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UNITED STATES' INTERESTS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

BY

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US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA
The United States national interests in the Horn of Africa and their relative importance are examined. United States global objectives and how they flow into regional objectives and strategies are illustrated. A cursory overview for the region and the countries which comprise it is provided. The prospects for the future conditions most likely to prevail in the countries and the region are summarily given. The threat to achievement of United States interests and United States reactions to the threat are addressed. A (cont.)
picture of a volatile region engulfed with socioeconomic problems, civil war, superpower competition, and bleak prospects for a stabilized region is painted. The primary conclusion drawn is that the United States will remain involved regionally for the long term because of predominantly strategic interest. The United States will continue to exercise its national instruments of power, political, economic, sociopsychological, and military, to secure its national interest objectives. The recommendations which has been discerned are that the United States must: increase economic and selective security assistance to stabilize regional governments, foster viable economics, and improve internal defense capabilities; establish multiple political, economic, and military linkages with the states to facilitate active conduits for prompt action and problem resolution; involve ex-colonial states, such as France, in resolution of regional problems and development of regional contingencies; maintain an open dialogue with the countries of the region; ensure that mutual interests are jointly derived with potential partners; involve, when possible, the international organizations to assist in development of solutions for regional problems; and continue to improve its capability to project military power within the region.
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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

UNITED STATES' INTERESTS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

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ABSTRACT

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The United States national interests in the Horn of Africa and their relative importance are examined. United States global objectives and how they flow into regional objectives and strategies are illustrated. A cursory overview for the region and the countries which comprise it is provided. The prospects for the future conditions most likely to prevail in the countries and the region are summarily given. The threat to achievement of United States interests and United States reactions to the threat are addressed. A picture of a volatile region engulfed with socioeconomic problems, civil war, superpower competition, and bleak prospects for a stabilized region is painted. The primary conclusion drawn is that the United States will remain involved regionally for the long term because of predominantly strategic interest. The United States will continue to exercise its national instruments of power, political, economic, sociopsychological, and military, to secure its national interest objectives. The recommendations which have been discerned are that the United States must: increase economic and selective security assistance to stabilize regional governments, foster viable economics, and improve internal defense capabilities; establish multiple political, economic, and military linkages with the states to facilitate active conduits for prompt action and problem resolution; involve ex-colonial states, such as France, in resolution of regional problems and development of regional contingencies; maintain an open dialogue with the countries of the region; ensure that mutual interests are jointly derived with potential partners; involve, when possible, the international organizations to assist in development of solutions for regional problems; and continue to improve its capability to project military power within the region.
UNITED STATES' INTERESTS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

This paper tentatively assesses US involvement in the Horn of Africa and provides some insights as to why the United States remains visible and active throughout the region. Key events and issues which significantly impact the geopolitical status of the region are identified. The geographic location of the region and its importance to world order and stability is illustrated. The relationship between US national purpose, regional purpose and military strategy is developed within this exploratory work. US interests in the Horn, and how those interests are secured by the application of the instruments of national power, are stated or may be inferred throughout this work.

The paper provides a general description of Africa and a thumbnail description of the current conditions which exist within the region and its associated countries. The paper then addresses US grand objectives and their inferred applicability for the pursuit of US regional interests.

The social, economic, and political realities of the continent of Africa complicate the formulation and execution of US regional policies. Such policies cannot be formulated in isolation from the 52 states which comprise the African continent. For example, regional social problems, economic development issues, and resolution of internal conflicts are most often issues assumed for redress by the Organization for African Unity, the United Nations, and the World Bank, among others. In essence, regional problems transcend political boundaries.
Therefore, a brief description of the continent provides a simplified frame of reference for the selective examination of US interests in the Horn of Africa.

Africa is: a continent whose states are divided linguistically by over 800 languages; a continent which possesses most forms of political persuasion: monarchy (Morocco), Marxist (Ethiopia), democratic (Botswana); a continent where the one-party state, with strong military linkages and affiliations, reigns supreme; a continent where one of eight world citizens resides; a continent where superpowers compete for political and military leverage; a continent engulfed by regional conflicts which emanate from ill-conceived boundaries and historical tribal and ethnic precedents; a continent of need, development opportunity, and political challenge; a continent whose independent existence spans less than 30 years; a continent of immense mineral wealth, unequally distributed between nations; a continent which possesses a disproportionate share of the world's most impoverished states (the Sahel states of Chad, Mauritania, Niger, and others); a continent endowed with complicated socioeconomic and health problems which unfavorably skew life expectations; and a continent troubled by an alarming refugee problem and an increasing inability to feed itself. The development challenges which exist throughout the continent are replicated in the Horn of Africa.

The Horn of Africa is politically comprised of the following states: the Somali Republic along the coast of the Indian Ocean; Djibouti, and enclave at the southern end of the Red Sea; the Marxist regime of Ethiopia in the center; and the Sudan stretching deep into the Sahara and north to Egypt. This region comprises an area almost the
size of Europe. The countries referred to as the Horn are a mixture of great beauty and the most barren waste, high promise and bleak prospects, great rivers and fearful deserts, rugged mountains and endless bush.¹

This region possesses no great ports, few all weather roads, and only the beginning of a rail network. Millions of people live today in isolation from the political realities of their countries and from the outside world. This is a region where instability and open warfare provide external influence opportunities which ensure great power competition and involvement.² The states which comprise the region necessarily rely on foreign assistance to satisfy the rising expectations of the populace. Long-term stable and viable economic growth is only considered possible with continued availability of foreign capital. No current regime can fulfill the rising expectations of its people or fit legitimate priorities into a totally satisfying program due to the severe economic conditions which currently exist and are continuously exacerbated by a very high population growth rate assessed in 1983 at 3.3 percent for the region.³ It can reasonably be stated that the countries which comprise the Horn will experience more challenging economic crises in the future.

There are multiple connections of increasing importance between Africa and the United States. These multiple linkages are most often associated with the following terms of reference: national security, humanitarian assistance, and foreign assistance. Appropriately, the degree of US involvement is activated by strategic, political, economic, and humanitarian interests and pursued by various significant action plans, which accomplish US national purpose and protect US national
interests. Unfortunately, the use of the instruments of power in achieving these interests is precise and measurable at only discreet moments of time. It is difficult to quantify over time the effectiveness or efficiency of foreign assistance, diplomatic initiatives, information programs, and applied military power. Another real difficulty is to assess the individual contributions of the instruments of power toward achievement of a global national strategy. It is through the integrative and selective application of multiple instruments of power that the objectives of a grand strategy are most often achieved.

The functional integration and connectivity of the instruments of power complicate measurements of policy impacts. There must be an agreed national purpose associated with a determined national will to achieve goals and objectives; concurrently, the goals and objectives must be flexible to accommodate changing global, regional, and internal conditions. Flexible but consistent policy initiatives and actions must be the guiding principles of US foreign policy.

President Reagan's foreign policy initiatives are flexible and are tempered by pragmatism in achievement of a long-standing national commitment to encourage world democracy. This underlying principle to "promote democracy" has been apparent in applied US foreign policy: in the change of the Haitian government; in the change of policy toward South Africa; in the change of policy toward the Palestine Liberation Organization; in the active support rendered to the democratic opposition to Chile's dictatorship; in the endorsement of Korean opposition demands for reforms to secure a more democratic based form of government; and in the change of government in the Philippines. 4

4
The examples illustrate the active pursuit by the United States of an ideological national purpose, which is the furtherance of democratic institutions and values. It also indicates the necessity of maintaining an open dialogue with world nations and organizations for the pursuit and attainment of these national goals.

Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick reminds us that it is the objective use of clout that makes a country or regime susceptible to US influence. She asserts that the Reagan administration clearly and consistently pursues democratization in the most diverse places - Haiti, the Philippines, Nicaragua and Angola. She further asserts that support for anti-Communist freedom fighters is an important dimension of the democratization policy. Ambassador Kirkpatrick would, on the other hand, have the United States cooperate with selected authoritarian regimes based on the strategic importance of the specific country, its moral offensiveness or inoffensiveness, its potential for democratic political evolution and its accessibility for United States influence. I consider this approach to be currently operative and believe it provides a baseline rationale for US presence and continuous political involvement on the Horn of Africa.

There is an operative US global national strategy which has clear focus and majority agreement on the grand objectives of world order, peace and prosperity for all nations, and freedom of nations and people in their broadest understanding. The overarching objectives of this national strategy have been consistent and are most often stated as being:

(1) To preserve and promote US institutions and values.
(2) To advance national well being and prosperity.
(3) To prevent Soviet adventurism.
(4) To promote world and regional stability.
(5) To promote, sustain and strengthen alliances.
(6) To reduce world armaments and tension via global arms limitations.

These grand objectives remain operative for the pursuit and achievement of United States regional interests and purposes.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick recently stated that:

United States foreign assistance is justified by sweeping assertions that it will "enhance regional stability" or help others "strengthen their economics." Occasionally, it is suggested that foreign assistance gives us "leverage", ..., or that it prevents a country from becoming "wholly dependent" on the Soviet Union.6

Thus, foreign policy objectives are directly linked with foreign assistance, i.e., such assistance enhances regional stability, strengthens economics, provides US leverage, and prevents nations from total dependence on the Soviet Union. Regional stability does contribute to world order, and economic viability provides the opportunity for a nation's pursuit of peace and prosperity. In addition, by offsetting Soviet hegemony, the United States provides an alternative political and economic model for world nations to choose from, thereby fostering democratic and pluralistic forms of government.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick asserts that only "some foreign assistance programs clearly serve both our national ideals and interests."7 That there are contradictions in the pursuit of our national ideals and interests is a prevailing truism, unlikely to change, when one realizes that over 150 world nations are attempting to facilitate accomplishment of their own internal national goals and interests.
There must be mutual interest between nations for the satisfactory resolution of internal and external state and regional problems. Mutual interests form the bedrock on which all interactions between states ultimately rest. Within the boundaries of mutually shared interests is where the motivation and solutions to resolve the most perplexing socioeconomic, political and military challenges will be found. This assertion must be an operative part of US foreign policy and regional involvement.

The FY 1986 Congressional Presentation Document for Security Assistance provides a succinct paragraph on national interests operative within Africa, which are broadly stated as stability, development, and security. Security assistance entails the transfer of military equipment, weapons, training, and services to foreign countries. The State Department is charged with the full program responsibility for security assistance, though the primary implementor is the Department of Defense. Providing security assistance to various political regimes is in accord with US national strategies and objectives. For example, a sale or lease of military equipment and services may not occur without Presidential determination that "the sale will strengthen the security of the US and promote world peace."8

It is from within this overall security assistance policy that the importance of Africa as a whole and the Horn of Africa in particular begins to take shape:

This region is important for its vital mineral resources, US investments and command of the critical Cape sea routes and to our interests in Southwest Asia. Our strategic objectives in Africa continue to be: the pursuit of a peaceful
settlement in Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban troops in the south and in the Horn; encouragement of South Africa's evolution away from apartheid and toward improved relations with black Africa; and the strengthening of resistance to Libyan intervention in West Africa, Central Africa and the Horn. Because much of Africa faces a continuing economic crisis compounded by drought, the United States seeks to foster broad-based economic development. By encouraging the development of an educated and professionalized military, our security assistance program reinforces the structure on which the stability necessary for economic growth and stability depends. Almost 83 percent of our total foreign assistance request for Africa is in the form of economic and food aid. The relatively small military assistance request for this area is almost all grant in recognition of Africa's massive economic problems.9

The total Security Assistance program for Africa approximates one billion dollars. Without this assistance access to and influence with all interested parties would be significantly reduced. Security assistance helps finance arms transfers, provides indirect economic assistance, and facilitates cash sales to nations which are considered important. In many instances government-to-government security assistance agreements are associated with military base rights, military access rights and military overflight rights of sovereign national airspace. This infers that mutual interests are key in the transfer of US weapons, equipment and services. The security assistance FY 87 budget for the countries comprising the Horn of Africa approximates US $200 million.10

The official nonmilitary financial assistance grants to the countries comprising the Horn have generally been maintained or increased; however, medium and longterm funding has fallen.11 This seems incredible considering the size of the Horn, its population, and
the undeniable human and developmental needs present throughout the region. The developmental stage of the recipients is a consideration which frequently limits the amount of investment capital which can be prudently used. Massive inflows of capital to politically and technically inept countries has not been the optimum solution for stable and steady growth. The institutional and technical expertise and sufficient infrastructure must be available to absorb and wisely use well intended nation building assistance. The Horn, however, possesses a population of approximately 80 million and minimal resources to resolve its grievances socioeconomic problems.12

For the near-term, three to five years, the United States will remain inextricably tied to these fragile nation states because of their strategic location. Any decrease in the economic or military linkages to Africa will necessarily overflow into selective regional policies. Official US policy toward Africa has been one of minimal involvement when compared to other regions of the world. As a result, uncertainties for direct linkages pose longterm regional policy issues.

In the long term, for example, the connection with Africa for strategic materials is uncertain. Large deposits of manganese nodules, a rich, source for such metals as copper, nickel, cobalt and manganese, all of which are essential for the production of steel, alloys, and other industrial products, are available in international waters.13 The point is that the lessening of direct linkages with Africa may precipitate a US retrenchment policy, or a US policy of minimal involvement with the continent and the region. This is especially true in view of current US resourcing limitations. The tradeoffs between
dollars spent and tangible returns become substantive political issues. As there are no minerals of importance in the Horn, it is the geographic location of the Horn that provides its current strategic value.

The strategic linkages to Africa will remain important through the foreseeable future for achievement of national purposes. President Reagan has indicated the importance of vital African sealanes for the uninterrupted flow of oil, food and raw materials in time of war and identified 16 critical sealane choke points. The choke points surrounding or adjacent to the Africa continent were the Bab el Mandeb at the south end of the Red Sea and the Suez Canal at the north end; the passages south of Africa; and the Strait of Hormuz, between the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

The Soviets provide the major threat to closure of these sealanes at their critical choke points. During the 1970's the Soviets established major naval and naval air facilities in Ethiopia and South Yemen. Today the Soviets maintain an average presence of about 20 ships on continuous deployment in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron currently conducts operations and show-the-flag missions designed to enhance the political image and military position of the Soviet Union. The majority of the Soviet naval force normally operates in the northwestern Arabian Sea astride the vital oil lines from the Middle East. Regional naval support facilities are maintained in Ethiopia and in Aden. In addition, the Soviets are attempting to broaden their access throughout the area in the strategically located islands and littoral countries of Mozambique, Mauritius, the Seychelles,
the Comoro Islands and India. Ensuring that these sealanes (choke points) remain open during periods of war or political turbulence is a vital part of United States Naval maritime strategy.

Admiral Robert J. Long, (Ret.) states "that although the United States receives less than five percent of its oil from the Persian Gulf, it recognizes that a precipitous cutoff of that oil to the free world, including Western Europe and Japan, could essentially bring the economies of the nations of Western Europe and Japan to their knees." He further states that, "because of the interrelationship of the US economy with those of other countries in the free world, the United States, and thereby its ability to maintain adequate deterrence and alliances with those of other nations." Our European allies currently receive 30 percent of their oil via the Suez.

It is the strategic location of the Horn of Africa and the requirement for military staging bases and facilities which provides the most likely longterm rationale for a continued US regional involvement. This is not meant to understate the economic potential of the region as a viable trading partner or the other objectives previously mentioned. This is a personal assertion dependent upon innumerable political, economic, and military variables and potentialities.

The strategic location of the Horn of Africa which occupies positions astride vital sealane choke points and points like a dagger toward the Middle East/Southwest Asia is the underpinning rationale for United States regional involvement. This region has attracted growing interest because of the obvious geographical importance of its location between Africa and the Middle East, abutting the vital sealanes out of the Arabian Sea, and also because of the Soviet naval presence in the
Mr. Richard Armitage, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), stated:

Probably the most problematic of all regions is the Middle East. The energy resources of the Arabian Gulf region are vitally important to the United States and the economies of the free world. Here more than anywhere also in the Third World, local and regional hostilities hold the potential for provoking the intervention of one or both of the superpowers.20

The above quote highlights the importance of countries in the Horn which sit astride key sealane choke points such as Ethiopia and Somalia. Mr. Armitage sees a threat to US regional interest resulting from the interaction of three factors—enhanced Soviet military capability, expanded Soviet interest, and the prevalence of regional opportunities. The US counter to this Soviet threat is a global military strategy of forward defense. This strategy requires a combination of forces deployed overseas, equipment prepositioned in the forward areas, and the capability to rapidly deploy forces to these areas.

Mr. Armitage believes that Soviet strategic objectives include gaining control over Persian Gulf oil to force the West to trade technology for oil. In 1984, a clear international threat to the Suez shipping lanes occurred. The Gulf of Suez was mined thus endangering and restricting free movement of world shipping through a critical choke point. The United States became immediately involved in removal of Soviet mines believed to have been sown by a Libyan vessel.21 This international terrorist event on the open sea points to the explosive potential of the region. It also indicates the necessity for a US naval presence and reaction capability within the region. Mr. Armitage openly
states, "that the United States must fully engage its diplomatic, economic, and military resources to thwart an obvious Soviet attempt at regional dominance.22

The Soviet Union, Communist China, Cuba and radical African states, such as Libya, attempt to politically subvert, economically dominate, and militarily influence the Horn of Africa, while the United States tries to directly offset these blatantly open strategic moves by economic assistance and selective, limited military assistance.23

These countervailing forces result in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia finding themselves at the crossroads of three conflicts: East vs. West; Moslem Arab North vs black Sub-Saharan South; and radical vs. conservative ideology.24 The strategic and economic importance of this region interacts increasingly to ensure diplomatic, economic, political, and military involvement by external governments. The internal conflicts of the regional countries inflame, and ensure regional instability well into the future. These immensely complex factors geometrically complicate the importance of US regional policies and goals.

The proximate location of the Horn of Africa to the Saudi Arabian peninsula and the essentiality for Saudi political independence and internal stability underpins the US strategic interests in the "arc de crise." It is the oil flow from Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf which promotes regional strategic importance.

The opportunity for the exercise of national policy by application of multiple instruments of power is indeed infinite. The national willingness to exercise the full range of instruments of power must
remain viable. Foremost among the instruments of power used in the region by the United States has been economic assistance, and this is the most likely future instrument of power.

The West offers structured economic development which centers on capitalist initiatives within the context of a democratic government assuring civil rights to the population. This capitalist democratic approach has been perceived in many of the underdeveloped African countries as a form of neo-imperialism. This unsavory African label of neo-imperialism must be overcome if US policies are to be totally achieved. However, Soviet ideological arguments have become less important since the Afghanistan invasion and a growing awareness on the part of the Africans that Soviets have little to offer developing nations except military hardware.

Growing economic difficulties have forced many countries to look more to the US and the West for advice and practical assistance. The opportunities for the West to make significant longterm linkages do exist, and the most lucrative instruments will be economic programs. The pressing need for economic assistance may offset the unsavory label of neo-imperialism.

Between 1953 and 1970 the Ethiopian government received American military and economic aid worth United States $170 million and United States $230 million respectively. Ethiopia was by far the largest Sub-Saharan African recipient of United States assistance. Ethiopia was the first African country in which the United States played a major role in the post WWII era. It served as the focal point for access to the rest of Africa.

It was a change in the regional balance of power that was
ultimately responsible for the loss of Ethiopia as a long-term ally of the United States. Mordechai Abir states that Soviet weapons supplied to Sudan, Somalia, Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen and Syria, and the Eritrean Liberation Front of Ethiopia in the early and mid 1960's changed the balance of regional power against the once preeminent Ethiopia military.26

The desire for timely modernization of regional military forces provided the initial opportunity for direct Soviet regional involvement. Somalia first requested Western assistance in 1969 in building an Army of 20,000. However, because of almost continuous regional conflicts and the Western fears of a full scale war in the region, only assistance to organize a Somalia army of 5,000 was offered. Frustrated, the Somali government signed an agreement with the Soviet Union to train and equip a initial force of approximately 14,000 men with the long-term aim of bringing the force to 20,000.27

At the same time the Soviets attempted to maintain friendly relations with the Ethiopians and reassured them that the agreement with Somalia stipulated that Soviet arms would only be provided for defensive purposes. It should be noted that United States arms agreements also state that arms will be used only for defensive purposes. The Soviet-Somali agreement of 1968 provided for the purchase of MIC-21 fighters, T-34 and T-54 tanks, an assortment of modern artillery, and large quantities of automatic light arms.28 The Soviets readily provided the armaments and the required training which would eventually enable Somalia to engage Ethiopia in conventional mechanized battles during the Ogaden War of 1977. This war was inevitable and was initiated by Somalia who underestimated the resiliency of Ethiopia and the Ethiopian military. The Somalis also acted against the advice of their Soviet
Sponsors. Somalia's irredentist claims to unify "Greater Somali," which included parts of Northern Kenya, Djibouti, and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, were known and publicized throughout the region. The desire for a "Greater Somalia" was frequently a rallying point for the government. The stability of Somali regimes depended in part on their determination to pursue the liberation and unification of Greater Somalia.

The "Greater Somalia concept was initially sponsored by the British and would have encompassed not only British Somaliland, the former Italian Somaliland, and the Somali inhabited Northern Frontier District of Kenya, but also the Ogaden and the Haud which fell within the international recognized Ethiopian borders. The British, in 1944, put forth a formal proposal for establishment of a greater Somalia. This proposal also suggested that Eritrea should be divided between Ethiopia and the Sudan rather than annexed to Ethiopia.29

It was from this political beginning, one of maneuvering for territory, that ultimately initiated United States involvement on the Horn of Africa. Marina Ottaway writes that after WWII Ethiopia desired to reestablish control within its legally recognized boundaries as well as to obtain international acceptance for Ethiopia's claim to a federated Eritrea. Ethiopia wanted to secure her territorial claims with the assistance of a superpower. In addition, there was a desire to build a modern Army. The Emperor of Ethiopia hoped to achieve his national purposes with the assistance of the United States. He orchestrated his moves very carefully to ensure that there was a direct linkage to the United States. In 1945 he sought out United States
assistance in establishing a national airline; he gave the concession to explore for oil to an American company; and he sent troops to fight in Korea. Emperor Haile Selassie's political maneuvering achieved the establishment of a United States vested interest in Ethiopia. The emperor's political astuteness resulted in Eritrea being federated to Ethiopia, and a treaty with the United States which permitted a 25 year lease of the previously British communications center to be known as Kagnew Station. The United States also agreed to train three Ethiopian Divisions totaling 18,000 men.

The primary interest of the United States at this time was to maintain access to the communications facility, while Haile Selassie intended to ensure that the United States had a vested interest in the survival of his regime. "There was never an alliance between the United States and Ethiopia, since an alliance presupposes a joining force in pursuit of a common goal." It was military aid that instituted and became the culminating point of Ethiopian and American relations.

The goals of each nation were varied. What was lacking from the outset was mutual interest between the United States and Ethiopia. The technological advances of satellite communications eventually outdated the need for Kagnew Station. It is certain that national reasons for involvement with other countries undergo constant change. The Red Sea, Bab al Mandeb Strait, proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, the Soviet Threat, and access to Persian Gulf oil are today strategic reasons for United States regional involvement which are not mentioned in the literature of 1953.

The development of the Soviet base at Berbera, Somalia in the 1970's was the factor which started the United States worrying about
Soviet regional penetration and the region's changing balance of power. The Soviet primary goal was to establish a base on the Straits of Bab al Mandeb. The increase in regional strategic importance to the Soviets is traced from 1962 which marks the date of the United States deployment of A-3 Polaris missiles launched from submarines. The decision of the United States to deploy the A-3 Polaris missiles aboard submarines in the Indian Ocean resulted in Soviet efforts to counter this sea based threat. Soviet commercial shipping significantly increased as did show-of-force by naval combatants. The Soviets earnestly sought opportunities to establish and assert regional political influence. The primary Soviet motive for regional involvement was initially strategic. Soviet regional initiatives were successful, and client states were created in South Yemen, Somalia and Sudan, and later Ethiopia. The Soviets did experience later reverses in Sudan and Somalia. The success of Soviet regional penetration was nurtured by regional turbulence and the desire of the countries of the Horn to modernize their armies.

On the other hand, these countries, especially Ethiopia and Somalia, were also able to impose their policies on both the Soviet Union and the United States. In essence, they were never politically or culturally dominated by the superpowers and remained politically astute in achieving their own goals. That the superpowers were unable to prevent the Ethiopia Somalia conflict of 1977 illustrates that there is a distinct separation between power and influence over the affairs of states. Nation states may be influenced by external powers toward a general course of action; however, it is rare that an external power can dictate specific policy by reliance on diplomatic initiatives and
military assistance. The erosion of superpower ability to control regional conflicts indicates clearly that regional powers will have to assume much of the burden of conflict resolution if regional stability is desired. This assumes the full application of all means of power in agreement with overarching national objectives, regional policy, and desired long-term relations with a particular state.

The solutions for regional problems depend on the attitudes and actions of the local parties and on the policies of superpowers. When the latter see their own interests affected, peace will probably be elusive. The instability of the Horn which has generated conflicts and perplexed resolution is founded on religion, language, ethnicity, and artificial political boundaries. The most pressing political problem of the Horn is the possible clash of two protege regimes, i.e., Ethiopia and Somalia. However, it is unlikely that any states of the Horn could pursue a modern war for more than a brief period. The political realities within the Horn are divisive and disruptive but remain for the moment in check, as the nations attempt to consolidate their internal power bases and develop the economies of their nations. The pace of development and the resolution of interstate disagreements, undeclared war, and rebellion is recognized by the most optimistic to be a dishelvingly slow process. In Ethiopia, the acceptance of an independent Eritrea which has sought such independence since the 1960's is considered impossible. As a pluralistic state, Ethiopia simply cannot accept the legitimacy of ethnic separatism because this concession would lead to ultimate fragmentation. Somalia remains a triple threat to Ethiopia by: Encouraging the Ethiopian Islamic population toward insurrection which threatens the Coptic Christians (40
percent of the Ethiopian population); seeking creation of a Greater Somalia; and providing psychological and military support for internal rebellions.36

The future prospects for the countries which comprise the Horn of Africa seem indeed bleak. Ethiopia will slip further behind in economic self-sufficiency. The economy is grossly mismanaged and plagued with raging inflation, frozen wages, corruption, and hoarding. The Eritrean, Tigrean, and Ogaden civil wars will continue to strain the fragile economy. The ability of the Ethiopian regime to even feed its populace is questioned. The Republic of Djibouti appears relatively stable and relies on a service oriented economic system. Djibouti hopes to establish itself as a financial capital on the Horn. However, it remains dependent on an annual French subsidy to preclude bankruptcy. The Kenyan economy, once a bright star within Africa, has been severely impacted by drought especially its northern areas. The current government is popular however, and except for the bleak economic prospects which could produce internal power struggles among ethnic claimants, the future appears reasonably stable. The economy of the Somali Republic is termed a dependent economy. The base of the economy is nomadic production of cattle which is not sufficient to support the population. There is no other basis or source of internal wealth.37

Sudan is faced with numerous problems which thwart development. It has a major refugee problem with more than 500,000, a high potential for civil war, a lively black market, and endemic corruption among high government officials. In addition, Sudan has no foreign credit and all materials are purchased cash on delivery. Throughout its existence the government has experienced coups d'etat and periodic revolts by its
three southern provinces. The issues of religion, Moslem North versus non-Moslem South, will prove continuing challenges for the government of Sudan. Sudan may be able to overcome its most pressing problems, but it must be willing to take great political risk to initiate substantive change. This is a country where significant arable land lies fallow, where known oil resources crucially needed for development are yet to be exploited, and where the quality of life should be reasonable for the majority and yet is not.

The existing conditions of the Horn of Africa point toward the need to analyze the existing realities of the region; to respect and accept the nations as equals, not as clients; to recognize the exceptional developmental assistance needs; to be patient; to analyze United States resource limits and prioritize capabilities accordingly; to identify the potential risks associated with regional involvement; to realize the varying ideologies and approaches within the countries and the region; and to develop multinational coalition strategies for the region, (What can the excolonial countries do? (What are they willing to do?). These perplexing points of issue challenge the full realization of United States goals and objectives. They also marvelously complicate Soviet regional adventurism.

There is a full realization that the resources of the United States are not limitless. However, it is also true that Western culture as we know it cannot survive in isolation in a world otherwise dominated by Soviet and/or Communist cultural institutions and values. Therefore, the United States will remain involved in world regions to more or lesser degrees depending on national interest.

United States interests in the Horn of Africa became more than mere
rhetorical with the establishment of the United States Central Command in 1983. This command was formed to deter the Soviets and their surrogates from further regional expansion, not specifically to resolve the political or military issues which engulf the Horn of Africa. The command's responsibilities encompass 14 countries from the Horn through the Middle East to the eastern edges of Pakistan and Afganistan. The command's establishment did provide the capability to properly plan and structure command and control arrangements for regional contingencies. It provides the primary focal point for regional military involvement. The command does face unique planning challenges, force planning constraints and uncertainties, but it is more than a paper tiger. The establishment of the command demonstrates the American resolve and will to provide a credible regional deterrence.

United States military strategy for the region is designed to meet the challenges to our security interest. Interrelated factors, such as United States-Soviet relations, relative strengths of regional nations, and the global military balance, are considered in the formulation of strategy and the development of forces to support it.39 The current United States military strategy is defensive and seeks to deter war while maintaining a secure environment within which the United States, its allies, and its friends can pursue legitimate interest. This strategy of deterrence is rooted in a national commitment to peace and freedom. The fundamental elements of this strategy include nuclear deterrence supported by negotiated arms reductions and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI); strong alliances; forward forces; a strong central reserve; force mobility; freedom of the seas, air and space; effective command and control; and good intelligence. The strategy
capitalizes on the strengths of the United States its political and social values, diversified economy, advanced technology, and the will and ingenuity of its people. This strategy fundamentally correlates with the United States overarching national objectives. This relationship is purposely engineered to align military goals, objectives and capabilities with national purpose.

The United States strategy currently results in a deployed battle carrier group in the Indian Ocean. To operate within this region, located some 7,000 miles from the United States with assured sustainability of forces, requires access to multiple support bases and facilities for naval, air, and land forces. The United States has obtained access to regional base facilities located in Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti and tentatively in Sudan. The United States has also improved its political stature as a result of security assistance and the conduct of training exercises with Somalia, Kenya, and Sudan. The acquisition of host nation support, military training exercises and arms assistance in the region, coupled with United States prepositioning of equipment, has significantly improved the ability of the United States project a military presence within the region, a capability which had been previously thwarted by lack of staging bases. The creation of CENTOM facilitates a better alignment of regional contingency plans with allies. This is especially true for France which maintains a permanent presence in Djibouti and is primarily responsible for its security. Such access to regional facilities will permit longterm regional operations necessary for a more credible United States deterrence strategy.

A final conclusion of this exploratory work is that the United
States will remain active within the region well into the foreseeable future. The achievement of United States regional objectives will require the United States to apply its diplomatic, economic, psychological and military instruments of power with consistency, flexibility, and patience. The resolution of the region's problems which are firmly seated in history will be a dishearteningly slow and tedious process. The growing needs of the region's population, longterm civil wars, fragile governments, nationalism, Islamic fundamentalism, infrastructure underdevelopment, superpower competition, etc., challenge the realization of United States objectives. The economic assistance needs of the region will only grow, and meeting these increasing requirements will be necessary for the United States to maintain politically viable influence. In addition, the United States must continue to improve its capability to project military power throughout this strategically vital region.

In summary, the United States national interests in the Horn of Africa and their relative importance were discussed. The prospects for the economic viability and stability of the region were summarily assessed as bleak. A picture of a volatile region engulfed with socioeconomic problems, civil war, and superpower competition was painted. The recommendations which easily flow from this tentative survey of an immensely complex region are that the United States must: increase economic and selective security assistance to stabilize regional governments, foster viable economies, and improve internal defense capabilities; establish and sustain multiple political, economic, and military linkages with the states to facilitate active conduits for prompt action and problem resolution; involve ex-colonial
states, such as France, in resolution of regional problems and
development of regional contingency plans; maintain an open dialogue
with the countries of the region; insure that mutual interests are
jointly derived with potential partners; involve, when possible, the
international organizations to assist in development of solutions for
regional problems; and continue to improve its capability to project
military power within the region.
ENDNOTES

1. J. Bowyer Bell, The Horn of Africa: Strategic Magnet in the Seventies, p. 3.

2. Ibid., pp. 25-36.


Concerned About the Bear," The Almanac of Seapower, ed. by Vincent C. Thomas, Jr., p. 48.

18. Ibid., p. 48.


27. Ibid., p. 12.

28. Ibid., p. 12.


30. Ibid., p. 173.

31. Ibid., p. 169.

32. Ibid., p. 173.


38. Ibid., p. 132.


40. Ibid., pp. 7-9.


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