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PSEUDO OPERATIONS

by

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### PSEUDO OPERATIONS

The most likely type of warfare that U.S. military forces will be involved in during the latter part of the 20th century will be counterinsurgency warfare. The U.S. military has neither had great success in this type of warfare nor has it developed any new tactics for countering insurgency. Pseudo operations are a counterinsurgency tactic which has been used successfully by several countries in counterinsurgency efforts. Pseudo operations establish pseudo units which completely mirror the enemy's insurgent units.

Throughout the 20th century the British have used pseudo operations on numerous occasions. Frank Kitson's efforts in the Mau Mau Emergency are a classic example of the successful decentralized use of pseudo operations. The Rhodesian Selous Scouts are an example of a more centralized use of pseudo operations. Other examples of successful pseudo operations can be seen in the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines and in the insurgency in Mozambique. Although the United States military established several types of programs in Vietnam which had pseudo type aspects in them, they never fully established a concept for pseudo operations. The Phoenix program should not be viewed as pseudo operations.

Pseudo operations are a form of tactics which should be used along with conventional tactics as part of a total counterinsurgency strategy. Conceptually, pseudo operations are operations

which deploy a counterinsurgent force which completely mirrors insurgent forces. Its purpose is to infiltrate the civilian communities or operational areas disguised as insurgents in order to develop background information on insurgents and to obtain tactical operational information upon which to act and bring force to bear on the insurgents. The missions of pseudo operations are to: (1) gain information; (2) penetrate, isolate and eliminate insurgent forces; (3) disperse tactical operational information to friendly tactical units; and (4) destroy insurgent political infrastructures.

Given the proven success of pseudo operations and the fact that U.S. military forces are very likely to be involved in counterinsurgency efforts, the Marine Corps should establish a small cadre unit within its own force structure which would concentrate on pseudo operations. The unit could easily expand within the force structure once the Marine Corps is committed to an insurgency.

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PSEUDO OPERATIONS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of World War II the United States has demonstrated little ability to successfully engage itself in low intensity conflicts, while at the same time has established its abilities to wage possible higher intensity conflicts with some degree of success. Yet warfare in the last part of the 20th century and probably beyond will, more than likely, be limited to those conflicts at the lower end of the intensity level. This dichotomy can be demonstrated in the following diagrams.

Figure 1

U.S. ABILITY TO WAGE WARFARE





Figure 2

LIKELIHOOD OF WARFARE



One of the key factors in the United States' inability to successfully wage low intensity warfare has been its inability to come to terms with insurgency in general and then its inability to develop and pursue tactics that effectively counter and defeat insurgency.

General Sir Frank Kitson, a veteran of numerous insurgency wars, has stated that if there are eighty insurgencies there are eighty different solutions to those insurgencies.<sup>2</sup> No two insurgencies are exactly the same. The key to defeating an insurgency is understanding the insurgency itself.

One form of tactics which has successfully been used in insurgency warfare to counter an insurgency is the use of pseudo forces in pseudo operations. Pseudo forces are units which disguise themselves as the insurgents. Pseudo operations are operations which use this pseudo force to infiltrate the civilian population or the insurgent infrastructure in order to bring force to bear on insurgents.

Throughout the history of warfare pseudo operations have been used in one form or another. The United States has used pseudo type operations on several occasions, but have never had a formalized concept for their use, nor has it ever deployed pseudo operations as a tactic in a total counterinsurgency strategy.

Pseudo operations have never been used as the sole form of tactics making up a total strategy in any insurgency. On the contrary, they have been used primarily as a secondary tactic along with other conventional tactics and social, civic and economic programs designed to counterinsurgency.

Since all insurgencies are unique to themselves and since pseudo operations make up only one form of tactics used by the counterinsurgents, the preferred method in examining pseudo operations is a case study method. Two case studies will be examined in the research study. First, the decentralized British model will be examined, concentrating on Frank Kitson's decentralized pseudo operations against the Mau Mau. Second, the more centralized Rhodesian model of the Selous Scouts will be examined. Both case studies will be described within the context of their own particular insurgency.

Several examples of pseudo operations associated with the U.S. military will then be examined. Following the discussion of a lack of an American model, a concept for future pseudo operations to be used by the U.S. military, in general, and the Marine Corps, in specific, will be proposed.

Finally, there will be a proposal for an expandable Marine Corps cadre unit whose principal mission would be pseudo operations in an insurgency environment.

Four fundamental issues must be kept in mind while reading this research: (1) the U.S. military has not been an effective counterinsurgency force; (2) the United States will more than likely be involved in insurgency warfare than in any other type of warfare in the years to come; (3) all insurgencies are different and must be treated as such; and (4) pseudo operations are a tactic and not a strategy.

This research is an attempt to reduce the dichotomy of the United States' inability to wage low intensity warfare and the probable likelihood that this is in fact the type of warfare in which it is most likely to be involved. It is an attempt to develop a tactic for insurgency warfare.

## CHAPTER II

### THE BRITISH MODEL

Early Use. The British have had the most experience in pseudo operations. Although pseudo operations were essentially established and utilized after World War II in the insurgency wars of the period, the British did, in fact use the concept at a much earlier date. The British developed counterinsurgency tactics during the Boer War (1899-1902) which very closely resembled those which they would use in the post-World War II insurgencies. The first stage of the Boer War followed a pattern of set-piece type battles such as those at Elandslaagte (21 October 1899), Ladysmith (30 October 1899), Modder River (28 November 1899) and Magersfontein (11 December 1899).<sup>1</sup> Following the surrender of the main Boer Army at Paardeberg (27 February 1900) the remaining Boer commandos used guerrilla tactics to continue the war. The war took this guerrilla form for the following two years. The British devised several methods to defeat the remaining Boer commandos. First, the British set up concentration camps in which to place the Boer women and children, while at the same time destroyed their crops and farms. This isolated the commandos from their families. Second, the British constructed a series of blockhouses connected with barbed wire and ran them across the veld of South Africa. This restricted the maneuver of the highly mobile Boer commandos.<sup>2</sup> Despite the concentration camps, the destruction of crops and farms, and the network of blockhouses, the British Army still had to come to terms with

defeating militarily the Boer commandos. The sluggish conventional European British Army found it difficult to isolate and engage the lightly equipped, horse mounted and highly mobile South African farmers. The British realized that if they were going to defeat the Boers militarily they would have to do it using Boer commando tactics. They did this in a twofold manner. First, they modeled the British Army in South Africa into a much more mobile force. While maintaining a set number of men to man the towns and garrisons, Major General John French's eight mobile columns were allowed to perform the task of "'sieving' and 'scouring' in the Eastern Transvaal."<sup>3</sup> Second, the British used captured Boers and formed them into regular units in order to engage the guerrilla Boer commandos. The British had always used captured Boers to assist them from the very start of the war. These so-called "joiners" individually joined the British units and acted as guides and scouts.<sup>4</sup> In October 1901 the British initiated a large scale recruitment campaign to organize former commando members into formal units. In this recruitment the British used a "carrot and stick" approach. On the one hand they offered the volunteers British Army wages and on the other they offered the captured Boers the return to the concentration camps. The largest units formed were the National Scouts and the Orange River Colony Volunteers.<sup>5</sup> These units were the closest thing that could mirror the guerrilla Boer commandos. Their utility to the British Army during the latter state of the Boer War was unquestioned. The Times of 21 May 1902 reported:

Of the usefulness of these National Scouts there can be no doubt. In operations in their own districts

their local knowledge renders them invaluable. It was a knowledge such as can never be acquired by anyone who has not lived all his life on the veld. . . .

The National Scouts were used in two ways. First, various units of the National Scouts were used as scout and guide sections for the British columns. Second, they were used as a large unit which became a maneuver element for a British column. Because the National Scouts were Boers themselves and because their units were so similar to the guerrilla commandos they proved to be a highly effective force.

Although units like the National Scouts were an attempt to get the Boers to fight in "their" war and an attempt to get units that were similar to the guerrilla commandos, they were not pseudo operations in the truest sense. They were not specifically clothed to model the Boer commandos. However, they were designed to get operational information and were equipped similar to the commandos. Being Boers themselves and former members of the commandos, they understood the guerrilla commando better than the British Army commanders.

Following the war the Boer society was in a state of turmoil. There was great hatred between the "bitterenders" and the "joiners". The British government did little to alleviate this situation by compensating the "joiners" with much less than what they had offered the "joiners" in order to induce them into service.

The two world wars did not produce many experiments into pseudo operations. An exception to this was Otto Skorzeny's use of German soldiers disguised as Americans during the German

counteroffensive of 1944 in the Ardennes. Obviously not an example of British pseudo-gang warfare; the Skorzeny "commandos" use in the Ardennes was Hitler's response to British commando attacks on Germany and is an interesting footnote in pseudo warfare. Skorzeny's "commandos" wore American military police uniforms for the primary purpose of misdirecting traffic, despite the more popularized purpose of assassinating General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Despite the operation being hastily planned and poorly executed, it did have limited success, primarily psychological. Skorzeny himself had reservations about putting his commandos in American uniforms.<sup>7</sup> Skorzeny's Ardennes operation, known as "Operation Grief" was really not pseudo operations as it was not in an insurgency war nor did it follow any of the tenets of pseudo operations. In fact, Skorzeny's commandos were breaking the rules of the Geneva Convention. Although Otto Skorzeny's numerous exploits have offered insights into raids and other special operations, they have not been very relevant to the aspects of pseudo warfare in an insurgency environment.

The Kenyan Emergency (1952-1960): Pseudo-Gangs and the Mau Mau. The Kenyan Emergency saw some of the most innovative and effective use of pseudo operations. In many ways Kenya saw the initiation of this type of operations in the post-World War II period, although the British were beginning to deploy similar type operations in Malaya. Much of the formulation of concepts and the actual deployment of pseudo-gangs was done by Captain Frank Kitson (now General Sir Frank Kitson, retired).

The insurgency in Kenya was in many ways unique. First, Kenya was one of the only British African territories (the other being Rhodesia) that won its independence following a major insurgency. The other British territories in Africa were able to make a relatively peaceful transition to independence. Second, the actual British troop commitment to the Mau Mau uprising was relatively small. When compared to the other major British commitments to operations in Korea and Malaya in 1952, the British military commitment to Kenya was quite secondary. From the British point of view "the Mau Mau uprising was looked on as a sideshow amongst sideshows."<sup>8</sup> During the entire emergency the British Army never had more than six King's African Rifles battalions and five British battalions serving in Kenya at any time.<sup>9</sup> Third, the Mau Mau revolt was not a total national insurgency. In fact, the insurgency was almost solely the effort of only one of the African tribes living in Kenya. The Corfield Report which in 1960 surveyed the causes and origins of the Mau Mau revolt stated:

Mau Mau in its shortest terms was the violent manifestation of a limited nationalistic revolutionary movement confined almost entirely to the Kikuyu tribe.<sup>10</sup>

The rebellion itself centered around Nairobi and in the Central and Rift Valley Provinces. The State of Emergency was proclaimed in October 1952 and lasted officially until January 1960, although in reality the rebellion actually ceased around October 1956. Since the rebellion was primarily a Kikuyu tribal rebellion, it found its roots in the many Kikuyu political organizations. It is believed that the Mau Mau was essentially the banned Kikuyu Central Association (KCA).<sup>11</sup> This group differed

somewhat from the Kenya African Union (KAU) which remained a legal party for some time during the Emergency. Although the KAU was a mass party unlike the KCA it was still controlled and dominated by the Kikuyu tribe. Finally, the insurgency was neither Communist inspired or backed. Julian Paget, a British authority on insurgency warfare and a soldier in the British Army who served in Kenya during the insurrection noted this lack of Communist backing.

There is no evidence that it was Communist inspired or even received material Communist support. It was a deliberate programme of insurgency, designed to enable its supporters to dominate, first the whole Kikuyu tribe and then the other tribes in Kenya. The ultimate aim was to eliminate the whites in the colony, and establish an independent, Kikuyu controlled Kenya.<sup>12</sup>

A unique feature of the insurgency was the "oathing" rituals adhered to by the Mau Mau. "Oathing" had not only historically been practiced by the Kikuyu, but it also held a significant function within the KCA.<sup>13</sup> Paget placed tactical significance to the "oathing" rituals:

From the start, Mau Mau used "oathing" as one of their main weapons, firstly, to control their own members, and secondly, to intimidate those who were reluctant to join the movement.<sup>14</sup>

The Mau Mau had an organization which was known as the Kenya Parliament. The organization itself was divided into an "active" wing and a "passive" wing. The "passive" wing was supposed to supply the "active" wing which was operating in the field, but as H.P. Willmott has noted:

In reality Mau Mau scarcely had any organization except in Nairobi, where the central committee and its subordinate bodies functioned quite effectively until mid-1954. The Mau Mau lacked the sophistication to organize itself. . . .<sup>15</sup>

The "active" wing of the Mau Mau consisted of loosely formed units which in most instances were held together by a forceful leader and the superstitions behind "oathing". Although technically formed into platoons, companies and battalions by the Kenya Parliament, in reality the "active" forces operated as isolated gangs in the Aberdare and Mount Kenya forests. It has generally been estimated that there were about 15,000 Mau Mau operating in the "active" wing during the height of the emergency.

Actual hostilities started in 1952 with the killing of African officials and the destruction of their property. On 20 October 1952 a State of Emergency was declared, with the subsequent commitment of British troops and expansion of local armed forces. The insurgency consisted of a series of Mau Mau raids and killings, primarily directed at the African population. Surprisingly few Europeans were killed by the Mau Mau during the entire insurgency.<sup>16</sup> Clearly the oath taken by the Mau Mau to kill at least one European was never fulfilled by each of its members. In March 1953 a group of 1000 Mau Mau massacred 84 inhabitants of the village of Lari, while another group of Mau Mau raided the Naivasha Police Station, releasing the prisoners and stealing the food stores.<sup>17</sup> This was the high point of the Mau Mau campaign. The following year the British forces launched a series of successful operations throughout the Kikuyu homelands. "Food denial" and "resettlement" programs were also incorporated into the British strategy.<sup>18</sup> With the success of these actions the Mau Mau ceased to become an effective insurgent force and according to Kenneth W. Grundy:

. . . from about mid-1954, the primary concern of the forest fighters was simply survival. Virtually all of their raids henceforth concentrated on securing food and supplies.<sup>19</sup>

Full control of anti-Mau Mau operations was taken away from the Army and returned to the police in May 1956.

It was into this ongoing insurgency in Kenya that Frank Kitson was assigned as a District Military Intelligence Officer (DMIO) for the Kiambu district (one of the districts located near Nairobi in the Central Province).<sup>20</sup> Kitson arrived in Kenya nine months after the declaration of the Emergency, at the height of the insurgency. Kitson realized the need to get operational information to soldiers in order to provide:

. . . pinpoint information regarding the whereabouts and future intentions of enemy groups,<sup>21</sup> so that soldiers could be put into contact with them.<sup>21</sup>

Despite this need, Kitson noted:

The intelligence organizations were seldom capable of doing this regularly, so the army did two things. Firstly it complained about the inefficiency of the intelligence organization and secondly it set about looking for the enemy by conducting large-scale operations in likely areas on a hit-or-miss basis.<sup>22</sup>

As a result, the British Army spent a great deal of time and effort in large-scale patrolling with only minimal results. Kitson's assessment highlighted two essential points in a counterinsurgency operations. First, there is a fundamental need for current operational information in order to conduct successful tactical operations. Second, without good operational information, standard counterinsurgency tactics become highly ineffectual.

In April 1954 a former captured insurgent named "James" who had been interrogated by Kitson led a group of security forces to several successful contacts. Upon return to Kitson's compound James's actions gave Kitson an idea.

Gradually, as a joke, he taught our men all about the Mau Mau ways. They started using Mau Mau slang, handshakes and signs. They started wearing their buckles upside down, so the boy scout badge on the buckle was inverted. They suddenly became Mau Mau--what a laugh!<sup>23</sup>

This joke soon gave Kitson and his Field Intelligence Assistant (FIA), Eric Holyoak an idea:

Eric and I decided that we might cash in on the situation. Hitherto Mau Mau had fallen into the trap by accident in one or two cases. We thought that we might get Africans to impersonate gangsters as a regular means of information. Not only had we got James who knew exactly how to behave as a terrorist, but he had obligingly taught our team of seven men how to do it as well.<sup>24</sup>

Kitson saw some immediate problems with the concept. First, captured terrorists were supposed to be handed over to the legal authorities for prosecution. If convicted they would be hung. The second problem was what would happen if they were disguised as insurgents and they ran into an army or police patrol. Third, there was the bureaucratic problem:

More import still was the question of what the District Commissioners and District officers would say. . . . We were also afraid that some people would consider the whole project too dangerous and not worth risking lives on. Finally, we were nervous of the "experts on Africans" who<sup>25</sup> were sure to say that the idea just could not work.

Kitson developed a Special Methods Training Center where he could train security force members along with captured Mau Mau for pseudo-gang operations.

In order to get Mau Mau personnel for his pseudo-gangs.

Kitson needed captured insurgents not dead ones:

Although most people felt that Mau Mau were better dead, we preferred them alive. You can't get much information out of a corpse.<sup>26</sup>

Kitson modeled his pseudo-gangs by completely mirroring the Mau Mau gangs. The members of the pseudo-gangs had to be Kikuyu. They were clothed in the ragged wear typical of the forest gangs. Their weapons were the home-made bolt-guns and out-dated rifles similar to those which the Mau Mau used. Pseudo-gang members had to allow their hair to become matted and braided and, in addition, they were not allowed to bathe often. Simple signs like cleanliness or kept hair could compromise a pseudo-gang. If a European was assigned to a pseudo-gang, he would have to put dye on his face and wear a wig. Plus the European, although he was usually the leader of the pseudo-gang, would have to stay in the background and be as indistinguishable as possible. The pseudo-gangs had to know the technical aspects of Mau Mau recognition, i.e., handshakes, slang, signs, identification in apparel, etc. Pseudo-gang members were allowed to take their wives or female friends with them on operations, since the majority of forest gangs had females with them. Thus, a pseudo-gang had to become identical to a Mau Mau unit. Their success rested on this essential factor.

Selection for pseudo-gang members was a specific problem, as Kitson noted:

. . . the main job was to keep up-to-date with the way of the gangsters, which meant having somebody from each of the major gangs and replacing them from time to time. Thus if we had just recruited somebody from

one gang we would prefer the next man to come from a different enemy group. In this way the field of terrorists ~~from~~ <sup>27</sup> whom we could select was narrowed a great deal.

Kitson then had to determine what sort of insurgent was best suited and justified for recruitment for pseudo-gang operations:

On the whole it was best to rule out people who had joined the Mau Mau because they were fanatically keen on the movement politically . . .

There was a far bigger group who . . . merely joined because all their friends had done so and because life was getting rough in the Reserve. Many of these surrendered when things got difficult in the forest and such people could often be used. On the whole, however, they were rather feeble and with certain exceptions were not good people for the job. By far the best were the Africans who joined the gangs from a spirit of adventure. . . . Their outlook was not far from that of many young men of spirit anywhere else in the world and they were the easiest to handle because they were the easiest to satisfy.<sup>28</sup>

Thus, basically, there were three categories of captured Mau Mau: (1) the small group who were political, hard-core doctrinaires; (2) the largest group who joined merely because it was the easiest thing to do at the time; and (3) the small group who joined for the sake of adventure; they were neither doctrinaires nor were they men who would succumb to minimal hardship. It was from this last group that provided the best possible members for pseudo-gang operations.

The "carrot and stick" approach to captured--Mau Mau insurgents and would-be pseudo-gang operatives was essentially basic. Either they could accept the relatively comfortable existence at the training camp or be hauled off to Nairobi to be hung. On this matter Kitson specifically stated that:

. . . the system only works when a suitable incentive can be offered, when it can be balanced against a

sufficiently horrific alternative and when an honour-  
able reason for changing sides can be displayed.<sup>29</sup>

The training or "taming" of possible pseudo-gang operatives was carried out in three phases. During the first phase the prisoner was treated in a hard manner basically to get as much information out of him and to see whether he would make a good pseudo-gang operative. In the second stage the pseudo-gang operative was "gradually incorporated into the community as a friend,"<sup>30</sup> but would not be told anything about pseudo-gang operations nor would he be left alone. When they were sure that the captured insurgent was completely trustworthy he was then allowed to enter phase three and allowed to carry arms, go on patrols and basically enter pseudo-gang operations. Entering this phase three was very critical, but as Kitson noted:

Any African could fool me no doubt: one or two could probably have got around Eric, but he would have to be very clever to pass the scrutiny of the other Africans in our teams, some of whom were loyalists, some of whom were ex-terrorists, and all of whom had a vital interest in making sure that there was no mistake.<sup>31</sup>

This philosophy clearly indicated the need to have friendly host-country operatives interspersed into a pseudo-gang. A "turned" insurgent had to be continually watched until his loyalty was proven. The best method for doing this was by having a "turned" insurgent be a member of a pseudo-gang which consisted primarily of host-country operatives. In addition, a pseudo-gang was normally led by a European, either a local Kenyan or a British security force member.

Kitson's pseudo-gangs were able to bring force to bear on the insurgents by coming into contact themselves with the insurgents or by gathering tactical operational information on the insurgents from the local populace and then transmitting that information to regular forces. In addition, the pseudo-gangs were able to establish a wealth of background information on the insurgents through their interface with the populace and the insurgents.

Kitson felt that the pseudo-gangs were most effective in working in areas which were inhabited--the tribal Reserves, the Settled Areas and the cities. Here the pseudo-gangs could operate and gain information from the populace; the same information as if it were given to the actual insurgents. From this source the pseudo-gangs obtained tactical operational information and background information which would allow them or friendly tactical units to close with the insurgents.

If a pseudo-gang was able to penetrate an insurgent force before being detected there was always the great chance that the pseudo-gang would be able to capture insurgents and thus build-up the supply of information after appropriate interrogation.

It was in the forests that the pseudo-gangs met their greatest challenge. In the forest there was no civilian populace. The Mau Mau alone existed in this refuge. A contact by security forces could only be with the insurgents. The difficulty of effective pseudo operations in the isolation of the forests was specifically noted by Kitson:

. . . it was easier to get some sort of results inside [the forests], but to do a really good job inside took more training and experience than outside. In addition the strain and discomfort of living as a Mau Mau inside the forest was greater than doing so outside.<sup>32</sup>

As for the matter of tracking down the insurgents living within the forest, the situation necessitated the need for normal conventional tactics. In essence it was "a matter for straight forward patrolling and nothing to do with pseudo work."<sup>33</sup>

Kitson was not the only member of the security forces in Kenya to adopt pseudo operations. Francis Erskine a platoon commander in the Kenya Regiment was using pseudo operations in the souther part of Kitson's district. Erskine, however, was using pseudo-gang primarily for immediate tactical kills. Kitson disagreed with the use of pseudo operations purely for offensive purposes.

It would have ruined the system. If everyone<sup>34</sup> had done it. It would have compromised the situation.

Kitson believed that the long-term intelligence gathering should not be seconded to quick short-term tactical results.

The large scale battalion size operations proved ineffective in the Mau Mau insurgency. Large cordon and search operations never were able to achieve results because they seldom acted on current pinpoint tactical operational information. The most effective means for counterinsurgency operations was the combination of small unit tactics and pseudo-gang operations. Thus:

By July 1955 nearly everyone had realized that small patrols, pseudo-gangs<sup>35</sup> or tracker combat teams were the right answer. . . .

It was through the close coordination among these small units that the Mau Mau campaign was able to be waged effectively and

successfully. The most important concept which was accrued in the counterinsurgency campaign was that "the key to fighting terrorism lay in getting enough operational information quickly."<sup>36</sup>

Pseudo-gang operations were effective during the Mau Mau Emergency for a multiplicity of reasons. First, because the insurgency was not a complete national uprising, the insurgents were able to be isolated. The British security forces were able to concentrate pseudo-gang operations within the Kikuyu tribe and within their tribal areas. Second, there was a wealth of knowledge and experience brought to pseudo-operations through the local European Kenyans and through Kikuyu security force members which facilitated their use as pseudo-gang operatives. These men not only knew the region in which they were operating but they also knew the habits and customs of the Kikuyu in the Mau Mau. Third, the chain of command and operating procedures remained relatively unencumbered by large bureaucratic entanglements. In fact, some of the pseudo-gang operations were run as low as at the company level. Fourth, tactical operational information because of this simple chain of command was able to be transmitted to local friendly tactical units which could then in turn bring force to bear on the insurgents. Fifth, "turned" insurgents had a real motivation factor to turn and then work for the security forces as pseudo-operatives. They could either work as pseudo-gang members or be hung. And finally, the Mau Mau never established a deep rooted infrastructure which was impenetrable by pseudo-gangs. The farther away from the cities the less effective was the Mau

Mau political infrastructure. Thus the insurgents that operated in the cities and Reserves had some form of political and support infrastructure but those Mau Mau operating in the forests were left to maintain themselves by their own individual resources, especially during the latter days of the insurgency.<sup>37</sup>

Although the pseudo-gang operations were highly effective in combatting the Mau Mau insurgency its operational implementation suffered from several shortcomings. The Mau Mau insurgency had gone on for almost two years before serious attempts to perform pseudo-gang operations were initiated. Earlier implementation could have greatly inhibited the organizational build-up of the Mau Mau infrastructure within the cities.

It was not until the end of the Mau Mau insurgency that pseudo-gang operations and training were placed under centralized control. Some of the founders of pseudo-gang operations in Kenya, like Kitson, felt that pseudo-gangs should be recruited, trained and deployed locally. Others, like General Lathbury, felt that the formation and training of pseudo-gangs should be centralized. By the end of the war this latter view was incorporated by the security forces. Although centralization was inevitable as a legitimate goal for the high command, much of the effectiveness of pseudo-gang operations in Kenya came as a result of its local organization and training. Kitson has later stated that the operational situation had changed greatly by the time General Lathbury took over. Because the insurgency threat had greatly diminished, centralization may have been necessitated. The "target" [isolated insurgent gangs surviving in the forest] as

Kitson called it was different.<sup>38</sup> Kitson advised against over centralization. He felt that pseudo operations must always be properly integrated with the security forces, and the security forces must be held accountable for them. As Kitson has noted:

If it [pseudo operations] is just controlled at the top it will not be controlled at all. It must be integrated at all levels.<sup>39</sup>

In general, the organizational questions were not enough to hinder the operational effectiveness of the pseudo-gangs. Pseudo-gang operations proved to be effective when used as a method for obtaining tactical operational information for tactical units and when used in congruence with standard operational counterinsurgency tactics. The Kitson model demonstrated one of the finest examples on the use of pseudo operations in a counterinsurgency campaign.

Malaya and Northern Ireland. The Communist insurgency in Malaya lasted from 1948 to 1960. British security forces used a variety of tactics to counter this insurgency. Although used, pseudo-gang operations were not deployed to the extent that they were in Kenya. The Special Operations Volunteer Force was a unit which consisted of some 200 men that was composed of surrendered insurgents and led by police officers.<sup>40</sup> This unit performed pseudo-type operations along with normal tracking and patrolling tactics. Because the insurgents were Chinese it was easier to racially separate them from the Malayan citizenry. Because of this fact a wide use of pseudo-operations was not necessary. Many of the captured Chinese insurgents were "turned" and then used as guides for the security forces who were then directed to

insurgent strongholds. This, again, was not a true model of pseudo-gang operations.

Because the situation in Northern Ireland is ongoing little is actually known about British pseudo operations there. General Sir Frank Kitson having commanded 39 Brigade in Belfast refused to comment on pseudo operations there for specifically the reason that the situation is ongoing. But as Kitson has said:

People will always say you cannot do it [pseudo operations]--but it might work. It might work in one little area. It is up to you to define it.

## CHAPTER III

### THE RHODESIAN MODEL

The war in Rhodesia (1965-1980) witnessed some of the most effective and organized pseudo operations that have ever taken place during insurgency warfare. The pseudo operations evolved through gradual requirements necessitated by the increasing intensity of the insurgency war. The insurgency war itself was actually a war within a rebellion.

Like in most insurgencies (the Cuban Revolution being a noteworthy exception) the Rhodesian insurgency first had its roots in political parties and political opposition to the existing government. In 1961 Joshua Nkomo's National Democratic Party took exception to the new Southern Rhodesian constitution. Southern Rhodesia at that time was still a self-governing British colony. Violence soon erupted in the African townships and the National Democratic Party was banned. Nkomo re-established the party under a new name, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). In 1963 Ndabaningi Sithole and the more radical elements of ZAPU broke away and founded the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). For the next several years the fighting which took place in Rhodesia was not against the Rhodesian Government or their Security Forces, but rather between the two African political movements. On numerous occasions the African townships outlying Salisbury and Bulawayo were the scenes of violent mob riots between the supporters of ZAPU and ZANU. It was also during the early 1960s that a few nationalists were being sent to Ghana, Tanzania and Communist Bloc countries for training.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile the Rhodesian Government was primarily concerned with maintaining the privileged status of the minority white population. The foe of the Rhodesians during the early 1960s was the British Government and not the African nationalists. The Rhodesian Army up to that time had been trained to fight a conventional war in service with the British Army. In fact, the Rhodesians had seen service in both World Wars and in Malaya.

In the First World War, Africans were recruited for the all-volunteer force, the Rhodesian Native Regiment (led by white officers and NCOs), and saw service in German East Africa. Rhodesian whites saw action in the German East African campaign and in France.

In the Second World War the Rhodesians fielded three squadrons for the Royal Air Force and saw service in Europe, North Africa and the Middle East.<sup>2</sup>

The Rhodesians' first experience with counterinsurgency warfare occurred in Malaya in the early 1950s. The Rhodesians provided one squadron of men, "C" Squadron, to serve with the British Special Air Service Regiment (SAS).<sup>3</sup>

During the mid-1950s some thought was given to counterinsurgency by the military but this area of conflict was still considered to be within the realm of the Rhodesian police, the British South African Police (BSAP). By the time the counterinsurgency operations fell into the lap of the Army, the BSAP had been overworked and the insurgents had been able to gain certain advantages in the war.

However, by the late 1950s, there was a gradual shift in emphasis in military training within the Rhodesian forces; plus the Rhodesians were becoming increasingly aware of their need for "self-reliance". By the early 1960s counterinsurgency training was beginning to be incorporated into the Army's training. But because the Rhodesian Government was pre-occupied with their relations with Britain they were unable to formulate any counter-insurgency strategy. Pseudo operations were not even considered or thought about at this time. Underestimating the growth of the insurgency and with their brief successful Malayan experience still in mind, the Rhodesians felt confident in their counter-insurgency capabilities.

In 1965 Rhodesia declared its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) which thus started a fifteen year rebellion from its mother country, Great Britain. Up until mid 1966 the armed struggle had been relatively non-existent. In July 1964 a small group of insurgents known as the "Crocodile Gang" killed a white Melsetter factory worker at a road block.<sup>4</sup> Until UDI this had been the most serious armed incident.

In April of 1966 a team of ZANU insurgents crossed into Rhodesia from Zambia, and then divided into three groups. One of the three groups was completely wiped out at a battle on Hunyani Farm, near Sinoia. This contact would later be known as "The Battle of Sinoia" by the victorious ZANU Party after they achieved power in Rhodesia. In reality it was not much of a battle. Seven insurgents were killed with no Rhodesian losses. A couple of weeks following the Battle of Sinoia, a farmer and his wife were

killed near Hartley. Surprisingly these deaths were to be the last white civilian deaths until 1972. For the next six years the Rhodesian Security Forces almost systematically eliminated the guerrilla forces operating within the country.<sup>5</sup>

The Battle of Sinoia had a significant impact on the counterinsurgency strategy of the Rhodesians. First, it ended the BSAP's exclusive control of counterinsurgency operations. A Joint Operations Command (JOC) was established. The Army now had co-equal status with the BSAP at all tactical levels. Second, senior members of the Security Forces began to contemplate new tactics for combatting the insurgency.

The first exercises using pseudo operations took place in October and November 1966. The principal proponent of pseudo operations at that time was Senior Assistant Commissioner Oppie Oppenheim of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and as a result the exercises were run under the auspices of the CID and the Special Branch, both of the BSAP.<sup>6</sup> However, members of the Army did participate in the exercise. Few people shared Oppenheim's optimism on the utility of pseudo operations. Assisting the exercises as instructors were men who had either pseudo operation experience in Kenya or vast knowledge of the African bush. The original concept was unique for three reasons. First, the exercise functioned primarily as a survival test. Second, no particular insurgent forces were singled out as the forces which the pseudo forces would operate (still in a very early stage of the war, the pseudo forces operated as if they were against any insurgent unit and not a particular one). Third, white Europeans

with blacken faces were used as pseudo operators. The results of the exercise did not impress skeptics of pseudo operations and the plan to create pseudo teams was postponed.<sup>7</sup>

However it was the concept of this particular operation that was wrong and not the notion of pseudo operations. First, although survival techniques are extremely important while operating in the bush, the primary mission of pseudo operations is to gather operational information and this must be done by having some interface with the civilian population. Second, a "general" insurgent cannot be viewed as the opponent that one faces in an insurgency. The insurgent opponent must be completely mirrored. Third, white Europeans could never pose operationally as black insurgents.

The one positive aspect of the 1966 exercise was the identified need for tracking capabilities in insurgency warfare. As a result a Tracker Combat Unit was established in the Rhodesian Territorial Army (their Reserve forces).

The attack on Altena Farm near Centenary on 21 December 1972 marked the beginning of the heated armed conflict stage of the insurgency. On 26 January 1973, JOC finally approved the use of pseudo operations. The first team was initiated by the Special Branch, BSAP, and consisted of six Africans, two Police Constables and four former insurgents. These men were dressed in ZANLA (Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army, the military wing of ZANU) uniforms, given communist weapons and artifacts and then sent out to the Bushu Tribal Trust Land (TTL). The team was soon sent out to other TTLs and proved successful in gathering

information. However, because the team was beginning to become influenced by African spirit mediums it was pulled out of the field and further operations were temporarily postponed.<sup>8</sup>

In the meantime, the Army began to experiment in pseudo operations. Rhodesian SAS personnel with Special Branch guidance trained several African teams and began operating in the TTLs. The majority of the pseudo teams were African but they were led and monitored by white Europeans. On 31 August 1973 reacting on information received through its pseudo disguise an Army pseudo team obtained its first kills of insurgent forces. In addition the pseudo teams reacting on information received were able to recover arms caches. There were some shortcomings with the teams, primarily in coordination. One of the original Army initiators of pseudo operations, Andre Rabie, was killed by a mistake in his identity.<sup>9</sup> This incident highlighted the need for close coordination between the Security Forces and the pseudo teams. For once in the bush, a team would be considered as insurgents when they came into contact with the Security Forces.

Special Branch was also realizing at that time that pure SAS type soldiers were not enough to handle the intricacies of pseudo operations.<sup>10</sup> What was more essential was to have a good knowledge of the language, customs and people in the area, and then combine that with combat and survival skills. Naturally, these men were hard to find. This requirement in personnel was often filled by the Territorial Army and other services.<sup>11</sup>

Pseudo teams were heloed into Mozambique and then walked back into Rhodesia just as if an insurgent team was penetrating into the country. This technique was used to establish who were the insurgent contactmen within the country.

By the end of 1973 the pseudo operations concept was fully accepted by the Special Branch as a viable form of tactics to counter the insurgency. It also had a few Army proponents. It was during this year that a new Army regiment was formed, the Selous Scouts. It was the mission of the Selous Scouts to perform pseudo operations. The Army provided the manpower while the Police provided the intelligence. Major Ron Reid Daly was brought out of retirement to command the regiment while Superintendent Mac McGuinness commanded the Special Branch detachment assigned to the unit. There was also a division of responsibility between the Army and Special Branch which was laid down by the Prime Minister Ian Smith in a formal directive.

The Army was responsible for:

- (1) the housing, training and discipline of all Army personnel;
- (2) the tactics adopted in the field by operational units in conjunction with other armed services;
- (3) the movement and physical deployment of operational units and their resupply;
- (4) the briefing of the Army Commander and the Brigadier commanding the Joint Operational Commands in the field; and
- (5) the control and direction of Army liaison at sub Joint Operation Commands and for overall communications.<sup>12</sup>

Special Branch was responsible for:

- (1) The physical recruitment and mental preparation of personnel other than Army [meaning the turning of terrorists] to be employed in operations;
- (2) The compilation and sifting of intelligence gleaned from all available sources for the briefing of teams to be deployed in the field;
- (3) Redirection and advice of personnel whilst deployed in the field, and subsequent full debrief (Special Branch details from Joint Operational Command being invited to attend) and compilation of reports for circulation to Special Branch stations;
- (4) The control and dissemination of intelligence gleaned by the Selous Scouts and overall security of the unit in all facets;
- (5) The welfare and employ on non military personnel [turned terrorists] and guidance of <sup>13</sup>Police officers seconded to the Selous Scouts.

The directive also assigned the task for the newly formed regiment. It was:

- (1) Tasked to carry out operations of a clandestine nature wherever it may be called upon to serve, drawing its manpower from the combined services and other less obvious channels [tame terrorists] while receiving instructions from the Overall Coordinating Committee, the Director of the Central Intelligence Organisation, Service Commanders and Joint Operational Commands;
- (2) In day to day events, the authority vested in the Director General Central Intelligence Organisation is delegated to the Commanding Officer, Special Branch who, in turn, is responsible for ensuring that the Commissioner of Police is kept fully informed of Scout activities and the unit is run in accordance with the concept laid down upon its inauguration, i.e. the clandestine elimination of terrorists/<sup>14</sup>terrorism both within and without the country.

Turned (or tame) insurgents were paid out of Special Branch funds, thus the Army administrative and pay systems had no knowledge of turned insurgents being in the ranks of the Selous Scouts. This knowledge was only held at higher operational levels. Because of its need for a cover the Selous Scouts were referred to as the Army's Tracking Wing. No direct mention was ever made to its pseudo operations.

The year 1974 was a highly productive year for pseudo operations. In addition the regiment had now perfected its selection course for joining the regiment. The selection process consisted of rigorous physical endurance, survival and always the unknown quantity of what was to happen next. Recruits for the selection course came from all the regiments in the Army and from other branches of the Security Forces including the Territorial Army.<sup>15</sup>

However, 1974 was significant for a much greater reason. A coup d'etat in Portugal forced that country to withdraw from its African colonies. As a result Rhodesian's flanks (Mozambique) were now exposed to open infiltration. Nevertheless, the insurgents did not make use of this fact for several years due to their own political infighting within their host nations, Mozambique and Zambia.<sup>16</sup>

In 1976 the insurgency war resumed again in earnest. With the exposed flanks now facing Rhodesia, the Selous Scouts as a unit were being used more and more for external raids and reconnaissance. Although such raids like those at Nyadzonya/Pungwe and Chimio were massively successful, they greatly reduced the numbers and effectiveness of pseudo operations within Rhodesia.

Despite the highly publicized external operations, the pseudo operations continued. The effectiveness of pseudo operations was essential to the Rhodesian counterinsurgency effort. The Selous Scouts have been credited by Combined Operations for being directly or indirectly responsible for 68% of the killed insurgents within Rhodesia at the end of the war.<sup>17</sup> Obviously, what this statistic proves is that basically through pseudo operations the pseudo teams were either able to eliminate the insurgents on contact or were able to relay timely tactical operational information to friendly tactical units and have those units eliminate the insurgents.

A primary requirement in pseudo operations is keeping up to date with information and in order to do this one must have a constant new flow of turned insurgents either for information or more important to act as operational members. Ron Reid Daly in his book Selous Scouts: Top Secret War described the many methods and techniques in utilizing captured insurgents:

. . . if a terrorist group was attacked by Fireforce and all were killed with the exception of one or two prisoners, we could turn those prisoners and adopt the group's identity, and function as them in an adjacent area sufficiently far enough away from any locals who could identify them. Or, we might appear in the guise of a new group just arrived from Mozambique. In this instance the newly turned terrorists would introduce our callsign to the contactmen and policemen and establish their bona fides with the local population.

For a prisoner to be of any use to us, it was absolutely vital that his identity was totally protected and that neither the locals in the area of the contact, or anyone back at the Security Force base knew of his capture or even of his existence. If it was ever necessary for him to be taken into an area to make vital indications, he would be taken with a hood covering his head so that his identification was impossible.

But even where a prisoner had become compromised or blown, we could still get useful service from him, with him acting . . . as we termed it . . . as a rear-rank instructor, pointing out the principal contactmen and other people who could be of use to our groups in particular areas.<sup>18</sup>

Thus when a captured insurgent was taken to a Selous Scout fort<sup>19</sup> the first priority was to give him as best medical attention as possible. In many cases the insurgent would be wounded and would require surgery. The insurgent knew full well that had he remained with his fellow insurgents he would probably have been left to die. Thus if the insurgent survived his wounds he inevitably felt a sense of debt to the Selous Scouts. As a result the unit would build on this feeling and attempt to turn him to fighting for their side. When Special Branch personnel interrogated an insurgent immediately after his recovery, the insurgent was normally more than willing to give information. One thing a captured insurgent seldom did was to admit to his own killing of civilians or government personnel. Following the interrogation the decision was made as to whether to recruit the insurgent for pseudo operations or not. The recruitment itself was often quite easy as Reid Daly has noted:

The recruitment of the terrorist itself was a fairly simple matter.

We had soon found that the best recruiting method was to send another former terrorist to visit him in hospital. He would draw up a chair by his hospital bed, and have a long conversation, dwelling in particular upon the hardships the terrorists were experiencing in the bush . . .

The tame terrorist, would then, if he had not already been identified by the capture, for we tried, if possible, to use a recruiting agent who was already known to the captured terrorist, reveal to the astonished man that he also had been a terrorist.<sup>20</sup>

No physical pressure was ever put on the insurgent to force him to switch sides:

The turning itself comprised no magic formula . . . no one was every beaten up by his Special Branch interrogational . . . in fact, quite the reverse was the interrogational technique, as it was vital a trusting relationship be quickly<sup>21</sup> established between the prisoner and his questioner.

The insurgent knew that if he was convicted of crimes he would be hung. This obviously weighed heavily in his decision.

As a terrorist went through an initiation phase he was observed by the Selous Scout members and would eventually be chosen to go on operations with them. However, no unit was ever obligated to take a specific turned terrorist with them to perform pseudo operations. The whole concept depended upon trust between the pseudo operators (between the Rhodesians and the turned insurgents). There was one incident in April 1975 where a turned insurgent betrayed his team, shot them while they were asleep, and then fled to Mozambique. Seven Selous Scouts were killed. This was the greatest single loss of Selous Scouts during the entire war.<sup>22</sup> Needless to say, there will always be this type of risk in pseudo operations. It is imperative for the senior leadership to minimize its occurrence.

By 1974 the Selous Scouts were fully operational in their pseudo operations. Their tactics had to be slowly modified as the situation in Rhodesia changed. The original method was for pseudo operators to gather enough information on the insurgents that would allow them to get close enough to the insurgents and then eliminate them. However, there was one intrinsic problem.

Once the pseudo operators initiated a contact, their cover as insurgents was normally compromised.

In 1973 the Rhodesians began to deploy company size units of the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) as reaction units (fireforce) to insurgent hostilities. By 1974 these RLI reaction units were now deployed to eliminate the insurgents based on pseudo operation information. Thus:

. . . pseudo groups were merely to make contact with terrorists groups through terrorist contactmen and arrange meetings. Then instead of the groups appearing at those meetings and shooting them, helicopter borne fireforces would be sent to keep the appointments instead.

In this manner, the pseudo group who had set them up for the kill, could afterwards protest their innocence of involvement and stay on in the area seeking other terrorist groups, with their covers intact.<sup>23</sup>

During the actual operational phase of the pseudo units the white members of the unit would have to be detached from the unit itself.

The European element of the groups would never move around with the African members, for that would have given them away. Instead, they stayed out of sight in hill bases and directed operations from there.<sup>24</sup>

By having the white European members at an isolated base camp he not only could control his unit from sporadic information brought back to him by the African members of the unit, he could also keep more sophisticated communication equipment at that base camp. Sophisticated communication equipment would obviously compromise a pseudo unit. The communication equipment allowed the team leader to keep radio contact with the reaction units and call on them when the need arose.

Camouflage for the non-African members was always a problem. They had to ensure that their identity was not compromised. They could never go into African villages no matter what kind of concealment they undertook and attempt to pose as an insurgent. It was during the movement phase to the isolated base camp (where the European member would control the unit) that it was critical for camouflage. In order to conceal their identify white Europeans blackened their faces, wore broad brimmed hats and grew beards. In this manner their identity would not be compromised if observed from a distance.

When a pseudo unit operated in an area, that area was isolated from normal regular troop movements. This prevented the regular troops from coming into contact with the pseudo operators and thus lessened the likelihood of an unfortunate mistake in identity. These areas, or frozen areas as they were called, were identified by natural boundaries as natural boundaries were more readily identifiable by both the pseudo operators and the regular forces. Other activities were allowed to go on in the frozen area in as practical a manner as possible, as Reid Daly noted:

As a matter of policy, normal activity in a frozen area was encouraged so as not to arouse the terrorists' suspicions. If, for example, a crime was reported within a frozen area, the Police would inform us immediately stating the places they wished to visit for investigational purposes. We would immediately warn any Selous Scouts' pseudo groups operating there and . . . only afterwards . . . give the Police permission to go into the frozen area.<sup>25</sup>

Frozen areas were frequently changed in order to not establish a recognizable pattern and the whole pattern of boundaries had to be re-established.

By 1976 the insurgency had greatly intensified. The Selous Scouts began to perform a whole new series of operations completely different from pseudo operations. They were involved in external raids, established hunter-killer teams and provided long-range reconnaissance. Pseudo operations were still being conducted and were still the most effective method for obtaining tactical operational information. However, the other operations which the Selous Scouts had to perform drew greatly on their resources for pseudo operations.

In 1978 the insurgent leaders Ndabamingi Sithole and Able Muzorewa decided upon an internal agreement with the Smith Government. Their insurgent forces were used as auxiliary forces for the internal agreement government which was formed in 1979. The Selous Scouts along with their counterparts in Special Branch were ordered to take charge of the training and administration of the auxiliaries. This was an additional drain on pseudo operations. But by this time the Army as a whole was pushed to its limits and the war itself was lost.

In order to fulfill the need for pseudo operations Special Branch detachments began to organize their own pseudo teams. These teams lacked the skill, training and effectiveness of the teams which had been deployed by the Selous Scouts and their Special Branch counterparts.

In December 1979 Rhodesia returned to colony status and in March 1980 Robert Mugabe came to power and disbanded the Selous Scouts. With the large number of turned insurgents in the Selous Scouts there is little doubt why the former insurgent leader and now Prime Minister of Zimbabwe wanted the unit disbanded.

Frank Kitson's pseudo operations in Kenya were decentralized while the Rhodesian pseudo operations were an extremely centralized affair (although at the end of the war they became less so). The Portuguese in their insurgency war in Mozambique had also formed a unit used primarily for pseudo operations. The unit known as Flechas or "arrows" was centrally controlled by the DGS (Portuguese Security). The Flechas were reconnaissance units disguised as FRELIMO (Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique) insurgents that operated in the bush for long periods of time to gather intelligence. The Flechas were centrally controlled more because of the DGS's complete lack of confidence in the Army's G2 section than for any other reason.<sup>26</sup> Because of the Rhodesians preference to work with the DGS and the Flechas during the early 1970s it is conceivable that the Rhodesians drew on this central organization from the Portuguese. Reid Daly had also studied Portugal's use of the Flechas.<sup>27</sup>

One of the major problems with the centralized control of the Selous Scouts was that they in essence became a "law unto themselves". From their very inception in 1973 the Selous Scouts were covered in secrecy for obvious reasons. As of 1977 they were under control of COMOPS with the Army being completely in the dark about their operations. By 1979 allegations were rampant that the Selous Scouts were more concerned with ivory poaching than they were with pseudo operations.<sup>28</sup> The Selous Scouts' ability for tracking and their secret sojourns into the bush greatly inflamed these allegations. The results of these allegations were that Reid Daly was court-martialled, reprimanded and

retired and the Commander of the Rhodesian Army, Lieutenant General John Hickman was sacked and placed on the retirement list.<sup>29</sup> The central organization and intense secrecy were key to the success of the pseudo operations that were run in Rhodesia. These two factors, however, also made the unit susceptible to indiscipline and corruption. As General Sir Frank Kitson has noted about pseudo operations, "If it's just controlled at the top it will not be controlled at all."<sup>30</sup>

It is hard to disagree with the fairly established fact that pseudo operations brought about the majority of insurgent kills within Rhodesia. The Rhodesian Army was simply too small to provide cordon and search operations on a grand scale. The use of pseudo operations coupled with the fireforce concept proved effective. Fireforces, however, had to react to many more contingencies than just those brought on by the information gathered by the pseudo operators. Fireforce like the Selous Scouts were stretched to the limit by the end of the war.

It is interesting to note that one of the skills which brought about much of the success of the Selous Scouts was that of tracking. When acting as insurgents pseudo operators could not rely on sophisticated electronic equipment. One of their greatest tools for locating insurgent forces was the art of tracking. It is significant that this same element of pseudo operations was stressed by Kitson in his pseudo operations in Kenya.<sup>31</sup>

The Selous Scouts were the most organized formation for pseudo operations in the history of modern insurgency warfare. Their training and selection for men for the regiment were rigorous and readily prepared the soldiers for tracking, survival and pseudo operations. Operationally they relied upon the human resources of white Europeans, both military and non-military; African military troops; and turned insurgents. An appropriate method for turning captured insurgents was established which provided current, up-to-date information for pseudo operations. Because they worked co-equally with the intelligence service they were able to relay the tactical operational information to friendly regular units in a rapid and efficient manner which allowed the regular units to eliminate the insurgents. The result being the most effective use of personnel assets in order to wage a counterinsurgency campaign.

## CHAPTER IV

### LACK OF AN AMERICAN MODEL

The United States military has never seriously considered pseudo operations as a viable form of counterinsurgency tactics. This, of course, is not to say that the United States has not participated in some form of pseudo operations in the 20th century, but rather that the United States has never had a doctrinal concept on pseudo operations nor has it deployed pseudo operations as a tactic in a general counterinsurgency strategy. This lack of deployment of pseudo operations in U.S. counterinsurgency warfare is brought on by both systemic and philosophical reasons.

The United States military system does not promote pseudo operations because their deployment is not considered a proper utilization of its officer corps. Officers assigned to pseudo operations cannot command platoons, companies, battalions, etc., in a normal tactical sense, nor do pseudo operations allow officers to be advisors or act as an advisory head. These factors reduce promotional likelihoods and thus cause a natural systemic tendency to avoid these type of operations.

There is a perception within military hierarchies of an inherent "vulgarity" in pseudo operations. General Sir Frank Kitson has alluded to this general reluctance by an officer corps (not only an American officer corps) to pursue this "dirty" warfare:

Their [the officer corps'] natural reluctance to grasp anything new was accentuated by their ability to see that promotion prospects were at best uncertain in a partisan force. Furthermore the whole idea was a little vulgar.

Thus this perception of inherent vulgarity in pseudo operations has led many strategists to conclude that pseudo operations are not a "proper" or "nice" tactic which should be included in a counterinsurgency strategy.

Despite the systemic and philosophical reasons for not deploying pseudo operations as a tactic incorporated into a larger counterinsurgency strategy, several examples of pseudo type operations used by U.S. or U.S. allies do exist.

Haiti-1919. The American military intervention in Haiti was the longest intervention that the United States has had in Latin America. It lasted from 1915 to 1934. The problems in Haiti were numerous and complex. Economic turmoil, political unrest, revolution and insurgencies were the norm during the period. In 1918 a revolutionary by the name of Charlemagne Peralte was leading a band of some 5000 adherents or Cacos in the northern part of Haiti.<sup>2</sup> The United States Marines who had been in Haiti from the start of the intervention, were assigned to pacifying the country and deal with Peralte. While the Marines were kept busy with patrols, the Cacos were ambushing the local gendarmes. The Marine patrols proved to be ineffective in quelling the uprising.

Marine Sergeant Herman H. Hannekan conceived of a method in which he could come into contact with Charlemagne Peralte. Hannekan had several Haitians pretend to oppose the U.S. intervention in Haiti while in fact they were really attempting to discover the whereabouts of Peralte. To give added realism to this pseudo group Hannekan staged several false attacks against his own positions.<sup>3</sup>

Upon discovering information on an insurgent meeting with Peralte, Hannekan along with Marine Corporal William R. Button and eighteen hand picked gendarmes set out to attend the meeting. Both Hannekan and Button spoke fluent Creole. They disguised themselves as Cacos--they were "garbed as Cacos in worn denim (the two blancs being blacked with burned cork)." <sup>4</sup> Hannekan himself had received information that Peralte would be wearing a blue suit and Panama hat. <sup>5</sup>

Disguised as Cacos Hannekan and his team were able to slip through six Caco outposts along the way to Charlemagne's camp. Once Hannekan and his team were at the camp, Charlemagne was singled out as he was dressed exactly as intelligence information had indicated. Hannekan then proceeded to draw his .45 caliber pistol, walk up to Charlemagne within a range of fifteen feet and fire two bullets into Charlemagne's chest, killing him. A fire fight between Hannekan's team and Charlemagne's guards followed the shooting, in which Hannekan and his Haitians prevailed. The death of Charlemagne Peralte established a peace in the northern part of Haiti.

This small example of pseudo operations in Marine Corps history highlights several basic tenets of pseudo operations in general. First, patrols, cordon and search operations and other standard counterinsurgency tactics often prove ineffective when there is no tactical operational information upon which to react. One method of obtaining tactical operational information is pseudo operations. Second, normally guest forces have a hard time in passing themselves off as the host nation's insurgents.

Disguise, not only in clothing but also skin texture and color is often necessary. And third, getting into an infrastructure of an insurgency is what is of greater importance than just offensive operations. Offensive operations which solely seek high numbers of kills should be made completely secondary to those operations which seek the base of the insurgency itself. Thus, this small episode in 1919 in Haiti exemplifies some of the basic tenets of pseudo operations.

The Philippines--Pseudo Operations in the Huk Insurgency.

The Huk insurgency lasted from after World War II till the late 1950s, although by 1954 the insurgency was no longer effectively being waged.<sup>6</sup> Huk was an abbreviation of Hukbong Bayan Laban Sa Hapan (which had been previously been abbreviated to Hukbalahap) which translated meant the People's Army Against Japan.<sup>7</sup> The Huks were a Communist organization. They had carried on guerrilla operations against the Japanese during World War II. Following the war they continued the insurgency against the newly formed Philippine government. There was a U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) in the Philippines but in general, U.S. military advisors refrained from any form of unconventional military tactics. It was noted about U.S. military advisors in the Philippines that:

. . . many MAAG officers felt that [unconventional] techniques violated the military managerial and tactical principles that had won World War II in the forties and were surely applicable to revolutionary conflicts in the fifties. Filipino officers considered these MAAG views so inappropriate and unacceptable that many of them refused to associate with their MAAG counterparts or communicate to them the true conditions in the countryside or in the Philippine Armed Forces.

The Filipinos derived much of their own tactics themselves. Their formation of battalion combat teams (BCTs) was basically a response to the Filipinos inability to form divisions along U.S. lines. In fact, the BCTs proved highly effective in the counter-insurgency campaign.<sup>9</sup> The Filipinos also used "hunter-killer" units and pseudo operations in their tactics. These operations were initiated in a gradual process by the Filipinos themselves.

In essence:

The Filipinos had no models to base themselves on and most of their American advisors were equally inexperienced. They [the Filipinos] arrived at these courses of action by reflecting upon their experience which, in early years, was mostly one of failure, and seeking to apply its lessons.<sup>10</sup>

Thus, the Filipino experience in pseudo operation came from their own initiation and with often times little support from their American advisors. In 1948 a unit was formed by the Filipinos purely for mission of pseudo operations. This unit was known as Force X.<sup>11</sup> When a Huk commander in Southern Luzon died some of his units then tried to establish contact with the commander of the Huk units in Central Luzon. The Filipino military took advantage of the situation and tasked the 16th Philippine Constabulary Company to become Force X.<sup>12</sup> Force X was isolated in a jungle training camp and underwent training for what the Filipinos called "Large Unit Infiltration."<sup>13</sup> The training is superbly described in the following passage:

The basic idea was to make this specially trained force into a realistic pseudo-Huk unit that could, in enemy guise, infiltrate deep into enemy territory. The men in training were divested of all items that could identify them as soldiers. They were given the things generally found on Huk dead, such as soiled handkerchiefs and love mementoes from girl friends.

During the four-week training period, all conversation was conducted in terms of the preassigned enemy identities--the enemy ranks, aliases, and pet names commonly used in guerrilla units of Southern Luzon. The men were addressed as comrades, brothers, members of the proletariat. They were taught Huk songs. They learned how to deliver speeches in Huk style.

They became familiar with the descriptions of the leaders of Southern Luzon guerrillas. Some, who resembled known guerrilla leaders, posed as those individuals. All men were required to take on the appearance of hunted guerrillas during those days. They became, and stayed, dirty, unshaven, badly in need of haircuts. Like the enemy, these soldiers were unhappily forced to renounce bathrooms, shaving cream, and razor blades.<sup>14</sup>

When Force X was finally ready it set out to establish contact with the Huk units in Central Luzon. False battles with Philippine Constabulary units were held to give Force X some credence. As Force X headed north it ran into Huk outposts which it completely fooled and soon they were linked up with several Huk squadrons directly in the midst of the Huk operational areas. After six days together Force X on a pre-arranged signal attacked the Huk units while at the same time directed in three Philippine Constabulary companies. The two Huk squadrons were destroyed. Although this pseudo operation was successful others were not.<sup>15</sup>

It was felt by the commander of the operation that certain prerequisites had to be met in order for pseudo operations to succeed. These prerequisites were: (1) poor communication between insurgent units had to exist; (2) the operation must be planned and conducted in total secrecy; (3) an appropriate cover plan must be developed and every man in the unit must know the cover plan; (4) priority in the destruction of the enemy should be--first, enemy leaders or fanatics--second, elite organizations--

and third, effective enemy support elements; and (5) the maximum number of turned insurgents should be used.<sup>16</sup>

It was thought that the advantages of pseudo operations were: (1) surprise contact with the enemy; (2) penetration of the enemy's security systems; (3) establishment of the "extent and nature of civilian support" in communication, liaison and supply; and (4) identification of local government collusion.<sup>17</sup>

Although the United States had military advisors in the Philippines during the Huk rebellion, it is questionable as to how much influence they had on the pseudo operations. As cited earlier most American advisors were critical of irregular counterinsurgency tactics, either through their lack of experience or through their belief in the superiority of conventional tactics. The Filipinos, on the other hand, were willing to learn from their experience and from their past mistakes. They had several successes in pseudo operations. They also had several failures. Despite their understanding of much of the essential mechanisms of pseudo operations, they never had the conceptual insight and tactical efficiency of Frank Kitson and his efforts in Kenya. Nor did they ever reach the established central organization of the Rhodesian efforts. The pseudo operations that failed in the Philippines were ones which were quickly put together without adequate conceptual understanding, training, organization, and support. The information gained on concepts, training and organization from the successful operations were never fully utilized by the Americans years later in Vietnam.

Vietnam--No Conceptual Model. The one striking fact about American tactics in Vietnam is that pseudo operations were never used as a form of tactics to gain tactical operational information. It would be wrong to say that there were no forms of "pseudo type" operations utilized, but there never was a conceptual model which resulted in the organizational formation and use of pseudo operations. A brief description of Marine Corps and Army efforts in this area illustrates this point.

The Marine Corps never contemplated pseudo operations as they probably assumed that it was outside of their realm of capabilities and missions (an inadequate assumption in counterinsurgency warfare). Reconnaissance units, rightly so, performed their mission in reconnaissance.

The Marine Corps' Combined Action Platoon (CAP) program was designed to place a squad of Marines into a village along with a platoon of South Vietnamese Popular Forces (PF). While in the village the Marines provided security, trained the PF, and established localized civil action programs.<sup>18</sup> "The CAPs were the only instance in which South Vietnamese troops were placed directly under the command of Americans. . . ." <sup>19</sup> Although one of the best methods for training local troops and for ensuring civilian safety, the CAP program had nothing to do with pseudo operations.<sup>20</sup>

Another program used by the Marines in Vietnam was the use of Kit Carson Scouts. Kit Carson Scouts were former Viet Cong used by Marine units for "providing information on the Viet Cong, identifying Viet Cong and their hiding places."<sup>21</sup> These turned

Viet Cong went through an initial period of observation. After passing this observation they were issued equipment and underwent a period of training with the Marines. If a Scout had a family, they were relocated to a secure area to avoid Viet Cong reprisals. The Scouts were used as guides and "scouts" for Marine patrols. It was the goal of Lieutenant General Lewis Walt, the III MAF Commander, to have "two Scouts for each rifle company."<sup>22</sup> There was a reason for having two Scouts per unit as General Walt pointed out: "Usually, the Scouts are assigned to a Marine unit in pairs, to share their common language and help overcome the problems of adjustment."<sup>23</sup>

Like the CAP program, the Kit Carson Scouts received less and less priority as the war went on. Although not pseudo operations per se, the Kit Carson Scouts program was an effort by the Marine Corps to use turned insurgents. What separates the use of the Scouts from pseudo operations is there was no systematic method specifically organized to break into the Viet Cong infrastructure. Following the initial information with which they departed, the Scouts were then used primarily as "point men" for Marine patrols. Because being part of a patrol there was no way they could transmit tactical operational information to that patrol. Like the CAP program, the Kit Carson Scouts program was a good counterinsurgency technique, but the program was not pseudo operations.

Despite these several effective programs, the Marine Corps never developed a concept for pseudo operations. In fact, the few irregular tactics that they did initiate had only limited

longevity. The program for turning the captured insurgents never developed any higher than the use of them as scouts, and the CAP program did not even attempt to address pseudo operations. Both programs could have easily argued pseudo operations had pseudo operations been initiated.

The Army fared little better than the Marines in trying to incorporate some form of pseudo operations into their general strategy. Any form of these type of operations would have been undertaken by the Special Forces. And like the Marines several irregular programs were initiated by the Army but none ever developed into a conceptual model or functioning organization along a pseudo operations concept.

The most well known Special Forces program was their paramilitary training of the Montagnard tribes and other minorities. This Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program was initiated for two primary reasons: first to get the minority groups involved in the counterinsurgency effort; and second, to keep the Montagnards and other minorities from being prime targets of Communist propaganda and recruitment.<sup>24</sup> Other programs initiated by the Special Forces were the training of paramilitary units such as the mountain scouts which were used for long range reconnaissance and the trail watchers program which provided border and area surveillance.<sup>25</sup> All of these programs and others similar to them were primarily used for expanding area defenses using the CIDG camps as "bases for offensive strike force operations."<sup>26</sup> The Special Forces teams were used as trainers, educators and

quasi-leaders of these paramilitary units. None of these operations ever bordered on being pseudo operations.

In late 1966 the Special Forces developed what was called "unconventional operations." Mobile guerrilla forces were established. These units were South Vietnamese paramilitaries led by Special Forces personnel whose mission was to infiltrate an area and then:

. . . interdict enemy scouts, conduct surveillance, seek out enemy forces and installations,<sup>27</sup> and collect intelligence along their axis of advance.

Tactically there was little difference between the mobile guerrilla forces and the previous strike forces coming from the CIDG camps used earlier.

Other unconventional operations were Projects Omega and Sigma. These programs were used for long-range reconnaissance and intelligence gathering. These projects consisted of reconnaissance elements and reaction forces (Mike Forces). Project Delta was a much expanded version of the Omega and Sigma Projects. These programs were essentially large scale reconnaissance in force missions, and not pseudo operations.

One point to note on these operations is that some of the personnel were disguised as Viet Cong. Road scout teams, known as Roadrunners, consisted of four-man teams of indigenous personnel.

They dressed and were armed to pass as VC, and would follow trails<sup>28</sup> used by the VC to observe and talk with the enemy

The Roadrunners were a small element which performed a pseudo type function. However, it was not pseudo operations because there was no concerted effort to penetrate the insurgent infrastructure. Their primary mission was that of a scouting decoy.

Special Forces members were also assigned to the Special Operations Group (SOG) which did a wide variety of special operations, none of which paralleled pseudo operations.<sup>29</sup>

A final example of pseudo type operations run by the United States was the Phoenix program which tended to be a joint Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)--South Vietnamese program which at times included the Special Forces.<sup>30</sup> Technically the program came under the auspices of a structure known as CORDS--Civilian Operations and Revolutionary Development Support which was headed by Robert W. Komer and was formed in 1967.<sup>31</sup> The Phoenix program (known as Phung Hoai by the Vietnamese) was an extension of the ICEX (Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation) program which was designed to neutralize the Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI).<sup>32</sup> The Phoenix program incorporated the use of Vietnamese agencies which ICEX had not. The latter being a joint CIA-MACV program.

In order to neutralize the VCI, Phoenix attempted to have the intelligence agencies "pool their information on the VC infrastructure at the district, province, and Saigon levels and agree on assigning responsibility for exploitation."<sup>33</sup> Although information was channeled centrally, exploitation of that information was done locally.

Exploitation--that is, the taking of action on the intelligence screened, collated, and put into usable form at the district centers--was the responsibility initially of the subsector adviser, who was to avail himself of the most suitable resources in the area.<sup>34</sup>

Thus Phoenix had no troops of its own and had to rely on the district for exploitation and neutralization.

William Colby who took over CORDS in 1968 and was probably the person most responsible for the direction of the Phoenix program has described how suspects were categorized.

Suspects were assigned to one of three categories: "A" for leaders and formal party members, "B" for holders of other responsible jobs--cadre--and "C" for rank and file members and followers. And the decision was taken that those in the "C" category should be ignored, since Phoenix was directed against the VCI command and control structure and not the occasional adherent or supporter.<sup>35</sup>

By using informants and captured Viet Cong the police at the local districts tried to neutralize the VCI. However, the Vietnamese police considered this centralized program of penetrating the VCI "unrealistic and far too difficult."<sup>36</sup> In order to create an incentive for the police CORDS introduced a quota system.

To satisfy the demands of Phoenix, they merely had to fulfill a quota which they proceeded to do by a variety of techniques, the most common of which was to list as VCI individuals killed or captured in routine military sweeps. Although the purpose of the system was to generate targeted operations against specific high-level VCI members, a large number of each monthly "bag" was made up, in fact, of untargeted suspects labeled as VCI after the fact. Another technique that helped fill the quota was to arrest as VCI the low-level peasants who merely paid taxes or joined VC mass organizations because they had no choice. In fact, they were not VCI at all. Moreover, it later turned out that some of the VCI "eliminations" were completely faked.<sup>37</sup>

In short, the local establishment tended to be more concerned with the status quo than with counterinsurgency. They soon adopted the quotas and systems management techniques of the American way of fighting insurgency. The number of VCI neutralized by the Phoenix

program have ranged from 20,000<sup>38</sup> to 100,000.<sup>39</sup> However, it has been noted that "the majority of those individuals killed were not even party members."<sup>40</sup>

According to Douglas Blaufarb, a CIA agent with years of experience in Vietnam, the Phoenix program suffered from an intrinsic defect which was:

. . . a simplified view of the complexities of village life in Vietnam and of the ability of the central authority to intervene directly in the internal<sub>40</sub> arrangements of thousands of villages simultaneously.

The Phoenix program was an:

. . . overly complex program[s] for the American and Vietnamese personnel who were required to carry them out, demanding too much trained and dedicated manpower and a subtle approach which was only possible if attempted on a small scale.<sub>41</sub>

In 1970 the Phoenix program's own initiator, Robert Komer, described the program as "a small, poorly managed, and largely ineffective effort."<sup>42</sup>

For many reasons the Phoenix program never came close to becoming pseudo operations. First, there was never any real attempt to impersonate the VC or VC cells. The information on the VC was gained primarily through informants because this was the easiest method for corrupt Vietnamese intelligence and police systems. Second, there was no effort to get tactical operational information to tactical units. Much of the neutralization of the VCI was done through assassination. Third, it was impossible to create background information if the VCI was continually being killed. And finally, the Phoenix program and pseudo operations work on completely different premises. The Phoenix program worked on a highly centralized system relying on relatively high

grade type sources--informants. Whereas, pseudo operations work on a decentralized system and rely on a large number of low grade sources--the populace, tracking, local and current trends, captured insurgents, etc.

There is little wonder why the Phoenix program never was a success and never neutralized the VCI. It was a centralized system relying on statistics and "body counts" for results. The centralized system created a situation which was subject to corruption and abuses. Concerning the organization of pseudo operations, General "Sir" Frank Kitson has stated, that if pseudo operations are just controlled at the top, they will not be controlled at all.<sup>44</sup>

No American Model for Pseudo Operations. From the cited examples it is apparent that the United States military has never developed a concept or model for pseudo operations. This is not to say that the United States military has not partaken in certain aspects of pseudo operations. However, it has never combined these various aspects into a concise workable model which can be used as a form of tactics in counterinsurgency operations. Whether it is because of the "vulgarity" of these types of operations; whether it is because of the U.S. military's natural trait to over centralize or the military's need to systems manage an insurgency war; whether it is from lack of knowledge or fear of official career risk; the fact remains: pseudo operations have not been incorporated into U.S. counterinsurgency tactics.

## CHAPTER V

### PSEUDO OPERATIONS: A CONCEPT

The following is a proposed concept for pseudo operations.

#### Pseudo Operations:

o A Definition. Pseudo operations are operations which deploy a counterinsurgent force which completely mirrors insurgent forces. Its purpose is to infiltrate the civilian communities or operational areas disguised as insurgents in order to develop background information on insurgents and to obtain tactical operational information upon which to act and bring force to bear on the insurgents.

o Missions of Pseudo Operations. The missions of pseudo operations are:

- (1) Gain information (background information) on insurgent forces operating in the assigned area or area of operations (AO).
- (2) Penetrate, isolate and eliminate (or capture) insurgent forces.
- (3) Disperse tactical operational information rapidly to friendly tactical units.
- (4) Destroy insurgent political infrastructures established within the civilian community.

Members of a pseudo force must be of the same local ethnic grouping, tribe and/or race of the members of the insurgent forces.

Having established pseudo forces, these forces can then proceed in performing the stated missions.

Mission 1: Gain Information on Insurgent Units.

Pseudo forces posing as insurgent forces operate within the civilian community or area of operations. Pseudo forces must learn everything they can (on a clandestine basis) about insurgent forces and proceed to "mirror" the insurgent units in the size of their units, organization, idiosyncracies, methods, etc. This mirror is critical for all future operations of the pseudo force. From the information gathered from the civilian community the pseudo force develops background information on the insurgent units. This information is reported to intelligence organizations whenever it is safe and possible to do so without being compromised. Background information must be continually exploited as it helps in the "mirroring" process.

These missions are interrelated and should be integrated into a total operational concept.

o Pseudo Forces (Units, Gangs, Cells or Individuals). In order to perform the missions of pseudo operations a pseudo force or forces (units, gangs, cells, or individuals) are established which completely "mirror" insurgent forces. The pseudo forces must be identical to the operating insurgent forces in:

- oo size of units
- oo organization
- oo tactics
- oo race and/or ethnic grouping
- oo weaponry
- oo idiosyncracies
- oo methods
- oo signs of identification

o Sources for Pseudo Forces. The possible sources for members in a pseudo force unit are:

- oo local populace
- oo host nation's military, paramilitary, police
- oo "turned" insurgents

Mission 2: Penetration, Isolation and Elimination.

o Penetration: In order for the pseudo force to penetrate an insurgent unit, cell or individual, it must adequately "mirror" the insurgent unit. Penetration can be physical or by sight. The tactical situation and operational requirements will determine whether or not the insurgents will be isolated and eliminated.

o Isolation: The pseudo force should attempt to isolate the insurgent unit to facilitate in the elimination of that unit. By isolating the insurgent unit the pseudo force can call on friendly tactical units to assist in the elimination of the insurgent unit.

By isolating the insurgent unit from the civilian population the pseudo force reduces the likelihood of compromising itself not only to possible insurgents but also to the civilian community on a whole.

o Elimination: Elimination of the insurgent unit can be done by one of two primary methods. The insurgent unit can be eliminated by:

- oo the pseudo force itself; or by
- oo a friendly local tactical unit

Elimination by a friendly local tactical unit is the preferred method as it should maintain the pseudo force's identity and allow it to continue to perform its mission.

Mission 3: Disperse Tactical Operational Information to Friendly Tactical Units.

In an insurgency environment tactical units have a need for rapid and precise tactical operational information upon which to act. This deliverance of rapid tactical operational information helps to eliminate numerous and often futile cordon and search operations and large sweep/patrol type operations.

The pseudo force upon determining when and where to eliminate an insurgent relays tactical operational information to friendly local tactical units as to the description, size, and location of the insurgent force. In order to avoid a mistake in identity by the tactical unit the pseudo force must disassociate itself from the insurgent force. This can be done by prearranged plan or signal. The pseudo force leader must have adequate communications which to rapidly transmit tactical operational information to "stand-by" or local tactical units. When the pseudo force has been withdrawn the pseudo force leader "unfreezes" his zone and allows the tactical unit to enter the zone and eliminate the insurgent unit.

Mission 4: Destroy Insurgent Political Infrastructure.

When pseudo operations have reached advanced stages the pseudo force can proceed to dismantle their informant network and the insurgent political infrastructure. When to destroy the political infrastructure will always be a calculated risk. The capture and elimination of insurgent political members greatly

increases the chances that the pseudo force will be compromised. In addition, it can dry up operational information sources, especially in the case of informants. On the other hand, if the insurgent political infrastructure is allowed to continue, recruitment and the insurgency will continue. The reason that the destruction of the political infrastructure is normally the last mission of the pseudo force is that penetration into this area is often the most difficult. However, elimination of the political infrastructure is of primary importance in defeating an insurgency.

#### Tactics, Techniques and Control Measures:

o Frozen and Unfrozen Zones of Action. Whenever a pseudo force is operating in an area, friendly tactical units must be restricted from this area. This control measure protects the pseudo force from being mistakenly identified as an insurgent force by friendly tactical units. Thus, the zone of action in which a pseudo force is operating in is frozen from friendly tactical units for the period that the pseudo force is operating in that zone. This zone of action is called a frozen zone.

When a pseudo force is not operating in an area, this area is known as an unfrozen zone. A pseudo force may unfreeze a frozen zone of action when it calls on a friendly tactical unit to assist it in eliminating the insurgent unit in that zone.

o Continually Changing the Frozen Zone of Action. In order to keep the identity and not compromise the pseudo force the frozen zone must be continually changed. If no conventional force operations are being run in a given area the insurgent

units may become aware of the fact that pseudo operations are being run in that area. Thus the frozen zone or at least the shape of it must be continually changed.

Conventional operations can be run in a frozen zone provided there has been proper prior planning and coordination made between the pseudo force and the friendly tactical units.

o Determination of Boundaries of Frozen Zones. The boundaries of frozen zones must be determined by dominant and permanent geographical features that are easily recognizable to both the pseudo force and the friendly tactical units. By using dominant and permanent geographical feature the frozen zone will be easily delineated by both parties and will prevent a mistake in identity.

o Base Camp within the Frozen Zone. If at all possible a base camp should be established within the frozen zone by the pseudo force. Sophisticated communication equipment for communication with friendly tactical units can be kept in the base camp. Unless the insurgent forces are using the same type of communications equipment, this sort of equipment would probably compromise a pseudo force. The base camp system is a preferred method for running pseudo operations. More than one person should always remain at the base camp.

o Use of U.S. Personnel/Leader and the Base Camp. Not all members of a pseudo force have to be from the insurgent unit's ethnic grouping or race. The leader of a pseudo force can be an American which probably would not allow him to perform an actual pseudo force functional role in a Third World country due to skin

color, language barriers and other ethnological differences. However, the American leader can set up an isolated base camp and have members of his functioning pseudo force report to him clandestinely. The leader can then relay information to friendly tactical units while in the security of his base camp without fear of being compromised to the civilian population or local insurgents.

For additional security the American leader can have on-call artillery fires or close air support. He can have on-call, a friendly tactical unit for protection. He can also act as a guide for friendly units called for the purpose of isolation and elimination of insurgent units.

A base camp must always be manned by more than one person. Communications and coordination with friendly units are essential.

o Using "Turned" Insurgents for Pseudo Operations. "Turned" insurgents are the best source for members in a pseudo force. Some captured insurgents can be made to fight for the counter-insurgent cause. Interrogator/translator teams and intelligence officers can evaluate captured insurgents in rear areas. Captured insurgents should be isolated and evaluated for their acceptability for pseudo operations. It must be stressed that most captured insurgents will not be good material for pseudo operations for various reasons; the captured insurgent may be unable to switch allegiance because he still believes in his cause, his capture may have been already compromised to the civilian community, he may personally not be able to function as a pseudo force member, or for numerous other reasons. The selectivity of captured

insurgents for use in pseudo operations should be strict and cautious. A newly "turned" insurgent should never operate independently immediately but rather should become a member of an already proven pseudo force. In addition, the members of the pseudo force must be willing to accept the newly "turned" insurgent on their team. These precautions in the selection of "turned" insurgents for the use in pseudo operations reduce the likelihood of a "turned" insurgent to "return".

o The Continual Need for "Turned" Insurgents. There is a continual need for "turned" insurgents. Newly turned insurgents keep the pseudo force current on all the up-to-date techniques and methods of the insurgent units. This need is greatly increased if the insurgent units know that pseudo forces are in fact operating in their area.

It is through recently captured insurgents that the best operational information can be obtained. Recently captured insurgents will have the best up-to-date information on the political and military infrastructure; location of insurgent units; new tactics, weapons and policies of the insurgents; and present relationships with the civilian community. The latter point also concerns the identification of informers within the civilian community which might be detrimental to the pseudo operations. It is upon the initial capture of insurgents that the evaluation process of insurgents for their use in pseudo gang work should be

o What Kind of Insurgent Makes a Good Pseudo Operator. It must be remembered that not all insurgents are fervent ideologues. People are motivated to join an insurgency for basically three reasons:

- oo politically motivated/or believe in the cause
- oo motivated by the fact that it is the easiest choice to make
- oo motivated by excitement/love of adventure

Insurgents from this last group are probably the easiest to turn. Neither political ideologues nor insurgents with lack of motivation should be considered because of their great likelihood to "re-turn".

o Effectiveness of Pseudo Operations. Pseudo operations may not be tactically effective in all insurgencies. Even if they are effective in an insurgency they may be effective in only a limited sense or only in limited areas of operation. The lesser the communication between insurgent units and the local populace (or other insurgent units) the greater the chance that pseudo operations will be effective. The opposite is also true. The greater the communication between insurgent units and the populace (or other insurgent units) the lesser the chance that pseudo operations will be effective.

An insurgency must be carefully evaluated as to when and where to use pseudo operations. Pseudo operations should always be kept as a tactical tool in which to counter an insurgency. There will always be some area or some form in which pseudo operations can be used in an insurgency. As no two insurgencies are completely alike, no use or form of pseudo operations will be

completely alike. The insurgency itself dictates the type of pseudo operations that are deployed.

The key to all pseudo operations is to "out-insurgent" the insurgents.

#### Laws and Pseudo Operations:

If U.S. forces are committed to an insurgency in another country the legal framework for pseudo operations will be within the context of that host nation's legal system. U.S. forces, however, still must comply with the existing laws of the U.S. military, the United States, and the world legal systems. Because an insurgency is an "undeclared" war, many legal parameters are vaguely defined.

#### Command and Control of Pseudo Operations:

Pseudo operations are most effective when decentralized and used at the lowest level possible. The size and nature of the insurgency, however, will dictate the actual scope of pseudo operations. Pseudo operations whether run at battalion, regiment or division level must follow the normal chain of command. Control must follow the standard operating procedures. The authority for the Marine Corps to run this form of counterinsurgency tactic is drawn from the National Security Act of 1947 which allows the Marine Corps to perform "such other duties as the President may direct."<sup>1</sup>

## CHAPTER VI

### A MARINE CORPS CADRE UNIT

#### A Pseudo Operations Cadre Unit:

The following is a model on how a pseudo operations cadre unit could be maintained in the existing force structure of the Marine Corps. This model is only one of many possible models on which a pseudo operations cadre unit could be created.

A pseudo operations officer would work under the CG FMFLANT or FMFPAC under the cover of Area Research Officer. His mission would be to coordinate all research concerning pseudo operations and report to the CG.

The Area Research Officer would be in-charge of several Specific Area Research Officers (Specific Area Pseudo Operations Officers) who would be assigned the task of investigating specific possible contingency areas. Their primary responsibility would be to research the feasibility and use of pseudo operations in a possible insurgency area. The Specific Area Research Officers must research the Clausewitzian "Center of Gravity" for the insurgency and then determine the use and applicability of pseudo operations as a tactic in that insurgency. The number of Specific Area Research Officers would be determined by the Commanding General as to the number of specific contingency areas he wanted to evaluate for the use of pseudo operations.

In addition to the Specific Area Research Officers, one General Research Officer should be assigned to work under the Area Research Officer. The task of the General Research Officer would

be to research various functions which would be applicable to pseudo operations when used by the Marine Corps. The General Research Officer should research such functions as tactics, communication, tracking, intelligence, and any other functions that would specifically relate to pseudo operations. The General Research Officer would work on the coordination of these tactics with standard conventional Marine Corps tactics.

See Figure 1 for a diagram of the Pseudo Operations Cadre Unit.

#### Organization of Pseudo Operations for an Insurgency

Once the Marine Corps is committed to an insurgency, it can expand its pseudo operations capability by an expansion of the cadre unit. This expansion will be to take place within the existing force structure of the Marine Corps.

The Area Research Officer will continue to be titled as such (as will all the other officers with similar titles), but will in fact become the head Pseudo Operations Officer in charge of all pseudo operations within the command that he is serving.

The Specific Area Research Officer of the area where the insurgency now exists and where the Marine Corps is now committed will become the Operations Officer for pseudo operations. This individual's research and background into this specific area should make him the best qualified for the job. He will monitor and control the operations of the pseudo teams.

Figure 3

PSEUDO OPERATIONS CADRE UNIT

# PSEUDO OPERATIONS CADRE UNIT

COMMANDING  
GENERAL  
(G-2 or S-2)

FMFLANT, FMFPAC,  
DIVISION, REGIMENT, OR  
BATTALION

AREA  
RESEARCH  
OFFICER

(PSEUDO OPERATIONS OFFICER)

SPECIFIC  
AREA  
RESEARCH  
OFFICER

AREA  
AREA

(SPECIFIC AREA PSEUDO  
OPERATIONS OFFICERS)

GENERAL  
RESEARCH  
OFFICER

researches-

tactics  
communication  
tracking  
intelligence

each officer researches  
specific possible  
contingency area

The other Specific Area Research Officers will become liaison officers to the local police, paramilitary and military units, intelligence organizations and any other organization that might provide assistance to pseudo operations. Liaison officers will coordinate information through the normal Marine Corps intelligence chain of command.

The General Research Officer will become the Training Officer in charge of training pseudo teams. He will receive members for the pseudo teams from personnel acquired by the Liaison Officers from their local host nation sources. In addition, the Training Officer can acquire "turned" insurgents via the intelligence chain of command. The Training Officer will be responsible for establishing a training camp for the training of the pseudo teams.


The pseudo teams will be under direct command and control of the Area Research Officer and more specifically the Operations Officer. The number of teams, their size, their functioning, etc., will depend upon the nature of the insurgency itself.

See Figure 2 for a diagram of the Organization of Pseudo Operations for an Insurgency.

Figure 4

ORGANIZATION OF PSEUDO OPERATIONS FOR AN INSURGENCY

# PSEUDO OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION



## CHAPTER VII

### CONCLUSION

Low intensity conflicts and counterinsurgency wars are more likely the types of wars in which the United States will be involved. The United States military is more capable of performing in wars of a higher intensity. In addition, it has not developed new tactics for waging war in low intensity conflicts. The United States military has never fully appreciated the role of pseudo operations in insurgency warfare.

Pseudo operations are a form of tactics which can be used to combat insurgency. This form of tactics has had great success in several insurgencies of the 20th century. It must be stressed that pseudo operations are a tactical means for combatting insurgency, to be used as only one of many forms of tactics and programs in a total counterinsurgency strategy.

Pseudo operations are operations which create a pseudo force, units which disguise themselves as insurgents, to infiltrate the civilian population or insurgent infrastructure in order to bring force to bear on the insurgents. Pseudo operations seek to gain background information on the insurgents and seek to distribute tactical operational information rapidly to friendly tactical units.

Pseudo operations can be effectively used in insurgencies. They can be used in a limited form or in a specific area when not usable in the insurgency on a whole.

Analysis of several insurgencies in which pseudo operations have been used provide the following tactical guidelines:

- Pseudo operations are most effective when communication between insurgent units is poor.

- Pseudo operations must be run in the same medium that the insurgents are attempting to spread their insurgency.

- The pseudo force must "mirror" the insurgents in every aspect.

- Pseudo force members must be comprised of members of the same race and origin of the insurgents.

- "Turned" insurgents are a good source for members of a pseudo force but they must always be in the company of regular pseudo force members.

- A decentralized system is the best method to run pseudo operations as it allows tactical operational information to be dispersed rapidly from the pseudo force to friendly tactical units.

- Conventional operations like tracking and patrolling should be used when the insurgent force is in an isolated sanctuary away from the civilian populace.

- Pseudo operations must be integrated into a strategy with other conventional tactics.

The missions of pseudo operations are: (1) gain information (background information) on insurgent forces operation in an area or area of operations; (2) penetrate isolate and eliminate (or capture) insurgent forces; (3) disperse tactical operational information rapidly to friendly tactical units; and (4) destroy

insurgent political infrastructures established within the civilian community. Tactical methods which can support these missions are frozen zones, base camp systems, tracking, and U.S. personnel as pseudo force leaders. The insurgency itself will indicate what will be the most effective methods to use.

If the Marine Corps expects to be successful in a counterinsurgency environment, it must break away from the notion that existing conventional tactics will suffice in that environment. Using purely conventional tactics to fight an insurgency war destines the counterinsurgents to failure. Unconventional wars require unconventional tactics. Pseudo operations are a form of unconventional tactics which have proven to be successful in past and should be incorporated into Marine Corps strategies for counterinsurgency warfare.

Similar to all wars, insurgencies require of the counterinsurgents; flexibility, open-mindedness and above all, leadership. Commanders must have even greater flexibility, open-mindedness and leadership in order to adapt to unconventional warfare. "There is only one prerequisite for pseudo operations--an open mind."<sup>1</sup> Commanders should never hesitate nor worry about limitations in order to attempt pseudo operations.

Pseudo operations are a more appropriate tactic for insurgency warfare than many of the conventional tactics now contemplated. They must be included with other counterinsurgency tactics if the United States is to successfully execute a counterinsurgency campaign.

## NOTES

### Chapter I

1. Diagrams provided by Colonel Stanley G. Pratt, USMC, Department of Strategy and Policy, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.

2. Interview with General Sir Frank Kitson, British Army (Retired), England: 6 January 1986. General Kitson served in the Kenya Emergency, 1953-1955; the Malaya Emergency 1967; Aden 1958; Cyprus, 1963-1964; and Northern Ireland, 1970-1972.

### Chapter II

1. See Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979).

2. Ian F.W. Beckett and John Pimlott, Armed Forces and Modern Counter-Insurgency (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1985), p. 3.

3. Pakenham, p. 496.

4. Albert Grundlingh, "Collaborators in the Boer Society," Peter Warwick, ed., The South African War: The Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902 (Harlow, England: Longman Group, Ltd., 1989), p. 265.

5. Ibid., p. 269.

6. Ibid., p. 270.

7. Glen B. Infield, Skorzeny: Hitler's Commando (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 84. For the Skorzeny Ardennes operation see Infield, pp. 78-93, also see Charles Foley, Commando Extraordinary (New York: Longman's, Green and Co., 1954), pp. 114-127.

8. Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five (London: Faber and Faber, 1977), p. 13.

9. W.P. Willmott, "Kenya in Revolt," Ashley Brown and Sam Elder, eds., War in Peace (London: Orbis Publishing Ltd., 1981), p. 112.

10. F.D. Corfield, Historical Survey of the Origins and Growth of Mau Mau (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1960), p. 7.

11. Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. and John Nottingham, The Myth of "Mau Mau": Nationalism in Kenya (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1966), pp. 331-334.
12. Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1967), p. 86.
13. Rosberg and Nottingham, pp. 331-334.
14. Paget, p. 86.
15. Willmott, P. 110.
16. By the end of 1956, 95 Europeans (63 military and 32 civilian) had been killed, as compared to 2,341 Africans (524 military and 1,817 civilian). 11,503 Mau Mau died in the fighting. Paget, p. 104.
17. Ibid., p. 93.
18. Ibid., pp. 99-100.
19. Kenneth W. Grundy, Guerrilla Struggle in Africa (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1971), p. 81.
20. Frank Kitson, Gangs and Counter-Gangs (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1960), p. 17.
21. Kitson, Bunch of Five, p. 29.
22. Ibid.
23. Kitson, Gangs and Counter-Gangs, p. 74.
24. Ibid., p. 75.
25. Ibid., p. 75
26. Ibid., p. 95.
27. Ibid., p. 126.
28. Ibid.
29. Kitson, Bunch of Five, p. 48.
30. Kitson, Gangs and Counter-Gangs, pp. 126-127.
31. Ibid., p. 127.
32. Ibid., p. 171.
33. Ibid.

34. Interview with General Sir Frank Kitson, British Army (Retired), England: 6 January 1986.

35. Kitson, Gangs and Counter-Gangs, p. 190.

36. Kitson, Bunch of Five, p. 62.

37. See Wilmott, pp. 110-111 and Kitson, Gangs and Counter-Gangs, pp. 78-82.

38. Kitson Interview.

39. Ibid.

40. Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1975), p. 364.

41. Kitson Interview.

### Chapter III

1. Those insurgents who went to Ghana were taught by Soviet advisors. It is paradoxical that neither the Soviet Union nor Ghana made good examples for insurgency theory.

2. Paul Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin, Chimurenga (Marshalltown, South Africa: Sygma Books (PTY) Ltd. and Collins Vaal (PTY) Ltd., 1982), p. 10.

3. The commander of the squadron, Captain George Peter Walls, would become the Commander of the Rhodesian Army and later Commander of Combined Operations.

4. James Baldwin, Black Fire (London: Julian Friedman Publishers, Ltd., 1978), pp. 53-74.

5. Moorcraft and McLaughlin, pp. 17-26.

6. Peter Stiff, Selous Scouts (Alberton, R.S.A.: Galago Publishing (PTY) Ltd., 1984), p. 48.

7. Ibid., p. 50.

8. Ron Reid Daly, Selous Scouts: Top Secret War (Alberton, R.S.A.: Galago Publishing (PTY) Ltd., 1982), pp. 24-26.

9. For a detailed account of Andre Rabie's death see Reid Daly, pp. 35-36.

10. The Rhodesian SAS allowed only white Europeans to be a member of the regiment.

11. Stiff, pp. 43-55. Linguists and National Park Rangers provided excellent pseudo team leaders; men who knew the language and the terrain.

12. Ibid., pp. 60-61.

13. Ibid., p. 61.

14. Ibid., p. 60.

15. Reid Daly, pp. 134-140.

16. For a detailed account on some of the political violence within the insurgent parties see Report of the Special Commission on the Assassination of Herbert Wiltshire Chitepo (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1976).

17. Reid Daly, p. 13.

18. Ibid., p. 103.

19. A Selous Scout fort was normally an isolated, walled compound with a helo pad in the center. A captured insurgent could be flown into the compound or fort unrecognized by locals due to the fact that no one could see into the fort.

20. Reid Daly, p. 104.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., pp. 142-144.

23. Stiff, p. 73.

24. Ibid.

25. Reid Daly, p. 153.

26. Al J. Venter, The Zambesi Salient (Old Greenwich: Devin-Adair Company, 1974), p. 107.

27. Ian F.W. Beckett and John Pimlott, eds., Armed Forces and Modern Counter-Insurgency (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), p. 158 and 176.

28. Ibid., 173. While I was observing the war in Rhodesia in 1979 and 1980 there were numerous rumors that the Selous Scouts were in fact very much into the business of ivory poaching. Members of the Selous Scouts and other Army units made such allegations to me at the time.

29. Ibid. Also see Reid Daly, pp. 321-422.
30. Interview with General Sir Frank Kitson, British Army (Ret.), England: 6 January 1986.
31. Ibid.

#### Chapter IV

1. Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1977), p. 63.
2. Robert Debs Heinl, Jr. and Nancy Gordon Heinl, Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1978), p. 453.
3. J. Robert Moskin, The U.S. Marine Corps Story (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1981), p. 184.
4. Heinl, p. 457.
5. Ibid.
6. Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counter-Insurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance (New York: The Free Press, 1977), p. 36.
7. Ibid., p. 24.
8. Hans Heymann, Jr. and William W. Whitson, Can and Should the United States Preserve a Military Capability for Revolutionary Conflict? (R-940-ARPA), The Rand Corp., Santa Monica, CA., January 1972, p. 46. Quoted in Blaufarb, p. 38.
9. Blaufarb, p. 36.
10. Ibid., p. 28.
11. Napoleon D. Valeriano and Charles T.R. Bohannon, Counter Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), p. 143.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 144.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 146.
16. Ibid., pp. 146-148.

17. Ibid., p. 148.

18. See Lewis W. Walt, Strange War, Strange Strategy (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1970) and F.J. West, Jr., The Village (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1972).

19. Edward Doyle and Samuel Lipsman, The Vietnam Experience: America Takes Over, 1965-1967 (Boston: Boston Publishing Co., 1982), pp. 65-66.

20. General Lewis W. Walt, USMC, the III MAF Commander, was a great proponent of the CAP program. The Army was not. General William Westmoreland, USA, later explained, "I simply had not enough numbers to put a squad in every village and hamlet . . ." Ibid., 66. This point has been debated. It is interesting to note that this excellent counterinsurgency technique received only limited attention at higher policy making levels--"The Marine approach was never considered by civilian foreign policy experts or debated beyond the military confines of the JCS." Ibid.

21. Walt, p. 44.

22. Ibid.

23. Walt, p. 45.

24. Francis J. Kelly, U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961-1971 (Washington, DC: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972), p. 19.

25. Ibid., pp. 32-34.

26. Ibid., p. 34.

27. Ibid., p. 135.

28. Charles M. Simpson, Inside the Green Berets (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1981), p. 153.

29. Ibid., pp. 143-144 and pp. 146-147.

30. Blaufarb, pp. 245-248 and Simpson, p. 216.

31. Robert W. Komer, "Impact of Pacification on Insurgency in South Vietnam," in David S. Sullivan and Martin J. Sattler, Revolutionary War: Western Response (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 50.

32. William Colby, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), p. 267.

33. Blaufarb, p. 245.

34. Ibid.
35. Colby, p. 268.
36. Blaufarb, p. 247.
37. Ibid.
38. Colby, p. 272.
39. Joseph A. Amter, Vietnam Verdict (New York: Continuum Publishing Co., 1982), p. 327.
40. Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army Concept and Vietnam: A Case Study in Organizational Failure, Unpublished PhD. Thesis, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA: 1983, p. 628.
41. Blaufarb, p. 276.
42. Ibid.
43. Komer, p. 53.
44. Interview with General Sir Frank Kitson, British Army (Retired), England: 6 January 1986.

#### Chapter V

1. "The National Security Act of 1947," Public Law 253, 80 Congress, 61 Stat. 495, Sec 206 (C).

#### Chapter VII

1. Interview with General Sir Frank Kitson, British Army (Retired), England: 6 January 1986.