


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INDIAN DEFENSE POLICY
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR NEPAL

BY

COLONEL DHARMAPAL BARSINGH THAPA

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

**INDIAN DEFENSE POLICY
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR NEPAL
AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT**

by

Colonel Dharmapal Barsingh Thapa

**Professor Gabriel Marcella
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ABSTRACT

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
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
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Soviet Union, East and South



CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

General.

Sandwiched between the Tibetan Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China in the North and the Union of India in the South, Nepal finds itself confronted by two of the world's most populous nations that share deep seated suspicions of each other. In a world that was originally bipolar in nature, Nepal had opted for a policy of nonalignment which served her well when her immediate neighbors resorted to hostilities. Though India herself is a founding member of the nonaligned movement, Nepal's policy of maintaining an equidistance from her two neighbors was unpalatable and serious concerns continue to be voiced by Indian Political leadership on grounds that the Himalayas are the natural defensive line for the security of the subcontinent. Nepal, which had maintained her independence even during a period when large parts of the world were under the colonial powers, finds Indian concerns unacceptable since her perception of security do not correspond to that of India. The present international environment, much to the dismay of small countries like Nepal, is also not supportive of the small and the militarily weak nations of the world. Large powers view their national interests only in terms of various regional powers and the security problems of the small are never given any serious consideration. As such, though, the aims and objectives of the United Nations have yet to be realized, smaller nations like Nepal are compelled to put their faith on the world body and believe that the only alternative to the present

United Nations is a stronger United Nations. In this paper I shall try to expose some of the problems that small nations like Nepal have to face in view of the often hypocritical and contradictory policies of the larger powers and attempt to suggest some remedies that may be acceptable to all the actors concerned.

Background.

It is indeed ironic that the second most populous democracy in the world should find itself being drawn into the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union, a champion of Communism, while the most populous state in the world, Communist China, should seek closer ties with the leader of the Free World - the United States. After the emergence of India as a free and independent nation in 1947 and the emergence of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the leaders of India were more concerned about the Hindu - Muslim riots and the creation of an independent Muslim state of Pakistan. It was a period when both India and Pakistan were busy in trying to decide the fate of the princely states of the subcontinent through the use of military force. To the Indian leaders, it was Pakistan that posed a greater threat to her national interest. China was too far away, separated by the high Himalayas. It was also a period when Sino-Indian friendship was at it's apex and relations were very cordial based on the "spirit of Bandung." Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, raised with English values and traditions, was more concerned in establishing the leadership of India in the nonaligned movement, which he saw as a solution to the evils of the cold war in which the world was rapidly grouping itself into two opposing camps. The horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were still fresh in the minds of

these leaders to whom alignment signaled a commitment to war - not security.

Post-Independent Period.

From the time of gaining her independence to the time when India was jolted out of her hibernation by the Chinese excursion across the Himalayas in 1962, the Indian leadership, civilian and military, seem to have viewed Pakistan as the primary threat. To them, the defense of India involved the maintenance of the status quo if not an outright victory in the state of Jammu and Kashmir only. These leaders also placed more emphasis on the economic development of the country where poverty, illiteracy, hunger and disease were stark realities and constituted the real threat to the society and the nation. It is therefore not surprising that Indian Defense Policy formulation began with any sense of seriousness only after the 1962 debacle in which the once proud and glorious Indian Army suffered a humiliating setback and the more enlightened people of Indian society began to raise doubts on the security of their country.

Prior to the clash with the Chinese in 1962, the Indian Army, which constituted the main element in the Indian defense establishment, was led by able military commanders who were uneasy about the almost casual attitude and the near blind faith displayed by the political authorities in their assessment of the Chinese threat. It was a period when the defense ministers, like Krishna Menon, considered the Indian Army little more than a "parade ground army"¹ and exerted more influence on the selection and promotion of senior generals; and men with questionable ability and controversial ethical beliefs were elevated to very high positions in the army. Following the 1962 debacle and after several

prominent political and military heads had rolled, a new team sat down to make a defense plan, both to deal with the immediate situation and to prepare for the future. It is from this point that I intend to carry out my analysis of the Indian Defense Policy with its implications on the smaller countries of that region with particular emphasis on Nepal. Regional Environment.

It is not uncommon to hear Indian defense analysts take pride in claiming that due to her size, geostrategic location, population, and political stability of her democratic institutions, India occupies a crucial position in the area and is actively engaged in shaping the security of other South Asian countries.² Such claims have contributed to the fears and apprehensions that the smaller countries of the region share. Though most Indians do not appreciate the picture of India as a threat to her smaller neighbors and tend to dismiss such fears as unjustified and unrealistic, internal developments in India and her proclaimed policies or otherwise do often have strategic implications for these countries. The change in the status of Sikkim which originally was a "Protectorate" of India, the racial problems in Sri Lanka, the terrorist activities of Nepalese political opposition based in India and the sharing of the Ganges waters with Bangladesh are some examples of what could be considered as threats to their national interests by the smaller nations of the region.

In view of her size and political influence which she enjoys in the region, India is often puzzled and bitter over the seemingly unbalanced importance that the United States and some Western democracies place on Pakistan. She has also surprised Western observers by not displaying much concern on the possible threats that could arise to the

subcontinent in view of the continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the growing Vietnamese menace in Southeast Asia. Is it possible then that India with a highly mature and professional defense apparatus suffers from a myopic view of threats to her security or is India only exposing her short term military objectives while steadily continuing towards her longer term objectives? These are some of the questions which I shall try to analyze in this paper.

CHAPTER II

INDIA'S DEFENSE PROBLEMS

General.

When the British left India in 1947, there were many unsolved problems which were potential trouble areas for the newly independent states of India and Pakistan. Chief among these were the questions on the future of the state of Jammu and Kashmir and the Sultanate of Hyderabad. Much blood had already flown over the differences caused by religious dogmas and hostilities between the Hindus and the Muslims. Remnants of colonialism were still present in Goa where the Portugese held sway. The British Indian Army was still in the process of reconstitution into two national armies which were destined to face each other as enemies henceforth. The boundary demarcation between Tibet and India was based on a flimsy document which the Chinese were to denounce on the grounds that it was unequal thus non-binding on them. The unity of the many diverse ethnic and religious groups, successfully maintained by the British through the use of force, was a serious problem and there was no shortage of armchair strategists who predicted the eventual disintegration of the country into several smaller independent states. Such was the condition of the country whose security had to be guaranteed by the leadership of the newly emerged India. The diversity and the vastness of the country coupled with the broad spectrum of conflict were not easy tasks which the new generals had to face. These generals themselves were also not very familiar with the strategic and higher direction of war since they had very little experience, if any,

in the British Indian Army prior to 1947 when all senior appointments were reserved exclusively for the British alone.

Prior to independence, the British rulers of India were concerned of possible threats developing from Russia and later Japan. The British Indian Army was only a part of the might of Great Britain and the Royal Navy was ever present to provide the support. With the creation of Pakistan as a homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent and the emergence of a strong Communist regime in Beijing the situation had changed so radically that the defense problems bore no resemblance to those that Britain faced during the hundred and fifty years of her rule.³ Barely two months after independence the Indian Army was called upon to defend Kashmir from "raiders". The Maharaja of Kashmir, a Hindu, had signed the instrument of accession to the Union of India hoping to preserve his throne in a country which was predominantly Muslim. The Kashmir conflict had finally sealed the fates of the Armies of India and Pakistan to stare at each other as enemies in perpetuity instead of cooperating with each other for the defense of the subcontinent from external aggressors. It is unfortunate that the two nations had chosen to ignore the realities of history and embarked on a policy of viewing each other as the primary source of all threats to their security.

The Threat from Pakistan.

Even after the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh, India continues to be obsessed with Pakistan as the primary threat to her security. To a foreign observer this preoccupation seems very odd. To understand the reason for this Indian attitude one needs to delve deeper into Hindu-Muslim relations and the

rational for the creation of Pakistan as a separate Muslim state as also the problems that a secular state faces in a country as vast and as diverse as India.

The creation of Pakistan out of the Muslim majority areas in the east and west was a political solution to the problem of power sharing between the Muslims and the Hindus. The British had hoped that over the years the two countries would learn to live in peace and harmony but the leadership of the two countries had widely diverging perspectives which prevented the marrying-up of the two countries. Mahatma Gandhi and leaders of the Indian National Congress like Nehru were opposed to the two-nation approach that the British planned since they felt that the division would be too unnatural while the leaders of the Muslim League looked upon the partition as an unjust usurpation of the Moghul inheritance by the Hindus. The self-image of the Indian Muslims had been that of conquerors who had ruled the subcontinent for over 600 years and considered India part of the Muslim world.⁴ The new state of Pakistan did not include many areas like Delhi, Agra, Lucknow and Hyderabad which the Muslims of India had traditionally looked upon as centers of their culture and past greatness. Though two nations were created, millions of Muslims remained in India while many more, Hindus and Muslims, were uprooted from their homes and the subcontinent witnessed atrocities of an unprecedented scale in its history resulting in the creation of deep hatred between the two religious groups.

After the creation of a new nation, Pakistan chose to become an Islamic state while India, due to her size and ethnic diversity, chose to be secular in nature. Any mention by Pakistan of "Hindu domination" began to be interpreted by India as religious wedges aimed at creating

problems within her ethnic groups while Pakistan voiced serious misgivings on Indian refusal to concede the territory of Kashmir, where the population is predominantly Muslim, and feared it would amount to a repudiation of the very basis of Pakistan's existence, namely that Muslims are a separate nation from Hindus. The Indians, on the other hand, believe that the 1947 partition was based on differences of religion but cannot be made the basis for deciding disputes between the two countries. For this reason India continues to reject the right to self-determination for the people of Kashmir even though she had originally agreed to conduct a plebiscite in response to the UN Security Council resolutions.⁵

Following the Indian underground nuclear detonation in the Rajasthan desert in 1974, India strongly believes that Pakistan is engaged in the development of her own "Islamic Bomb" with funds from some of the oil-rich Arab countries. Arms transfers from the United States to Pakistan is also looked upon by India as a threat to her own security while the United States justifies these transfers on grounds that Pakistan has now become a front-line state in view of continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

Even after Pakistan was more than halved in population and her effectiveness as a serious threat against India was reduced, following the war of 1971 when the eastern wing of Pakistan broke away to form Bangladesh, India continues to view Pakistan as a threat to her security because of fears that Pakistan could take advantage of internal problems in India to stir up separatist movements among the diverse ethnic groups. After the conclusion of "Operation Blue Star", when Indian Army units were ordered to attack the Sikh rebels in the Golden

Temple of Amritsar, Indian political leaders have been accusing Pakistan of involvement. In spite of changed situations, both India and Pakistan still cannot get over this obsession of a threat developing from the other neighbor.

The Threat from China.

After the Indians had conceded to Chinese claims on Tibet, it is surprising that they never appear to have taken Chinese threats to her own security with any sense of seriousness. To the Indian political leadership, still fresh from the First Non-aligned Conference held in Bandung, a direct military confrontation with the Chinese was inconceivable. Following the ideological break between Moscow and Beijing, the Chinese had occupied parts of Kashmir and Northeastern Frontier Agency. They had quietly begun construction of a major military highway across Tibet and unknown to the Indians at that time, through some parts of Kashmir as well. Once the balloon went up, there were frantic Indian troop movements aimed at a "forward defense posture" and the creation of the so called "Special Task Force" with the task of "evicting all foreign troops from Indian territory." Political rhetoric dominated pragmatic military considerations and the Chinese, alarmed by the "provocative tactics" of the Indians,, reacted by sweeping across the Himalayas in Ladhak and the NEFA regions.⁶ The speed and ease with which the Chinese succeeded in pushing their forces surprised not only the Indians but also the Chinese themselves. For the first time the Himalayan region had become a live frontier after having remained dead all through history. The two great civilizations had finally come into contact after well over 2500 years of independent growth.

As a result of the reverses suffered by the Indian Army in 1962, Indian political leaders, civil and military officers made a soul searching reappraisal of India's defense problems and practices. Since then Indian defense planners have adopted a broader concept in the defense of the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean. She has also displayed her capability to produce nuclear weapons which is aimed at offsetting that of China and is actively engaged in establishing her military preeminence in South Asia for fears of a China - Pakistan axis. Over the years India - China relations have shown signs of improvement and though she no longer feels threatened by China to the same degree, India has been attempting to maintain a certain degree of regional hegemony to ensure that China or the other superpowers do not increase their influence in that region.

The Indian Ocean.

Indian defense planners view the activities of the superpowers in the Indian ocean as a source of possible threat to her 5,600 km coastline and also a possible source of friction in the future exploitation of the sea bed. Such imagined threats became a reality during the 1971 Indo - Pakistani Conflict when the USS Enterprise put in its appearance in the waters of the Bay of Bengal. India is concerned about the establishment of the US naval base in the island of Diego Garcia and feels it necessary to discourage the possible use of naval facilities by either of the two superpowers in the territories of the littoral states. She has been actively canvassing for the creation of a "Zone of Peace" in the Indian Ocean hoping to deny the entry of superpowers in this area. The Indian Navy, which was always relegated

to an inferior position among the three sister services, has now been given a greater degree of priority in view of the Indian perception of threats developing from the high seas.⁷

Smaller Neighbors.

Though India's smaller neighbors like Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bhutan do not pose any military threat to her security, India is concerned that these countries could become the targets of Chinese or super power influences thereby complicating the security environment of the subcontinent. Furthermore, with India now following the old British colonial policy of a "forward defense posture," these countries may be justified in their apprehensions on Indian designs. They are also aware that India could take advantage of internal unrest and civil strife in their territories to increase Indian influences.⁸ These countries generally share fears of an India which could embark on a policy of the creation of "Bharatbarsha" - a greater India.

Internal Threats.

Ever since the independence of India many western scholars had predicted the eventual disintegration of the country in view of the massive problems of poverty and underdevelopment, as also the religious, regional and ethnic divisions within the country. Despite these problems India has succeeded in coming out intact. Since the storming of the Golden Temple in Amritsar by the Indian Army the country is currently undergoing a severe challenge to its unity. Though the Naga and Mizo insurgency problems in the Eastern part of India are not as acute as they were a decade ago, they are nonetheless still live problems. Hindu - Muslim relations continue to create major heartburns to the political leaders of the nation. Demands for greater autonomy by

the states also threaten the unity and tranquility of the country. The Indian political leadership is aware that foreign powers could take advantage of her internal troubles to destabilize the situation and are as such very sensitive to any indications, real or otherwise, of any foreign involvement in her domestic affairs. This concern seems justified when viewed from the fact that Great Britain succeeded in creating an empire in the subcontinent through the skillful use of manipulation and creation of mistrust and division among the rulers of the many princely states of India.

Major Concerns for India.

With the Himalayas no longer providing the psychological defensive barrier and the need to protect her territorial acquisitions in Kashmir, India is faced with the possibility of a two-front war. Indian fears of a threat developing from the Indian Ocean from either of the superpowers and the occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet Forces has complicated the situation even further. She is particularly worried that Pakistan may offer base facilities to the US Navy in her ports as a precaution to Soviet moves directed towards the warm waters of the Arabian Sea. The need to hold together a vast country with a poor and hungry population rapidly approaching the 1 billion mark which is fragmented by religious and ethnic differences is no easy task even at the very best of times. It is generally not realized by foreign observers that though India is a country of many ethnic and racial groups, there are two major divisions. The population of Northern India is predominantly of Aryan origin while

that of South India are of Dravidian origin. This difference in her ethnic composition is a major factor which could pose serious problems for India in the future. Though India possesses abundant resources, the strain on her economy imposed by the need to safeguard her security has created even more instability within the country. Based on this backdrop we will now try to analyze her defense policy.

CHAPTER III

INDIA'S DEFENSE POLICY

THE SHAPING OF HER DEFENSE POLICY

Indian defense policy has been shaped by her history, both colonial and precolonial. An independent India inherited, from the British, a highly efficient and articulated civil service and an officer corps in her armed forces who were a true reflection of aristocratic British values and beliefs. The political leadership, on the other hand, was more an expression of the common India that was highly suspicious of the Western world, particularly the British "sahib," and never forgot that their country had been subjugated by powers from across the seas. As can be expected, the political leadership steered the country towards a policy of nonalignment for fears not only of becoming involved in the cold war between the US and the Soviet Union but also for her experience in having been subjugated by, what appeared then as allies of some princely state, the East India Company. To them the Soviet Union signified a champion of the oppressed that had industrialized itself in a relatively short period of time to emerge as a superpower and also as a counterweight to the colonial powers of the west. The civil service and the military officers, on the other hand, held the belief that there is an integral relationship between foreign policy and defense; that the foreign policy, however wisely conducted and ably followed, would not achieve any success if it did not have adequate military strength to back it. Thus during the earlier years of her independence, the views

of the politicians prevailed and India was steered towards a foreign policy which was dictated more by idealism than by pragmatic considerations of her national interests and defense was accorded a very low priority.

Nonalignment became the cornerstone of India's foreign policy. Prime Minister Nehru was not interested in building up a strong defense force and his main energies were directed only towards economic development, further expansion of the nonalignment movement, containment of Pakistan in Kashmir and resistance to superpower influences in the subcontinent. The military had very little say, if any, in the policy formulation process of the country. All this, however, was to change most dramatically after the 1962 border war with China.

The officers of the Indian Armed Forces and the civil service were aware that they had inherited a strategic position between Europe and East Asia. They had been used to working within a system that was employed by Imperial Britain to police everything "East of the Suez." The 1962 conflict ensured that the military would also become key actors in the policy formulation process of the country.

Traditional strategic perceptions, which were rooted in the old Imperial Defense College ideas believed that India could not be defended in the Plains of Punjab or the Indo-Gangetic Plains, that the subcontinent is a strategically indivisible unit and that it must be defended at the Hindu Kush, the Himalayas, the Malacca Straits and Bab-el Mandab, it not the Suez.⁹ Senior military leaders still support this view and believe that India needs a strong and stable Pakistan just as Pakistan needs defensive depth and would like to encourage and help Pakistan create a credible defense in the north and

west. The civilian "think tank" led by K. Subramaniam believes that this concept is no longer valid as no country can hope to subjugate a country with a large population and that there is no possibility of an invasion of India by the Russians or the Chinese from the north or by the Americans from the south. He lists five major security concerns for India:10

- o Trouble in a neighboring country spilling over into India.
- o Covert intervention by a neighbor or other powers in India's domestic affairs.
- o Miscalculation by one of its neighbors about any Indian domestic situation, leading to military intervention.
- o Visible superpower presence in the neighborhood, encouraging extremist elements in India.
- o Lack of confidence in the government's ability to shelter India from turbulence in the neighborhood, producing adverse impact on national integration and development.

Though Subramaniam has discounted the possibility of a direct military threat to India from the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan or across the Himalayas by the Chinese or the US from the Indian Ocean, it should not be forgotten that the policy makers have tried to formulate a defense policy for India both to deal with the immediate situation and also to prepare for the future. What Mr. Subramaniam has expressed are most likely India's short term concerns as also a justification for the intervention in Pakistan's eastern wing during the 1971 war. They are also intended to serve as warnings to India's immediate neighbors on what India considers to be the limit of her toleration. Indian leadership, both political and military, is

aware that she has the economic, technical and military potential to go beyond the regional role that she plays as present and there can be no doubt that they aspire to an enhanced role.¹¹ The desire to maintain regional hegemony is bound to have a braking effect on Indian long term policy objectives. When one considers India's long term strategic objectives, it becomes quite evident that her first task is to create an atmosphere of trust and confidence among the states of South Asia which is possible only if India can show more understanding and magnanimity in her dealings with them. The recently formed South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation may be the beginning to the end of the suspicious and often hostile atmosphere which has dominated South Asia for the past four decades.

Lessons Learned from Her Wars.

The three wars that India fought against Pakistan and the war against China have assisted India in evolving her defense policy. The 1948 conflict with Pakistan convinced Indian political leaders of the utility of the Indian Army and helped dispell the distrust and suspicions which was associated with its Imperial past. The 1962 War against China was also significant for India. It exposed the hollowness of an idealistic foreign policy when there was no corresponding military capability to support it. Prime Minister Nehru's idealistic nonalignment policy was then replaced with a nonalignment policy based on more pragmatic national interests. The stalemate in the 1965 conflict with Pakistan helped Indian leaders realize that India's borders with Pakistan are difficult to defend and that India cannot afford to wait for an extraregional invader to reach the plains of the Punjab before defending India against a conventional military attack

thereby reinforcing the traditional concept of a defense based on the Hindu Kush, the Himalayas, the Malacca Straits and Bab-el Mandab. After the 1971 War against Pakistan, resulting in the creation of Bagladesh, India emerged as the predominant military power in South Asia which convinced her about the feasibility of using armed force as an instrument of power. Her enhanced position in the region has perhaps now, hopefully, encouraged her to take a more balanced position in her interregional and extraregional relationships with a view to achieving her long term objective of playing a larger role.

Foreign Policy Issues.

Since 1947 India followed a policy that was inward looking with the region as the primary focus. The rest of the world was important primarily for her efforts to limit superpower influences. She was not interested in joining any of the blocks though she was willing to accept economic assistance from the United States or the Soviet Union. There were also possibilities of playing one against the other to acquire as much economic assistance as possible and the main thrust of the government was directed towards economic development though Prime Minister Nehru did have ambitions of assuming leadership in the nonaligned movement.

Pakistan's decision to join the Baghdad pact, later renamed CENTO, was a major factor which forced India to consider Moscow for some of her arms purchases. The introduction of the F-104 Starfighters and the F-86 Sabres into the Pakistan Air Force in 1954 alarmed the Indian leadership who then made a request to Soviet Union in 1960 for some helicopters and transport aircrafts. With the Soviets agreeing to the supply of these requests, the foundations to Indo-Soviet military relationship were

laid. The border war with China brought both the Soviet Union and the United States with offers of military assistance for India. But after the unilateral Chinese withdrawal, the request of F-104 and C-130 transport aircrafts was not approved by the US resulting in a firm conviction among the Indian leaders of the desirability of shopping for Soviet alternatives. This decision was also influenced by the more favorable terms of payment offered by the Soviet Union.

Just as India hoped to play one superpower against the other, the Soviet Union offered to supply military equipment to Pakistan, which was hurt badly by the US ban on arms shipments following the 1965 war, while at the same time proposing an Indo-Soviet treaty of peace and friendship with India.¹² The Indian leadership, already convinced that the US was an unreliable partner due to her unpredictable policies, decided to move closer towards Moscow to ensure not only the continued flow of Soviet equipment for her defense forces but also to deny Soviet arms to Pakistan. With the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty in 1971, India chose to rely on Moscow's deep rooted suspicions of the Chinese to ensure that her defense requirements were met at all times. This tilt towards Moscow was a major policy decision that the Indian leadership had to make with far reaching consequences for the subcontinent.

With the continued occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet Forces, India is engaged in "quiet diplomacy" while Pakistan has been engaged in "loud diplomacy." Though India has failed to be vocal in her criticisms on the Soviet aggression of Afghanistan, she is most certain to feel a certain degree of apprehension since no foreign power that has occupied Afghanistan has ever stopped short of the Khyber Pass. Pakistan today is engaged in a dangerous game by allowing the Afghan freedom fighters

to train and operate from within its territory. The Kabul government and the Soviet Union could create major security problems for Pakistan if they decided to instigate the Pakhtoons and the Baluch tribes. A concerted Soviet drive directed at bringing these tribal areas within the sphere of influence would pose a most perplexing problem for India. Any Soviet gains in these areas would not only threaten the integrity of Pakistan but would also simplify Soviet intentions of acquiring the warm water ports in the Indian Ocean which would most certainly draw a military response from the United States.

The future course of events in Afghanistan may bring about changes of far reaching consequences in Indian defense and foreign policy. India is also aware that the Soviet union has been attempting to convince Pakistan on the need to be more favorably disposed towards it. Should the Russians succeed in converting Pakistan into a Soviet client state, India is bound to feel even more threatened. Afghanistan has perhaps contributed significantly towards the possibility of a thaw in India's relations with both China and Pakistan.

Force Structure Issues.

On achieving independence, the Indian Army was the major element in Indian defense. The Indian Air Force, especially after the 1962 war with China, also quickly achieved the capability to support a two-front war and continues to be modernized at a rapid pace. It was only after the appearance of the USS Enterprise in the waters of the Bay of Bengal in the 1971 war that led Indian leaders to reexamine their policy on force structure and ratio. Following these reassessments, an independent Coast Guard was created in 1978 while freeing the Indian navy for "blue water" operations and capital construction now ranks

first among the three services.¹³ Indian Defense Planners are also working on a two-fleet navy, one for the Bay of Bengal and the other for the Indian Ocean. This vastly expanded role, though causing some cuts in other sectors, will ultimately ensure that India is well on her way to playing a role beyond her own region.

Acquisition Policy Issues.

India's stated aim has been self-reliance and self-sufficiency. India produces much of her defense needs but continues to buy state-of-the-art equipment from outside sources and the Soviet Union has been her main supplier. Indian defense planners are equally worried that India could become over dependent on Moscow and are always keen for diversification. The Indians have also consistently sought to gain coproduction rights eventually leading to domestic production in almost all that they purchase from outside sources. This long term policy is sometimes disrupted when Pakistan is able to obtain more modern and higher performance equipment from US source which then dictates the purchase of items off the shelf. Among the developing world, India has succeeded in establishing a very impressive military industrial complex and has begun exporting some items to other third world countries

Nuclear Policy.

With the detonation of a nuclear device in May 1974 India joined the nuclear club. Though Indian governments have consistently stated that they will not acquire nuclear weapons, they have also stated that they will keep their options open. If Pakistan should explode a nuclear device, as is generally believed, India will most certainly go nuclear. She also has a modest space program giving her the capability to produce a nuclear weapons system. Her continued opposition to the NPT and the

arguments put forth that she will not accept the theory that some nations can be trusted with nuclear weapons while others cannot, is strong indication that India continues to develop her nuclear weapons technology to ensure that should the need arise, she will not be lagging. Many western analysts believe that Indian determination to carry on with the nuclear and space program are based on India's sensitivity about her pride, prestige and image.¹⁴ Given her experiences, India is perhaps more concerned about the possibility of only a few nations being in a position to monopolize in this field. If countries like France can be accepted in the nuclear club, India most certainly feels that it would be irresponsible of her to submit to western and superpower pressures into accepting the NPT.

Future Trends.

Though the present world situation is favorable for India in pursuing her long term objectives, continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan with possibilities of trouble in Pakistan's western tribal areas will most certainly pose a serious and difficult policy decision for Indian leaders. Their relations with the Soviet Union, which was never taken as a serious threat to her own security, could take a dramatic turn and two of the most bitter enemies of the subcontinent, India and Pakistan, may be compelled to become allies. Their relations with China would also perhaps undergo a similar change. A country capable of producing nuclear weapons, ships, submarines, tanks and various other defense needs can hardly but hope to play a larger role than what she has been accustomed to so far. Greater power accompanied by more understanding and responsible behavior with her neighbors can only strengthen her more without having to worry about her backyard.

Given her size, geography and economic performances it is but inevitable that India of the twenty-first century will play a far more influential role in world affairs.

CHAPTER IV

IMPLICATIONS FOR NEPAL

Background.

The security position of Nepal is difficult due to the realities of her size, location and geography. The crucial question has always been how to maintain stable relations with her two large neighbors, China and India. Over the past centuries she has succeeded in preserving her independence and sovereignty when some of her neighbors were not as successful. With the emergence of a free and independent India and the reassertion of her authority over Tibet by the People's Republic of China, Nepal was placed in an unenviable position especially in view of the fact that the two neighbors have deep seated suspicions of each other.

In a geographical sense the territory of Nepal does not constitute a focal point for Indo-Chinese interests. There are not strategically attractive targets within Nepal; neither are there any foreign troops within the country. She could never be the cause of a war or a primary target in a possible war. For this reason, and given the nature of her foreign policy, it will be highly unlikely that Nepal would become embroiled in a separate conflict. What is more significant, however, is the threat of subversive elements inspired by forces from across either of the borders which threaten the socio-political stability of the country. Nepal no doubt also feels the economic constraints imposed on her due to her landlocked position as also her demographic

vulnerabilities and feels concerned when the balance shows signs of change. Since a military threat against Nepal would be part of a larger conflict involving both India and China, the policies and postures that they adopt has far reaching significance for Nepal.

China's Entry.

The Chinese successes in the Himalayan War against the Indians in 1962 was a major development for Nepal. The Himalayas were no longer an effective defense. Similarly China, which had never played a significant role in the subcontinent, could no longer be ignored and nonalignment took on a different meaning for Nepal. What was once adopted by Nepal as "an avoidance of the power blocks" came to mean "equal friendship for all" - specially India and China. Kathmandu's modified form of nonalignment was not very well received by many Indians and relations between the two countries reached an all time low during the 1960s.

Forward Defense Policy.

Though India's defense posture today is more favorable and there is evidence of a growing sense of confidence matched by greater capability, senior strategic thinkers, both within and outside the government, firmly believe that India can and should adopt a "forward defense policy" based on the Himalayas, the Suez and the Straits of Malacca. Such concepts will most certainly be viewed with concern by smaller nations like Nepal who could get sucked into a broader conflict. Indian Policy makers would do well to realize that India's best interests are served by a policy that preserves Nepal's non-involvement in any Himalayan confrontation, as this would free the Indian Army for more vulnerable sectors. Recent Nepalese efforts to have their country

declared a "Zone of Peace" is a further extension of this same concept -aimed at institutionalizing the de facto neutrality necessitated by her geo-political location and the need to carry on with economic development, the failure of which would have a serious impact on her socio-economic front. The tendency of Indian political leaders to retain bargaining chips in her dealings with Nepal by sheltering opposition Nepalese leaders in India or the occasional harassment policy in the Transit Treaty with Nepal with a view to applying economic pressures on that country can only contribute towards the ever increasing suspicion on Indian designs and motives. A stable, friendly and confident Nepal can contribute significantly to the security of the region while a weak, suspicious and vulnerable Nepal will most certainly keep exploring various other avenues for greater security.

Irritants in Relations.

India's decision to tilt towards Moscow has had a profound impact for Nepal which has to live in peace and harmony with China also. Nepal cannot afford to alarm either India or China by following a "special relationship" with either of these two countries. Soviet occupation of Afghanistan perhaps has had some impact on the threat perceptions of the countries in the region and there is evidence of a greater desire on the part of both India and China to settle their long standing border disputes. Contrary to what is generally believed in Indian circles, Nepal feels that these are encouraging signs since they will ease the problems that a buffer state like Nepal has had to face for so long.

Some Indians continue to insist that due to her geographical location and economic limitations, all Nepalese must behave like "good, patriotic Indians" in meeting the Chinese threat. Such views do not

take into account the interests of smaller states and only help in creating greater complications as was proved when the Nepalese Prime Minister Bishta remarked in 1969,

"it is not possible for Nepal to compromise its sovereignty or accept what may be called limited sovereignty for India's so called security."

The Nepalese government must also tread a careful path in the conduct of its balance policy in order to forestall an Indian overreaction to perceived - or misperceived - Chinese threats. Most governments in Nepal have tried to follow a balanced policy with her two neighbors, but there is always a possibility that some future Indian government may decide to replace the existing political system in Nepal by direct military intervention; slightly disguised intervention through the use of a Nepalese revolutionary movement; or an all out economic blockade. While this could be accomplished by India with relative ease, it may prove to be even more counter-productive in the long run, thus destabilizing the region as a whole.

Nuclear Proliferation.

Though both India and Pakistan have denied their involvement in the development and acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability, all indicators point to the possibility of Pakistan going that direction. India, which has already exploded her bomb, has the capability to produce not only a weapon but the delivery and guidance system as well. This race, if left unchecked, would further threaten the well being of the other states in the region. It is indeed unfortunate that when the larger powers of the world are becoming more conscious of the dangers of a nuclear war, these two developing countries should feel it necessary

to keep their policy options open for the development of nuclear weapons to safeguard their national interests.

Security Issues.

For the countries of South Asia, especially Nepal, security and economic development are the twin goals of their national policy. If the results of the 1971 war against Pakistan has encouraged some Indian policy makers to view the use of military force in dealing with problems in South Asia, then India, which most certainly aspires for a larger role in the world, cannot hope to free herself from regional complications. But if, on the other hand, India shows more understanding and magnamity in her dealings with the South Asian countries, then she will be in a better position to reap greater benefits arising from trust, confidence and goodwill without having to worry needlessly in regional matters. After the change in the political leadership in India, countries of this region feel more confident in the improvement of relationship between their countries of this region feel more confident in the improvement of relationship between their countries and India. In this, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation comprising of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, could play a major role.

CHAPTER V

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

Threat Perceptions.

Scholars and policy makers in both Western and non-Western countries generally view contemporary international relations in terms of major powers, both real and potential. Only rarely have the security problems of a single country like Nepal been thought to merit consideration in depth. Even when major powers find that their directive policies towards a particular region fails to achieve the desired results, it is generally never appreciated that these could be the result of a cumulative effect of the cross currents interacting within a region.

Countries of South Asia have a multidimensional perception of security. Nepal's perception of threats originate more from her political, economic and demographic vulnerabilities than the concern of a militarily secure territory - a view generally overlooked in the United states. Some western scholars have tried to point out that Nepal suffers from an "identity problem"¹⁵ due to her close cultural, religious, economic, ethnic and geographic ties with India. But when viewed from a Nepalese perspective,

"national identity involves the identity of territory and citizenry to lay the foundation for a secure sense of nationality."¹⁶

Given the present demographic, economic and political environment in the subcontinent, such fears and concerns of smaller states in the region are justified. Any changes in the balance of these factors will have a

serious destabilizing influence on the societies of these smaller countries. It is for these reasons why countries like Nepal are constantly attempting to anticipate the destabilizing forces within and without, before they destabilize her society.

For a superpower like the United States, it is understandable that her perception of threats arises from the possibility of an armed conflict with the Soviet Union which seems ever eager to exploit situations as they present themselves. The failure, on the part of the United States, to monitor and understand the regional environment and concerns of the nations located there will almost always have a negative effect in her quest to meet the Soviet challenge. As a leader of the "Free World," the United States cannot afford to think in terms of the interests of Western Europe alone. She needs to be ever willing to uphold the principles of freedom and the rule of law as accepted by the community of nations. With greatness the acceptance of added responsibilities are essential. Much of the frustrations felt today in the United States could disappear if she could only decide what role she is willing to play. Would she play the role as the "leader of the free world" or that of a "leader of the capitalist developed world?" As a leader of the free world, the United States could not only increase her credibility but also her effectiveness in some of her long term objectives if she would be prepared to play a more active moderating role in the world. Such a role would assist in relieving much of the concerns that smaller nations have for their own security.

Realism as a Policy Tool.

US policy towards the subcontinent has been very inconsistent because American motivation for involvement in this region has been

contradictory. In the early 1950s, Washington was interested in developing Pakistan as a support base for the "northern tier" states Iran and Turkey, even at the cost of alienating India. Following the 1962 Chinese excursion across the Himalayas, the US almost went overboard to assist the Indians; but this interlude was short lived. Pakistan, which had been an ally of the US, was also disillusioned when the US failed to be of any assistance when her eastern wing was forcibly dismembered in 1971. The only response that the US could make was a feeble show of force by dispatching her USS enterprise which returned without achieving anything other than antagonizing the Indians who now seriously believe that a US threat from the Indian Ocean exists for their country.

The present US policy of using Pakistan as a base to funnel military and economic aid to the Afghan rebels fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan is also a short-sighted and dangerous policy. Continued neglect of India, which is the only power in the region that has the military and industrial capacity to offer any resistance to the Soviet Union, will be counter productive in the long run. A realistic policy for the United States would be to accept the fact that India is a major power in the region and any posture which neglects India is bound to be ineffective. Similarly a hostile and suspicious Pakistan can also thwart all possible US strategies aimed at containing the Soviet threat from Afghanistan. As such, the United States should concentrate in bringing about a rapid reconciliation between these two countries. This is only possible if an atmosphere of trust and confidence is established in the subcontinent where India's neighbors are closely following Indian policies towards her other smaller neighbors.

Indian political leaders should realize that playing on the religious, ethnic or racial sentiments of populations in other neighboring countries, such as Sri Lanka, is a double edged sword and can be detrimental to her own unity and security. Should the Tamils of Sri Lanka succeed in breaking away to form their own state, it is only a matter of time before other larger powers also begin to play on similar sentiments among India's diverse ethnic populations. The unity which the British were able to effect between Northern India and the South is still a fragile union. The ethnic disparity between the two halves could prove to be a serious unity problem for India if Dravidian nationalism was allowed to get out of control. This is where the United States could use her influences on India by convincing her that for the security of the subcontinent India needs to be more realistic in her dealings with her neighbors.

STATISTICAL DATA AND BALANCE OF
FORCES IN SOUTH ASIA

INDIA

Area: 3,288,000 sq. Km.

Population: 762,200,000 (1985)

Annual Growth Rate Population: 2.2%

GNP: US\$ 143,900,000 (1984)

Per Capita Income: US\$ 193 (1984)

GNP Real Growth: 7.4% (1984)

Defense Expenditure % of GNP: 3.6% (1985)

Defense Expenditure % of Public Expenditure: 21.5% (1985)

Defense Budget 1985 - 86: US\$ 6.13 billion.

Total Regular Forces: 1,260,000

Army: 1,100,000

5 regional commands.

8 corps headquarters.

2 armd divs.

1 mech div.

18 inf divs.

10 mountain divs.

7 indep armd bdes.

10 indep inf bdes.

1 para bde.

8 indep arty bdes.

8 indep engr bdes.

AFV: 700 T54/55, 300 T72, 1,500 Vijayanta MBT, 150 PT76, 350 BMP 1

MICV; 500 OT62/64, BTR60 APC.

Arty: Yug M48 76mm, 25-Pdr (88mm) (retiring), 100 100mm, 200 105mm
(incl Abbot SP), 550 M45 130mm (some SP), 140mm (retiring), S23 180mm
guns; 75/24 75mm mountain, 105mm (incl. M56 pack), O20 152mm how;
81mm, 500 120mm, 20 160mm mor; Frog 7 SSM.

ATK: M81 57mm, Carl Gustav 84mm, M40 106mm RCL; 6-Pdr (57mm) ATK guns;
SS 11 B1, Milan AT3, Sagger ATGW.

AD: 20mm, ZWU23-4 23mm SP, L40/60, L40/70 40mm; 500 94mm guns; 180 SA
6/7, 48 SA 8/9, 40 Tigercat SAM.

(On order: Arjun, 1,600 T72M MBT, BRDM recce, MBP1/2/BMD MICV, Milan
ATGW launchers, 3,700 msls.)

Reserves: 200,000. Territorial army 50,000.

Navy: 47,000, incl. naval air force.

8 Sov F-class submarines.

1 Br Majestic aircraft carrier 9capacity 18 attack, 4 ASW ac, ASW hel).

1 Br Fiji cruiser (trg).

3 Sov Kashin II GW destroyers with 4 Styx SSM, 2 X 2 SA N1 SAM, 1 Ka 25
hel.

23 frigates: 2 Godavari with 2 Styx SSM, 1SA-N4 SAM, 2 Sea King hel;
6 Leander with 2 X 4 Seacat SAM, 1 hel; 2 Br Whitby with 3 Styx SSM;
10 Sov petya II, 3 Br Leopard (trg.)

3 Sov Nanuchka corvettes with 4 SS-N2 SSM,, 1SA-NR SAM.

8 Sov Osa I (6FAC [G], 2 FAC), 8 Osa II with 4 Styx SSM.

1 Abhaya, 5 SDB2, 2 Sov Osa large patrol craft.

6 Sov Natya ocean, 4 Br Mam minesweepers; 6 Sov Yevgenya inshore
minehunters.

2 LST; 6 Sov, 1 Pol Polnocny LCT; 4 LCU.

(On order: 4 Sov F-class, 1 Type 1500 subs, 2 Kashin GW destroyers,
4 Godavari [mod Leander] FFG, 2 Nanuchka corvettes, 5 Polnocny LCT, 1
survey ship, Exocet SSM.)

Bases: Western Fleet: Bombay, Goa. Southern Fleet: Cochin.

Eastern Fleet: Visakapatnam, Port Blair.

Naval Air Force: (2,000); 36 combat ac, 26 combat hels.

1 attack sqn with 15 Sea Hawk FGA6 (being retired), 8 Sea Harrier FRS MK
51 (2 T60 trg) (10 ac in carrier).

1 ASW sqn with 5 Alize 1050 (4 in carrier).

2 MR sqns with 5 L1049 Super Constellation, 3 Il 38 May.

1 comms sqn with 18 Defender (some MR).

4 ASW hel sqns with 10 Sea King (carrier, frigates); 5 Ka25 Hormone
(in Kashins); 11 Alouette III (in frigates).

1 SAR hel sqn with 10 Alouette III.

2 trg sqns with 7 HJT16 Kiran, 2 Sea Hawk FB5, 10 BN2 Islander ac;
4 Hughes 269 hels.

(On order: 10 Sea Harrier MK 51, 1 T60; 3 Tu 142m Bear MR ac; 12 Sea
King MK 42B, 18 Ka 27 Helix hel; Sea Eagle SSM; Exocet AM 39 ASM.)

Air Force: 113,000; 846 combat ac; abt. 60 armed hels.

5 air commands.

3 lt bbr sqns (1 maritime role): 35 Canberra B(I)58/B(I)12 (to be replaced): 18 Jaguar.

12 FGA sqns: 2 (1 forming) with about 7 Mirage 2000h; 1 with about 10 Hunter F56A (jaguar to replace); 2 with 50 Jaguar GR1, 6 T2; 3 with 90 Mig23BN Folgger H.

20 AD sqnd: 14 with 260 MiG21/FL/PFMA/MF/bis; 2 with 40 MiG23 MF Flogger B, 4 with 92 Ajeet.

2 recce sqns: 1 with 8 Canberra PR57, 4 HS748; 1 with 7 MiG25R, 1 Mig25U.

12 tpt sqns; 5 with 95 An32; 2 with 30 An 12B; 2 with 20 DHC3; 1 with 16 DHC4; 2 with 28 HS748M, 2 Boeing 733-248 (leased).

1 HQ comms sqn with 7 HS748m.

Liaison flts and dets with 16 HS748, C47.

6 tpt hel sqns with 72 Mi 8.

7 liaison hel sqns, 3 with 100 SA316B Chetak (Alouette III), 4 with Cheetah (lama); some with 4 AS11B ATGW.

Trg Comd: 3 trg and conversion sqns with 11 Canberra T4/13/67, 25 Hunter F56/T66, 40 MiG21U, 16 Su 7U; 13 MiG23UM Flogger CL; 5 MiG27 Flogger 60 HT2, 83 HJT16 Kiran, 15 Marut MK 1T, some 20 HPT32 (replacing HT2), 44 TS11 Iskra, 27 HS748 ac; Chetak hel.

AAM: R23R/T Apex, R60 Aphid, R550VK, SA2, SA3.

ASM: AS30; AS11B (ATGW).

30 SAM bns with 180 Divina V 750VK, SA2, SA3.

Air Defense Ground Environment System

(On order: about 40 MiG29, about 33 Mirage 2000H, 4 TH, 31 Jaguar [to be locally assembled], 165 MiG27M Glogger D/J, MiG21 bis, 20 Ajeet ftrs;

69 An32, 3 Do228, about 17 I176 tpts; 90 Kiran MK2, about 120 HPT32;
trg ac; Mi17, Mi26, 45 Chetak hel; R23R Apex, R60 Aphid AAM.)

Paramilitary Forces Border Security Force 85,000; 175,000 in other
organizations. Coastguard 2,000: 2 Br type 14 frigates, patrol
craft, 2 air sqns with 2 F27, 5 Defender ac, 4 Chetak hel.
(On order: 4 offshore, 3 inshore patrol vessels, 9 lt tpt ac
6 hel.)

PAKISTAN

Area: 804,000 sq. km.

Population: 99,200,000 (1985)

Annual Growth Rate Population: 2.7%

GNP: US \$29,640,000 (1984)

Per Capita Income: US \$360 (1984)

GNP Real Growth: 7.3%

Defense Expenditure % of GNP: 7.08%

Defense Expenditure % of Public Expenditure: 26%

Defense Expenditure (1985-86): US \$2,06 billion.

Total Regular Forces: 482,000.

Army: 450,000.

7 corps HQ: 1 fd command.

2 armd divs.

16 inf divs.

4 indep armd bdes.

8 indep inf bdes.

8 arty bdes/bde equiv.

3 AA arty bdes.

6 armd recce regts.

7 SAM btys with 6 Croatele (each 4 msls); 1 with 6 CSA1 (SA2).

1 special services group.

AFV: 405 M47/48 (incl A5), 51 T54/55, 1,050 type 59 MBT; 500 M113,

50 UR416 APC.

Arty: some 1,000 25-pr (88mm), type 59 100mm, 130mm, 140mm and 155mm
guns and M116 75mm pack, 105mm (incl pack), 12 M7 SP, 75 M198 towed,
M109 SP, M115 and 40 M110A2 SP 203mm how; 122mm MRL; 107mm, 102mm
mor.

ATK: 75mm, 89mm RL; Type 52 75mm, 106mm RCL; Cobra, 200 TOW ATGW.

AD: 14.5mm, 37mm, 57mm, 85mm, 100 Stinger, 6 Croatele SAM.

Aviation: 1 liaison sqn with 45 Mashshaq (Saab 91 Safari) ac.

4 hel sqns

Indep army observation slts.

45 O1E, Cessna 421, 50 Mashshaq, Turbo Commander, Queen Air ac; some

2 Bell AH1S Cobra with TOW, 16 Mi 8, 35 Puma, 23 Alouette III, 13

Bell 47G hels.

(On order: 65 M48A5 MBT; M113 APC; TOW ATGW launchers [incl 24 M901

improved TOW SP, 1,0000 msls]; some 10 AH1S hels; 144 RBS 70 SAM

launchers, 400 msls.)

Reserves: 500,000.

Navy: 15,200 (incl naval air).

11 subs: 2 Agosta, 4 Daphne, 5 SX404 midget.

8 destroyers: 1 Br County, 2 X 4 Sea Cat SAM, 1 Alouette hel; 6 US

Gearing with 1 X 8 ASROC ASW; 1 Br Battle.

4 Ch Hainan FAC(P), 1 Town, 1 Spear, 18 MC55 type patrol craft.

4 Ch Hoku FAC(G) (2msls).

12 Ch Shanghai-II FAC(T).

4 Ch Huchwan hydrofoil FAC(T).

3 US Adjutant and MSC268 coastal MCM.

2 tankers (1 ocean, 1 coastal), 1 Br Oido cruiser (cadet trg/AA ship;
nonoperational).

Naval Air: 3 combat ac, 6 combat hel.

1 ASW/MR sqn with 3 Atlantic with AM39 ASM Exocet.

2 ASW/SAR hel sqns with 6 Sea King ASW with AM39 ASM.

Base: Karachi.

Reserves: 5,000.

Air Force: 17,600; 375 combat ac.

8 FGA sqns: 1 with 17 Mirage IIIEP; 4 with 50 Mirage 5PA3; 3 with 41
ch Q5.

11 interceptor/FGA sqns, 9 with 170 Ch F6, 2 with about 30 F16.

1 Recce sqn with 13 Mirage III RP.

2 tpt sqns: 1 with 13 C130B/E, 1 L100; 1 with 1 Falcon 20, 1 F27-200
(with navy), 1 Super King Air, 1 Bonanza.

1 SAR hel sqn with 6 HH43B, 4 Alouette III.

1 utility hel sqn with 4 Super Frelon, 12 Bell 47G.

1 trg sqn with 20 T33A, 4 MiG15UTI.

Other trainers; 2 Mirage 5 DPA2, 3 Mirage IIIDP, 2 J6, 35 T37C, 45 Ch
JJ5 (MiG17U), 12 CCJ6, 24 Reims FTB337.

AAM: Sidewinder, R530, R550 Magic.

(On order: 10 F16, about 100 Ch Q5 FGA, 500 AIM9L Sidewinder.)

Reserves: 8,000.

Forces Abroad: 30,000 contract pers in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya,
Oman, UAE.

Paramilitary Forces; 164,000: National Guard (75,000); Frontier
Corps (65,000); Pakistan Rangers (15,000); Coast Guard (2,000);
Northern Light Infantry (7,000); Mujahid Force; Janbaz Force,
National Cadet Corps; Women Guards.

BANGLADESH

Area: 144,000 sq. km.

Population: 101,500,000 (1985)

Annual Growth Rate Population: 2.8%

GNP: US \$12.6 billion (1984)

Per Capita Income: US \$135

GNP Real Growth: 3.7%

Defense Expenditure % of GNP: 1.37%

Defense Expenditure % of Public Expenditure: 18.48%

Defense Budget 1985-86: US \$185.59 million.

Total Regular Force: 91,300.

Army: 81,800.

5 inf div HQ.

13 inf bdes.

2 armd regts.

6 arty regts.

6 engr bns.

20 Ch Type 59, 30 T54/55 MBT; 6 M24 Chaffee lt tks: 30 Model 56 pack,
50 M101 105mm, 5 25-pdr (88mm), 20 type 54 122mm guns/how; 81 mm,
50 type 53 120mm mortar; 6-pdr (57mm), ch type 54 76mm ATK guns; 30
106mm RCL.

Navy: 6,500.

3 Br frigates.

4 Ch Hegu FAC(G) with 2 HY2 SSM.

8 Ch Shanghai II FAC.

6 large patrol craft.

4 Ch Hainan FAC(P).

4 P-4 FAC(T).

6 Pabna river patrol boats.

1 trg ship, 4 misc.

Bases: Chittagong (HQ), Dhaka, Khulna, Chalna.

Air Force: 3,000: 23 combat ac.

2 FGA sqns with 18 Ch F6.

1 interceptor sqn with 3 MiG21MF, 2-21U.

1 tpt sqn with 1 An 24, 4 An 26 (1 Yak 40, 1 DC6).

1 hel sqn with 7 Bell 212, 6 Mi 8, 4 alouette, 2 206L.

Trainers: 6 Magister, 12 Ch CJ6.

AAM: AA2 Atoll.

Paramilitary Forces: 55,000.

SRI LANKA

Area: 65,600 sq. km.

Population: 16,400,000 (1985)

Population Growth Rate: 2.1%

GNP: US \$5.1 billion.

Per Capita Income: US \$340.

GNP Real Growth: 5.2%

Defense Expenditure % of GNP: 0.9%

Defense Expenditure % of Public Expenditure: 2.5%

Defense Budget 1985: US \$131.4 million.

Total Regular Forces: 21,560.

Army: 30,000 incl active reservists.

5 Task Forces (inf bdes, 5 regular, 6 reserve bns).

2 recce bns.

2 fd arty, 1 AA regt

1 fd engr, 1 engr plant regt

1 sigs bn

1 Special Forces bn

Support services

18 Saladin armd, 15 Ferret, 12 Daimler Dingo scout cars; 10 BTR152 APC;

16 76mm, 30 85mm guns, 12 107mm mor; M60 82mm RCL; 24 40mm, 24 90mm

AA guns.

Reserves: 16,100.

Navy: 3,960.

7 Sooraya FAC (Ch Shanghai II)

2 jayasagara large patrol craft.

28 coastal patrol craft.

(On order: 3 large, 12 coastal patrol craft).

Reserves: 1,000.

Air Force: 3,700

1 tpt sqn

1 hel sqn

In storage: 2 jet Provost MK 51 ac.

On Order: 12 SF260TP trg ac.

Reserves: 1,100.

Paramilitary Forces Police 14,500, Volunteers 5,000.

NEPAL

Area: 147,000 sq. km.

Population: 17,000,000.

Population Growth Rate: 2.4%

GNP: US \$2.3 billion.

Per Capita Income: US \$145.

Real Growth GNP: 7.4%

Defense Expenditure % of GNP: 1.3%.

Defense Expenditure % of Public Expenditure: 6.1%

Defense Budget: US \$50 million

Total Regular Forces: 25,000.

Army: 25,000.

6 inf bdes: (incl 1 Royal Guards bde).

1 spt bde: 1 arty, 1 engr, 1 sigs bn.

1 log bde: 1 tpt bn, 1 air sqn (1 ac flt, 1 hel flt).

Forces Abroad: 1 inf bn (666) Lebanon (UNIFIL).

Paramilitary Forces: police 15,000.

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