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THE UNIFIED COMMAND SYSTEM

Remarks by
MAJ GEN ALBIN WHEELER

at
AUSA Winter Defense Symposium

26 Feb 86

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BRIEFING BY MG WHEELER
TO REDCOM'S WINTER DEFENSE SYMPOSIUM
ON THE UNIFIED COMMAND SYSTEM
26 FEBRUARY 86, MACDILL AFB

(Opening Amenities)

LTG Lawrence, President of National Defense University, has asked me to convey to you his regrets that he could not be here today. He had other unavoidable commitments and requested that I act in his stead at this podium. I hasten to add, though, that I, and not he, should be held accountable for what is said.

In that regard, I recall a story Harold Brown used to tell from his boyhood memories in New York. One day the very august head of a very august church arrived at the airport for an official visit. The dignitaries in the city had all turned out to greet him. The red carpet was rolled out to the steps—they still had steps in those days—and the band struck up a lively tune as the formidably stout clergyman in his flowing robes descended to the tarmac. A cluster of journalists pressed close, and one particularly enterprising reporter was able to get in the first question. "Your Honor," he asked, "What do you think of the night clubs in New York?" Taken somewhat aback, the cleric hesitated, then asked, "Are there any night clubs in New York?" You can imagine the headlines that screamed across the reporter's newspaper the next morning, "Prelate's first question: Are there any night clubs in New York?"
Well, I understand my job is primarily to try to answer your questions rather than to ask my own, but I would not be faithful to my charge if I did not raise some issues to you for which we have not yet worked out fully satisfactory answers. What I propose to do over this next hour is to set the stage for addressing the Unified Command System—as General Mahaffey asked us to—some of the history and the major elements of the structure, and then to turn this podium over to Colonel Hutton who will look at some of the responsibilities and challenges facing our Unified Commanders-in-Chief in the field. Lastly, I would invite your queries from the floor. Our purpose here is dialogue, not monologue.

The Unified Command System, like English Common Law and all major American institutions, was never created full blown from the force of a single driving intellect—or even always a rational one. It has evolved over a good number of years (and is at the threshold of another potential major change even now). It is the product of the contending views of proponents and opponents, executives and legislators in some degree of compromise reflecting the political climate of the moment.

Any understanding of the Unified Command System must start with two key, and very typically American, principles: first, civilian control over the military; the second, checks and balances. The former has been invariably applied throughout our history. The application of the latter has resulted in an organizational structure uniquely our own, one in
which the traditional precept of unity of command— that supposed *sine qua non* of military organizations— may have been honored more in the breach than in the observance. Reflect if you will that our senior uniformed military entity (the JCS) is a committee, and that our joint commanders have very sharply circumscribed authority over how their subordinate Service Component Commanders organize and even employ their forces.

Our modern Unified Command Structure dates from the National Security Act of 1947, as most importantly amended in 1958. The purpose of these reorganizations was to bring the efforts of the combatant forces of each of the four military Services into closer integration to achieve our national goals. This desired inter-Service unity of effort has had a checkered past. The success of coordinating the movements of the land and naval forces at Yorktown 200 years ago (in that case the American and French armies and the French navy) was not uniformly repeated in subsequent U.S. military campaigns. During the Spanish-American War, the failure of the Army and Navy to cooperate in the Cuban campaign led to such strained relations that the Army Commander refused to let the Naval Commander sign the surrender document. At Pearl Harbor, a key ingredient in the thoroughness of the Japanese surprise was the lack of coordination between General Short and Admiral Kimmel in Hawaii. Saipan, Okinawa, and Normandy were, of course, examples of successfully coordinated joint operations, yet as late as 1944, the outcome of the Battle of Leyte Gulf was put in jeopardy because we still lacked a unified commander to integrate the efforts of the separate Service assets.
The mistakes we made and the lessons we learned from these wartime experiences impelled the overhaul of our military structure. Post war occupation and subsequent Cold War duties further underscored the requirement. What was needed was a structure that could:

- In peacetime, integrate the efforts of the Services overseas, as well as harmonize them with diplomatic initiatives;

- In crisis, minimize any turbulence in the transition from peace to war; and

- In wartime, provide for true unity of effort in the accomplishment of military missions.

The 1947 Act attempted to do that. It created an overarching Department of Defense, as well as a separate Service for the Air Force, and it provided a statutory basis for the wartime Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JCS were assigned the specific responsibility for establishing, subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, unified commands in strategic areas as required by national security. Eight of these existed, such as the European, Caribbean, Pacific, Alaskan, and Far East Commands, but the structure fell short of the desires of its framers because each command was responsible to a particular Service as its executive agent, and in effect, no unity was achieved below the level of the JCS.
President Eisenhower recommended major changes to the 1947 Act. These were his guiding thoughts. (Pause) The 1958 Amendment as finally passed did away with the executive agent concept and provided for a chain of command to the Unified and Specified Commanders-in-Chiefs (or CINCs) from the President and Secretary of Defense, bypassing the Service Secretaries. It further gave the CINC's operational control over the forces assigned to them, leaving administrative and logistics control in the hands of the Services.

Thus we have the basic structure of our military today, one that embodies civilian control at the top and a division of military authority along two distinct chains of command, a system of checks and balances. The administrative and logistical chain (to the left of the screen) runs from the President and Secretary of Defense to the three Service Secretaries and four military Services. The military Services have very specific combatant functions assigned to them by law, more commonly referred to as their roles and missions. These combatant functions serve as the fundamental organizational logic for all defense endeavor. The departments are responsible for the administrative support of their forces wherever they may be employed. In short, the Services do the recruiting, organizing, manning, equipping, training, supplying, and administering. As you well know, the military budgets are essentially items of Service involvement. The major R&D, testing and acquisition initiatives are Service driven. More on that point later. The Services provide the operating forces for assignment to the Unified and Specified Commands. When so assigned, these forces are called the Service
Components. Quite obviously, there are a large number of forces that are not assigned and remain under full Service control.

The operational chain (to the right of the screen) runs from the President and Secretary of Defense, through the JCS, to the Unified and Specified Commanders. This chain is concerned with the deployment and employment of our forces rather than their establishment, training, and provisioning. Except for certain very particular circumstances, such as during disaster or civil emergency, the Service Secretaries exercise no direct control over military operations. This organizational feature was spotlighted during Vietnam, when Secretary of the Air Force Seaman testified that he was ignorant of the Air Force bombings in Laos. There were immediate cries of lack of civilian control, but the charge was a false one, as Secretary of Defense McNamara and the President were very firmly in control. The real issue was that opponents of the bombing did not agree with the civilian control that did exist.

I said that the operational chain of command runs through the JCS. The JCS are not in the chain of command in the sense that either they or the Chairman are commanders with the authority to assign missions or forces. Their authority—now the topic of considerable congressional debate—is sharply limited by law, and within that, by the further authority and direction given to them by the National Command Authorities, that is, the President and the Secretary of Defense. Their statutory role is one of advising, and their executive mandate is to
serve as military staff to the President and Secretary. As military staff, the JCS exercise no executive authority in their own right. Subject to the policies of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the JCS are, however, charged with preparing strategic plans and providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces, including the direction of operations conducted by Unified and Specified CINCs.

As the chart shows, there are currently ten of these commands, and each faces and is organized to cope with a particular, enduring strategic problem. The three Specified Commands have a single Service as their core (in each case today, the Air Force), and they are functionally oriented: Strategic Air Command (strategic nuclear capability), Military Airlift Command (strategic and tactical airlift), and Aerospace Defense Command (U.S. aerospace defense) respectively. The Specified Commanders, since they are responsible for both JCS operational matters and their own Service departmental administrative ones, face a somewhat simpler situation than the Unified Commanders, so my remaining comments will focus principally on the role of the Unified Commanders.

The seven Unified Commands are made up of the forces of two or more services and five of them have a specific regional focus. Three--European, Central, and Southern Commands--are oriented preponderantly toward continental affairs, while two--Atlantic and Pacific Commands--are focused primarily on maritime concerns. The Commander-in-Chief of Readiness Command, our host at this symposium, has both geographic and functional responsibilities. He is the central player in being
responsible for the land defense of the continental United States and, in a global sense, for providing a strategic reserve to the other theater commanders with JS-based combat ready continental land and air forces. In the main, he is a deployer rather than an employer of the forces.

U.S. Space Command is the newest Unified Command, having been activated just this last fall. As soon as its manning is complete, sometime later this year, it will subsume the full mission of the Aerospace Defense Command, and the latter will be inactivated.

I'll not get too much further into the specifics of the separate commands except for comparative purposes, since you will be hearing from each of them more directly in the next few days. It would be useful, however, to look at these commands in their geographical context. The Unified Command Plan, reviewed every two years by the JCS, sets out the boundaries and broad tasks for each of the CINC’s. A few points merit special attention:

- U.S. European Command has U.S. responsibilities that extend well beyond Europe. In addition to his NATO and U.S. unilateral concerns in West Europe, the CINC is responsible for U.S. military planning and operations along the Eastern Mediterranean littoral as well. Recall that the responsible command during the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut was EUCOM. Similarly, EUCOM has security assistance and contingency planning responsibilities for most of Africa from Morocco to the Cape, except the northeastern quadrant which is assigned to U.S. Central Command.
U.S. Central Command has responsibilities for Northeast Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and east to Pakistan, the land areas enclosing the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. An outgrowth of the Carter Administration's concern for the deteriorating conditions in the Gulf and secure access to the world's largest oil reserves, this command is the only regional unified command without its headquarters deployed overseas in its area of responsibility. That headquarters is, of course, here at MacDill. U.S. Central Command's creation has significantly enhanced the visibility and credibility of the U.S. deterrent in the Middle East.

U.S. Pacific Command has by far the largest area of responsibility, extending from the West Coast of the U.S. across both Pacific and Indian Oceans to the African shore. Within that assigned span also lie the great nations of South and East Asia, countries embracing over one half of the world's population.

U.S. Southern Command answers for U.S. military concerns on the land mass of Latin America south of Mexico. El Salvador, Nicaragua and the Panama Canal are obvious concerns, but our burgeoning military relations with the governments in South America are getting increasing attention.

U.S. Atlantic Command concerns stretch from the potential challenge of confronting the Soviet fleet in the Norwegian Sea to securing the Southern Atlantic trade routes around Africa. Cuba and the Caribbean pose special problems because the region lies astride a vital trade and reinforcement line of communication.
This covers the background and basic structure of the Unified Command System as we find it today. Let me pause now and turn the podium over to Colonel Powell Hutton who will address the responsibilities and some of the challenges of the CINCs as they carry out their assigned duties. Colonel Hutton.

* * *

(Amenities)

The primary peacetime responsibilities of the various Commanders-in-Chief are deceptively simple, and although their specific missions may vary, their generic tasks are to:

-One, protect U.S. forces, bases, possessions, or territory against hostile attack.

-Two, make plans for the employment of assigned forces in peace or war to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of their assigned missions. These tasks can range from providing assistance in an earthquake disaster to conducting nuclear war. A major responsibility for the regional CINCs in this regard is planning for the evacuation of U.S. non-combatants from an area of crisis should the need arise.

-Three, perform operational tasks as assigned within their areas of responsibility. In more traditional military parlance, this means
carrying out orders. Ideally, these CINCs' tasks would be supported by particularized plans, but often, as in Grenada, time and circumstances do not permit that degree of formal preparation. Because these tasks may be sudden and urgent, each CINC has a primary interest in the readiness of his forces.

-Four, implement security assistance programs in the countries over which the CINCs have cognizance. This means that each CINC does a good deal of coordinating with U.S. embassies within his region as well as with governments concerned. He is a strong actor on the politico-military stage, one with good knowledge and contacts for military planning. Bear the point in mind for later consideration, because there has been a growing tendency to try to bypass the CINC on some operations and thereby forfeit the valuable perspectives he can offer.

-Lastly, coordinate with the military forces of our allies in the region to provide for successful combined operations for the common defense. Where multinational commands exist, these are the primary vehicles for such coordination. Otherwise, coordination is bilateral. We need to remember that if we sometimes seem to have difficulty in getting the separate American Services to pull uniformly in the traces, doing so with allies is doubly difficult. Winston Churchill, neatly summed up the issue. "There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies," he said, "and that is fighting without them."
For all the many short term crises that require the attention of the Unified Commanders, it is the longer range diversity of operational requirements for which they must plan that are the most demanding. Operational plans are drawn up by the CINCs as individually tasked by the JCS or on their own initiative as they see the need. The plans are then approved by the Chiefs and cover every major foreseeable military eventuality. Broadly speaking, these plans fall into two main categories: those for global war, such as plans that outline each CINC’s actions during an all-out war with the Soviet Union, and those for lesser contingencies, normally conflicts or actions more local in scope.

Requirements, however, can quickly outstrip the forces directly assigned the regional commanders. While the forward deployed forces may be able to handle a considerable array of tasks, maritime forces afloat or land and air reinforcements based in the United States are essential for any of the larger contingencies involving hostilities and even some smaller more specialized ones as could happen in a terrorist incident.

Assignment of forces, then, emerges as a major policy and resource issue. As an example, U.S. European Command has a substantial combat capability assigned to it in peacetime, but a NATO Warsaw Pact conflict would require far more forces, and EUCOM would become a supported command. The reinforcing army and air forces may well come from U.S. Readiness Command if they are based in the United States. Additionally, the forces of a neighboring CINC could be shifted to aid in the effort. U.S. Atlantic Command, Strategic Air Command, Military Airlift Command,
as well as perhaps the U.S. Pacific Command would be involved. These latter would be termed supporting commands.

The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command faces a far different problem, since he has very few forces under his direct operational control in peacetime, a much longer line of communications, and no well-developed infrastructure to support him in theater. He does, however, have forces that are assigned to him for planning purposes and assumes that he will be given their operational control in time of crisis.

The JCS have resolved the issue of multiple taskings for the combat forces associated with the major global war plans of the CINCs. Not so for the lesser contingency plans. The 82nd Airborne Division, for example, as a uniquely strategically mobile fighting force, requires a truly global planning perspective. It has seen combat in Vietnam and Granada and has made jumps in exercises in Europe and the Middle East. Its range of contingency requirements are among the heaviest, but its commitment would depend on actual crisis development and national priorities at the time. Marine, Air Force and Naval Forces are similarly susceptible to multiple contingency tasking, a feature which makes strategic planning far more complex for the United States than, for example, our European NATO allies or Israel which generally have to focus on a much narrower range of threats to their security.

After force planning and allocation, the second major area of contention is the degree to which the Unified Commander has authority
over the forces assigned to him. Because the subordinate Service Component Commanders must constantly look in two directions for guidance—on operational issues to the CINC and on administrative matters to the Service Chief—a certain amount of schizophrenia is unavoidable, and that division of focus and responsiveness is at the heart of the debate. The cornerstone document specifying the nature of and options for the CINC's control over his forces is JCS Pub 2, or Unified Action Armed Forces. It is the sole document of its kind in the world, for only the United States has such inter-Service doctrinal agreement. It was put together by those who had fought singly and jointly, the successful practitioners of military art against the Japanese, Germans and North Koreans. Yet it still falls short of full unified action. As such, it is maligned by critics of the system and is now undergoing a thorough review by the Joint Chiefs.

At this time, the JCS policy is that the CINC must exercise operational command over the forces assigned to him through his Service Component Commanders or through the commander of a subordinate subunified command or joint task force. These latter arrangements interpose a layer or two between the CINC and a Service Component, but they do not change the basic structure of the system. Ultimately, the CINC must "take cognizance of the prerogatives and responsibilities of his Service Component Commanders."

These prerogatives include both responsibility for training component forces in their "own Service doctrines, techniques, and tactical methods,"
and most importantly, responsibility for the "tactical employment of the forces of his component." The issue comes into focus where Service doctrine differs from the CINC's perspective of what is needed. Command and control of air assets is a particularly thorny issue, since Service doctrines differ on employment concepts, and the CINC has limited day-to-day authority to enforce a solution that opposes Service positions. As Admiral Crowe, then Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command, stated to Congress a year ago, the system in essence provides "for single-Service operational chains of command within the Unified Command [that] require the Unified Command to remain a rather loose confederation of single-Service forces."

Nevertheless, the CINCS are granted a sort of last ditch opportunity to pull together the reins of operational command--but only on a temporary basis. The Unified Command Plan provides that "in the event of a major emergency that necessitates the use of all available forces, the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands are...granted the additional authority to assume temporary operational command of all forces in their areas of responsibility."

While the arrangement is far from ideal, the picture is alleviated by the considerable doctrinal agreement that has been reached among the Services. Some of this is captured in a dozen JCS publications. Others are detailed in formal inter-Service agreements. The much heralded 35 point agreement between the Army and the Air Force, now also under consideration by the Navy and Marines, is a recent example of...
inter-Service consensus at its best on key operational, as well as developmental, issues.

The CINCs have also gotten involved. In a JCS initiated joint doctrine pilot program, the two maritime CINCs have been asked to work up concepts for strategic and tactical air support to maritime operations. The Commander-in-Chief, Europe has worked up a Theater Counter-Air concept now being considered by the JCS, a concept that capitalized on work he had already done with the Allies. Commander-in Chief, Readiness Command is responsible to the JCS for developing joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.

A number of lessons about joint coordination have, of course, been drawn from the recent operation in Granada. We must be sure we draw the right ones, however. Critics have alleged that the lack of prompt naval gunfire support for Army troops against the Cuban forces was an example of inter-Service rivalry or even disdain. Not so. The delay in support was less a matter of unwillingness (the ships were there) or lack of doctrine (it existed), than it was in being able to implement the doctrine. ANGLICO teams for Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison needed to be moved to the correct spot, radios with the right frequency codes had to be on hand, and ground commanders needed to know how to use them. The issue was joint training and interoperability, not joint doctrine. It was also joint planning, a very human factor. The use of a standing joint headquarters might have worked out some of the planning bugs more easily, but the speed and security required of the operation ruled out that option. In short, the procedures existed; knowing how to apply them when needed was unfortunately spotty. Given the complexities of modern
warfare and the rapid turn-over of servicemembers in units, training proficiency can become an extraordinarily perishable commodity. A major challenge for commanders at all levels is ensuring that their units are capable of contending with the variety of tasks combat entails.

Joint and Unified Commanders face this challenge in spades because joint training for units sometimes takes second fiddle behind Service training needs. The annual JCS exercise program involving each CINC and major elements of his forces is a primary vehicle for addressing this need, but since joint exercises are both time consuming and expensive, questions of priority often arise as between Service and joint exercises, and even among joint exercises themselves. When political issues are thrown in, as for example the need to exercise frequently in Southwest Asia, the CINC often feels he has not achieved the degree of joint training and interoperability within his command that he would like.

We have so far covered three key challenges for the CINCs: force planning and allocation, operational control of assigned forces, and the development and application of joint doctrine. A fourth major area of contention relates to resourcing. The forces, the manning levels, the ammunition stocks and supplies, these are all items of Service control because they are Service funded. Thus, from the CINC's point of view, it is he who must fight with the combatant elements of these assets, yet his ability to determine their adequacy has to be filtered through Service needs first. His desire to increase current readiness and sustainability within his theater in the near term may be held hostage to Service plans
for modernization which aim more generally to increase readiness and capability worldwide in the longer term. The Services, for their part, face global not just regional needs, and their programs assume no major war will occur in the next five year period, a feature which impells Service programs toward modernization. Add that to Congressional concerns about where monies are spent—for the most part procurement dollars rather than readiness dollars—and you have a CINC feeling that he fights an uphill battle for resources.

The arbitration in this debate often centers within the Joint Chiefs. The JCS are the focal point because only they, at a level below that of the Secretary of Defense himself, pull together both the administrative and operational issues that must be weighed in any joint resourcing decision. Because of their magnitude, many disagreements spill over into the Office of the Secretary of Defense's arena and more particularly the Defense Resources Board (DRB). This board is the senior board for planning, programming, and budgeting in the Department, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, for the review of planning and resource allocation throughout the Department.

Rest assured I will not try to cover the entire planning, programming, and budgeting system within the next few minutes, but I think it is important to know where and how the CINCs play in it. It is also important to know what changes have been made in recent years to give the CINCs more clout. The decisions, of course, may
still not go their way, but their views are better expressed within the system, and the resource decision are, to that extent, more broadly based. Bringing the CINCs in on resource decisions is another example of checks and balances at work.

It used to be that the CINC's views were heeded more in the planning stages than the programming ones. As the programming phases approached the budget year, the CINC's voice tended to be drowned out in a host of competing views from the key players in Washington. Last minute program changes, the subject of continuous negotiations between OSD and the military departments, left little room for an interested but remote player who did not have his hands on the purse strings. Now, however, the CINCs have increased personal involvement in the near term phases of the programming system.

The CINC's foremost responsibility within the planning and programming system is to establish his requirements for forces based on his mission and the threat. To this end, he provides policy and force recommendations that find their way into the Joint Strategic Planning Document, the annual strategic military advice the Joint Chiefs give to the National Command Authorities. He also provides comments on the subsequent Defense Guidance, the Secretary of Defense's policies for his Department over the next five year program period. About a year and a half ago, each CINC was further tasked to provide an Integrated Priority List of his major concerns relatively early in the programming cycle (before December). In the past, the CINC's issues were worked out with
his respective Service Component Commanders and in turn forwarded back to the military departments for addressal. There was little mechanism to discipline the Services, and the CINC was left on the outside struggling to get his own programs into the comprehensive Service programs.

Now, however, the CINC's proposed solutions to his problem areas must be individually addressed by the Services, and the level of support they give to each must be displayed in a separate annex to the Service program memorandums when they are submitted in May. Then, during the summer program review, the CINCs may address specific deficiencies in Service support for their needs which become the impetus for major issue papers for discussion by the Defense Resource Board. Further, the CINCs make their case personally to the board before the final decisions are rendered by the Deputy Secretary. Later, in the fall, the CINCs again appear personally before the same board to comment on the Defense Guidance.

These personal appeals are supplemented by a quarterly report, instituted a number of years ago, whereby each CINC conveys directly to the Secretary of Defense his major operational and resource concerns. From the CINC's point of view, this very flexible tool has proven of great value.

Apart from these personal representations, the CINC does have a continual friend in court--the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or more particularly, the Chairman. In the process of negotiation with a Service
on a priority item, for the most part a satisfactory compromise can be reached between the CINC and the Service. On those occasions where the CINC believes a Service has not adequately responded to his requirements, he has direct access to the Chairman, or if need be to the Secretary of Defense, but these issues ought normally to be resolved within the Joint Chiefs.

There are times, however, when the issue might bubble up to the Defense Resources Board, and this may pit the Chairman against a Service Secretary or other senior Defense official. Because the Services and the functional agencies of OSD have analytical staffs to support their programs, the Chairman has in the past found himself lacking the ability to meet these opposing arguments on their own terms. And for this reason, a separate staff element was created in 1984 within the Joint Staff to provide the Chairman and the JCS with just such support. The Strategic Plans and Resource Analysis Agency, with about 40 officers assigned, has made a real impact in enhancing the influence of the Chairman in the final deliberations on the Defense Program. It has also sensitized the JCS to a variety of resource issues early in the programming cycle, thereby fostering more informed and timely judgment.

Another very salutary vehicle for helping integrate Service programs has been the recent establishment of the Joint Requirements Management Board. This body, composed of the Vice Chiefs of each Service, has hammered out early inter-Service agreement on equipment requirements for a number of vital cross-Service programs that have had a direct positive

-21-
bearing on the CINC's needs. The JRMB has already allowed some $3-4 billion in life cycle cost savings by early melding of Service programs and will help the CINC's by getting equipment to the field earlier, with fewer logistic complications and more interoperability.

In the programming and budgeting business, the Services are the ones who have the real control because they run the budgets. There are those who believe, then, that the CINC's should get more power to offset Service dominance by having a larger piece of the action themselves—to include having their own staffs and budgets for programs such as readiness, training, and sustainability. Some CINC's have already formed small programming cells within their staffs to handle these issues. There is a danger there, though. Such efforts, certainly if carried too far, suffer from the drawback that the CINC's, too, would be caught up in the web of programming and budgeting to the detriment of their primary war-fighting responsibilities. The CINC's are now the only senior military agents relatively free of the PPBS who can devote their time and energies to operational concerns. They should be concerned less with how their needs will be met than that they be met. They should not be encumbered nor diverted from the essential steadiness of that operational purpose.

Before leaving the subject, I think it is necessary to note the linkage that must and does exist between the obligations of operational and resource allocation authority. No operational commander can afford to overlook the impact of an unwise expenditure of all training munitions or flying hours on a single exercise. Similarly, no Service Chief can
afford to withhold such sensitive Service assets as AWACS from an operational CINC who needs assistance in a crisis. Intelligent, thoughtful communication among the key players resolves most of the problems.

The more we have communication between the operational and resource allocation sides of the establishment, the greater our ability will be to break down barriers to broader understanding and wider perspective. General Vessey made a start at this several years ago when he asked the separate CINCs personally to brief their major war plans to the JCS. These briefings have been subsequently followed up by periodic war games played with the JCS and the CINCs as the key participants. These face-to-face sessions that involved the joint working through of some very tough problems brought the nation's senior military leadership together in a way that staff interchange, no matter how complete, could ever replicate. They have helped close the loop between the CINCs and the Chiefs, as the latter got closer to seeing how their programmed resources were to be used.

The last major area of challenge within the Unified Command System deals with crisis management and the chain of command. In crisis, secure, rapid, and reliable communications have been indispensable both for transmitting orders down to field commanders and for sending reports back up. As these means of communication have become more sophisticated and powerful, there has been a corresponding and growing tendency to maintain direct contact with all of the elements of the chain, not just
those at the immediately adjacent layers. This raises the risk and the temptation for those at the top to bypass the intermediate levels of the chain--including the CINC--and deal with the on-scene commanders.

General W.Y. Smith cites an incident that highlights the dangers in this practice. During the tree-cutting incident in Korea ten years ago, a senior defense official wanted to deal directly with the first lieutenant on the ground with respect to a proposed course of action. Only after some discussion was it made clear that the lieutenant did not control all the necessary resources to make an authoritative recommendation. If the young officer had acted with his small detachment and the affair had ended, that was one thing. But it would have been entirely another had the North Koreans reacted differently and required an escalated response from other U.S. and South Korean forces not under the command of the lieutenant. The U.S. commander in Korea had to plan for that eventuality. After explanation of the risks, the official in question agreed to use the chain of command.

The incident points to the dangers of short-circuiting the chain, because such by-passing can only help create confusion when the prime need at the time is to minimize that. It weakens the authority of the intermediate commanders, the need for whom becomes evident when events multiply in number and increase in complexity so that some devolution of authority becomes absolutely necessary. As the stakes in international crises keep rising, and they are likely to, these dangers must be
recognized in advance and the authority and responsibility of the CINCs not be undercut by too hasty or ill-considered action from the top.

The incident also highlights an organizational issue and the frustration that is sometimes felt because of the many layers of command between the National Command Authorities and the operating forces. Critics charge that these clog the chain so much that any transition from peace to war becomes cumbersome. On the one hand, the Long Commission, investigating the Beirut bombing, noted that the six formal layers in the European Command operational chain above the Marine battalion tended to diffuse authority and responsibility—a major contributing factor in the tragedy. On the other hand, the Desert One debacle pointed out the dangers of having an ad hoc chain stovepiped to the NCA, controlling forces that had never worked together before. I will not develop the topic further at this juncture because each CINC's organization is unique, but you may care to pursue this issue as later presentations warrant.

What the chain must provide for is responsiveness to political direction from the top. Admiral Ike Kidd, while with the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean during one of the recurring Middle East crises in the fall of 1970, received the following urgent message from the Pentagon: "Proceed immediately to the Eastern Med and be prepared to render all possible assistance." He promptly cabled back: "Am proceeding at flank speed. P.S., whose side are we on?"
The Unified Command System is set up to expedite our response to crises worldwide. Each CINC is ready. Washington just has to let him know whose side he is on.

Let me close with the summary slide and then raise a few questions for your consideration. General Wheeler discussed the historical and legal underpinnings of our current Unified Command System, and then outlined their structural and geographical relationships. I followed with the basic responsibilities of the CINCs and some of the challenges they face. (Pause)

The final question I would leave with you is this: by what criteria should we assess the structure and performance of the system? Should it be by the degree of civilian control over the military? This, you may recall was an issue during the Cuban Missile Crisis when Secretary of Defense McNamara broke tradition to extend himself down to the details of how naval vessels would enforce the blockade. Should it be by demonstrated unity of effort, and if so, how should that best be achieved? To put that another way, when is decentralization to the Services more effective than centralizing authority at the joint level? To what extent should cost and efficiency be a criterion in peacetime when our job is to be prepared for and effective in war? Certainly the Unified Command structure could stand some changes, and President Eisenhower spelled out the desired goal. But responsible proposals for change should flow from deeper understanding of what it is and how it works today— the essence of what this conference is all about.
You may care to raise some of these issues during the next several days, but certainly in the meantime, General Wheeler and I would be happy to entertain any questions.
The National Defense University

THE UNIFIED COMMAND SYSTEM

MAJOR GENERAL AL WHEELER

COLONEL POWELL HUTTON
THE UNIFIED COMMAND SYSTEM

BACKGROUND
— HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE
— LEGAL (1947 AND 1958 ACTS)

STRUCTURE
— ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
— GEOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT

CINC's RESPONSIBILITIES

CHALLENGES FACING CINCS
— FORCE PLANNING AND ALLOCATION
— OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ASSIGNED FORCES
— DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF JOINT DOCTRINE
— RESOURCE ALLOCATION
— CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND THE CHAIN OF COMMAND
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER
ON UNIFIED COMMAND

APRIL 5, 1958

"...SEPARATE GROUND, SEA, AND AIR WARFARE IS GONE FOREVER. IF EVER AGAIN WE SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN WAR WE WILL FIGHT IT IN ALL ELEMENTS, WITH ALL SERVICES, AS ONE SINGLE CONCENTRATED EFFORT. PEACETIME PREPARATORY AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY MUST CONFORM TO THIS FACT. STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL PLANNING MUST BE COMPLETELY UNIFIED, COMBAT FORCES ORGANIZED INTO UNIFIED COMMANDS, ...SINGLY LED AND PREPARED TO FIGHT AS ONE, REGARDLESS OF SERVICE."

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS
PROPOSING REVISIONS TO
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
THE CHAINS OF COMMAND

**ADMINISTRATIVE**
- DEPT OF THE ARMY
- DEPT OF THE NAVY
- DEPT OF THE AIR FORCE

**OPERATIONAL**
- JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
  - STRATEGIC AIR CMD
  - MILITARY AIRLIFT CMD
  - AEROSPACE* DEFENSE CMD

**SPECIFIED**
- OPERATING FORCES ASSIGNED TO U+S CMD

**UNIFIED**
- EUROPEAN CMD
  - CENTRAL CMD
  - ATLANTIC CMD
  - READINESS CMD
- SOUTHERN CMD
- PACIFIC CMD
- SPACE CMD

*SCHEDULED TO BE INACTIVATED IN 1986. MISSIONS TO BE SUBSUMED IN US SPACE CMD.
END FILMED

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