"PEACETIME CONFLICT: REALITIES OF WAR"

ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY
WINTER SYMPOSIUM
28 FEBRUARY 1986

By:

General John R. Galvin, USA
Commander in Chief
U.S. Southern Command

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AS THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND, I AM PLEASED TO BE ABLE TO SHARE WITH YOU - WHAT I KNOW ABOUT THE COMMAND AND HOW IT RESPONDS TO A VERY COMPLEX REGION - A REGION COMMONLY REFERENCED AS OUR "STRATEGIC SOUTHERN FLANK."

AS YOU KNOW, LATIN AMERICA IS A PLACE OF SIGNIFICANT CONTRADICTIONS: OF TREMENDOUS PERSONAL WEALTH AND CRUSHING POVERTY; OF GREAT PERSONAL WARMTH AND STAGGERING BRUTALITY; OF STRONG NATIONAL PRIDE AND CONTINUING DEPENDENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE; AND FOR US, THE UNITED STATES, IT IS A REGION OF TREMENDOUS PROMISE AND GREAT CHALLENGE. I MAKE THESE COMPARISONS BECAUSE I AM STRUCK BY HOW LITTLE WE, AS AMERICANS, KNOW ABOUT LATIN AMERICA AND WHAT WE, AS A NATION, ARE DOING THERE.

NEW YORK TIMES/CBS POLL - MAY 1985

26% Knew that the U.S. supported the guerrillas in Nicaragua
6% Said the U.S. supported the current Sandinista government
68% Said they had not been following the situation and did not know who the U.S. supported

TWO YEARS AGO - ONLY 2% OF A SIMILAR SURVEY KNEW WHERE EL SALVADOR WAS. I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE APPARENT LACK OF UNDERSTANDING ABOUT THIS REGION . . . .

MYTH

The United States is only seeking a military solution to the problems in Central America... a solution that involves the direct commitment of U.S. combat forces into Central America.

AND WANT TO BEGIN BY DISSPELLING, FROM THE OUTSET, THE WIDELY HELD MYTH THAT YOU SEE ON THE SCREEN . . . NOTHING COULD BE FURTHER FROM THE TRUTH. WE EMPHASIZE COMMITMENT TO NATION BUILDING, STABILITY, AND MILITARY SELF-SUFFICIENCY. THE DIRECT COMMITMENT OF UNITED STATES COMBATANTS INTO CENTRAL AMERICA WOULD BE COUNTER TO OUR STRATEGY OF HELPING LATIN AMERICANS TO FIND FOR THEMSELVES THE SOLUTIONS TO THEIR PROBLEMS.
WITH OUR HEADQUARTERS IN PANAMA, USSOUTHCOM IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES ON THE LAND MASS OF LATIN AMERICA, SOUTH OF MEXICO. ALTHOUGH MEXICO IS NOT WITHIN OUR AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY, THE COMMAND DOES HAVE SECURITY ASSISTANCE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THIS COUNTRY.

![Diagram of USSOUTHCOM's organization structure]

OUR COMMAND IS ORGANIZED IN A TRADITIONAL WAY -- THROUGH THREE SERVICE COMPONENTS. BY WAY OF COMPARISON TO THE OTHER UNIFIED COMMANDS, OUR HEADQUARTERS IS THE SMALLEST OF THE UNIFIED COMMAND HEADQUARTERS WITH AN AUTHORIZED MILITARY STRENGTH OF 306. OUR TOTAL MILITARY FORCE CONSISTS OF SOME NINE THOUSAND MEN AND WOMEN, WHO ARE AUGMENTED WITH EIGHT THOUSAND CIVILIANS. WE ALSO HAVE A STANDING JOINT TASK FORCE IN HONDURAS THAT PROVIDES SUPPORT FOR THE EXERCISES THAT WE CONDUCT WITH THE HONDURAN ARMED FORCES. WE MAINTAIN MILITARY LIAISON OFFICES IN 16 LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. THESE MEN NOT ONLY WORK WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE U.S. AMBASSADORS, BUT WITH THE HOST COUNTRY'S ARMED FORCES TO BUILD DEFENSE COOPERATION, STRONGER MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS, AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY.
SLIDE: SUBMARINE IN LOCKS

SMALL IN NUMBER, WE CONTENT WITH REGIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES THAT EXTEND WELL BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL AND WELL KNOWN MISSION OF THE DEFENSE OF THE PANAMA CANAL.

MISSIONS

* COMMAND/CONTROL OF U.S. FORCES
* PREPARE CONTINGENCY PLANS
* CONDUCT TRAINING/OPERATIONS
* SUPPORT U.S. COUNTRY TEAMS
* MONITOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
* PROMOTE REGIONAL SECURITY/DEVELOPMENT
* DEFEND THE PANAMA CANAL

THE BREADTH OF OUR WORK IS SEEN IN THIS SUMMARY OF OUR FUNCTIONAL MISSIONS. IF THESE RESPONSIBILITIES AND OTHER TASKS WERE CONDENSED INTO A SIMPLE STATEMENT, OUR MISSION WOULD BE: TO SECURE THE SOUTHERN FLANK OF THE UNITED STATES, AND TO BE PREPARED TO FULFILL OUR OBLIGATIONS TO OUR ALLIES. WE CAN DO THIS BY STRENGTHENING OUR FRIENDS AND BUILDING A MORE STABLE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.

PRESIDENT REAGAN

"The stability of our Latin friends - Indeed, the security of our borders - depends upon which type of society prevails - the imperfect democracy seeking to improve or the communist dictatorship seeking to expand."

(During March 24, 1984 radio address)

INDEED, THE PRESIDENT HAS RECOGNIZED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REGION TO U.S. INTERESTS AND HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THESE CHALLENGES CANNOT GO UNANSWERED.
LATAM - STRATEGICALLY VITAL TO THE U.S.

- Significant market for U.S. exports
- 40% of U.S. petroleum imports come from regional oil fields and refineries
- 45% U.S. seaborne traffic transits Latin American waters
- 60% of reinforcements for NATO would transit Latin American waters
- Source of strategic minerals

LATIN AMERICA IS A MAJOR TRADING PARTNER WITH THE UNITED STATES; LAST YEAR, U.S. EXPORTS TO THIS REGION WERE GREATER THAN OUR EXPORTS TO JAPAN AND WERE ABOUT HALF OF OUR EXPORTS TO WESTERN EUROPE . . . ABOUT 1/3 OF U.S. INVESTMENTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD ARE LOCATED IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN.

LATIN AMERICA IS ALSO A LEADING SOURCE OF CRITICAL RAW MATERIALS. FOR THESE REASONS, THE SECURITY OF OUR REGION AFFECTS OUR ECONOMIC VITALITY AND WORLD INFLUENCE: IF MORE U.S. FORCES WERE REQUIRED TO PROTECT AMERICA'S SOUTHERN FLANK, OUR SUPPORT OF OTHER GLOBAL COMMITMENTS WOULD SUFFER.

TODAY, NINE OF THE COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, 50% OF LATIN AMERICA, ARE CONFRONTED WITH ACTIVE INSURGENCIES, LITERALLY AT WAR WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF THESE COUNTRIES AND DEDICATED TO THEIR DESTRUCTION.
THERE ARE FRIENDS AND ALLIES IN OUR REGION WHO ARE FIGHTING AND DYING TODAY TO RESIST THE PERSISTENT EFFORTS TO DESTABILIZE THEIR COUNTRIES.

THESE INSURGENCIES ARE NOT OPEN WARS OF GLOBAL CONFRONTATION, BUT SERIOUS CONFLICTS THAT ARE SUPPORTED BY THE SOVIETS AND CUBA TO ACHIEVE THE SAME OBJECTIVE: TO REDUCE THE GLOBAL INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES AND TO PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL MARXISM AND MARXIST GOVERNMENTS.

ISSUES

* Economic development
* Externally supported insurgencies - terrorism
* Drug production and smuggling

COUNTERING THIS COMMUNIST EFFORT WE HAVE THE NATIONAL AIMS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OUR REGIONAL ALLIES. OUR STRATEGY IS AFFECTED BY THREE MAJOR ISSUES.

THE POVERTY IN THESE SLIDES REPRESENT THE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM FACING LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS: THE CONDITION OF THEIR ECONOMIES.

LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS FACE A SERIOUS LONG-TERM CHALLENGE. AS YOU CAN SEE THERE ISN'T A COUNTRY IN LATIN AMERICA THAT HAS HAD ECONOMIC GROWTH IN PROPORTION TO ITS POPULATION'S GROWTH. BY COMPARISON, THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, AND WEST GERMANY HAD PER CAPITA GROWTH RATES OF 18 TO 34 PER CENT OVER THE SAME PERIOD. THE REGION'S UNEMPLOYMENT IS EXPECTED TO BE CLOSE TO 46% THIS YEAR, WHILE THE UNITED STATES EXPECTS UNEMPLOYMENT TO BE CLOSE TO 7%.
REMEMBER WHAT INFLATION RATES OF 13% DID TO THE AMERICAN ECONOMY? COMPARE THAT TO BOLIVIA'S INFLATION OF 15,000% IN 1985. BOLIVIA'S AUSTERITY PROGRAMS HAVE BROKEN THE INFLATIONARY SPIRAL. NOW BOLIVIA HAS TO RECOVER FROM BEING THE FOURTH WORST CASE OF HYPERINFLATION IN THIS CENTURY, RANKING BEHIND: GREECE (1946), WEIMAR REPUBLIC (1923), AND RUSSIA (1917).

### LATAM FOREIGN DEBT

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<th>Percent</th>
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<td>20.7</td>
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### TOTAL FOREIGN DEBT: $272.6 Billion

SHARPLY RISING INTEREST RATES, WEAK MARKETS AND INCREASED DEFICIT SPENDING IN THE 70's HAVE CAUSED A SIGNIFICANT ACCUMULATION OF EXTERNAL DEBT. LATIN AMERICA'S SHARE OF THE GLOBAL EXTERNAL DEBT IS 45%.

Because their debt obligations are out of balance with their earnings, these countries have to pursue economic stabilization programs that are necessary but not well received by their populations. The region's poverty, widespread unemployment, and stagnant economies provide fertile climates for discontent and Soviet supported opportunism. Every democratic nation in the region has made it clear that economic recovery cannot be divorced from internal security and stability.
FOR DECADES, LATIN AMERICA HAS FACED INSURGENCIES AND BANDITRY. OVER THE YEARS, THESE GROUPS LACKED THE TRAINING AND RESOURCES TO SUSTAIN OPERATIONS, AND THE THREAT REMAINED MANAGEABLE.

TODAY, THE SITUATION HAS CHANGED, AND CHANGED RADICALLY. SINCE 1960, FIDEL CASTRO HAS TRAINED LATIN AMERICANS IN SUBVERSION AND INTERNATIONAL REVOLUTION. RETURNING FROM CAMPS IN CUBA, THE INSURGENTS HAVE WORKED TO DESTABILIZE THEIR HOMELANDS.

INSURGENT GROUPS NOW SHARE COMMON MISSIONS, GOALS, AND OBJECTIVES, AND HAVE BEGUN TO REORGANIZE THEIR INDIVIDUAL GROUPS UNDER COMMON UMBRELLA ORGANIZATIONS THAT PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL LINKAGES AND SUPPORT NETWORKS.

**INGREDIENTS FOR INSURGENCY**

- Poor, vulnerable populations
- Trained insurgent leadership – hard core ideology in the "field"
- Extensive external support
  - Arms
  - International political image
NOW, INSURGENT GROUPS HAVE ALL THE INGREDIENTS FOR REVOLUTION. THE CUBANS, WHILE INITIALLY UNSUCCESSFUL, HAVE GAINED A CLEAR APPRECIATION FOR HOW TO BUILD CONDITIONS FOR REVOLUTION. THEIR EFFORTS ARE FOCUSED ON THE LONG TERM. THE SANDINISTA REVOLUTION TOOK 15 YEARS TO BUILD.

**PREDICTION OF JOAQUIN VILLALOBOS**

"The United States will eventually become tired of its involvement (in El Salvador) .... The prolongation of the war favors us (the insurgents)."  

(Villalobos, a Salvadoran guerrilla leader, made prediction during a July 1985 interview.)

THIS PREDICTION NOT ONLY REFLECTS THE INSURGENT'S VIEW, BUT, CHARACTERIZES HOW MANY LATIN AMERICANS FEEL ABOUT THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO LATIN AMERICA .... OUR ASSISTANCE FOR THE REGION MUST CONTINUE AT SUBSTANTIAL LEVELS TO HELP LATIN AMERICA MOVE TOWARD SUSTAINED DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT AND NATIONAL WELL-BEING.

*U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO LATIN AMERICA*

BUT WHAT HAS ACTUALLY HAPPENED? .... DURING THE 1970’S THE UNITED STATES ALL BUT STOPPED SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN THIS HEMISPHERE. THE 88 PEOPLE APPROVED FOR 1986 ARE FOR 16 COUNTRIES.

SLIDE: SU-22

COUNTRIES LIKE PERU HAVE TURNED TO OTHER SOURCES OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT. LATIN AMERICA PURCHASED 6.3 BILLION DOLLARS IN ARMS, BETWEEN 1980 AND 1985, FROM COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE U.S. IN MANY COUNTRIES TODAY, IT IS RARE TO FIND AN OFFICER WHO CAN SAY THAT, 10 YEARS AGO, HE WAS IN THE UNITED STATES FOR INFANTRY TRAINING AT FORT BENNING OR FLIGHT TRAINING IN FLORIDA OR TEXAS. THE CAREER-MINDED PERUVIAN ARMY AND AIR FORCE CAPTAINS ARE LEARNING TO SPEAK RUSSIAN.
YOU CAN SEE FOR YOURSELF WHAT THE SOVIET AND CUBAN RESPONSE TO OUR WITHDRAWAL HAS BEEN.

**LENIN'S REMARKS AFTER RUSSIAN REVOLUTION**

"Conflict is inevitable .... It is inconceivable that communism and capitalism can exist side by side; inevitably one must perish."

(1917)

LENIN'S REMARKS, 69 YEARS AGO, SUMMARIZE SOVIET INTENTIONS TODAY. IN THE PAST 15 YEARS, THE GROWTH OF THE SOVIET MILITARY HAS PERMITTED THE PROJECTION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE INTO THE THIRD WORLD.

IN OUR HEMISPHERE THE SOVIETS HAVE BECOME MUCH MORE OPPORTUNISTIC. THEY HAVE PURSUED EVERY OPENING, EVERY CHANCE TO PROMOTE DYNAMIC DESTABILIZATION FROM CHILE TO MEXICO BY USING ANY MEANS AVAILABLE. BEFORE 1959, THE SOVIETS HAD DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN ONLY THREE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES; NOW THEY HAVE MISSIONS IN ALL BUT SIX. WE ARE N'T AGAINST SOVIET DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND DIALOGUE, BUT SUCH PRESENCE, WE HAVE LEARNED, BRINGS ALONG A LOT OF UNWANTED BAGGAGE SUCH AS THE KGB OPERATIVES AND THE SOVIET MILITARY. THE SOVIETS HAVE SELECTIVELY PICKED THEIR LATIN AMERICAN CLIENTS, AND WITH OVERWHELMING MILITARY ASSISTANCE HAVE ENABLED THEM TO BUILD FORTIFIED STATES FROM WHICH THEY CAN EXPAND INTERNATIONAL MARXISM.
WITH MASSIVE MILITARY AID, THE SOVIETS HAVE FORTIFIED CUBA. CUBA HAS MORE PEOPLE UNDER ARMS THAN BRAZIL, A COUNTRY THAT IS ALMOST AS LARGE AS THE UNITED STATES AND HAS 13 TIMES CUBA'S POPULATION. CUBA HAS THE LARGEST MILITARY FORCE IN LATIN AMERICA.

THE SOVIETS HAVE LEARNED THEIR LESSONS IN CUBA. NICARAGUA, FROM ITS POSITION IN THE MIDDLE OF CENTRAL AMERICA, HAS DIRECT ACCESS TO ITS NEIGHBORS.

NICARAGUA SERVES AS A SANCTUARY AND SOURCE OF SUPPORT FOR CENTRAL AMERICAN INSURGENCIES, WHO NEED THE ARMS THAT FLOW FROM CUBA, LIBYA, VIETNAM, AND EASTERN BLOC NATIONS.
THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF NICARAGUAN SUPPORTED INSURGENCIES IN EL SALVADOR ALONE ARE SEVERE. IN THE LAST TWO YEARS, EL SALVADOR HAS LOST $4.82 MILLION IN COFFEE, COTTON, AND SUGAR; TEN CRITICAL BRIDGES ARE STILL DOWN; AND OVER 1100 TELEPHONE POLES WERE DESTROYED IN 1985 ALONE.

NICARAGUA HAS ALSO UNDERGONE A SIGNIFICANT ARMS BUILDUP TO BECOME, UNEQUIVOCALLY, THE LARGEST CONVENTIONAL MILITARY FORCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

COMPARISON OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES

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<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>24</td>
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BY ANY STANDARD, SANDINISTA FORCES EXCEED ANY DEFENSIVE REQUIREMENTS. EL SALVADOR IS FIGHTING FOR ITS OWN SURVIVAL, COSTA RICA DOES NOT EVEN HAVE A STANDING MILITARY, AND THE ARMED FORCES OF HONDURAS ARE SMALL.

SLIDE: T-55 TANK: NICARAGUA

IN FACT, NOT ONE NICARAGUAN NEIGHBOR (ES, HO, CS) HAS A SINGLE TANK. AS A FORTIFIED STATE, NICARAGUA HAS FACILITIES, AS DOES CUBA, THAT COULD BE USED IN A CRISIS TO RESTRICT OUR ECONOMIC ACCESS TO LATIN AMERICA.
NOW, I WOULD LIKE TO SHIFT OUR FOCUS TO FOUR SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES. THESE COUNTRIES GROW 90% OF THE COCAINE THAT IS SOLD IN THE UNITED STATES. COLOMBIA WAS ALSO THE LARGEST PRODUCER OF MARIJUANA FOR 1984 AND IS EXPECTED TO HOLD THIS RANKING FOR 1985. DRUG SMUGGLERS FROM THESE COUNTRIES SOLD 100 BILLION DOLLARS IN DRUGS, IN THE UNITED STATES LAST YEAR.

HOWEVER, THESE COUNTRIES ARE BEGINNING TO REALIZE THAT DRUGS ARE NOT ONLY AN AMERICAN PROBLEM. THE "CAMPESINOS" GROW DRUGS TO COMPENSATE FOR THEIR COUNTRY'S LOW INCOMES, WIDESPREAD POVERTY, AND HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT. THE RESULTING NARCOTRAFFICANT PROFITS PROMOTE GROWING LINKAGES TO INSURGENTS, WHO PROTECT THE PRODUCTION AND TRANSPORTATION OF DRUGS IN RETURN FOR ARMS AND SUPPLIES TO FURTHER DESTABILIZE THE ECONOMY. THUS, LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS FACE A DILEMMA THAT DOES NOT HAVE AN EASY ANSWER . . . SINCE DRUG ERADICATION INCREASES THE ALIENATION OF THEIR POPULATIONS, AND CONTINUED DRUG PRODUCTION INCREASES INSURGENT DESTABILIZATION OF THE COUNTRY.

SLIDE: SANDINISTA OFFICIAL LOADING

THIS SLIDE SHOWS ANOTHER DIMENSION TO THIS PROBLEM. THE SCENE IS NICARAGUA. THE SECOND MAN FROM THE RIGHT IS FEDERICO VAUGHN. HE IS A SENIOR ASSISTANT TO THOMAS BORGE, THE SANDINISTA MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR. HE IS LOADING BALES OF MARIJUANA INTO AN AIRCRAFT BOUND FOR THE U.S. HE HIGHLIGHTS THE CORRUPTION AND GREED THAT IS A PROBLEM FOR DEVELOPING GOVERNMENTS -- AND THE INCREASING DRUG INVOLVEMENT OF NICARAGUA TO PROMOTE INSURGENCIES THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA. THIS GORDIAN KNOT DOES NOT HAVE A SIMPLE ANSWER FOR ANYONE.
The problems that we face in Latin America are not going to disappear overnight. Despite the efforts of our adversaries, we have seen positive improvements in our hemisphere since our retrenchment in the 1970's. There are only three military dominated governments in Latin America.

Slide: LATAM-U.S. Troops Training

Our help is being sought in a variety of military areas such as counter terrorism and civil-military relations. Latin Americans want to help themselves and are concerned with their insurgencies and the growing Soviet influence in this hemisphere. El Salvador has begun to control its insurgency and experienced some economic growth in 1984 (1.4%), the first time since the Sandinista Revolution in 1979. While this is encouraging, the Salvadoran population growth of 2.7% negates their economic growth on a per capita basis and the country is still far from overcoming the insurgency and the attendant economic attrition.
I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THE MEANS THAT WE USE TO IMPLEMENT OUR REGIONAL STRATEGY. FIRST OF ALL, SECURITY ASSISTANCE IS FUNDAMENTAL TO STRENGTHENING OUR REGION, WHERE ECONOMIES ARE INCAPABLE OF SUPPORTING EFFECTIVE MILITARY PROGRAMS TO COUNTER STRONG ACTIVE INSURGENCIES. YET THERE IS NO ASPECT OF OUR RESOURCES OVER WHICH WE HAVE LESS CONTROL.

THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE THAT IS ALLOCATED TO LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES IS LESS THAN OUR SHARE OF THE LAND MASSES ASSIGNED TO UNIFIED COMMANDS. (5% VS 20%), AND IT IS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR A COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL PROGRAM.

BECAUSE OF THE INTENSITY OF THE PROBLEM IN CENTRAL AMERICA, 81% OF THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE APPROVED FOR LATIN AMERICA IN FY 85 WENT TO TWO COUNTRIES: EL SALVADOR AND HONDURAS. THIS FISCAL YEAR IS NO DIFFERENT.
EIGHT LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES ARE SPECIFICALLY AFFECTED BY SECURITY ASSISTANCE LEGISLATION. HERE ARE JUST A FEW EXAMPLES OF THESE SANCTIONS -- SANCTIONS THAT COMPLICATE THE PURSUIT OF OUR MILITARY STRATEGY. IN THE CASE OF BRAZIL, THE MOST STRATEGICALLY SIGNIFICANT COUNTRY IN SOUTH AMERICA, MILITARY OR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IS PROHIBITED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE GLENN-SYMINGTON AMENDMENT. THUS, I MUST RELY ON PERSONAL DIALOGUE AND EXERCISES TO BUILD OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH BRAZIL.

SLIDE: OLD P-51

WE NEED TO GET AWAY FROM THE IDEA THAT SECURITY ASSISTANCE SERVES AS A "RUMMAGE SALE" FOR EXCESS INVENTORIES OF OBSOLETE EQUIPMENT. NOT ONLY HAVE WE ELIMINATED THE EXCESSES FROM THE KOREAN AND VIETNAM WARS -- BUT THE UNITED STATES, BECAUSE OF ITS TECHNICAL SOPHISTICATION AND CONVENTIONAL FORCE ORIENTATION, CAN NO LONGER BE OF MUCH MATERIAL HELP TO ANY THIRD WORLD MILITARY WHO IS WRESTLING WITH AN ACTIVE INSURGENCY, DRUG CONTROLS, AND A MARGINAL MILITARY BUDGET. WE DO, HOWEVER, HAVE OPPORTUNITIES TO HELP THESE COUNTRIES ACQUIRE THE UNIQUE EQUIPMENT THAT THEY NEED TO FIGHT LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT ON THEIR OWN. LET ME USE THREE EXAMPLES TO ILLUSTRATE MY POINT.

15
Latin America is predominantly an enormous expanse of wilderness that requires the extensive use of helicopters and aircraft with longer ranges who are also capable of using very short dirt strips. Latin American militaries need these aircraft to deliver and sustain forces capable of attacking remote insurgent camps. Yet our smallest tactical transport, the C-130, is limited to 3% of the available runways in Latin America. There are over 1300 airfields with runways that do not exceed 1500 ft. Runways that Latin American militaries cannot use with American aircraft. Could we, or in cooperation with another major industrialized country, build a third world airlifter that would be simple, easily crewed and maintained, and capable of operating from these short, rough fields? One that could compete in a third world market.

A similar problem is seen in the lack of Latin American brown-water navy capabilities. Insurgents, terrorists, drug smugglers and other destabilizing groups in the third world use coastal and river routes for mobility and logistics. Conversely, friendly governments in Latin America are often least prepared to deal with these threats to their internal security. Their defense developments have historically focused on ground and air forces so that they do not have the experience nor the facilities to independently develop the brown-water forces that they presently need.

We have recently seen in El Salvador two examples of simple transfers of technology that have boosted Salvadoran self-sufficiency: durable boot soles and canned field rations. The Salvadorans bought the equipment from the United States with assistance funds, to make boots so that their soldiers could go on extended patrols over very rough terrain. They have also sought ways to prepare rations so that they could operate without confiscating their food from
LOCAL CIVILIANS. THE RECENT IMPROVEMENTS IN HIGH TEMPERATURE PASTEURIZATION THAT ENABLE US TO KEEP WHOLE, FRESH MILK, UNREFRIGERATED FOR SIX MONTHS IS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS, OR LIGHT INDUSTRIES THAT COULD BE MOVED TO CENTRAL AMERICA.

SLIDE: LATIN TROOPS READY TO JUMP

THE INCREASED PRESENCE OF U.S. MILITARY FORCES HAS PROVEN OUR WILLINGNESS AND CAPACITY TO SUPPORT OUR FRIENDS IN HONDURAS AND HAS DETERRED SANDINISTA AGGRESSION. BUT THIS PRESENCE DOES NOT HAVE TO BE A FULLY CONFIGURED BATTLE GROUP OFF THE COAST OF A LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY, OR THE DEPLOYMENT OF A TASK ORGANIZED BRIGADE.

SLIDE: SOLDIER WITH CHILD

IN TERMS OF HEARTENING BELEAGURED FRIENDS, THERE HAVE BEEN TIMES WHEN THE DEPLOYMENT OF A "HUMBLE" COMBAT ENGINEER COMPANY, OR A HANDFUL OF DOCTORS, DENTISTS, OR A DETACHMENT OF UTILITY HELICOPTERS HAVE BEEN MORE EFFECTIVE THAN ANY LARGE SHOW-OF-FORCE.

SLIDE: ENGINEERS BUILDING BRIDGE

OUR EXERCISE AND TRAINING DEPLOYMENTS PROVIDE REALISTIC TRAINING FOR ALL PARTIES AND INCREASES OUR PRESENCE IN THE REGION.

SLIDE: CLIMBING COMMUNICATOR

THE PARTICIPANTS ARE SOMETIMES NO MORE THAN COMMUNICATIONS OR ARTILLERY DETACHMENTS THAT ARE TRAINING WITH A COMPARABLE LATIN AMERICAN UNIT, OR THEY CAN INVOLVE MORE THAN A BATALLION.

SLIDE: CAMOUFLAGED TROOPS

EACH DEPLOYMENT IS SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO USE OUR CAPABILITIES EFFECTIVELY AND WISELY FOR MUTUAL OBJECTIVES. THE LIMITED STAFF SIZE AND SMALL OPERATING BUDGETS IN MANY LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES CONSTRAIN WHAT CAN BE PLANNED AND SUPPORTED AS BILATERAL TRAINING.
THESE COMBAT ENGINEERS ARE A VERY GOOD EXAMPLE. THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD WAS DEPLOYED TO PANAMA LAST SUMMER IN INCREMENTAL GROUPS FOR TRAINING WITH THE PANAMANIAN DEFENSE FORCE IN AN ISOLATED AREA OF PANAMA. THE EXERCISE WAS A TREMENDOUS SUCCESS. IT INCREASED THE GUARD'S READINESS UNDER REALISTIC CONDITIONS, IMPROVED OUR ABILITY TO CONDUCT BILATERAL PROJECTS WITH OTHER FORCES, AND PROVIDED A SUBSTANTIAL BENEFIT TO THE LOCAL PANAMANIANS, WHO ONLY HAD ANIMAL TRAILS TO GET TO ANY ROAD.

WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO EXPAND OUR EXERCISE PROGRAM TO INCLUDE 60% OF OUR REGION IN SOME KIND OF ANNUAL EXERCISE. IN SEVERAL CASES, EXERCISES AND DEPLOYMENTS ARE THE ONLY MEANS AVAILABLE TO BUILD RELATIONS AND IMPROVE OUR ABILITY TO WORK TOGETHER.

FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS ARE FAR MORE THAN CHARITY. THEY ARE INTEGRATED INTO OUR EXERCISE PROGRAMS TO PROVIDE LOW COST WAYS TO: TRAIN IN A REALISTIC ENVIRONMENT, INCREASE COUNTRY TO COUNTRY RELATIONS, PROVIDE A ROLE MODEL FOR HOST COUNTRY MILITARIES, USE BILATERAL PROJECTS TO IMPROVE CONDITIONS AND COUNTER INSURGENCIES, AND INCREASE OUR PRESENCE AS A SIGNAL OF REGIONAL COMMITMENT.
MEDICAL READINESS TRAINING EXERCISE BENEFITS

- Realistic training in tropical medicine, environment
- Improves accessibility of intelligence - medical and other
- Enhances goodwill and mutual understanding
- Assists local officials with recommendations for their public health programs

SLIDE: TROPICAL DENTAL CARE

MEDICAL READINESS TRAINING EXERCISES PROVIDE MEDICAL CIVIC ACTION WHILE ENHANCING THE SKILL AND EXPERIENCE OF THE MILITARY PARTICIPANTS. HERE IS A QUICK EXAMPLE OF SOME OF OUR BILATERAL TRAINING IN LATIN AMERICA . . . .

SLIDE: MEDRETE OFFLOAD

WHERE WE LEARN TO DEPLOY EFFECTIVELY . . . .

SLIDE: WATER QUALITY ASSESSMENT

ARE CONFRONTED WITH REAL TROPICAL PROBLEMS - LIKE WATER QUALITY . . . .

SLIDE: PARASITE SURVEY

PARASITES . . . .

SLIDE: TREATMENT OF TROPICAL DISEASES

AND OTHER DISEASES.

TRANSLATION OF SANDINISTA MEDICAL POSTER

WHEN YOU ARE PRESENTED WITH THESE SYMPTOMS

HEADACHE  CHILLS

Fever  Fatigue

PAIRS IN YOUR JOINTS

REPORT IMMEDIATELY TO AN ACHU MEDICAL STATION, OR NEAREST MEDICAL HELP

TO RECEIVE ATTENTION AND PROTECT YOUR HEALTH

THE SANDINISTA REVOLUTION IS HEALTH
This Sandinista poster was found in Belize during a MEDRETE: it identifies symptoms of malaria. As you can see from the translation, we are not the only ones who feel that medicine is one of the least expensive, cost-effective ways to sway a population that has not had adequate medical care. We have expanded the medical units under USSOUTHCOM and promote this training because we have seen how far small amounts of military medicine can go towards promoting internal defense and popular support.

Slide: Map study

U.S. Intelligence sharing can provide mutually beneficial information and allow friendly nations to handle their security threats on the local level. I am speaking about the sort of detailed intelligence that Washington rarely requires - but intelligence that a county team, a CINC, or a friendly nation might find very valuable in planning an operation. In order to accomplish this we need to rebuild unilateral intelligence and associated communication structures in Latin America and the Caribbean that can collect, process and disseminate information and, we need to assist friendly nations in the development of appropriate force structures to respond to the intelligence provided.

The 1970's witnessed a ninety percent reduction in Latin American military liaison personnel. They have been reduced to the extent that they only have time to serve as administrative conduits for their host military's request for budgeted military assistance. They are not able to get out and develop a broader foundation for revitalizing the military to military interfaces that were lost during the 1970's.
VISITS SUCH AS MG EN CANTERBURY'S VISIT WITH THE ECUADORANS IS ONE WAY THAT WE COMPENSATE FOR THE REDUCTIONS IN MILITARY LIAISON OFFICE MANNING. OUR DIALOGUE TAKES MANY OTHER FORMS, FROM SUPPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN ARMIES TO A VARIETY OF PERSONNEL AND SMALL UNIT EXCHANGES THAT CAN LAST FROM SEVERAL WEEKS TO SEVERAL YEARS. OUR CIVIC ACTION SEMINARS HAVE BROUGHT OFFICERS FROM THE REGION'S MILITARIES TOGETHER, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN SOME CASES, TO DISCUSS PROBLEMS THAT THEY ALL SHARE. WE ARE CONTINUING TO EXPLORE ADDITIONAL WAYS TO INCREASE THE QUALITY AND DEPTH OF OUR RELATIONS AND TO EXCHANGE IDEAS ON SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS THAT I HAVE MENTIONED TODAY.

I AM CONVINCED THAT WE ARE HEADED IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. BUT I DO NOT SEE A QUICK OR EASY ANSWER. LATIN AMERICANS ARE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN RESPONDING TO THEIR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, INSURGENCIES AND DRUG TRAFFICKING.

THE UNITED STATES HAS MADE SOME PROGRESS SINCE 1979. BUT WE MUST BE RESOLVED TO STRENGTHENING OUR ALLIES AND SUSTAINING THIS COMMITMENT WHILE WE HELP LATIN AMERICANS WORK ON THEIR SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS THAT I HAVE TOUCHED ON. A SMALL INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA TODAY WILL NOT COMPARE TO WHAT WILL BE REQUIRED LATER ON IF WE DON'T STABILIZE THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.
END

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