The Military Sealift Command: One Vital Component of Navy Preparedness (U)

Military Sealift Command
Washington DC W T Piotti 27 Feb 86
"THE MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND: ONE VITAL COMPONENT OF NAVY PREPAREDNESS"

BY

REAR ADMIRAL WALTER T. PIOTTI, JR., USN
COMMANDER, MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND

BEFORE THE

UNITED STATES READINESS COMMAND WINTER DEFENSE SYMPOSIUM

MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA
27 FEBRUARY 1986
I am happy to have the opportunity to provide this audience with a concise, and hopefully informative, overview of the mission, structure and function of the Military Sealift Command and how our command complements and supports the other DOD forces represented at this symposium.

In early 1984 the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations formally recognized strategic sealift as one of the Navy’s three major functions, joining sea control and power projection. Simultaneously, administrative and operational changes were instituted within the Navy to ensure that sealift programs are considered on a balanced basis with competing Navy programs and fully integrated with all of MSC’s resources into the operational structure of the Navy’s major fleets and their subordinate numbered fleets worldwide. As a consequence, the entire operation of forces assigned to the U.S. Navy, both combatant and sealift, will come under one strategic, tactical, and operational purview. This important policy change will help shape Navy thinking for years to come.
The primary mission of the Military Sealift Command (MSC) is to provide sealift for strategic mobility in support of national security objectives. This mission, known as strategic sealift, demands the capacity to deploy and sustain military forces whenever and wherever needed, as rapidly and for as long as operational requirements dictate. This mission is accomplished through the activation of three forces:

- Strategic Sealift,
- The Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force,
- The Special Support Force.

How does our mission and force structure support and complement the overall US. naval function? First, MSC fulfills its mission through the employment of strategic sealift forces from two principal sources: US. government-owned ships and the US. merchant marine. But government-owned vessels provide only a small part of the necessary sealift capability. As a result, in time of war or national emergency the vast majority must be chartered or requisitioned from the regularly operating US. flag fleet.
AN ANCILLARY MSC MISSION IS MANAGEMENT OF OUR COMMAND'S NAVAL FLEET AUXILIARY FORCE, COMPRised OF DEDICATED SEALIFT ASSETS OF THE MSC FORCE THAT PROVIDE DIRECT SUPPORT FOR POWER PROJECTION OF NAVY FLEET OPERATIONS WORLDWIDE. EXAMPLES ARE OILERS, STORES SHIPS, AND OCEAN SURVEILLANCE SHIPS.

A THIRD MISSION IS THE OPERATION OF A SPECIAL MISSION SUPPORT FORCE, MADE UP OF DEDICATED SEALIFT ASSETS THAT PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR SPECIALIZED SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL MISSIONS THAT PROVIDE DATA REQUIRED FOR SEA CONTROL. EXAMPLES ARE OCEANOGRAPHIC RESEARCH, HYDROGRAPHIC SURVEY, AND MISSILE TELEMETRY.

THE CHART NOW ON THE SCREEN WAS DESIGNED TO EXPLAIN THE FOUR BASIC RELATIONSHIPS THAT WE AT MSC HAVE WITH OTHER COMPONENTS OF THE NAVY AND WITH THE JOINT OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE.

-- FIRST, AT UPPER RIGHT, IS THE RELATIONSHIP THAT STEMS FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, THROUGH THE CNO, TO MSC. THIS DASHED LINE REPRESENTS, IF YOU WILL, THE SINGLE-MANAGERSHIP OF OCEAN TRANSPORTATION, CONFERRED
ON THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, AND WE IN MSC HAVE BEEN DESIGNATED THE SINGLE MANAGER OPERATING AGENT FOR THE EXECUTION OF THAT RESPONSIBILITY BY THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. THIS RELATIONSHIP FLOWS THROUGH THE CNO BECAUSE THERE ARE CERTAIN POLICY AND PROGRAM MATTERS THAT RIGHTLY MUST BE EXERCISED BY THE CNO AND HIS STAFF, AND WE ARE NOT PART OF THE CNO'S STAFF. WE ARE A FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION THAT WORKS FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, A PERHAPS SMALL BUT IMPORTANT DISTINCTION.

-- SECONDLY, THE SAME DASHED LINE FROM THE CNO TO MSC ALSO SHOWS WE ARE AN ADMINISTRATIVE COMMAND IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMAND STRUCTURE OF THE NAVY. THE CNO COMMANDS THE NAVY THROUGH THIS ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE, BUT HE DOES NOT OPERATE IT. IT IS OPERATED THROUGH THE JOINT STRUCTURE. WE ARE ALSO CALLED OUT AS AN OPERATIONAL COMMAND, BUT WE DERIVE OUR OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES INDEPENDENTLY FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

-- THE THIRD RELATIONSHIP THAT WE HAVE IS THE ONE FOR JOINT PLANNING AND EXECUTION.
INDICATED BY THE DOTTED LINE, FROM MSC THROUGH, OR IN CONCERT WITH, THE JOINT DEPLOYMENT AGENCY TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND TO THE UNIFIED COMMANDS. THIS LINE SHOULD BE SEEN AS HAVING ARROWS AT BOTH ENDS, THAT IS, IT IS AN INTER-ACTIVE PROCESS AND ONE THAT PROVIDES INPUT AND RESPONSIBILITY FROM BOTH DIRECTIONS. IT IS A PROCESS THROUGH WHICH WE RECEIVE DIRECTION FROM THE JCS, JDA AND THE UNIFIED CINC'S AND ONE THROUGH WHICH WE TRANSMIT INFORMATION BACK THROUGH THE CHAIN.

THAT IS HOW WE IMPLEMENT CERTAIN OPERATION PLANS. IT IS A VERY IMPORTANT FUNCTION, AND IT IS CERTAINLY OUTSIDE THE REALM OF THE CNO. IT IS VERY MUCH WITHIN THE UNIFIED COMMAND STRUCTURE.

-- THE FINAL RELATIONSHIP IS ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE CHART, AND IT IS AN OPERATIONAL RELATIONSHIP. IT ASSOCIATES ITSELF WITH THESE OTHER THREE ACTIVITIES THAT ARE ALL ONE AND THE SAME FAMILY -- THE MSC FAMILY. THE POINT HERE IS THAT BY DOUBLE-HATTING COMSC IN THE OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE NAVY FLEET ORGANIZATION, AND BY DOUBLE HATTING OUR SUBORDINATES
IN THAT STRUCTURE, WE FACILITATE THE OPERATION OF THE FORCES THAT COMPRISSE STRATEGIC SEALIFT -- AS WELL AS NAVAL FLEET AUXILIARY AND SPECIAL MISSION SUPPORT -- THROUGH THE GENERAL OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE NAVY. THIS HAS BEEN A RECENT REORDERING WHICH IS JUST BEGINNING TO TAKE ROOT AND STARTING TO GROW. RATHER THAN TRY AND MAINTAIN A SEPARATE OPERATING STRUCTURE FOR MSC OUTSIDE THE NAVY FLEET OPERATING STRUCTURE, I BELIEVE IT BEST THAT WE REMAIN JOINED WITH THE STRUCTURE THAT NOW EXISTS. THAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS STRUCTURE UNDER THE FLEET CINC’S SHOWN AT LOWER LEFT, AND IT IS THROUGH THIS STRUCTURE THAT THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF HAVE THE CAPACITY TO MOVE THOSE STRATEGIC SEALIFT FORCES. THIS IS A STRUCTURE THAT ALREADY EXISTS, ONE THE JOINT CHIEFS KNOW AND UNDERSTAND AND THAT HAS THE NECESSARY SUPPORTING COMMUNICATIONS AND THE LIKE IN PLACE.

SUMMARIZING THEN, THERE ARE FOUR ITEMS ON THIS CHART THAT SHOW WHAT WE DO AND HOW WE GET DIRECTION:

-- ONE IS FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY AS THE SINGLE MANAGER FOR SEALIFT.
-- ONE IS FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE COMMAND FUNCTION, WHICH GOVERNS MUCH OF WHAT MSC DOES.

-- ONE IS FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, WHICH IS PRINCIPALLY A JOINT PLANNING AND EXECUTION FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP.

-- FINALLY, THERE IS AN OPERATIONAL RELATIONSHIP THAT IS INTEGRAL TO THE OVERALL OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE NAVY.

This slide gives further illustration of MSC's relationship to the CNO and the overall Naval Command structure as well as a breakout or flow chart of command within the MSC itself, emanating from COMSC headquarters in Washington and delineating the command's worldwide structure.

As a complement to the command flow chart just shown which provided a graphic illustration of the origin and delineation of our command's duties, this slide is designed to give a pictorial illustration of the global operations and physical locations of the various area and subarea
COMMAND BOUNDARIES. THEY ARE THE SAME AS YOUR OWN.

MSC NORMALLY OPERATES WITH A COMPARATIVELY SMALL NUMBER OF PEOPLE. WE HAVE LESS THAN 1,900 PEOPLE -- BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN -- ASHORE IN PEACETIME. WE HAVE A SMALL GROUP OF MILITARY AT SEA IN SPECIFIED SHIPS -- NOT AS PART OF SHIP'S COMPANY -- BUT IN WHAT WE CALL MILITARY DETACHMENTS THAT ASSIST IN CARRYING OUT PURELY MILITARY FUNCTIONS SUCH AS HANDLING CLASSIFIED COMMUNICATIONS AND THE LIKE. AND, OF COURSE -- ON BOARD SHIP WE HAVE 3,627 CIVIL SERVICE MARINERS AND 1,825 CONTRACT MARINERS FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR. THIS NUMBER OF PEOPLE -- IN COMBINATION -- FACILITATES THE OPERATION OF A PEACETIME FORCE OF ABOUT 123 SHIPS. IN TOTAL -- THEN -- WE HAVE ROUGHLY 8,000 PEOPLE INVOLVED IN OUR BUSINESS EVERY DAY.

AS TO PHYSICAL ASSETS, MOST OF THESE 123 SHIPS ARE PRIVATELY OWNED VESSELS UNDER CHARTER TO MSC. THEY ARE PRIMARILY DRY CARGO SHIPS AND TANKERS.
THE OTHER SEALIFT FORCES THAT CAN BE DRAWN FROM OUR NATIONAL ASSETS STACK UP IN THIS FASHION:

FROM THE READY RESERVE FORCE, OR RRF, WE HAVE 87 SHIPS OWNED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND IN A FIVE, TEN AND TWENTY DAY READINESS STATUS.

FROM THE U.S. FLAG MERCHANT MARINE WE HAVE 331 MILITARILY USEFUL DRY CARGO SHIPS AND TANKERS.

FROM THE NATIONAL DEFENSE RESERVE FLEET (NDRF), THERE ARE ANOTHER 156 SHIPS IN ADDITION TO THE RRF -- WHICH IS ACTUALLY A SEGMENT OF THE NDRF FLEET. NINETY-SEVEN OF THESE NDRF SHIPS ARE OLD WORLD WAR II VICTORY SHIPS, AND WE MUST RECOGNIZE THEIR LIMITED UTILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS IN OUR PLANNING. THESE OLDER SHIPS WOULD BE USED PRINCIPALLY AS "ATTRITION FILLERS."

THERE ARE ABOUT 91 MILITARILY USEFUL DRY CARGO SHIPS AND TANKERS IN THE FOREIGN FLAG EFFECTIVE U.S. CONTROLLED (EUSC) FLEET. EUSC SHIPS ARE CONSIDERED TO BE NATIONAL SEALIFT
ASSETS SINCE THEY ARE OWNED BY U.S. COMPANIES AND HAVE MET SPECIFIC ESTABLISHED CRITERIA, INCLUDING COUNTRY OF REGISTRY, THAT WOULD INSURE THEIR AVAILABILITY.

THE SUM OF THE MILITARILY USEFUL ASSETS CURRENTLY AVAILABLE FROM ALL THESE NATIONAL SOURCES -- BOTH GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND PRIVATELY-OWNED -- IS CURRENTLY ABOUT 733 SHIPS.

IN ADDITION -- WITHIN A NATO CONTEXT -- OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES WOULD BE EXPECTED TO BRING ABOUT 600 SHIPS WITH THEM IN AN OPERATIONAL SITUATION INVOLVING EUROPEAN RAPID REINFORCEMENT. OTHER REGIONAL ALLIES WOULD MAKE CONTRIBUTIONS AS WELL.

FOR EXAMPLE, THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA HAS ENTERED INTO AN AGREEMENT TO PROVIDE KOREAN SHIPS FOR U.S. USE IN A CONTINGENCY INVOLVING KOREA WHEN THE KOREANS HAVE MOBILIZED. THIS IS A VERY SENSITIVE ISSUE WITH THE ROK AND WHILE THE EXISTENCE OF AN AGREEMENT IS NOT CLASSIFIED ANY OF THE DETAILS AND CONDITIONS ARE CLASSIFIED SECRET.
THEREFORE, IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH A WORLD-WIDE SITUATION REQUIRING STRATEGIC SEALIFT, THERE SHOULD BE AN AGGREGATE OF OVER 1300 SHIPS AVAILABLE TO US TODAY. THAT IS NOT TO SAY THAT NUMBER IS EITHER ADEQUATE OR INADEQUATE OR TO INFER ANYTHING ABOUT WHAT ATTRITION MIGHT BE EXPECTED -- ONLY TO PROVIDE A GENERAL VIEW OF THE FIELD OF SHIPS WE WOULD EXPECT TO BE AVAILABLE.

TO MORE SPECIFICALLY ILLUSTRATE THE STRATEGIC ASSETS AVAILABLE TO US TODAY, THIS SLIDE PROVIDES A GRAPHIC ILLUSTRATION OF THE PARTICULAR TYPES OF VESSELS NOW AT OUR COMMAND'S DISPOSAL. THERE ARE 12 DRY CARGO SHIPS, 20 TANKERS, 8 FAST SEALIFT SHIPS, 13 MARITIME PREPOSITIONING VESSELS AND 12 PREPOSITIONED SHIPS, TOTALING 65 AVAILABLE UNITS.

AS A FURTHER ILLUSTRATION OF OUR PHYSICAL ASSETS, THE COMMAND HAS AVAILABLE 88 RRF SHIPS OF VARIOUS TYPES. THESE INCLUDE 13 RO/RO's, 8 TANKERS, 52 BREAKBULK SHIPS, 2 SEATRAINS, 2 T-AVB's, 8 BARGE CARRIERS AND 3 T-ACS, FOR A TOTAL AVAILABLE FORCE OF 88 RRF CLASS VESSELS.
What specifically would happen in the event of the outbreak of actual hostilities? Our reaction will of course be tempered by the situation -- the kind and location of the threat leveled at us. This sequence of sealift force activation shows our normal response to a progressive enemy threat build-up. All along the utilization sequence there are systems of checks and balances to assure that our response does not result in overreaction and the wrong signal to the rest of the world. All of these responses are predicated upon our desire to preserve our various national commercial shipping assets until such time as they are actually needed to support full scale conflict.

Not to be alarmist, but should such a conflict occur, this comparison of Soviet and U.S. fleet capacity over the last 45 years is not a particularly encouraging sight.

Nor, I might add, is the precipitous decline in privately owned U.S. flag merchant vessels illustrated in this graphic particularly comforting.
THE NAVY RECOGNIZES THAT IT IS CLEARLY IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST TO SUPPORT A STRONG MERCHANT MARINE. IN FACT -- THE RECOVERY OF THE DOMESTIC MARITIME INDUSTRY IS AN ESSENTIAL NATIONAL PRIORITY IN OUR VIEW. SO -- IN PEACETIME -- MSC WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE SHIPPING POLICIES THAT MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF U.S.-FLAG SHIPS FOR THE MOVEMENT OF DOD CARGO. WE WILL PROVIDE THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF JOBS FOR MERCHANT SEAMEN -- SO AS TO PRESERVE THAT BASE OF TALENT FOR THE FUTURE. AND WE WILL SUPPORT NAVY AND CONGRESSIONAL SHIPBUILDING OR SHIP MODIFICATION INITIATIVES THAT WILL CONTINUE TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE VIABILITY OF OUR SHIPYARD BASE.

MORE OMINOUS PERHAPS IS THIS GRAPHIC WHICH ADDRESSES SPECIFICALLY THE AMOUNT OF LAID-UP -- UNUSED -- U.S. TONNAGE CAPACITY.

HAND IN HAND WITH THAT LAID-UP AND UNUSED U.S. SHIPPING CAPACITY IS THE UNSETTLING ATTENDANT MASSIVE SEAFARER UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEM. UNEMPLOYMENT IS A DIFFICULT AND WASTEFUL CONDITION IN THE ABSTRACT, BUT WE OUGHT ALL TO BEAR IN MIND THAT THESE WORKERS ARE THE ONES WHO WILL BE
CALLED UPON TO MAN THE SHIPS DEDICATED TO OUR COMMAND. IF THEY ARE NOT AVAILABLE, RUSTY IN THEIR SKILLS, OR SIMPLY EMPLOYED ELSEWHERE, THEY ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO OUR COMMAND AND THE NATION IN TIME OF CRISIS. HENCE, THIS IS MORE THEN MERELY AN UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEM. IT ALSO LOOMS LARGE AS A NATIONAL SECURITY PROBLEM.

IN A WARTIME SITUATION -- OUR FORCE WOULD BE AUGMENTED CONSIDERABLY. THE ASHORE FORCE WOULD BE PRIMARILY AUGMENTED BY THE ACTIVATION OF SOME 5,000 RESERVE PERSONNEL INCLUDING MSC NAVAL RESERVES, THE NATIONAL DEFENSE EXECUTIVE RESERVE (NDER) AND THE NAVAL CONTROL OF SHIPPING ORGANIZATION (NCSORG). THERE WOULD BE A SMALL INCREASE IN CIVIL SERVICE MANNING ASHORE AND AFLOAT. THERE ARE ABOUT 800 CONVOY COMMODORES AND THEIR STAFFS THAT WE WOULD BRING ON -- AND THERE ARE ABOUT 11,000 MERCHANT MARINE PERSONNEL FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR WHO WOULD BE CALLED UPON TO MAN THE U.S. FLAG MERCHANT SHIPS, RRF, NDRF, AND EUSC SHIPS IF NECESSARY. SO, IN ROUND NUMBERS, IT WOULD TAKE ABOUT 24,000 PEOPLE TO MAN OUR NATIONAL SEALIFT ASSETS IN A WARTIME SCENARIO.
IF YOU APPLY THE APPROPRIATE MANNING FACTOR FOR EUROPEAN AND OTHER ALLIED SHIPPING -- YOU FIND AN ADDITIONAL 16,000 OR SO ALLIED PERSONNEL ARE REQUIRED TO CARRY OUT JOINT SHIPPING OPERATIONS. THIS BRINGS THE GRAND TOTAL OF WARTIME MANNING FOR ALL THESE AVAILABLE SHIPS -- U.S. AND ALLIED -- TO SOME 40,000 PEOPLE.

THE FOLLOWING FIVE SLIDES ARE INTENDED TO DEMONSTRATE THREE THINGS: (1) THE PRECIPITOUS SHORTFALL IN CAPABILITY; (2) NEW ASSETS DEVELOPED BY THE NAVY TO ADDRESS THIS SHORTFALL AND, (3) WHERE THESE NEW NAVY DEDICATED ASSETS ARE LOCATED.

SUCCINCTLY PUT, THIS SLIDE DEMONSTRATES THAT WE ARE IN FOR A LONG PERIOD OF SIGNIFICANT SHORTFALL IN OUR UNIT SURGE EQUIPMENT CAPABLE SHIPPING CAPACITY. IN THE OUT YEARS, PROJECTED HERE TO 1990, THAT PROBLEM, AFTER A PROJECTED BRIEF RESPITE IN 1988, IS NOT ABOUT TO GO AWAY.

TO ADD FURTHER CREDENCE TO MY MESSAGE, THIS SLIDE MAKES CLEAR THE GLARING DISPARITY
BETWEEN WHAT THE NATION REQUIRES AS FAR AS TANKER REQUIREMENTS FOR FY 1990 AND WHAT WE CAN ACTUALLY EXPECT TO HAVE. IT IS NOT A PRETTY PICTURE.

NOT TO BEAT A DEAD HORSE, BUT IF FURTHER EVIDENCE BE NEEDED TO CONVINCE THE SKEPTICAL THAT OUR MARINE INDUSTRY -- AND OUR NATIONAL SECURITY -- IS IMPERILED BY AN ACROSS THE BOARD SHORTFALL IN SHIPPING CAPACITY, THIS SLIDE OUGHT WELL SERVE AS A CLOSING ARGUMENT IN THE CASE. I CALL YOUR ATTENTION IN PARTICULAR TO THE BOTTOM LINE WHICH PROJECTS A TROOPSHIP SHORTFALL OF 13,474 -- ASSUMING THAT SCHOOLSHIPS ARE AFFECTED IN THE MANNER SHOWN.

TO HELP AMELIORATE THE DECLINING NUMBER OF U.S. MERCHANT SHIPS, MSC IS IN THE PROCESS OF SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASING ITS SEALIFT CAPABILITY.

THE MAP NOW ON THE MONITOR SHOWS WHERE SOME OF THESE NEW ASSETS ARE LOCATED AND THEIR COMMAND AFFILIATIONS.
IN RATHER QUICK SUCCESSION, LET ME SHOW SOME SLIDES OF A NUMBER OF THESE ASSETS THAT WE HAVE HELPED TO DEVELOP TO OFFSET THE PRESSING EQUIPMENT SHORTFALL.

Slide 22
Fast Sealift Ship

Slide 23
MPS
General Dynamics

Slide 24
Ocean Surveillance Ship (T-AGOS)

Slide 25
Tanker (T-5)

Slide 26a
Working Crane Ship (T-ACS)

Slide 26b
Hospital Ship (T-AH)

Slide 26c
Aviation Support Ship (T-AVB)

Slide 27
Oiler (T-AO)

FORCE STATIONED AT DIEGO GARCIA, IN THE PHILIPPINES AND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.


OUR FULL MARITIME PREPOSITIONING SHIP FORCE INCLUDES TWO OTHER MPS SQUADRONS. FOUR SHIPS ARE IN MPS SQUADRON ONE -- ALREADY STATIONED IN THE EASTERN ATLANTIC. SQUADRON TWO WILL CONSIST OF FIVE MPS VESSELS AT DIEGO GARCIA PLUS 12 OTHER PREPOSITIONING SHIPS LOADED WITH ARMY AND AIR FORCE EQUIPMENT, PETROLEUM AND SUPPLIES. THE FOUR SHIPS IN MPS SQUADRON THREE WILL BE DEPLOYED TO THE
VICINITY OF GUAM AND TINIAN IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC IN SEPTEMBER 1986.

THE 13 MPS VESSELS IN TOTAL WILL BE LOADED WITH MARINE CORPS CARGO TO SUPPORT THREE FULL MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADES (MABs) OF APPROXIMATELY 16,500 MEN EACH FOR A PERIOD OF 30 DAYS. THE 12 OTHER PREPOSITIONING SHIPS UNDER COMMANDER MPS SQUADRON TWO SUPPORT SELECTED UNITS OF THE AIR FORCE AND ARMY. ALL THE SHIPS ARE CHARTERED AND CONTRACT MANAGED BY THE MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND.

BY MID 1986 THE TOTAL OF 13 MARITIME PREPOSITIONING SHIPS -- BUILT OR RECONFIGURED BY MAERSK, GENERAL DYNAMICS AND WATERMAN -- WILL BE FULLY DEPLOYED -- AND WHETHER SAILING THE WORLD’S OCEANS . . . OR PREPOSITIONED NEAR POTENTIAL TROUBLE SPOTS . . . THEY WILL -- THEY ALREADY HAVE -- GREATLY IMPROVED OUR CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT MILITARY FORCES WHEREVER NEEDED ON SHORT NOTICE.

WE HAVE ALSO UNDERTAKEN THE CONVERSION OF EIGHT LARGE CONTAINERSHIPS INTO WHAT WE NOW CALL FAST SEALIFT SHIPS. THESE ARE THE
MOST PRODUCTIVE AND THE FASTEST -- IN EXCESS OF 30 KNOTS -- CARGO SHIPS IN USE ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD -- AND THEY ALLOW US TO QUICKLY MOVE LARGE VOLUMES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM THE UNITED STATES TO DISTANT TROUBLE SPOTS. FSS SHIPS ARE PRINCIPALLY PROGRAMMED FOR RAPID REINFORCEMENT BY CARRYING ARMY MECHANIZED DIVISIONS. SEVEN OF THE FAST SEALIFT SHIPS HAVE BEEN DELIVERED, AND THE LAST OF THE NUMBER WILL BE OPERATIONAL NEXT MONTH.

NEXT, WE HAVE STARTED AN AMBITIOUS EXPANSION OF THE READY RESERVE FORCE. DURING 1986, THE RRF WILL EXPAND TO 88 SHIPS. WE EXPECT IT TO INCLUDE AT LEAST 116 SHIPS BY 1991. OUR RRF SHIPS ARE LOCATED PRINCIPALLY IN THE NATIONAL DEFENSE RESERVE FLEETS AT JAMES RIVER IN VIRGINIA -- AT SUISUN BAY, CALIFORNIA -- AND AT BEAUMONT, TEXAS. ADDITIONALLY, FORTY-FIVE RRF SHIPS ARE DISPERSED NEAR SHIPYARDS FOR READY ACTIVATION -- ON CONTRACTS FOR LAYBERTHS RECENTLY AWARDED BY MARAD.

WE HAVE ALSO BEGUN CONVERTING UP TO 12 CARGO SHIPS INTO AUXILIARY CRANE SHIPS --
CAPABLE OF UNLOADING COMMERCIAL CONTAINERSHIPS UNDER A WIDE RANGE OF CONDITIONS -- MOST IMPORTANTLY -- IN PORTS WHERE THE CONTAINER CRANES HAVE BEEN DAMAGED BY ENEMY ACTION OR WHERE NO PORT FACILITIES EXIST AT ALL. THIS IS ONE SOLUTION TO THE CHALLENGE OF MAKING TODAY'S CONTAINERSHIPS MORE MILITARILY USEFUL.

AND THERE ARE OTHER STRATEGIC SEALIFT PROGRAMS ON-GOING . . . MODIFICATIONS TO CONTAINERSHIPS -- SUCH AS THE UTILIZATION OF SEA SHEDS AND FLAT RACKS -- TO PERMIT LOADING OF LARGE MILITARY EQUIPMENT. WE ARE ALSO MAKING SPECIAL MODIFICATIONS TO SOME OF OUR RRF SHIPS SO THAT -- WHEN ACTIVATED -- THEY CAN IMMEDIATELY AUGMENT OUR AUXILIARY FORCE IN DIRECT FLEET SUPPORT ROLES.

SO -- YOU CAN READILY SEE THAT THE UNITED STATES NAVY IS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT SEALIFT -- AND IS DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ENHANCE OUR SEALIFT CAPABILITY. OUR PROGRAMS HAVE OBVIOUSLY BEEN PRIMARILY UNDERTAKEN TO SUPPORT OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE. BUT A MOST-WELCOME "BY-PRODUCT" OF THE PROGRAMS IS THE SUBSTANTIAL
BENEFIT THAT FLOWS TO OUR NATION'S MARITIME INDUSTRY.

I BELIEVE AT THIS POINT IT WOULD BE OF BENEFIT TO REVIEW AN EARLIER SLIDE WHICH DEMONSTRATES THE PRECARIOUS CONDITION OF THE INDUSTRY AND TO FOLLOW THAT REVIEW UP WITH TWO OTHER GRAPHICS WHICH OUGHT TO FURTHER BRING HOME THE MESSAGE THAT OUR NATION IS ON THE HORN OF A RATHER LARGE DILEMMA WITH REGARDS OUR MARINE CAPACITY.

THIS SLIDE EMPHASIZES MY MESSAGE THAT WE ARE IN TROUBLE AND THERE ARE NO QUICK FIX SOLUTIONS.

THE NAVY IS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE U.S. MARITIME SITUATION AND HAS SET ABOUT TO DO ITS PART TO ALTER IT BY ENCOURAGING THE FUNDING OF NEW PROJECTS.

BEFORE 1980, COMPARATIVELY LITTLE WAS SPENT ON SEALIFT; SINCE 1980 -- MORE HAS BEEN SPENT ON SEALIFT PROGRAMS THAN IN THE ENTIRE PERIOD SINCE WORLD WAR II. IN TERMS OF TOTAL DEFENSE DOLLARS, THE PERCENTAGE IS VERY SMALL.
BUT IN TERMS OF BUSINESS FOR THE MARITIME INDUSTRY -- THE IMPACT IS VERY SIGNIFICANT.

DURING THE PERIOD FY 1982-89, APPROXIMATELY $5.4 BILLION WILL BE SPENT FOR NEW SHIP CONSTRUCTION AND CONVERSION UNDER NAVY SEALIFT PROGRAMS -- ALMOST ONE BILLION DOLLARS THIS YEAR ALONE. AT LEAST EIGHT DIFFERENT U.S. SHIPYARDS WILL SHARE IN THIS WORK -- AS WILL SCORES OF COMPONENT MANUFACTURERS AND SHIPYARD SUPPLIERS. DURING THE SAME PERIOD, APPROXIMATELY $13.4 BILLION WILL BE PAID TO SHIP OPERATORS FOR THE OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF SEALIFT SHIPS FOR THE NAVY. THE NEW SEALIFT SHIPS WILL PROVIDE NEARLY 3,000 MORE SEAGOING JOBS -- AND, FOR EXAMPLE, IT IS FURTHER ANTICIPATED THAT BETWEEN FY 86 AND FY 91 APPROXIMATELY HALF A BILLION DOLLARS WILL BE USED TO CONTINUE TO FURTHER EXPAND OUR READY RESERVE FLEET.

MONEY ASIDE, THERE IS ONE FINAL EXACERBATING COMPONENT TO OUR MARINE CRISIS. THAT IS THE DICHTOMY BETWEEN THE NEEDED WARTIME MARINER POOL AND THAT WHICH CAN, REALISTICALLY, BE COUNTED UPON TO BE AVAILABLE. AGAIN, NOT A PRETTY PICTURE. AGAIN, NO EASY ANSWERS.
CLEARLY, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC BENEFITS FROM A STRONG NATIONAL DEFENSE. BECAUSE THE MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND IS AN ABSOLUTELY VITAL -- LOGISTIC SUPPORT ELEMENT SERVING OUR ENTIRE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT -- ONLY WITH A STRONG MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND SUPPORTED IN LARGE MEASURE BY A STRONG MERCHANT MARINE INDUSTRY WILL THE UNITED STATES BE ABLE TO DEPLOY AND SUSTAIN OUR MILITARY FORCES WHEREVER NECESSARY.

ALTHOUGH THE MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND HAS JUST CELEBRATED ITS 37TH YEAR OF OPERATION AND IS RELATIVELY YOUNG IN TERMS OF SERVICE HISTORY -- I SEE NOTHING ON THE HORIZON EXCEPT A CONTINUED EMPHASIS ON ENHANCEMENT OF ITS CAPABILITIES -- AND A CONTINUED BROADENING OF ITS ROLES -- BOTH IN MORE DIRECT SUPPORT OF OUR ACTIVE FleETS AROUND THE WORLD -- AND IN NEWER, MORE INNOVATIVE STRATEGIC SEALIFT PROGRAMS.

OUR STRATEGIC SEALIFT PROGRAM PROVIDES US THE NEEDED READINESS -- AND OUR FLEET AUXILIARY AND SPECIAL MISSION SHIPS ENSURE THE PROPER PROPORTIONALITY OF FORCE NECESSARY
TO MEET TODAY'S DIVERSE AND OFTEN UNPREDICTABLE MILITARY CHALLENGES.

AS AN OVERALL FORCE -- THE MSC WILL BE A VITAL PART OF ANY AMERICAN MILITARY ENCOUNTER -- ENSURING THAT OUR TROOPS AND AVIATION UNITS ARE PROPERLY PREPARED -- THEIR SUPPLIES PROPERLY POSITIONED -- THEIR LOGISTICAL AND SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS ASSURED.

WE INTEND TO SEE TO IT THAT, SHOULD THIS NATION'S SERVICEMEN BE CALLED UPON TO FACE THE FIRE OF COMBAT -- THEY WILL DO SO WITH THEIR BATTLES MORE THAN HALF WON -- BECAUSE OF THE CONCERTED EFFORT PUT FORTH -- BEFORE THE FACT -- BY LOGISTICAL PLANNERS AND OPERATORS WHO RECOGNIZE THAT PREPARATION AND READINESS COMPRISE AT LEAST HALF THE TOTAL COMPONENT OF VICTORY.
END
DTIC
6-86