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STUDENT REPORT
MANUAL STRENGTH ACCOUNTING OF
DEPLOYED AIR FORCE PERSONNEL

MAJOR GAREY T. WOOD
86-2760

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REPORT NUMBER 86-2760
TITLE MANUAL ACCOUNTING OF DEPLOYED AIR FORCE PERSONNEL.

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Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of requirements for graduation.

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
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The Air Force relies more and more on deployed forces to carry out its worldwide commitment. Because of airlift and environmental problems with the current computer systems and training problems with PERSCO teams, a manual system of personnel accounting is necessary. This study develops such a system and recommends training programs be developed by Air Force to solve the training problem.
PREFACE

1. This study is intended as a tool to help the Air Force better account for personnel under deployed conditions when computer support is not available. It offers a manual solution to the problem and suggests that the manual system should be maintained as a back-up system even when computer support is available. It also recommends coordination with other branches to determine if service wide application is feasible.

2. The author wishes to acknowledge the support received for this study effort from the Hq TAC/DPX staff. Especially important was the information received from Hq TAC/DPXX concerning current procedures and future plans.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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REPORT NUMBER 86-2760
AUTHOR(S) MAJOR CAREY T. WOOD, USAF
TITLE MANUAL ACCOUNTING OF DEPLOYED AIR FORCE PERSONNEL

I. Purpose: To determine solutions to the problem of accounting for personnel in deployed locations when computer support is either not available or is lost.

II. Problem: Accurate accounting for deployed forces is severely hampered when computer support is lost. Since Air Force relies more and more on deployments to meet its overseas commitments, it is necessary to devise some system of manual accounting. Timely and accurate personnel accountability is necessary for management of resources and must be planned for and personnel trained to operate a manual system. Deployed locations are usually austere and provide a hostile environment for delicate computers. Resources are usually not available to repair and maintain high tech equipment and personnel specialists are not able to keep the systems operating. To further compound the problem, personnel specialists have evolved to a reliance on computer systems to the point that manual systems have never been thought of. Therefore, it is necessary to plan and train in peacetime for what we plan to do in wartime.
III. Data: Based on discussions with key personnel in HQ TAC DPX, HQ AFMPC/MPCRP43, and ICSG/CC it was determined that the major problem was lack of a standard back-up system to the computer. PERSCO teams had come to rely so heavily on availability of computers and communication facilities that it was devastating to the team's mission to lose the support. Since ability to account for personnel is a requirement to execute command and control effectively, commanders' ability to perform his mission could be degraded without this back-up.

IV. Findings: Conversations with individuals who have deployed with computer systems indicated that computer support for strength accounting cannot be relied upon to provide strength data to insure proper levels of manning for deployed commanders. These conversations also indicated that emphasis on PERSCO training has not been equally placed Air Force wide. Therefore, there has been a lack of consistent knowledge and ability to operate by deployed PERSCO teams.

V. Recommendations: To correct the problem of the inability of the computer to support deployed commanders, it is recommended that the Air Force discontinue its reliance on computer systems in deployed locations and an Air Force wide manual system be adopted. As part of this recommendation, a manual system to include recommended procedures, forms and training requirements was developed. This manual system has been coordinated with Headquarters Tactical Air Command personnel for completeness and feasibility. This manual system would reduce costs by deleting the requirement to purchase computers for deployment and would solve a major portion of the training problem PERSCO teams face. To correct the inconsistency in training, a training course should be developed by Air Force to train personnel readiness unit personnel on base level computer support for deployed forces. A PERSCO course, to train deploying PERSCO teams on the recommended manual system should also be developed. Adoption of these two recommendations would provide sound, standardized procedures to support deployed commanders in the accomplishment of the mission.
Chapter One

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to find solutions to the following problem statement—how can deployed Personnel in Support of Contingency Operations (PERSCO) teams account for deployed personnel when computer support is lost?

This chapter provides a basic introduction to the specifics of this study. It first provides a look at the background of the problem. It then identifies assumptions and limitations.

The study is then developed in succeeding chapters. Chapter two looks at purposes of accounting and current accounting procedures. Chapter three looks at scenarios where computer support could be lost or may be inadequate. Chapter four discusses specific problems associated with a lack of accountability. Chapter five identifies findings and makes specific recommendations to solve the problem.

BACKGROUND

This problem is of importance because the Air Force tends to rely more and more on deployed forces to meet its worldwide commitments. It also relies almost totally on computers to account for personnel. Until recently Air Force planners have been attempting to devise small computers which could be handcarried to the deployed location and which would be durable under field conditions. Because of several problems, such as interrupted electrical power, infiltration of dust and dirt, and security of transmissions, no cost effective system has been found. Chapters two, three and four more fully detail these problems.

ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

Several assumptions have been made for this study. The first is that Hq Tactical Air Command/DPX will consider implementing recommendations made from this study. Second is
that Hq Tactical Air Command/DPX will coordinate the recommendations made from this study with other major commands and sister services to insure that the same reporting procedures are followed for all deployed personnel. The final assumption is that Hq Tactical Air Command/DPX will test the recommendations during an active deployment to validate and fine-tune the system.
Chapter Two

CURRENT STRENGTH ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES

INTRODUCTION

This chapter explains the reasons for and current methods of strength accounting for deployed personnel. It also explains the need for accurate accountability and outlines the flow of information.

PURPOSE OF STRENGTH ACCOUNTING

The personnel assigned to accomplish a mission, especially under normally austere deployed conditions, are a valuable and essential resource.

Strength accountability (and its reporting) is the single most important responsibility of deployed in-place PERSCO teams in a theater of conflict (or exercise location). It provides invaluable information to local and theater commanders as well as Hq USAF/MPRC, AFMP, and MAJCOM. It enables them to better utilize valuable resources, and if necessary, to redeploy portions to fill voids created by casualty losses, or to rapidly activate new provisional units (1:20. 3-11).

CURRENT PROCEDURES

The current manual system utilizes the TDY order as the central file, with other available source documents utilized for additional data. Manual files are established and maintained as follows: 1) An alpha file of TDY orders on all service personnel, 2) An alpha Force Requirement Number (FRN) file, 3) A separate file for transients, 4) Other files as necessary.

Strength accountability begins with in-processing requirements and continues through strength and duty status changes. Daily reporting is required with the method of reporting determined by the PERSCO Team Chief.
When automated data processing (ADP) is not available at the deployed location, strength and daily status changes must be furnished to the location providing ADP support to the PERSCO team, which would be the attached CBPO or the PERSCO van. Data is transmitted to the ADP site by use of a duty status change (DSC) message (Appendix A). In cases where electrical transmission support is not available, any means will be used to transmit data, such as courier, mail, or returning aircraft.

**COMPUTER SYSTEMS**

There are three types of computer systems currently utilized by PERSCO teams for strength accounting. The base level data system is the primary data support function for deployed personnel teams and is utilized when deployment is to a location having computer support. The second system is the PERSCO van (see Appendix B). It is equipped with a minicomputer which provides the automated support to accomplish personnel reporting from bare base locations (those without a Data Processing Installation). Microcomputers are handcarried by PERSCO teams and are utilized for local products and files maintenance at present, but use is being expanded through development of interface programs with base level computers.

**FLOW OF INFORMATION**

Information is provided to commanders and decision makers at all levels. Most data updates are provided to Air Force Military Personnel Center (AFMPC), assigned major command, attached major command, theater major command, and assigned CBPO. Information is used at all levels to account for personnel and to insure adequate manning to accomplish the mission. Inaccurate or untimely information can affect replacement actions which could degrade the commander's ability to perform the mission.

**COMPUTER SUPPORT PROBLEMS**

Recent deployments have surfaced problems with both the PERSCO van and with microcomputers. The PERSCO van presents a problem first with airlift support and second with operating under adverse conditions. Temperature fluctuations and unsanitary environments are major limitations for microcomputers in a combat or wartime situation. Also, inability to interface with mainframes in isolated areas is a limiting factor with these small, portable stand-alones. Even the ideal situation of collocated CBPO and Data Processing Installation support is not a practical concept. In wartime
deployments or simulations such luxuries would not normally be available. For this reason, a manual system of reporting is necessary. The next chapter discusses these problems in-depth.
Chapter Three

PROBLEMS WITH COMPUTER SUPPORT
IN THE DEPLOYED LOCATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Because of the worldwide commitment, the United States Air Force is tasked to establish operations in many different locations. These locations can vary from Africa to well established military installations in Europe. Each of these types of deployment can present problems of strength accountability and other personnel support—especially computerized support. Each situation is unique and causes unique problems for each of the different computer systems.

PERSCO VAN

The major problems encountered with deployment of the PERSCO van begin with airlift priorities. It is difficult to convince field commanders that the expense of shipping the van will be paid back by better information and decision making ability. In most cases, if the van is not in the first increment to arrive, its usefulness is questionable. During the first phases of a deployment, airlift is at a premium and operational equipment and personnel must have priority. Tying up an entire aircraft in the first increment of air flow to transport a personnel computer system is not a logical option in most cases.

To further complicate matters, the van has been problem prone and has not been very reliable during practice deployments. In addition to problems with the computer itself, there have been mechanical problems with the van and with the power generator. Also, the van is a large recreational vehicle and is very difficult to camouflage and to maneuver into isolated areas.

MICROCOMPUTERS

Microcomputers solve the airlift problem because they are small and don’t require any special handling. Again, the
computer and its operators should be in the first increment to insure accountability begins early in the deployment. However, commanders hesitate to dedicate space on initial aircraft for administrative personnel and their equipment at the expense of critical maintenance resources and munitions.

Unlike the van, however, the microcomputer is open to the elements. Because of sensitivity to fluctuating power, moisture, sand and dirt, and the possibility of losing information during power outages, this system is much more susceptible to the environment. With the power supply being the biggest factor in operating the computer, electrical sources in the deployed area are key factors in deciding if the microcomputer is a viable option.

In most cases, when deploying to an area that doesn’t have base level computer support, electrical power will be locally generated and will fluctuate. This fluctuation causes the microcomputer to become erratic in its computations. Erroneous information can be worse than no information.

Another problem with the microcomputer is the lack of training for the operators. The computer is only as good as the person telling it what to do. Without training, the average personnel specialist does not have the knowledge or ability to extract information so that a deployed commander can use it for decision making. Presently, no Air Force program exists to provide such training.

Last and probably the biggest problem with the microcomputer is the lack of compatibility with the personnel mainframe. Microcomputers are totally stand alone and are used for local information processing only. There is no capability to send or receive information from outside sources. Although this problem is being worked, the solution is somewhere in the future, expensive, and has questionable payoff.

**BASE LEVEL COMPUTER SUPPORT**

Base level computer support for deployments is the optimal situation, however there are significant problems with this option. The most prevalent problem is that of the deployed organization vying for already overtasked computer time and Data Processing Installation support. Historically, these host facilities are saturated with normal activities and unable to fully support deployed units within the required timeframe.

Following open hostilities and the potential for collateral damage of computer facilities, sustained support is questionable. Additionally, many of the contingency deployment
locations are bare base and computer support is not a viable option for many units and contingencies.

Although timely, accurate personnel information can be significantly enhanced through the use of a PERSCO van, a microcomputer, or host base level support, the above discussion has related some of the pitfalls which may be experienced by reliance on automated systems. Problems ranging from personnel training on the use of the automated systems to wartime contingencies expose significant limitations for units which are not prepared for operations without automated support. The next chapter focuses on the personnel accountability problems which may be encountered by such data automation system outages. By examining the effects of these problems on the deployed organization, the need for a responsive manual procedure for personnel accountability is evident.
Chapter Four

PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH LACK OF STRENGTH ACCOUNTABILITY

INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the problems encountered at all levels of command when computer support cannot provide accountability for personnel and highlights the need for some procedure manual. In determining the problems associated with a lack of personnel accountability, the author has drawn from four primary sources--his last three years as a CBPO Chief in the Tactical Air Command, interviews with Hq TAC/DPX personnel, interviews with deployed PERSCO teams, and interviews with commanders.

THE Deployed COMMANDER

The first problem area is the accuracy of information provided to the deployed commander. The deployed commander uses strength accounting figures to make decisions ranging from how many sorties to fly to how much food to order for the dining facility. If these decisions are made using erroneous information they can be costly in lives, dollars, and war-fighting estimates. These decisions have a direct bearing on mission accomplishment.

Under austere deployed conditions, quick replacement actions are imperative. The information furnished to theater and MAJCOM commanders affect these replacements. Only through accurate and timely strength accounting can commanders provide information up the chain which will insure proper actions are taken to maintain adequate troop levels to accomplish the mission.

THEATER COMMANDER

The theater commander makes decisions based on information passed to him by the deployed commander. He has the ability and resources to make moves within the theater of operation to fill voids caused by unexpected losses or to strengthen areas...
as needed. If he does not have information or if the information he has is erroneous, his decisions cannot adequately support his subordinate commanders and ensure required strength at critical locations within the combat area.

The information compiled by the theater commander and passed up the chain through MAJCOM commanders to HQ USAF triggers planning actions Air Force wide. Erroneous strength information will negate the effectiveness of the planning activity and may directly impair the combat sustainability of his forces. The theater commander's credibility rests on the information he furnishes to his superiors.

**MAJCOM COMMANDER**

MAJCOM commanders are responsible for insuring that adequate resources are available to the deployed commander for mission accomplishment. Timely, accurate information allows the MAJCOM to plan, identify, and provide replacements for shortfalls. Poor information, untimely information or no information does not allow the planning factor to have its positive influence in the force replenishment system.

The time from the initial identification of a requirement to the final in-place date can take weeks to work its way through the selection and notification system. In most cases the deployed commander cannot afford even a week's void especially in critical areas such as aircraft maintenance specialists and munitions personnel. Readily available, correct and relevant information can improve response times.

**SUMMARY**

The importance of timely and accurate information for Air Force managers of deployed forces dictate that better procedures for strength accounting be developed. Proposed changes designed to provide that information to respective levels of command are identified in the next chapter.
Chapter Five

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INTRODUCTION

This concluding chapter is divided into three sections. The first section is a summarization of the findings relative to the problem statement--how can deployed Personnel in Support of Contingency Operations (PERSCO) teams account for deployed personnel when computer support is not available? The second section presents specific recommendations to address each finding and provides supporting rationale. The final section summarizes this study and includes some personal observations.

FINDINGS

This study has illustrated problems with the current strength accounting system and provides solutions to the problems. (This vital function of the Personnel in Support of Contingency Operations (PERSCO) teams insures adequate personnel resources are available for deployed commanders to perform the mission.) The study also discussed the current systems utilized, the manual system maintained at the deployed location, and the three computer systems used to store, transmit and receive data. It then identified the problems associated with the three computer systems from airlift support to environmental factors. The next section identified the problems caused by a lack of information at all levels of command.

FINDING ONE

The first finding is that computer support for strength accounting cannot be relied upon to provide strength data to insure proper levels of manning for deployed commanders. The sensitivity of the computer itself to environmental factors, reliance on high quality electrical power, and the low priority for airlift make this option unreliable.
FINDING TWO

The second finding is that emphasis on training of PERSCO teams has not been equally placed Air Force wide. Quality of training not only varies between commands but also between CBPOs within each command. Associated with this lack of training is an overemphasis on computer support at the deployed location. The technical aspects of the computer require more in-depth training and a more thorough understanding of the system than can be universally taught at base level.

RECOMMENDATION ONE

The reliance on computer based strength accounting at the deployed location should be discontinued until a more reliable and user friendly computer system can be developed and an Air Force wide manual system adopted.

RATIONALE FOR RECOMMENDATION ONE

The reliability of computer systems under field conditions is not adequate to support commanders. Strength accounting during combat is an essential, mission oriented function and cannot be interrupted because of breakdowns of environmentally vulnerable equipment and poorly trained personnel. A simple manual system is recommended to include the following forms, files and reporting procedures.

PROPOSED STRENGTH ACCOUNTING SYSTEM

The basic strength accounting system should consist of three forms. AF Form 245, Employment Locator and Processing Checklist (Appendix D) maintained alphabetically by each deployed unit clerk on personnel assigned to specific units and by the deployed PERSCO team on all personnel assigned to the deployed site.

The second form is a proposed form, Daily Personnel Report (Appendix E) which is prepared daily and forwarded to the installation providing computer support and to the theater commander. This form is designed to provide the information required to maintain situational control of the manning at both the site and at the theater level. Source documents will be used to update the form and attached to the form forwarded to the servicing CBPO to provide computer update backup.
The third form is a proposed form, AFSC Manning Summary (Appendix F) which is a manning document prepared immediately upon arrival by the PERSCO team and maintained daily using changes from the Daily Personnel Report. The form will be forwarded to the theater commander weekly for validation against master files. The form will be prepared using authorized information from the Deployed Manning Document. This form will allow the deployed commander and the theater commander to identify immediately, and monitor constantly, critical shortfalls.

While this recommendation will require a change in philosophy, that of computer vice manual accounting systems, it is believed that deployed conditions call for simple systems. The proposed procedures are easy to understand and will facilitate training of deploying personnel specialists. It will also provide a readily available, clear English document for commanders to use for decision making.

**RECOMMENDATION TWO**

A training course should be developed at Air Force level to train personnel readiness unit personnel on base level computer support for deployed forces manual forms inputs. A second course should be developed to train deploying PERSCO teams on the manual system procedures and their duties and responsibilities at the deployed site.

**RATIONALE FOR RECOMMENDATION TWO**

Training is the key to success in any operation. Because PERSCO teams are not a part of the normal personnel management structure at base level, it is difficult to insure quality decentralized training. Managers place emphasis on programs that cause them immediate concern which usually does not include PERSCO support and therefore PERSCO training.

Centralized training will insure that consistent, quality training is provided which will improve the support provided to deployed commanders. Developing a course is costly and the personnel community must decide if not having the training is more costly in the way of poor support for contingency operation than the cost of the course.

An alternative would be a correspondence type course prepared by AFMPC which would at least standardize training information Air Force wide. This alternative would be less costly but would not insure an across-the-board standard of actual training.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

This study has addressed the problem of how deployed PERSCO teams can account for deployed personnel when computer support is lost or not available. The recommended solutions to this specific problem statement were directed at improving the quality, timeliness and accuracy of the personnel accounting information maintained for and provided to commanders of deployed organizations. Implementation of these recommendations will help insure that this required, accurate personnel information is available to the appropriate commanders for their employment and to sustain combat operations.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Official Documents


APPENDICES

A. Sample Duty Status Change Message
B. PERSCO van
C. Glossary
D. AF Form 245, Employment Locator and Processing Checklist
E. Daily Personnel Report (Proposed Form)
F. AFSC Manning Summary (Proposed Form)
Appendix A

Sample Duty Status Change Message
FROM: PERSCO TEAM, XXX BASE, LOCATION

TO: ATTACHED CBFO //DPMUX//

INFO: ANY ADDRESS SPECIFIED IN ANNEX E OF OPLAN

UNCLAS

SUBJ: DSC MSG NR XXX (SEE NOTE)

PART I: PERSONNEL ARRIVING: PID: XXXX
GRADE/NAME/SSN/DAS/FRN LN/AFSC/ASGN-CBPO-ID

PART II: PERSONNEL DEPARTING: PID: XXXX
GRADE/NAME/SSN/DT DPT

PART III: PERSONNEL REDEPLOYING: PID: XXXX
GRADE/NAME/SSN/DT DPT/DLOC

PART IV: DUTY STATUS CHANGES
GRADE/NAME/SSN/DS/EFF DT/EXP DT

NOTE: UTILIZE THIS MSG ONLY TO PROVIDE DUTY STATUS CHANGES WHEN NON-COLLOCATED WITH AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING.
ATTACH XX BARE BASE DSC MSG.

DISTR

APPENDIX A: SAMPLE DUTY STATUS CHANGE MESSAGE
Appendix B

PERSCO Van
Each PERSCO unit will be manned by two computer operators, a personnel system manager, and a computer maintenance person.

APPENDIX B: PERSCO VAN
Personnel Support for Contingency Operations (PERSCO) is a computerized personnel accounting system designed to use in the field to support rapid deployment of forces. Developed for the Air Force Manpower and Personnel Center's General Electric's Management & Technical Services Co. (MATSCO), the system consists of environmental and personnel computer system housed in a self-propelled van. Four units will be maintained at strategic locations in the United States and Europe. They will be deployed along with operational forces to forward bases to track the assignment of troops during contingency operations.

Each system is a self-contained mini-Consolidated Base Personnel Office capable of handling records for troops. The systems have undergone rigorous testing and data analysis to insure transportability and performance in widely varying environments. Tests & Analyses included:

- Vehicle weight
- 200 mile road test with 20 miles of gravel
- Radio frequency suppression
- Electrical system
- Audible noise level - interior and exterior
- Rain tightness
- Environmental control in temperatures from -50°F to +120°F and humidity from 20-90%
- Air conditioner vibration
- Air transportability
- Vestibule timed setup.

The 45-foot PERSCO system comprises a 32-foot, 15,000 pound converted mobile home and a two-ton trailer which carries the power generator. It is equipped with a hydraulic leveling system and tamper-proof alarms.

PERSCO is the first mobile personnel computer system designed for and purchased by the USAF. The first unit was delivered to Randolph Air Force Base in July 1981.

The first PERSCO van was subjected to extensive testing to assure operability in the field environment. Tests included 30 minutes of "driving rain" at 25 PSIG.
Appendix C

Glossary
GLOSSARY

AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING (ADP): Data processing performed by a system of electronic or electrical machines so interconnected and interacting as to reduce to a minimum the need for human assistance or intervention.

ADVANCED PERSONNEL DATA SYSTEM (APDS): An ADP system that collects, processes, stores, and communicates personnel information.

ATTACHED: The condition of being present for duty at a unit other than the one assigned as a result of valid military orders.

ATTACHED CBPO: The CBPO designated by the supported MAJCOM as the CBPO responsible for supporting a PERSCO support force at a specified employment location. This CBPO normally is responsible for the input of update transactions to the Personnel Deployment Reporting System (PERSDEP) and the generation and production of management information products in support of the TDY force commanders.

ALLOCATION: Notification to a MAJCOM and servicing CBPO that a personnel resource is being deployed to that command or unit.

BARE BASE: A base having a runway, taxiway, and parking areas which are adequate for the deployed force, also possessing an adequate source of water that can be made potable. No established CBPO or DPI support.

CONSOLIDATED BASE PERSONNEL OFFICE (CBPO): The single manager of base level military personnel systems for all units being serviced; whether on base, geographically separated from the CBPO, or centralized in one location for maximum economy, efficiency and service. It is the personnel staff for, and provides equal service to, all supported units.

DATA BASE: A group of data elements or related features arranged in a logical sequence.
DATA ELEMENT: A basic unit of information which has a unique meaning and which has subcategories of distinct units of value.

DATA IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (DIM): An alphanumeric code which identifies a specific data element.

DATA PROCESSING INSTALLATION (DPI): The organizational facility where automatic data processing equipment is located and operated.

DEPLOYMENT: The relocation of forces to desired areas of operation.

DEPLOYMENT MANNING DOCUMENT (DMD): A document which lists the manpower requirements and unit tasking for a specific exercise, contingency, or Opord/Oplan. The DMD line items are identified by an ATE indicator and a DMD line number that consists of a 3-digit numeric and a 1-digit alphabetic suffix code. The purpose of the DMD is to identify the manpower required to provide support and sustain a given capability at an employment location.

DUTY LOCATION: The place an individual is located for the purpose of performing military duty.

EXERCISE: A military maneuver or simulated wartime operation involving planning, preparation, and execution. It is carried out for the purpose of training and evaluation. It may be a combined, unified, joint, or single service exercise, depending on participating organizations.

FORCE REQUIREMENT NUMBER (FRN): The FRN is an alphanumeric number that is assigned to each Manpower Force Element (MFE) of a plan. For example, when a plan calls for three tactical fighter squadrons of the same mission, design and series (MDS) and therefore the same UTC, each squadron is assigned a unique FRN. Major units are identified by a three digit FRN.
GEOGRAPHICALLY SEPARATED UNIT (GSU): An Air Force unit geographically separated from any CBPO. Normally, the GSU will be serviced by the CBPO that is nearest to the GSU.

LINE NUMBER: A number identification assigned to each manpower space requirement listed in a deployment manning document.

MANPOWER REQUIREMENT: Human resources needed to accomplish specified work loads for an organization.

MOBILITY CONTROL CENTER: A predetermined area provided on a base as a central point from which the wing/group mobility officer can discharge his/her responsibilities of control, direction, and supervision of deployment functions.

MOBILITY POSITION NUMBER (MPN): A number assigned to a specific individual possessing a required mobility AFSC. The number is prefixed with the team or support element designation and indicates the relative order in which the personnel skill is required at the overseas employment location.

OPERATION ORDER (OPORD): A directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.

OPERATION PLAN (OPLAN): A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. The designation "plan" is usually used instead of "order" in preparing for operations well in advance. An operational plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then becomes the operation order.

PERSONNEL READINESS CENTER (PRC): Established at AFMPC and MAJCOMs and OPRs for all support personnel actions associated with contingency, exercise, rotational, and manning assistance actions. The MAJCOM PRC is responsible for the identification, tasking and accounting for all support personnel deployed to each contingency location by numbers and skills.
PERSONNEL READINESS UNIT (PRU): Established at base level and is responsible for all base level personnel actions required to support contingency and exercise operations. Close liaison between the CBPO PRU and the other base functions must be established and maintained to insure responsiveness.

PERSONNEL IN SUPPORT OF CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS (PERSCO): A capability that provides essential personnel support for USAF forces deployed TDY on contingency operations and information required for operational and management decisions and control of the deployed force.
APPENDIX

Appendix D
AF Form 245, Employment Locator and Processing Checklist
# Appendix D: AF Form 245, Employment Locator and Processing Checklist

**Employment Locator and Processing Checklist**

(This form is subject to the Privacy Act of 1974 - See reverse)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)</th>
<th>SSN</th>
<th>GRADE</th>
<th>SEX</th>
<th>TDY AFSC</th>
<th>FRN/LN NO.</th>
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**Instructions:** In-process as indicated. Out-process in reverse order.

**Processing Actions**

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<td>3</td>
<td>TRANSPORTATION (PAX Svcs, Veh Ops)</td>
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*For local use only*

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**AF FORM**

**JUN 85**

**245**
Appendix E

Daily Personnel Report (Proposed Form)
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**APPENDIX E:** DAILY PERSONNEL REPORT, PAGE 1 (Proposed Form)
# STRENGTH RECAP

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**REMARKS**

APPENDIX E: DAILY PERSONNEL REPORT, PAGE 2 (Proposed Form)
Appendix F

AFSC Manning Summary (Proposed Form)
### APPENDIX F: AFSC MANNING SUMMARY (Proposed Form)

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<thead>
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<th>AFSC MANNING SUMMARY</th>
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