The Impact of Eastern Europe on Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe

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This report presents the results of research conducted under the Project AIR FORCE National Security Strategies Program project, "The Future of Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe," directed by Harry Gelman. The report analyzes how Soviet control of Eastern Europe has both contributed to and detracted from the USSR's pursuit of foreign policy goals in Western Europe.

This research has involved examination of East European publications, the reports of Western journalists from Eastern Europe, and Western studies. It also reflects the author's many discussions with officials, journalists, and research institute staff members in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania in 1983-1985. Finally, it draws on analyses of Soviet-East European relations conducted under an earlier Project AIR FORCE study, "Soviet Vulnerabilities in Eastern Europe."
SUMMARY

Soviet policy has sought to influence Western Europe in a pro-Soviet direction by controlling Eastern Europe while simultaneously utilizing influence in Western Europe to enhance that control. In the Soviet perspective, influence in Western Europe and control of Eastern Europe are not contradictory, but mutually reinforcing objectives. In practice, however, emphasis on one objective has often turned out to be at the expense of the other.

Since the mid-1950s, East European officials have periodically launched diplomatic initiatives, such as the Rapacki Plan, reinforcing Soviet anti-NATO campaigns. Such diplomatic initiatives have on occasion assumed a life of their own, indicating that East European Communist leaders who are otherwise loyal to Moscow can assess national and Soviet bloc policy priorities differently and, in dealing with Western Europe, can adopt both "softer" and "harder" stances than that of the USSR itself. This was the case in 1966–1967, when Romania accepted Bonn's offer to establish diplomatic relations in the absence of a comprehensive settlement with the East. It was the case again in 1969–1971, when Soviet-West German negotiations led Gomulka to try to safeguard Poland's territorial interests with a preemptive diplomatic initiative, while Ulbricht maintained an "all or nothing" attitude toward Bonn so persistently that Moscow had to see to his replacement as East German party leader by Honecker in 1971.

The German settlement and emerging Soviet-American détente paved the way for European détente in the 1970s, resulting in the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Moscow evidently hoped that the further development of intra-European ties fostered by what became known as the "Helsinki process" would help to consolidate Soviet control over Eastern Europe, while gradually persuading West Europeans of the merits of the Soviet version of détente.

The Soviet balance sheet of European détente as it in fact developed in the second half of the 1970s is evidently mixed. If, in the Soviet view, European détente furthered some Soviet aims in Western Europe in the 1970s, it had some negative results in Eastern Europe. A major consequence of the European détente of the 1970s was to increase the exposure of East European elites and societies to Western, and especially West European, influences. Indirectly, international détente thus fostered internal détente in Eastern Europe. This was facilitated by relative Soviet neglect of an Eastern Europe which the Soviet leadership under Brezhnev seemed to take for granted.
After the breakdown of Soviet-American détente at the end of the 1970s, Moscow attempted to pursue a separate détente with Western Europe, in order to sharpen American-European differences and extend Soviet influence in Western Europe. This Soviet effort proved to be unsuccessful, at least in the short run, not because West European governments failed to show interest in “differentiated détente,” but because of the consequences of two developments in the Soviet bloc itself—the Polish crisis and the Soviet SS-20 deployment.

Poland

The rise of Solidarity in Poland constituted a threat to Soviet interests that the Soviet leadership could not ignore. The Soviet decision not to resort to military intervention was not primarily the result of Soviet apprehensions about scuttling Soviet-style détente in Western Europe. Indeed, in weighing the costs and benefits of military intervention in Poland, the Brezhnev leadership might have concluded that a renewed demonstration of its resolve and power in Eastern Europe—like the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia—would have a healthy intimidating effect on the West. Rather, Soviet non-invasion of Poland can be explained by Soviet concern about the prospects of violent resistance in Poland and the incalculable consequences of even limited military conflict in the heart of Europe, linked with a hope that “healthy forces” inside Poland could crush Solidarity—as they in fact did in December 1981.

The seriousness with which the USSR and its allies viewed Polish developments after 1980 was evident from ongoing Soviet bloc analyses of the crisis. The peaceful workers’ revolt in Poland raised for Soviet ideologues troublesome issues of the party’s role of representing the “best interests of the working class.” In the 1970s, Soviet and Polish ideologues had proclaimed that Poland had completed the “transition to socialism” and was developing a socialist society. Now, Soviet ideologues revised that view and proclaimed that Poland was still in the pre-socialist phase. This was an unprecedented acknowledgment of the failure of “socialism” to take root in Poland. But it was dictated by the need for Soviet ideologues to avoid a more damaging admission—that the Soviet “socialist” system itself might be susceptible to a Polish-like undermining of Communist party rule.

A second key point in Soviet assessments of the Polish crisis was that the incipient reversal of socialism in Poland, while attributable in part to domestic circumstances, had been worsened by subversive Western influences, which had increased under conditions of European détente. The West was viewed as promoting “an expanded network of
economic, trade, financial, cultural, and political relations" with Poland as part of an effort "to separate the socialist countries from their Soviet ally and link them with the West." Such analyses of the importance of external factors in the Polish crisis were related to and fueled Soviet assessments that the West had attempted to utilize the Polish crisis to bring about a fundamental reversal of the "forces of socialism" in the world.

Soviet assessments of the Polish crisis were not confined to the Polish situation and Western attempts to influence it, however, but extended to the structure of the Soviet bloc and to the nature of socialism in the USSR itself. A theoretical debate with very real practical consequences ensued. This debate focused on "contradictions in socialism," and this became the rubric for a wide-ranging discussion, with sharply opposed views, on how much the "lessons" of Poland applied to other "socialist" countries and to the USSR itself, and on whether far-reaching reforms were required in the USSR and elsewhere in Eastern Europe to avert Polish-style developments. The Soviet "contradictions" debate was broadened into a blocwide discussion and spilled over into relations between Communist states and Communist foreign policy generally.

Some East European regime spokesmen took the Soviet debate on "contradictions" as an opportunity for analyses of differences among Communist states. They focused upon the issue of "national" versus "international" (meaning Soviet-defined) interests in Communist countries, first in terms of divergent domestic policies, but then in foreign policy matters as well. Especially Hungarian, but also East German and even Bulgarian spokesmen took the occasion to outline their own "national" interests in more distinct theoretical form than had heretofore been the case and in terms approaching Romania's long-standing emphasis on the priority of national interests within the Soviet orbit. Soviet and Czechoslovak spokesmen, on the other hand, stressed the importance of "internationalism" and Soviet hegemony in the bloc. These differences prepared the ground for and were later to find practical reflection in the divergence over policy toward Western Europe that emerged between Moscow and several of the East European regimes in 1984.

This divergence of viewpoint, however, did not become visible for two years after the imposition of martial law in Poland, while Moscow was still promoting differentiated détente with Western Europe. Although Moscow pointed to Poland's ties with the West in the 1970s as one cause of the crisis, in its assessments of the practical consequences of the Polish crisis for policy toward Western Europe, Moscow failed to draw a clear conclusion that the way to avoid "Polands" was
to isolate Eastern Europe. Rather, in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, Moscow concluded that slightly more differentiated European détente could serve Soviet longer-term interests by promoting American-West European differences (a prospect reinforced by NATO’s self-imposed disarray over the “pipeline deal”). If some developments in Western Europe (including the return to power of several conservative parties) seemed to be moving against Soviet interests, other trends appeared more favorable, especially the situation in West Germany. In 1982–1983, the Soviet leadership could hope that altered security thinking in the Social Democratic party (SPD) and the growing “peace movement” could prevent NATO’s intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) deployment, thus increasing the decoupling of European defense from that of the United States while increasing intra-Western divisions. The INF issue thus became a “test of strength between the alliances” to which Soviet “after-Poland” policy toward Western Europe, and hence the Soviet notion of proper East-West European relations, was harnessed. This objective precluded a policy of attempting to isolate Eastern from Western Europe. So did continued Soviet interest, however qualified, in utilizing the Western economic connection to help stabilize Eastern Europe.

Post-INF

In attempting to forestall NATO’s INF deployment, Moscow continued to welcome the development of relations between Eastern and Western Europe. Most striking was the activization of East German foreign policy, which continued after West Germany’s decision to proceed with the missile deployments. The East German line was spelled out by Honecker in November 1983, when he ignored his earlier warnings of a new “ice age” and declared that East Germany would attempt to “limit the damage” resulting from NATO’s actions by a more activist policy toward the West in general and by continuing a policy of dialogue and negotiations with West Germany in particular. Words were matched with deeds; in the following months, East Germany undertook a variety of dramatic steps to improve relations with Bonn. Hungary also actively cultivated its Western connections in late 1983 and 1984, as did Bulgaria, although to a more limited extent. Romania continued to pursue ties with the West, in accordance with its long-standing autonomous position in the Soviet bloc.

But if the détente policies pursued by the four East European countries were in line with the approach previously staked out by the USSR toward Western Europe, they were influenced by special motives and interests. At the time of the Helsinki Conference in 1975, there
had evidently been a near identity of views on the part of the USSR, on the one hand, and most East European leaderships, on the other hand, concerning the objectives of East European involvement in European détente. That involvement could promote Soviet notions of "pan-European security" in the West, while utilizing Western recognition and Western trade and credits to help stabilize the East. But by the turn of the 1980s, as a result of changing domestic and international circumstances, Soviet and East European perspectives began to diverge. Domestic economic, social, cultural, and national factors, operating differently in individual East European countries, motivated several East European leaderships to acquire a greater stake in the potential of the détente process to help stabilize their regimes than did Moscow itself. This was especially true of Hungary, East Germany, and Romania, and partly true of Bulgaria.

These latent differences within the Soviet bloc on the proper tactics of Westpolitik following NATO's INF deployment became fully evident only in April-May 1984, when Soviet policy toward the West Europeans hardened generally. Confronted with this change of course, Hungary, East Germany, and Bulgaria, as well as Romania, resolved to continue to pursue rather than abandon the effort to develop relations with Western Europe. That differing motives could lead to public disagreements was demonstrated even before the Soviet shift in spring 1984, in the course of a continuation of the ideological discussion on "national vs. international" aspects of socialism (the discussion that developed from the "contradictions" debate), with Hungary and East Germany taking the lead in defending national interests against the accusations of Czechoslovak and some Soviet officials. In July-August 1984, Soviet-East German differences over policy toward Bonn became public.

These departures from the Soviet line on the part of East Germany, Hungary, Romania, and—to a lesser extent—Bulgaria were important not only individually, as national deviations from the Soviet line, but in combination, as multilateral divergence from the Soviet line and thus incipient "factionalism" on important foreign policy issues. East Germany propagated the slogan "coalition of reason" in seeking ties with anti-INF forces in the West, yet precipitated the formation of what might also be termed a "coalition of reason" inside the Soviet bloc excluding the Soviet Union.

This East European "coalition of reason" evidently had an impact on the tone of Soviet bloc multilateral statements, including the April 1984 meeting of the Warsaw Pact Council of Foreign Ministers and the June 1984 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) summit, and was able to use such statements to justify subsequent policy—typical behavior of coalitions in multilateral organizations.
The persistence of the East European states in pursuing their interests in the face of the Soviet change of course in spring 1984 seems explicable only with reference to the unsettled Soviet leadership situation at the time. In 1984, as on several occasions in the past, the diversion of Soviet attention from Eastern Europe because of the uncompleted Soviet leadership succession had relaxed the constraints that normally restrict East European impulses toward greater foreign policy autonomy. Moreover, those signals the East European leaderships did receive from Moscow in 1984 seemed to be mixed, no doubt partly because of disarray in the Soviet leadership due to the ongoing succession struggle. Some Soviet voices warned against excessively close economic ties with the West, but others stressed the importance of maintaining East-West economic ties. Some Soviet voices continued to endorse East-West European contacts in mid-1984, and Soviet policy continued to promote the development of Soviet economic ties with Western Europe at the height of the harder political line. These Soviet ambiguities gave the East European leaderships additional leeway.

Finally, and perhaps most important, the East European leaderships evidently concluded that they understood Soviet interests better than did those in the USSR who were making (or not making) decisions in mid-1984. The East Europeans gambled that through a combination of lobbying, Soviet indecision, and an anticipated future Soviet shift back to a softer line vis-à-vis Western Europe, they could promote their own interests while avoiding a frontal clash with Moscow. That veteran Communist leaders Kadar and Honecker pursued such a high-risk strategy is testimony to the strength of the motives that impelled the East European states, INF notwithstanding, to pursue expanded relations with Western Europe throughout 1984.

This strategy worked for Hungary. It worked for Bulgaria, until Soviet-East German friction interfered. Romania continued its autonomous foreign policies, although Romania's deteriorating domestic situation detracted from its former appeal in the West, and its policy on INF converged with the Soviet line. East Berlin, on the other hand, was less successful, given the especially sensitive nature of inter-German relations. The Soviet reassertion of authority in connection with the abortive Honecker visit to West Germany and the subsequent Soviet shift to a slightly more accommodating posture vis-à-vis the United States led the East European states in fall 1984 to proceed more quietly in their relations with Western Europe, while maintaining most of the substance of their mid-1984 activism. Diversity within the bloc surfaced again on issues of foreign policy, the Warsaw Pact, and domestic models in spring 1985.
Past experience suggested that any consolidated Soviet leadership would seek more discipline in Eastern Europe, as occurred after Soviet leadership successions in 1957 and again in 1967. Yet, at the end of Gorbachev’s first year, the motives that impelled the East European leaderships to cultivate special ties with Western Europe in the wake of NATO’s INF deployment remained as strong as ever and continued to complicate Soviet policies directed toward increasing cohesion and discipline in Eastern Europe. Intensification of Soviet contacts with West European countries during 1985 gave East European regimes greater latitude to cultivate ties with the West and diluted the Soviet impulse to impose greater conformity on them. Soviet attitudes remained inconsistent and ambiguous regarding both Eastern Europe’s domestic policies and the region’s relations with the West, allowing the East European leaderships to retain significant room for maneuver.

Thus, since the mid-1970s, the Soviets have faced an increasingly pronounced dilemma in attempting to use control over Eastern Europe to promote greater Soviet influence in Western Europe while at the same time attempting to avoid the “reverse influence” from Western Europe that could threaten Soviet control of Eastern Europe—the primary Soviet imperial asset. This dilemma was most evident in Poland. But the issue also arose with regard to East Germany and thus involved Soviet German policy—the most important and sensitive element of Soviet West European policy. The Soviet effort to influence Western Europe via the latter’s ties with Eastern Europe also gave rise to dependencies of Eastern Europe on Western Europe. In the specific circumstances of 1983-1984, this web of intra-European relations caused the Soviet campaign against NATO’s INF deployment to have divisive ramifications within Eastern Europe which reduced the effectiveness of that campaign in late 1983, as Moscow still attempted to woo Western Europe and West Germany in particular, and in spring 1984, when Moscow shifted to a harder-line approach to Western Europe.

For Moscow, the political costs of empire in Eastern Europe have increased, in the sense that meeting the increasing challenges to Soviet interests in the region requires unacceptable sacrifices of other Soviet interests. In this sense, the Soviet bloc foreign policy disarray of 1984 was less a consequence of Soviet leadership weakness than an indicator of deepening bloc fissures not strongly correlated with Soviet leadership strength.

Continued Soviet cultivation of Western Europe is likely to lead in time to renewed negative feedback in Eastern Europe that will again constrain Soviet policy in Western Europe. At the same time, Western Europe serves as a constraint on Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe,
since a radically repressive Soviet policy there would hamper Soviet policy objectives in Western Europe. Soviet foreign policy decision-makers may still conclude that extending influence over Western Europe and consolidating control over Eastern Europe are mutually reinforcing objectives. Yet East-West European ties in fact constrain Soviet policy in Western Europe, limiting the extent and duration of sharp departures in the direction of either wooing or threatening Western Europe, while at the same time dampening Soviet efforts to discipline Eastern Europe.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Soviet policy toward Western Europe, like Soviet policy toward other regions, cannot be approached in isolation, but must be considered in a broader context. Soviet relations with Western Europe can be examined meaningfully only in the context of Soviet-American relations and with attention to Soviet interests elsewhere in the world. Most important, Soviet-West European relations can be understood only against the background of the course of Soviet-East European relations.

In the 1970s, under conditions of European détente, a Soviet dilemma involving Eastern Europe—the primary Soviet imperial asset—became more pronounced. That dilemma resulted from the Soviet attempt to utilize control over Eastern Europe to promote greater Soviet influence in Western Europe, while at the same time avoiding negative feedback in the form of "reverse influence" from Western Europe that could threaten that control. This dilemma was most evident in Poland. But the issue also arose with regard to East Germany and thus involved Soviet German policy, the most important and sensitive element of Soviet West European policy. The Soviet effort to influence Western Europe via the latter's ties with Eastern Europe also gave rise to dependencies of Eastern Europe on Western Europe. In the specific circumstances of spring 1984, this web of intra-European relations caused the Soviet campaign against NATO's intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) deployment to have divisive ramifications within Eastern Europe which in turn reduced the campaign's effectiveness.

This report examines the East European factor in recent Soviet policy toward Western Europe. Section II reviews the highlights of USSR-East European-West European interactions in the past and suggests general characteristics of the triangular relationship. Section III examines the impact of the continuing Polish crisis. Section IV traces in detail the foreign policy activity of the East European states related to NATO's 1983 INF deployment decision and analyzes the emergence of a grouping of East European states—East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania—whose policies differ from those of the Soviets. The discussion also includes an analysis of Soviet treatment of Eastern Europe during Gorbachev's first year in power. A more detailed chronology of the events examined in Section IV, along with additional source material from Soviet bloc media, is provided in the Appendix. Section V presents the conclusions of the study.
II. BACKGROUND

THE IMPORTANCE OF WESTERN EUROPE

In the 1970s, Soviet global expansionism brought the USSR into conflict with the United States in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. While the superpower competition has thus become globalized, it is Europe, where that competition began after World War II, that remains the major stake in the Soviet-American competition. A Western Europe firmly tied to the United States represents a major challenge to the USSR, while a Western Europe at odds with the United States and susceptible to Soviet influence would represent a major increment to Soviet power worldwide. It is not Eurocentrism to argue that "Western Europe is the place where the destiny of the Soviet Union and what it stands for will eventually be decided." 2

In the first twenty-five years after the end of World War II, the USSR generally advocated variants of what it called a "collective security system" or "pan-European security system" intended to insure a dominant Soviet voice in West European security affairs, and thus Soviet influence over West European policies and resources, through the exclusion of the United States from Western Europe. 3


3This was still the Soviet approach when Moscow revived its call for a European Security Conference in the mid-1960s. (See Lilita Dzirkals and A. Ross Johnson (eds.), Soviet and East European Forecasts of European Security: Papers from the 1972 Varna Conference, The Rand Corporation, R-1272-PR, June 1973.) In Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's words, citing Roosevelt's statement to Stalin at Yalta that U.S. troops would remain in Europe no more than two years after the war: "Ten times two years have elapsed since then, but the American army is still in Europe and, by all signs, claims per-
At the beginning of the 1970s, evidently recognizing both the barrenness of this totally anti-American approach and its incompatibility with emerging superpower détente, Moscow shifted to a more qualified anti-American stance in Western Europe. This revised approach encouraged the gradual decoupling of Western Europe from the United States yet eschewed language that denied the United States any legitimate interest in Europe. It also seemed to recognize that precipitate unilateral American withdrawal from Europe could equally precipitately be reversed and could have counterproductive destabilizing effects, including encouraging German nationalism.

Moscow’s more qualified anti-Americanism in Western Europe since 1970 has involved the pursuit of six objectives:

1. To win Western recognition of the territorial and systemic status quo in Eastern Europe.
2. To ensure that West European countries adhere to the Soviet definition of “peaceful coexistence,” i.e., that they maintain “friendly” relations with the USSR, abandon “politics from positions of strength,” and refrain from “interference in the internal affairs” of the USSR and the East European countries.
3. To broaden access to Western technology, know-how, and credits in order to overcome the Soviet Union’s perennial economic and technological inferiority vis-à-vis the West.
4. To limit as much as possible Western political cooperation in the frameworks of the European Community (EC) and NATO.
5. To preclude any security threat from Western Europe; to deny to Western Europe any viable defensive option; and to make sure that the West Europeans are acutely aware of their military vulnerability in relation to the USSR.
6. To transform the pluralistic systems of Western Europe by encouraging and supporting the Communist parties and other “progressive” and “peace-loving” forces.

As the ordering of the above list suggests, a key objective of Soviet policy toward Western Europe is the consolidation of Eastern Europe, which might be interpreted as a defensive rather than an offensive motivation. Yet in the Soviet political calculus, “offensive” and “defensive” considerations are so intermingled that the very labels are misleading. Enhanced Soviet influence over Western Europe would

\footnote{Based on Adomeit, "Soviet Policy Towards the West," pp. 12-13.}
also serve in the Soviet view to ensure Soviet control over Eastern Europe. That control should, in the Soviet view, simultaneously contribute to the achievement of Soviet objectives in Western Europe. In the Soviet perspective, influence in Western Europe and control of Eastern Europe are not contradictory but mutually reinforcing objectives. In practice, however, emphasis on one has usually turned out to be at the expense of the other.5

THE ROLE OF EASTERN EUROPE

No observer of Soviet-East European relations disputes the importance of Eastern Europe to the USSR as its core “sphere of influence” asset. That importance is multidimensional. Eastern Europe serves Moscow as a security buffer. Control of Eastern Europe augments Soviet military strength through stationing of Soviet forces in the region, through the organization of East European military forces for Soviet military planning objectives, and through denial of the area to hostile military forces. Such control is intended to limit the greater penetration of Western ideas into the USSR that would result from the presence of Western-style democracies or other non-Communist states in the region. A Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe helps funnel Western technology to the USSR for economic and especially military purposes. It also provides the USSR with a guaranteed source of industrial goods, even if Moscow no longer benefits from net economic exploitation of Eastern Europe and, indeed, even if it has had to subsidize the region through discounted energy prices (now declining, if not gone), trade surpluses, ruble and hard-currency credits, and implicit subsidization of industrial goods purchases.6

The USSR, however, has viewed Eastern Europe not only as a buffer but also as a springboard in its diplomatic, political, and military-related efforts to decouple Western Europe from the United States and to increase Soviet influence. East European diplomatic initiatives, such as the Polish Rapacki and Gomulka Plans of the late 1950s and 1960s for nuclear-free zones in Europe, have served Soviet


purposes in seeking to weaken NATO's defenses without corresponding reductions of Soviet military capabilities. Eastern Europe's promotion of "European détente" with West European states has been encouraged by the USSR to increase West European interest in "peaceful coexistence" with the East that could either pull the United States in the same direction or, alternatively, enhance frictions within the Western alliance. Eastern Europe has served as a military staging ground and as a source of supplementary military capabilities for Soviet efforts to achieve and maintain regional military superiority over NATO, intended, among other purposes, to intimidate West Europeans.

Yet Eastern Europe has a significance for the USSR beyond its roles as buffer and springboard. Eastern Europe also has a crucial political-psychological and ideological importance for Moscow, in that it provides justification for the belief that the USSR is a world power whose system of "real existing socialism" is legitimate and historically ascendant. More is involved than the "natural" desire of a Great Power to control neighboring states. In the 1970s and 1980s, the "international Communist movement" continued to fragment. Moscow took a longer-term view of the "socialist" character of "national liberation movements" in the Third World, and some Soviet advances in the Third World proved uncertain and even reversible. In this situation of reduced historical optimism and concern about the possibly negative development of the "world correlation of forces," Eastern Europe has become increasingly important to the Soviet elite as a region "developing socialism." One indicator is the more defensive tone of "Brezhnev Doctrine"-like statements about Eastern Europe in the 1980s. Another indicator, to be discussed in Section III, is the Soviet debate on "socialist contradictions" sparked by the post-1980 Polish crisis.

EASTERN EUROPE IN SOVIET-WEST EUROPEAN RELATIONS

Imposition of Soviet control over Eastern Europe after 1945, and especially the Stalinization of the region after 1948, was accomplished

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5The USSR's resolve to maintain its hegemony over Eastern Europe was demonstrated by Soviet words and deeds before and after the "Brezhnev Doctrine" became known as such in 1968-1969. But the articulation of the Brezhnev Doctrine in the Soviet bloc today is often in more pessimistic and defensive terms than in the past; e.g., "Not only security is at stake, but ideology as well," said Soviet commentator Aleksander Bovin (regarding party rule in Eastern Europe) to Joseph Kraft (The New Yorker, January 13, 1983). The same lifeline approach is articulated within Eastern Europe as well: "The socialist community is politically interested in maintaining the socialist system in all its members, for otherwise it may face disintegration." (Adam Schaff, in Polityko, January 22, 1983, justifying the imposition of martial law in Poland.)
at the cost of decreased Soviet influence in Western Europe. Stalin created a physical and political Iron Curtain between Eastern and Western Europe that galvanized an anti-Communist Western Europe and led to the creation of NATO. The Stalinization of East Germany, officially established as a separate state in 1949, reinforced the Western and anti-Soviet orientation of West Germany. Stalin's attempt to overthrow Tito through political, economic, and military pressure against Yugoslavia provided Western Europe with another negative example of Soviet policy and hastened the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO.

Stalin's successors attempted to rationalize the system of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe by limiting the use of terror and improving economic conditions. Yet the effort to modify Stalinism led to uprisings in East Germany in 1953 and Hungary in 1956 and to a peaceful revolution in Poland in 1956—developments which served to remind West Europeans of the oppressive nature of Soviet hegemony, of their affinities with Eastern Europe, but also of their helplessness (like that of the United States) to affect developments in the area in the face of Soviet power.

After 1957, Khrushchev succeeded in stabilizing Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe on a less overtly coercive basis than existed in Stalin's day. Eastern Europe entered a decade of quiescence that lasted until 1968. During this period, Moscow was able to develop East European armed forces as an important component of "coalition warfare" capabilities against NATO. East European officials began to appear as actors on the European diplomatic stage, launching such initiatives as the "Rapacki Plan" and the "Gomulka Plan" (Poland) and the "Stoica Plan" (Romania), which reflected particular security concerns of East European Communist leaderships but served to reinforce Soviet "anti-nuclear" campaigns directed against NATO and thus advanced Soviet interests.

Yet it would be an error to view all past East European diplomatic initiatives on the European stage as proxy actions for Moscow. The mid-1960s demonstrated that East European diplomacy could on occasion assume a life of its own, that East European Communist leaders otherwise loyal to Moscow could assess national and Soviet bloc policy priorities differently and, in dealing with Western Europe, could adopt both "softer" and "harder" stances than that of the USSR itself. This was the case in 1966-1967, as the Soviet bloc responded to the "new Eastern policy" of the West German government. Romania, beginning to establish its deviant autonomous position within the Soviet bloc, accepted Bonn's offer to establish diplomatic relations in the absence of a general West German-East German settlement. Hungary and
Bulgaria showed signs of wanting to follow suit, but in early 1967, Moscow made clear that this could not occur. However, this Soviet decision was delayed and was taken following the Romanian *fait accompli* and after the clear urging of Polish party leader Gomulka and East German party head Ulbricht, who both insisted on an all-or-nothing approach in Bonn's relations with East Germany and Eastern Europe generally.  

Moscow itself subsequently resumed talks with Bonn, but these were interrupted by the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968. That crisis nonetheless hastened the subsequent "German settlement" by reemphasizing to Western Europe (and to the United States) the fact of Soviet control over Eastern Europe and Soviet ability and resolve to enforce that control by military means when necessary. Soviet military occupation of Czechoslovakia demonstrated to Bonn in particular that "the road to Eastern Europe leads through Moscow."

Thereafter, complicated sets of inter- and intra-alliance negotiations led to what seems to be the equivalent of a German peace treaty with the East, in the form of treaties or agreements between Bonn and Moscow, Warsaw, Prague, and East Berlin, and the Four-Power Agreement on the status of Berlin. This "policy of treaties" conducted by the Social Democratic party-Free Democratic party (SPD-FDP) coalition government in West Germany was controversial domestically (and was originally challenged by the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU)). It was equally controversial in the Soviet bloc; Gomulka, demonstrating Polish fears of a Soviet-German deal at Poland's territorial expense, sought to safeguard Poland's territorial interests with a preemptive diplomatic initiative (his speech of May 17, 1969), while Ulbricht so persisted with his all-or-nothing attitude toward Bonn that Moscow had to see to his replacement as party leader by Honecker in 1971.  

Soviet suppression of reform communism in Czechoslovakia in 1968 again resulted, as had been the case after 1956, in a temporary stabilization of Eastern Europe. This stabilization contributed to, and was in turn reinforced by, the "German settlement" of 1970-1972, in which Bonn explicitly accepted the existing postwar Eastern borders and in effect more generally recognized the prevailing East European "status

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Moscow, for its part, dampened the stridently anti-American element of its West European policy and placed more emphasis on first stabilizing and then altering relationships between the two existing alliance systems. Moscow stopped calling for the total withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe (although Soviet commentators indicated their view that this should still happen in the long run). Moscow acknowledged the reality of the EC (and occasionally the utility of certain forms of political—but not military—cooperation between France and Germany). Finally, the USSR dropped its long-standing demand to exclude the United States and Canada from a European security conference, thus acknowledging that both countries legitimately figured in European security arrangements.

Under the impact of these developments and in the context of emerging Soviet-American détente, Europe seemed to evolve in the early 1970s in the direction of the “détente, entente, and cooperation” that de Gaulle had prescribed in the mid-1960s. The symbol and high point of this development was the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975 and its unanimously adopted Final Act. Moscow evidently hoped that the further development of intra-European ties fostered by what became known as the “Helsinki process” would help to consolidate Soviet control over Eastern Europe while gradually persuading West Europeans of the merits of the Soviet version of détente. In this Soviet-preferred future, West Berlin would be as separated as possible from West Germany; West Germany would have as special a position as possible within the West and improving ties to the East; and Western Europe would have as autonomous a position as possible vis-à-vis the United States, with growing links to the East. Yet Soviet expectations were limited by the perceived need to work cautiously toward these objectives so as not to provoke counterproductive reactions in either West Germany, Western Europe, or the United States.

The Soviet balance sheet of European détente as it in fact developed in the second half of the 1970s is evidently mixed. If, in the Soviet view, European détente furthered some Soviet aims in Western Europe in the 1970s (although the balance is hardly exclusively positive on this score), it had some negative consequences in Eastern Europe (although, again, the balance is hardly exclusively negative). European détente in the 1970s made the Iron Curtain more porous and increased the exposure of East European elites and societies to Western, and especially West European, influences. This occurred in a variety of ways:

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8 The Impact of Eastern Europe on Soviet Policy

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10 Ibid., p. 303.
through the involvement of East European officials and broader elites in a network of political, economic, and cultural ties with the West, through expanded travel—more to than from Eastern Europe; and through the reduction of radio jamming and the greater penetration of Western media into Eastern Europe.

West Germany's new Ostpolitik contributed significantly to this process. It succeeded in the 1970s in largely defusing the German "revanchist" bogeyman in Eastern Europe. This was most significant in the case of Poland (which had gained territory from Germany at the end of World War II), for it called into question the claim of Poland's Communist leaders that only total loyalty to the USSR could guarantee Poland's borders and national existence.

Economic ties with the West assumed a new importance. The infusion of Western credits contributed to a rise of living standards in the region, while creating a requirement for four of the countries—Poland, Romania, Hungary, and East Germany—to export to the West to service their debts. But more fundamentally, the East European economies became dependent on Western components, semi-manufactures, and raw materials for industrial production, and thus emphasized exports to the West to earn the necessary hard currency for these imports. East European technological elites became convinced that access to Western technology was essential to increased productivity. Hungarian economic elites, especially, concluded that only by being competitive in the West could Eastern Europe improve the efficiency of its domestic industry.

Cultural and societal ties between Western and Eastern Europe developed as well. The Helsinki Final Act's "basket three" provisions encouraged oppositional and dissident forces in Eastern Europe that were calling for systemic reform and helped legitimize Western interest in such East European social groups and in "human rights." Helsinki thus provided the West with a basis for pursuing intra-European ties at the societal level, a counter to the East's pursuit of such ties on a "popular" and "class" basis. Especially in Poland and Hungary, but also marginally in East Germany and Bulgaria, the Leninist Commu-

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12This created what one Polish commentator later called a system of "unofficial bridges" between Eastern and Western Europe. (J. Stefanowicz, in Sprawy Miedzynarodowe, July 1984.)

nilt systems became less repressive. Indirectly but undeniably, "international détente fostered internal détente" in Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{14}

These developments were facilitated by relative Soviet neglect. Having again stabilized Eastern Europe with the invasion of Czechoslovakia, in the second half of the 1970s the Soviet leadership—perhaps because it was preoccupied with its deteriorating relations with the United States and with the Third World—seemed to take Eastern Europe largely for granted.\textsuperscript{15}

Increased Western influence in Eastern Europe in the 1970s was primarily an objective process, yet one that was intensified by Western policies. Helsinki Conference “basket three” issues—human rights and information flows—were pursued vis-à-vis Eastern Europe by West European governments, human rights groups, and then by the Carter and Reagan Administrations with an intensity Moscow surely had not expected when it agreed to the language of the Helsinki Final Act on these issues. Indeed, human rights issues overshadowed Soviet proposals for all-European economic cooperative activities at the Helsinki follow-up conferences in Belgrade and Madrid.

Soviet-American détente came under challenge almost as soon as it came into being and ended completely as a purportive common code of superpower conduct with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Yet initially, European détente seemed to be little affected; Europe remained what some West European commentators called an “island of détente” at the turn of the 1980s. As far as Soviet motives were concerned, if détente involving the United States could not be maintained, then differentiated détente in Europe promised to advance Soviet interests by helping to magnify conflict between Western Europe and the United States.\textsuperscript{16}

This Soviet calculation proved to be premature, not because West European governments failed to show interest in “differentiated détente” (they did, although for reasons not necessarily compatible with Soviet purposes), but because of two developments in the Soviet

\textsuperscript{14} Personal interview with an East European official, 1983. The linkage between European détente and internal relaxation was subsequently acknowledged in Poland, e.g., the contention that Polish leader Gierk could not afford to have political prisoners in Poland while he was attempting to play an active role on the European stage. (Roundtable Discussion, Sprawy Miedzynarodowe, September 1982.) East European sources have granted that the “ideological competition” of Soviet-style “peaceful coexistence” worked against them, in that Western ideas had more impact in the East than vice versa. (Roundtable Discussion, Sprawy Miedzynarodowe, No. 3, July 1984; personal interviews with East European officials and researchers, 1983 and 1984.) See also the collection of articles, “Helsinki: Ten Years After,” International Affairs, Autumn 1985.

\textsuperscript{15} See A. Ross Johnson, Eastern Europe Looks West, The Rand Corporation, P-6032, November 19.

orbit itself: The first development, obviously unintended and perhaps more unexpected in the USSR than in the West, was the Polish crisis that erupted in 1980. The second development, consciously pursued by Moscow as an integral part of its “peace policy” in Europe, was the continued Soviet military buildup through the 1970s in Europe and globally, and above all the constant Soviet deployment (at the rate of one a week after 1978) of SS-20 intermediate-range missiles targeted on Western Europe, in the absence of any increase of relevant NATO Eurostrategic capabilities. The SS-20 deployment became the symbol in Western Europe of Soviet efforts to “decouple” Western Europe from American extended strategic deterrence.

These two developments had important consequences for Soviet foreign policy generally, and for the role of Eastern Europe in Soviet foreign policy toward Western Europe in particular. These consequences will be examined in the following two sections.
III. THE IMPACT OF POLAND

THE POLISH CRISIS

The crisis that engulfed Poland after 1979 posed the sharpest challenge to Soviet interests in Eastern Europe since the unrest and revolution of 1956. Solidarity, the independent trade union, won 10 million members in 12 months and as such mounted the first mass, nonviolent challenge to Soviet domination of Eastern Europe in the postwar period. The Polish workers' strikes of mid-1980 forced the ouster of party leader Gierek, and subsequently Solidarity wrested a series of concessions from the Polish authorities by means of more strikes and threats of strikes and other forms of pressure "from below." The Communist party was demoralized and paralyzed; it failed to initiate a single economic or political reform "from above." Rural Solidarity organized Poland's overwhelmingly private agricultural workers. The Catholic Church expanded its institutional prerogatives while assuming a more political role. The institutional balance between the Polish Communist army and the civilian party apparatus shifted in favor of the former well before the imposition of martial law.

Solidarity's growing role in Poland was abruptly halted in December 1981, through the imposition of martial law by the Polish army, with Soviet support. "Jaruzelski's coup" was a reaction not to Solidarity's radicalism (its lack of preparations to wage active resistance belied regime accusations that it was preparing to seize power by force) but to its existence—specifically, to Solidarity's inherent challenge to the Communist party's monopoly over lower-level political organization, the specialized and mass media, and internal security forces.

The military-dominated Council of National Unity subsequently pacified Poland but has been unable to "normalize" it—to return Poland to a "normally" functioning party dictatorship (accepted as inevitable, if not legitimate, by the population)—as Husak was able to do in Czechoslovakia after 1968.1

SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN REACTIONS

The concern with which Moscow viewed the Polish developments in 1980 and 1981 was evident from the familiar set of interventionist measures it resorted to: top-level multilateral and bilateral meetings, military maneuvers and deployments around Poland, a propaganda campaign about the danger of “counterrevolution” and “a threat to the foundations of the socialist state” in Poland, a CPSU Central Committee letter to the Polish party condemning “the policy of concession and compromise . . . [of] S. Kania, W. Jaruzelski, and other Polish comrades,” a Soviet party-government threatening letter, and support for “healthy forces” in the form of the Council of National Unity that imposed martial law.2

Solidarity caught the imagination of a wide cross-section of people in Western Europe and the United States—far more than had the Czechoslovak Communist reformers of 1968. In responding to the Polish crisis, Moscow thus had to pay greater attention to the effects of its actions on Western publics and governments than had been necessary in 1968 (when both the United States and West European governments adopted a hands-off approach).

But the Soviet reluctance to intervene earlier and more directly in Poland than it in fact did is not attributable primarily to Soviet concern that such an action would scuttle the Soviet promotion of differentiated détente in Europe. Indeed, in weighing the costs and benefits of military intervention in Poland, the Brezhnev leadership might have concluded that a renewed demonstration of its resolve and power in Eastern Europe would again have a healthy intimidating effect on the West. Soviet military intervention could remind Western Europe of the irreversibility of Soviet control in the East, demonstrate that Soviet military power could be utilized to further Soviet political objectives, and encourage Western Europe to reappraise its security relationship with the United States in general and to refuse INF deployment in particular.

The problem with this plausible calculation was that the Soviet leadership could not count on the lack of opposition to military intervention in Poland it had seemed assured of when it planned the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968. On the contrary, Soviet military occupation of Poland, while certainly achievable, promised to be bloody and costly. A “bloodbath” in Poland carried the danger of galvanizing

NATO rather than splitting its European and American components. And, probably most important, the consequences of even limited military conflict in the heart of Europe were incalculable and hence to be avoided except as a very last resort.3

The rise of Solidarity sent shivers around Eastern Europe's Communist establishments. No matter how unlike Poland the situation was in other East European countries, and whatever the popular as well as elite antipathies to “Polish anarchy” in some of them, East European leaders evidently feared that the Polish crisis might dangerously weaken the Soviet bloc and thus their own ultimate basis of power and that the Polish spark might ignite some dry tinder in their own countries. The best case in point is East Germany, which reacted to the Polish crisis (as it had reacted to the Czechoslovak ferment of 1968) quite defensively, by painting the Polish situation in the darkest colors, isolating itself both from Poland and from the West, and calling on Moscow to correct the problem.

Thus Lech Walesa was indirectly compared in East Germany with Hitler.4 The East German-Polish border was practically closed to citizens of the two countries, and 22,000 Polish guest workers were sent home.5 In fall 1980, East Germany sought to limit contacts with West Germany as well, through doubling the minimum currency exchange requirement for West German visitors and escalating its demands on Bonn (in Honecker's speech in Gera on October 13, 1980).6 At the same time, East German spokesmen used domestic and Western media to propagate their view that Moscow should suppress Solidarity.

That developments in Poland led the Honecker leadership to reduce its ties with West Germany—ties which it had cultivated in both Soviet and its own interests after the deterioration of superpower relations—was an indication of how seriously the East German leadership viewed the Polish bacillus and how fragile it judged the domestic consolidation and stability of East Germany to be. Czechoslovakia took an equally hard position on the Polish crisis for similar reasons. Hungary,


5See de Weydenthal et al., The Polish Drama, pp. 156-158.

6Honecker demanded four changes in West Germany’s policies: settlement of the disputed Elbe River border between the two states by demarcation in the middle; closing the West German Salzgitter Registration Center (which recorded shootings of would-be escapees); recognition of East German citizenship; and establishment of full diplomatic relations. (Neues Deutschland, October 14, 1980.) In the late 1970s, as inter-German ties improved, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) had deemphasized these points.
Romania, and Bulgaria were also clearly worried by the events in Poland, but more cautious in reacting to them.\(^7\)

**WHY POLAND? SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN ASSESSMENTS OF "CONTRADICTIONS IN SOCIALISM"**

The seriousness with which the USSR viewed the Polish developments after 1980 was evident not only from Soviet policy but also from ongoing Soviet analyses of the crisis. The peaceful workers’ revolt in Poland raised for Soviet ideologues troublesome issues of the party’s role in representing the “best interests of the working class.” Later, martial law in Poland raised the equally troublesome issue of the relationship between the party and what Trotsky had called its “gun,” the Communist army.

At the 26th CPSU Congress in February 1981, Brezhnev painted a dark picture of the Polish situation: “Opponents of socialism supported by outside forces, by stirring up anarchy, are seeking to channel events in a counterrevolutionary course” and thus “the pillars of the socialist state in Poland are in jeopardy.”\(^8\) Soviet spokesmen attributed this situation to errors of the Gierak leadership, which was guilty of “a certain underestimating of the international experience of world socialism” and of “the violation of the universal laws governing the building of socialism,”\(^9\) and of flagrantly ignoring in Poland “the principles of socialist construction.” Specific Soviet criticisms focused on “risky” economic ties with and “reckless” borrowing from the West; on allowing the Workers’ Defense Committee (KOR), a “counterrevolutionary grouping,” to operate in Poland unchecked; and on permitting “antisocialist” elements to utilize the mass media.\(^10\)

Following the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981, Soviet assessments continued to indicate dissatisfaction with features of the Polish situation tolerated or promoted by the Jaruzelski leadership. The weekly Polityka (closely identified with its long-time chief editor Mieczyslaw Rakowski, deputy prime minister until late

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\(^7\)See de Weydenthal et al., *The Polish Drama.*

\(^8\)Pravda, February 24, 1981.


\(^10\)These criticisms were made by Konstantin Rusakov, CPSU Central Committee Secretary and head of the bloc relations department, in April 1981, “XXVI s”ezd KPSS o razviti mirovoi sotsialisticheskoi sistemy,” in E. M. T'azhel'nikov, *Za vysokoe kachestvo i deitvennost' ideologicheskoi raboty,* Moscow, 1981, p. 238; and by chief editor Kosolapov, in *Kommunist,* No. 5, March 1982.
1985) and military sociologist Jerzy Wiatr (also connected with Jaruzelski and then head of the Institute for Marxism-Leninism) were criticized by Soviet sources for espousing ideas of political pluralism.11

However, these assessments and analyses indicate only part of the Soviet concern about the Polish crisis. Most of the same accusations had been made by Soviet ideologues about the Czechoslovak reform movement in 1968. But the Polish crisis was far more serious. Of the thousands of Soviet words devoted to Poland in 1980-1981, the most important was dovelastie, or “dual power.” In Soviet usage the term signified, ideologically, that “socialism” was being dismantled in Poland; it recalled the period of the Kerenski government in Russia 1917, when Lenin coined the term to indicate a temporary sharing of power.12 Sharing power as a stepping stone to Communist rule was sometimes necessary, but to revert to such a situation thirty-five years after seizure of power by a Communist party was, for a Soviet ideologue, unthinkable historical regression.

It is understandable that Soviet ideologues and theoreticians had difficulty reconciling this regression with standard precepts of “socialism” and that their attempt to do so resulted in the formulation of a number of different views about the “lessons” of Poland.

In the 1970s, Soviet and Polish ideologues had proclaimed that Poland had completed the “transition to socialism” and was developing a socialist society. In 1983, Soviet ideologues revised that view and proclaimed that Poland was still in the pre-socialist phase, that “it is not possible to regard the tasks of the transitional period [from capitalism to socialism] as being completely resolved or Polish society as having coped with the task of building socialism.”13 In such a pre-socialist Poland, Soviet ideologues granted “the existence of objective causes for antagonistic class contradictions” (which Marxist-Leninist theory views as a feature of capitalism but not socialism or communism). This meant that the Bolshevik question kto kogo (Who will win out?) had not yet been settled in Poland after all,14 that “counterrevolution” and “capitalist restoration”—that is, the end of Communist party rule—remained real dangers in Poland.

14Kosolapov, Pravda, March 4, 1983.
15Ibid.
This was an unprecedented acknowledgment of the failure of "socialism" to take root in Poland. It was dictated, as will be shown below, by the need for Soviet ideologues to avoid a much more damaging admission—that the Soviet system itself might be susceptible to Polish-like developments.

A second key point of Soviet (and some Polish) assessments of the Polish crisis was that the incipient reversal of socialism in Poland, while attributable in part to domestic "objective" and "subjective" circumstances, had been worsened by subversive Western influences, which had increased under conditions of European détente. The West was viewed (in the words of one Polish commentator) as promoting "an expanded network of economic, trade, financial, cultural, and political relations" with Poland as part of an effort "to separate the socialist countries from their Soviet ally and link them with the West."

Such analyses of the importance of external factors in the Polish crisis were related to and fueled Soviet (and Polish) analyses that the West had attempted to utilize the Polish crisis to bring about a fundamental reversal of the "forces of socialism" in the world. As John Van Oudenaren concluded from a review of Soviet assessments of Poland, "Far more than was even the case in Czechoslovakia in 1968, Soviet and bloc commentators stressed the broad geopolitical significance of events in Poland, portraying the Polish crisis as a fundamental challenge to the Soviet Union's position in Europe and by extension its global equality with the United States."

Soviet assessments of the Polish crisis were not confined to the Polish situation and Western attempts to influence it, however, but extended to the structure of the Soviet bloc and to the nature of socialism in the USSR itself. This spillover into Soviet debate of the Polish crisis was far greater than the spillover of the 1968 Czechoslovak crisis, which contributed to the dampening of economic reformism in the USSR but did not spark a broader discussion of fundamental political issues. That this occurred after 1980 with regard to the Polish crisis suggested the extent of the impact of the Polish developments on the USSR itself, a consequence of both the nature of the challenge to

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16 E.g., V. Chernyshev, "[Imperialism versus People's Poland]," Partiinaia zhizn', September 1981; Kommunist, No. 7, May 1983, reprinting an article from Nowe Drogi.
17 Z. Lachowski, "[United States Policy Towards Poland in the CSCE Process]," Sprawy Miedzynarodowe, July-August 1984. Such analyses of Western intentions did not appear primarily in media targeted for Western audiences. Thus they evidently did not have a primarily instrumental function vis-à-vis the West but reflected real Soviet perceptions.
18 Van Oudenaren, The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, p. 53.
Communist orthodoxy in Poland and the more evident and acknowledged domestic economic and social problems in the USSR itself. Soviet concern about repercussions of the Polish crisis for the USSR was further heightened by the specific apprehension of Communist leaders in the Baltic Republics that the Polish unrest threatened concretely to promote dissent, opposition, and even social unrest in the Western USSR. The "Eurocommunist" critique probably also had some influence on the wide-ranging nature of the Soviet debate. Following the imposition of martial law in Poland, for example, the Italian Communist party (PCI) stigmatized the Soviet-style monolithic systems in Eastern Europe as a barrier to social development.

The Polish crisis thus led to a debate in the Soviet bloc focused on "contradictions in socialism," and this became the rubric for a blocwide discussion, with sharply opposed views, on how much the "lessons" of Poland applied to other "socialist" countries and to the USSR itself and whether far-reaching reforms were required in the USSR to avert Polish-style developments. The debate is a story unto itself; only relevant highlights will be noted here, as necessary background to understanding the effects of the debate on Eastern Europe and its impact on Soviet policy toward Western Europe in 1983–1984.

The Soviet debate on "contradictions" occurred because, under the pressure of mounting problems in the USSR and what Kommunist's chief editor called the Polish "spark," the Soviet leadership itself granted the barrenness of important ideological tenets and the need for new ideological analyses. Thus before Brezhnev's death, Chernenko called for studies of "the nature and types of contradictions characteristic of the contemporary stage of Soviet society's development."
In the ensuing debate, a group of Soviet academicians, primarily from the Institute of Economy of the World Socialist System headed by Academician O. Bogomolov (formerly deputy head of the Central Committee Secretariat Bloc relations department) and writing primarily in Voprosy filosofii and Voprosy istorii, in effect called for far-reaching economic and social reforms in the USSR, involving elements of economic decentralization, reprivatization, and marketization, to ensure the social and economic development of the USSR and to avoid the danger of any Polish-like crisis in the USSR itself. These Soviet specialists rejected the argument that "vestiges of capitalism" could explain Poland's crisis and warned of the danger of "nonantagonistic" contradictions developing into "antagonistic" contradictions under socialism. In other words, "it could happen here." Several Soviet specialists discussed the period of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in the USSR (initiated by Lenin in 1921 as a concession to prerevolutionary society, especially private economic activity) and suggested that NEP-like measures, especially a greater role for private enterprise, were required in Eastern Europe and the USSR today.

The guardians of ideological orthodoxy, on the other hand, rejected both the premises and the conclusions of the putative reformers. The USSR, having reached the stage of "developed socialism," was a qualitatively different social system from that of Poland and thus—so the argument went—in effect immune from the Polish disease. Under socialist conditions, as Andropov had reiterated in 1982, "antagonistic contradictions" could not arise. Hence, whatever the improvements needed in the Soviet system, there was no cause to question its fundamental principles. The Soviet system, as a socialist system, was

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24 This was evidently a "sanctioned debate," welcomed by the top leadership as a whole in its search for new analyses but guided and in time limited by the appointed watchdogs in the party Secretariat. It was not a "factional debate," in which lower-level authors express the viewpoints of contending top leaders. For discussion of these and other types of media controversies, see Lilita Dzirkals, Thane Gustafson, and A. Ross Johnson, The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in the USSR, The Rand Corporation, R-2869, September 1982.

25 The key articles expressing such viewpoints were written by Voprosy filosofii chief editor V. Semenov; a group of experts from the Institute of Economy of the World Socialist System, especially V. Novopashin, A. Butenko (the most radical, who linked contradictions with different social interests under "socialism"), and E. Ambartsumov (who compared the "sociopolitical crisis" in Eastern Europe with that of the USSR in 1921); and Academician P. Fedoseev, a leading theorist.

26 This was the thrust of Kosolapov's March 3, 1983, Pravda article, cited above, which stressed the importance of "the ability to see the qualitative difference between societies which are still forced to deal with the question kto kogo and societies which no longer experience class struggle."

27 Pravda, April 23, 1982.

28 Kosolapov interview, Literaturnaia gazeta, February 1, 1984.
immune to serious crisis and safe from any danger of revolutionary upheaval. As Kommunist's chief editor said, "We cannot discuss the Soviet Union on the basis of Poland's different reality." After the discussion had run for two years, steps were taken in mid-1984 to limit or end it. This seemed to be part of a general conservative swing in Soviet politics after Andropov's death that brought a dampening of economic reform discussion, more attention to Stalin's "merits," and (as discussed in Section IV) a harder-line foreign policy. In its April 1984 issue (No. 6), Kommunist editorially rejected the view (which Butenko had suggested) that the "working class" could ever lose its "leading role" under socialism. Kommunist's chief editor criticized "certain authors" for "methodologically unsubstantiated" analyses of antagonistic contradictions. Voprosy filosofii was criticized by its "publisher," the Academy of Sciences, and issued a qualified self-criticism in its October 1984 issue. Kommunist deputy chief editor Bugaev rejected (in issue No. 14, September 1984) Ambartsumov's prescription of private economic activity. In a letter from its chief editor to Kommunist (published in issue No. 17, November 1984) and in an article in its December 1984 issue, Voprosy istorii acknowledged the validity of Bugaev's criticism.

The Soviet "contradictions" debate, sparked by the Polish crisis, began as a debate on conflicts within "socialist" countries but broadened into a blocwide discussion, spilled over into relations between Communist states, and—the key issue for this report—affect East European self-perceptions of relations with Western Europe. The Soviet discussion was influenced by the ongoing theoretical discussion of the Polish crisis in Poland itself. Authoritative Polish spokesmen, including Jaruzelski, granted the existence of "antagonistic differences of a political and class nature" in Poland but refrained from granting that Poland was still in a pre-socialist stage; that would have called into question much of the Polish Communist past. Some Polish Marxists’ analyses of the origins of the crisis, such as that of sociologist Jerzy Wiatr (as noted, then head of the Polish Institute of Marxism-Leninism), questioned the validity of the initial post-1948 Stalinist...

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29E.g., "[under socialism], the socialist classes and groups are distinguished by the community of their fundamental interests and social goals... there are nonantagonistic contradictions that are resolved in good time by the Marxist-Leninist parties." (Iu. Filipov, "Ideological Pluralism as Deviation from Marxism-Leninism," Voprosy istorii KPSS, November 1984.)
30Kosolapov interview, Rizospastis.
phase of "socialist construction," called for greater "pluralism" in Poland, and warned against attempts to solve "contradictions" by force.34

Such views may have influenced the more radical Soviet participants in the "contradictions" debate; they were anathema to the orthodox ideologues, as their criticisms of Wiatr and other Polish theorists demonstrated. Such heretical views encouraged the Soviet ideologues to periodically restate that "the general laws according to which socialism develops, and also its general features, were, and are, inviolable."35 Such views were seconded by Czechoslovak ideologues.36

Other East European theoreticians took the Soviet debate on "contradictions" as a point of departure (or an excuse) for analyses of differences between Communist states. The ideological bridge was the issue of "national" versus "international" interests in Communist countries, first of all in terms of divergent domestic policies but then extended to foreign policy matters as well.

In East Germany, the "contradictions" debate was taken seriously enough that an ideological conference was devoted to the subject in December 1983. East German ideologues generally supported the line of the more orthodox Soviet participants in the discussion, arguing against the possibility of antagonistic contradictions in socialism. In the process, however, East German ideologues praised the East German system as being far more "socialist" than that of Poland37 and affirmed specific GDR state interests.

Hungarian analysts took a different approach. In the late Brezhnev period, as part of the acknowledged need to search for new approaches to economic and other domestic issues, Soviet ideological pronouncements about the Soviet bloc stressed the continuing overriding importance of the Soviet model but granted some scope for innovation, primarily in the economic system, in Eastern Europe. At the 26th CPSU Congress in 1981, Brezhnev acknowledged that "during the years of socialist construction, the fraternal countries have accumulated diverse, 

34See Wiatr's article in Kultura, Warsaw, June 21, 1981.
35V. Zagladin, "[The Historic Experience of Real Socialism]," Pravda (Bratislava), November 23, 1984. Zagladin was first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department.
36E.g., M. Pecho, head of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, in Pravda (Bratislava), February 11, 1985. Still struggling to rationalize the late 1960s in Czechoslovakia, Pecho granted that "it would be incorrect to believe that the antagonistic contradictions that have already been overcome cannot reappear in a new form as we build the foundations of socialism," yet he argued that "there are no conditions in socialist society for antagonistic socioclass conflict."
positive experiences in the organization of production, management, and the resolution of national economic problems. Andropov extended this acknowledgment slightly (albeit with seemingly more regret than praise), noting "how diverse and complex" the "world of socialism" had proved to be.

Such acknowledgments relativized the continuing Soviet assertions about the overriding importance of the "general laws" of socialism and their embodiment in the Soviet model. This made it easier for East Europeans to emphasize national departures from that model. Thus a Hungarian researcher sided with Butenko in the Soviet debate on "contradictions" but extended the analysis to inter-state relations as well:

"[I]f a theory is not willing to recognize as antagonisms the division in the world socialist system or the social crises that developed in certain socialist countries, it will deprive itself of the possibility of the recognition and timely prevention of such dangerous situations... the reflex of striving for unity in all matters of detail [in relations among socialist countries] has considerably lessened already, and will in all probability continue to lessen, since the capacities of the member countries differ in many aspects, and this fact is inevitably reflected in the stands they are taking."

Such views approached long-standing Romanian theses on the primacy of national interests in socialism. Like the Romanian theses, and like the GDR touting of GDR socialism, they provided the ideological underpinning for nationally specific foreign policies toward the West.

Soviet analysts who addressed relations among socialist states, on the other hand, generally restated standard ideological formulations that implied Soviet hegemony. Thus, V. Kulish granted that "non-antagonistic contradictions" could arise between "international requirements and national interests" of various socialist countries but argued that such contradictions were resolved through decisions based on "socialist internationalism" (meaning subordination to Soviet interests).

This divergence between Soviet and some East European views over the legitimacy of national interests in socialism was reinforced in the...
course of the "contradictions" debate and then (as will be discussed in Section IV) further elaborated in the Soviet bloc's effort to adjust its policies toward Western Europe in the wake of its failure to block NATO's INF deployment.

IMPLICATIONS FOR WESTPOLITIK

Soviet military intervention in Poland in 1980 was forestalled, not because of Soviet concern about negative repercussions in Western Europe, but rather because of Soviet concern about the prospect of resistance in Poland (linked with a hope—which was fulfilled—that "healthy forces" inside Poland could crush Solidarity). Before and after the imposition of martial law in Poland, Moscow pointed to Poland's ties with the West in the 1970s as one cause of the Polish crisis. There was some agreement with this analysis in Eastern Europe. Fearing a spread of the Polish disease, East Germany partly isolated itself from the West (especially West Germany) prior to the imposition of martial law in Poland. But Moscow did not draw a clear conclusion that the way to avoid "Polands" was to isolate Eastern Europe. Since Western Europe (like the United States) remained interested in expanding ties with Eastern Europe (Poland temporarily excepted), Moscow could pursue a policy of slightly more differentiated European détente, involving toleration of the Western isolation of Poland (which was viewed as having both positive and negative aspects) and more discrimination in East-West economic ties. Moscow evidently concluded that such a détente policy could serve Soviet longer-term interests by maintaining channels for expanding Soviet influence in Western Europe and by promoting American-West European differences (a prospect reinforced by NATO's self-imposed disarray over the "pipeline deal"). While some developments in Western Europe at the time seemed to be moving against Soviet interests—specifically, the policies of the Thatcher government in Great Britain and the Mitterrand government in France—other trends appeared more favorable. The most important of these was the situation in West Germany. There, the Soviet leadership could hope that altered security thinking in the SPD and the growing "peace movement" could prevent NATO's INF deployment, thus increasing the decoupling of European defense from that of the United States while widening intra-Western divisions.42

The issue of NATO's INF deployment became what one Hungarian ideologue termed a major "test of strength between the alliances" to which Soviet policy toward Western Europe "after Poland" was harnessed, as was the Soviet notion of proper East-West European relations. This objective specifically precluded a policy of attempting to isolate Eastern from Western Europe in order to avoid new "Polands"; Moscow needed the interchange between Eastern and Western Europe.

A continued Soviet interest, however qualified, in utilizing the Western economic connection to help stabilize Eastern Europe "after Poland" also precluded such isolation. It may be assumed that the Soviet leadership took a more reserved view of East-West European economic relations in the wake of the Polish crisis. But there was no uniform authoritative Soviet position or assessment fundamentally opposing such ties. Some Soviet economic specialists interpreted the lessons of the 1970s as indicating that "the possibilities of economic ties with the developed capitalist states for boosting the socialist economies should not be overestimated." But other influential specialists warned that "the trend toward weakening East-West economic collaboration does not accord with the requirements of the future. The CMEA countries are seeking to oppose it." The Polish crisis emphasized—more to East European leaderships than to Moscow—the importance of avoiding the kinds of socioeconomic tensions that could lead to another "Poland," which mandated that Eastern Europe continue to develop ties with Western Europe.

The ideological debate about the "lessons" of Poland and "contradictions in socialism" reinforced this process. In the course of the ideological debate, some East European establishments—especially the Hungarian, but also the East German and Bulgarian—began to define their own "national" interests more distinctly than had heretofore been the case. This was the background of the disarray that emerged within the Soviet bloc when Moscow failed to forestall NATO's INF deployment.

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45 O. Bogomolov, in Kommunist, No. 7, May 1983.
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF INF

THE FAILURE OF MOSCOW'S ANTI-INF CAMPAIGN

In the late 1970s, as “all-European” cooperation failed, in the Soviet perspective, to develop the momentum that had been expected to follow the Helsinki Conference, the military component of Soviet policy toward Western Europe assumed greater importance. The Soviets continued to improve their conventional military capabilities in a manner viewed by NATO as intended to insure Soviet superiority and to reinforce an offensively oriented operational military doctrine in Europe. The USSR also continued to improve its regional nuclear or “Eurostrategic” capabilities, seemingly to intimidate West Europeans, to block the implementation of agreed defense programs within NATO, and to force a “second-class security system” on Western Europe.1

Moscow employed three primary instruments to this end. It encouraged and supported the “peace movement” in Western Europe, especially in West Germany, in an effort to bring popular pressure to bear on the West German and other West European governments.2 Moscow also continued to promote détente with West European governments, periodically publicly threatening Western Europe with unpleasant consequences if NATO’s INF deployment took place. And Moscow also continued to welcome the development of relations between Eastern and Western Europe. East Germany and Hungary, each with its own interest in promoting European détente (discussed below), were the best candidates for this role. Both Honecker and Kadar visited Moscow in 1983 and seemed to have Moscow’s endorsement to continue their respective policies toward the West.3

But with the approach of the November 1983 deadline for NATO’s initial deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in the absence of an INF arms control agreement in Geneva, Soviet and East European spokesmen alike threatened that European détente could not survive this deployment. Zagladin labeled the notion that East-West ties could

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3For coverage of Kadar’s July 1983 visit to Moscow, see Alfred Reich, “Kadar Policies Get Seal of Approval from New Soviet Leadership?” Radio Free Europe Research, August 11, 1983.
continue in a post-INF environment a “dangerous illusion.”\(^4\) Soviet Deputy Defense Minister Mikhailov warned West Germans that “the Soviet Union will reply . . . both militarily and politically, and the consequences will be very grave indeed.”\(^5\) Honecker specifically extended this principle to inter-German relations, warning of a new “ice age” in those relations if the INF deployment occurred.\(^6\) This language was echoed in the Soviet-East German communiqué issued after a visit by Gromyko to East Berlin, which warned that INF deployment would “severely damage the FRG’s relations with the Soviet Union and the GDR.”\(^7\)

In the absence of an INF agreement in Geneva, the West German parliament reaffirmed NATO’s deployment decision, and the first Pershing IIs arrived in West Germany in late November 1983. Moscow then walked out of the Geneva talks and Soviet spokesmen threatened worldwide political and military countermeasures. Yet there was little sign of the “ice age” the Soviet bloc had forecast. Soviet military “countermeasures” were limited in scope and consisted of (1) accelerated modernization of shorter-range ground-to-ground nuclear-capable missiles in Soviet units stationed in East Germany and Czechoslovakia through deployment of SS-23s and additional SS-21s and (2) deployment for the first time in Eastern Europe of intermediate-range nuclear missiles, SS-22s.\(^8\)

The SS-22 deployment, in particular, reemphasized Soviet interest in using nuclear weapons as instruments of political pressure against Western Europe. The more NATO responded to the SS-20 deployment by “recoupling” nuclear deterrence for Western Europe with nuclear deterrence for the United States through deployment of modern Eurostrategic weapons, the more the USSR sought additional levels and kinds of threats that could have a renewed decoupling effect. “Eurostrategic” systems such as the SS-22 based outside the USSR

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\(^4\) Moscow television, July 30, 1983, in FBIS-USSR, August 1, 1983.


\(^6\) Der Tagesspiegel (West Berlin), October 16, 1983.

\(^7\) Izvestiia, October 19, 1983.

\(^8\) The SS-21 (mobile, dual-capable, with a 125-km range) replaces the FROG and was reportedly introduced in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) before 1983. The SS-23 (mobile, dual-capable, with a 500-km range) replaces the SCUD. The SS-22 replaces the Scaleboard, or SS-12; it is usually considered only nuclear-capable, has a 1000-km range, and was not previously stationed outside the USSR. See “The Counter-deployments in Eastern Europe: Military and Political Implications,” Radio Liberty Research, January 18, 1984.
promised to have that effect. Nonetheless, none of the Soviet "counterdeployment" measures seemed to have much specific impact on West European thinking, at least initially, although they did induce concern in Eastern Europe.

Nor did Moscow accompany these limited military "countermeasures" with the serious political countermeasures it had threatened. It initially sought instead to reverse or limit NATO's INF deployment by utilizing rather than abrogating the structure of European détente. The same approach was taken, even more forcefully, by several East European states.

DAMAGE LIMITATION IN EASTERN EUROPE

Following NATO's initial INF deployment, several East European states continued or increased their efforts to expand their ties with Western Europe. Most striking was the activization of East German foreign policy. The East German line was spelled out by Honecker in November 1983, when he contradicted his earlier warnings of a new "ice age" and declared that East Germany would attempt to "limit the damage" resulting from NATO's actions by a more activist policy toward the West in general and by a continuing policy of dialogue and negotiations with West Germany in particular. Words were matched with deeds. In the following months East Germany continued negotiations with Bonn on issues ranging from postal services to environmental protection. Kohl and Honecker met at Andropov's funeral in February 1984, and Honecker's twice-postponed visit to West Germany was subsequently rescheduled. Nearly 40,000 East German citizens were allowed to emigrate to West Germany in the course of 1984 (more than a threefold increase in the usual rate), including several groups who had sought refuge in West German embassies in Eastern Europe. East Germany welcomed an unprece-

9If Western opinion viewed Pershing II and Cruise missiles as a counter to the SS-20, there was nothing to counter SS-22k, distinct both as a type of weapon and geographically.

dent high-ranking West German visitors to East Berlin and to the spring 1984 Leipzig Trade Fair. East Germany negotiated a 600 million DM joint production arrangement with Volkswagen in February and negotiated a second billion-DM government-guaranteed unrestricted credit from Bonn (following the credit that was arranged on similar terms in mid-1983). East Germany also agreed on small changes in its travel restrictions that made it slightly easier for West Germans to visit East Germany.\(^\text{11}\)

At the same time, East Berlin promoted relations with a variety of other Western states; high-level visitors included Canadian Premier Trudeau, Italian Prime Minister Craxi, Swedish Premier Palme, and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Burt.


Bulgaria also improved its ties with West European countries in late 1983 and 1984, albeit more cautiously. Romania (in a different position, given its semi-autonomous position within the bloc) also continued to promote relations with Western Europe; this effort was hampered not by Romanian or Soviet reservations, but by foreign policy consequences of Romania's repressive domestic system.\(^\text{12}\)

Only Czechoslovakia and Poland failed to pursue active foreign policies vis-à-vis Western Europe after NATO's INF deployment. The constraints on the former were self-imposed, a manifestation of the continuing post-1968 immobilism of Czechoslovak politics, while Polish foreign policy continued to suffer from the domestic Polish crisis and the related sanctions and isolationist policies of Western countries.

The (tentative) policies pursued by the four East European countries were in line with the approach taken by the USSR toward Western Europe through the spring of 1984. Soviet policy subsequently hardened, particularly vis-à-vis Bonn, and some Western observers concluded that East European Westpolitik had Moscow's total support until that date and was only playing a role allocated by Moscow. It will be argued below that such an interpretation overstates the case and neglects important origins of the foreign policy differences within

\(^{11}\)Data from West German media reports. See also F. Stephen Larrabee, The Challenge to Soviet Interests in Eastern Europe: Romania, Hungary, East Germany, The Rand Corporation, R-3190-AF, December 1984.

\(^{12}\)Specifically, West German dissatisfaction with the increasing restrictions on and limited emigration opportunities for Romania's German minority and France's objections to Romania's high-handed actions against Romanian émigrés in France.
the Soviet bloc that emerged later in 1984. These differences were exacerbated by, but are not fundamentally traceable to, diverging calculations about optimal responses to the NATO INF deployment.

**EAST EUROPEAN MOTIVATIONS**

At the time of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, there was evidently a near identity of views between the USSR and most East European leaderships concerning the objectives of East European involvement in European détente. That involvement could promote Soviet notions of “pan-European security” in the West while utilizing Western recognition and Western trade and credits to help stabilize the East. But by the turn of the 1980s, as a result of changing domestic and international circumstances, Soviet and East European perspectives began to diverge. Domestic economic, social, cultural, and national factors operating differently in individual East European countries motivated several East European leaderships to acquire a greater stake in the stabilization aspects of the détente process than Moscow itself. This was especially true of Hungary and East Germany.\(^\text{13}\)

**Hungary**

Since the late 1960s, when it introduced the New Economic Mechanism, Hungary has gradually pursued market-oriented economic reforms and measures of political decompression that have evoked widespread Western interest in the “Hungarian model” as an example of how a Communist regime might evolve in a more liberal direction. Part of the price that Hungarian leader Kadar seemed to pay for Soviet acceptance or toleration of Hungarian domestic reform was foreign policy orthodoxy. It was difficult to discern any Hungarian strivings toward foreign policy autonomy in the early and mid-1970s. Indeed, Moscow at times seemed to utilize Hungary as an international mouthpiece (e.g., regarding China), while Hungarian spokesmen were publicly silent on and privately disparaging of former Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter’s ideas, expounded in the late 1960s, of East-West Danubian

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regional cooperation, which implied an element of Hungarian foreign policy autonomy.\(^{14}\)

The Hungarian leadership's view of its foreign policy interests began to change in the late 1970s, primarily in response to economic factors. In 1978, reacting to negative economic trends and an increase in popular dissatisfaction, the Kadar leadership revived the economic reform process that had been allowed to lapse under domestic and Soviet pressure in the early 1970s. A major thrust of the renewed reform was an effort to improve Hungary's economic competitiveness over the long run by expanding its ties with Western economies. By 1984, foreign trade turnover provided half of the domestic net material product, with Hungary exporting 25 percent of its industrial output and 20 percent of its foodstuffs. Hungary conducted 35 percent of its foreign trade with Western countries, joining the IMF and the World Bank in 1982. It managed its external debt of $9.5 billion, assumed in the 1970s, without formal debt renegotiations, and it sought a general agreement with the EC (such as Yugoslavia and Romania have).\(^{15}\) Hungary remained dependent on energy imports from the USSR and on the Soviet market, but it looked increasingly to the West for technology imports and industrial goods markets.

Given this situation, much of Hungarian foreign policy was influenced by foreign trade policy. Economic factors gave the Hungarian leadership a stronger stake in European détente, and in good East-West relations generally, than Moscow had. Domestic social and political consequences of economic reform reinforced that stake. As the domestic situation relaxed somewhat, Hungarians came to enjoy and to expect more contact with the West. The jamming of foreign radio broadcasts was ended; Hungarians could travel more easily in the West; some were allowed to work temporarily in the West; the Hungarian "freedom fighters" of 1956 who had left the country were permitted to revisit. These small freedoms, albeit not as large or as irreversible as Yugoslavia's policy of open borders, came to be considered by both rulers and ruled as a part of the "social contract" and therefore a factor in foreign policy formulation.

These factors led the Kadar leadership in the early 1980s to begin to develop a theoretical justification for the "Hungarian model." This involved two principal themes: in ideological terms, more stress on the "national" as opposed to the "international" (i.e., Soviet) element of

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socialism; in foreign policy terms, more stress on the importance of “small and medium-sized powers” (i.e., in the Soviet bloc, all states except the USSR). Both themes were treated in several speeches and articles in 1982–1983, some directly contributing to the “contradictions” debate traced in Section III, and were then elaborated in a major treatise by the Hungarian party’s new Secretary for International Affairs, Matyas Szuros.17

Szuros’ brief had four points: First, national interests cannot be subordinated to international interests under socialism. Second, there is no arbiter of what and who is correct in the socialist community; practice and history will determine what is correct under socialism. (Szuros’s words recall Togliatti’s “Yalta Memorandum” on this score; moreover, he does not once mention the Soviet model.) Third, there is a special role for small states in the present international situation. Fourth, socialist states should exploit “special possibilities” in developing relations with capitalist countries, since “historic traditions of relations and certain contemporary situational factors” allow relations between specific East and West European states to develop when East-West relations generally display “deterioration and a narrowing of the range of contacts.”

This bold ideological manifesto was reinforced in statements by Szuros, Kadar, and other Hungarian leaders and ideologues in 1984. Such forward behavior raises the question of why the Kadar leadership, which had made a virtue of maintaining a low profile in international and ideological matters and which had explicitly criticized the notion of a special role for small states in European diplomacy, adopted this more activist ideological position.

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16E.g., interview with Matyas Szuros (then head of the Party Foreign Affairs Department), Budapest television, January 13, 1983, translated in FBIS-EEU, January 17, 1983; Szuros, in Nepszabadsag, February 26, 1983.
17Szuros, “[The Reciprocal Effect of National and International Interests in the Development of Socialism in Hungary],” Tarsadatme Szemle, January 1984, an article based on an October 1983 speech. (Translation in Asmus, “East Berlin and Moscow.”)
18“We are firm and consistent supporters of the unity of our movement and of the international workers’ movement, but it’s unity has to be realized within the diversity of each country. . . . In the Socialist camp too, it is perhaps necessary . . . to be on one’s guard against enforced external uniformity and to reflect that unity must be established and maintained in the diversity and full autonomy of each individual country.” (“The Yalta Memorandum,” in Palmiro Togliatti, On Gramsci and Other Writings, Donald Sasson (ed.), London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1979, pp. 284, 297.)
Several factors motivated the Kadar leadership to undertake a theoretical justification of its position. First, the ongoing domestic reform process eventually required more theoretical underpinnings, particularly since the renewal of economic reform in the late 1970s had caused the Hungarian party to cautiously broach the matter of structural political reform. Second, as discussed in Section III, the Polish crisis sparked a wide-ranging debate in the USSR about “contradictions in socialism,” which both permitted and challenged East European ideologues to take a stand; a Hungarian analysis, cited above, stressed the need for domestic reforms and foreign policy autonomy. Third, the greater activity of Hungarian foreign policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s itself fostered a greater sense of “national interest” among the Hungarian Communist establishment and impelled Hungarian ideologues to explain and justify the phenomenon. Fourth, the blocwide debate that began with “contradictions in socialism” and was extended to “national and international interests in socialism” took on a life of its own. Hungarian ideologues were criticized in both Prague and Moscow. This challenged them to either expand on or retract their views, and they chose the former course. That this Hungarian affirmation of national interests was purposefully promoted by Kadar is suggested by the revamping of the Hungarian foreign policy establishment that preceded it; Szuros was appointed Central Committee Secretary in July 1983, while Peter Varkonyi (who had held the post for a year) became foreign minister, replacing Frigyes Puja, who had been associated with Hungary's low-profile foreign policy of the previous decade.

East Germany

East Germany, too, came to acquire a special stake in East-West European cooperation in the early 1980s, involving a complicated set of domestic as well as foreign policy considerations, all centrally related to East Germany’s ties with West Germany.

Long known as the “Soviet Occupation Zone” and almost totally isolated from the West, East Germany first achieved formal international recognition as a state as a result of the European détente process of the early 1970s. Although it then established diplomatic relations with Western states and entered the United Nations, East Germany’s relations with Western countries remained minimal—a situation the

\[20\]In discussions with the author in 1983, Hungarian interlocutors spoke of Hungarian “security interests” and the “blocks,” unusual terms in the Hungarian context. See also Rudolf L. Tokes, “Hungarian Reform Imperatives,” Problems of Communism, September-October 1984, pp. 18-23.
Honecker leadership endeavored to change. The trappings of international recognition and respectability were relatively more important for East Germany—a new state trying to consolidate itself internationally and domestically—than for, say, Poland or Czechoslovakia.

The Western economic connection was also important to East Germany. Although East Germany retained a rigid centrally planned economic system, its economy depended importantly on a Western, mainly West German, economic connection. About 30 percent of East German foreign trade is with Western countries, over half of it with West Germany. The West German trade provides East Germany with hard-currency resources estimated to amount to over $1 billion yearly, not including the unrestricted credits of the past few years.21

In the 1970s, like most other East European countries, East Germany borrowed heavily in the West, incurring a hard-currency debt of about $10 billion by 1982, most of it from West Germany. Western credits became especially important at the turn of the 1980s, as East Germany suffered the same economic ills as Hungary—a declining growth rate, declining productivity, shortages of consumption goods, and a growing debt service ratio to the West. Hence for East Germany, just as for Hungary (according to an East German journalist), "Economic relations with the West have quite another meaning for us as for our Soviet comrades."22 But whereas Hungary’s Western economic connections were diversified, East Germany’s economic ties with the West were more narrowly focused on West Germany, giving the Honecker leadership a special economic stake in relations with Bonn. This stake motivates East Germany to continue to conduct economic relations with West Germany on the basis of the Berlin Agreement of 1951, providing for “inter-zonal trade,” which is hardly in line with current East German self-perceptions of national sovereignty.

Yet East Germany’s special interest in relations with West Germany cannot be reduced entirely to economics. East Germany is the only European state facing another, much larger state whose population

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21 Including an interest-free trade credit (“swing”), payments for the use of highways and other services by West Germans, payments for release of political prisoners, minimum currency exchange surpluses from visitors, gifts to relatives, and preferential “back door” access to the EC market. (See Handelsblatt, July 26, 1983; Die Zeit, July 13, 1984.) Estimates of the yearly West German subsidy range from $1.5 billion (Paul Marer) to $0.5 billion (Rudolf Herlt). See John P. Hardt, “The German Question Revisited, The Future of Inter-German Economic and Political Relations,” in Angela Stent (ed.), Economic Relations with the Soviet Union; American and West German Perspectives, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1985.

22 Quoted by Theo Sommer in Die Zeit, August 2, 1984. The same point is made in the official history of East German foreign policy, which speaks of the “increasing importance in [East German] foreign policy of furthering foreign economic requirements.” (Aussenpolitik der DDR, East Berlin, 1982, p. 19.)
shares the same traditions and language. (The only other Communist state in such a position is North Korea, which has never abandoned its professed goal of Korean reunification.) East Germany's leadership, ruling part of what most Germans in both East and West still consider a divided nation, has in recent years been impelled by a complicated set of domestic social and political factors, as well as economic interests, to pursue ties with West Germany.

In the early 1970s, East Germany sought to combine official recognition by Bonn (albeit at less than the full diplomatic relations Ulbricht had long demanded) with a continuation of domestic “demarcation” (Abgrenzung) of East German society from West Germany (which had existed since the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961) and an attempt to shape a distinct “German Democratic Republic” nation as well as state. Yet in fact, ties between the two societies increased in the 1970s, through visits of West Germans to East Germany, through visits of East German retirees to West Germany, and through the impact of West German mass media, especially television—the importance of which cannot be overrated—in East Germany.

Increased inter-German contacts in the 1970s created expectations on the part of elements of East German society which became political factors for the East German leadership and complicated the conduct of relations with West Germany. On the one hand, too much exposure of East Germans to West Germany, especially if it involved the possibility of large-scale emigration, could prove disruptive. On the other hand, too little contact could also prove disruptive domestically, while burdening the official-level contacts that East Berlin sought to promote. The Honecker leadership has attempted to calibrate the proper mix of

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23 In the 1960s, East Germany still hindered reception of West German television, even monitoring the direction in which antennas were pointed. Ulbricht declared in 1961: “The class enemy is sitting on the roof.” (Quoted by David Marks, “Broadcasting Across the Wall: The Free Flow of Information Between East and West Germany,” Journal of Communication, Vol. 33, No. 1, 1983, p. 50.) This was abandoned in the early 1970s. Today the regime facilitates reception of West German television, e.g., by providing suitable central antenna systems in new apartment buildings and, evidently, by extending suitable antenna/cable facilities to the Dresden region (too distant from West German transmitters for regular reception). See “Nur Schnee,” Der Spiegel, November 4, 1985. One East German, asked by the author how many television channels his country had, replied, “Officially two, but really five,” the other three being West German channels. See also George H. Quester, “Transboundary Television,” Problems of Communism, September-October 1984.

24 West German sources estimate that half a million East Germans (of a total population of 16.7 million) have made official application to emigrate, the obvious penalties notwithstanding. The East German Lutheran Church has publicly expressed its concern about the “emigration mentality” of East Germans. See Matthew Boyse, “East German Lutheran Synod Calls for Human Rights Improvements,” Radio Free Europe Research, October 4, 1985.
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these elements in changing circumstances. The Polish crisis, as noted earlier, led Honecker to emphasize temporarily the isolation of East Germany. After the imposition of martial law in Poland, some of the restrictions were relaxed and inter-German contacts resumed.

This process was reinforced by the "rediscovery" of the German national past in East Germany. In the early postwar years, East German Communists had claimed to speak for the entire German people. But in the late 1960s under Ulbricht and in the early 1970s under Honecker, as part of the policy of "demarcation," the East German Communist leadership attempted to ignore the German past (going so far as to "de-Germanize" titles and names, substituting "GDR" for "German"). Since the late 1970s, however, East Germany has turned from dismissal to cultivation of German history, reflecting the outlook of a regime that has in some respects become more self-confident and because of that (or in spite of it—both interpretations are possible) has turned to the national past in search of a broader base of domestic legitimacy. Thus East Germany has "rehabilitated" Frederick the Great, a host of Prussian generals, Luther, Bismarck, von Stauffenberg and other anti-Hitler conspirators of July 20, 1944, and many other historical figures earlier condemned in East Germany. It has also begun to rehabilitate the utopian socialist philosopher Ernst Bloch, earlier condemned as a "revisionist."

It is doubtful that this return to German national traditions in East Germany would have occurred so rapidly had it not been for the impact of West German mass media, which has destroyed the East German party's monopoly over information and led it to proclaim the ideological precept that it must "build socialism" under "conditions of opening towards the outside world (weltoffene Bedingungen)." East Germany rejects open borders, but it has had to accept "open airwaves." This involves, nolens volens, a competition for German national consciousness, demonstrated in East Germany's public celebration of the "Luther Year" in 1983 (which brought increased ties between the Protestant churches in East and West Germany). The "Bach Year" in

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25See Larrabee, The Challenge to Soviet Interests in Eastern Europe, pp 86ff; Ronald Asmus, "The GDR and the German Nation: Sole Heir of Socialist Sibling," International Affairs, Summer 1984. For example, an account in the East German military history journal described the anti-Hitler conspirators as "patriots" whose "intentions and actions belong to the good traditions of the German people" (Militargeschichte, June 1984, p. 553.) Some sources have continued to condemn the anti-Hitler conspirators as "imperialists." See also C. Schmidt-Heuer, in Die Zeit, August 9, 1984.

26Hungarian officials use (in East German media) the same vocabulary, "small countries developing under conditions of opening towards the outside world" (eg. 1 Series, in Einheit, March 1985, p. 264).

1985, and preparations for the 750th anniversary of Berlin. If Ulbricht and Honecker ever looked to an “Austrian solution” for East Germany (i.e., claiming for its own a regional slice of what had once been a common German culture), that option would seem to have disappeared by the early 1980s.

New security concerns following the first NATO INF deployments also motivated the East German leadership to attempt to pursue European détente and develop rather than restrict ties with West Germany. Whatever the Soviet and East European calculations and expectations, the anti-Pershing campaign had the effect of frightening East European populations and perhaps even leaderships (certainly in the GDR, and also in Czechoslovakia, although apparently less so in Hungary). Although Soviet forces have long had battlefield and tactical nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe, deployment of the SS-systems in Eastern Europe after November 1983 forced East European populations and many elites to grapple for the first time with issues connected with specific Soviet nuclear-capable weapons and with the Soviet version of nuclear deterrence. The “independent peace movement,” closely connected with the Lutheran Church, was strengthened in the GDR. In October 1984, the Saxony Church Synod issued a strong statement...
criticizing the Soviet "counterdeployment" (as well as NATO's INF deployment) and calling for "alternative security concepts." At the same time, the Church has come more outspoken on human rights issues; Church figures have supported conscientious objectors and urged relaxation of travel restrictions.32

All these factors have influenced the behavior of the Honecker leadership. Its foreign policy was also affected by the increasing importance of the East German state to Moscow and its potentially stronger position to exert (within clear limits) particular interests vis-à-vis Moscow, as Hungary had done in terms of domestic economic policy since the late 1960s. East Germany's original importance for Moscow had been negative and "historic," preventing the reemergence of a unified Germany while advancing "socialism" into Central Europe. As important as these roles remained for Moscow, East Germany subsequently acquired more positive value in Soviet eyes, becoming the tenth-ranking industrialized state and assuming the largest defense burden in Eastern Europe. It also became an important source and conduit of technology for the USSR. East Germany's relative weight in the Soviet bloc further increased as a consequence of Poland's declining position. The term "room for maneuver" (Spielraum) became a part of the official vocabulary in 1982.33 East Germany has begun to compare its weight in the Soviet bloc with that of West Germany in NATO.34 In short, by 1983, East Germany was a quite different actor within the Soviet bloc and internationally than it had been in the 1960s and early 1970s, one impelled by domestic and international factors to pursue a more active Westpolitik.

Other East European States

Romania continued to strive for a high profile in intra-European affairs, in line with and as part of its effort to maintain its long-standing autonomous position within the Soviet bloc. Its domestic difficulties impelled it to cultivate certain economic ties with the West (even while economic difficulties led it to expand economic ties with Moscow, and domestic repression detracted from its image as a national Communist state and complicated its relations with Western governments). The Ceausescu leadership continued to propound the

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32 E.g., Bishop Hempel stated in his sermon on the 40th anniversary of the destruction of Dresden, "We are burdened and suffer that two German states have arisen with their difficult border." (Excerpts in Die Zeit, February 22, 1985.)

33 Neues Deutschland, May 3, 1982. See Asmus, "The Dialectics of Detente."

34 E.g., Politburo report to the 11th Plenum, Neues Deutschland, November 23-24, 1985.
long-standing ideological justification of Romanian autonomy: nationalism. It continued to stress, as it had since the 1960s, the important role of small, especially socialist, European states in East-West relations.

Bulgaria has more cautiously attempted to expand its ties with Western Europe in the cultural and diplomatic realms, as part of Bulgarian leader Zhivkov's effort to increase Bulgaria's access to Western technology and reassert its cultural orientation as a European state.

Czechoslovakia and Poland are in a different position. The Husak leadership in Czechoslovakia, as noted earlier, has feared political movement of any kind (whether domestic or international), refrained from any hint that Czechoslovak interests might somehow diverge from Soviet interests, and militantly promoted Soviet bloc unity.

After 1981, the foreign policy elite in Poland wanted their country to resume its former place on the European scene. The Jaruzelski leadership itself seemed to share some of this sentiment. But Poland's domestic problems and Western policy toward martial-law and post-martial-law-Poland have prevented this. There has apparently been some sentiment in the Polish leadership—whether that sentiment is shared by Jaruzelski is unclear—in favor of a partial longer-term realignment of Poland's political and economic relations toward the USSR and the East. But the active role Poland played in the Soviet-promoted anti-German campaign in 1984 is not part of a move toward Eastern realignment. The Polish anti-German campaign preceded the Soviet campaign, and conceivably helped catalyze it. It stemmed from the age-old Polish fear of any movement on the German question, and

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37As asked by the author why Czechoslovakia was not more active internationally, one Czechoslovak interlocutor replied, "We don't think we should put on a cloak that is too big for us," and went on to outline Czechoslovakia's role as that of making its voice heard in intrabloc councils in the working out of coordinated foreign policy. As discussed below, Czechoslovak officials have often taken the lead in publicly condemning departures from Soviet norms by other East European states. Given the outlook of the Czechoslovak leadership, such criticisms may well be self-initiated and not specifically directed by Moscow; some may have been intended to precipitate similar Soviet criticism.
38The debacle of Gierek's promotion of European détente in the 1970s notwithstanding, most of the Polish Communist foreign policy establishment hoped for Poland to resume its place in all-European affairs as quickly as possible. Polish interlocutors have argued this, as do many articles in Sprawy Międzynarodowe, the journal of the Polish Institute of International Affairs. Janusz Symonides, Director of the Institute, noted: "There are attempts [in Poland] to put forward the thesis on the necessity of isolation from the West. Such a thesis cannot be defended, for various—not just economic—reasons." (Issue No. 9, 1982.) See also the roundtable discussion on the role of small- and medium-size states in the June 1984 issue.
was (in terms of motivation if not effect) directed as much against the USSR—the fear of “Rapallo”—as against the Germans, and certainly directed as much against East as West Germany.\textsuperscript{39} It was a consequence of Poland’s weakened position internationally and within the bloc, of its resulting jealousy of Hungary and especially of the GDR for capturing the limelight, and a reaction to the West German discussion of Ostpolitik under the CDU/CSU-led government that has included some renewed questioning of the permanence of Poland’s Western border.

The above analysis suggests that while the pursuit of European détente by Hungary, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Romania immediately after November 1983 was fundamentally in the Soviet interest, some of the motives and special interests of these states in fact diverged from Soviet motives and interests. These differing motives and interests were translated into divergent behavior when Soviet tactics toward Western Europe changed in spring 1984.

SOVIET-EAST EUROPEAN DIFFERENCES

Differences within the Soviet bloc on the proper tactics of Ostpolitik following NATO’s INF deployment became fully evident only in late spring 1984, when Soviet policy hardened on all fronts: vis-à-vis China, Japan, the United States, and also Western Europe. One indicator was Moscow’s decision to boycott the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles. Soviet policy switched from wooing Western Europe and especially West Germany, inter alia by warning it of the irresponsible and dangerous actions of its American ally and urging it to follow its own interests,\textsuperscript{40} to more direct pressure. This shift was most striking in the case of West Germany. Moscow launched a campaign against West German “revanchism,” proclaiming that Bonn was moving away from acceptance of the East European territorial and political status

\textsuperscript{39} As an example of the Polish elite’s mood, one Polish interlocutor voiced the fear that inter-German economic contacts were leading to a “recreation of the economic infrastructure of the Third Reich.” Similar fears were expressed, only slightly less explicitly, in a 1984 discussion of foreign affairs experts organized by the Polish Institute of International Relations. Daniel Rotfeldt pointed to a “revival of German territorial expansionism” and said “the most serious long-term danger is the dynamization of the German problem.” It is indicative of the siege mentality of the Polish foreign affairs elite that “the return of Poland’s position in the process of all-European security and cooperation through active inclusion in political dialogue” came only fifth in a listing of quite defensive Polish foreign policy tasks. (Sprawy Międzynarodowe, July-August 1984.)

\textsuperscript{40} This was the Soviet line in Soviet-West German bilateral meetings and conferences through April 1984.
quo and claiming that these negative tendencies were reinforced by the stationing of Pershing II and cruise missiles in West Germany.

This shift in the Soviet line was perhaps partly the consequence of a Soviet reappraisal that concluded that the NATO INF deployment could not be halted or reversed (the Soviets may have still considered a reversal possible after November 1983) and that Western Europe should be punished. Soviet policy was also probably influenced by a reinvigorated public discussion of the "open German question" in West Germany in the first half of 1984, with some public figures underlining the provisional legal character of Germany's present Eastern frontiers (Bonn's standard position in concluding the treaties with the USSR and East European countries, but a position deemphasized in the 1970s) and the imperative of national reunification. The lifting by the West European Union of its 1955 prohibitions against West German production of long-range aircraft or missiles, a step intended to end a stigma of inequality, doubtless fueled Soviet concerns (although West Germany declared it would not produce such weapons). The unsettled Soviet leadership situation after Andropov's death clearly played a role. It is also possible that the very enthusiasm of the East European states in pursuing "damage limitation" vis-à-vis Western Europe appeared counterproductive to some in Moscow and contributed to the Soviet shift. That Soviet shift to a harder line in relations with Bonn was evident during West German foreign minister Genscher's visit to Moscow in May 1984.

Confronted with this Soviet change of course, Hungary, East Germany, and Bulgaria, along with Romania, resolved to continue rather than abandon the effort to develop relations with Western Europe (and with the United States). That their differing motives (discussed above) could lead to public disagreements within the Soviet bloc was demonstrated even before the Soviet shift of late spring 1984, in a continuation of the ideological discussion on "national vs. international" aspects of socialism. The background of this discussion was traced in Section III and earlier in this section. The new phase of the discussion was initiated by an "internationalist" article by two Czechoslovak party officials, published in the Czechoslovak party daily in March, which

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reacted to Hungarian party Secretary Szuros' treatise published in January. Responding to Szuros's views (probably in an effort to provoke a clear Soviet stance rather than on Soviet instructions), the Czechoslovak officials denied a special role for small nations in the Soviet bloc, opposed the counterposing of "national" to "international" interests in socialism, warned of excessive economic ties with the West, and stressed the need for bloc foreign policy coordination.

That both Hungary and East Germany, as well as Romania, were intended targets of this criticism was quickly demonstrated by reactions from Budapest and East Berlin. Szuros restated his viewpoint in early April, arguing in effect that NATO INF deployments had not changed things all that much, since the danger of war had not increased, the military balance was intact, and most international agreements remained in effect; he also reaffirmed the important role of small- and medium-sized powers in both alliances. Szuros' article was quickly reprinted in the East German party daily, initiating the East German party practice of reprinting Hungarian articles to make points it is reluctant to make directly. This practice has continued to the present.

In April 1984 (the time sequence with regard to Szuros' April 4 article is unclear), the first deputy head of the Soviet party Central Committee bloc relations department, O. B. Rakhmanin, joined the debate, making essentially the same points made by the Czechoslovak officials in March and restating the importance of Soviet experience in "building socialism."\footnote{Szuros, Magyar Hirap, April 4, 1984.}\footnote{Neues Deutschland, April 12, 1984.}

Notwithstanding the shift in the Soviet line vis-à-vis Western Europe and especially West Germany in April-May 1984 and the reaffirmation of the ideological principle of Soviet leadership in the bloc in March-April 1984—indeed, in the face of these Soviet positions—the four East European states continued to promote ties with the West in mid-1984.

This was true, first and foremost, of East Germany, primarily but not exclusively in its relations with West Germany. Having accepted a "billion mark" unrestricted Bonn-guaranteed credit in mid-1983, East Berlin negotiated a second credit of nearly the same amount in mid-1984. It agreed at the same time to a series of additional minor relaxations of travel restrictions. It continued to discuss with Bonn arrange-\footnote{O. V. Borisov, "[Union of a New Type]," Voprosy istorii KPSS, April 1984, signed to the press April 3, 1984. While there is no conclusive proof, Borisov is widely presumed by Western analysts to be a pseudonym for Rakhmanin; East European officials affirm this identification as well.}
ments for Honecker’s trip to West Germany. These and other steps were justified by a stream of speeches and articles by East German officials restating and reemphasizing the Honecker “damage limitation” line of the 7th Party Plenum of November 1983.47

That these East German steps were viewed with some reservations in Moscow was suggested by reports leaked to the Western media in May-July 1984 from both East German and Soviet sources. Thus in May the East Germans reportedly claimed they had been criticized by Moscow in January during Foreign Minister Fischer’s visit to the Soviet Union, and again in mid-March,48 while by July, Soviet officials were dropping hints to Westerners that a Honecker visit to West Germany might not be suitable under the existing circumstances.49

Simultaneously, if somewhat less dramatically, Hungary, Bulgaria, and (again, a special case) Romania continued to cultivate their Western connections. Kadar welcomed West German Chancellor Kohl to Budapest in June and visited France in October. Like the East Germans, Hungarian leaders and ideologues continued to expound the moderate pro-détente line Szuros had outlined earlier in the year.50 Bulgaria generally refrained from the “anti-revanchist” campaign against West Germany. Romania pursued contacts with a variety of West European states, and Ceausescu visited Bonn in October after Honecker and Zhivkov called off their visits under Soviet pressure, thus demonstrating again the reality of Romanian autonomy in the Soviet bloc.

These departures from the Soviet line on the part of East Germany, Hungary, and, to a lesser extent, Bulgaria, as well as Romania, were important not only individually, as national deviations from the Soviet line, but in combination, as multilateral divergence from Soviet policy and incipient “factionalism” on important foreign policy issues. East Germany propagated the slogan “coalition of reason” in seeking ties with anti-INF forces in the West, yet precipitated the formation of what might be termed a “coalition of reason” inside the Soviet bloc.

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47E.g., Honecker’s speech to the 8th Plenum in May 1984. For an authoritative explanation of West German policy, see Inter-German Minister Windeln, Aussenpolitik, September 1984. In accordance with “damage limitation,” the East German media had in early 1984 toned down harsh Soviet statements on the INF issue. *Neues Deutschland*, February 28, 1984, printed an ADN summary of Gromyko’s Minsk electoral speech of February 27 and omitted Gromyko’s criticism of West European countries (TASS in English, February 27, 1984, FBIS-SOV; February 29, 1984). See Fred Oldenburg, “Geht die SED eigene Wege im Sowjetimperium,” *Deutschland Archiv*, May 1984.


49West German media accounts.

50Hungarian party official Horn, for example, stressed the special role of economic ties in present East-West relations, which, he said, can play “a kind of mediating and stabilizing role.” (Kulpolitika, Summer 1984.)
embracing East Germany, Hungary, and Romania (with Bulgaria joining it on some issues) and excluding the Soviet Union. The East German-Hungarian axis in this coalition was clear and was demonstrated by the mutual reprinting in the national media of each country of favorable articles about the other. It was also demonstrated by East Germany’s abandonment of its earlier criticism of the Hungarian economic reforms.51

The Hungarian-Romanian axis, in contrast, was more of an “objective” than an acknowledged fact; Hungarian and Romanian policies toward Western Europe in 1984 were mutually reinforcing, but bilateral relations deteriorated as a result of Hungary’s openly expressed concerns about Romanian mistreatment of the Hungarian minority in Romania.

The GDR-Romanian axis, while less developed than the corresponding East German-Hungarian relationship, was demonstrated more explicitly, in the form of Honecker’s participation (as the only Soviet bloc leader) in the Romanian liberation celebrations in August 1984 (after public Soviet criticism of East German policy toward Bonn). East German-Romanian relations have thus come full circle from the Scinteia-Neues Deutschland polemics of 1967, when Romania defended itself against East German charges of selling out to Bonn in terms not so different from those East Germany would use in 1984 to defend itself against analogous accusations from Moscow.52

This East European “coalition of reason” was evidently able to influence the tone of Soviet bloc multilateral statements; it then used those statements to justify subsequent bilateral policy—a classic tactic of coalitions in multilateral conditions. The April 1984 meeting in Budapest of the Warsaw Pact Council of Foreign Ministers issued a communiqué on relations with the West that was much milder than most Soviet statements of the time (including those of Gromyko himself in Budapest), and this nuanced treatment is plausibly explained by

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51 East European interlocutors, in interviews with the author, asserted that privately and publicly East Germany had stopped criticizing the Hungarian economic reforms. A review of East German media coverage of Hungary since late 1983 indicates only neutral-to-positive treatment of the Hungarian economy, e.g., articles by A. Fussak in Horizont, June 1984 and February 1985. (Information provided by B. Flow of Radio Free Europe.) This treatment of Hungary is at odds with East German treatments of its own economic system or general principles of socialist economy, which continue to stress strict central planning. E.g., Otto Reinhold, “[Socialist Planned Economy—Basis for the Policy of the Principles’ Task],” Einheit, November 1985.

52 E.g., editorial in Scinteia, February 4, 1967, “it is necessary to continue to make persevering efforts for the step-by-step elimination of the sources of tension, to carefully and patiently make use of every opportunity for rapprochement between the peoples, and to develop collaboration and strengthen peace on this continent.” (Ceausescu speech, Scinteia, February 21, 1967.)
the lobbying of the East European "coalition of reason." Finally, at the long-postponed CMEA "summit" held in Moscow in June 1984, the assembled party leaders, while affirming the importance of some forms of bloc integration, declared their interest in developing "mutually beneficial economic, trade, and scientific-technical relations with the developed capitalist countries"—a standard Soviet formulation, but one little utilized in mid-1984.

The interests of East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania in cultivating ties with Western Europe have been discussed previously. The persistence of the East European states in pursuing those interests in the face of hardening Soviet policy in late spring 1984 seems explicable only with reference to the unsettled Soviet leadership situation. Andropov received his last foreign visitor in August 1983 and was evidently incapacitated much of the time thereafter until his death in February 1984. His successor, Chernenko, was publicly visible through June 1984, when he received East European leaders in connection with the CMEA summit meeting, but was evidently incapacitated afterwards.

In 1984, as on several occasions in the past, the diversion of Soviet attention from Eastern Europe to other matters—principally the uncompleted Brezhnev succession—had the effect of relaxing the constraints that normally restrict East European impulses toward greater foreign policy autonomy. Moreover, the signals the East European leaderships did receive from Moscow in 1984 seemed to be mixed. Some Soviet voices warned against excessively close economic ties with the West, but others, as noted earlier, stressed the importance of developing East-West economic ties. Soviet policy continued to promote the development of economic ties with Western Europe at the height of the harder political line. Bilateral trade relations with West Germany remained unaffected, increasing by 7 percent in 1984, and the USSR continued to borrow in West German credit markets, although there seemed to be a freeze on Soviet overtures about new large-scale

53East European officials claimed this in interviews with the author. While such claims are obviously self-serving, there seems enough public evidence of foreign policy disarray in the Soviet bloc to support their plausibility. One East European official claimed that Moscow had originally promoted adoption at this meeting of a comprehensive limitation on contacts with the West, but that this proposal was abandoned in the face of East European objections at the working group level. For a textual analysis, see Gyula Jozsa, Ungarn im Kreuzfeuer der Kritik aus Prag und Moskau; Teil I: Die Aussenministerkonferenz der WP-Staaten (April 1984) und die Polemik zwischen Prag und Budapest, Koeln, Berichte des Bundesinstituts fuer ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, January 1985.

54Final communiqué, Izvestia, June 16, 1984.
cooperative economic projects. On at least one occasion, a Soviet publicist explicitly endorsed the development of East Germany’s economic ties with West Germany, and a few Soviet commentators continued to stress East-West European détente. These Soviet ambiguities gave the East European states additional leeway.

Finally, the East European leaderships evidently concluded that they understood Soviet interests better than the people in the USSR who were making (or not making) decisions in mid-1984. They gambled that through a combination of their own lobbying, Soviet indecision, and an anticipated future Soviet shift back to a softer line vis-à-vis Western Europe, they could avoid a frontal clash with Moscow which would leave them with no recourse but to retreat. That veteran Communist leaders Kadar and Honecker pursued such a high-risk strategy is testimony to the strength of the motives that impelled the East European states, INF notwithstanding, to pursue expanded relations with Western Europe throughout 1984.

This strategy worked for Hungary. It would have worked for Bulgaria had not Zhivkov been unlucky enough to schedule a visit to Bonn right after Honecker. Romania’s decisionmaking calculus was different; Ceausescu could not risk not making his scheduled visit to Bonn in the wake of Honecker's canceled visit (just as he could not risk not sending a Romanian contingent to the Olympic Games). To do so would have dangerously compromised Romania’s long-standing foreign policy autonomy.

East Berlin, on the other hand, was less successful. Given the especially sensitive nature of inter-German relations, the bilateral relationship and especially planning for Honecker’s scheduled trip to West Germany took on a life of its own. Public discussion in West Germany of the pending trip was (inevitably and understandably) sensationalist and led the Kohl Government to publicly exclude security issues from the agenda of a Kohl-Honecker meeting. There was much discussion in the West German media of “buying” alleviations on human rights issues, especially travel, from East Berlin. In Moscow, this discussion probably reinforced existing apprehensions about what Honecker was up to. The issue for Moscow was less inter-German economic ties per


than their terms and justification. Some in Moscow must have feared that Honecker, “dizzy with success,” had started down the road of “unprincipled compromises” with the capitalist German state. This was unacceptable in its own right; it was even more worrisome as an indicator that the inter-German relationship might be developing a momentum of its own and escaping Soviet control. By July, Foreign Minister Gromyko and other decisionmakers probably assumed that the Honecker trip would be unwise.

Such Soviet concerns were first given public expression in Soviet German specialist L. Bezymenski’s Pravda article of July 27, 1984, entitled “In the Shadow of American Rockets,” which explicitly criticized West Germany and implicitly but unmistakably criticized the Honecker leadership—quoting to it its own words from the past, especially Honecker’s 1980 hardline Gera speech—for the intensity and nature of its dealings with such a West Germany.

But if the Bezymenski article was intended to bring about a quick reversal of Honecker’s line, it failed. In March, East Berlin had defended itself against criticism from Prague; now it defended itself against criticism from Moscow. East Berlin reprinted the Bezymenski article in Neues Deutschland, but it also reprinted a Hungarian article endorsing East Berlin’s policy toward Bonn which had appeared—apparently by accident rather than design—on July 28. It then published its own authoritative commentary implicitly defending a détenteist policy.

Moscow responded to this intransigence on August 2 with an authoritative Pravda editorial entitled “On the Wrong Path.” Sotsialisticheskaia industriia (August 10) explicitly condemned the new West

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58 Although Soviets reportedly complained at the June 1984 CMEA summit that East Germany was exporting to the West at the expense of Soviet needs (Neue Zuercher Zeitung, June 17-18, 1984).

59 By one account, former Soviet Ambassador Abrasimov exercised a close watch over and approved in advance East-West German agreements, but when Abrasimov was replaced in June 1983 by V. I. Kochemasov, at Honecker’s urging, this practice was no longer followed. See Wettig, “The Present Soviet View of Trends in Germany,” note 19.

60 Moscow thus used against East Germany arguments similar to those Ulbricht had once used against Hungary, warning it not to be seduced by Bonn: “German imperialism attempts through contacts of all kinds, through economic and ideological means, to penetrate the socialist countries and destroy their solidarity.” (Ulbricht’s 1964 speech in Budapest, as cited in W. Seifert, “Die Natur des Konflikts zwischen der SED-Fuehrung und Moskau,” Deutschland Archiv, October 1984, p. 1045, note 9.)

German credit as "economic pressure on the GDR." East Berlin did not reprint the Pravda editorial, which according to East European interlocutors created "deep uneasiness" in the East German party—a clear sign of dissent. Honecker waited two weeks, and then expounded on his views in a press interview, justifying his policy of "damage limitation," yet making some concessions to Soviet reservations.

At this point Honecker may have still hoped to make his trip to West Germany, but now, more vulnerable to charges of incautious behavior from Moscow and from within his own party, he sought more concessions from Bonn on the arrangements and agenda for the trip. Another indication of Honecker's defiance was his attendance on August 21 at the Romanian liberation ceremonies; he was the only Soviet bloc leader to appear. During this period, East Germany also began to intensify its ties with the Italian and French Communist parties.

On September 4, 1984, the Honecker visit was "postponed" at the request of East Germany. In the absence of any evidence of top-level Soviet-East German contact in July and August, it seems probable that Honecker himself came to the conclusion that the political costs of the trip, both within the East German party and in Moscow, would outweigh the benefits. East Germany's (minor) concessions on travel restrictions in connection with the West German credit of July 1984 had left it vulnerable to charges of "rotten compromises." West Germany's definitive public exclusion of security issues from the trip agenda deprived Honecker of the argument that he could use the trip to campaign against the INF deployment. Moscow doubtless conveyed its reservations to East Berlin in informal private communications. But it would be a misunderstanding both of Soviet-East European leadership relations and of Honecker's motives to assume either that a

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62 Polish sources criticized East Germany in a similar vein: "Does [Bonn] expect that the leadership of the GDR, which has so much experience in dealing with West German revanchist circles, does not know the real cause and background of this sudden interest in selective development of mutual relations?" (Tomala, in Nowe Drogi, September 1984.)

63 Honecker interview with ADN, August 17, 1984, Neues Deutschland, August 18-19, 1984.

64 See Heinz Timmermann, Grundpositionen und Spielräume der SED am Beispiel ihres Verhältnisses zu den westeuropäischen Kommunisten, Koeln, Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, August 1984.

65 It seems very likely, given the mood of the East German elite at this point, that any formal Soviet private communication, such as a party letter, would have been leaked to the Western press (as was the 1981 Soviet letter to the Polish party). By one Western account, the pending trip was discussed by the Soviet Politburo in late August, and Soviet Ambassador Kochemasov returned to East Berlin with the message that Moscow did not favor the trip. (Der Spiegel, September 17, 1984.)
lower-level Soviet official (for example, Rakhmanin) could deliver the equivalent of an ultimatum to Honecker or that Honecker was dead set on visiting West Germany regardless of the circumstances in the absence of an authoritative Soviet ultimatum. He had postponed his trip twice before, for less compelling reasons, with little if any damage to his policy objectives vis-à-vis Bonn.

The circumstances surrounding the postponement of Zhivkov's trip to Bonn were different and more reminiscent of Soviet ultimata to East European leaderships in the past. Gorbachev traveled to Sofia, where he publicly condemned Western policies of "differentiation" toward Eastern Europe and warned that "no one can stand aside" from the task of "consolidating socialist unity." Under these circumstances, Zhivkov presumably needed little convincing that his trip to Bonn should be put off.

By October 1984, however, those East European leaders who had bet on at least atmospheric improvements in Soviet-American relations that would facilitate the cultivation of ties with the West were encouraged. Soviet spokesmen again began to use "détentist" language that made the East European positions of mid-1984 less deviant. At the same time (perhaps because Chernenko and other leaders reasserted themselves in Moscow), the East European states proceeded more cautiously in policies toward the West and especially toward West Germany, because the Soviet line had been made clearer. Official East German-West German relations stagnated, although East Germany only perfunctorily joined the Soviet anti-revanchism campaign. Hungary moderated its ideological justifications of its diplomacy somewhat but continued to pursue an active Westpolitik and call for acceptance of national differences in the Soviet bloc.

This period of lower-profile East European behavior came to an end in the month prior to Chernenko's death. Honecker received West German Finance Minister and FDP head Bangemann, along with other officials, and Foreign Minister Genscher received East German Politburo member Axen in Bonn, thus reviving top-level political contacts.

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66Tass, September 8, 1984 (passage omitted from Pravda version). The Czechs were quick to support this Soviet resolve. Foreign Minister Chnoupek, speaking in Poland on September 6, accused the FRG of trying to "swallow" East Germany and called for "strengthening the coordinated line of conduct" in the Soviet bloc. (Trybuna Ludu, September 7, 1984.)

67An example is Szuro's article in The New Hungarian Quarterly, No. 96, 1984.

68"Despite the colder international atmosphere, we have guarded our foreign policy sensitivity and openness, we are continuing to build our foreign economic relations, our diplomatic activity with the West European countries, we are taking the initiative in cultural exchanges, we are developing tourism." (Janos Berecz, in Nepszabadsag, December 24, 1984.)
between the two Germanies. Hungarian media played up these contacts. Foreign Minister Genscher visited Sofia, and West German sources reported that Zhivkov's trip to Bonn would be rescheduled. Hungarian deputy foreign minister Roska publicly defended Hungary's "activist foreign policy" of promoting dialogue with the West and encouraging visits of Western leaders. Broaching a new and more sensitive topic, he spoke of differences in the Soviet bloc on the terms of renewing the Warsaw Pact, as well as on domestic models of socialism.69 Neues Deutschland (March 3) reprinted the Roska interview. And Honecker met with Chancellor Kohl for two hours on the occasion of the Chernenko funeral ceremonies in Moscow. Thus in spring 1985, the East European leaderships in the "coalition of reason"—those of Hungary, East Germany, and Bulgaria, as well as Romania—seemed to again launch more activist foreign policies just as Gorbachev's succession portended an end to the drift in Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe.

IMPLICATIONS FOR WESTPOLITIK

In the wake of the Polish crisis, Moscow initially welcomed the development of East-West European ties as part of its effort to split the Western alliance in general and to forestall NATO's INF deployment in particular. Yet four East European states (Hungary, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Romania) had special motives and special interests—economic, national, and political—in continuing to cultivate ties with Western Europe. From the Soviet perspective, these special interests detracted from the effectiveness of overall Soviet policy toward Western Europe. Moscow could initially welcome Honecker's slogan of "damage limitation," but when this resulted in the unprecedented development of ties between East Berlin and Bonn, with Bonn trying to "buy" concessions from East Germany, Moscow probably began to question whether this approach contributed to encouraging West Germany to reconsider its INF decision; the Soviets may have feared that, on the contrary, it encouraged "illusions" that NATO's INF deployment had not involved significant costs in relations with the East at all.

In this phase, Moscow could also note a negative East European impact on the West European peace movement. The Soviet "counter-
deployment" in East Germany and Czechoslovakia resulted in considerable popular dissatisfaction and greater independent peace movement activities in those countries, which combined concerns about Soviet as well as NATO weapons with calls for greater human rights in Eastern Europe. This fed back into the peace movement in Western Europe through exchanges of letters and some contacts among activists, diluting somewhat the Eastern movement's intended exclusively anti-NATO orientation.70

Soviet concern about the impact of East-West European ties on its anti-INF policy in late 1983 and early 1984 could only have been reinforced by Eastern Europe's opposition to the new Soviet harder line regarding such ties in April-May 1984. In this period, foreign policy disarray in Eastern Europe, and especially the continued pursuit of ties with Western Europe, above all East Germany's cultivation of ties with Bonn, clearly undercut the shock effect that the Soviet policy shift was presumably intended to have in Western Europe.

Thus, on balance, foreign policy diversity in Eastern Europe in 1983-1984 detracted from the effectiveness of Soviet anti-INF policy in Western Europe, while reviving for Moscow issues of bloc unity and discipline.

MORE DISCIPLINE UNDER GORBACHEV?

Gorbachev moved quickly to consolidate his power after assuming the post of CPSU General Secretary in March 1985. That consolidation of power portended a Soviet effort to impose greater discipline on Eastern Europe and, above all, to end the embarrassing foreign policy disarray of 1984. Such has been the pattern in the past; East European ferment encouraged by Soviet succession politics was ended in 1957, as Khrushchev consolidated his power, and again, albeit less dramatically, in 1967, as Brezhnev's position became more secure.

There were, moreover, specific features of the East European scene related to the present succession that seemed especially likely to motivate a new Soviet leader to put the Soviet house in Eastern Europe in order. Questioning by Romania, Hungary, and perhaps

70This was demonstrated at the Fourth European Nuclear Disarmament Convention in Amsterdam in July 1985, which was boycotted by Soviet Front “peace” organizations because of the presence of dissident Hungarian independent peace movement activists and the publicity given to Charter-77 and other independent peace activity in Eastern Europe. (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty News dispatch, July 5, 1985.) See Robert English, "Eastern Europe's Doves," Foreign Policy, Fall 1984; E. P. Thompson, coordinating committee member of European Nuclear Disarmament, “Peace and Human Rights. It's Time for the Twain to Meet,” The Nation, September 14, 1985.
others of the term and modalities of extending the Warsaw Pact constituted a challenge to a crucial Soviet security interest. The same held for the reservations in the East German and Czechoslovak leaderships about the deployment of new Soviet INF systems there, and the evident opposition of the Hungarian and Bulgarian leaders to deployment in their countries. The active Westpolitik of four East European states in 1984 constituted not just unwelcome individual departures from the defensive hardline Soviet policy of the day, but a multilateral deviation and hence factional challenge to Soviet hegemony by a majority of East European states.

Thus there were a number of reasons to expect—as many Western observers did in the first half of 1985—that the relative Soviet neglect of Eastern Europe during the extended Brezhnev succession would soon be replaced by more Soviet attention and greater insistence on unity and discipline under a consolidated Gorbachev leadership.

But the first year of the Gorbachev leadership leading up to the 27th CPSU Congress did not bring that unity and discipline. Indeed, Gorbachev's first year did not provide the outside observer with any clear signs of future Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe—generally, or with specific reference to intra-European ties.

This is true of Soviet pronouncements on the Soviet economic system, which indirectly apply to Eastern Europe, and to Soviet statements about Eastern Europe itself. The thrust of Soviet statements on economics was to grant the need for economic modernization and measures promoting efficiency but to caution against reliance on the market mechanism or the private sector—cautions that would seem directly applicable to Hungary. At the same time, there was a revival of the Soviet “post-Poland” debate on the economic system, which had lapsed in mid-1984, and a return of proponents of economic reform to the pages of the Soviet press.

The most authoritative Soviet call for bloc discipline was contained in a June Pravda article, apparently authored by CPSU Secretariat bloc relations department deputy head Rakhmanin, which restated in the official Pravda forum many of the criticisms of East European foreign policy and domestic autonomy, ties with the West, and market- and private sector-oriented economic reform that had been advanced in the April 1984 Voprosy istorii KPSS article—including repeated criticism of the “small states” theory and warnings about East-West

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71This was the sense of CPSU Secretary Ligachev's speech to the Academy of Social Sciences (Pravda, June 29, 1985).
72E.g., T. Zaslavskaja, in Sovetskaia Rossiia, January 7, 1986.
economic ties. Other articles in Pravda and elsewhere have contained similar criticisms of market-influenced economic reform, private enterprise, and, more generally, overemphasis on national distinctiveness under socialism.

Yet the authoritativeness of the Vladimirov article was undercut by comments of a Soviet International Information department official. Shortly thereafter, articles by Bogomolov and Hungarian Politburo member and Deputy General Secretary Karoly Nemeth appeared in the July issue of Kommunist, asserting specific national interests of individual Communist countries and the importance of East-West economic ties (Nemeth's even praised the Hungarian reform program) and thus in effect disputing the Vladimirov line. Soviet commentator Bovin explicitly endorsed recent Hungarian foreign policy, and an article in New Times gave some weight to national differences in the

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73 O. Vladimirov, "[Questions of Theory. Leading Factor in the World Revolutionary Process]," Pravda, June 21, 1985. Vladimirov (like "Borisov") is widely regarded in Eastern Europe and the West to be a pseudonym for Rakhmanin. See E. Teague, "Pravda Raises Specter of Revisionism within the Bloc," Radio Liberty Research, June 24, 1985. The Vladimirov article commended to East Europeans the "traditions of Dimitrov, Thaelmann, Gottwald, and other wonderful communists"—a reference to prewar East European Soviet agents that was doubtless galling to present East European leaders under the circumstances.

The Vladimirov article repeated Romanov's warning to the Hungarian Party Congress in March about the dangers of improper economic ties with the West. (Tass, March 28, 1985.) It was preceded and followed by articles in the Czechoslovak press critical of Communists "enraptured by capitalist methods" and private property (F. Kudrna, in Tribuna, May 22, 1985) and those who emphasize Western technological imports and are otherwise susceptible to Western attempts to undermine socialism by economic ties. (Hlivka, in Rude Pravo, July 7, 1985.) Czechoslovak party leader Husak categorically rejected "market concepts" as instruments of economic modernization. (Report to the Central Committee Plenum, Radio Prague, June 19, 1985, FBIS-EEU, June 24, 1985.)

74 E.g., Melenteev, in Pravda, August 2, 1985.


76 O. Bogomolov, "[Coordination of Economic Interests and Policy Under Socialism]" and K. Nemeth, "[In the Interest of the All-Around Development of the Socialist Commonwealth]," Kommunist, No. 10, July 1985 (signed to the press July 3, 1985). Bogomolov (and the institute he heads) have a clear record of supportive interest in the Hungarian reforms and ties with Hungary (e.g., Bogomolov, article in the Hungarian economic weekly Figyelo, March 31, 1983).

77 Bovin, interview with Budapest Radio, August 31, 1985, FBIS-SOV, September 6, 1985. "...[F]inding the zone of agreement is so much easier for those states which are not direct participants of this [superpower] confrontation...in a period of confrontation the weight and role of the small and medium-sized countries grow." Compare Vladimirov: "What question can there be of any mediation by particular socialist countries in resolving disagreements between the USSR and the USA?"
Perhaps the strongest rebuttal to the Vladimirov line appeared in an article in the September 1985 issue of Rabochi klas i souvremenyyi mir, authored by Yiri Novopashin, a staff member of Bogomolov's institute, rejecting the principle of "democratic centralism" in the bloc and arguing that differences and even contradictions among socialist states were normal. These articles notwithstanding, other Soviet pronouncements stressing bloc unity in the "Vladimirov" spirit continued to appear.

Soviet comment on the Hungarian economic model itself was contradictory. The Hungarian model continued to interest and be praised by influential Soviet spokesmen. Bogomolov's bloc economic institute convened a Hungarian-Soviet economic seminar in July at which Hungarians expounded on their model.\(^8\) Pravda articles seemed to support the Hungarian experiments.\(^9\) At the same time, there has been continued criticism of Hungary's economic reform from other Soviet sources.\(^8\) Yet the pace of Hungarian economic reforms and their

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\(^7\)N. Shishlin, in Novoe Vremia, August 23, 1985.

\(^8\)E.g., Biryukov, in Pravda, December 14, 1985, reporting on the fifteenth anniversary of the December 1970 Czechoslovak party document on "fraternal assistance" and post-invasion "normalization"; Zagladin interview in Nepszabadsag, January 11, 1986. Zagladin's emphasis, too, was in sharp contrast to that of Bovin: "[East-West] contacts, including economic relations, help to improve the atmosphere and to make a part of those [Western] groups that are as yet passive join the side of détente. However, there is no ground yet for exaggerating the role for such contacts. It is progress in the main strategic aims that is of decisive significance. One must never put the cart in front of the horse. The cause of détente can be supported by all countries, whether large, medium, or small. ... As far as our countries, the socialist countries, are concerned, the main thing is a coordinated foreign policy."\(^9\)


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\(^8\)D. Valovoy, in Pravda, June 7, 1985. This article, ostensibly a defense of the Hungarian system against Western descriptions that distort its "socialist" character, reads more as a defense of the Hungarians than a warning to them.

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\(^8\)L. I. Abalkin criticized Hungarian experimentation with private enterprise: "It is a resurgence of capitalist small enterprise which leads directly to the emergence of a new class—new in the sense that capitalist traits have been eliminated in Hungary. In other words, a step backward." (Interview in Unita, October 25, 1985) Voprosy ekonomiki, November 1985, published a harsh criticism of economic revisionism by Khudokormov, which seemed to apply broadly to Hungarian economists and not only to its manifest object, economist M. Vajda.

The lack of consistent signals in Soviet media treatment of Hungary is demonstrated in Pravda reports from Hungary by correspondents I. Vorozheikin and V. Gerasimov. A report published on December 23, 1985, was not unsympathetic of Hungarian economic policy. By contrast, a second report published on January 21, 1986, constituted a warning against excessive economic and cultural ties with Western countries. It specifically disparaged the benefits of cooperative arrangements with Western enterprises and cautioned that Hungary's more open borders raised the danger of the rise of "bourgeois ideology and anti-socialist propaganda." The concern in Hungary about this article is evident from Szuro's discussion of it on Budapest Radio, January 17, 1986 (FBIS-EEU, January 31, 1986).
cautious extension to elements of the political system have to date been apparently unaffected by the leadership change in Moscow.

Nor do developments in other East European countries indicate any pattern of response to Soviet pressure. In Poland, Jaruzelski's efforts in 1985 to selectively impose greater domestic discipline, e.g., the removal of university rectors, might be attributable to greater pressure from Moscow. Yet Soviet articles implicitly critical of excessively moderate policies of the Jaruzelski regime ended following Gorbachev's succession. In late 1985 Jaruzelski succeeded in extorting the putative leaders of a hard-line and more pro-Soviet grouping: Central Committee Secretary and Politburo member Milewski, Foreign Minister and Politburo member Olszowski, and Ambassador to Moscow Kociolek. Similarly in late 1985, Konrad Neumann, who reportedly opposed Honecker's policy of cultivating ties with West Germany, was removed from the East German Politburo.8

These different and partly contradictory Soviet messages about Eastern Europe and its ties with the West were not clarified by the authoritative political documents of Gorbachev's first year. The documents contain sufficiently amalgamated or ambiguous phraseology on issues of bloc cohesion, national autonomy, and East-West ties to lack operational relevance. This was the case with Gorbachev's inaugural remarks to bloc leaders on the occasion of the renewal of the Warsaw Pact in March; the new draft CPSU Party Program; and the declaration of bloc leaders, meeting in October for the first session of the Pact Political Consultative Committee to be held under Gorbachev. The latter document, moreover, contained ample language by which East European leaderships could legitimize future dealings with Western Europe.84 Published accounts of the December 1985 meeting of Soviet bloc party secretaries responsible for ideology and international affairs also contain bland formulations and lack the juxtaposition of differing views (for example, those of Ponomarev and Szuros) that characterized the 1984 meeting of the party secretaries.

Only in the area of Soviet-East European economic relations did signals in Gorbachev's first year seem clearer—and more unfavorable for Eastern Europe. The decline in world energy prices had meant an effective end to Soviet subsidies of East European energy imports by

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83Herbert Haeber, directly responsible for ties with West Germany, was also removed, although evidently for medical reasons. See the account in Der Spiegel, November 25, 1985.
84Gorbachev speech of March 11 in Warsaw, Pravda, March 12, 1985; draft CPSU Program, Pravda, October 26, 1985; PCC Sofia meeting "statement," Pravda, October 24, 1985. The Sofia declaration endorses "deepening the political dialogue among the European countries in various forms and at various levels" and "new forms of economic, scientific, and technical cooperation" with West European countries.
In 1985, Moscow evidently pursued its demands for higher-quality East European manufactured goods exports to the USSR and resolved to balance bilateral trade, ending the ruble credits that had accumulated in bilateral trade relations with several East European countries in the past. Soviet criticism of the quality of Bulgarian exports to the USSR was a warning to the bloc as a whole that past practices and preferences could no longer be assumed. Nonetheless, the question remained of how seriously and consistently Moscow would attempt to impose this policy on Eastern Europe and specifically whether it would attempt to impose this economic discipline at the expense of Eastern Europe's economic ties with the West or at the expense of domestic social stability.

These ambiguities during Gorbachev's first year permitted those East European states that had emphasized Westpolitik in 1983–1984 to continue to do so in 1985. Indeed, in comparison with fall 1984, the latitude to cultivate ties with Western Europe was enhanced by Gorbachev's reemphasis of Soviet relations with West European countries (including a less hostile attitude toward Bonn, if not yet a real warming of relations). In 1985, as at the turn of the 1980s, East European leaderships could justify their cultivation of ties with West European countries as supportive of larger Soviet policies. The very language of Soviet propaganda worked to East European advantage in this regard. Soviet appeals to Western Europe that the struggle for "peace" is "the political task and the historical duty of all European states, whether great, medium-sized, [or] small" are easily cited by East European publicists in defense of East European positions. What has changed from the early 1980s is the awareness on all sides, sharpened by the events of 1983–1984, that Soviet and East European interests in Westpolitik do not necessarily fully coincide.

This is true of East Germany, which in 1985 continued to broaden its Westpolitik, moving beyond a narrow focus on Bonn to develop political and economic ties with a variety of West European countries. Thus British Foreign Minister Howe and French Prime Minister Fabius visited East Berlin. Honecker paid his first visits to NATO

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86 See also Ronald D. Asmus, "The National and the International."

87 Karelov, "USSR-West Europe; Guidelines for Cooperation," International Affairs, October 1985. Another example is the language of Shishlin in Sovetskaiia Rossia, January 21, 1986: "We in the Soviet Union are thinking of security for all states—large, medium, and small. It is in breaking down the old stereotype that sees the world as an arena for struggle between the nuclear 'superpowers' that Europe can play its own outstanding role."
capitals, Rome and Athens, and scheduled a visit to Paris for 1986. East Germany extended its borrowing from Western capital markets from Bonn to other Western countries. Diplomatic and economic diversification found ideological justification in a broadening of the "coalition of reason" concept, originally applied to West-East German relations but now proclaimed to have a "democratic [leftist-to-Communist] and global character." At the same time, East Germany continued to assert a special role for small states in international affairs.

This diversification of East German policy was both necessitated and permitted by the former East German focus on relations with West Germany. That focus became a liability in terms of ties with the USSR; a state described in Moscow as the principal object of West German revanchism that continued to promote ties with West Germany could never expect to avoid some Soviet suspicion of illicit dealings. Public display of that Soviet suspicion in 1984 contributed to East Germany's image of having assumed a more important role within the Soviet bloc. This in turn increased the willingness of other Western states to take relations with East Germany more seriously, whereas formerly they had considered East Germany primarily a West German matter.

Yet the broadening of East German Westpolitik in 1985 was a complement to, not a substitute for, policy toward West Germany, which remained at the core of East German foreign policy. East German policy toward West Germany itself also changed somewhat. Since fall 1984, East German policy has given more emphasis to cultivating the opposition Social Democratic Party. This is explained by the fact that the SPD has shown itself more eager to promote ties with the East, because it is viewed more favorably in Moscow than the ruling CDU/FDP government, and because the East German and Soviet leaderships probably expect the SPD eventually to return to power. Thus Honecker met in 1985 with former SPD chancellors Schmidt and Brandt and present SPD parliamentary faction head Vogel, and in June 1985 the SED and the SPD issued a joint proposal for the creation of a chemical-free zone in Central Europe.

Like the geographical broadening of its Westpolitik, this political broadening of East German policy toward West Germany has been a complement to cultivation of inter-state ties with Bonn. East Germany did forgo top-level contacts with Bonn in late 1984, in the wake of the Soviet criticism, but in 1985 Honecker revived his practice of

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meeting top West German politicians of the ruling CDU/CSU coalition. He again met with Franz Josef Strauss at the fall 1985 Leipzig Trade Fair, and on that occasion he referred to successfully overcoming "turbulence" in bilateral relations, which "actually have developed very well." In November, receiving the SPD Minister-President of the Saarland, Honecker vowed in the future as well to practice "talking to one another, especially in difficult times." In 1985, 25,000 East Germans were permitted to emigrate to West Germany — fewer than the record number in 1984, but twice the average number of previous years. Perhaps most important, in terms of bilateral relations, negotiations on the long-pending cultural agreement between West and East Germany resumed in September, and East Germany evidently agreed to concessions on the two issues — treatment of West Berlin and cultural exhibitions — that had held up an agreement for years. Progress was also reportedly made in negotiating an overall environmental protection agreement. A Honecker visit to West Germany remained on the future agenda.

These inter-German ties developed in the absence of a corresponding warming of Soviet-West German relations (although, as noted, Soviet policy did moderate its hostility) and in the face of periodic Soviet public warnings that West German disregard of Soviet "security concerns" and specifically involvement in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) would hamper development of ties with the East.

Hungarian foreign policy in 1985 was an extrapolation of previous policy. Evidently judging its foreign policy activism of 1984 to have

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89ADN, September 1, 1985.
90Honecker interview with the Saarbruecker Zeitung, reported by ADN, November 13, 1985.
91East Germany reportedly agreed to the inclusion of cultural activities involving West Berlin in the first two-year program under the agreement. It also reportedly ended its boycott of cultural exhibitions including the West Berlin-based Prussian Cultural Foundation; the Foundation's collection includes art works originally from what is now East Germany, which has demanded their return. See Minister for Inner-German Affairs Windeln's report, carried by dpa, December 13, 1985.
92GDR Politburo member and parliament head Sindermann visited Bonn in February 1986, where he was received by Chancellor Kohl and Bundestag President Jenniger. He stressed the importance of "human relations" in inter-German ties and refueled speculation about a Honecker visit in 1986. (ZDF interview, February 19, 1986, FBIS-WEU, February 20, 1986.) Prior to the visit, Honecker gave a long interview to Die Zeit (February 5, 1986) in which he was more responsive to West German concerns on inter-German issues than he had been in any previous public statement and was ambiguous on the question of future German unification.
93E.g., Portugalov's warning in West Germany that Bonn's involvement in the SDI was "bound to obstruct any further normalization of relations between the FRG and the GDR, Poland, and other socialist countries." (Portugalov, in Deutsch-Zeitung, August 9, 1985.)
been vindicated, and in the absence of any authoritative Soviet condemnation, Hungary has proceeded along the path it followed in 1984. In 1985, Kadar visited Great Britain as well as Austria, and welcomed U.S. Secretary of State Shultz in Budapest. Hungary continued to emphasize expansion of economic relations—especially inter-enterprise ties—with Western countries.

It was noted earlier that Hungarian Westpolitik, although basically unchanged, was pursued with a lower theoretical and ideological profile in fall 1984. This lower profile continued in the immediate wake of the Hungarian Party Congress, where Romanov seemed to criticize Hungary for overemphasizing its Western connections. One indicator of this lower profile was the reduced activity of party Secretary Szuros, the chief mouthpiece and symbol of Kadar's active policy toward the West, who published only one article on international affairs\(^4\) between January 1985 and October 1985 and who failed to accompany Kadar on his late September 1985 visit to Moscow. Yet his limited visibility notwithstanding, Szuros remained the secretary responsible for foreign affairs, one indicator of continuity in Hungarian Westpolitik.

The lower Hungarian ideological profile ended in fall 1985 with a series of Hungarian foreign policy pronouncements. The first of these was a strong restatement of the Hungarian line by Szuros. Writing in the foreign policy quarterly Kulpolitika,\(^5\) Szuros noted "an increase in the initiative role played by the small and medium-sized countries." He defended "Hungarian foreign policy" as distinct from "socialist foreign policy":

> By joining the IMF and the World Bank and generally by increasing our economic cooperation with the capitalist world, do we not make concessions at the expense of our relations with the socialist countries? The answer [to questions "among our friends abroad"] is a clear and firm no . . . we are endeavoring to ensure that Hungarian foreign policy serves even more directly than hitherto the interests of our economic development . . . [for as explained earlier in the text] we receive half our national income through foreign trade, and the volume of our economic relations is accounted for half in rubles and half in dollars.

Szuros returned to these themes in milder formulations in the more authoritative Nepszabadsag (November 2).\(^6\) His points were seconded

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\(^4\)Magyar Hirlap, May 21, 1985.
\(^5\)No. 4, 1985, available by October 1.
\(^6\)Eliciting what has evidently become an obligatory rebuttal from Czechoslovakia: Stefanek, in Rude Pravo, November 12, 1985. Szuros failed to head a delegation of the Hungarian party International Department to Moscow in late November (Pravda, November 30, 1985).
by Kadar, writing in the *New Hungarian Quarterly,* who singled out for praise the role of small and medium-sized countries "during difficult and cloudy periods."

Szuros's November 2 article was reprinted in *Neues Deutschland* on November 6, demonstrating the continuation through 1985 of the East German-Hungarian foreign policy axis, involving mutual reprinting of articles favorable to the respective country and endorsing ties with the West. The same point was made by the top leaderships of the two countries during Honecker's visit to Budapest in October 1985.

Bulgarian *Westpolitik* in 1985 was overshadowed by domestic economic and social tension (the latter worsened by the regime's attempt to forcibly "Bulgarize" the country's Turks) and by Soviet criticism of Bulgarian economic performance. Nonetheless, Bulgaria continued in a low-key way to express its interest in ties with the West (unlike Czechoslovakia).

Romanian foreign policy in 1985, too, was characterized by more of the same—closer relations with Moscow dictated by economic necessity, but continued cultivation of Western ties and reiteration of the longstanding Romanian ideological theses on national independence.

The sum of these developments was greater activism and initiative in foreign policy on the part of the majority of East European states than might have been expected at the outset of the Gorbachev period. This is testimony to the strength of the ties between Eastern and Western Europe that have developed in the past decade and the political as well as economic motivations that have made key East European leaderships captives of expanding ties with the West.

The continued East European activism under Gorbachev is also attributable to the absence of a clear Soviet line on *Westpolitik*: If the mechanisms of bloc policy coordination improved with Gorbachev's consolidation of power, the policy content of that coordination process remained undefined. This was explicable in part by the revived Soviet debate about domestic policies—economic organization above all—and the implicit and explicit extension of that debate to Eastern Europe. Gorbachev seemed to successfully consolidate his power with continued key personnel appointments, yet the Soviet policy debate showed little

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98Other cases were the reprinting in the East German media of Deputy Foreign Minister Rostka's March 2 interview and an August article in *Nepszabadsag* praising East German détente policy.

99Standard Romanian positions on national characteristics under socialism and the important role of small states were reiterated by Ceausescu in speeches of July 11 and 24. See Romanian Situation Report No. 12, *Radio Free Europe Research,* August 13, 1986.
sign of slackening. With specific reference to Eastern Europe, that debate was largely shaped by the expression of different views on the part of two bureaucracies—the Central Committee Secretariat (specifically its bloc relations, International, and International Information departments) and Bogomolov’s bloc economy institute. These institutional differences suggested the likelihood of contending views on bloc policy within the Politburo and the absence of a “Gorbachev line.” As long as that situation continued, and as long as the Central Committee apparatus, on the one hand, and the Bogomolov institute, on the other, continued to send different signals, Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe remained ambiguous—and Eastern Europe’s room for maneuver and license to cultivate ties with Western Europe were correspondingly enhanced.
V. CONCLUSIONS

In the 1970s, under conditions of European détente, the Soviets faced an increasingly pronounced dilemma: They wished to use control over Eastern Europe—the primary Soviet imperial asset—to promote greater Soviet influence in Western Europe while at the same time avoiding the reverse influence from Western Europe that could threaten that control.

This dilemma was most evident in Poland. European détente and the ensuing influx of Western influences were important contributing factors and probably preconditions for the emergence of Solidarity in 1980. Moscow correctly pointed to Poland's ties with the West in the 1970s as one cause of the Polish crisis, yet the Soviets did not draw a clear conclusion that the way to avoid future "Polands" was to isolate Eastern Europe. There were two principal reasons for this. First, since Western Europe (like the United States) was still interested in expanding ties with Eastern Europe, Moscow evidently concluded that slightly more differentiated European détente could serve Soviet longer-term interests by maintaining channels for expanding Soviet influence in Western Europe and by promoting American-West European differences (a prospect reinforced by NATO's self-imposed disarray over the "pipeline deal"). "More differentiated" détente meant, in these circumstances, toleration of the Western isolation of Poland—i.e., not boycotting Western Europe while Poland was boycotted by the West—and more discrimination in the nature of East-West economic ties—i.e., no more "Polish-style" loans. Moscow was especially concerned with the situation in West Germany and hoped that altered security thinking in the SPD and the growing "peace movement" could prevent NATO's INF deployment, thus further decoupling European defense from that of the United States while increasing intra-Western divisions. The effort to thwart NATO's INF deployment thus became a key objective to which other aspects of Soviet policy toward Western Europe "after Poland," and hence the Soviet notion of proper East-West European relations, was harnessed. This objective specifically precluded a policy of attempting to isolate Eastern from Western Europe to avoid future "Polands."

Second, a continued Soviet interest, however qualified, in utilizing the Western economic connection to help stabilize Eastern Europe also precluded such isolation. The Polish crisis emphasized—albeit perhaps more to East European leaderships than Moscow—the importance of
avoiding the kinds of socio-economic tensions that could lead to another “Poland.” This situation mandated that Eastern Europe continue to develop ties with Western Europe.

Yet the Soviet effort to again exploit the West-East European connection led to new challenges from Eastern Europe to bloc cohesion and discipline. Hungary, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Romania had special motives for and special interests in continuing to cultivate ties with Western Europe. The East European elites defined their “national” economic and political interests more distinctly in the course of blocwide ideological debates about the “lessons” of Poland and “contradictions in socialism.” From the Soviet perspective, these special interests detracted from the effectiveness of overall Soviet policy toward Western Europe.

The disadvantage to the Soviets was clearest in the case of East Germany. Moscow initially welcomed Honecker’s slogan of “damage limitation,” but the resulting unprecedented development of ties between East Berlin and Bonn, with Bonn trying to “buy” concessions from East Germany, undoubtedly caused Moscow to question whether this approach really contributed to encouraging West Germany to reconsider its INF decision. The Soviets probably concluded that, on the contrary, it encouraged “illusions” that NATO’s INF deployment had in the end not involved significant costs in relations with the East at all. Moscow could also note a negative East European impact on the West European peace movement. The Soviet “counterdeployment” in East Germany and Czechoslovakia caused considerable popular dissatisfaction and led to more independent peace movement activities in those countries. This fed back into the peace movement in Western Europe, diluting somewhat the intended exclusively anti-NATO orientation.

Soviet concern about the impact of East-West European ties on its anti-INF policy in late 1983 and early 1984 could only have been reinforced by the opposition in Eastern Europe to the harder Soviet line regarding such ties in April-May 1984. In this period, foreign policy disarray in Eastern Europe, and especially the continued pursuit of ties with Western Europe—in particular, between East Germany and West Germany—clearly undercut the shock effect that the Soviet policy shift was presumably intended to induce in Western Europe. Thus on balance, foreign policy diversity in Eastern Europe in 1983–1984 detracted from the effectiveness of Soviet anti-INF policy in Western Europe, while reviving for Moscow troublesome issues of bloc unity and discipline.

While the specific developments of 1984 seem only explicable in light of the unsettled Soviet leadership situation of the time, the
underlying causes of those developments affect the policies of the more consolidated Gorbachev leadership as well. Gorbachev's return to a policy of differentiated détente vis-à-vis all West European countries in 1985 (including a less hostile line toward Bonn in late 1985) has removed an immediate source of Soviet-East European tension, since active East European Westpolitik is again largely in tune with Soviet policy. The broadening of East German foreign policy to include cultivation of relations with France, Italy, and other Western countries in addition to West Germany has further dampened Soviet-East European tension. Yet the underlying differences between the USSR and the East European states with respect to the motivations for and consequences of developing ties with Western Europe continue. Hungary and East Germany, especially, have continued policies toward Western Europe in 1985 that are more active than Moscow might prefer.

Intensification of Soviet contacts with West European countries gives the East European regimes further license to cultivate ties with the West—with all the ensuing foreign and domestic policy implications demonstrated in recent years. Should the current Soviet policy of cultivation of Western Europe continue, renewed negative feedback is likely to occur in Eastern Europe that will again constrain Soviet policy in Western Europe. This cyclical relationship appears to be well-established.

Yet if Eastern Europe serves as a constraint on Soviet Westpolitik, Western Europe also serves as a constraint on Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe. The challenge to Soviet interests in Eastern Europe is likely to continue to increase, on issues ranging from Soviet foreign policy positions to domestic economic viability and social peace.¹ But a radically different, more repressive Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe would imply a drastic limitation of Eastern Europe's ties with the West that would both constrain Soviet policy objectives in Western Europe and exacerbate Eastern Europe's immediate economic and social difficulties. The same adverse consequences would ensue from a Soviet hardline policy toward Western Europe that Moscow would attempt to impose on Eastern Europe as well.

Thus the political costs of empire in Eastern Europe have increased for Moscow. Moscow may still be able to manage the increasing challenges to Soviet interests, but any amelioration of those challenges seems to require unacceptable sacrifices of other Soviet interests. In this sense, the Soviet bloc foreign policy disarray of 1984 was less a consequence of Soviet leadership disarray than an indicator of

¹As argued in Brown and Johnson, Challenges to Soviet Control in Eastern Europe.
deepening bloc fissures. In 1957 and 1967, reconsolidation of Soviet leadership after a lengthy succession process ended foreign policy disarray (albeit only briefly in 1967), while in 1985 it did not. The characteristics that distinguish proper from improper East European policy toward the West, from the Soviet perspective, were no clearer in spring 1986 than in mid-1984. Soviet leadership cohesion is no longer the predominant variable explaining Soviet bloc disharmony. Thus the Soviet bloc disarray in 1984 was not so much atypical behavior in unique circumstances as an indicator of things—absent fundamental changes in the Soviet-East European relationship—to come.

Soviet foreign policy decisionmakers may still conclude that extending influence over Western Europe and consolidating control over Eastern Europe are mutually reinforcing objectives. Yet many in the Soviet elite evidently also see the other side of the coin: East-West European ties constrain Soviet policy in Western Europe, limiting the extent and duration of sharp departures in the direction of either wooing or threatening Western Europe, and at the same time dampening Soviet efforts to discipline Eastern Europe.
Appendix

A CHRONOLOGY OF EAST EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WAKE OF NATO'S INF DEPLOYMENT

1983

November

Honecker addresses the 7th East German Party Plenum (November 27) and calls for continued dialogue with West Germany "to limit the damage" said to be created by NATO's INF deployment.

Kadar visits East Berlin (November 30).

December

The Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers Committee convenes for its annual meeting in Sofia. Ustinov calls for increased East European defense buildup in light of the NATO buildup.

1984

January

Hungarian party Secretary Szuros publishes a major article in Tarsadalme szemle emphasizing national interests and the role of smaller countries.

Honecker (Neues Deutschland, January 3) calls for dialogue with West Germany.

East German foreign minister Fischer visits Moscow (January 3); his public remarks are notably softer than those of Gromyko.

A Soviet delegation led by Gromyko visits Bucharest (January 30-February 1).

February

British Prime Minister Thatcher visits Budapest (February 3-4, 1984).

Andropov dies (February 10).
Honecker restates the GDR “damage limitation” to regional party secretaries (February 12).

Honecker and Chancellor Kohl have their first meeting (February 13) in Moscow on the occasion of Andropov’s funeral.

March

Bucharest, on behalf of the Warsaw Pact, presents a proposal to NATO countries for talks on reducing defense spending (March 5).

At the spring Leipzig Trade Fair, Honecker meets with several high West German officials and accepts an invitation to visit West Germany and meet with Chancellor Kohl (March 11).

Czechoslovak party officials Stefanek and Hlivka take issue (in Rude Pravo, March 30) with Szuros’s theses, denying any special role for small states and accusing those who argue the contrary of “opportunism.”

April

Italian Premier Craxi visits Budapest.

Soviet Central Committee official Rakhmanin (in Voprosy istorii KPSS, No. 4, 1984, signed to the press April 3, under the pseudonym Borisov) restates the importance of Soviet experience, quoting an earlier statement by Kadar on the danger of ignoring “general laws” of socialism and casting aspersions on “remnants” of private ownership under socialism. He praises “internationalism” and questions a special role for small countries.

Szuros defends the Hungarian position in Magyar Hirlap (April 4), arguing that the danger of war has not increased, that the structure of détente is in effect, and that small countries have an important role to play vis-à-vis the superpowers.

Chernenko (in Pravda, April 9) dismisses talks for the sake of talks.

Neues Deutschland (April 12) reprints the Szuros’ April 4 article.

Novoe vremia (April 13) publishes a slightly toned-down version of the Stefanek-Hlivka article of March 30.

The Hungarian party Central Committee issues a foreign policy statement defending the Hungarian position on the eve of Gromyko’s visit
to Budapest (April 17–18). The joint communiqué issued on the visit contains tougher language.

The Warsaw Pact Committee of Foreign Ministers meets in Budapest (April 19–20) and issues a communiqué that is relatively mild in tone.

Kadar restates the Hungarian position, warning of neglect of “specific traits” of socialist countries, in an interview with Leaders, reprinted in Neues Deutschland (April 19).

May

The Soviet Defense Ministry announces (May 14) the deployment of “additional” Soviet missiles in East Germany.

Ustinov, in a May 20 TASS interview, states that Soviet missiles introduced into East Germany and Czechoslovakia in late 1983 are now “operational” and warns that additional SS-20s will be deployed in the European USSR if the United States adds missiles in Europe.

East German Politburo member Hager, addressing the 8th Party Plenum (May 24), reemphasizes the East German line. He calls for a “security partnership” and a “community of responsibility” with realistic forces in the West and says East Germany has tried to improve inter-German relations after NATO’s INF deployment. Herbert Haeber, head of the Central Committee Department of Western Affairs since 1973, is promoted to full member of the Politburo and Secretariat.

Zhivkov visits Moscow (May 31–June 1).

June

Ceausescu visits Moscow (June 4). Romanian media fail to report Chernenko’s rejection of the view that the USSR should continue arms negotiations with the United States despite NATO deployments, as Romania had suggested in November 1983.

Kadar meets Chernenko in Moscow (June 13). Both leaders resolve (according to TASS) to “redouble their efforts aimed at ensuring peace and international security and at reverting to the road of normal cooperation among states.”

Honecker meets Chernenko in Moscow (June 14) and discusses, inter alia (according to TASS), “activization of . . . revanchist circles in the
FRG; both leaders stressed the "significance of the peace initiatives advanced by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries."

Chancellor Kohl visits Budapest (June 21–23). On this occasion *Nepszabadsag* (Gyori article, June 21) praises Hungarian-West German ties.

Hungarian party Secretary Szuros visits Moscow (June 28–29).

Honecker, in an interview for Swedish media (ADN, June 29) refuses to speculate on his projected visit to West Germany.

Swedish Premier Palme visits East Berlin (June 29–30).

**July**

Hungarian official Horn reinforces the Hungarian position in an article in *Kulpolitika* (No. 3). He states that Hungarian foreign policy is European-oriented, as is Hungarian trade, and that economic ties can play a stabilizing political role. He omits any criticism of West Germany and indirectly seems to criticize the Soviet SS-20 deployment. Hungary tries to "reduce the political damage" in the wake of the INF deployment.

Greek Premier Papandreou visits East Berlin (July 5–7).

Honecker, in an interview for *Il Messaggero* (*Neues Deutschland*, July 9), discusses his upcoming visit to West Germany as a certain thing. He pledges to promote a "security partnership" and to "deal with all questions about relations between the GDR and the FRG in an open dialogue."

Italian Premier Craxi visits East Berlin (July 9–10). Craxi is quoted in *Neues Deutschland* (July 11) as praising inter-German ties as of "immense value for all of Europe."

Lufthansa and Interflug agree (July 10) on Frankfurt-Leipzig flights during the fall 1984 Leipzig Trade Fair.

The USSR delivers a memorandum (July 10) objecting to the formal lifting of restrictions on West German armaments by the West European Union.

Soviet Bloc CC secretaries for ideological and international affairs, including Szuros, Hager, Ponomarev, Zimianin, and Russakov, meet in Prague (July 11–12). The meeting declares that the success of the
peace movement depends “on the power and unity of the socialist community, on the cohesion of its communist and workers’ parties based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism, including solidarity, comradely mutual assistance, complete equality, non-interference in one another’s internal affairs, respect for the right of each party to independently determine and pursue its political course.” (World Marxist Review, September 1984, pp. 39-40.)

Czechoslovak foreign minister Chnoupek visits Bonn (July 13) and restates Czechoslovakia’s interest “in continuing dialogue.”

Soviet foreign policy commentator Bovin, interviewed in the East Berlin Berliner Zeitung (July 19), endorses East Germany’s policy of dialogue with West Germany.

The anniversary of the anti-Hitler conspiracy of July 20, 1944, is appraised more positively in the GDR than in the USSR.

Komsomolskaia pravda (July 24) reprints Honecker’s statement that the GDR must “build socialism” under “wetoffene Bedingungen” (openness to Western influences).

East German Politburo member Kranz’s references in a speech in Poland to the “imperialist FRG” and “greater German expansionism” are excised from the Neues Deutschland version (July 24).

West German official Jenniger announces (July 25) a second Bonn-guaranteed loan to East Germany and speaks of related East German “concessions” on travel.

German specialist Bezymenskii, writing in Pravda (July 27), warns that Bonn is trying to subvert the GDR and implicitly criticizes East German policy. He quotes Honecker’s October 1980 Gera speech and a December 1981 hardline statement. He dismisses the notion of an East-West European “security partnership.”

Hungarian foreign policy commentator Thurzo supports the East German line in Nepszava (July 28).

CPSU International Department deputy head Zagladin sharply criticizes West Germany (New Times, July, available July 28) for “revanchism.”

Neues Deutschland (July 30) reprints the July 28 Thurzo article.
East German Politburo member Haeber states the East German position to West German journalist Sommer (reported in Die Zeit, August 2). He declares East Germany wants neither to simply execute Soviet orders nor to escape from the Soviet alliance. He is positive on a Honecker visit to West Germany and declares that top-level inter-German talks should deal with science and technology, culture, the environment, and security issues.

August

Neues Deutschland (August 1) publishes an authoritative article (signed A.Z.) defending the Honecker line by quoting East German statements made since the November 1983 Plenum on “damage limitation,” “dialogue,” “security partnership,” and not missing “a single chance” to defuse tensions.

An authoritative Pravda article (unsigned, “On the False Path,” August 2) implicitly criticizes East Berlin for the nature of its relations with Bonn, which is accused of engaging in economic subversion and ignoring the legitimate demands of East Germany. Under current conditions, the article maintains, the notion of “damage limitation” is pharisaic.

Sovetskaia Kul’tura (August 2) carries a general article by Lev Tolkunov on East-West relations praising détente.

Trybuna ludu (August 4-5) carries an article by foreign affairs editor Lulinski implicitly criticizing the GDR for the nature of its ties with Bonn.

Neues Deutschland (August 4-5) reprints the Tolkunov article.

The Hungarian press agency correspondent in East Berlin, writing in N. Magyarorszag (August 5), praises inter-German dialogue “on 17 levels,” lauds the new West German credit to East Germany, and welcomes Honecker’s projected trip to West Germany as an indicator of the important role of small countries. “The strengthening of inter-German dialogue is clearly due to the increased initiating role of the GDR and first of all to its striving to limit and eliminate the damage caused by the deployment of missiles.”

A “Soviet journalist” tells a West German journalist (Siegl, in Frankfurter Rundschau, August 8), “If things continue and the GDR becomes a second Poland for us, the Rubicon will have finally been crossed.”
**Literaturnaia gazeta** (August 8) endorses inter-European ties.

**Sotsialisticheskaia industriia** (Dadiants article, August 10) criticizes the July West German credit to East Germany.

**Neues Deutschland** (August 10) publishes an article by PCI leader Cossetta praising détente.

Veteran German affairs commentator “Genri” (in Literaturnaia gazeta, August 15) attacks West German “militarists” as “heirs to Hitler’s generals.”

Honecker defends his line in an interview (ADN, August 17) but makes some concessions to Soviet criticism. He defends dialogue and the notion of a “security partnership” as efforts to avoid “war beginning again from German soil” and affirms that inter-German ties develop with full respect for East German sovereignty, but he recalls some points made in his 1980 Gera speech.

Hungarian party Secretary Szuros, in a speech on August 20, praises improved inter-German relations.

Honecker attends celebrations in Bucharest (August 21)—the only Soviet bloc leader to do so—and calls for “continuing the political dialogue.” Ceausescu presents him with Romania’s highest decoration.

**Neues Deutschland** (August 22) reprints Szuros’s August 20 speech.

East German leader Mies has met “recently” with Gorbachev.

Radio Budapest (August 27) cautions that “Western” actions may “wreck this or that visit or meeting. However, dialogue will continue.”

Soviet minister Kostandov, in an interview in East Berlin (August 29), praises “socialist economic cooperation” as a safeguard against hostile efforts by “imperialism.”

Bucharest radio (August 28) announces Ceausescu will visit West Germany on October 15-19.

Ustinov, speaking in Czechoslovakia (August 28), criticizes “ruling circles in Bonn” and warns of the danger of “trying to weaken the socialist community and to drive a wedge in the cooperation between the fraternal socialist countries.”

Zhivkov tells visiting West German politicians (late August) that détente is the “only alternative.” Visitors also told that Zhivkov plans to visit West Germany in September.
September

Polish German expert Tomala (Nowe Drogi, September) questions the course of development of inter-German relations.

Moldt, GDR's permanent representative to the FRG, announces (September 4) that the Honecker visit to West Germany has been postponed.

Honecker, writing in Einheit (September, reported in Neues Deutschland, September 6), explains the GDR's need to develop socialism under conditions of exposure to Western influences.

The Soviet Politburo discusses bloc unity at its September 6 meeting, according to Radio Moscow (September 10).

East German official Reinhold, in an interview with West German television on September 8, calls for "actions" by a "community of responsibility" to reduce the danger of war, and suggests a compromise formulation on West German recognition of East German citizenship.

Gorbachev visits Sofia (September 8), where he criticizes the Western policy of "differentiation" and warns that "no one can stand aside" from the task of "consolidating socialist unity."

West German (September 9) and bloc sources report the Bulgarian decision to postpone Zhivkov visit to West Germany.

Soviet foreign affairs commentator Berezhkov justifies the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 (Literaturnaia gazeta, September 12).

Sotsialisticheskaia industriia (Gribachev article, September 16) accuses Kohl and Reagan of "repeating the slogans and methods of Hitler."

East German Politburo member Axen visits Bonn (September 20) for talks with the SPD on limiting chemical weapons, but has no contact with government officials.

Colonel Ponomarev reports in Krasnaia zvezda (September 25) on a seminar devoted to the dangers of underestimating revisionism in West Germany.

Pravda sharpens Honecker's seventy-third birthday congratulations to Chernenko (September 25) to make them more anti-Western.
October

Rusakov, writing in *World Marxist Review*, condemns “an upsurge in revanchist sentiments in Bonn’s policies” and “persistent attempts to encroach on the sovereign rights of the GDR and to interfere in its internal affairs.” He also sharply criticizes the IMF as “an instrument of outright interference in the internal affairs of indebted countries.”

*Kommunist* (No. 15) editorially stresses bloc unity, emphasizing internationalism and the special status of the CPSU and condemning “repudiation of collective discussions and initiatives and of joint actions.”

Faluvegi’s speech on the GDR’s 35th anniversary (*Nepszabadsag*, October 5) praises East Germany’s “active foreign policy” and its readiness for dialogue.

SPD leader Vogel visits East Berlin. *Neues Deutschland* (October 5) quotes his statement on a compromise on the GDR’s “Gera conditions.”

Honecker, writing in *Prawda* (October 5), says East Germany will make no concessions to Bonn.

Honecker, speaking on the occasion of the 35th anniversary of the GDR (*ADN*, October 6) stresses that “socialist achievements” are secure in East Germany and praises political dialogue in general, but is silent on ties with Bonn.

Gromyko, addressing the GDR anniversary celebrations, lectures that Bonn wants to incorporate the GDR into its governmental system. The final communiqué (October 8) calls for more effective foreign policy coordination.

Honecker visits Finland (October 16–19) and, prior to the visit, reportedly (*Helsinki radio*, October 11) describes the postponement of his visit to West Germany as a temporary setback.

Marshal Ogarkov visits Honecker in Berlin (October 12) following his replacement as Chief of Staff.

Kadar visits Paris (October 15–16).

Ceausescu visits Bonn (October 15–16).

*Narodna Armiia* (Sofia, October 24) reiterates Bulgarian concerns about the economic feasibility of additional defense expenditures.
November

Austrian Chancellor Sinowatz visits East Berlin (November 5–6).

*Neues Deutschland* (November 8), reviewing an SPD position paper on the German question, restresses the notions of “security partnership” and “coalition of reason.”

December

The Warsaw Pact Foreign Minister’s Committee meets in East Berlin (December 4) and claims that the Pact counterdeployment “forced the U.S. to adopt a more conciliatory stance.”

At a conference in Prague, Szuros repeats many of the points he made earlier in 1984 (*Nepszabadsag*, December 6): “Our foreign policy strove, with the opportunities and means available to it, to prevent further deterioration in the international atmosphere and to promote efforts aimed at improving relations. . . . We regard it as natural that under different conditions, different answers come about, even in analyzing problems of such great significance as the specific image of a future socialist society or the paths leading to socialism. It also happens that—arising from the specific interests of their countries, of one region or another—parties judge certain international issues differently. . . . We believe that views that differ from the generally accepted fundamental principles, disparage the results of other parties, or call others to account . . . cause unnecessary tensions between the parties . . . our party acknowledges the legitimacy of creative path-seeking.”

Ponomarev stresses, in contrast, an “increase in the cohesion among the socialist countries, their combined course of action on the international arena, and their common struggle against the subversive activity of imperialism.” (Prague television, December 6.)

West German official Schaeuble visits East Germany (December 6) to discuss the range of pending inter-German agreements.

Bloc party ideological secretaries meet in Moscow (December 9); Romania fails to send a representative.

Zhivkov, in an interview for the SPD weekly (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, December 12), calls for good relations with Bonn, including “dialogue on the highest level.”

Belgian foreign minister Tindermans visits East Berlin (December 11).
West German Foreign Minister Genscher visits Prague. Radio Prague comments (December 20) that “he could not offer anything concrete.”

Hungarian foreign minister Varkonyi, writing in Magyar Hirlap (December 24), defends the Hungarian foreign policy line of 1984.

Hungarian party official Horn, writing in Nepszabadsag (December 31), stresses the role of non-superpower states.

1985

January

Honecker praises East-West cooperation in the face of even antagonistic political standpoints or causes to foreign diplomats (January 7).

Honecker receives SPD politician Rau (January 11). The East German press agency claims East Germany is “in favor of a world-wide coalition of reason and realism and of a meaningful results-oriented dialogue . . . precisely because of the current complex international situation, it is now more important than ever for the two German states to work actively for peace disarmament, and détente . . . by proceeding realistically and on the basis of the Basic Treaty [of 1972], that which has been achieved can be retained and augmented.” The comment criticizes “vociferous statements” (not revanchism) in West Germany.

Hungarian foreign minister Varkonyi visits Bucharest (January 21–22).

East Germany states its maximalist position on the issue of East German citizenship (Neues Deutschland, January 30).

March

Hungarian Politburo member Sarlos, writing in the East German party monthly (Einheit, March 1985), stresses the role of small countries in reducing international tension.

West German Foreign Minister Genscher visits the USSR (March 3–4).

Czechoslovak foreign minister Chnoupek (in Trybuna, March 1) calls for strengthening the Warsaw Pact and defending the socialist community against efforts to drive “wedges” in it.

Hungarian deputy foreign minister Roska (in an interview with Thurzo, Nepszava, March 2) defends Hungary’s “activist foreign
policy” promoting dialogue with the West and visits of Western leaders. He says there are differences in the Soviet bloc on renewing the Warsaw Pact and on domestic models. “Anyone in touch with reality will take cognizance of these differences and not see them as an aberration.”

*Neues Deutschland* (March 3) reprints the Roska interview.

East German Politburo member Axen visits the SPD in Bonn on March 2-3 and sees Genscher.

Hungarian media play up the Axen-Genscher meeting.

West German Foreign Minister Genscher visits Sofia (March 9-10). West German sources (ddp, March 10) report that Zhivkov is to reschedule his trip to West Germany.

Honecker, visiting West German exhibits at the Leipzig Trade Fair (March 11), states that expanded inter-German trade can promote the further development of overall relations. He praises Chancellor Kohl's State of the Nation speech to the Bundestag, in contrast to Soviet criticism.

Gorbachev meets with bloc leaders in Warsaw (March 11) and stresses bloc ties as the “first precept” of Soviet policy.

West German Economics Minister Bangemann meets Honecker and Politburo member Mittag in connection with his visit to the Leipzig Trade Fair (March 12).

Kohl meets with Honecker for two hours during the Chernenko funeral ceremonies in Moscow (March 13).

Radio Prague warns (March 21) that credits by Western countries or the IMF to socialist states “always end in attempts at political blackmail.”

Romanov (addressing the 13th Hungarian Party Congress on March 26) warns of the need for “consolidation of our states’ economic independence from the West” and for preventing “imperialist forces from exploiting economic levers as a means of political pressure and interference in the affairs of the sovereign socialist states.”
April

Soviet commentator V. Kuznetsov stresses to Hungary (*Nepszabadsag*, April 4) "close coordination of [socialist states'] actions in the international and other spheres."

British Foreign Secretary Howe visits East Berlin (April 8-10).

East German media (e.g., *Neues Deutschland*, April 10) begin to use the expression "Soviet Forces in the GDR" instead of the standard "Group of Soviet Forces in Germany."

East German Politburo member Mittag visits Hanover and Bonn (April 17-18), declaring that West-East German economic ties are "an important factor in stabilizing relations as a whole between the two German states."

Honecker visits Rome, his first trip to a NATO country (April 23-24). In an interview with Italian journalists, he speaks of a community of responsibility of the two German states.

May

Honecker visits Moscow (May 4-5).

June

French Prime Minister Fabius visits East Berlin (June 10-11).

Husak, addressing the Czechoslovak Party Plenum (June 19), rejects "market-oriented concepts" of economic reform.

The East German party and the West German SPD issue a joint proposal for the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Central Europe (June 20).

A *Pravda* article by "Vladimirov" (June 21) stresses international over national interests. The article is reprinted in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia but ignored in East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.

Ceausescu visits East Berlin (June 28-30).

East Germany indicates (June 6) its intention to attend the 1988 Olympic Games in South Korea (Soviet officials have questioned the suitability of the venue). *Neues Deutschland* (June 30) reports that Hungary will also attend.
July

*Kommunist* carries articles by Soviet official Bogomolov and Hungarian leader Nemeth in effect upholding the principle of national differences in socialism and supporting the Hungarian economic reform.

Soviet party Secretariat official Portugalov, interviewed on Austrian television, downplays the "Vladimirov" article.

Bonn and East Berlin agree (July 5) on an increase in the interest-free "swing" credit in inter-German trade from 600 million to 850 million accounting units. An evident East German quid pro quo is restrictions on illegal immigrants from Sri Lanka entering West Berlin through East Berlin's airport.

Hungarian foreign minister Varkonyi visits Moscow (July 7-8).

August

The Hungarian party daily *Nepszabadsag* praises East German détente policy. *Neues Deutschland* (August 9) reprints the article.

*Novoe Vremia* (August 23) gives more weight (in an article by Shishlin) to national differences in the Soviet bloc than did the Vladimirov article of June 21.

Soviet commentator Bovin, interviewed on Hungarian radio (August 31), supports a foreign policy role for small states and seems to fully back the Hungarian line. ("In a period of [superpower] confrontation, the weight and role of the small- and medium-sized countries grows.")

September

Negotiations for a cultural agreement between East and West Germany resume in East Berlin (September 11).

Kadar and Szuros visit Prague (September 30).

October

Soviet bloc leaders meet in Sofia (October 22-23) for a session of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee.

Honecker visits Greece (October 12).
Honecker visits Budapest (October 29) and calls for continued “political dialogue” with Western Europe.

Kadar visits Great Britain (October 31–November 2).

**November**

Kadar (writing in the *New Hungarian Quarterly*, No. 4, 1985, as reported by MTI on November 2) restates the Hungarian position on East-West ties. He praises the role of small and medium-sized countries “during difficult and cloudy periods.”

Hungarian party Secretary Szuros, writing in *Nepszabadsag* (November 2) after months of silence, discusses national peculiarities under socialism.

*Neues Deutschland* (November 6) excerpts the Szuros November 2 article.

Czechoslovak party International Department head Stefanek, writing in *Rude Pravo* (November 12), stresses bloc cohesion.

Hungarian party Secretary Szuros visits West Germany (November 23) in his capacity as president of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian Parliament.

East German Politburo member Felfe visits Minister Schaeuble in Bonn (November 28).

**December**

Kadar visits Austria (December 11).

Secretary of State Schultz visits Romania and Hungary (December 15–16).

Marshal Ogarkov’s name heads the list of Soviet military leaders expressing condolences on the death of East German defense minister Hoffman (*Neues Deutschland*, December 4).
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see reverse side
This report examines the ways in which Soviet control of Eastern Europe has both contributed to and detracted from the Soviet Union’s pursuit of foreign policy goals in Western Europe. In successive sections, it (1) reviews the highlights of past USSR-East European-West European interactions and outlines general characteristics of the triangular relationship; (2) examines the impact of the Polish crisis; and (3) traces the East European foreign policy activity related to NATO’s 1983 decision to deploy intermediate-range nuclear forces and analyzes the emergence of a group of East European states—East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania—whose policies differed from those of the Soviets. The author suggests that, while Eastern Europe serves as a constraint on Soviet relations with Western Europe, Western Europe also acts as a constraint on Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe.