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STUDENT REPORT

THE PROBLEM OF ACCOUNTABILITY
IN THE MILITARY PROFESSION

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TITLE THE PROBLEM OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE MILITARY PROFESSION

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Recent critics of the US military charge the military officers with being unaccountable for all the post-Vietnam failures in military operations. This article analyzes organizational and professional developments since 1945 that have made it difficult to hold officers accountable for their failures. The major thesis of this article is that accountability has been seriously jeopardized by an organizational contradiction between the unified commands and the military services. This contradiction violates the principle of unity of command. Coupled with shortcomings in professional ethics, training, and knowledge, this contradiction has confused the lines of authority in the military organization, leading to a lack of accountability. Recommendations are made to reform the unified and specified command structure.
My interest in this study on accountability in the military profession was generated by Lt. Col. Norton A. Schwartz, USAF, of Plans and Operations, at Headquarters US Air Force. As the sponsor of this study, he set up the guidelines for the initial research and analysis of the problem. I am grateful for his suggestions and comments on earlier drafts. I am also grateful to Cdr. Brent L. Gravatt, USN, for his ideas, advice, and comments on earlier drafts, which he provided throughout my stay at Air Command and Staff College.

Subject to clearance, this manuscript will be submitted to ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY for consideration. Consequently, this manuscript follows that journal's current style, which is based on the University of Chicago MANUAL OF STYLE.
Major Bernard J. Pieczynski flew C-130s in Vietnam and Southeast Asia from 1972 to 1974. He was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross and the Air Medal with one oak leaf cluster during his tour of duty there. He has flown over 5000 hours in the C-130, performing duties as the Chief of Tactics for the 914 Tactical Airlift Group, Air Force Reserve, and the Chief of Standardization/Evaluation for the 928 Tactical Airlift Group, Air Force Reserve. In 1985 he earned his Ph.D. in political science from the State University of New York at Buffalo. His dissertation is entitled "Problems in US Military Professionalism, 1945-1950." Currently Major Pieczynski and his wife Wendy are residing in Montgomery, Alabama, where he is attending Air Command and Staff College.
THE PROBLEM OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE MILITARY PROFESSION

During the Korean War, Gen. Douglas McArthur was given the responsibility for battlefield operations and the authority to carry them out. When he exceeded his authority, the remedy was simple: fire him. Now...when something goes wrong—as in the bombing of the marine barracks in Lebanon—the confusion of authority and responsibility makes it virtually impossible to determine who is at fault...

Accountability is the state of being responsible for the performance or discharge of one's office or duty. Recent critics of the US military charge the military officers with being unaccountable for all the post-Vietnam failures in military operations. Various political scientists, military analysts, and congressional committees have pointed to the problem of accountability in the US military. They have identified some causes for a lack of accountability. This article will analyze organizational and professional developments since 1945 that have made it difficult to hold military officers accountable for their failures in military operations. The major thesis of this article is accountability has been seriously jeopardized by an organizational contradiction between the unified commands and the military services. This contradiction violates the principle of unity of command, which is, supposedly, the foundation of the unified commands. Coupled with
shortcomings in professional ethics, training, and knowledge, this contradiction has confused the lines of authority in the military organization, leading to a lack of accountability. This lack of accountability undermines effectiveness, and erodes professional ethics.

Problems in Military Organization

Carl von Clausewitz recognized the inherent differences between war preparation and war fighting.

...We see clearly that the activities characteristic of war may be split into two main categories: those that are merely preparation for war, and war proper. The same distinction must be made in theory as well. The knowledge and skills involved in the preparation will be concerned with the creation, training and maintenance of the fighting forces... The theory of war proper, on the other hand, is concerned with the use of these means, once they have been developed, for the purpose of the war.²

In the US, these differences between war preparation and war fighting have had an adverse affect on military organization in the nuclear age. After World War II, for the first time in history, the US had to maintain large forces in being to deter future war. In order to mobilize the manpower and materiel resources needed to deter war, the US military organizations had to increase their involvement in peacetime domestic politics and budgets. This responsibility of preparing for war fell upon the shoulders of the military services and the newly created Department of
The responsibility for fighting a war went to the unified and specified commands.

In October 1985 the Senate Armed Services Committee opened hearings on the organization and decisionmaking procedures of the Defense Department. These hearings produced a study entitled *DEFENSE ORGANIZATION: THE NEED FOR CHANGE*. The study points out that the DOD has failed in its primary organizational goal of integrating the objectives of the military establishment. According to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, the DOD has six major objectives, or what Weinberger calls "key missions." Three objectives are worldwide, and three are regional. The worldwide objectives are nuclear deterrence, maritime superiority, and power projection superiority. The regional objectives are the defense of NATO Europe, the defense of East Asia, and the defense of Southwest Asia. These six objectives should be the focus of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the unified and specified commands. In reality, the OSD focuses on functional areas, such as manpower, research and development, military installations, and logistics. The JCS focuses on the needs determined by the service doctrines of the military services. The unified and specified commands try to coordinate the military services in maintaining nuclear deterrence, maritime superiority, and power projection in the various regions of the world, according to the doctrines of the military services.
Peter Drucker tells us that "if a structure is to be effective and sound, we must start with objectives and strategy....Strategy—that is, the answer to the questions: 'What is our business? What should it be? What will it be?'—determines the purpose of structure. It thereby determines the key tasks or activities in a given business or service institution....Organization design is, or should be, primarily concerned with the key activities: other purposes are secondary." The DOD tends to violate this principle of organization. The six primary objectives of the DOD become secondary objectives because OSD focuses on functional areas and the distribution of resources among the military services. Usually, none of the highest ranking leaders in the OSD spend anytime at all on strategy or in reviewing the compatibility between joint military strategy and the six primary objectives of the DOD. Lacking a joint strategic focus from the JCS or OSD, the military services are free to define US defense interests from their biased perspective of US defense needs. Based on these service-biased viewpoints, the JCS develops strategy, and the OSD assists the services in developing weapon systems. The services pursue their pet projects, which may or may not optimally serve the six primary objectives. The JCS coordinates and compromises the various service strategies until they produce a single strategy that meets all the basic needs of the services, instead of the six primary objectives of the DOD.
Samuel P. Huntington calls this domination of service interests "servicism: the doctrine or system that exalts the individual military service and accords it primacy in the military establishment."\textsuperscript{13} Huntington discusses the detrimental effects servicism has on defense policy.

\textit{...The individual services per se were not supposed to fight wars, to make strategy, or to determine overall force structure. In fact, they continued to exercise a prevailing influence in each of these areas. Instead of developing a system for coherent central strategic planning, the Joint Chiefs continued to give priority to their role as spokesmen for their services, and Joint Staff officers bargain among themselves, each trying to get the most for his service. Instead of rational choices of programs and weapons most needed to serve national purposes, such choices are still largely determined by service needs and service interests, resulting in duplication of some programs, misallocation of resources to others, and, most important, neglect of still others. Instead of the unified command of combat forces, command is often fragmented and the unified commanders (CINCs) almost always find their authority over their forces second to that of the services that supplied those forces.}\textsuperscript{14}

The US has common goals (the six primary objectives of the DC., but we do not have truly integrated strategies and plans to achieve these common goals. Instead we have a defense organization designed to achieve service goals. That is what the JCS is supposed to do: bring the service-defined goals up to the national level of strategic goals.\textsuperscript{15} That is why the JCS is such a maligned organization today. But it is doing exactly what is was designed to do back in 1947 and 1949 when the three military departments lost their cabinet-level status. The JCS ensures that service goals are considered at the highest level of defense policymaking.\textsuperscript{16} What the JCS does not do is tie the
contingency plans of the unified and specified commands to the available resources. This leads to shortcomings in military strategy because the national objectives are not linked to the military means of achieving them.

The military services are well-designed organizations for mobilizing the manpower and materiel resources of the nation in preparation for war. They have a large number of politically-attuned, civilian and military bureaucrats trained in the social and natural sciences. They develop the various military doctrines the services present before congress and the nation to justify the numbers and types of military forces. The services are very good at training (at the basic skill level) and equipping the military forces. They can get the dollars for the hardware that many social scientists, congressmen, and journalists say is necessary to prepare for war in peacetime. But this is not the type of people or organization we want fighting a war.

...People who only ask how much is enough, or how few can we barely get by with, tend to develop an instinct for the capillaries. That is not the instinct it is wisest to cultivate if you want to win real—not bureaucratic—battles. There are more important questions: How can I destroy the enemy's strategy?...How can I keep him on the defensive? Analytical offices, staffed with economists and the like, are not especially good at answering, or asking, these sorts of questions...

UNITY OF COMMAND

In response to the need for clear lines of authority, the unified command structure supposedly is organized
according to the principle of unity of command. In Army Field Manual 100-1, the unity of command is defined as follows:

6. UNITY OF COMMAND. FOR EVERY OBJECTIVE, THERE SHOULD BE UNITY OF EFFORT UNDER ONE RESPONSIBLE COMMANDER. This principle insures that all efforts are focused on a common goal. At the STRATEGIC LEVEL, this common goal equates the political purpose of the United States, and the broad strategic objectives which flow therefrom. It is the common goal which, at the national level, determines the military forces necessary for its achievement. The coordination of these forces requires unity of effort. At the national level, the Constitution provides for unity of command by appointing the President as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The President is assisted in this role by the national security organization, which includes the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the highest level, and the unified and specified commands and joint task forces at the operational levels.19

The unified command structure is designed to meet the requirements of the principle of unity of command. This principle states that "the more completely an individual has a reporting relationship to a single superior, the less the problem of conflict in instructions and the greater the feeling of personal responsibility for results."20 The unified command structure is supposed to conform to this principle of unity of command. However, criss-crossing the lines of authority of the unified command structure are the lines of authority of the two, or three, service components within the unified command. The Senate Armed Services Committee study on Defense Organization in 1985 found the same problem that President Eisenhower articulated in 1958.

Because I have often seen the evils of diluted command, I emphasize that each unified commander must have unquestioned authority over all units of his
Today a unified command is made up of component commands from each military department, each under a commander of that department. The commander's authority over these component commands is short of the full command required for maximum efficiency.

The problem of diluted command goes to the heart of the problem of accountability. The conflicting lines of authority in the unified commands leads to "operational deficiencies evident during the Vietnam war, the seizure of the Pueblo, the Iranian hostage rescue mission, and the incursion into Grenada...". In all of these operations few people were held accountable for these deficiencies because no one was really in charge.

The unified commands (Southern Command, Atlantic Command, Pacific Command, European Command, Central Command, and Readiness Command) each have a headquarters and a joint staff headed by a Commander-in-Chief (CINC). The staff is made up of personnel representing the services in the command. Just below the CINCs in the operational command structure are the component commanders. For example, under the CINC European Command (an Army General), there are component commanders of equal rank (4 Star general) commanding the Army, Navy, and Air Force components in Europe. In all other matters outside of operations, such as logistics, procurement, maintenance, and training, the component commanders come under the control of their service. Here is where the principle of unity of command starts to unravel because we begin to confuse the needs of war preparation (the mobilization of manpower and materiel
resources) with the needs of war fighting that were mentioned in the principle of unity of command. Although under the operational command of the CINC, the component commanders primarily serve their services' interests. It is the services who train and equip their forces and control the promotions of all the officers, not the CINCs or the JCS, or any other joint organization. More importantly, it is the services that control the readiness assessment system. "Because it is centered in the components and routed through service channels, readiness reporting and evaluation" reflects what the services want them to reflect. Thus peacetime operational readiness evaluations may have little to do with the actual readiness of the overall command the CINCs would employ in combat. "Correcting deficiencies is predominantly a service responsibility, the CINCs and JCS playing only a minimal role, even though such actions relate primarily to combat forces and are particularly important to the CINCs."

In his appraisal of the Defense Organization Study of 1977-1980, Archie D. Barrett describes the plight of the CINCs: commanders with responsibility, but little real authority. He also points out how the principle of unity of command is violated at the highest levels of the national military command structure.

The commanders in chief of the unified and specified commands (CINCs) have neither the influence nor the clear-cut durable links with higher authority commensurate with their responsibilities as theater commanders of US forces in the field. In crucial decisions determining the composition and warfighting
capability of theater forces, subordinate component commanders and, by extension, the services, overshadow the CINCs. No overarching readiness assessment system exists to analyze the preparedness of each unified theater force and subsequently relate this assessment through joint channels to resource allocation decisions intended to correct the deficiencies. Instead, readiness evaluations are conducted by the component commands, controlled by the services, and linked to service budget proposals....Finally, the CINCs' chain of command from and to the secretary of defense is rendered potentially indecisive by its routing through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a committee, as opposed to a single military official acting as the secretary of defense's agent in supervising the CINCs.27

The services, those great generators of military hardware existing in the political atmosphere of Washington, control the unified commands' training, resource allocation, and combat readiness evaluations. Through the component commander, command authority is diluted by the administrative control of the services. In peacetime the CINCs have all the responsibility, but little authority. This separation of authority and responsibility can lead to military failures and shortcomings during peacetime contingency operations, as may have happened in the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut and the Grenada operation. It also helps explain the lack of accountability military officers have for their actions. How do you hold a commander-in-chief responsible for something he had little control over? This lack of control over military forces in peacetime contingencies seems insurmountable when one analyzes how the junior and field grade officers train for combat.
Military Training

Most training is service oriented. The services develop military doctrine and training requirements. For individual officers, these training requirements have priority over all joint training. For example, in the airlift community, the Air Force is supposed to work with the Army on a regular basis in the Joint Airborne/Air Transportability Training (JA/ATT) program. This program is meant to keep the aircrews combat ready. But, due in part to the historical difficulty in accomplishing enough Air Force training events, "the priority for JA/ATT missions has been extremely low."\(^2\)\(^8\) In FY 80-83, JA/ATT flying hours "comprised about 16% of the total hours flown by the active duty C-130 force and about 5% for the active and reserve C-141 force."\(^2\)\(^9\)

The services conduct the combat readiness inspections of all units. The training and evaluation of these units may be devoid of any extensive participation by units from the other services. Even when other services participate, usually only one service is the benefactor of the training because the training scenario is designed to serve their singular service needs or unit needs.\(^3\)\(^0\) Officers get very little realistic training because the unified command structure plays a very minor role in the conduct of such exercises. The bulk of the officer training is spent polishing up basic skills. Unfortunately, this kind of training usually takes place in a very controlled,
unrealistic, single-service training environment. Officers get very little training at coordinating with other units and components within the unified command.

In the joint exercises, mistakes are always made, which is to be expected, but year after year the same mistakes are repeated. Part of this is due to the quick rotation of officers through assignments. However, other causes for repeat mistakes are the shortcomings in the JCS Remedial Action Program (RAP). The JCS RAP program is meant to give the military units in a JCS exercise a way of identifying the operational deficiencies that occurred during an exercise. These deficiencies must be remedied by the JCS, the services, the unified or specified commands, the OSD, or other federal agencies. However, due to faults in the program, in one JCS exercise, 442 of 567 reported problems were excluded from the remedial action program.

Other significant problems, which were identified in a unified command after-action report to JCS but not entered in the JCS RAP, include the lack of standard procedures in logistics areas, computer software shortfalls, communications problems, and inadequate all-weather capabilities.

These kinds of issues do not get the attention they deserve in the JCS because more often than not the JCS finds it very difficult to force a compromise among the services that they all can agree upon. Thus interoperability among the services remains a problem in the unified commands.

When combat readiness is determined and measured not by how well the unified command fights a war, but how well
the Air Force (or Army, or Navy) fights ITS OWN WAR, military failures are bound to occur. Because of the dominance of these single-service training exercises, officers are not trained to fight a war in coordination with other services. At the highest levels of the unified command structure, officers are not necessarily trained to serve their commander-in-chief. Instead they are trained to serve their service. And the whole situation is acceptable to the CINCs because the unified commands are usually dominated by the CINCs' own service.35

This failure of training not only affects accountability, it also affects the development of leadership and strategic skills of the officer corps. Officers trained in a service-oriented, sterile environment, will likely become incredibly adept at basic skills and incredibly inept at strategic planning and leading diverse units. Officers become ignorant of the strategic and tactical advantages of the diverse units within the unified command. Their unfamiliarity with the workings of the unified command structure leads to mistakes in decisionmaking, and a lack of coordination and communication between the various units within the command. The kind of training that predominates today's armed forces is analogous to having the Department of Music train a musical conductor who plays violin, by having him conduct the violin section every day. Come performance night, the conductor must direct an orchestra he has rarely seen or heard before. His
job is complicated by the fact that the horn section has never heard the violins or the percussion instruments and vice versa. After a terrible performance, the critic writes his critique. The question is, who does the critic blame for this musical disaster: the conductor, the musicians, or the system of training controlled by the Department of Music?

The Bureaucratic Personality versus Professional Ethics

Confronting every military leader is the bureaucracy. The advantages of a bureaucracy (technical efficiency, command of a complex knowledge base, standard operating procedures, continuity) can lead to trained incapacity and displacement of organizational goals. Bureaucrats often fall victim to "trained incapacity." Bureaucrats trained in viewing and doing things one way, find themselves incapable of responding to a different set of circumstances. The training and discipline in following standard operating procedures can lead to a displacement of the organization's goals. Robert Merton states:

Adherence to the rules, originally conceived as a means, becomes transformed into an end-in-itself; there occurs the familiar process of DISPLACEMENT OF GOALS whereby 'an instrumental value becomes a terminal value.'...This may be exaggerated to the point where primary concern with conformity to the rules interferes with the achievement of the purposes of the organization....

The bureaucrat's official life is planned for him in terms of a graded career, through the organizational devices of promotion by seniority, pensions, incremental salaries, etc., all of which are designed to provide incentives for disciplined action and conformity to the official regulations. The official
is tacitly expected to and largely does adapt his thoughts, feelings and actions to the prospect of this career. But THESE VERY DEVICES which increase the probability of conformance also lead to an overconcern with strict adherence to regulations which induces timidity, conservatism, and technicism. Displacement of sentiments from goals onto means is fostered by the tremendous symbolic significance of the means (rules).

This helps to explain the goal displacement which leads to the requirements approach of defense policymaking. To see how this requirements approach is put into effect, we must first look at the defense budget process.

The defense budget is made up of a set of building blocks. The services receive fiscal and defense policy guidance from the secretary of defense. The services construct programmed budgets and submit them to the JCS and the Defense Resources Board (DRB) for approval. These service budgets are designed to meet the needs of the services and their strategic doctrines. Other than the Defense Guidance of the secretary of defense, the service budgets conform only to the strategic doctrines of the services. The JCS, whose forum is dominated by the services, makes a few minor alterations to the service budgets and forwards them to the DRB. The JCS historically has been incapable of reconciling military means with the needs of military strategy. Nor is the DRB a strategic council. It is in fact a council where bureaucratic politics rather than strategic concerns rules the decisionmaking process. From the DRB we get a defense budget that looks more like a service wish list (600 ships,
40 air wings, 18 divisions) than a fiscal outline of US military strategy. So at the highest level of the military we see the ranking officers operating in a political environment, faithfully following the standard operating procedures of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS). In the defense policymaking process, strategic goals—having been pushed aside by service goals in the JCS and the DRB—have been replaced by the numbers in the defense budget. This is just one example of goal displacement.

Peacetime has encouraged military officers to displace strategic goals with a devotion to service goals. Earlier we have seen how the services dominate training and combat readiness evaluations throughout the unified commands. This service orientation to training ignores many crucial variables of combat. The services train and equip forces to fight a war independently of the other services. Because of the component command structure within the unified commands, the US military is trained, equipped, and organized to fight as independent services. This forces military officers to train in an environment that is not meant to simulate or resemble a combat environment. Such an organizational environment is designed for peace. It can only exist in peace. The fact that it could not exist in war was proven in Vietnam, when the military hierarchy refused to make the necessary organizational and bureaucratic changes to carry on the war successfully. This flawed organizational
environment creates significant ethical problems for military officers, especially for those with combat experience, because they realize that in order to accomplish their combat mission, they may have to break peacetime service rules and regulations. Moreover, these officers might conclude that unethical behavior is being forced upon them by a malformed military organization.

The emphasis on peacetime training represents an emphasis on means instead of organizational goals. Instead of focusing on a simulated combat environment, officers focus on a training environment. Training accomplishments become more important than the quality of training. Units find themselves spending almost all of their time "filling training squares" or training for the upcoming combat readiness inspection. As combat becomes less and less relevant to the training environment, dysfunctional bureaucratic behavior becomes more prevalent. This kind of environment becomes "normless" as the military tries to maintain combat norms in a noncombat environment. "In the absence of combat, there is no legitimate measure of combat effectiveness, only surrogate quantitative measures of readiness." Quantification compliments this peacetime syndrome by providing data that supposedly measures combat readiness when in fact it really measures how well a military unit can operate under criteria more indicative of peacetime service needs than combat readiness.
Probably the most damaging charge against the military profession that can be made is that the officer corps has a significant shortcoming in military expertise. Charges of a lack of expertise have been made against the JCS and high level commanders for their inability to plan contingency operations, and in carrying out a limited conventional war. This lack of expertise can be attributed to the service orientation in the unified command structure. Officers are trained to think along single-service guidelines. Even the CINCs, who are most harmed by this single-service orientation, fall victim to this mind set. They are encouraged to think along service lines due to the fact that their own service most likely dominates their particular unified command.

Conclusion

The organizational conflict between the unified commands and the service organizations violates the principle of unity of command, encourages the development of dysfunctional bureaucratic personalities, and leads to military ineffectiveness. These organizational and bureaucratic dysfunctions create a system that diffuses responsibility and authority, and leads to unaccountability and related ethical problems. The ethical problems promote more irresponsibility. Officers may come to relish the fact they are unaccountable: it protects them in a system where strategic goals have been replaced with bureaucratic or career goals.
The real damage is not spectacular but routine: it is the loss of purpose in the daily operation of the military machine, the substitution of procurement for defense. This is the true corruption, and it affects all the relevant groups.

All this could only exist in a peacetime environment. When the military goes to war or conducts military operations in a contingency action, the system sputters along and fails to perform. Only then do we see the failures of organization and leadership, which leads to failures in military operations.

The service departments and the civilian and military bureaucrats assigned to them should not be involved with the operations of the unified and specified commands. Yet, because the services control the training, operational readiness, and administration of the component commands of the unified commands, the existing structure ensures service participation in combat, and this inevitably leads to failure on the battlefield. Our warfighting structure encompassed by the unified and specified command structure must be designed for war fighting, not war preparation. Service departments, engrossed in the politics of Washington as they focus on the quantity and type of military hardware that make up the numbers of war preparation, should not be involved in warfighting. The US military needs to refocus its organization and officer development more to the demands of combat. Only then will the system promote more combat-oriented officers.
Organizational Reforms

The most important change that could be made to the existing defense organization is the extrication of the services from the military operations of the unified commands. To do this the powers of the CINCs must be increased. The CINCs should be given primary responsibility for training the units under their command. The services will still be responsible for basic training skills. But military units must conduct unit training with other service units in their unified command. This would require an increase in joint training under the control of the CINCs. Basic service doctrine should be supplemented by command doctrines controlled by the CINCs and their headquarters. Correspondingly, the component commanders should be junior in rank to the CINCs, and their staffs should be reduced significantly since the CINCs would retain the primary responsibilities for training, evaluation, and planning. The CINCs' staffs should expand to conduct combat readiness inspections for all units in the unified commands.

The services should continue to focus on training at the basic skill level. The services should still equip forces and maintain the weapons development facilities, and other doctrinal and strategic development and test centers. They should be encouraged to provide the impetus for modernization. But the unified commands should control the application of doctrine and have the last say on making changes to service doctrine.
As for the JCS, the chairman should be given more power. The Joint Staff should work directly and exclusively for the chairman. The chairman and the Joint Staff should supervise joint strategy, planning, and operations, to ensure that contingency plans are closely linked to available resources, and to monitor operations in times of crisis or war. The chain of command should run from the president, to the secretary of defense, to the chairman, to the CINCs of the unified and specified commands.

A major goal of the organizational reforms should be the development of greater cooperation between the secretary of defense and the chairman of the JCS to control the services. The services need to be the bastions of modernization, and share resource allocation responsibilities with the CINCs on the DRB. The CINCs and the unified and specified commands should become the bastions of joint training, readiness, and combat effectiveness.

Unity of command should be established in the unified command hierarchies. This would require structural changes in these commands. To be effective these structural changes must give the CINCs complete control over the training and readiness evaluation of the units assigned to them. The number of units assigned to more than one unified or specified command should be decreased. Hopefully these changes will give the CINCs both the responsibility and authority over their forces that is necessary to maintain
combat effectiveness. These structural changes should lead to clear lines of authority and increased accountability and responsibility among the officer corps.

Professional Reforms

A serious problem with defense reform in US history has been the reliance on organizational reforms to take care of professional shortcomings. When Elihu Root considered the general staff reforms at the turn of the century, he realized that, before reform could be effective, the professional Army officers had to be trained in general staff doctrine. This is also the case today. The organizational reforms that would invigorate the unified commands and take the services out of the operational commands and restrict them to the basic training, equipping, and modernizing of forces, calls for some professional re-education of the officer corps. In the Executive Summary to the Senate Armed Services Committee Study of the Defense Organization it states:

The problem is more deep-seated; it involves the basic attitudes and orientations of the professional officer corps. As long as the vast majority of military officers at all levels gives highest priority to the interests of their service or branch while losing sight of broader and more important national security needs—and believes that their behavior is correct—the predominance of service influence will remain a problem. Whatever changes are made at the top of the DOD organization, powerful resistance to a more unified outlook will continue to be the basic orientation of military officers deeply immersed in the culture of their services. This dimension of the problem will require changes in the system of military education, training, and assignments to produce officers with a heightened awareness and greater commitment to DOD-wide requirements, a genuine multi-
service perspective, and an improved understanding of other services.

Some of the ethical problems presently facing the officer corps would be mitigated by the organizational reforms recommended earlier in this section. The peacetime training syndrome and the emphasis on quantification of military intangibles in all forms of decisionmaking, should be lessened once the unified commands gain control of training, and the chain of command better reflects the unity of command principle. But until the organizational contradictions are eradicated, the officer corps will still face the present ethical conflicts. In the meantime, professional reforms should focus on professional military education.

As a closed, inbred system, the military has a difficult time at innovation. The problem is that peacetime fosters "the development of conformist and even ritualistic behavior, while discouraging the innovation that will prove so invaluable in wartime. Unfortunately, peacetime innovation is seen as a destabilizing threat to institutional norms, at least by those who have acquired positions of authority." There is a tendency to make professional military education into an institution that perpetuates the system, instead of an institution that legitimately challenges the system's norms, means, and goals. Professional Military Education (PME) sometimes is used to indoctrinate rather than educate. This occurs when challenges to the system are not allowed, due to an
overemphasis on the school solutions to military problems. This aspect of PME must change. A balance between indoctrination and education must be established. More importantly, the PME schools should be made into bastions of innovation, serving both the modernization tendencies of the services and the readiness goals of the unified and specified commands. To do this they must be provided with an academic environment that is meant to challenge and critique the system and be provided a medium in which those challenges are disseminated throughout the profession. Professional journals should be the avenue of dissemination.

Much has already been said about the lack of strategic and tactical knowledge of the military officers. The PME schools could and should place more emphasis on strategy. But if officers are to get a thorough education in strategy and doctrine, they will only get it once the unified commands control the training and evaluation of their units. As long as the unified commands are dominated by the services with their service strategies, military officers will never get adequate training in strategy and warfighting.
Notes


4. Ibid., p. 34.


7. Ibid., p. 33.


9. DEFENSE ORGANIZATION: THE NEED FOR CHANGE, p. 3.


11. Ibid., p. 213.

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