


EMPLOYMENT OF NATIVES IN COUNTERINSURGENCY
OPERATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirement for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE



by

ANTONIO S. NALE, LTC, PA
B.S., Philippine Military Academy, 1963

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1983

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period: 1948-1961, and the ineffective use of native forces in Laos during the period 1954-1971.

The study describes experiences of the Philippine Army using native forces in CI operations during the period 1948-1981. The author was a participant observer for many of these events.

The study finds:

1) that the Philippine Army effectively employed native forces in such roles as guides and scouts, porters, informants, security forces, and as members of regular combat units;

2) that the Philippine Army effectively used lessons learned from the British experience in Malaya and avoided ineffective roles for native forces from lessons learned from the French and American experiences in Laos.

3) that careful supervision, avoiding personal conflicts of interests, and integration of effective programs of psychological operations and civic action are essential to effective use of native in CI operations.

The study concludes that the experiences of the Philippine Army in the use of native forces for CI operations have general application to future CI operations in situations with similar cultural and political environments.

The study recommends the testing of concepts, development of doctrine for use of native forces in CI operations, and inclusion in appropriate contingency plans and training.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

USE OF NATIVES IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, by
Luis Antonio S. Nolasco, Philippine Army.

This study investigates the use of native forces in counterinsurgency (CI) operations in order to determine effective and ineffective employment roles.

The study reviews the effective employment and the effective use of native forces in CI operations in Malaya during the period 1948-1961, and the ineffective use of native forces in Laos during the period 1954-1971.

The study describes experiences of the Philippine Army using native forces in CI operations during the period 1946-1961. The author was a participant observer for many of these events.

The study finds:

1) that the Philippine Army effectively employed native forces in such roles as guides and scouts, porters, informants, security forces, and as members of regular combat units;

2) that the Philippine Army effectively used lessons learned from the British experience in Malaya and avoided ineffective roles for native forces from lessons learned from the French and American experiences in Laos.

3) that careful supervision, avoiding personal conflicts of interests, and integration of effective programs of psychological operations and civic action are essential to effective use of native in CI operations.

The study concludes that the experiences of the Philippine Army in the use of native forces for CI operations have general application to future CI operations in situations with similar cultural and political environments.

The study recommends the testing of concepts, development of doctrine for use of native forces in CI operations, and inclusion in appropriate contingency plans and training.

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As former commander of a combat unit in the field, it was my good fortune to command a unit that was very successful in accomplishing all its missions. Part of this success is due to the cooperation extended to the unit by the various natives in my area of responsibility. It was their unselfish support that encouraged me to pursue this study. To all of them, I extend my sincere appreciation.

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CHAPTER: 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

History of military campaigns is never complete without a discussion of the participation of the natives¹ either as combatants or in support of the combat forces. As early as 400 B.C.² Sun Tzu wrote in his book, The Art of War, that "Those who do not use local guides are unable to obtain the advantages of the ground."³ Another Chinese writer Li Ching, wrote that the bravest and most intelligent officers using local guides can cross mountains secretly and pass through forests without a trace or noise.⁴ Although the employment of natives were limited to their use as guides as shown in these early writings, subsequent literatures on military campaigns by famous Generals are full of stories regarding the exploits of natives as combatants. During the Napoleonic Wars, native soldiers were used by most European armies. A very good example were the Cossacks of the Russian Army.⁵ The British Army also had their Gurkhas, those fearless warriors from Nepal.⁶ The U.S. Army has employed natives in its military campaigns. For example, during campaigns against the Indians of the American Midwest, military commanders used friendly Indians as scouts and guides. A very good example is in the capture of Geronimo, wherein General Crook used friendly Apaches as scouts and interpreters

in tracking down Geronimo and his band of renegade Indians.⁷

In the Philippines, the use of natives in military operations is not something new. In fact, from the time the first Spaniard set foot on Philippine soil up to the present, natives were always used in military operations. During the Philippine Insurrection of 1899, the U.S. Army in the Philippines recruited a company of Macabebe⁸ scouts. This was later increased to three companies. These scouts were used in helping the U.S. Army clear the esteros and swamps around Manila of rebels and insurgents. They were used also as scouts, guides and in protecting American columns.⁹ Gen. Frederick Funston used these Macabebe scouts in leading him to the hideout of Gen. Aguinaldo, the leader of the Filipino Insurrection.¹⁰ Subsequent American efforts to pacify the country especially against the recalcitrant Moros¹¹ of Mindanao and the Igorots¹² of Mountain province made the Americans realize that closer cooperation of the Filipino people was very necessary. On the Christian population of the country, the Americans were able to get this cooperation but on the non-Christian Filipinos they were not successful. American military commanders and administrators had to exercise a lot of patience in dealing with this minority group. One of those successful commanders was John J. Pershing who was well-liked by the Moros.¹³ As Military Governor of the Moro provinces he was responsible for conducting the military operations against the Moros but in spite of this, he was still loved by the Moro people as

a whole. In his operations against the Moro rebels he made full use of Philippine scout units which were composed mostly of Moro soldiers but led by American officers. In the Bud Bagsak campaign¹⁴ where five hundred Moro rebels were killed, three companies of Philippine Scouts (all Moros) participated and it was practically a fight between a Moro soldier and a Moro rebel. The Moros are the only Filipinos who never acknowledged the sovereignty of Spain. The Americans succeeded in "pacifying" them only through military might.¹⁵

When Japan invaded the Philippines in 1941, all the Filipinos rallied behind the Americans in its fight against the invaders. The best description of the bravery of the Filipino natives especially the Igorots is this stirring tribute from General MacArthur:

"Many desperate acts of courage and heroism have fallen under my observation on many fields of battle in many parts of the world. I have seen forlorn hopes become realities. I have seen last ditch stands and innumerable acts of personal heroism that defy description. But for sheer, breath-taking and heart-stopping desperation, I have never known the equal of those Igorots riding the tanks."¹⁶

This tribute of Gen. MacArthur was given when a company of Igorot soldiers completely annihilated the 20th Japanese Infantry Regiment in Bataan.¹⁷

After the war, the Philippines was again confronted with a new enemy.¹⁸ This was the Communist inspired revolutionary movement spearheaded by the Huks.¹⁹ This movement

subsided in the middle sixties but resurfaced in the early seventies.²⁰ This time the movement was spearheaded by the New Peoples Army (NPA).²¹ Aside from this Communist inspired uprising a new threat developed in the southern part of the country. This was the secessionist movement in Mindanao. At the forefront of this movement was the Moro National Liberation (MNLF) which was composed mostly of disgruntled and misguided Muslims.²² This dual threat posed and it is still posing a serious problem to the security of the country. One of the solutions initiated by the government was for the military to conduct counterinsurgency operations or police actions as they are officially referred to. Considering the magnitude of the threat the military had to mobilize all its resources to meet this threat. One of the least tapped resources of the country is the ethnic minorities which can be found in the forest and mountain areas. During the American occupation, some of these ethnic minorities were recruited by the Army and used in its pacification drives against the Moro rebels and Igorot headhunters. When the Japanese invaded the Philippines, some of them were used in the fight against the invaders. At this time the Philippine government is confronted with an enemy that are ideologically motivated, fully armed and well supported. Some of the ethnic minorities were actually influenced to join these so called insurgent groups. In order to fight this enemy effectively, the military, specifically the army used the ethnic minorities in its counterinsurgency operations.

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to investigate and examine the role the natives of the Philippines played in counterinsurgency operations in the country. It is the intention of this thesis to determine whether their employment in such operations were effective and if so, identify those factors that made them so effective. If, on the other hand, they were ineffective, determine the causes why this was so. Effectiveness, in this particular case, will be gauged by looking at several factors: (1) successful accomplishment of the missions entrusted to them, (2) close and friendly relationship between the natives and the regular troops without a feeling of distrust and suspicion, (3) alienation of the natives from the influence of the insurgents, (4) successful containment of the insurgency problem. On the other hand, ineffectiveness will be gauged by looking into these factors: (1) noncooperation of the natives with the military forces, (2) increased insurgent activity particularly in tribal areas, (3) insurgents become stronger and bolder.

Scope

The first chapter will present an introduction of the thesis. A short background on the importance of natives in fighting a limited war is discussed. The purpose, scope, definition of terms and methodology is discussed also in this chapter.

The second chapter will present a review of the literature related to the topic that were used as references in preparing this thesis. Primarily, a total of eight books will be reviewed. Two books regarding the counterinsurgency war in Malaya will be reviewed and they are: The Long Long War by Richard L. Clutterbuck, and Defeating Communist Insurgency by Sir Robert Thompson. Another two books on the war in Laos will be reviewed and they are: North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao by Paul F. Langer and Joseph J. Zasloff and Special Report on Laos of April 1971 by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, US Congress. The last four books to be reviewed will be: The Huk Campaign in the Philippines by Uldarico S. Baclagon, Counter Guerrilla Operations--The Philippine Experience by Napoleon C. Valeriano and Charles T. Bohannon, The Forest, a record of the Huk guerrilla struggle in the Philippines by William J. Pomeroy, and Notes on the New Society by President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

The first part of the third chapter of this thesis will examine the experiences of Malaya and Laos. These two countries typify countries that were deeply involved in an insurgency problem. Both countries fought an enemy that was coming from within but supported from without. Both countries fought an enemy that was of their own kind. Their main difference however, is the fact that in Malaya, the government was successful in solving its insurgency problem.²³ In Laos, the government was not successful. In spite of massive US support, the government did not succeed in its counterinsurgency

operations. In both countries, natives were extensively employed by the government in fighting the insurgents. Although the natives of Malaya are similar in some respect to the natives of Laos, but as a people they are much different. The natives of both countries came from different backgrounds. As such, their cultures are very different. This diversity in their cultural, socio-economic, and sometimes political orientation will affect their usefulness to the government. It is on this context that the attention of this thesis will be focused.

The second part of this chapter will focus mainly on the current situation in the Philippines. Since the end of World War II up to the present, the country has been involved in an insurgency problem which goes off and on depending on the outside support the guerrilla can get. Initially, I will describe the different major native groupings in the country. This is very important because the effective employment of Filipino natives depends, to a great extent, on the type of native groupings they belong. Based on this grouping, the rest of the chapter will examine how the natives were used by the military in various counter-insurgency operations. It is interesting to note that it is not only the government that uses them but also the enemy. In fact, in the present conflict, a particular native group was actually influenced and swayed to join the insurgents. The government, however, through various programs was able to win them back to the side of the government.

The fourth chapter will give an assessment of the Philippine experience in counterinsurgency operations using ethnic minorities. In the assessment, two major key points will be looked into which will be used as the basis in forming a conclusion of this thesis. The first point is the success or failure of the government's policies towards the ethnic minorities. These policies includes the following: resettlement of ethnic minorities in protected areas, attitude of the military towards the ethnic minorities, employment of ethnic minorities in combat/combat support roles, and government support and assistance to the ethnic minorities. The second point is the effectiveness of ethnic minorities in counterinsurgency operations based on the factors enumerated earlier.

The last chapter will give the conclusion as to whether employment of ethnic minorities in counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines is effective and if so, identify those factors that made them effective, so that in the future those same factors will serve as a guide not only for the Philippines but for other countries in conducting counterinsurgency operations using ethnic minorities.

Methodology

The methodology that will be used in this study is an investigation and analysis of the experience of Malaya and Laos in the employment of ethnic minorities in counterinsurgency operations. The investigation was focused on the works of

authoritative authors who are knowledgeable of their subject matter. Congressional report on the US involvement in Laos was a major source of data. From the experiences of these two countries, the Philippine experience will be compared by using also as references the works of Filipino and American writers who are expert on counterinsurgency operations. On the current conflict in the Philippines, in as much as it is still going on and there are no published literatures on the subject, most of the data used as references are based on the experience of the author as an Infantry Battalion Commander for four and a half years in the combat zone in the southern part of the country. From this comparison, the following questions will be answered.

a. What are the government's policies towards the ethnic minorities particularly in resettling them in protected areas?

b. What is the general attitude of the military towards the ethnic minorities?

c. What specific roles are the ethnic minorities playing in the counterinsurgency operations of the military?

d. What support and assistance is the government giving to the ethnic minorities?

Based on the answers from these questions, a logical conclusion will be drawn. This conclusion will determine whether the ethnic minorities in the Philippines are being employed effectively in counterinsurgency operations.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The purpose of this chapter is to review the major sources of materials for this study. Considering the numerous number of books and references that were used, this review will be focused but not necessarily limited to the eight books that were very significant in the preparation of this study. All these books provided valuable information which were used as a basis in formulating the conclusion at the end of this study.

Historical Background on Use of Natives

The Art of War by Sun Tzu is one of the earliest known writings on the subject of war. It was reportedly written in China in the year 500 B.C. Despite its age, most of the strategic theories of Mao Tse-Tung and the tactical doctrine of the Chinese armies were derived from this book. In the chapter on maneuver, Sun Tzu wrote about the importance of using local guides in obtaining information about the terrain. This kind of information is very necessary in maneuvering an army to a vantage position.¹

Philip J. Hathornthwaite's book on Weapons and Equipment of the Napoleonic Wars discussed in detail the irregular forces employed by the various armies during this period. The Russian Army had their Cossacks. They were superb horsemen, loyal to the Czar but undisciplined and

prone to looting and barbarity. The French Army had several units composed of Dutch, Polish, Germans, Italians and even Lithuanian peasants. It was not uncommon during this period for an army to have contingents of foreigners serving in its ranks.²

The Gurkhas by Harold James and Denis Sheil-Small is a story of the Gurkha soldiers from the time they were first organized in 1815 up to the end of the Malayan Emergency in 1961. The Gurkhas are actually the natives of Nepal who were recruited by the British Army and assigned with the Gurkha Rifles. This book tells of the great endurance, bravery and courage far beyond the call of duty of the Gurkha soldiers.³

The History of American Wars-From 1745 to 1918 by T. Harry Williams is an account of the American military experience from 1745 to 1918. Aside from being a purely history of war, included are descriptions of military campaigns particularly those with the Indians. The author gave a very good description of the campaign against Geronimo and how General Crook used friendly Apaches in tracking down the renegade Indians.⁴ This is a very good example of using natives in military operations.

Guerrilla Warrior by Donald Smythe is an account of the early life of John J. Pershing. The book traces the career of Pershing from the time he was a lieutenant of cavalry up to the time he was appointed as head of the American Expeditionary Force to Europe. A large portion of

the book is about the experiences of Pershing in dealing with the Moros of the Philippines. The best description of how Pershing dealt with the Moros is this quotation from the abstract of the book which says:⁵

"Assigned to counterinsurgency operations against the Moro tribesmen in the Philippines, he drew official notice when he won the respect and submission of those fierce warriors by a notable display of fearlessness, diplomacy, and-only if necessary-force."

Defeating Communist Insurgency in Malaya

Sir Robert Thompson, the author of Defeating Communist Insurgency - The lessons of Malaya and Vietnam published in 1966, wrote this book based on his personal experience. He spent twelve years in Malaya during the period known as the Emergency. He spent also four years in Vietnam as head of the British Advisory Mission. Based on his experiences and observations, the author showed how to stop and defeat guerrilla forces short of general war, without too much cost on personnel, money and material.

In the first part of the book the author discussed the three phases of insurgency. He traced the growth of the Communist Party in Malaya and Vietnam and compared the two. After this discussion the author enumerated five basic principles which must be followed in order to counter an insurgency. The first is about a government having a clear political objective. The second is that the government must operate within the limit of the law. The third is for the government to have an overall plan. The fourth is that the

priority of the government must be to defeat the political machinery of the enemy and not the guerrillas. The fifth is for the government to secure its base areas first before it tries to defeat the guerrillas.⁶

The rest of the book is a discussion of these five principles, as they were applied in Malaya by the British government. Chapter eight is devoted solely to a discussion of the British policy towards the aborigines in Malaya. The author explained how the government in Malaya won the assistance and cooperation of the aborigines and how they were employed against the communist terrorists.⁷

Richard L. Clutterbuck, the author of THE LONG LONG WAR which was published in 1966, is a Brigadier in the British Army and was awarded the Order of the British Empire for his service in Malaya from 1956 to 1958. Before his service in Malaya he had participated in counterinsurgency campaigns in Trieste and Palestine. He had served also in France, Belgium, Germany, Egypt, Italy, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Singapore.

In this book, the author traced the history of the Malayan Communist Party, from the time it was first introduced in 1930 up to the time it was put under control in 1950. The first part of the book is devoted mainly to a discussion of the growth of the Communist Party in Malaya and how the British officials were caught unprepared for this emergency. In the second part of the book the author discussed the various countermeasures implemented by the government. In the

third and last part of the book, he analyzed all these counter-measures, their effects on the terrorists and their long term impact on the civil populace. In his conclusion he cited four indicators to determine whether the government is having any progress in its counterinsurgency operations and these are: (1) honesty of the local government officials in doing their job and enforcing law; (2) size of the guerrilla units that operates in a certain area; (3) information about the insurgents being furnished by the people; (4) number of genuine guerrillas surrendering to the government.⁶

The other books that provided valuable information particularly on how the British used the aborigines of Malaya in defeating the Communist Terrorists are the following: The War of the Running Dogs by Noel Barber which was published in 1971 discussed the various tribes and the methods used by the British in winning them over to the government side. The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960 by Anthony Short which was published in 1975 gave a detailed account of the Malayan Emergency. The author gave a very good account of the various programs implemented by the government in winning the "hearts and minds" of the people. Counter-Insurgency Operations: Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare by Julian Paget which was published in 1967 is a very good reference particularly on the counterinsurgency techniques used by both sides. In this book, the author gave a good account of the aborigines that were organized into security forces and the Home Guards. These paramilitary forces

provided very valuable assistance to the regular troops in fighting the Communist Terrorists.

A Report on Laos

The Staff Report on Laos: April 1971 prepared by the Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate is a very enlightening and revealing reference. Although a considerable portion of the report were deleted for security reasons, still a lot of data were retained particularly on the activities of the CIA. The report covered the military situation, air operations, military assistance program, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) activities, Agency for International Development (AID) program and other miscellaneous subjects.

The report stated that the war in Laos was ran by the US Embassy in Vientiane. With regards to the irregular military forces which were composed mostly of ethnic minorities, the CIA was directing the organization, training, and support.² Many important data on CIA activities were deleted particularly on the size of the irregular forces, their leaders, locations and the type and quantity of support they received.

In spite of this gap in the information, the report presented a clear picture of the US involvement in Laos. In conclusion the report stated that in a sense the US were using the Laotian people for US purposes at a heavy cost on Laotian

lives and territory.¹⁰ The attempt to solve what were essentially political and social problems by military force drove the people into the Pathet Lao camp.

The book, North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao - Partners in the struggle for Laos, published in 1970 and written by Paul F. Langer and Joseph J. Zasloff gives a very good description of the problem in Laos. The first part of the book traces the growth of the revolutionary movement in Laos. It is here where the authors discussed in detail the three major ethnic groups in Laos and how they became an influencing factor in the struggle for supremacy between the Pathet Lao or the Communists and the Royal Lao Government.¹¹ The authors also discussed the role of North Vietnam in trying to influence the Pathet Lao in its struggle for control of the central government. On the other hand, the United States also was pumping aid to the Royal Lao Government. The second part of the book, covered the period from July 1962, when the Geneva Agreements on the Neutrality of Laos was signed, to May 1970. The authors gave a chronological account of the major events that happened in Laos particularly those involving the United States, North Vietnam, and the three contending factions in Laos.¹²

The emphasis of the authors, however, in writing the book is to highlight the involvement of North Vietnam in their effort to shape the destiny of Laos. On this aspect, the authors gave three fundamental objectives of North Vietnam:

(1) establish a regime in Laos that is politically friendly

to North Vietnam, (2) have an access to South Vietnam through Laos, and (3) protect the borders of North Vietnam.¹³ In their assessment at the end of the book, the authors discussed how North Vietnam was able to pursue these objectives despite the intervention by the United States. The following factors worked in favor of North Vietnam in attaining their objectives: (1) close historical associations since ancient times, (2) Lao Communist leaders closely associated with North Vietnamese leaders, (3) Vietnamese advisers are distributed in all Laotian Communist organizations, (4) common external policy, and (5) Laotian Communist leaders are selected by Hanoi.¹⁴

Two other references provided very good information about the Hill tribes of Laos. Laos Buffer State or Battleground by Hugh Toye which was published in 1968 provided interesting accounts about the hill tribes since the French occupied Laos up to the American involvement in Indo China. The other reference is the thesis by Howard J. Johnston entitled "The Tribal Soldier: A Study of the Manipulation of Ethnic Minorities" which was published in the Naval War College Review in January 1967. In his study, the author discussed in detail the characteristics of the Laos and how they were manipulated and exploited as a people.

Huk Campaign in the Philippines

Uldarico S. Baclagon, the author of Lessons from The Huk Campaign in the Philippines published in 1960, is a retired Colonel from the Philippine Army. He was a professor of History of Military Art at the Philippine Military Academy. He was also an instructor of Infantry Tactics at the Infantry School, Philippine Army. Aside from this book he is also the author of three other books on Philippine campaigns.

In this book about the lessons from the Huk Campaign, the author discussed several lessons learned based on actual events. These events were categorized based on tactical and operational concepts like intelligence, civilian cooperation, leadership, offensive, surprise, security, mobility, weather and terrain, deception, planning, coordination and training. These events were actually the after operations reports that were submitted by the Operation officer, Commanding Officer, or the officer involved in the operation.

In his conclusion about civilian cooperation, the author stated that cooperation of the civilians is of utmost importance but that cooperation should not be demanded by force. During military operations, the commander must not totally depend on civilian assistance for the success of his operation. Instead, the commander should give them guidance so that their efforts will be directed towards assisting the

troops in the accomplishment of the mission. Finally, the author concluded that to maintain the cooperation of the civilians, compensation and assistance should always be considered however, the commander must not promise something that he cannot fulfill or which is not backed by higher headquarters.¹⁵

Napoleon D. Valeriano and Charles F.R. Bohannon concluded in their book, COUNTER-GUERRILLA OPERATIONS the Philippine Experience, which was published in 1962, that convincing the people of a country that the government and the military are working for their welfare is the most important lesson in counter guerrilla operations.¹⁶

In their book the authors tried to define a guerrilla by answering the question: What and why is a guerrilla?¹⁷ From this, the authors proceeded to outline the different countermeasures to be followed in fighting a guerrilla movement. Specific examples were given to support the validity of these techniques. Their examples were actual events that happened in the Philippines. This was easy for the authors, because Valeriano was a Battalion Commander of the 7th Battalion Combat Team, a unit that made a record for being one of the best fighting battalions of the army.

In outlining the different countermeasures, they cited three target objectives in order to attain success. First is the guerrilla and how to suppress them. To successfully fight a guerrilla who is supposed to be an expert in unconventional warfare, the authors used the old motto "Find 'Em,

Fight 'Em, Finish 'Em" and in addition "Fool 'Em!"¹⁸ Second are the civilians and how to win them to the side of the government. To accomplish this objective, three elements are necessary and these are: improved military command and leadership, military organization that is sensitive to the needs of the populace, and an effective program tailored to the attitudes of the people.¹⁹ Third is the nation and how to convince the nation that the military is working for their welfare. This objective can only be attained if all government officials to include the military will keep in mind that the ultimate goal of any government is the welfare of the governed.²⁰

The Forest which was published in 1963, is a personal account of William J. Pomeroy when he spent two years with the Huks in the forests of the Philippines. The author was a U.S. Army historian in the Philippines attached to the Fifth Air Force during the second world war. After the war, he went back to the Philippines as a free-lance writer. Later, he studied at the University of the Philippines where he met Celia Mariano, daughter of the University auditor. In 1948 they were married. In 1950, they joined the Huk movement as instructors and writers. Two years later, they were captured by the government forces. After ten years of imprisonment, they were released from prison and given pardon. William J. Pomeroy was deported to the U.S. while his wife was not allowed to accompany him.

In his account during their two years of constant travelling in the mountainous areas of the country, the author found out that the Dumagats cannot be trusted. The Dumagats are the ethnic minorities in the Sierra Madre mountains of northern Luzon. Having lived in these areas since childhood, these people know all the hidden trails and shortcuts across mountains. They were very valuable as guides and couriers and the Huks exploited the Dumagats.²¹ Their value however, diminished because of their unreliability. As the author found out in his travels, the Dumagats are loyal only to his clan and his chieftain. To be sure of their loyalty, they had to be threatened and coerced.²² This kind of loyalty is not good if the life of a person is at stake.

The last book to be reviewed is Notes on the New Society of the Philippines published in 1973 by President Ferdinand E. Marcos of the Philippines. In this book, the President narrated the sequence of events which led to the proclamation of martial law on September 21, 1972.²³ His narration of the different events supported by documents and information which he alone possessed as the highest official of the country makes the book a very authentic and authoritative document. The first part of the book deals with the different factors affecting the peace and economic conditions of the country. In the second part of the book, the President outlined the objectives of martial law and the different programs of the new government. Chapter three deals with the program of upliftment for the poor.²⁴

Chapter four deals on the question of equality. Equality here means equal opportunity for all Filipinos. The most important chapter of the book is the one which deals with the programs to conquer poverty.²⁵ All these various programs will have an effect on the current insurgency problem of the country. Hand in hand with the military operations of the military, these various programs, which are aimed towards the masses, will make counterinsurgency operations easier and credible.

The other references that were used about the Philippines are the following: Peoples of the Philippines by Herbert Krieger which was published in 1942 gives a detailed description of the different natives in the Philippines. Although the book is quite old but the data about the natives are still accurate. Marcos on the Armed Forces which was edited by Jose Crisol, who is the current Deputy Minister of Defense for Home Defense describes in detail the current threat to the country and how the Armed Forces of the Philippines is meeting the threat. The emphasis of the book is on the military, and how the military is being organized, trained and equipped to fight the threat. And lastly, Marcos and Martial Law in the Philippines which was edited by David A. Rosenberg and published in 1979. This is the most current book about Martial Law in the Philippines. This book is a collection of the works of five authors two of whom are Filipinos and three are Americans. This book gives a balanced analysis of the martial law regime up to 1975. It

delved in detail into the ideology and practice in the "New Society" and it also examines and analyzes the various programs under martial law like the land, political and economic reforms.

CHAPTER 3

COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN MALAYA, LAOS AND PHILIPPINES

Malaya and the Communist Terrorist

Communism was formally introduced in British Malaya in the 1920's when Chinese immigrants in large numbers settled down in that country. Most of these immigrants were members of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern. Their initial targets were the students in Chinese schools and the Chinese laborers in the ports, rubber plantations and tin mines.¹ These early organizers of the Communist Party in Malaya were very orderly and did not create any trouble for the government. As such, these people were not considered a threat to the security of the colonial government. After the defeat of the British during the Second World War, the Communists were the only party left capable of fighting the Japanese in a resistance type movement.² Because of their determination to fight the Japanese, the British and Americans supplied them with firearms and other war materials. After the war most of these firearms were no longer recovered.³ The Second World War had two major impacts which strengthened the communist movement in Malaya.⁴

a. The British defeat in the Far East compared to the Russian victories over the German armies as well as the victory of Mao Tse-Tung over Chiang Kai-Shek gave a much

needed prestige to the communist movement in Malaya.

b. The war made the people especially those in the rural areas aware of the world around them. For the first time, people saw the modern implements of war. They were also subjected to political propaganda not only from the Japanese but from the Allied side. All these created among the people a feeling of wanting to be free from any colonial power.

After the war the British re-occupied Malaya. The Malayan Communist Party was not strong enough to oppose the British, so they agreed to disband its armed units in exchange for some concessions from the British. One of these concessions was for the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) to be recognized as a legal party. In this way they were hoping to strengthen the Party, increase the mass base or the support of the people and eventually throw out the British. Unfortunately, it did not work out that way. The MCP made little appeal to the people and instead of gaining ground it lost ground. So in June 1948, the MCP reverted to the "armed struggle" and this was the start of the Malayan Emergency.⁵

The Malayan Emergency and how the British coped with it is one of the classic example of how to fight and defeat a guerrilla movement. During that emergency which covered the period from 1948-1961, Malaya was still under British rule. So it was the British who provided the direction, manpower and logistics to fight the Communist Terrorists (CT's) who were about to overrun the whole countryside. Were it not for

the dedication of the British officials, and the complete and unwavering cooperation of the Malayan people, then Malaya today would be like Vietnam, Kampuchea or Laos. Behind this spectacular success were the hardships endured by the British and the Malay people.

Aborigines of Malaya

Among those who suffered the most were the various natives of Malaya particularly the Abos, Sum-Sums, and the Ibans or Dyaks. There is no accurate record as to the exact number of aboriginal tribes in Malaya but a safe estimate would be in the range of between fifty and one hundred thousand.⁶ These aborigines were the earliest known inhabitants of the islands. They were much ahead of the Malays and the Chinese from the Asian mainland and as such these aborigines were wary and suspicious of other people who do not belong to their tribe. Due to the expansion of the different settlements and the advancement of civilization into the tribal areas, these different tribes were pushed back into the hinterlands of Malaya.

The population of Malaya is composed mostly of three racial groups: Malays, Chinese and a mixture of Indian and Pakistani.⁷ In addition to these three major racial groups are the aborigines who inhabit the hinterlands and jungles of Malaya. The British refers to these aborigines generally as the Abos. The Abos consists of many tribes and they are scattered throughout the whole country. A tribal group has its own specific area in the forest which the group considers

as its own domain. The northern tribes which inhabit the areas bordering with Thailand are called the Sum-Sums. The tribes in the central and southern part of the country are generally referred to by the British as the Abos, the tribes in Borneo are called the Ibans or Dyaks. Figure 1 shows graphically the general distributions of these various tribal groups.

Each tribe exists as a separate and distinct community with a well-defined boundary. These tribes regard the jungle as their own by virtue of their right of occupation and custom.⁸ These various tribes of Malaya live a semi-nomadic life. The basic structure of their society is the family and a group of families constitute a tribal group. Usually the families in one tribal group are related to each other either by blood or by marriage. Normally a tribal group consists of twenty to one hundred members depending on the size of the families. Because of their suspicion on the people in the lowlands, they usually stay in areas which are very far from civilization. Most often they are three to four days march from populated areas. The families live in bamboo houses along the banks of the rivers and streams. For their food they depend on fishing on these streams and from time to time catch some game animals with the use of their blowpipes. Some natives however, practice what is known as "shifting cultivation." This simply means that a certain tribe clears a portion of a forest of trees and vegetation and plants rice and tapioca. After two or three planting seasons, when the

soil is no longer productive, the tribe shift to another area and starts the whole process over again.⁹

In 1948 when the emergency started in Malaya, the government, particularly the British officials running the country, did not have a definite policy concerning these various tribal groups. The aborigines were practically left to themselves in their natural habitat in the forests and jungles of Malaya. Because of government's indifference towards the aborigines, these people became an easy prey for the CT's. These were some of the reasons why the CT's were able to get the sympathy and support of the aborigines during the early stage of the emergency.¹⁰

a. During the Japanese occupation, the CT's and the aborigines were working together in fighting the Japanese.

b. The CT's were the only people from outside their tribe who were always in contact with the aborigines.

c. The aborigines were ignorant of the issues and to them the British were just like the Japanese, so that the CT's should be helped in fighting the foreigners.

d. The CT's used propaganda, persuasion and sometimes coercion.

As a result of this friendly relationship between the CT's and the aborigines, the CT's were able to convince the aborigines to plant and grow rice and tapioca. The aborigines were also used to gather and carry supplies. In some instances, they were used as guides and spies. These natives were not necessarily pro communist or communist sympathizers

but because they had no other choice, they were forced to be on the side of the CT.¹¹ In the Malay--Thai border which was the sanctuary of Chin Peng, a CT leader, and his four hundred hard core guerrillas, a group of aborigines called the Sum-Sums became friendly with the CT's. The reason for this was that the CT's helped the Sum-Sums in their cultivation and the planting of rice. At harvest time, the CT's buy the rice at a price more than the prevailing price. In this way the CT's were able to gain the support and cooperation of the natives.¹² Because of the increasing strength of the CT's and the support they were getting from the aborigines, the government was faced with two major problems:

a. How to win back the natives from the insurgents and prevent them from being influenced by the CT's.

b. How to improve the living conditions of the natives, raise their living standard and assimilate them so that they can participate in the government in the future.

To solve these problems, the British administration in Malaya initially appointed P.R.D. Williams-Hunt, as Protector of Aborigines. Williams-Hunt was a competent archeologist and he had a talent for ethnological work. He was also determined to spend his life working with the aborigines. Williams-Hunt realized that the aborigines were not only commercially exploited but also subject to insensitive treatment by the government.¹³ In December 1949, this particular problem was discussed at King's House, wherein the Army, the Police Commissioner and Williams-Hunt were present.

They agreed that their immediate step must be how to control the aborigines, and this could be done only through the establishment of military or police posts in the jungle where the aborigines are located.¹⁴ The Army and the Police however, were hesitant to take this job because of the difficulty in maintaining these deep outposts. As a solution, an Aboriginal Areas Constabulary was organized composed of Malays, with some Indians and aborigines and European officers. This was in 1950, and this special unit was commanded by J.A. Hyslop. The first step taken by this unit was to put up resettlement sites. These resettlement sites were near population centers where they can be guarded and secured at all times. The aborigines were then removed from the jungle and put in these resettlement sites. In this way, the CT's were deprived of their sources of food and manpower and at the same time cut off their influence among the aborigines.

One problem however resulted from this arrangement. The natives, because of their long isolation in the forests and jungles, did not possess the necessary immunity against civilized diseases such as the common colds, measles, and other non fatal diseases. As a result, these non fatal diseases became fatal to them and many of them died in these new environment. The government realizing the futility of this solution allowed the natives to return to their natural habitat--the forest.¹⁵

Again, these natives became an easy prey to the CT's who were in need of food supplies, porters and guides. By this time the British realized that they had to do something drastic or else the entire aborigines of Malaya would be on the side of the CT's. Finally, they came up with the idea of establishing jungle forts near the tribal areas of these natives. To do this they were very careful to see to it that these forts not interfere with the normal daily routine of the natives in the area. They did not want the same mistake to happen again because, instead of getting the support and cooperation of the natives, they would be alienating them.

To accomplish this delicate task the Special Air Service (SAS) Regiment was tasked to establish the initial friendly contact with the natives. Teams of SAS troops were dropped by parachute near the jungle settlements of the natives. Without bothering the aborigines or interfering with their lives the SAS troopers lived just like the natives did. After several days of a wait-and-see game, a medical officer would provide medical care for these natives. Little by little the entire native population of the area would have visited the medical clinic. Eventually, these natives realized that the SAS would do more for them than the guerrillas.¹⁶

Having established the initial contact and getting the desired response, the next step in the process was to develop these posts into a system of jungle forts. Using

local materials such as bamboos and trees and resupplied by air the SAS troops constructed makeshift forts which served as their patrol bases. The natives also assisted in the construction of these forts. These forts had a dual purpose: They served as advance bases for the troops and they served also as intelligence outposts for gathering information on the whereabouts of the CTs in the area. With the establishment of these forts near the settlements of the natives, some sort of symbiotic relationship existed between the natives and the troops. The natives provided a screen by warning the troops of enemy approach or presence in the area. The troops on the other hand provided security to the natives by preventing the CT's from coercing or harassing them. For greater security for both, the natives shifted their cultivation around the forts.¹⁷

In one particular area near the Malay--Thai border where the group of Chin Peng and his four hundred followers established rapport with the Sum-Sums in the area, the government concentrated its efforts to win back these natives. This particular area was very critical because it was the only land avenue for smuggling arms and supplies to the CT's from the north. Once this route is sealed the guerrilla movement could be easily contained. The only feasible solution open to the government was to give and provide the natives with more of the things they needed than the CT's could give them. These are security, education, medical care and easier market for their crop. From this experience, the

British realized that killing insurgents alone is not the solution in countering communist subversion. They realized that economic development goes hand in hand with military operations. So the British started to develop rural and remote areas.¹⁸

With this very successful experiment, the government was able to control the aborigines and at the same time contain the CT's in Malaya. Counterinsurgency operations involve the use of the righthand and the lefthand method. This means that while the righthand is used to shoot and kill the guerrillas, the lefthand is used to encourage them to surrender. The government in Malaya was very successful in these and the aborigines played a vital role in both.

In the right hand method of fighting insurgents, the aborigines played three vital roles: First, they were used by the British as guides and porters during military operations. As mentioned earlier, with the establishment of jungle forts, various tribal groups were put under protective control by the government. With the presence of these forts, there were more contacts between the aborigines and the government. The government, realizing the need to win the support of the aborigines provided assistance in crop planting, health and hygiene. In return for these services, the aborigines were very willing to provide guides and porters during military operations. Having grown up and lived in the jungle all their lives, the aborigines were very reliable and dependable guides. As porters or supply carriers, they are strong and sturdy and

really very suitable for this job.¹⁹ Among the aborigines, the Ibans from Borneo were the best trackers. They can easily spot a crushed leaf or a broken twig and from these determine how many men had passed through the place. The Ibans together with the use of trained dogs were very successful in tracking down and finding arm cache, food and supply dumps of the guerrillas.²⁰

Second, they were used to gather and provide information on the whereabouts of the insurgents. Because of their earlier association with the CT's, the aborigines knew most of the CT's by face if not by names. There was one constraint however, when it comes to providing information about the CT's. A tribal group will never provide information about a CT group if the aborigines believe that another tribal group is sympathetic or helping that CT group. Also, they will not provide information if the CT's are located near a tribal group village or area.²¹ Because of this, the British organized the Aborigine Research and Interrogation Section located on the jungle edge near Kuala Lumpur.²² Its main mission was to direct the collection of information using aborigines to the maximum.

Third, some aborigines were organized into small units to track down and kill CT's. Aborigines volunteers were formed into Operational Sections composed of twelve men and attached to Infantry Battalions for duties in the jungle.²³ As part of a larger unit they were very effective in performing the following:

a. Providing skill and expertise in tracking down the CT's.

b. Going out on patrol as a specialized unit composed solely of aborigines but led by British officers.

c. Fighting the CT's as part of a Battalion.

Other aborigines were organized into the so-called Home Guards and they were issued firearms. The Home Guards were military type organizations composed of civilians and were tasked to perform the following:²⁴

a. Provide security for their own villages thus freeing the security forces from static duties.

b. Serve as a valuable link between the security forces and the populace.

c. Provide valuable information about the CT's.

As mentioned earlier, hand in hand with the military operations is the left hand method whereby the guerrillas are encouraged to return to the folds of the law. The aborigines played a very vital role in this kind of operations by:

a. serving as points of contacts for guerrillas who wants to surrender but afraid to go directly to the authorities.

b. serving as liaison and couriers during negotiations for surrenders.

c. serving as guides in locating areas in the jungle where guerrillas would like to surrender.

As part of the left hand method of fighting guerrillas, the government launched psychological operations not

only to gain the allegiance and cooperation of the people but also to deprive the CT's of the people's support. A good example of this was the government's policy of not harming innocent civilians. In conducting military operations against the guerrillas, the government was very careful not to kill indiscriminately. They knew that the guerrillas look and act like the ordinary people so they had to be very careful lest they kill an innocent person. Particularly in air support operations, inhabited villages were never shelled, bombed or strafed. They knew that one aborigine woman or child killed, wounded or maimed, would have a lasting scar on hundreds of "hearts and minds."²⁵ This policy was very successful and the aborigines cooperated fully with the government. In fact one tribal group was instrumental in the surrender of guerrilla leader Osman China and his followers. After the surrender of Osman China, other guerrillas were either killed, captured or surrendered.²⁶ A few however still remained in the mountains and these are the insurgents that are now giving the Malaysian government a problem. So many Abos received rewards from the government for information that led to the capture or surrender of the guerrillas.²⁷

The counterinsurgency operations in Malaya produced the highest objective of civil-military cooperation, and if for anything else, it demonstrated that it is a decisive factor not only in defeating insurgents but also in establishing political stability in the area.²⁸

Summary

In summary, the following key points were noted:

- a. At the start of the Malayan Emergency the aborigines were on the side of the CT's.
- b. Initially, the government did not have a definite policy towards the aborigines.
- c. The government put up an office solely to look after the affairs of the aborigines.
- d. The aborigines were reliable as guides, trackers and porters.
- e. As spies and sources of information the aborigines were not reliable.
- f. The aborigines were good fighters as part of a regular infantry unit or if led by good officers.
- g. Relocation of aborigines in safe areas was not successful.
- h. Establishment of jungle forts to secure tribal habitats were very effective.
- i. As liaison and couriers during surrender negotiations, the aborigines were very useful.

Laos and the Pathet Lao

Another country that was confronted with an insurgency problem is Laos. For the purpose of this study I will limit the time frame during the American involvement in Laos. At the time when the whole of the Indo-China was under the French, there was very little if any, involvement by the

hill tribes in counterinsurgency operations. In fact there were some criticisms by the Americans that the French did not try to enlist the support of the hill tribes into the Laotian Army. This observation however is not true because the French actually used some of them. Several battalions of Thais were incorporated into the French Army and they fought at Dien Bien Phu.²⁹ As to the recent conflict in Laos where the Laotian government was confronted by the Pathet Lao³⁰ in a struggle for the control of the country, the hill tribes were overly exploited to the extent that their usefulness to the government was greatly diminished.

The revolutionary movement in Laos started during the Second World War. After the fall of France, the possibility that French protection might be withdrawn in the future created some doubts in the minds of some Laotian intellectuals.³¹ A group of Laotian students plotted a coup against the French but this initial attempt failed.

From this very first attempt at revolutionary struggle against a ruling power, a series of violent and sometimes bloody uprisings occurred. When Japan surrendered in 1945, the king of Laos, King Sisavong Vong proclaimed the independence of Laos.³² One year later, this independence came to an end when the French reoccupied Laos. This French reoccupation continued up to 1954.³³ After the defeat of the French in Indo-China particularly at Dien Bien Phu, France decided to withdraw from Laos. The Geneva conference of 1954 provided for the settlement of all conflicts and the withdrawal

of all foreign troops in the country. This refers to the French and the Vietnamese forces who went to Laos to help in the fight against the French.³⁴ When Laos finally gained its independence in 1954, the power to rule was given to the Royal Lao Government.³⁵ The Pathet Lao because of their contribution in the struggle for independence was given a role in the new government. Pathet Lao forces were integrated into the national army.³⁶

This arrangement of sharing power did not work out well. The Royal Lao Government instituted measures to consolidate its powers by isolating and attacking Pathet Lao forces. On the part of the Pathet Lao, it tried to strengthen its political and military position by:³⁷

- a. Asking for military assistance from North Vietnam
- b. Recruiting supporters from the people
- c. Conducting offensive operations against the government.

During this time, the United States was already supporting the Royal Lao Government, though not openly. US technicians training the Royal Lao Army were in civilian clothes.³⁸

As a result of this continued turmoil in Laos, another conference on Laos was held in Geneva in 1962. This time a ceasefire was arranged and both the US and the USSR guaranteed the neutrality and independence of Laos. A coalition government was formed comprising the three warring factions: The Rightists, the Neutralists, and the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS).³⁹ The NLHS is actually the same as the Pathet

Lao of the previous years. This troika government did not last very long. In less than a year the NLHS and the Neutralist merged in order to fight the Rightists. The Rightists in turn tried to maneuver its forces in order to destroy the NLHS. In theory Laos had a tripartite government, but in practice it was a government of two contending factions: the Royal Lao Government and the NLHS. As before, the United States supported the Royal Lao Government while North Vietnam supported the NLHS. This continued struggle for supremacy involved all of the people of Laos and one of those that suffered the most were the hill tribes of Laos.

The Hill Tribes

The population of Laos is composed of the predominant Lao (the Lao Loum) and the three ethnic groups composed of: the Meo (or Lao Soung), the Tai, and the Kha (or Lao Theung). Figure 2 shows graphically the distribution of these ethnic groups in the whole country. The Lao people can be found mostly in the Plains and the lowlands. The Meos who are of Tibeto-Burman stock are still living a seminomadic life in the northern regions of the country. The Meos are known for their fighting skill. The Tais are scattered in the mountainous northern and northeastern regions of the country. These people are generally fluent in Lao and in Vietnamese. The Khas who have been dominated and exploited by the lowland Lao can be found in the mountain areas of South Laos. Even the name Kha means slave. It can be said that the Lao inhabit




Figure 2

the lowlands, the Tai the valleys, the Khas the mountains and the Meos the mountain tops.⁴⁰ Because of the geographical location of the Tais, the Khas, and the Meos, these ethnic groups became involved in the constant power struggle between the Royal Lao Government and the Communist. The communist revolutionaries who were operating in these region were determined to get the support of these people. On the part of the government and its US advisers, they were also determined to get the loyalty and cooperation of the hill tribes.

In the pursuit of this objective, the Royal Lao Government encountered three major obstacles: The first major obstacle was the unreliability of the hill tribes, especially the Meos. During the time of the French occupation of Laos they found out that the Meos were "too self-centered to be useful." They said that the Meos "will fight for himself, his hilltops, his family, but for very little else." During the American involvement in Laos, the Meos would accept everything that the Americans would give them such as arms, ammunitions, supplies and food but afterwards instead of fighting the guerrillas, they would use these arms against their own enemies and for their own purposes. Because of this the Meos were not considered a very reliable ally in war.⁴¹ The second major obstacle was the power of the tribal chief over his followers. The loyalty and cooperation of a tribal group is determined by the chieftain and tribal chief.⁴² Individual members will follow blindly the decision of their tribal chief. As a result, the Royal Lao Government had a

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difficult time recruiting from among the members of the hill tribes. They had to deal with each individual tribal chief. The third major obstacle was the effect of the propaganda used by the Pathet Lao in getting the support and allegiance of the hill tribes. Borrowing the slogan used by the Chinese in Yunan which says "One nation composed of several peoples" and further assuring the mountain people that their customs, traditions, languages and method of writing will be preserved, the Pathet Lao was able to get their cooperation and allegiance. At the same time the Pathet Lao publicized the fact that the Royal Lao government symbolized oppressions and commanded no respect from the minorities while the Pathet Lao are their friends and their protectors. This type of propaganda went well with the hill tribes and as a consequence these people were not much of a help to the government.⁴³

Despite these major obstacles, the Americans were still able to get plenty of volunteers from among the hill tribes. The two primary reasons why many tribesmen volunteered are: First, they are guaranteed to receive their pay and their ration unlike in the Royal Lao Army. Second, in case they become casualties, they are assured of evacuation by Air America helicopters and subsequent hospitalization and medical care in a U.S. field hospital. Again, this privilege is not guaranteed in the Royal Lao Army. In 1967, the irregular forces totaled 37,800.⁴⁴

Through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Agency for International Development (AID), the hill tribes

were organized, trained, equipped supported and paid. Those two US agencies worked together in organizing the hill tribes, especially the Meos who were more warlike than the other tribes. The CIA trained and advised these irregular forces while the AID provided the food and equipment through the military assistance program. Irregular forces were organized nationwide to include the forces of Gen Vang Pao. Gen Vang Pao was the leader of the Meos. These irregular forces of Meos became the striking forces of the military while the regular forces were given the job of conducting static defences.⁴⁵

The brunt of the fighting fell on the shoulders of the irregular forces particularly the Meos. The US found out that the most effective force in Laos are the irregular forces and not the Royal Lao Army.⁴⁶ The reasons for this are: First, there is greater flexibility in employing the irregular forces than the army. The army cannot just be deployed from one area to another without the approval of the regional commander in the area while the irregular force can be deployed anywhere. Second, the irregular forces are considered to be more disciplined and better capable of conducting unit operations independently.⁴⁷

As a result of this too much dependence on the irregular forces, casualty was very heavy. For the period from 1968 to April of 1971, the irregular forces lost 8,020 killed in action while the Royal Lao Army lost only 3,664 killed in action. On enemy losses, the irregular forces killed 22,726

of the enemy while the Royal Lao Army killed only 8,522 of the enemy.⁴⁸ Of the Meo forces alone under Gen Vang Pao, from 1967 to 1971, it suffered a casualty of 3,272 killed and 5,426 wounded.⁴⁹ Because of this high mortality rate, Gen Vang Pao could not replace his casualties with additional manpower. The manpower base in Laos especially the Meos was exhausted because it was not only the US that was recruiting for the irregular forces but also the Royal Lao Army and the Pathet Lao. As a result, the US had to recruit Thai "volunteers" and brought them to Laos and fought as part of the irregular force.⁵⁰

These tremendous losses in personnel coupled with the fact that it was hard to recruit replacements much less train and equip them contributed to the eventual ineffectiveness of the irregular forces particularly the Meos under Gen Vang Pao.

As to the outcome of the insurgency problem in Laos, there were so many factors why the US did not succeed in putting down the communist movement. These are beyond the scope of this study, however, one of those factors I believe was improper employment of the hill tribes.

Summary

In summary, the following key points were noted:

- a. Among the hill tribes of Laos, only the Meos were considered good fighters.
- b. Their loyalty first and foremost was to themselves,

their tribe and their tribal chief.

c. For a long time, the hill tribes were exploited by the Lao majority so that these people fought the Pathet Lao not for love of country but for the payment and supplies they receive from the US.

d. The attrition rate among the hill tribes was very high because they were employed in combat operations most of the time.

e. Replacement of casualties was not available because of manpower scarcity among the hill tribes.

Huk Movement in the Philippines

Even before the start of the Second World War, there was already some form of unrest in the Philippines. With the rise to power of Communism in Russia, that form of ideology was exported to other countries. Because of the appeal of Communism especially to the oppressed and the underprivileged, that ideology was easily embraced by the farmers and peasants of central Luzon where the landlords and the moneyed people were exploiting the masses.⁵¹ Before the movement grew into a big proportion, the Japanese invaded the country. For a time the movement died down.

When the guerrilla movement came into being, and American arms and supplies were brought into the country by submarines, the communist movement received its share of arms and supplies because it was allied with the guerrilla movement in fighting the Japanese. After liberation and when

the country was finally granted its independence from the United States, the Communist movement resurfaced again because they wanted their share in government participation. By this time they were called the Huks, because during the days of occupation they were called (Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon) or People's Army against Japan.⁵²

Believing that they did not received a fair share in running the new government, the Huks went back to the mountains to fight the government. They tried to get what they want by force. With the arms they received from the Americans during the war, the Huks were fully armed and fully equipped when they started fighting the government. The fighting continued until the late fifties and after a while it died down. This was due to military operations coupled with economic, social and political reforms in the affected areas. At the beginning of the 1970's, the movement resurfaced again because of deteriorating political and economic conditions in some parts of the country. This time the movement assumed a different name. This was due to the fact that in the late sixties, a split in the leadership of the Huk movement occurred.

Young intellectuals disagreed with the policies of the old timers so much so that a splinter group was formed. This group formed their own party and organized the NPA (New Peoples Army) as their military arm to carry out their military policies. While the Huks were Moscow oriented, the NPA was Maoist oriented, but both were pursuing the same goal

and that is to overthrow the government. To meet the threat and at the same time remove the root cause of the problem, the President had to declare Martial Law in order to reform the political, economic and social structure of the country.⁵³ The declaration of Martial law was very timely because before the year was over, a new form of insurgency cropped up in the southern part of the country. This is the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front). This is a secessionist movement advocated by some of the radical Muslims in Mindanao. Being Muslims they were able to get the support of other Muslim countries in their struggle to secede from the Philippines. Because of this support from other countries in terms of firearms, ammunitions, supplies and money, the movement grew into such a proportion that at one time the government forces were on the defensive.⁵⁴ The situation however was immediately stabilized when the government started harnessing its manpower and resources to meet the threat.

Countering the Threat

At the early stage of the insurgency problem, which covered the period from 1946 to 1957, the government was confronted only with the Huk insurrection.⁵⁵ This insurrection was concentrated only in the main island of Luzon and in the island of Panay in the south. To meet and solve this problem, the government launched a two-pronged attack. One of these was the full scale military operations to contain, isolate, and force the Huks on the defensive. At the same

time this will pressure them to abandon their cause and surrender. The other thrust of the government was to institute social and economic reforms. This was the brain-child of then President Ramon Magsaysay. His method of disciplining the army so that military abuses were eradicated, and at the same time instituting economic and social reforms gained world-wide attention. It was through his efforts that this initial insurgency threat was contained.⁵⁶

At the outbreak of the second insurgency problem during the early seventies, the insurrection started in the northeastern part of Luzon.⁵⁷ This was followed later by the secessionist movement in Mindanao which started attacking government forces in Sulu and Cotabato in Mindanao. To meet this double threat, the government launched a double strategy to solve the problem. Realizing from past experience that military solution alone will not solve the problem, political alternatives were looked into. The problem in the north needed a different approach than the one in the south. The insurgents in the north, which were composed mostly of NPA's could be solved using the same techniques instituted by President Magsaysay during the early fifties.⁵⁸ The insurgents in the south, composed of Muslim terrorists needed a different approach. These terrorists were well-armed, well-supported, and were fighting for a cause other than economic and social justice. They were fighting for the division of the country. The government instituted several measure to solve the problem and these are:⁵⁹

- a. Diplomatic initiatives to cut off external support to the terrorists.
- b. Political reforms by means of organizing two autonomous regions run by Muslim officials.
- c. Economic development of the area through infrastructure, electrification, extension of bank loans, formation of cooperatives and encouragement for government and private investments in the area.
- d. Educational and social reforms through adult education, vocational training and greater Muslim Christian interaction.
- e. Greater incentives for surrenderees such as bank loans with their firearms as collaterals, Presidential amnesty, enlistment with the army for those who are eligible and incorporation to the civilian House Defense Force for the others.

With the series of police actions to locate and arrest the terrorists, and the attractive offers by the government, terrorists by the hundreds surrendered to the government.⁶⁰ Only those who were really considered hard core terrorists remained in the mountains. These are the terrorists that up to this time are still fighting the forces of the government.

Because of this threat from the NPA and the Muslim terrorists, all the resources of the government were harnessed to fight and defeat both enemies. While the country was not lacking in manpower resources, but the burden of defending the country had to be borne by everybody. One of

the least tapped resources of the country are the natives. Filipino natives refers to the hill tribes that are still living in the forest and mountainous areas of the country. In spite of the progress in communication, education, and transportation, there are still several groups of people that persists to stay in their natural habitat-the forest- because it is there where they find their basic necessities such as food, clothing and shelter.

Types of Natives

In the main island of Luzon there are three major native groups that are of significance. Figure 3 shows the distribution of these natives throughout the country. One of these are the Negritos.⁶¹ They are found mostly in the mountains and forested areas on the northeastern part of the island. They are the earliest known immigrants to the Philippines and they are known by other names such as Aeta and Ati. They are black-skinned pygmy type people with frizzy hair. Their origin is unclear but their feature resemble very much certain African pygmy tribes. So, it is possible that these people may have travelled from Africa through the Middle East, to the Asian mainland and down to the Philippines where the country was still connected by land bridges with the Asian mainland. Another possible theory is that these people may have travelled by rafts across the oceans. Their origin is immaterial in this study. What is important is that these hill tribes are inhabiting the mountainous areas

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
 Negritos

 Igorots, Ifugaos, Ilongots


 Dumagats


 Maranaos

 Maguindanaos




 Manobos

 Subanons

 Tausogs

 Samals



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Figure 3

of northeastern Luzon and their presence in these areas played a very important role in the counterinsurgency operation of the government. One very distinct characteristic of the Negritos is the fact that they are a mild and peaceful people, and they are contented to stay in their mountain habitat without bothering the people in the lowlands. Some subsist mainly on hunting and fishing using primitive implements, and most often on wild fruits which are abundant in the forest.⁶² There are more or less 30,000 scattered all over the country, but a majority of them can be found in Luzon.⁶³

The other group of natives in the island of Luzon are the mountain tribes in the northern central provinces. These are the Igorots, Ifugaos and the Ilongots.⁶⁴ These natives have sturdy bodies, shorter legs, and broader nose. They are accustomed to living in colder climates which can be found in the higher mountain ranges of the island. Their physical structure gives them the stamina and strength to walk in rugged and mountainous terrain. This tribe of natives are more warlike than the Negritos. They still practice their age old traditions which are no longer acceptable in the civilized world. For example if a member of a family is harmed by a member of another family, the relatives of the former will never stop until they have taken revenge even after several generations later. Tribal wars are still common wherein one tribe will fight another tribe for various reasons like family honor. Another tribal tradition still being

practiced by the Igorots is their practice of trial marriage and premarital promiscuity.⁶⁵ This is not very surprising however because even in modern society this is also practiced.

The third group of natives in the island of Luzon are the Dumagats which are found in the forest and mountain ranges of Rizal province. The Dumagats are very similar in features to the Negritos. The only difference is that the Dumagats are more civilized than the Negritos. The Dumagats although they are considered as hill tribes have already adopted some of the practices of the people in the lowlands. For example, they have learned how to cultivate and plant root crops. In this way, they are no longer dependent on wild fruits.

In the Mindanao, Basilan and Sulu group of islands, several native tribes are located in the various forest and mountain ranges of the area. Basically, these different tribes can be categorized into two types: the warlike and the peaceful tribes. Under the warlike tribes are the Tausogs of Sulu, the Maguindanaos of Cotabato and the Maranaos of Lanao. Under the peaceful tribes are the Samals or Water people of Basilan, the Subanons of Zamboanga and the Manobos of Bukidnon.⁶⁶

The Tausogs can be found primarily in the province of Sulu and in some parts of Zamboanga and Basilan. They are a proud people who do not want to be dominated by others. As such they are good warriors. Even the Americans had a hard time trying to subjugate this people.⁶⁷ Up to this day,

their most prized possession is a firearm. To them a firearm is a status symbol. The Tausogs are not pagans. They are Muslims and most of them have gone to Mecca at least once.

The Maguindanaos of Cotabato and the Maranaos of Lanao are also good warriors but they are not as good as the Tausogs. They are very similar to the Tausogs not only in appearance but also in customs and traditions. Their only difference is their dialect and the fact that the Tausogs are more warlike than the other tribes.

The Samals of Basilan are commonly known as the water people because they live along the shorelines of the islands and their source of livelihood is fishing and pearl diving. These native tribes are peace loving and they can be easily dominated by the Tausogs and the Maguindanaos. They are not good warriors and to them the sea is their home. Even their houses of bamboos are on the shallow waters of the sea. Samals are also Muslims.

The Subanons, on the other hand, are also peace loving natives but they are found mostly in the hinterlands of Zamboanga. They live in the mountain ranges of the island and their source of livelihood is hunting and shifting cultivation. Usually a tribal group would clear a portion of the forest and plant rice and some root crops. After three or four planting seasons when the soil is no longer productive, the whole group would shift to another place and starts clearing the area for planting. Some of the Subanons are Muslims while others were already converted to Christianity.

They are not necessarily catholics because practically all religious denominations have missionaries in the area and most of the Subanons had been already converted.

The Manobos of Bukidnon are considered the more primitive compared to the other tribes. Although similar in appearance to the rest of the tribes, the Manobos are not Muslims. They are animists and still subscribe to the concept of communal land ownership.⁶⁸

In the main island of Luzon, there are three major tribal groups that are very significant in this study. They are the Negritos in the northeast, the Dumagats in the central and southern part of the island and the Igorots of northern Luzon. In Mindanao together with the provinces of Basilan and Sulu, there are six major tribal groups. They are the Tausogs of Sulu, the Maranaos of Lanao, the Maguindanaos of Cotabato, the Samals of Basilan, the Subanons of Zamboanga and the Manobos of Bukidnon. All these major tribes have participated in some form of conflict in the past either for or against the government. In the present conflict the NPA is trying very hard to get the cooperation and support of these people. On the part of the government particularly the military, these tribal groups cannot just be ignored because they constitute a large segment of the population. Whoever wins the "hearts and minds" of these people will have a great advantage over its enemy. It is on this context that their role in counterinsurgency operations will be examined and determine whether these people are being utilized effectively.

Role of the Natives in Counterinsurgency

In counterinsurgency operations, use of natives can be categorized into five classes.

- a. As guides
- b. As supply carriers
- c. As sources of information
- d. As security for base camps and villages
- e. As combatants

As guides, the natives are really expert because they know the mountains and forests like the palm of their hand. As guides, they are able to lead government troops to the hideout of the enemy without the necessity of conducting a very detailed terrain reconnaissance. They are able to help the troops save time, energy and effort in trying to locate difficult hideouts and identify the enemy. On the part of the rebels they can also use native guides in evading government patrols and operations.

As supply carriers, the natives are suited for that kind of job. They are used to walking long distances carrying heavy loads. With the type of terrain in the Philippines which is mostly mountainous and rugged, the natives would really be a great help not only to the government but also to the rebels.

In counterinsurgency operations, intelligence about the enemy is very important. One very important source is the natives. The natives can move freely anywhere and most often they come in contact with the enemy. With the proper

technique and motivation these natives can provide very valuable information about the enemy.

Another important role for the natives in counter-insurgency operations is for providing security for their own villages. The army cannot be tied down to static defenses in towns and villages or else their efficiency will be hampered. In order to free army units from being used as security guards, selected natives can be organized, trained and armed to secure their villages.

The natives, given the proper training and incentive, can become good fighters. However, natives should be utilized in combat operations only as a last resort or when the manpower resources of the country is almost exhausted. The reason for this is because the males in a tribal group are the provider, bread earner, and protector of their families. Without the men or in case they become casualties in combat operations, the families would become helpless and eventually the tribe will suffer.

The Natives and the Huks

During the first insurrection in the early fifties, the Negritos of Northern Luzon were initially neglected by the government. Because they were living mainly in the rain forests and mountain areas, the government had very little contact with them. On the other hand, the Huks who were for the most part living in the same mountain areas had all the contacts they needed. As a result, the Negritos, who were

ignorant of the issues, sided with the rebels. Being peaceful and shy, the Negritos were used by the Huks mainly as guides, couriers, and carriers of supply. Having grown and lived in these mountains, the Negritos were very effective and were a great help to the rebels. When President Magsaysay learned about this, he contacted the Negrito chieftains through intermediaries and talked with these leaders. During this talk, he explained to them the situation and enlisted their support and cooperation. From then on, the Negritos became a valuable ally of the government troops, and they provided valuable information of the whereabouts of the Huks in the mountains.⁶⁹ A good example of this is an incident on 28 June 1949 when four companies of troops each led by a Negrito guide tracked down a band of Huks led by two commanders and their thirty three followers. After two months of tracking through mountains, they finally caught up with the rebel group. After the encounter, the two commanders and twenty five of their followers were killed, seven were captured and one surrendered.⁷⁰ During this time, it was always emphasized among the troops that civilian support is paramount. As the Huks must depend on civilian's support in getting their food so must the troops depend on the civilians in getting information about the rebels.

The Dumagats of Central Luzon were also involved with the Huks during this time. Having been long neglected by the government and coupled with the fact that most of them were driven from the lowlands by Christian settlers, the Dumagats

became prime targets for the Huks. The Huks tried to enlist their support but because the Dumagats are by nature not to be trusted, they were not of much value to the Huks.⁷¹ The only loyalty of a Dumagat is to his clan which is vital for his survival. The Huks tried to use them as guides and supply carriers but at the slightest provocation, they will desert the Huks. A good example of this is the experience of William Pomeroy, an American journalist who married a Filipina and joined the Huk movement. In one of his travels in the Sierra Madre mountains, he employed two Dumagats as guides. As payment he offered to the leader a shotgun. At first they were very efficient and reliable but after two days they deserted him in the middle of a forest.⁷² At another time he used Dumagats again as guides because they really knew the mountains. This time he had to be pointing a gun at them all the time so that they will not run away.⁷³ This type of natives would not be good ally in battle.

The Igorots, however, of Mountain province are loyal and good fighters. An Infantry Battalion composed mostly of Igorots was organized to fight the rebels. This battalion was so effective that they were much feared by the Huks. These Igorot soldiers will obey and fight regardless of the risk or danger. It was a common saying during that time that to an Igorot soldier "order is order, no matter what."



The Natives and the NPA

The second insurgency uprising started in the early seventies and up to this time it is still going on. Initially, the natives of Luzon were involved only on a small scale. NPA activities were concentrated in the northern and southern part of Luzon and the natives in the areas were used as guides and supply carriers. The Negritos and the Dumagats who up to this time are still engaged in their favorite job of hunting wild animals in the forest became unwilling recruits for this kind of job. The military units in the area, not to be outdone by the NPA's, also used these natives not only as guides and supply carriers but also as sources of information about the enemy.

The natives were continuously exploited by the more civilized people in the urban areas and because of this they were wary of any stranger who do not belong to their tribe. With this feeling of distrust for strangers, the NPA was not able to win them over. For several years the natives were left to themselves. This tranquil period however did not last long because progress and development have to continue even if the country is faced with an adversity.

With the continued rise of the oil price, the Philippine government decided in 1974 to revive an old plan for the construction of a hydroelectric plant by harnessing the water of Chico River as a source of power.⁷⁴ Chico River flows northward from the Cordillera Mountains. Figure 4

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Figure-4

shows the general location of the river. Because of the fertile valleys along the route of this river, villages had been existing for many years in this area. These villages are inhabited by Kalingas, a tribal group belonging to the Ifugao tribes.⁷⁵ Ever since the initial plan for the construction of the dam was announced, the Kalingas were already opposing the plan. In the construction plan, a Kalinga village will have to be relocated because the village will be submerged under water after the dam is completed. The Kalingas did not want to be removed from their village for the following reasons:⁷⁶

- a. Close to 10,000 tribesmen will be displaced.
- b. The Kalingas believe that the development plan of the government would make the Chico a river of despair.
- c. Relocation of the tribesmen would result in:
 - (1) Disintegration of a close-knit Kalinga community.
 - (2) Loss of their homes
 - (3) Loss of ancestral lands and a way of life which they have protected for centuries.

The feeling of attachment to their land was so strong that a tribesmen said:

"The land cannot be exchanged for anything material, no matter how precious, except for our deaths."⁷⁷

Despite this strong opposition by the Kalingas, through the persuasive powers of the President, the natives were relocated and the project was started.

Sometime in October of 1978, civilian workers in the dam site were attacked by unknown armed men wherein four were killed and four were wounded.⁷⁸ A few days later, a local mayor who was also the head of a 2,000 strong Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF)⁷⁹ was also killed. Subsequent investigation revealed that these were perpetrated by the NPA. It was learned that as early as 1976, the NPA started moving into the Kalinga territory in order to create trouble for the government. Earlier attempts by the NPA to recruit the Kalinga were not successful because of the native's distrust of outsiders. This time they were more susceptible to propaganda and the NPA capitalized on this. This following propaganda techniques were used by the NPA:⁸⁰

a. Some NPA members fraternized with the tribeswomen and even married some of them. This kinship with the Kalinga tribes generated loyalty and support for the NPA.

b. Aside from playing on the native's spiritual link to their land, the NPA were successful in convincing them that the purpose of the Chico dam is for the interest of the government alone and not for the natives. As example they cited that:

(1) Only the rich industrialists will benefit from the dam's hydroelectric power and not the poor people in the area.

(2) Speculators with the right connection in the government had already obtained land near the dam site whose value will go up upon completion of the project.

c. Capitalized on the earlier activities of the PANAMIN⁸¹ which prompted the President to remove them from the area. Some of these improper activities were:


(1) Persuading the tribesmen to sell their valuable artifacts at very low prices.

(2) Alleged taking advantage of local girls.

As a result of this NPA propaganda, most of the Kalingas became NPA sympathizers. To counter this threat the military intensified its operations in the area and at the same time organized a rival tribe into a paramilitary force. The rival tribe called the Basao was organized into a CHDF and issued firearms.⁸² This tribal force was used in securing villages. To some extent using this tribal force in this type of mission was effective because army troops were not tied down to static defense of villages.

This use of the Basao tribes however, created additional problems to the government. Instead of unifying the different tribes, other tribal groups were driven to the NPA side because of some abuses by the Basao paramilitary troops, or because they were simply Basao's enemies.⁸³

Another tribal group that created a problem for the military were the Manobos of Bukidnon. Figure 5 shows the general location of Bukidnon. For years this province had been a peaceful place until trouble suddenly erupted in 1979. A series of armed clashes between the Army and the Manobos occurred in 1979.⁸⁴



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Negritos

Igorots, Ifugaos, Ilongots

Dumagats

Maranaos


Maguindanaos

Manobos

Subanons

Tausogs

Samals



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Figure 5

The problem in Bukidnon started in 1974 when the military in its bid to control the tribes in the province organized the Higaunon Datus Association (HDA). Higaunon is another term for Manobo, the predominant tribal group in the province. The purpose of the organization was to unite the tribes and represent its interest in any government forum. At about this time loggers began encroaching on tribal lands while people from the lowlands also began to push the tribes into the forest. For fear of being ejected from their tribal home, the Manobos struck back by attacking logging personnel or harassing peaceful villages in the lowlands.⁸⁵ To solve this problem, PANAMIN established tribal "reserves" wherein nobody can eject or harass the tribes in these designated "reserves." This program by PANAMIN had these objectives:⁸⁶ control of the tribes who are potential enemy of the government, control of strategic areas which the NPA might use, and use of the tribes in anti-guerrilla activities when the need arises. Through the timely resolution of the problem, the NPA did not make any headway among the Manobos.

The Natives and the MNLF

It was in Mindanao, where the secessionist movement was gathering strength, where the natives of the area were greatly involved. The brains behind the movement were able to win the allegiance, support and cooperation of some of the Tausogs of Sulu, the Maguindanaos of Cotabato, the Samals of

Basilan and the Subanons of Zamboanga. Among these groups, the Tausogs and the Maguindanaos were the better fighters and they were organized into various commands under a rebel commander. Some of the talented recruits were sent abroad for military training. Firearms, ammunitions and money were provided to them.⁸⁷

On the part of the government, those Muslim leaders loyal to the government were tapped to help win back the "hearts and minds" of the misguided rebels.

In the counterinsurgency operations conducted by the military, the uncommitted Muslims and the surrendered rebels played a very vital role. Because of the constant shortage of military personnel and units, a CHDF (Civilian Home Defense Force) was organized. These are paramilitary units composed of civilians who are willing to help the military fight the rebels. In every town a CHDF unit was organized, the strength usually numbering from 20-100 depending on the size of the town and the population. In the entire country a total of 64,000 CHDF members were organized and trained. In addition, another 30,000 paramilitary forces composed mostly of ex-MNLF or surrendered MNLF members were organized.⁸⁸

Not all of them however were issued firearms. Usually in a province a Special Forces team is assigned to supervise all the CHDF in the area. These CHDF are employed in their particular area to guard and protect the place. During military operations when the companies and battalions are pulled out from their camps to conduct several weeks of

operations, the CHDF are tasked to maintain the security of the various camps and detachments previously occupied by the military.

In the province of Zamboanga in Mindanao one can find the Subanons who are the predominant tribes in the area. As the rebel movement escalated and the pressure from the military increased, MNLF forces from other areas particularly Sulu and Basilan seek refuge in the virgin forests of Zamboanga. Some of the Subanons that were living in the forest were coerced by the MNLF to stay near their camps. These natives were used in raising food for the rebels, carrying supplies and sometimes acting as couriers and messengers. This was the situation when the 28th Infantry Battalion which I commanded was assigned in the area. For three and a half years we had numerous encounters with the rebels and in almost all of these encounters the Subanons were a great help to us.

The first thing that our unit did upon reaching our assigned area was to cultivate the friendship of the Subanons in our area. This we were able to do by conducting civic action in the area.⁸⁹ The Battalion medical officer together with the medical aidmen went out to the remote areas to administer medical assistance to the natives. Through this method we were able to get the cooperation and support of the Subanons.

As guides, the Subanons were really excellent. They knew the terrain like the palm of their hand. However, there

was one drawback because if the guide selected has some relatives in the rebel camp, he will try to select the most difficult and longest route. As a result, either the patrol returns empty-handed or the patrol finds the enemy camp deserted because the enemy has been forewarned. So, to maximize their effectiveness, extreme caution and good judgement are very necessary in dealing with them.

In one operation where I employed two Rifle companies to look for a rebel base camp, I used two native guides to guide us to the place. After one whole day of walking through treacherous mountain trails, we finally found the place. The rebels were completely surprised. We overran the place, killed or captured all of them and recovered all their firearms without any casualty on our side. We could not have accomplished this feat without the help of the native guides. For this operation, the two natives were carefully screened to be sure that they would not fail us. Even the planning was done in complete secrecy to preclude any loose talk by the soldiers.

We also use natives as supply carriers. In one Brigade operation where my battalion was a part, the operation lasted for more than one month. The terrain was so rugged, mountainous and forested that resupply by truck, air or helicopter was next to impossible. There was one way only to resupply my men and that was by foot. I resupplied my unit with ammunition and food for more than one month using only the natives. This was true not only in my battalion but also

in other battalions particularly if they were operating in the jungle of Mindanao.

The Subanons were also good sources of information, but as mentioned earlier, if they have relatives in the rebel camp they might give a false information. It is here where caution, judgement and proper technique will be needed. Through medical civic action, many valuable information about the rebels can be gathered.

Considering that the area of responsibility (AOR) of my battalion was very large, it was necessary to disperse my units into platoon size detachments. Each detachment is strategically located or is guarding an important location in my main supply route (MSR). Because of this dispersal of my companies, I had to assemble them first before launching company-size or battalion-size operations. To assemble the units and at the same time not leave the detachments unmanned, CHDF made up of natives were left behind to man the detachment.

As combatants, those natives who were incorporated into the Armed Forces of the Philippines, whether the natives served as an officer or an enlisted man, they made a good record for themselves. Even if they were fighting against their own kind, they fought with zeal and enthusiasm. Many of them received decorations for bravery in combat. Many of them donated their lives for the cause they believe in and lost their lives because they believe that the government was doing what was right and just for them.

Summary

The following key points were noted in the use of natives in counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines:

a. The natives are reliable guides as long as they have no relatives on the enemy side.

b. In the absence of trucks or helicopters or when their use is not practicable, the natives are very good substitute.

c. The natives are also very good sources of information but it requires good technique and right judgement to acquire them.

d. CHDF composed of natives are suitable for securing villages and detachments provided they are properly supervised.

e. As combatants, the natives are brave and courageous soldiers.

f. Arming a particular tribal group might have a counterproductive effect because rival tribes will be driven to the enemy side.

g. Armed tribes are prone to commit abuses not only against rival tribes but also against peaceful civilians.

h. The enemy can always capitalize on current issues, distorts facts and win the natives to their side.

i. The enemy can also capitalize on the existing rift between the natives and the people in the lowlands and encourage them to take up arms against the government.

j. Any abuses by the military or any government official will be exaggerated by the enemy for their own advantage.

k. A good project initiated by the government can turn into a liability if not properly explained and supervised just like the Chico River dam project.

l. Any promise given to the natives must be fulfilled or else the credibility of the government will be lost.

m. A government entity, like the PANAMIN, dedicated solely to look after the welfare of the natives is very important.

n. The best method of getting the cooperation of support of the natives is through civic action.

CHAPTER 4

ASSESSMENT OF PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE

Aborigines of Malaya

The British government in Malaya established an office called the Protector of Aborigines whose main objective was to look after the welfare of the aborigines in the country. This office had a say in all programs and policies pertaining to the aborigines.

The program in resettling aborigines near population centers was not successful as already explained. However, the establishment of protected sanctuaries was very successful so much so that the aborigines cooperated fully with the government. Assistance in the form of medical care, health and sanitation, root crop production and education were extended to the aborigines.

As a result of these government policies, the aborigines reciprocated by:

- a. Helping the British locate the CT's.
- b. Providing porters during military operations.
- c. Providing information on the whereabouts of the CTs.
- d. Providing security for their own villages.
- e. Providing manpower to fight as part of British units.

The only policy that was a failure was the resettlement program because the aborigines were not adapted to the

new environment. This however was corrected immediately. On the part of the aborigines, their cooperation and support to the British was very valuable. Although there were some deliberate actions by the aborigines to mislead the British especially if some of their relatives or friends are involve but this is understandable. The aborigines have very close family ties and in fact this is the foundation of their society. This handicap was overcome by the British through the organization of the Aborigines Research and Interrogation Section whose main function was collection of information using the aborigines. Through propaganda and good interrogation technique, the aborigines became reliable sources of information. It can be said that the success of the British in countering insurgency in Malaya was partly due to the contribution of the aborigines in the overall effort.

Hill Tribes of Laos

The insurgency in Laos cannot be compared to that in Malaya or the Philippines. In Laos there was no single government who had the support of the population. The enemy or the Pathet Lao did not only received supplies and equipment but also were trained by the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). In some instances the NVA provided manpower to help the Pathet Lao. This was the situation that confronted the United States when it tried to help the Royal Lao government.

In spite of this situation, the US proceeded with its program of helping Laos. The hill tribes particularly the

Meos were mobilized to help in the fight against the Pathet Lao. Unlike the British in Malaya where the aborigines were used more in combat service support roles, the US used the Meos more in combat operations. This was so because the Meos were easier to employ, they were better disciplined, and more capable of doing the job. As a consequence, the Meos suffered so many casualties which were hard to replace because of limited manpower base.

The US failure in Laos cannot be attributed to its policy toward the hill tribes. Considering the threat in Laos, it needed more than the fighting skill of the hill tribes to defeat them. What is presented here is the US and the Laotian government's policy toward the hill tribes and how they were used. From this experience, comparison can be made to that in Malaya.

Comparison of Philippine Experience with Malaya and Laos

The model in Chart 1, Figure 6 shows the various government programs to help the aborigines in Malaya, the hill tribes in Laos and the natives in the Philippines. In Malaya resettling of the aborigines near population centers was a complete failure. Due to lack of proper immunity from common diseases, most of the aborigines died in the resettlement areas. As a result they went back to the jungle. In Laos, there was no specific government program towards the resettlement of the hill tribes. For years, the Lao majority who inhabit the

Chart 1

Government Programs	MALAYA	LAOS	PHIL
Resettlement Projects	-	0	X
Protected Sanctuaries	X	0	X
Government Agency	X	0	X
Support & Assistance	X	X	X
Rehabilitation Programs	X	0	X

X-successful --unsuccessful 0-no government program

Chart 2

Uses of Natives	MALAYA	LAOS	PHIL
Guides	X	0	X
Porters & Supply Carriers	X	0	X
Informants	X	X	X
Security Force	X	X	X
Combat Force	X	X	X

X-used in this role 0-not used in this role

Figure 3

lowlands of the country, have been at odds with the hill tribes. Perhaps, it is for this reason that the hill tribes were neglected and left to themselves. In the Philippines, resettlement projects were very successful particularly in Mindanao where most of the fighting occurred. Unlike the aborigines of Malaya, the natives of the Philippines were able to adapt immediately to their new environment. A very good example is the resettlement project that was put up in my operational area in Zamboanga. So many natives were displaced from their houses because of the conflict while others simply left their homes in the forest and seek temporary refuge near military detachments. To solve this problem, a resettlement housing project was put up adjacent to the Battalion Headquarters. My Battalion was tasked to secure the area and as the commander in the area it was my job to coordinate with other government agencies for assistance in building the project. The whole project was a success and up to this time the natives are still there. This is true not only in my area because in the other areas of Mindanao this was done also and they were successful. One resettlement project that did not succeed was the one in northern Luzon. As part of the Chico River hydroelectric project a whole village of the Kalinga tribe had to be relocated several miles away. After a while the natives started going back to their old village because of the three hectares of land promised to them, only one was given.¹ This is a very good example of the importance of fulfilling a

promise in order that a project will succeed especially when dealing with natives. To the natives an agreement even if unwritten is binding.

Due to the failure of the resettlement project in Malaya, another scheme called the protected sanctuary was used. This time the project succeeded because the aborigines remained in their homes in the jungle and their customs and traditions were respected. In Laos, because of the nature and intensity of the fighting protected sanctuary for the hill tribes was not used. In the Philippines, protected sanctuary was used especially for the small and peaceful tribes. This prevented the people in the lowlands, the NPA and the MILF and other interested persons from exploiting and harassing these tribes.²

To look after the welfare of the aborigines in Malaya, the office of Protector of Aborigines was created in 1949.³ It was headed by a dedicated and hard working official. With the creation of this office all policies affecting the aborigines were closely examined before they were implemented. In Laos there was no such office or agency. In some way US AID and CIA provided assistance to the hill tribes in the form of war materials and food in order to fight the enemy.⁴ On the part of the Royal Lao Government, there was no agency that was responsible for the hill tribes. In the Philippines, the PANATH was created solely to look after the welfare of the Filipino natives. This government agency was so effective that in 1972 it was instrumental in the discovery of a

Stone Age tribe in Mindanao called the Tasaday. In counter-insurgency operations, the PAMAN worked very closely with the military particularly when the natives are involved.⁵

The aborigines received government support and assistance in the areas of medical attention and education. Roads were developed and technical assistance in agriculture were extended. In Laos, support and assistance were given to the hill tribes, but they were in the form of foodstuffs, firearms and medical care if they become casualties. This assistance was more for the benefit of the US than for the hill tribes themselves. In the Philippines, all form of assistance were given to the natives. For example: Free foodstuffs were distributed. Rural and remote areas were developed. Bank loans with low interest were offered. Schools and clinics were opened. These are but a few of the assistance extended to the natives.⁶

For the aborigines of Malaya who were initially with the CT's, the British did not condemn them outright. Instead, an indoctrination program was conducted wherein the real issues were explained to them. Consequently these aborigines sided with the British and they were a great help especially in negotiating for the surrender of so many CT's. In Laos there was no such program. The Heos and the other hill tribes were extensively used for combat operations so much so that any form of rehabilitation program would not have been possible. In the Philippines, for those natives who surrendered to the government or who were dislocated from their tribal

lands, a rehabilitation program was always available to them. This program consist of financial and technical assistance. For example, a surrenderee will be given construction materials and some money so that he can construct a house for himself and his family. A piece of land normally an idle government land is set aside for this purpose. Then he will be given a work animal and seedlings so that he can plant his crop. While he is not yet producing his food, he and his family will be given food so that they will survive. This is only one example of the rehabilitation programs in the Philippines.

Uses of the Aborigines, Hill tribes and Natives in Counterinsurgency Operations

The model in Chart 2, Figure 6 shows how the aborigines, hill tribes and the natives were used in counterinsurgency operations. There were success and there were failures in the employment of the natives in each country.

The aborigines in Malaya were very reliable as guides and trackers. The British used them extensively in small unit operations. Their skill in tracking down the CI's led to the capture or surrender of so many CI's. In Laos the hill tribes had a very different role. As already mentioned earlier they were used more for combat operations. The natives in the Philippines just like the aborigines of Malaya were used extensively as guides. However, the Commander should be careful in selecting a guide because the dependability

and accuracy of the guide depends on the type of native and the relationship between the guide and the natives on the enemy's side.

As porters and supply carriers the aborigines and the natives were very reliable. Their strength and stamina despite their size were suited to this type of job. The hill tribes of Laos were not used extensively for this type of job. With the air support provided by the US, there was not much use for local labor.

In the field of intelligence, the aborigines of Malaya were not very reliable. The same was true with the natives in the Philippines. They will provide a true or reliable information only if no relatives, friends or tribe members will be compromised. This is true because of the very close family ties in the tribe. In Laos, loyalty to the tribe and the tribal chief was also very strong. This did not affect their performance however, because the irregular forces of hill tribes people were closely supervised by the CIA.⁷ Intelligence collection was one of the main role of the Laos.

Once the aborigines were secured from the influence and harassment of the CP's the next step taken by the British was to organize the aborigines into special type of units similar to the Home Guards. Their main task was to guard and secure their villages under the supervision of British troops. In Laos, the hill tribes especially the forces of Gen Vang Pao were used in securing villages and towns whenever they are not engaged in operations. Because of their

discipline and the flexibility with which they can be employed, these hill tribe forces were always fully committed. In the Philippines some of the native groups were also organized into a CHDF for the purpose of securing their villages. For the most part these paramilitary forces were very useful and effective because army troops were freed from the dreary task of garrison duties. However, two bad effects resulted in the use of the natives as paramilitary forces. First, some of the natives committed some abuses against members of other tribes, against friendly civilians or against their personal enemies.⁸ Second, rival tribes instead of being wooed to the government side were driven to the enemy's side.⁹ The abuses could be minimized or prevented by closer supervision of the CHDF. This is being done now by tasking Special Forces Teams to supervise all the CHDF in the country. The second bad effect could be prevented by organizing a CHDF unit in an area by getting the members from all the tribes in the area and not from one tribe alone.

As combatants the aborigines were not employed separately as a unit but were integrated into the units of the British Army in Malaya. In some instances specialized units composed solely of aborigines but led by British officers were used. In both cases the aborigines fought well. In Laos, the Laos and the other hill tribes were organized into military type units and were employed as a striking force by the Americans. Whenever there was trouble, the Laos were rushed into the area. They were the ones who were doing the

day to day patrolling, ambushing and attacking.¹⁰ Due to the heavy casualty suffered by the Meos under Gen Vang Pao, forty percent of his troops were no longer Meos but Khas.¹¹ This affected the efficiency and integrity of the unit. Some native tribes in the Philippines were organized into tactical units and employed against the Huks during the early fifties. One of these units was the Igorot Battalion which was much feared by the Huks. In the current insurgency situation, natives are no longer organized into separate units. Instead, they are integrated into regular army units. This procedure is much better because the natives are better supervised, and the government cannot be accused of favoritism because recruitment is open to all natives. As members of a team the native soldiers are good, reliable and brave.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Regardless of the diversity in culture, customs, traditions, language and even appearance, the Filipino natives, have several things in common. They are the least developed and most often neglected sector of society. They are easily exploited and most often fooled by the people from the urban areas. And they are a simple people with simple needs. It is for these reasons that the natives have become an important pawn in the ever continuing struggle between the government and the combined forces of the New Peoples Army and the Muslim secessionist rebels. To get the support of the natives and at the same time prevent the enemy from influencing them the Philippine government have implemented the following policies.

a. A government agency called the Presidential Assistant on National Minorities (PANAMIN) was established to look after the welfare of all the natives. There has been some allegations by the enemies of the government that PANAMIN personnel committed a few abuses and unbecoming conduct in their dealing with the natives but as a whole the agency has been successful in its mission. Prompt Presidential action on erring personnel upheld the integrity and noble purpose of the agency.

b. Resettlement areas for natives who surrendered were put up. For those natives who initially fought against the government but later on decided to surrender, Presidential amnesty was granted to them. Afterwards they were settled in protected areas and provided the three basic needs of man: food, clothing and shelter. For the other natives who for various reasons vacated their tribal villages or were rendered homeless due to military operations, resettlement areas were also established. This government project is very successful because while before these resettlement areas were dependent on the government for support, now they are self-sustaining communities. This success can be attributed to the following: sincerity of the government, adaptability of the natives to a new environment, efficient administration of the resettlement areas, and diligence and desire of the natives to help themselves.

c. Another government program that was established is the protected sanctuary. In essence this is a tribal preserve where people from the lowlands cannot touch for purposes of exploitation or development. The primary objective of this program is to preserve the culture of the natives and at the same time prevent encroachment from non-natives. This is also a very successful program because aside from protecting the natives from being exploited their cultural heritage is preserved as well.

d. All these government programs would be useless without strong government support and assistance to the

natives. This assistance can be categorized into four types:

(1) Material assistance in the form of food, clothing, and building materials.

(2) Technical assistance in the form of technicians and experts on agriculture, fishing, and home industry providing advice to the natives. Assistance also in securing bank loans was provided.

(3) Educational assistance through the establishment of schools not only for the children but also for the adults.

(4) Medical assistance, by providing free medical and dental treatment and also the introduction of proper health and sanitation measures.

e. The last government policy is the rehabilitation program which is designed to help a surrenderee adjust and become self-sufficient. This was a major incentive for many surrenderees from the enemy ranks.

Because of these policies by the government, most of the various tribal groups cooperated with the government. The military did not encounter any major difficulty in recruiting natives or in enlisting their support. The natives in the Philippines were employed in the following categories.

a. They were used extensively as guides. For the native guide to be effective, he should have no relative on the enemy side or his action will not compromise fellow members of the tribe who might be working on the enemy's side. So, in order to get the most out of a guide, good judgment, and proper discretion is very necessary in selecting a guide.

b. The natives were very efficient and reliable porters and supply carriers. In a country with a very limited logistical capability and a terrain that is rugged, mountainous and forested, use of manpower for transporting supplies is very necessary. The natives have the strength and stamina for this purpose. As incentive, they should be well-fed and properly remunerated. This remuneration is normally in the form of supplies like rice and canned goods which they like very much.

c. The natives were also excellent sources of information. Again good judgment is necessary because the information might be self-serving. The informant might give an information on a suspect not because that he is guilty but because he is the personal enemy of the informant. An informant also might give a false information in order to protect some members of the tribe. So, although a native is a good source, to be a reliable source, the background and motive of the native should be examined thoroughly.

d. Natives who were organized into paramilitary units such as the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) were effective for the security of town, villages or detachments when military units are on operation. Although this created two major problems, immediate corrective measures solved the problems. These problems were abuses by the natives and tribal jealousy particularly if the force is recruited solely from one tribe. These were corrected through closer supervision of the CHDF and recruitment of the CHDF from all

tribes. If properly organized and supervised the natives can be an effective force for security and support missions.

e. As a separate unit organized purposely for combat operations, the natives were very effective during the war against Japan and even during the Huk campaign in the early fifties. In the present conflict, the natives are integrated into the various units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Those Units with natives who were involved in combat operations, the native soldiers did very well.

Individual actions by Filipino natives may appear negligible but taken collectively, they are making a big contribution in the current counterinsurgency effort of the country. Their cooperation and participation makes the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) a truly representative of all the people. It is towards this end that the ideological and political orientation of the AFP is geared using the theme, "Isang bansa, isang diwa" (One nation, one spirit).

Based on the observations, this study concludes that the methods and techniques being used by the Philippine Army in employing natives for counterinsurgency operations have general application. The programs implemented by the British government towards the aborigines of Malaya were successfully implemented also in the Philippines. The Philippine Army successfully used and are still effectively using Filipino natives in much the same way that the British used the aborigines in Malaya. By avoiding the French and American experience with the hill tribes of Laos, the

Philippine national security interests are being well served by the use of the various natives in the country. Regardless of their national identity aborigines, hill tribes, natives, or whatever they may be called, have several things in common. They are the neglected and most often exploited sector of society. They are simple and trustworthy people. They are also clannish and good warriors. Because of these qualities, natives everywhere particularly in Asia are very good potentials for insurgency or counterinsurgency warfare, if properly employed.

This study therefore recommends that further studies be made to formulate doctrines and concepts on the effective use of natives in counterinsurgency operations for inclusion in pertinent training manuals and programs.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Aborigines	- An indigenous inhabitant of a country.
BMA	- Bangsa Moro Army. Military arm of the secessionist movement.
CHAF	- Civilian Home Defense Force
CT	- Communist Terrorist
Dissidents	- Term used to describe the Hukb and other groups that fought against the government.
Ethnic Minorities	- Same as natives
Guerrilla	- Irregular soldier using surprise tactics.
Huk	- Short for Hukbalahap (acronym for Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon) People's army against Japan. Originally organized to fight the Japanese but after liberation, continued the fight against Philippine government.
Insurgency	- A revolt against a recognized government but not recognized as a belligerency.
Insurgents	- Persons who revolt particularly those rebels who are not recognized as belligerents.
MIA	- Killed in Action
MILF	- Moro National Liberation Front. Umbrella organization of the Moslem secessionist movement.
Natives	- Born in a region or country in which one lives; belonging to a place or country by origin; indigenous.
NPA	- New Peoples Army. Military arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines.
Rebels	- Same as insurgents
SAS	- Special Air Service - An elite British unit used for special operations.
Tribe	- A primitive group acting under a chief.

NOTES

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

¹Natives refers to the ethnic minorities of the Philippines everytime this term is used in this thesis.

²SUN TZU, The Art of War translated by Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963) p. 11.

³Ibid., p. 104.

⁴Ibid., p. 105.

⁵Philip J. Haythornthwaite, Weapons and Equipment of the Napoleonic Wars (Dorset: Blandford Press Ltd., 1979) pp. 119-122.

⁶Harold James and Denis Sheil-Small, The Gurkhas (Harrisburg: The Stackpole Company, 1966) p. 17.

⁷T. Harry Williams, The History of American Wars - From 1745 to 1918 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc, 1981) p. 316.

⁸Macabebe - natives of the town of Macabebe in Pampanga province. Presumably they are descendants of American Indian troops brought from west coast of Mexico and California by the Spaniards during the 17th century. They were permitted to stay and resettle in the area by marrying Filipina women.

⁹W. Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands, Vol. 1 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928) p. 196.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 103.

¹¹Moros are the Mohammedan Filipinos who inhabit Mindanao and Culu. The Spaniards first called them Moros which is the Spanish for Moors.

¹²Igorots are the ethnic minorities of Mountain province in the island of Luzon.

¹³Donald Smythe, Guerrilla Warrior, The Early life of John J. Forshing (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973) p. 154.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 198.

¹⁵ Frederick E. Jarquardt, Before Bataan and After (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Terrill Company, 1943) p. 122.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 275.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 274.

¹⁸ Ulmarico C. Baclagon, The Huk Campaign (Manila: Colcol, 1956) pp. 3-4.

¹⁹ Huks - short for Hukbaldag - Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon meaning People's Army against Japan. It was organized during the Japanese occupation to fight the Japanese but after the war, it fought the Philippine government.

²⁰ People's War in the Philippines (Union of Democratic Filipinos, 1974) p. 10.

²¹ NPA - Military arm of the revitalized Communist Party of the Philippines.

²² David A. Rosenberg, ed. Marcos and Martial Law in the Philippines (New York: Cornell University press, 1979) p. 26.

²³ Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966) p. 169.

CHAPTER 2 - REVIEW OF LITERATURE

¹ Sun Tzu p. 11.

² Haythornthwaite p. 113.

³ James and Shell-Shell p. 17.

⁴ Williams p. 316.

⁵ Smythe p. 154.

⁶ Thompson: pp. 50-57.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 150-155.

⁸ Richard H. Clatterbuck, The Long Long War-Counter-insurgency in Malaya and Vietnam (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966) p. 177.

⁹ 92nd Congress, 1st Session, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 1971, April 1971: A Staff Report, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1971) p. 3.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 23.

¹¹Paul F. Langer and Joseph J. Masloff, North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao-Partners in the Struggle for Laos (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970) p. 11.

¹²Ibid., pp. 192-223.

¹³Ibid., p. 176.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 171-173.

¹⁵Daclagon, p. 231.

¹⁶Napolcon B. Valeriano and Charles T.R. Eohannon, Counterinsurgency Operations-The Philippine Experience (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962) p. 112.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 4-8.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 142.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 228.

²⁰Ibid., p. 241.

²¹William J. Poweroy, The Forest. A Personal Record of the Huk Guerrilla Struggle in the Philippines, (New York: International Publishers Co; 1965) p. 135.

²²Ibid., p. 203.

²³Ferdinand B. Marcos. Notes on the New Society (Manila: Marcos Foundation, Inc; 1973) pp. 1-34.

²⁴Ibid., p. 50.

²⁵Ibid., p. 97.

CHAPTER 3 - COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN MALAYA, LAOS AND PHILIPPINES.

¹Thompson p. 13.

²Ibid., p. 14.

³Ibid., p. 15.

⁴Ibid., p. 15.

⁵Ibid., p. 16.

⁶Noel Barber, The War of the Running Dogs (New York: Waybright and Talley, 1971) p. 13.

⁷Howard J. Johnston, "The Tribal Soldier: A Study of the Manipulation of Ethnic Minorities," Naval War College Review (January 1967): p. 107.

⁸Thompson p. 150.

⁹Clutterbuck p. 151.

¹⁰Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960 (New York: Crane, Russak and Co. Inc., 1975) pp. 402-441.

¹¹Barber p. 172.

¹²Clutterbuck p. 153.

¹³Short p. 441.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 442.

¹⁵Barber p. 180.

¹⁶Clutterbuck p. 151.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 154.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 155.

¹⁹Short p. 442.

²⁰Clutterbuck p. 117.

²¹Short p. 452.

²²Ibid., p. 455.

²³Julien Jayet Counter-Insurgency Operations: Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Walker & Company, 1967) p. 67.

²⁴Ibid., p. 68.

²⁵Clutterbuck p. 151.

²⁶Barber p. 220.

²⁷Ibid., p. 215.

²⁸Barber p. 72.

²⁹Hugh Love, East African State of Intolerant (London: Oxford University Press, 1960) p. 105.

³⁰ Pathet Lao meaning land of the Lao is the term for the Armed Forces of the Lao Communists.

³¹ Langer & Masloff p. 25.

³² Ibid., p. 192.

³³ Ibid., p. 193.

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 46-58.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 60.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 61.

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 66-67.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 70.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 85.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 11.

⁴¹ Toye p. 195.

⁴² Langer and Masloff, p. 46.

⁴³ Toye p. 116.

⁴⁴ 92nd Cong., p. 15.

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 2-3.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 14.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 15.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 6.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 14.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 16.

⁵¹ Jose C. Grisol, The Armed Forces and Martial Law (Manila: Agro Printing & Publishing House, 1960) p. 15.

⁵² MacLagan pp. 1-2.

⁵³ Rosenberg p. 312.

⁵⁴ Grisol p. 12.

⁵⁵ MacLagan p. 3.

- 56 Ibid., p. 6.
- 57 People's War, p. 13.
- 58 Enclagon p. 6.
- 59 Ferdinand E. Marcos, Revolution from the Center (Hongkong: Daya Books, 1978) pp. 31-41.
- 60 Crisol pp. 18-23.
- 61 Herbert W. Hiegar, Peoples of the Philippines (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1942) p. 39.
- 62 Ibid., p. 41.
- 63 Ibid., p. 39.
- 64 Ibid., p. 71.
- 65 Ibid., p. 39.
- 66 Ibid., pp. 34-36.
- 67 The book Guerrilla War by Donald Smythe, which is an account of the early life of John J. Pershing relates in detail the campaigns of the Americans against the Moros.
- 68 Michael Vohay and Sheila Geampo, "A Rising Tide of Violence;" Far Eastern Review (March 16, 1979): pp. 21-23.
- 69 Valeriano A. Bohannon p. 55.
- 70 Ibid., p. 101.
- 71 Toxey pp. 185-186.
- 72 Ibid., pp. 187-188.
- 73 Ibid., pp. 202-206.
- 74 Sheila Geampo, "The Battle for Chico River," Far Eastern Economic Review (Oct. 20, 1978) p. 34.
- 75 Sheila Geampo, "Tense Fights and Blood Baths," Far Eastern Economic Review (Oct. 20, 1978) p. 32.
- 76 Sheila Geampo, "The Battle for Chico River" p. 32.
- 77 Ibid., p. 32.
- 78 Ibid., p. 32.

⁷⁹ONLF is a paramilitary force composed solely of civilians.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 34.

⁸¹PARMIN - Presidential Assistant on National Minorities - a government office in charge of all matters pertaining to ethnic minorities.

⁸²Ibid., p. 34.

⁸³Ibid., p. 34.

⁸⁴Vokey and Ocampo, "A Rising Tide of Violence" p. 22.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 26.

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 22..

⁸⁷Sheilah Ocampo "A New Role for the Forces" Far Eastern Economic Review (Oct 13, 1978) p. 36.

⁸⁸Sheilah Ocampo "Marcos Still Calls the Shots" Far Eastern Economic Review (Aug. 10, 1979) p. 27.

⁸⁹Oricol, The Armed Forces and Martial Law p. 3.

CHAPTER 4 - ASSESSMENT OF PHILIPPINE DIPLOMACY

¹Ocampo, "The Battle for Chico River." p. 34.

²Vokey and Ocampo, "A Rising Tide of Violence." p. 27.

³Short p. 441.

⁴U.S. Congress, pp. 14-15.

⁵Vokey and Ocampo, "A Rising Tide of Violence." p. 22.

⁶Marcos. Notes on the New City. pp. 136-137.

⁷U.S. Congress, p. 15.

⁸Vokey and Ocampo, p. 22.

⁹Ocampo, "The Battle for Chico River," p. 34.

¹⁰U.S. Congress p. 15.

¹¹Ibid., p. 16.

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