent. This is precisely the effect the Soviets have sought,

¹⁷²Rostow, p. 36.

TABLE IX.173

THE INF CONTROVERSY AND NATIONAL INTEREST

Basic Interest at Stake	Intensity of Interest			
	Survival	Vital	Major	Peripheral
Defense of homeland	...	NATO France Britain	US USSR	...
Economic well-being	US USSR NATO France Britain	...
Favorable world order	...	US NATO France Britain	USSR	...
Promotion of values	US USSR NATO France Britain	...

but not with the intention of sparking a counter build-up. Instead they sought the acquiescence of Western Europe to Soviet dominance.

The US and the Soviet Union, on the other hand, are not as seriously threatened by the INF issue; for them it is a major interest. In spite of the Soviet rhetoric about the seriousness of the threat posed to the Soviet homeland by the US INF deployed in Europe, the Soviets know its limitations and that their ability to retaliate against the US is more than sufficient to deter a US first strike. They also know the US is a status quo power. The Soviets merely sought to expand their influence in

¹⁷³Nuechterlein, p. 75.

Western Europe and reduce the US's through modernization of their sub-strategic nuclear capabilities. For the US, although of a higher order of importance, because of the Soviet INF's ability to devastate Western Europe, INF capability is a factor to be either negotiated away or countered in kind. Failure on the US's part to do either would enable the Soviets to achieve, fait accompli, the equivalence of the nuclear capability of all the other nations in the world. This would then pose a more serious defense problem for the US; a threat at the vital issue level.

The INF controversy does not pose any direct or immediate impact on the economic well-being of the states, but the potential, long-term impact is significant. If INF led to a realignment of Western Europe away from the US and towards the Soviet Union, it would greatly enhance Soviet access to Western Europe's economic wealth and its products (i.e., technology). It would reduce US markets and in the long run could reduce Western Europe's ability to be competitive in the world's economic arena.

As far as a favorable world-order is concerned, it is much more crucial for the West to maintain the status quo, than it is for the Soviet Union to expand its control. The present structure is the one in which both Western Europe and the US can feel more secure. It also provides an excellent framework for them to operate within in the international setting. For the Soviet Union the status quo does not reduce their security, but a realignment by Western Europe would enhance it.

The INF controversy is not specifically about the values either side holds dearest. To a degree, the protection of those values are involved as long as there is any level of threat to a state's sovereignty, but that is not what the controversy hinges upon. However, a resolution of the controversy in the Soviet's favor, rather than something mutually beneficial, would enhance the Soviet influence in Western Europe. This, in turn, could eventually lead to an abridgment of Western values (i.e., censorship of the press, either by the government or self-censorship of the items that would be viewed unfavorably by the Soviet Union).

The US should seek a negotiated settlement, but should not view an agreement as an end in itself. The goal is a reduction in INF weapons or at least parameters upon them. If that cannot be realized, the present status of Western Europe, between the US and the USSR, has not been weakened by the course of the INF controversy to date. All indications are that the bonds between the West European governments and the United States today are much stronger than they were in the late 1970s, a time when the tide of European confidence in American leadership of the alliance was at a low ebb.

Lawrence Freedman, in The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, made the following observation about NATO's December 1979 "twin-track" decision: "The feature of the decision that aroused the most satisfaction was that it had been made at all, given the domestic political difficulties it caused in a number of member

states"174 This is clearly the consensus of a diverse West European perspective. The US view would be similar, while the Soviet viewpoint would be more, one of frustration. Repeated attempts, by several Soviet leaders over the past six years, have failed to dissuade the alliance members involved from honoring their obligations to this decision. This domestic discontent became even more marked during the past six years in some of the states in question. But that discontent has subsided somewhat, but by no means disappeared, in each state, after deployment has actually been effected.

Recent Soviet proposals still contain many of the same disproportionate or inequitable aspects as previous proposals, however there may be some encouraging aspects. The Soviets have offered to negotiate with the French and British separately. They have agreed in principle to substantial reductions in long-range/strategic systems. They have offered to negotiate a separate US/USSR bilateral agreement on European INF systems.

NATO's December 1979 decision and the tenacity of the member states involved has been seen as credible enough to cause the Soviets to display some movement (although much less than it would appear in the media). This has been accomplished by keeping in mind that the goal of their collective security is a Western alliance that poses a credible deterrent. If the process leads to a truly equitable and verifiable agreement on INF

¹⁷⁴Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Power (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 386.

systems, then these systems may have helped to bring about the ultimate goal of most people, a true reduction in the nuclear threat to all. If not, then a viable, credible deterrent will, at least for the time being, maintain the status quo in Europe and, thereby, enhance stability.

APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY OF NUECHTERLEIN'S TERMS¹⁷⁵

Defense Interest: the protection of the nation-state and its citizens from the threat of physical violence by another country, and/or protection from an externally inspired threat to the national political system.

Economic Interest: the enhancement of the nation-state's economic well-being in relations with other states.

World-order Interest: the maintenance of an international political and economic system in which the nation-state can feel secure and in which its citizens and commerce can operate peacefully outside their own borders.

Ideological Interest: the protection and furtherance of a set of values which the citizens of a nation-state share and believe to be universally good.

Survival Issues: The very existence of the nation-state is in jeopardy, either as a result of overt military attack on its own territory or from the imminent threat of attack should an enemy's demands be rejected. The key to whether an issue is one of survival, or a vital issue, on the table of priorities is the degree to which there is an immediate, credible threat of massive physical harm by one state on another. By this definition there probably are no economic, world-order or ideological interests that qualify. Only a defense interest, as defined above, would ever reach that level of intensity. The distinction becomes more meaningful when the use of strategic nuclear weapons is factored into the equation. Only if the issue is at the survival level would a government be justified, on any rational grounds, in actually using strategic-nuclear weapons against an enemy.

Vital Issues: Serious harm will likely result to the state unless strong measures, including the use of conventional military force are employed to counter an adverse action by another state or to deter it from undertaking a serious provocation. A vital issue may, in the long run be as serious a threat to a country's political and economic well-being as a survival issue. Time is the essential difference: a vital issue usually provides a government with sufficient time to seek help from allies, bargain with its antagonist or take aggressive countermeasures to warn the enemy that it will pay a high price if the political, economic or military pressure is not withdrawn. Unlike survival issues, a vital issue may involve not only

¹⁷⁵Nuechterlein, 76, 79-80.

defense interests but also economic, world-order and, in some cases, ideological interests. In 1971, for example, when the United States imposed a 10 percent surcharge on imports in order to force its trading partners to accept a devaluation of the dollar, it signaled that its growing balance-of-payment difficulties had reached the vital level.

Major Issues: The political, economic and ideological well-being of the state may be adversely affected by events and trends in the international environment which thus require corrective action in order to prevent them from becoming serious threats (vital issues). Most issues in international relations fall into this category and are usually resolved through diplomatic negotiation. It is when diplomacy fails to resolve such disputes that they can become dangerous: governments must then reconsider just how deeply their interests are affected by the event or trend in question. If, in the final analysis, a government is unwilling or unable to compromise on what it considers to be a fundamental question, it has implicitly maintained that the issue is a vital one. On the other hand, if negotiation and compromise are deemed to be the best course of action, then the issue probably is a major one. Most economic problems between states are major, not vital, issues; the same is true of ideological interest, although states sometimes cloak other problems in ideological garb in an effort to mobilize public opinion at home and abroad. World-order interests are more difficult to compromise, however, because these usually affect a country's feeling of security.

Peripheral Issues: The well-being of the state is not adversely affected by events or trends abroad, but the interests of private citizens and companies operating in foreign countries are endangered. Obviously, the large and powerful multinational corporations are usually given a higher priority by the parent country since their earnings and taxes have a significant effect on the economic well-being of the home state. Each nation-state makes its own determination on how greatly it values commercial enterprises operating abroad: for some, these companies constitute major issues of national interest; for others, they are only of peripheral importance.

Sentimental Attachment: the support given certain countries because of cultural links and strong ethnic ties felt by many Americans.

National Prestige: a nebulous concept, but leaders of great powers are acutely aware of the impact that their decisions in one part of the world can have on the credibility and prestige of their country elsewhere.

Type of Government: has to do with the ideological issue in foreign policy--whether the regime asking for help is democratic or authoritarian, whether it has regard for human rights and the dignity of the individual.

Risk of Protracted Conflict: determined largely by assessing the enemy's willingness to resist military pressure, and it is crucial to all other cost/risk factors.

Risk of Enlarged Conflict: refers to the possibility that other powers might become involved in a local conflict and thereby increase the danger of escalation to major warfare.

<u>LONG RANGE</u>							
US				USSR			
<u>CATEGORY</u> Type	<u>Range(km)</u> Warheads #	<u>Deployed</u> 1st;#(7/84)		<u>CATEGORY</u> Type	<u>Range(km)</u> Warheads #	<u>Deployed</u> 1st;#(7/84)	
<u>SEA</u> (continued) (SLCM)				<u>Sea</u> (continued) (SLCM)			
Tomahawk	2,500;1	1983;	48	SS-N-3	450;1	1962;	296
				SS-N-7	45;1	1968;	88
				SS-N-9	280;1	68-69;	200
				SS-N-12	1,000;1	1973;	96
			TOTAL 48				TOTAL 680
<u>AIR</u> (Bomber)				<u>AIR</u> (Bomber)			
B-52 G	12,000	1959;	151	Bear			
B-52 H	16,000	1962;	90	TU-95	12,800	1956;	100
				Bison			
				Mya-4	11,200	1956;	43
			TOTAL 241				TOTAL 143
<u>INTERMEDIATE RANGE</u>							
US				USSR			
<u>CATEGORY</u> Type	<u>Range(km)</u> Warheads #	<u>Deployed</u> 1st;#(7/84)		<u>CATEGORY</u> Type	<u>Range(km)</u> Warheads #	<u>Deployed</u> 1st;#(7/84)	
<u>LAND</u> (GLCM)				<u>LAND</u> (IRBM)			
Tomahawk	2,500;1	1983;	64	SS-20:			
				mod 1	5,000;1	1977	} 378
				mod 2	5,000;3	1977	
			TOTAL 64				TOTAL 378
				<u>AIR</u> (Bomber)			
				Badger			
				TU-16	4,800	1955;	410
				Backfire			
				TU-26	8,000	1974;	235
							TOTAL 645

MEDIUM RANGE							
US				USSR			
CATEGORY Type	Range(km);	Warheads #	Deployed 1st;#(7/84)	CATEGORY Type	Range(km);	Warheads #	Deployed 1st;#(7/84)
<u>LAND</u> (MRBM)				<u>LAND</u> (MRBM)			
Pershing II	1,800;1	1983;	48	SS-4	2,000;1	1959;	224
				SS-12	900;1	1969;	100
				SS-22	900;1	1979;	40
			TOTAL				TOTAL
			48				364
<u>AIR</u> (Bomber)				<u>AIR</u> (Bomber)			
FB-111 A	4,700	1969;	56	Blinder TU-22	4,000	1962;	160
			SUBTOTAL				SUBTOTAL
			56				160
(Land-based Strike)				(Land-based Strike)			
F-4 E	2,200	1962;	440	Fitter D/			
F-111 E/F	4,700	1967;	230	H SU-17	1,800	1974;	850
F-16	3,800	1979;	456	Fencer SU-24	4,000	1974;	630
			SUBTOTAL				SUBTOTAL
			1226				1480
(Carrier-based Strike)				(Carrier-based Strike)			
A-6 E	3,200	1963;	170				
A-7	2,800	1966;	288				
			SUBTOTAL				
			458				
			TOTAL				TOTAL
			1640				1640
SHORT RANGE							
US				USSR			
CATEGORY Type	Range(km);	Warheads #	Deployed 1st;#(7/84)	CATEGORY Type	Range(km);	Warheads #	Deployed 1st;#(7/84)
<u>LAND</u> (SRBM)				<u>LAND</u> (SRBM)			
Pershing IA	720;1	1967;	90	Scud A	150;1	1957	} 540
Lance	110;1	1972;	90	Scud B	300;1	1965	
				FROG-7	70;1	1965;	530
				SS-21	120;1	1978;	90
				SS-23	500;1	79-80;	100
			SUBTOTAL				SUBTOTAL
			180				1260

APPENDIX C

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NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES COMPARISON
NATO (non-US) vs WARSAW PACT (non-USSR)

<u>INTERMEDIATE RANGE</u>					
NATO (non-US)			WARSAW PACT (non-USSR)		
<u>CATEGORY</u> Type	<u>Range(km);</u> Warheads #	<u>Deployed</u> 1st;#(7/84)	<u>CATEGORY</u> Type	<u>Range(km);</u> Warheads #	<u>Deployed</u> 1st;#(7/84)
<u>LAND</u> (IRBM)					
SSBS S-3	3,500;1	1980; 18			
		TOTAL			18
<u>SEA</u> (SLBM)					
Polaris					
A-3	4,600;3	1967; 64			
MSBS M-20	3,000;1	1977; 80			
		TOTAL			144
<u>MEDIUM RANGE</u>					
NATO (non-US)			WARSAW PACT (non-USSR)		
<u>CATEGORY</u> Type	<u>Range(km);</u> Warheads #	<u>Deployed</u> 1st;#(7/84)	<u>CATEGORY</u> Type	<u>Range(km);</u> Warheads #	<u>Deployed</u> 1st;#(7/84)
<u>AIR</u> (Land-based Strike)					
F-104	2,400	1958; 281			
F-4 E/F	2,200	67-73; 131	Fitter C		
F-16	3,800	1982; 178	SU-20	1,800	1974; 35
Buccaneer	3,700	1962; 25			
Mirage IVA	3,200	1964; 28			
Mirage					
IIIE	2,400	1964; 30			
Jaguar	1,600	1974; 45			
Tornado	2,800	1981; 223			
		TOTAL			TOTAL 35

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Ibid.

SHORT RANGE					
NATO (non-US)			WARSAW PACT (non-USSR)		
CATEGORY Type	Range(km); Warheads #	Deployed 1st;#(7/84)	CATEGORY Type	Range(km); Warheads #	Deployed 1st;#(7/84)
<u>LAND</u> (SRBM)			<u>LAND</u> (SRBM)		
Honest John	40;1	1953; 54	Scud B/C	300;1	1965; 132
Pershing IA	720;1	1962; 72	FROG -3/-5/-7	70;1	57-65; 208
Lance	110;1	1976; 56			
Pluton	120;1	1974; 44			
		SUBTOTAL 226			SUBTOTAL 340
(Artillery)			(Artillery)		
203mm SP			152mm Gun/		
How M110	17	1962; 436	How	n.a.	n.a.; 100
155mm SP					
How M109	18	1964;1,186			
		SUBTOTAL 1,622			SUBTOTAL 100
		TOTAL 1,848			TOTAL 440
<u>AIR</u> (Carrier-based Strike)					
Super Etendard	1,500	1980; 36			
		TOTAL 36			

APPENDIX D

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EUROPEAN NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES
COMPARISON
NATO vs THE WARSAW PACT
(includes European dedicated US and USSR forces)

<u>LONG RANGE</u>					
NATO			WARSAW PACT		
<u>CATEGORY</u> Type	<u>Deployed</u> by	<u>Deployed</u> 1st;#(7/84)	<u>CATEGORY</u> Type	<u>Deployed</u> by	<u>Deployed</u> 1st;#(7/84)
			LAND (ICBM)		
			SS-11/17/19	USSR	66-82; n.a.
<u>SEA</u> (SLBM)			<u>SEA</u> (SLBM)		
Poseidon C-3	USA	1971; 40	SS-N-5	USSR	1964; 45
Polaris A-3	Britain	1967; 64			
MSBS M-20	France	1977; 80			
		SUBTOTAL			SUBTOTAL
		184			45
			(SLCM)		
			SS-N-3	USSR	1962; 240
			SS-N-7	USSR	1968; 88
			SS-N-9	USSR	68-69; 140
			SS-N-12	USSR	1973; 80
					SUBTOTAL
					548
		TOTAL			TOTAL
		184			593
			<u>AIR</u> (Bomber)		
			TU-95	USSR	1956; @
			Mya-4	USSR	1956; @
					[@-number included in intermediate range bomber total]
<u>INTERMEDIATE RANGE</u>					
NATO			WARSAW PACT		
<u>CATEGORY</u> Type	<u>Deployed</u> by	<u>Deployed</u> 1st;#(7/84)	<u>CATEGORY</u> Type	<u>Deployed</u> by	<u>Deployed</u> 1st;#(7/84)
LAND (IRBM)			LAND (IRBM)		
SSBS S-3	France	1980; 18	SS-20	USSR	1977; 243
		SUBTOTAL			SUBTOTAL
		18			243

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Ibid.

INTERMEDIATE RANGE					
NATO			WARSAW PACT		
CATEGORY Type	Deployed by	Deployed 1st; #(7/84)	CATEGORY Type	Deployed by	Deployed 1st; #(7/84)
(GLCM) Tomahawk	USA	1983; 32			
		SUBTOTAL			
		TOTAL			TOTAL 243
			AIR (Bomber)		
			TU-16	USSR	1955 >
			TU-26	USSR	1974 > 760+@
MEDIUM RANGE					
NATO			WARSAW PACT		
CATEGORY Type	Deployed by	Deployed 1st; #(7/84)	CATEGORY Type	Deployed by	Deployed 1st; #(7/84)
LAND (MRBM) Pershing II	USA	1983; 48	LAND (MRBM) SS-4 SS-12 SS-22	USSR USSR USSR	1959; 224 1969 > 1979 > 90
		TOTAL			TOTAL 314
AIR (Bomber) FB-111 A	USA	1969; 56	AIR (Bomber) TU-22	USSR	1962; @
		SUBTOTAL			SUBTOTAL @
		[@-number included in intermediate range bomber total]			
		(Land-based Strike)			
F-104	FRG, Gr, Ne, It, Tur	1958; 281	SU-17	USSR	1974; 800
F-4 E	USA	1962; 96	SU-20	Poland	1974; 35
F-4 E/F	FRG, Tur	67-73; 131	SU-24	USSR	1974; 600
F-111 E/F	USA	1967; 150			
F-16	USA	1979; 72			
F-16	Bel, Den, Ne, Nor	1982; 178			
Buccaneer	Br	1962; 25			
Mirage IVA	Fr	1964; 28			
Mirage IIIIE	Fr	1964; 30			
Jaguar	Fr	1974; 45			
Tornado	FRG, Br, It	1981; 223			
		SUBTOTAL			SUBTOTAL 1,435

MEDIUM RANGE					
NATO			WARSAW PACT		
CATEGORY Type	Deployed by	Deployed 1st; #(7/84)	CATEGORY Type	Deployed by	Deployed 1st; #(7/84)
(Carrier-based Strike)					
A-7	USA	1966; 48			
		SUBTOTAL 48+*			
TOTAL 1,363+*			TOTAL 1,435+@		
SHORT RANGE					
NATO			WARSAW PACT		
CATEGORY Type	Deployed by	Deployed 1st; #(7/84)	CATEGORY Type	Deployed by	Deployed 1st; #(7/84)
LAND (SRBM)			LAND (SRBM)		
Pershing IA	USA	1976; 60	SS-21	USSR	1978 >
Pershing IA	FRG	1962; 72	FROG-7	USSR	1965 > 440
Lance	USA	1972; 36	SS-23	USSR	79-80 >
Lance	Bel, Br, FRG, It, Ne	1976; 56	Scud A/B	USSR	57-65 > 500
Pluton	Fr	1974; 44	Scud B/C	E. Eur.	1965; 132
Honest John	Gr, Tur	1953; 40	FROG-3/-5/-7	E. Eur.	57-65; 208
		SUBTOTAL 308			SUBTOTAL 1,280
(Artillery)			(Artillery)		
M-110	USA	77-79; 500	M-1976	USSR	1981 >
M-110	Bel, Br, FRG, Gr, It, Ne, Tur	1962; 436	2S-5	USSR	1978 >
M-109	USA	1963; 500	S-23	USSR	55-59 >
M-109	Bel, Br, Can, Den, FRG, Gr, It, Nor, Por, Ne, Tur	1964; 1,186	M-55/D-20	USSR	1955 > 3,500
		SUBTOTAL 2,622	M-1973/C2-S3	USSR	1972 >
		TOTAL 2,930	M-1975 How	USSR	1979 >
			M-1975 Mor	USSR	1979 >
					SUBTOTAL 3,500
					TOTAL 4,780

SHORT RANGE					
NATO			WARSAW PACT		
CATEGORY Type	Deployed by	Deployed 1st;#(7/84)	CATEGORY Type	Deployed by	Deployed 1st;#(7/84)
<u>AIR</u>			<u>AIR</u>		
			(Land-based Strike)		
			MIG-23	Bul, Czech, DDR	75-76; 60
			SU-7	Czech, Poland	1959; 95
			SU-7	USSR	1959 } 1,000
			MIG-21	USSR	1970 }
			MIG-27	USSR	1971 }
(Carrier-based Strike)					
F-18	USA	1982; *			
Super Etendard	Fr	1980; 36			
		TOTAL 36+*			TOTAL 1,155
[*-number included in medium range strike total]					

APPENDIX E
TRENDS IN NATO AND WARSAW PACT NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES 179
(1975-1985)

CATEGORY type (RANGE)	DELIVERY VEHICLES				NUCLEAR WARHEADS			
	1975		1985		1975		1985	
	NATO	PACT	NATO	PACT	NATO	PACT	NATO	PACT
SHORT RANGE: (0-800km)								
Artillery								
155-240mm (14-29)	700	0	700	600	1400	0	1400	1200
Lance (110)	36		90		216		810	
FROG/ SS-21 (0-120)		662		691		1324		1382
Honest John (40)	200		24		2000		240	
Sergeant (140)	20		0		200		0	
Fr. Pluton (120)	12		42		12		42	
Scud/ SS-23 (300-350)		384		539		768		1078
Pershing 1A (740)	180		72		270		108	
Land-based Aircraft (Varies)		1250		1500		375		637
Fr. Carrier-based Aircraft (1500)	0		24		0		24	
SUBTOTAL	1148	2296	952	3330	4098	2467	2624	4297
MEDIUM RANGE: (801-2,400km)								
Land-based Aircraft (Varies)	967	1250	947	1500	1450	375	1420	638
Fr. Land-based Aircraft (Varies)	30		70		30		70	
Carrier-based Aircraft (Varies)	86		72		122		108	
Bombers (Varies)	85	100	170	75	170	208	340	200
French Mirage IV (3200)	36		33		36		33	
SS-4 (2000)		450		50- 200		900		100- 400
Pershing II (1600)	0		108		0		108	
SS-12/ SS-22 (1000)		85		85		170		170
SUBTOTAL	1204	1885	1400	1710	1808	1653	2079	1108

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See Uwe Nerlich, ed., Soviet Power and Western Negotiating Policies, vol. 1: The Soviet Asset: Military Power in the Competition Over Europe (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1983), p. 110-111, 114-115; Military Balance '84-'85, p. 130-137.

CATEGORY type (RANGE)	DELIVERY VEHICLES				NUCLEAR WARHEADS			
	1975		1985		1975		1985	
	NATO	PACT	NATO	PACT	NATO	PACT	NATO	PACT
<u>INTERMEDIATE RANGE:</u> (2,401-5,500km)								
Bombers (Varies)	56	400	0	375	56	834	0	800
GLCM (2500)	0		40		0		160	
Fr. IRBM (3000)	18		18		18		18	
SS-5 (3800)		50		0		100		0
SS-20 (5000)		0		260		0		1560
SUBTOTAL	74	450	58	585	74	934	178	2360
<u>LONG RANGE:</u> (Over 5,500km)								
SLBM Varies	104	55	104	48	104	55	464	96
Fr. SLBM (3000)	48		96		48		160	
SUBTOTAL	152	55	200	48	152	55	624	96
GRAND TOTAL	2578	4686	2610	5673-5823	6132	5109	5505	7861-8161

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