TASK TWO

(FINAL)

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

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TRENDS IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY: STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE FORCES

Forecasting the general shape of the U.S.-Soviet strategic competition over the next thirty years is no more hazardous than predicting other developments in the U.S.-Soviet relationship, and in some respects is probably less so. The lengthening life cycle for strategic weaponry is such that only one wholly new generation of such systems is likely to intervene between the present and the early years of the next century. And that generation is likely to incorporate technologies that are currently extant or at least foreseeable with some degree of assurance. This is not to suggest that there are not substantial uncertainties in any such forecasting. But it seems fair to say that the chief uncertainties derive less from the technical than from the political sphere. This is true above all in the case of the United States, where the political future of the current Administration's commitment to strategic defense can by no means be considered assured.

Accordingly, consideration will be given here in the first instance to the political factors bearing on the future of strategic forces. The discussion will then review the technological developments with the greatest potential for dramatically affecting the strategic nuclear situation. Finally, the various categories of strategic offensive and strategic defensive forces will be briefly treated.
The Politics of Strategic Forces

The strategic arsenal of the United States has been decisively -- in recent years, increasingly -- shaped by political factors. As a major item in the defense budget, strategic forces have always attracted the attention of Congress. And public opinion has always been of importance in defining the outer bounds of acceptability of strategic forces, in terms of their social impact (e.g., civil defense, MX basing) as well as their fiscal burden. Over the last decade and a half, however, the emergence of arms control as a central political issue in the U.S., and in the West generally, has increasingly drawn strategic forces into the arena of political debate. Particularly in Western Europe, but to a significant degree also in the U.S., popular anti-nuclear sentiment has become an important factor in the framing of this debate and in its outcome in specific instances.

The reemergence of the anti-nuclear movement in the 1980's appears to reflect a fundamental weakening, if not a shattering, of the political consensus which supported the growth of American strategic forces during the 1960's and 1970's. The causes of this development are not entirely clear, but, no doubt, include a growing awareness of the increased Soviet military threat, a lessened understanding of the nature of the Soviet regime and its global ambitions, and a greater diffusion of the complex of assumptions associated
with the idea of arms control. At all events, the idea of nuclear deterrence resting on the threat of mutual annihilation -- which formed the public rationale for U.S. strategic forces, if not the actual basis of U.S. strategic doctrine, for twenty years -- seems to have lost fundamental legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of Western publics. At the same time, structural changes in governmental processes -- in the U.S., the relative decline in the power and authority of the Executive Branch and the concomitant rise of Congress, the media, and various academic and other independent centers of expertise -- have significantly increased the role of public opinion in national security policy formulation. As a result of all this, the modernization of U.S. strategic forces over the next several decades will almost certainly continue to be held hostage, in more or less unpredictable fashion, by the American political process.

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) announced by President Reagan on March 23, 1983 has, as now seems clear, fundamentally altered the terms of the political debate over strategic forces in the U.S. By offering a plausible alternative to "mutual assured destruction," it has provided a potential cure for the nuclear anxieties of the public, while at the same time arousing intense opposition from elites committed to the previous strategic consensus. In fact, public opinion polls have consistently shown levels of support for strategic defense of upwards of 70 percent, whereas only 10-15 percent tend to favor new offensive systems such as MX.
This suggests that a shift toward a defense-dominant strategic posture will be very politically sustainable in the long term. In the short term, however, elite hostility to the SDI conceivably may succeed in terminating the program following a change of administration.

Assuming that the SDI survives beyond 1988, it will probably survive in some form into the Twenty-First century. But the shape of a U.S. strategic defense program will certainly depend, to a large extent, on the outcome of a continuing debate on the merits of population defense and arms control, which cannot now be foreseen. Of course, Soviet behavior over the next decade will also be of considerable importance to the eventual outcome. Continuing Soviet intransigence over arms control may eventually dampen enthusiasm in the West for new agreements on strategic offense and defense. By the same token, a combination of Soviet negotiating flexibility and anti-SDI propaganda and disinformation could well be effective in limiting the scope of American strategic defenses (specifically, perhaps, in choking off a population defense option) under a new comprehensive agreement.

With respect to offensive forces, the safest assumption is the probability that all new U.S. offensive systems will remain politically at risk to some extent, but particularly ICBMs. The current debate over MX may well repeat itself in the 1990's, over the prospective small ICBM (SICBM). Yet it is not difficult to imagine controversy over other elements of
a strategic modernization program, such as counterforce capability for SLBMs or strategic systems based on stealth technology. The ideological and arms control issues raised by these systems are not essentially different from those associated with MX, and the Soviets could fan such controversy should they choose to do so.

Soviet strategic forces are much more immune to internal political challenge than those of the United States, yet, here too, political factors must be taken into account. It is conceivable that the current Soviet commitment to what seems a virtually open-ended buildup of strategic weaponry could be curtailed or halted by the Soviet leadership during the coming decades. Such a decision would probably presuppose both a worsening domestic economic situation and an international political-military environment either highly favorable to the Soviets or sufficiently adverse to convince them of the futility of further investment in strategic forces. In particular, rapid progress in the American SDI effort could induce the Soviets to rethink their current strategic doctrine, with its heavy emphasis on strategic offensive forces in a damage-limiting role. Such a rethinking could conceivably lead to a comprehensive strategic arms agreement involving relatively stringent limits on ballistic missiles. It might also lead to a fundamental reorientation of Soviet strategic efforts in the direction of air-breathing offensive systems and stealth technologies, coupled with massive homeland defenses. Soviet options in this regard will be
explored in greater detail below. Suffice it to say that any such development would have significant internal political ramifications, and would probably be possible only with a strong political leadership not encumbered with serious factional problems or succession politics.

### New Technologies and their Strategic Implications

The future of strategic forces, and the strategic and operational doctrines governing their employment, will be decisively affected by technological developments currently foreseeable or in process. Six technology areas may be singled out as having potentially revolutionary implications in this regard:

- directed energy
- computers/microelectronics for C³I/battle management
- stealth
- non-acoustic sensing for ASW
- superhardening
- genetic engineering

These technologies are not only, or even primarily, of relevance for strategic as distinguished from general purpose forces. In one case, genetic engineering ("biotechnology"), the relationship to strategic forces is not even immediately apparent, and the technologies in question are currently, and will probably remain, of direct interest only to the Soviets. Nevertheless, whatever the extent of their utilization in U.S. strategic nuclear programs, they are likely to have a decisive
impact on the overall environment in which strategic forces will exist. It is therefore essential to understand how they are likely to interact both with strategic forces as currently structured and with one another.

**Directed energy.** Directed energy (DE), comprising various types of lasers and particle beams, is, in some of its forms, a relatively mature technology well on its way to weaponization. It has important applications for surveillance and target acquisition, as well as for anti-satellite (ASAT) warfare and air and ballistic missile defense. It is, of course, the core technology envisioned by proponents of the SDI for eventual territorial defense of the U.S. against ballistic missile attack, operating in a ground- or space-based mode against Soviet missiles in their boost phase. Also of considerable near-term promise, however, are lasers used against hostile satellites and for local defense against air-breathing systems. Particularly significant is their promise for fleet defense against Soviet anti-ship cruise missiles.

While our understanding of Soviet efforts in the DE area remains limited, it is clear that they have invested considerable resources in it and may be ahead of the U.S., if not in the basic technologies, then in weaponization of first-generation laser systems. It is reported that a Soviet laser ASAT system could be operational before the end of this decade.
The impact of DE technology on the relationship of strategic offense and defense is a complex question. It is not clear how lasers will be able to cope with passive defense measures used to protect satellites and ballistic missiles, nor whether laser air defense would remain effective against stealthy missiles and aircraft. A better understanding of the operational characteristics of DE weapons is necessary before a useful answer can be given to such questions.

**Computers/microelectronics.** Dramatic improvements in technologies for gathering and processing information are likely to have large consequences for the future of strategic forces by revolutionizing command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) and improving the accuracy, responsiveness and flexibility of strategic systems. The SDI will depend decisively on such technologies in order to meet the stressing requirements for surveillance, acquisition, tracking and kill assessment (SATKA) of attacking missiles or reentry vehicles. But the future military environment as a whole will be reshaped by these technologies. The development of "smart" conventional munitions and the achievement of real-time targeting of the battlefield, for example, may affect importantly the future of strategic forces, by raising the threshold of nuclear use in a theater conflict and reducing the counterforce requirements for U.S. strategic forces against the Soviet homeland. It should be added that this is a technology area in which it is virtually certain that the U.S. will maintain a significant advantage over the Soviets.
In a defense-dominant strategic environment, it could provide the U.S. with a margin of advantage that would be extremely valuable in shaping Soviet perceptions of the correlation of military forces.

**Stealth.** Remarkably little thought seems to have been devoted, to date, to the implications of stealth technologies for the military environment of the future; yet those implications are certain to be very far-reaching. In fact, the U.S. has made rapid strides in recent years in translating into operational systems a variety of technologies for minimizing the signatures of aircraft, and efforts are currently underway to incorporate these technologies into the next generation of cruise missiles and satellites. The penetrativity of the B-1 strategic bomber, now on the verge of deployment, will be enhanced substantially by the addition of stealth features; a revolutionary stealth fighter designed for theater strike missions is essentially operational today; and the stealth Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB) designed for strategic missions will probably be available by the end of this decade. These aircraft will enhance enormously the offensive capabilities of U.S. strategic and theater-strategic forces and will essentially neutralize the vast Soviet investment in theater and homeland air defenses of the past several decades. It seems highly unlikely that the Soviets will be able to develop effective counters to these capabilities until well into the next century, if then. In addition, stealth technology has greater potential for
enhancing the offensive capabilities of U.S. cruise missiles of all kinds, as well as the general effectiveness of air support of both ground and naval operations. It also has important defensive applications, particularly with respect to passive defense of satellites and air defense (strategic as well as theater and tactical).

Of course, stealth systems will only be as survivable as their platforms and bases and will be dependent on adequate strategic and tactical warning. Conceivably, an increasing reliance by the U.S. on stealth systems could push the Soviets in the direction of a strategy of preemption with minimal strategic warning, coupled with nuclear barrage attacks designed to disable or degrade stealth aircraft through EMP effects, as well as direct attack on the relevant command and control networks. Maintaining adequate connectivity with stealth aircraft and ensuring their refueling and recovery could well be the most significant problems facing the U.S. in this area.

It is necessary, of course, to keep in mind the possibility of the Soviets acquiring or developing comparable stealth capabilities. Barring a catastrophic compromise of U.S. programs, however, it seems likely that the Soviets will remain a decade or more behind the U.S. in deployed stealth systems for the foreseeable future. Indeed, the first decade of the next century may well represent the high point of U.S. advantage, as second-generation stealth systems of every type begin to come into the inventory in large quantities. It is
probable that the Soviets, by the turn of the century, will manage to field some stealth-modified aircraft and missiles and possibly an array of first-generation systems comparable to those currently under development in the U.S. However, U.S. countermeasures probably will be able to contain this threat within reasonable bounds. The effectiveness of countermeasures will depend on technical advances in sensors and data processing -- both areas in which the U.S. is likely to retain a commanding advantage. There is every reason to suppose that the U.S. lead in stealth technologies will provide it a strategic advantage of incomparable importance -- and one which it may be possible not only to maintain but to increase in the decades following the initial operational deployment of U.S. stealth systems in the late 1980's or early 1990's.

ASW. Development of a variety of non-acoustic sensors for anti-submarine warfare is another technology area with a large potential for affecting dramatically the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship, although the available evidence is insufficient for judging the maturity of the relevant technologies. The combination of the promise of stealth technologies with the threat of a Soviet breakthrough in ASW could encourage a fundamental reorientation of American strategic doctrine, with the eventual superseding of SSBNs by bombers as the element of the strategic triad best combining invulnerability with offensive effectiveness. It should be noted, however, that the Soviet ASW threat to the U.S. SSBN
force will depend principally on satellite-based surveillance systems, as well as on improved real-time targeting capabilities and command and control. Defeat of that threat thus may require an aggressive U.S. ASAT effort, including sea-based directed energy systems and electronic warfare capabilities of global scope.

**Superhardening.** There are a number of technologies which may affect the future of the ICBM and its relationship to other strategic forces in important ways, but superhardening is the one with the clearest revolutionary potential. It now appears that ICBM silos and other key military targets can be hardened far beyond what was thought possible until very recently -- on the order of twenty-five to fifty times beyond current nominal values for U.S. silos. This (relatively inexpensive) process would make ICBMs essentially invulnerable to anything but a direct hit by existing RVs. It would solve the vulnerability problem of Minuteman and the MX, and also raise questions about the necessity of a mobile basing mode for the SICBM. It would make less urgent the need to focus SDI efforts initially on active defenses for the ICBM force and other key military targets.

The Soviets have already achieved hardness levels for existing silos and other facilities substantially higher than current U.S. levels. They have devoted particular efforts to ensuring the survivability of key command and control nodes as well as of political leadership cadres. A U.S. move toward superhardening would not only frustrate current Soviet
damage-limiting intentions vis-a-vis U.S. ICBMs, but it also would have an important deterrent effect, by enhancing U.S. capabilities for command and control in a protracted nuclear war.

**Genetic engineering.** Emphasizing Soviet efforts in the area of biotechnology is important, if only to highlight a dimension of strategic military power that is too often completely neglected in assessments of the nuclear balance. It is now clear that the Soviets have proceeded with a very extensive effort in the general area of chemical and biological warfare, in direct contravention of existing international arms control agreements (itself an important measure of the seriousness of their interest). In particular, they are in the process of developing an entirely new generation of biological agents, which are more various, flexible, easier to handle and harder to counter than existing agents. Chemical-biological warfare (CBW) has been generally viewed as an adjunct to the tactical/operational battlefield. Soviet biological weaponry, however, and particularly the new generation of agents, seems principally intended for strategic missions. It has been suspected that the Soviets may have developed an ICBM variant (the SS-11 mod 4) for BW delivery. More important, however, is the potential of BW in special operations applications in a period immediately preceding and following the outbreak of general war. Specially-targeted BW attacks within the United States would be ideal precursors to a Soviet nuclear strike, eliminating key military and
political cadres and disrupting U.S. command and control without provoking an immediate nuclear response. To the extent that the SDI and improved air defense of the continental U.S. threaten to deny the Soviets the option of a preemptive, damage-limiting nuclear strike against the U.S., BW is likely to become an increasingly integral and important component of the Soviet strategic arsenal.

Strategic Forces and Doctrine

Before reviewing possible developments within the various categories of strategic forces, it may be useful to raise the more general question of the nature and extent of foreseeable evolutions in U.S. and Soviet strategic doctrine. For the Soviets, doctrine has always played an extremely important role in paving the way for changes in the Soviet strategic force posture. This has been less true for the U.S., where doctrine has generally had a post hoc character and served largely bureaucratic and political functions. The SDI, however, represents a doctrinal more than a technological revolution in U.S. strategic nuclear policy, in spite of the fact that its doctrinal implications have been spelled out by the current Administration only belatedly, if at all.

There is little reason to expect any fundamental changes in Soviet doctrine for nuclear war. The Soviets, in all likelihood, will continue to view their strategic forces principally as a war-fighting instrument geared to the requirements of military and political victory over the West.
Accordingly, they will continue to pursue superiority at the nuclear level, as well as at every other level of potential violence. And they will continue to rely heavily on the strategic approaches or principles that they have favored since World War II -- in particular, surprise, deception, mass, and the maintenance of large reserve forces.

At the same time (as noted earlier), it is conceivable that significant changes could occur over the next ten to twenty years in certain aspects of Soviet nuclear strategy. As the Soviets analyze the challenges potentially facing them should the U.S. successfully capitalize on its prospective technological advantages, particularly in the area of strategic defense, they may see only a stark choice between a fundamental revision of their political-military strategy toward the West and preventive war -- much like calculations made by the Germans in 1914 and the Japanese in 1941. That the Soviets may opt for preventive war is a possibility perhaps less far-fetched than is generally assumed, in view of the serious efforts they have made in recent years to improve their ability to effect a very rapid transition from peace to war. This observation, it may be added, is not intended as an argument against the SDI, since any such decision would be based on a much broader assessment of the general correlation of forces, emphatically including non-military "forces" such as ideology and economics. Should the Soviets not make this choice, they well might consider a reorientation of their strategic doctrine away from its current dependence on
land-based ICBMs and a strategy of nuclear preemption. Such a reorientation might involve the assumption, by expanded strategic defenses, of the damage-limiting mission of ICBMs and thus their relegation to the role of a secure reserve force, coupled with a greater reliance on naval forces and air-breathing systems for strategic and/or theater offensive missions. It might also involve an extensive "peace" campaign, centering on the achievement of a comprehensive strategic arms control agreement and intended to capitalize on tensions between the U.S. and its NATO allies.

As regard the U.S., it remains unclear at present to what degree the SDI will assume the character of a general doctrinal revolution in American national security policy in the direction of a defense-dominant strategic posture. To date, the Administration has been reticent concerning the implications of the SDI for aspects of strategic defense other than ballistic missile defense (BMD), and Administration spokesmen (particularly those representing the Department of Defense) have generally been reluctant to make far-reaching doctrinal claims even for BMD. As a result, to what extent the SDI represents a commitment to the pursuit of defense in the absence of technologies less than optimal for providing full protection of the continental U.S. remains rather ambiguous. Given the foreseeable (international as well as domestic) political pressures against a maximalist version of the SDI, it is difficult to predict the shape of American strategic thought and doctrine in the early years of the next
century. Nevertheless, it seems fairly safe to say that at least the terms of the political debate will have moved a considerable way in the direction of a defense-dominant strategic outlook.

In order to examine more closely the relationship between doctrine and force structure, it will be convenient to discuss separately strategic offensive and defensive forces.

**Strategic offensive forces.** As indicated earlier, there is a strong likelihood that political factors will continue to constrain the modernization of the U.S. ICBM force. It can be confidently predicted that the MX's political troubles will be revisited with the SICBM in the 1990's. A variety of options will be available to solve the problem of the vulnerability of the current ICBM force -- hard mobile basing, deep underground basing, and superhard silo basing. However, many questions remain concerning the operational merits of the first two modes, and political objections to both of them can be easily imagined. Superhardening, on the other hand, seems relatively unproblematic. Yet other questions will remain concerning the positive rationale for the SICBM and its cost-effectiveness, particularly in an environment of expanding Soviet defenses and an increasingly-hard Soviet target base. It will be plausibly argued that the prompt counterforce requirement can be assumed by the D-5 SLEBM, while other counterforce missions can be taken over by stealth bombers and by air- and sea-launched cruise missiles. Depending on the anticipated performance of stealthy air-breathing systems and on the
solution of current problem involving target acquisition and
C³I for sea-based systems, such an argument may prove to be
not only plausible but compelling. On the other hand, it is
perhaps not altogether fanciful to wonder whether decreasing
concerns about ICBM vulnerability and increasing concerns
about ICBM cost-effectiveness, penetrativity and lethality
might not lead to a revival of interest in MX in the 1990's.

With regard to sea-based strategic forces, it is likely
that the political consensus supporting the sea-based leg of
the triad and its modernization with the Trident SSBN, the D-5
SLBM and a Trident successor will continue for the foreseeable
future, although the possibility should perhaps not be
excluded that the D-5 will become the focus of political
attack over the question of its counterforce capability. It
also seems likely that, over the next decade, nuclear-armed
SLCMs for land attack will become widely dispersed throughout
the U.S. fleet thus substantially expanding the role of the
Navy (both surface and subsurface) in supporting strategic
missions. By the turn of the century, the Navy may also have
developed stealthy carrier-based strike aircraft, which will
further enhance its capabilities for power projection against
the Soviet homeland in a nuclear conflict.

As for the bomber leg of the triad, it seems well within
the realm of possibility that a stealthy strategic bomber
force could become the premier U.S. strategic service in the
1990's and beyond. This will be particularly likely if the
future of the ICBM is clouded by lengthy debate over the
merits of the SICBM and if Soviet advances in ASW raise questions about the survivability of the SSBN force. On the other hand, the possibility should not be excluded that stealth technology will come under political fire for providing the U.S. with a dangerously destabilizing first strike advantage (particularly when coupled with strategic defenses for damage limitation). The formidable difficulties of handling stealth technology and cruise missiles in the context of an arms control agreement may, however, render such political attacks ineffective. From a military point of view, the dual-use potential of stealth bombers is likely to be particularly attractive, since improved conventional munitions will make increasingly possible not only non-nuclear theater combat but even limited non-nuclear strategic engagements. Dual-use ALCMs would of course also support such employment concepts. Conceivably, U.S. nuclear targeting of the Soviet Union could eventually be restricted to the relatively limited number of superhard leadership/C2 facilities.

Strategic defensive forces. As stated earlier, it is unclear to what extent the SDI will effect a revolution in the direction of a defense-dominant posture for American strategic doctrine. To the extent that the SDI begins to provide an effective defense against ballistic missiles from the 1990's on, however, it will greatly increase Soviet incentives to improve their offensive capabilities in other areas. Even moderate Soviet success in developing stealth-modified air-breathing systems by the turn of the century could have
serious consequences for the strategic balance, if the U.S. continues to neglect its continental air defenses. The same is true of Soviet development of new biological warfare agents for special operations. However, a U.S. commitment to deployment of a full range of strategic defense forces and capabilities -- BMD, air defense, ASW, ASAT, civil defense, and "land defense" (i.e., defense of key civilian and military facilities against sabotage and special operations) -- is likely to encounter formidable political difficulties because of the societal impact in the U.S. of many of these forces and capabilities. A serious revival of civil defense, to name just the most obvious case, could become a major political bone of contention. However, such problems could perhaps be kept within manageable bounds by a vigorous public campaign in support of an integrated concept of strategic defense.

As regards BMD, it is premature to predict precisely how political and technical factors will interact in the development of the SDI. Political factors in addition to American military culture, may well operate to delay deployment of any BMD system until well into the next century, rejecting the option of piecemeal deployments of first generation systems (whether conventional or directed energy) as they mature, in favor of a comprehensive defense anchored by a highly effective boost-phase DE component. On the other hand, concern over the vulnerability of the U.S. ICBM force and other military targets in the continental U.S. -- notably, the C3I network -- could conceivably give the SDI a
shorter-term focus on area defense, utilizing off-the-shelf conventional BMD components. In the latter case, it is possible that a defense of critical areas and facilities (especially the National Command Authority, (NCA) SAC and NORAD headquarters, and at least some Minuteman/MX fields), consisting of some version of the existing Sentry low altitude defense system and a Homing Overlay-type exoatmospheric system, could be ready for deployment in the early 1990s. A minimal system, designed to remain within current ABM Treaty constraints, might be deployed for protection of the NCA. (Such an option may become increasingly attractive, to the extent that command and control vulnerability replace ICBM vulnerability as a source of concern and focus of political debate over strategic forces in coming years.) As regards options for comprehensive defense, the most promising system at present appears to be one employing kinetic kill mechanisms rather than DE. Such a system might be deployable well before the end of the century. At the same time, a laser system with at least limited capabilities (for example, a laser ASAT system) will almost certainly be available within a similar time frame.

As regards air defense, the U.S. may decide to exploit the potential of stealth technology to develop new generations of air defense interceptor aircraft and associated missiles that could mount a credible defense of U.S. airspace against the Soviet air-breathing threat. In so doing, it could avoid the requirement of a costly and vulnerable air defense
infrastructure comparable to that in the Soviet Union, with
warning and battle management functions instead being
performed principally by air- and space-based sensors and
command elements. Such air defense systems, it may be added,
would also have important applications in support of naval and
theater operations.

Passive measures for civil and land defense are likely to
attract increasing attention, to the degree that active air
and ballistic missile defenses are seen to be effective in
limiting damage to U.S. military targets and the civilian
population. Superhardening of key military facilities is
likely to occur, to some extent, regardless of other
developments. But it remains to be seen, whether and to what
extent political support can be obtained for civil defense
measures to protect key industrial facilities, important
communications nodes and other infrastructural elements
(particularly electric power installations and oil
refineries), and the general population. It can only be hoped
that more attention in the coming decades will be given to
defense of key military facilities against Soviet special
operations and sabotage.
I. INTRODUCTION

This essay is intended to survey the basic framework within which the United States will make national security decisions in the year 2010, focusing especially on American orientation toward the Atlantic (Europe) or the Pacific (Asia).

Such a task for projecting the international environment some 30 years into the future is an intrinsically speculative intellectual exercise. The world in 1985 would not seem terribly unfamiliar to the analyst of 1955. But how accurate would predictions in 1925 have been about 1955? International politics tend to operate on something of a plateau for a certain period, which is eventually interrupted by one or more revolutionary events (e.g., major wars, internal revolts, rapid technological change) that fundamentally transform the strategic environment. The thesis of this essay is that the existing international environment will more likely than not continue to be the pattern in 2010 (see Section II) -- primarily because of the constraints established by the existence of nuclear weapons and the probable continuance of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry as the central factor in world politics. This suggests that the relative importance which the United States has given to the Atlantic/Europe and the Pacific/Asia since 1945 will not shift dramatically. Section
III then examines circumstances which might bring about a significant change or revolution in world politics by 2010, and the impact that this situation might have on the Atlantic-Pacific equation.

II. PATTERNS AND TRENDS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY ORIENTATION

The United States historically has accumulated four major regional overseas interests: Latin America (especially the Gulf of Mexico/Caribbean basin); Asia and the Pacific (especially the key peninsulas and islands); Europe (as an ally of Britain and later with considerable and direct interests on the continent itself); and the Middle East/Persian Gulf. In the 19th century, when the United States engaged in the process of continental expansion while assuring its strategic security in the Western Hemisphere, there was neither the necessity nor the inclination to place priorities on these various overseas interests because the latter three were regarded then as not vital (the Far East) or as nonexistent (Europe and the Middle East). The present century, however, has seen the weakening and finally the collapse of the European-centered world order -- a series of events that forced the United States to become increasingly involved in the affairs of Asia and the Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East. The goal of American policy since the late 1940s has been to create and maintain a global balance of power against the Soviet Union, which had emerged from World War II with the apparent ambition and potential to dominate
Eurasia. As this geopolitical principal was articulated by the American geographer Nicolas Spykman in 1942:

If the New World can be united or organized in such a manner that large masses of unbalanced force are available for action across the ocean, it can influence the politics of Europe and Asia. And if the Old World remains divided and balanced that external force can play a determining role in its political life. If, on the other hand, the Old World can be united or organized in such a manner that large masses of unbalanced power can become available for action across the ocean, the New World will be encircled and, depending on its powers of resistance, may have to submit to the dictates of the Old.¹ (p. 279)

In conducting its policy of anti-Soviet containment, the United States has been required to make difficult choices about the political attention and military resources that it was willing to devote to each particular region. Although there are no hard and fast rules governing these choices, it is nonetheless extremely useful to consider the general historical patterns and trends as a context within which to consider the framework for U.S. strategic choices in the 21st century.

A. The Continuing Soviet Challenge

For the past 40 years, U.S.-Soviet relations have been the dominant concern of American foreign policy. At the end of World War II, the Soviet Union -- although grievously injured from nearly four years of bitter conflict with the German Wehrmacht -- emerged as the greatest military power in Eurasia. As a consequence of its wartime operations against Germany and (very briefly) Japan, the U.S.S.R. occupied
territory that made it impossible for the other major states in Europe and Asia to create local balances against Soviet power.2

Franklin Roosevelt, anxious to return the United States to its more traditional hemispheric and Pacific orientation, had sought to deflect, prior to his death, any dangerous Soviet postwar ambitions by creating a four-power condominium that would ensure global stability. These "Four Policemen" -- the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union -- would assume regional responsibilities under the formal auspices of the United Nations. President Roosevelt expressed the view that the Soviet Union would welcome membership in such an international club of great powers and would not seek to dominate Eurasia as long as certain of its legitimate security requirements were met -- for example, the imposition of a harsh peace against Germany and Japan, and the recognition of Soviet interests in Eastern Europe. In any event, the two other major Eurasian powers -- Britain in Europe and China in Asia -- were to serve as counterweights to any Soviet expansionist tendencies.3

Roosevelt's grand postwar design did not long survive his death, however. First, it became clear that no single Eurasian power or group of powers (including Britain and China) was itself capable of restraining Soviet ambitions. Second, the Soviets seemed determined to block the kind of a political settlement -- notably in Germany -- that would provide assurances of the limitations of Moscow's objectives.
Third, Soviet activities in Greece, Turkey, Iran, France, and Italy appeared to be part of a concerted drive to achieve Eurasian hegemony. Fourth, the United States reached the conclusion that Soviet policy stemmed from internal pressures essentially beyond the influence of the West, rather than from external conditions that could be adjusted by negotiation.  

These four conclusions which were reached by U.S. policymakers from 1945-1949, have since largely governed America's national security policy:

1. During the late 1940s, the United States regarded the Soviet threat as being essentially political and opportunistic in character. The United States attempted to identify those critical regions -- essentially Western Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, Japan and the Philippines -- which were to receive U.S. economic and political aid against Soviet pressure. Emphasis was placed on preserving Western Europe's independence, since it was regarded as the most vulnerable and most important of these critical regions.

2. During the decade of the 1950s, the United States placed much more emphasis on the Soviet military threat and on its global rather than regional character. This view reached its height during the Eisenhower administration, when U.S. declaratory policy held that local Soviet military aggression might be met with a strategic American response (i.e., with nuclear weapons and not necessarily limited to the immediate local threat). In practice, however, the defense of Western
Europe remained the principal concern, and political/military efforts in other regions were scaled accordingly.6

3. During the period from 1961 through 1969, the imminent advent of effective nuclear parity indicated that the U.S.-Soviet competition would shift to low-intensity types of conflict in the so-called Third World: Latin America, Africa, and Asia. The danger of direct confrontation over Europe had receded markedly; the central political question was seen to be whether the United States or the Soviet Union would benefit from the inevitable revolutionary movement sweeping the non-industrialized world.7

4. From 1969 to 1977, American foreign policy was guided by the assumption that at least a partial modus vivendi with the Soviet Union was necessary and possible. The United States was in a relatively-weaker position around the world because of domestic turmoil and overcommitments abroad (particularly Vietnam). On the other hand, the U.S.S.R. seemed to have its own economic and political reasons for reaching a superpower understanding. Both sides were faced with the increasing devolution of political power and the erosion of the postwar bipolar order, but the United States believed itself to be in a much better position to take advantage of this fluid geopolitical situation (e.g., China, Egypt).8

5. During 1977 and 1978, the United States experimented with a policy that, for the first time in three decades, rejected the centrality of U.S.-Soviet competition. The
United States judged that the political and economic evolution of the Third World should become the great international project for American foreign policy, since Soviet communism had become irrelevant to the developing nations. The question therefore was not how to compete with the Soviet model but how to identify the United States with the model that best appealed to the aspirations of the Third World.9

6. Since 1979, the United States has operated on the assumption that the Soviet military threat had been underestimated during the previous decade, and that a restoration of stable international politics depends in the immediate instance on the restoration of a stable global military balance. Recognizing the limitations on American resources identified earlier, the United States has pressed its economically strong industrial allies (Western Europe and Japan) to increase their regional contributions while the United States addressed the global competition with the Soviet Union. Events during the past year suggest that the current administration believes that the military situation is sufficiently stable to support a realistic improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations.

With a brief exception, then, the post-World War II period of American policy has been dominated by the necessity of dealing with the Soviet geopolitical challenge, whether through military confrontation, diplomatic maneuvering, or superpower negotiations and whether in Europe, Asia, or in other regions. Short of the catastrophic failure of the
American or Soviet regimes, this competitive relationship will continue for the indefinite future. Seventy years (by 2015) is by no means unprecedented as a length of time for global, great-power competition. The British, Spanish and French empires were rivals for well over 100 years during the 17th and 18th centuries; the British-Russian competition extended for most of the 19th century, yet never led to global war. The long-term factors which are likely to maintain the U.S.-Soviet rivalry into the 21st Century include:

The Geopolitical Rivalry. With the breakup of the overseas European empires, only the United States (because of its central maritime location) and the Soviet Union (because of its dominant continental location in Eurasia) are now global powers. As noted in Section III, the Soviet Union's perceived security requirements in Eurasia represent, for the United States, an unacceptable attempt to dominate Eurasia.

The Ideological Rivalry. The geopolitical differences in perspective between the United States and the Soviet Union are compounded by the different (antagonistic) principles which animate the two regimes. Liberal democratic and Marxist governments have very different understandings of the meaning and importance of political, social, and economic rights, human equality, and so on. If these differences were confined entirely to the respective domestic political systems, it might be possible for Washington and Moscow to deal with each other simply on the basis of power politics (i.e., "value-free" international relations). Neither side,
however, believes it possible to exclude political philosophy from foreign policy. Democracy and Marxism, after all, are doctrines which claim universal validity -- i.e., they are in theory applicable to all men and women, and to all governments, at all times. In theory, each side would prefer a world order based solely on nations espousing its philosophical principles.

In practice, the United States and the Soviet Union recognize that the conditions necessary for democracy (or Marxism) do not exist everywhere -- and that other democratic (or Marxist) governments will not necessarily subscribe to the same interests and policies. But each nation believes it to be important, and perhaps vital, that the principles on which its own regime is based become increasingly the standards of other nations and of the international system as a whole. The legitimacy of their domestic orders, rightly or wrongly, is believed to be at least partly contingent on the success of similar governments.

The Nuclear Rivalry. The United States and the Soviet Union are now designing and deploying extensive nuclear weapon systems that will continue to support the respective national security objectives of each side against the other -- and that will still be deployed in the 21st century. No other power (with the possible exception of China) has the resources and the inclination to join the U.S.-Soviet nuclear competition at this level. Also the existence of extensive superpower nuclear arsenals imposes a sort of discipline on
the U.S.-Soviet competition and makes it much less likely that this competition will "end" in a decisive military conflict (i.e., war).11

The Overall Military Rivalry. Partly because of their geographic locations, the United States and the Soviet Union are the only states which possess and are likely to possess complete conventional as well as nuclear military forces. These forces are required to defend vital or important interests around the Eurasian periphery. Whatever systemic economic shortcomings of the Soviet Union, the U.S.S.R.'s ability to compete quantitatively (and increasingly qualitatively) with the West in military production has been amply demonstrated. And even if domestic pressures force something of a retrenchment in Soviet military procurement, a substantial military structure will remain an irreplaceable pillar of the communist regime.12 Of course, the United States, for its own reasons, has been reluctant to engage the U.S.S.R. in an unrestrained arms race that could break the Soviet economy or compel Moscow to seek a negotiated settlement of outstanding East-West issues.

The possibility of a dramatic change in U.S.-Soviet relations should not be totally dismissed, however. The effects of a significant diminution in the Soviet threat or of an American reversion to isolationism will be considered in Section III.
B. The Strategic Primacy of Europe

During those periods in this century when the balance of power in Europe and in Asia has been at risk, the United States has chosen to follow a "Europe first" approach. During the late 1930s and early 1940s, before the American involvement in World War II, the United States sought to avoid, if possible, a conflict with Japan in the Pacific in order quietly to support Britain in the Atlantic. U.S. strategy during the war itself placed decided priority on the European rather than the Pacific theater, although the United States was able to conduct a restrained offensive strategy in the Pacific after mid-1942. From time to time, the United States (and particularly the American military) contemplated a shift in emphasis to the Pacific -- largely as a means of opposing what were regarded as self-serving British plans in the European/Mediterranean theater rather than because of the intrinsic merits of a shift away from the Atlantic. A hostile European coalition was regarded as geopolitically more dangerous than a hostile Asian/Pacific coalition, and the United States had active military allies in Europe (Britain and the Soviet Union). Also, the defeat of friendly European colonial powers by Germany inevitably created expansionist opportunities for Japan, whereas Japanese victories in China or the Pacific lacked an equivalent global impact.13

After World War II, the United States remained convinced that the loss of Western Europe to a hostile power (now the Soviet Union) would be the single greatest geopolitical defeat
that the United States could suffer. The classic postwar argument was expressed thusly by Henry Kissinger in 1957:

...in relation to Eurasia the United States is an island power, inferior at present only in human resources though eventually even in industrial capacity. Thus we are confronted by the traditional problem of an "island" power -- of Carthage with respect to Rome, of Britain with respect to the Continent -- that its survival depends on preventing the opposite land mass from falling under hostile control.

If Eurasia were to be dominated by a hostile power or group of powers, we would confront an overpowering threat. And the key to Eurasia is Western Europe because its loss would bring with it the loss of the Middle East and the upheaval of Africa. Were this to happen, the strategic advantage in al-out war would shift to the U.S.S.R. If the United States were ever confined to "Fortress America," or even if Soviet expansion went far enough to sap our allies' will to resist, the Western Hemisphere would be confronted by three-quarters of mankind and hardly less of its resources and our continued existence would be precarious. At best we would be forced into a military effort incompatible with what is now considered the American way of life. At worst we would cease to be masters of our policy.14

During the Korean war, the United States deliberately limited its involvement in Asia because of the strategic priority that was placed on Europe. Indeed, the United States actually deployed its first ground forces (4 divisions) specifically dedicated to NATO defense in 1951.15 Over time, however, the United States has become less concerned about the likelihood of a Soviet invasion of Europe. After the post-World War II division of power in Europe had begun to harden in the late 1940s, the Soviet-American rivalry never became so serious as to lead to a major challenge of the status quo on the continent, much less war. Instead, the
Middle East and Asia became the major points of conflict. "Today's struggle does not lie there [in Europe]," President John F. Kennedy told Belgium's Paul-Henri Spaak, "but rather in Asia, Latin America and Africa." Kennedy also expressed doubt that any large armies would be necessary in Europe if the problem of Berlin did not exist.16

Although the European continent declined in importance as the immediate determinant of the balance of power, the United States could not afford to abandon its position or its alliance structure there. To do so would gravely threaten the United States' global position, and risk the eventual and catastrophic loss of Europe itself. New roles for Europe were invented by the United States in order to maintain its ties to the continent. The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations proposed to involve Europe in a great partnership for the development of the Third World.17 (This partnership was revived by President Carter's National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski under the the rubric of trilateralism.) Henry Kissinger perceived the Europeans as "a counter-weight to discipline our occasional impetuosity and to supply historical perspective to our penchant for abstract and 'final solutions.'"18

The importance of Europe is indicated by the willingness of the United States to deploy American ground forces in the center of Western Europe and to link the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent to this continental position -- a continental commitment that the United States has been unwilling to make
and sustain anywhere else. Even that commitment was
to geographically limited; as an island power removed from
traditional European politics, the United States concluded
that the fate of Eastern Europe was of secondary importance to
American security. In geopolitical terms, the United States
was willing to accept a Soviet advance into Central Europe,
and even a division of the German state. But without a
powerful British/French counterpoise, it could not risk Soviet
control of all Germany.¹⁹ (The United States has since proven
unwilling to risk that situation even after the postwar
revival of Britain and France.) As Walt Rostow emphasized in
1964:

Germany is located astride the balance of power in
Europe. It represents a critically important area,
population and concentration of resources between
the East and the West. In the past, some Germans
have been able to dream of using that position to
dominate Europe. From the communist point of view,
in the pursuit of world power Germany remains the
greatest possible prize.²⁰

Those sections of Germany under Western control thus
became the fulcrum of America's strategy in Europe. The
United States assumed that it could eventually limit its
commitment to Europe only if Western Germany could be
integrated fully into a united and democratic West Europe.
For the first time in American history, Great Britain was no
longer the focal point of United States policy toward Europe.
If a balance against the Soviet advance were to be achieved,
the United States itself would have to be the catalyst, and it
would have to do so within the continent during peacetime.
The radical nature of this departure was obscured somewhat, however, because this commitment was deemed only a temporary expedient.\textsuperscript{21}

Over time, the American position on the continent became fixed. Neither West European political unification nor military integration followed successful economic union -- in fact, the European Community became more of a competitor than a partner to the United States. American policy toward Europe had shifted from a universal, temporary solution to a particular, temporary solution and finally to a particular, permanent commitment that exists nowhere else outside of the Western hemisphere (with the limited, insular exception of Japan).

C. Is the United States a Pacific or an Asian Power?

Prior to World War II, with the brief exception of 1917-1918, the United States had no pretensions of being a power on the European continent, despite its long-standing interests in the Atlantic Ocean. After 1945, despite its initial preference for withdrawal from the continent, the United States found itself established as a power in Europe.

Since the late 19th century, however, the United States has vacillated over the question of whether its interests required it to become an Asian (continental) power as opposed to merely being a Pacific (maritime) power. Advocates of American interests in Asia around the turn of the century stressed the importance of trade; the Far East -- and
particularly China -- was generally regarded as the great marketplace of the future for the overproduction from burgeoning American industry. The American acquisition of the Philippine Islands (1898-1899) was justified in part because of their location relative to China. At this time, Secretary of State John Hay also promulgated the Open Door Policy -- i.e., the United States would oppose the establishment of any special commercial zones in China that would benefit one power over others. This eventually came to mean that the United States would support the territorial integrity of China against outside powers.22

This did not mean that the United States would take military action to prevent the dismemberment of China, however. Such a continental interventionist policy lacked widespread public support. And even had such support existed in principle, the United States would have found intervention in Asia an extremely difficult strategic proposition. Unlike Europe, in which American intervention occurred with the support of the dominant naval power (Britain), intervention on the continent of Asia would have had to be accomplished, in all likelihood, against the opposition of the dominant naval power (Japan, by the 1920s). The already difficult task of operating at great distances in the western Pacific was complicated enormously by the fear of a Japanese attack on exposed American territory (the Philippines).23

In short, the United States determined not to risk war in order to prevent Japan from seeking to dominate the Asian
continent. However, the United States was prepared to resist Japanese advances in the Pacific against American territory and/or against British and Dutch possessions. If it had failed to resist Tokyo's maritime expansionism, the United States would have surrendered permanently its position as a Pacific power and would have weakened significantly friendly European states preoccupied with local matters. The strategy was reinforced by the belief that Japanese economic vulnerabilities, particularly the dependence on overseas oil, left Tokyo extremely susceptible to a military blockade. The U.S. Navy presumably could hold Japanese aggression by establishing such a line from the Aleutians through Hawaii to Guam while the British patrolled from Guam to Singapore. Harold Ickes, the Secretary of the Interior, noted in 1937: "This would be a comparatively simple task which the Navy could take care of without having to send a great fleet. Blocked thus, the President thinks that Japan could be brought to her knees within a year."24 (Because of its success in the first six months of the war, however, Japan was able to deny this line to its opponents until late in the war.

U.S. Army planners before the war were less sanguine about the effects of an economic blockade, much less the ambitious naval offensive and relief of the Philippines that was contemplated in War Plan Orange. Because of the strategic priority which the United States placed on the Atlantic and because of the general weakness of the United States in the Pacific, the Army tended to prefer a strictly defensive
strategy in the Pacific. The key to this strategy was to be the establishment of a defensive perimeter from Alaska to Hawaii to Panama that would ensure the security of the continental United States.25

Because of the early setbacks once the war began, President Roosevelt placed a great deal of emphasis on aiding China as a means of tying down the Japanese military. Roosevelt also did so in order to fulfill his postwar objective of elevating China to the rank of great power. Once Japan was defeated and a pro-U.S. Chinese government was in power on the mainland, the United States would become de facto the dominant Pacific power and yet would not need to concern itself with Asian affairs. (This is analogous to American postwar objectives in Europe.)26

Unfortunately for the United States, hopes for a stable and friendly China were dashed by the Chinese civil war and the eventual victory of the Communists. Despite American preference for a unified and independent (i.e., anti-Soviet) China, the administration rejected any U.S. intervention on the mainland on behalf of the Nationalist Chinese. NSC 34/1, approved by President Truman in February 1949, relegated China to a relatively low priority -- lower than that of other areas "where the benefits to U.S. security are more immediately commensurate with the expenditure of U.S. resources."26 This policy implicitly rejected the 1947 strategic analysis of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (although the Chiefs were not necessarily in favor of U.S. military intervention):
The United States must seek to prevent the growth of any single power or coalition to a position of such strength as to constitute a threat to the Western Hemisphere. A Soviet position of dominance over Asia, Western Europe, or both, would constitute a major threat to United States security.

United States security interests require that China be kept free from Soviet domination; otherwise all of Asia will in all probability pass into the sphere of the U.S.S.R....

Soviet expansionist aims in China, furthered by operations of Chinese communists, are clearly incompatible with United States security.

With a disarmed and occupied Japan, the only Asiatic government at present capable of even a show of resistance to communist expansion in Asia is the Chinese National Government. 28

Instead of continental intervention in order to create an Asian balance of power, the United States elected to seek an Asian/Pacific balance of power based on an offshore defensive perimeter. Secretary of State Dean Acheson identified this island chain in January 1950 as consisting of the Aleutians, Japan, the Ryukyus, and the Philippines. Although "other areas in the Pacific" could not be guaranteed against an attack, Acheson stated that if aggression were to occur, "the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations." It was under this latter rubric that the United States intervened in Korea from 1950-1953 and Taiwan came to be subsumed within the American security perimeter in the Pacific -- but these steps were intended to contain outward communist (Chinese) pressure and not to seek a realignment of power on the mainland itself.
Even American involvement in Indochina/Vietnam in the 1950s and 1960s was predicated on the basis of resisting rather than creating pressure as a means of maintaining a balance of power in Asia and the Pacific.

Communist control of all of Southeast Asia would render the United States position in the Pacific offshore island chain precarious and would seriously jeopardize fundamental United States security interests in the Far East. The extension of communist power via Burma would augment the communist threat to India and Pakistan and strengthen the groups within those countries which favor accommodation. However, such an event would probably result in a stiffer attitude toward communism on the part of the India government.

Communist domination of mainland Southeast Asia would place unfriendly forces astride the most direct and best-developed sea and air routes between the Western Pacific and India and the Near East. In the event of global war, the development of Soviet submarine and air bases in mainland Southeast Asia might compel the detour of U.S. and allied shipping and air transportation in the Southeast Asia region via considerably longer alternate routes to the south. This extension of friendly lines of communication would hamper U.S. strategic movements in this region and tend to isolate the major non-communist bases in the Far East -- the offshore island chain and Australia -- from existing bases in East Africa and the Near and Middle East, as well as from potential bases on the Indian sub-continent.

The American withdrawal from Vietnam in the mid-1970s was fortunately offset by an important change in the regional and global alignment of power: the U.S.-Chinese rapprochement. This meant that, for the first time since the late 1940s, a local balance of power against the Soviet Union in Asia became possible. Sino-Soviet hostility had existed since the late 1950s or early 1960s, but the United States had been unable to take advantage of it because of the perceived necessity to
contain a hostile China. This geopolitical shift eased considerable pressure the from friendly states that constituted the offshore Pacific defense perimeter, and allowed the United States to avoid difficult questions about long-term American interests in Asia itself.

D. Preventing the Two-Ocean Security Dilemma

Military or political encirclement by hostile powers is the most serious strategic problem that a nation can face. A state so threatened cannot concentrate its forces against an adversary in one theater without risking disaster in another; the initiative generally rests with the encircling coalition. Despite the United States' relative security in the Western Hemisphere, this problem also exists for Washington, in the form of a potential two-ocean alliance by aggressive European and Asian/Pacific states. The long-standing American interest in the construction of a trans-Isthmian canal reflected this anxiety: with such a passageway under American control, the U.S. Navy could move rapidly from ocean to ocean to meet a particular threat while denying an opponent the similar luxury. Of course, this strategic advantage of interior ocean lines of communication worked best against a single enemy. Diplomacy was the best guarantee that the Navy would not have to operate against two separate opponents at the same time.

The most famous statement of American foreign policy -- the Monroe Doctrine -- was partly a reaction against such a two-front danger. The Holy Alliance (for all purposes,
France) seemed on the verge of intervening to suppress the revolts in Spain's colonies in the Western Hemisphere -- thus creating a renewed European military threat in the Caribbean basin. To the West, in the lands which promised to one day make the United States a continental power, Russia was beginning to make inroads. As a general foreign policy declaration, then, the Monroe Doctrine was intended to kill two birds with one stone.31

In the first two decades of the Twentieth Century, the United States sought to sever the alliance between the greatest European and Asian naval powers (Britain and Japan). In the Washington Naval Treaties (1921-1922), the United States proved willing to concede significant advantages to the Japanese (e.g., the nonfortification of Pacific possessions) in order to break up the Anglo-Japanese alliance. As late as 1934, when it appeared that London might side with Tokyo on certain critical naval limitations issue, Roosevelt sought to make it clear "that if Great Britain is even suspected of preferring to play with Japan to playing with us, I shall be compelled, in the interest of American security, to approach public sentiment in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa in a definite effort to make these Dominions understand clearly that their future is linked with us in the United States."32 Unfortunately, within a few years a diplomatically unassailable German-Japanese alliance proved a much more serious strategic problem. The resulting peacetime equation for Roosevelt was extremely disquieting:
"...it is terribly important for the control of the Atlantic for us to help keep peace in the Pacific. I simply have not got enough Navy to go round -- and every little episode in the Pacific means fewer ships in the Atlantic."33 The wartime equation, of course, was even more serious.

The principal American adversary after 1945 represented an implicit threat to U.S. security in the Atlantic and the Pacific by virtue of its geography alone. Yet the Soviet Union's geographical disadvantages -- Churchill once compared Russia to a giant with both nostrils pinched -- meant that the Soviet Navy would have difficulty in posing a serious threat to the United States in one ocean, let alone two. The Sino-Soviet alliance presented a much more serious problem in Asia, but the PRC's lack of maritime power and the slow development of the Soviet Navy allowed the United States to remain secure in its offshore island strongholds. Even so, the pressures of two-front competition with the U.S.S.R. caused the Eisenhower administration to devise a "massive retaliation" doctrine that would prevent the Sino-Soviet bloc from using its conventional advantages and interior lines of communications. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations were more willing to meet the global challenge conventionally -- but only by placing considerably less emphasis on the Soviet military threat in Europe.

The United States' exploitation of the Sino-Soviet rift in the 1970s substantially reduced the immediate threat to American interests in Asia and the Pacific and provided the
U.S. with indirect leverage that might well reduce Soviet pressure elsewhere. The steady Soviet buildup of naval and air assets in the Far East in the 1980s, however, has come to constitute, for the first time, a serious threat to decisive American superiority in the Pacific. The impact of this renewed two-ocean threat is already being felt. The United States is well aware of the inherent limitations of the Chinese contribution to the defense of the American security perimeter in the Pacific. For its part, the U.S. has pressed Japan to devote additional resources to defense of air and sea lines of communication in the vicinity of the home islands, in an effort to free American forces for more distant operations.

E. The Global Character of U.S. Security Policy

Working within the general imperative to avoid a two-ocean threat to U.S. security, the United States increasingly has come to regard the European/Atlantic and the Asian/Pacific regions as part of a single geostrategic problem. This first manifested itself to the United States during the late 19th century, when American trading interests in Asia and the Pacific became entangled with the penetration of European colonial empires into the region. To take another example: although the proximate cause of the War of 1898 was Spanish misrule in Cuba, the United States chose to extend the war to Spain's Pacific possessions in the Philippines. Admiral Dewey's naval operations at Manila Bay were successful, but the U.S. victory over the Spanish fleet only served to attract
French, German, British, and Japanese warships to the Philippines. Any attempt by Spain to recover the islands would have depended in part on the willingness of other European powers to resupply the Spanish relief fleet at the various colonial ports in the region. For a time, it appeared that the European continental powers might intervene diplomatically (and perhaps militarily) to prevent the United States from dismembering the Spanish empire -- with the Philippines obviously being the most exposed point in the American campaign. The possibility of such a coalition foundered, however, on the workings of the European balance of power when Britain indicated its opposition to this undertaking.35

During the First World War, Japan took advantage of the preoccupation of the European nations (and its alliance with Britain) to make extensive demands on China. Many of these demands were later abandoned under American pressure, but Japan did succeed in obtaining possession, through the peace settlement, of former German-held islands north of the equator. These islands -- the Marshalls and the Carolines -- represented serious potential barriers to American offensive naval operations in the Pacific and to the wartime relief of the Philippines, as envisioned in War Plan Orange.36

The breakdown of the balance of power in Europe during the 1930s, and the outbreak of war then in 1939, again provided Japan with opportunities for expansion in China and in Southeast Asia. Even before American involvement in the
war, President Roosevelt offered aid to China in part as a means of tying down Japanese military power and perhaps discouraging Japanese aggression elsewhere. In the end, Roosevelt decided to bring the United States into the war if Japan attacked British or Dutch possessions in the region, even if Tokyo avoided attacking American territory (notably the Philippines). The decision was made partly to protect long-term U.S. interests in Asia and the Pacific, but also to support friendly European governments already greatly strained (and in the case of the Netherlands, defeated) in the more critical struggle against Germany. Roosevelt also felt that any U.S. appeasement of Japan would undermine the public case that he had built for opposing Hitler's aggression.37

The psychological as well as the strategic connection between Europe, Asia, and other vital regions later was one of the principal justifications for U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The 1954 document stating U.S. national security objectives in French Indochina (NSC 5405) asserted:

In the conflict in Indochina, the Communist and non-Communist worlds clearly confront one another on the field of battle. The loss of the struggle in Indochina, in addition to its impact in Southeast Asia and in South Asia, would therefore have the most serious repercussions on U.S. and free world interests in Europe and elsewhere.

Such is the interrelation of the countries of the area that effective counteraction would be immediately necessary to prevent the loss of any single country from leading to submission to or an alignment with communism by the remaining countries of Southeast Asia and Indonesia. Furthermore, in the event all of Southeast Asia falls under communism, an alignment with communism of India, and in the longer term, of the Middle East (with the
probable exceptions of at least Pakistan and Turkey) could follow progressively. Such widespread alignment would seriously endanger the stability and security of Europe.38

Drawing upon the perceived lesson of the 1930s, the United States during the 1950s and 1960s insisted that international security was indivisible, and hence it was impossible to draw a distinction between "vital" and "peripheral" interests.

U.S. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg stated in March 1966:

"In my view, the complete answer is that there would be no greater danger to world peace than to start segregating mankind and the countries they live in as either peripheral or crucial. Perhaps in those halcyon days when the Congress of Vienna was the supreme example of intelligent diplomacy, such distinctions had meaning. The introduction of Marxism-Leninism into world society and the visible determination by its militant exponents to implement that doctrine through "wars of national liberation" has today obliterated such distinctions. So has the expansion of technology, which has made this a shrinking world of interdependent nations."39

That same month, Secretary of State Dean Rusk observed:

"I have read that I have drawn "no distinction between powerful industrial democratic states in Europe and weak and undemocratic states in Asia." The answer is that, for the Secretary of State, our treaty commitments are a part of the supreme law of the land, and I do not believe that we can be honorable in Europe and dishonorable in Asia.

I do believe that the United States must keep its pledged word. That is not only a matter of national honor but an essential to the preservation of peace. For the backbone of world peace is the integrity of the commitment of the United States.40

This is not to say that the United States failed to develop a particular strategic rationale for a universal policy of
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara described the "sentinels of the free world" in a May 1964 speech:

Imagine a globe, if you will, and on that globe the Sino-Soviet bloc. The bloc is contained at the north by the Arctic. To the west are the revitalized nations of Western Europe. But across the south and to the east you find the 11 "forward defense" nations -- Greece, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, India, Laos, Thailand, South Vietnam, the Philippines, and the Republics of China and Korea. These nations together with stretches of the Pacific Ocean bearing the U.S. Fleet, describe an arc along which the free world draws its frontlines of defense.41

The American withdrawal from Vietnam seemed to indicate the abandonment of such a universalistic vision of U.S. security policy. But, in fact, the Nixon and Ford administrations, under the guidance of Henry Kissinger, developed a different kind of global approach. "Equilibrium was the name of the game," Kissinger has written, emphasizing the necessity of "...strengthen[ing] security in an international system less dependent for stability on permanent American intervention."42 The key to Kissinger's new equilibrium was China -- not because China was an Asian power, but because the PRC represented the sole player in the balance of power game whose shift toward the United States would allow Washington to maintain the strategic initiative over the U.S.S.R. Flexibility and intelligence were to replace material superiority as the foundation of American foreign policy. "Clearly, triangular diplomacy [with the U.S.S.R. and the PRC] required agility. We had somehow not to flex our own muscles but, as in judo, to use the weight of an adversary to

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propel him in a desired direction. If successful, we would have larger series of options toward either side than they had toward each other..."43

The global character of Kissinger's policy of equilibrium is most strongly indicated by the Nixon Administration's decision to oppose any Soviet attack on China:

From the beginning Nixon and I were convinced -- alone among senior policymakers -- that the United States could not accept a Soviet military assault on China. We had held this view before there was contact of any sort; we imposed contingency planning on a reluctant bureaucracy as early as the summer of 1969. Obviously, this reflected no agreement between Peking and Washington -- not even the Warsaw talks were taking place at that time. It was based on a sober geopolitical assessment. If Moscow succeeded in humiliating Peking and reducing it to impotence, the whole weight of the Soviet military effort could be thrown against the West. Such a demonstration of Soviet ruthlessness and American impotence (or indifference -- the result would be the same) would encourage accommodation to other Soviet demands from Japan to Western Europe, not to speak of the many smaller countries on the Soviet periphery.44

Early in the Reagan Administration, another global concept was put forward: horizontal escalation. "The loss of clear superiority means we must take strategy more seriously then [sic] ever," Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger stated in 1982. "Today we must respond to the challenges thrust upon us by Soviet conventional forces that outnumber us, and by Soviet strategic forces that have acquired a margin of superiority over us." Weinberger rejected the notion that the material weaknesses facing the United States must themselves compel a reduction of overseas commitments.
To those who say we are trying to do too much, we must ask, what should we give up? Should we give up defense of the Central Front in Europe? Should we give up the Caribbean? Should we give up any attempt to defend the oil fields, so vital to Europe and Japan? Should we give up our defense of Northeast Asia? Should we give up any other vital interests?

For history tells us, and recent history at that, that it a nation with enormous military power and a historically aggressive policy of adding to its bases and its influence throughout the world, knows that it will meet no opposition in a particular crisis -- if it knows in short that there is a vacuum, it will rush in to fill that vacuum, and another vital area will be lost to the West.45

Weinberger indicated that the solution to this problem was to meet Soviet conventional aggression at the conventional level (avoiding, if possible, vertical escalation to nuclear weapons) by having the capability to widen the geographic scope of the conflict (horizontal escalation).

If armed aggression should occur, naturally, our defensive actions will seek to end the conflict as quickly as possible, at the point of aggression. But if a conventional war should be forced upon us, the United States and allied forces may also have to launch counter-offensives elsewhere to restore the peace and protect our freedom. The United States may take military actions that threaten Soviet vulnerabilities critical to their prosecution of the war, should that prove necessary to restore the peace.46

The strategy of "horizontal escalation" received substantial criticism, and, in the end, the Reagan Administration was required (because of budgetary constraints, if no other reason) to downplay its new foundation for a global security policy -- but without providing a convincing justification for reconciling ends with means.47 This is not meant to single
out the current administration for its particular foibles, but
rather to illustrate the necessity for, and the difficulty of,
choices between various regions and interests when those
regions and interests are often closely interrelated.

III. CRITICAL FACTORS AFFECTING U.S. NATIONAL
SECURITY PRIORITIES IN THE 21st CENTURY

If the 20th century could be described as a period in
which the most important single region for U.S. national
security was Europe (although American commitments in the
Asian/Pacific area also increased), what can be said of the
early part of the next century? What are the likely critical
issues that will determine the relative priority of Europe,
Asia and the Pacific, and other regions in American foreign
policy?

A. The Future Direction of Soviet Policy

As long as the United States' principal national security
objective is to prevent the Soviet Union from dominating the
Eurasian landmass, the United States will be required to react
to Soviet choices about the relative priority of Europe and
Asia. Alternately, the United States may be able to explore
military or political options that address Soviet weaknesses
instead of Soviet strengths -- i.e., make the
choice between East and West for the U.S.S.R. and thus place
the superpower competition on grounds more favorable to the
United States.
For the foreseeable future, the Soviet Union will likely regard Europe as the single greatest strategic concern of its foreign policy. The Soviet Union, at the present time, can be threatened as a state (and as the center of global communism) only from Western Europe. That threat is only partially a military one; it also relates to dangers to the legitimacy of the Soviet Union based on ideological grounds. An independent, prosperous and democratic Western Europe -- maintained as such in the late 1940s and early 1950s by the presence of the United States -- is the greatest stumbling block to Soviet foreign policy success, whether defined nationally or ideologically.

While Europe remains the long-term concern of Soviet strategy, the Soviets acknowledge that factors external to Europe will play a decisive element in determining the outcome of the struggle. For the U.S.S.R, the most significant extra-European factor is the United States. In Soviet eyes, the American commitment to Europe after World War II, by reviving a portion of the pre-1939 order, prevented a radical new alignment of forces on the continent. Although a restored Western Europe lacks the vigor of the past, it has served as a platform for the United State's global struggle with the Soviet Union. In the Soviet view, if the American presence on the continent were removed or minimized, the full reality of Soviet power would be realized by Western Europe and the Soviet Union would achieve its "natural" position as the dominant Eurasian land power. Soviet policy in Europe
therefore has been intended to encourage isolationist trends in the United States, and neutralist trends among the West Europeans. The Soviet Union, however, has no desire for the American withdrawal from Europe to result from the success of United States' policy -- i.e., the development of a united, independent Western Europe capable autonomously of maintaining the balance of power. American isolationism must not result in the creation of a British-French-German military alliance. Soviet diplomacy in Europe is therefore based on the assumption that:

(1) a united Europe would represent a threat to Soviet security; a divided Europe serves Soviet security and provides the more suitable environment for the pursuit of Soviet interests;

(2) a prosperous and politically cohesive Western Europe would prove a dangerous attraction to the states of Eastern Europe;

(3) a united Western Europe would be dominated by Germany; the best mid-term solution is to keep Germany divided in a divided Europe. In the longer term, the Soviet Union might use the device of a pan-European collective security system to satisfy the Western European desire for unity without compromising Soviet interests.48

The Soviet Union also sees itself as an Asian as well as a European power, while making the essential distinction between the relatively densely populated regions of European Russia and the immense but sparsely inhabited expanse to the
east of the Urals. In one sense, Asia is not now as strategically vital to the maintenance of the Soviet regime as Europe, but its natural resources and territory represent the U.S.S.R.'s great national hope for the future, in the same way that in the 19th century, the American West did for the United States. To protect this region, which is so far removed from the current political and economic core of the Soviet state, the U.S.S.R. must contain any continental threat and frustrate hostile maritime powers -- and above all, prevent an alliance between enemy continental and maritime states.

A nation that is faced with the Soviets' strategic requirement of defending two fronts (Europe and Asia) can do so by developing its internal lines of communication or by securing a perimeter that denies a potential enemy the advantages of whatever mobility he may possess. Unfortunately for the U.S.S.R., the Soviet state cannot be protected solely by its long and vulnerable land lines of communication. The Soviets have thus demonstrated considerable interest in establishing a perimeter along the Indian Ocean littoral and in the western Pacific -- a perimeter along which Soviet forces can move freely, but which bars any other major maritime power (the United States) from attaining a logment on the Asian continent and which serves to contain the major continental threat (China). If one begins with the Dardanelles and the Eastern Mediterranean, it is possible to trace a line of Soviet interest in and activity around the Suez Canal, the Horn of Africa, the Persian Gulf (for example,
Afghanistan), India, Vietnam, North Korea, the Kurile Islands, and Kamchatka. The Soviets unsuccessfully sought to institutionalize this perimeter with their 1969 proposal for a "system of collective security" in Asia as a replacement for "existing military-political groupings."

Although the Soviet Union (like the United States) regards Europe as the central geopolitical prize in the superpower contest, the U.S.S.R. (again like the United States) does not always regard Europe as the central theater for the competition. However, unlike the United States, the Soviet Union cannot tolerate an unacceptable balance of power on the Asian continent. The hostility of China is thus a much more serious matter for Moscow than it was for Washington during the 1950s and 1960s. During the 1970s, the Soviets accordingly placed considerably more emphasis on containing China (and its participation in Third World opportunities such as Angola and Ethiopia) than they did on Europe. This situation changed during the early 1980s, when the U.S.S.R. turned its attention back to Europe (e.g., the INF deployment issue), apparently satisfied that the political and military groundwork had been laid for better (or at least less hostile) relations with the PRC.

This pattern of opportunism in Europe and the long-term development of a security structure in Asia -- with the Soviets preferring to focus their energy on one region at a time -- is now well established, and, as likely as not, will remain the pattern in 2010.
Long-term Soviet policy could be disrupted by several external factors. Severe political difficulties in Eastern Europe would represent a major threat to the Soviet empire and hence would demand constant attention and considerable resources. (There is the possibility that the Soviets might attempt to relieve pressure in the West by making a dramatic military move in Asia. This does not seem to fit the historical behavior of the Soviets, however.)

Opportunities might occur in Europe if internal factors caused the disintegration or weakening of NATO; the Soviets would then have to decide if the best course would be to consolidate their advantage in Europe first, or to use their new-found political and military flexibility to seek gains in Asia. The most dangerous and demanding circumstances would arise if Western Europe were to unite (probably under German leadership) and develop a credible nuclear deterrent, while China remained hostile in Asia and the United States continued its global policy of anti-Soviet containment. Under these conditions of encirclement, the U.S.S.R would have lost its strategic flexibility altogether, and the Europe versus Asia question would be decided for the Soviets by other powers.

The most likely determinants of Soviet strategic orientation in 2010 will come from Asia, however. Over the past two decades, the U.S.S.R. has laid the military foundation for its long-term security in Asia and, to a lesser extent, the Pacific. (To be sure, it has not done so at the expense of its NATO-oriented forces.) In 1964, the Soviets
had only 12 divisions available for immediate operations against the PRC; by the early 1970s this figure had grown to 45 divisions and by 1984 to 52 divisions. In the late 1970s, the Soviets began gradual but significant qualitative improvements in their Asian-based military forces, especially those forces (e.g., naval and air assets) which could be employed against Japanese and American forces in the region.53

If Beijing remains actively hostile to the Soviet Union in 2010, the U.S.S.R clearly will be forced to maintain and increase its military and political efforts in Asia. Above all, the Soviet Union will seek to prevent a Sino-Japanese-American alliance, probably seizing upon Tokyo as the weak link to be intimidated or blandished into neutrality. The Soviet Union also would seek to complete its long-established goal for an Asian collective security sphere that would be effective both against China and the offshore powers; maintain and consolidate ties with Vietnam; to prevent ASEAN, at the very least from becoming part of an anti-Soviet coalition; and to increase naval and maritime power in the key waterways of the western Pacific, the South China Sea, and the Indian Ocean.

If Beijing assumes a more neutral stance in the Soviet-American rivalry and especially if it begins to favor the U.S.S.R., however indirectly, the nature of the Soviet task in Asia changes dramatically. Moscow would then be free to exploit periodic opportunities to weaken the U.S. position
and to neutralize Japan, while concentrating most of its effort in Europe or the Middle East.

One also should consider the possibility that the Soviet Union, for domestic reasons, will stress economic development of Siberia and the Soviet Far East. This development could best be served by extensive foreign participation. Japan is the natural economic partner for such activities: "Japan produces advanced industrial goods and requires raw materials; the U.S.S.R produces raw materials and desires advanced, high technology industrial goods." The Soviets discovered in the late 1970s, however, that Japan would not undertake significant development projects without American participation, and that the United States would not participate during a climate of poor U.S-Soviet relations. (The West Europeans have been somewhat more eager, but the Yamal gas pipeline project controversy has had a sobering political and economic effect on all concerned.) Because the United States has traditionally rejected any special regional arrangements with the U.S.S.R. in the absence of generally satisfactory relations ("linkage"), American cooperation in Siberian development would certainly require a relaxation of tensions in Soviet pressure on Europe.

B. The State of NATO

Since 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty has been the cornerstone of American foreign policy. NATO has been the policy instrument through which the United States prevented
the Soviet Union from achieving the political or military domination of the single most important region outside the Western hemisphere. American membership in NATO has also permitted the restoration of the political and economic strength of the major states of Western Europe without setting off a third continental war in this century. As noted earlier, the United States has not been completely successful in its European policy -- i.e., no "third force" has emerged in Europe capable of removing the principal burden of defense from the United States. Despite the political and military resources which the United States has been forced to devote to Europe since 1945, however, the strategic rewards have been enormous. With the European front relatively stable, the United States has enjoyed considerable diplomatic and military freedom of action elsewhere in the world -- notably in the Pacific basin.

This comfortable state of affairs may not continue for the indefinite future. By the year 2010, European elites will be two generations removed from the experience of World War II and the Cold War. Even during the height of U.S.-West European cooperation and the depth of U.S.-Soviet confrontation, considerable differences were evident between Washington and the European allies in general, between the United States and particular allies, and among the European NATO members themselves. These differences have become even more noticeable recently in the political and economic, as well as the military, realms.
The United States sees NATO as the single most important element in its global policy of anti-Soviet containment. (To be sure, the United States has many other foreign policy objectives besides containing Soviet power -- and it is precisely the existence of an independent Western Europe that permits it the relative freedom of action to pursue those objectives.) U.S.-Soviet tensions, whether over other regions (e.g., Asia, the Middle East) or issues (e.g., strategic nuclear forces) will thus be reflected in Europe. Also, as long as the U.S.-Soviet rivalry continues at the global level, the United States will be reluctant to sanction too great a relaxation of tensions in Europe, lest this allow the Soviets to divert resources to other areas.

The Western European nations, on the other hand, regard NATO as a regional mechanism that guarantees them political and military security -- and hence provides them with some international flexibility that otherwise would be lost in a truly bipolar world. The NATO Europeans do not see themselves as benefitting from increased U.S.-Soviet tensions because they are inevitably placed on the diplomatic (and military) front lines -- and are thus denied the flexibility that exists during periods of good U.S.-Soviet relations. (At the same time, the West Europeans have a latent fear that superpower relations may one day become too good -- i.e., Washington may settle its outstanding differences with Moscow irrespective of European interests.) The NATO Europeans are thus extremely suspicious of American activities in other
areas -- notably the Middle East and, to a lesser extent, Asia and the Pacific -- which may adversely affect U.S.-Soviet relations and hence "rock the boat" in Europe.

These essential differences will continue to erode the political cohesion of NATO. The centrifugal forces created by this process by 2010, could well overcome the centripetal forces that hold the alliance together. At the very least, a fundamental restructuring of NATO is quite conceivable.

If this restructuring were to take place along lines generally favored by the United States, the European allies, as an aggregate, would become a true "second pillar" of the alliance. Ideally, the European states would be able to assume greater burdens in conventional ground forces, allowing the United States to concentrate more on air and naval forces. In other words, the United States would seek to emphasize its role as an Atlantic (maritime) power and deemphasize its role as a European (continental) power. Under such a restructuring, the West Europeans would be likely to bear greater responsibility for nuclear deterrence, allowing the United States to reduce in some portion the requirements placed on its strategic nuclear forces, at least in the NATO context.

This solution would be attractive for the United States because it would, in theory, free military resources that could then be utilized in the Middle East or Asia and the Pacific. Even if this should prove to be the case, however, the United States might not be able to reap the political
benefits. In the face of at least a partial decoupling of the United States from Europe, the U.S.S.R. would have the option of reconfiguring or redeploying some of its own forces away from Europe and toward other areas where the opportunities/threats appeared greater.

Second, it is not clear how viable, in fact, a "second pillar" would be. If the Soviets increased their political/military pressure on the continent, the United States might be forced to take various expensive or dangerous unilateral countermeasures, because it no longer had sufficient leverage in Western Europe to generate a coordinated allied response. One type of countermeasure might be to increase American political and military activity in Asia and the Pacific -- but as Europe remains the single most important "prize" in the U.S.-Soviet competition, a shift in U.S. emphasis to the Far East would not compensate completely for Soviet gains in Europe. A more likely response would entail an adjustment in U.S. nuclear posture (offensive and/or defensive) that might result in increased U.S. unilateralism or isolationism. Along the same lines, the United States could increase its conventional forces (especially naval, amphibious, and tactical air) to enhance its ability to project power at suitable locations along the Eurasian periphery -- with sizable forces still required for Atlantic and European contingencies.

Less likely but still conceivable by 2010 would be the creation of a united or federated Western Europe, one
independent of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Such an entity would have some sort of unified military command and an independent nuclear force. Although, since 1945, the United States has been a passive (and occasionally active) supporter of the concept of a united Europe, the creation of a "third force" would inevitably mean a substantial loss in American influence over European regional and global policies. An integrated Europe might then have the means and incentive to challenge U.S. policies elsewhere in the world if those policies conflicted with perceived European interests. This is most likely to be true in the Middle East, especially if energy resources from this area remained critical to the European economies, but differences could also arise over relations in Asia and the Pacific. These U.S.-European tensions could stem from economic and trade issues with Japan or other regional powers, or from differing approaches to the People's Republic of China. The PRC would be a natural counterpart of an independent and united Europe; in this case, the United States might lose decisive political and military influence on the continental landmass of both Europe and Asia -- a situation not dissimilar from that which was obtained during the late 19th century.

A third strategic possibility for NATO by 2010 would be the complete collapse of the alliance structure, due to a combination of external (Soviet) pressure and the internal contradictions described above. Under these circumstances, the United States would be forced to withdraw its forces
from the continent unless Washington concluded bilateral agreements (especially with West Germany) to permit stationing U.S. troops -- an unlikely event. The Soviet Union would be expected to gain important and quite possibly decisive sway over a politically demoralized Western Europe, even without necessarily occupying additional territory. If, over time, Moscow were able to integrate the industrial and technological assets of Western Europe into its own economy, the United States would face a severe challenge to maintain a global balance of power. At a minimum, it would leave the Soviets in a much stronger position in the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Middle East. The obvious alternative for the United States would be to make the best of a bad bargain by greatly increasing its military commitment to the Far East. The United States, if it lost its position in Europe, could not hope to maintain a strong position in Asia solely by relying upon a peripheral, maritime strategy in the Pacific. The United States would be compelled to conduct an Asian (i.e., continental) strategy centered on China, the only Asian power with the resources, population, and geographic location to offer a counterweight of sorts to the Soviet Union.

This situation would pose extreme difficulties for American policy. First, the United States would have to convince China of the benefits of a pro-American alignment as opposed to accommodation with the U.S.S.R. -- at a time when the Soviet Union could bring virtually its entire political and military weight to bear on a single front. This almost
certainly would mean that the United States would be forced to grant China a free hand in securing Beijing's interests elsewhere in Asia. Such a policy likely would undermine the United States' position with other important regional states (e.g., Indonesia, Malaysia) which have traditionally been more concerned with Chinese than with Soviet expansionism. In addition, were the United States to support unambiguously the political and military objectives of the PRC, the Japanese would come under enormous pressure (both internal and Soviet-directed) to opt out of the East-West struggle. In short, the United States might seek to gain an essential continental ally, only to lose secure maritime access to that ally.

To conclude: a major shift in the status of NATO Europe by 2010 would probably compel the United States to place much greater emphasis on the Pacific/Asian region. This eventuality could well require the United States to devote more, and not less, resources to maintaining the balance of power -- and in less, rather than more, advantageous circumstances. Ironically, the best opportunity for a deliberate (and not coerced) reemphasis on Asia and the Pacific would be the existence of a strong American position in Europe that provided the foundation of flexibility elsewhere. Unfortunately, the United States' strong position in Europe has been eroding over the past two decades, due to a substantially-increased Soviet military threat and to emerging national differences within the alliance. The United
States may be able to remedy these disquieting conditions by devoting additional attention to Europe, but this may come at the expense of opportunities foregone in Asia and the Pacific.

C. Chinese Foreign Policy

In the four decades since the end of World War II, Sino-American relations have fluctuated from tacit war (in the early 1950s) to a quasi alliance (in the late 1970s). This historical volatility makes prediction of the long-term future extremely difficult, but the character of Chinese foreign policy in 2010 well may be (after the status of Europe) the single most important geopolitical determinant in America's national security orientation. When the Sino-Soviet bloc seemed the order of the day in the 1950s, the United States ran the risk of being whipsawed between simultaneous threats in Europe and in Asia -- threats posed by adversaries each of whom needed to focus only on one front. Even when the U.S.S.R. and the PRC parted company, during the late 1950s and early 1960s, so long as each remained hostile to the United States, Washington faced the onerous task of organizing global opposition to Soviet expansionism while also containing Chinese aggressiveness in Asia. During the 1970s, Sino-American rapprochement turned the tables on Moscow, which now faced the task of waging the worldwide contest for power with the United States while also engaging in its regional containment of China. Fortunately for the U.S.S.R., the United States during this decade, because of its own domestic
and international weaknesses, was a somewhat passive actor at
the global level.

By the year 2010, two extreme circumstances would deny
the United States the flexibility inherent in a triangular
U.S.-U.S.S.R.-PRC relationship. The first would be extreme
Sino-Soviet tension or conflict. Under these conditions, the
United States would be compelled to resist Soviet domination
of China or face a possibly-decisive shift in the Eurasian
balance of power. The PRC undoubtedly would press the United
States to open a "second front," to draw Soviet pressure away
from the Sino-Soviet border, but the opportunities for
horizontal escalation outside of Asia would seem to be limited.
The United States probably will not have a major military
infrastructure available in the Middle East that could pose a
serious conventional distraction to the U.S.S.R. The West
European states, in all likelihood, would want to remain
neutral and thus prevent the United States from using NATO to
counter Soviet pressure on China. Washington, in any event,
would be inclined to limit the geographical scope of a
Sino-Soviet conflict, and above all, to prevent nuclear
escalation. This would argue for a substantial effort in the
Asian/Pacific theater, primarily to keep the sea and air lines
of communications to the PRC open and (in the event of war) to
attack Soviet Asian military assets (e.g., Cam Ranh Bay,
Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk) that pose a direct threat to U.S.
security in the Pacific. The status of Japan would clearly be
a major determinant of the success of American strategy.
The other extreme would be a Sino-Soviet alliance that aggressively sought to undermine or attack U.S. interests in Eurasia. As in the 1950s, the United States would have surrendered the geopolitical initiative but in 2010 might lack the margin of strategic nuclear power necessary to offset the Moscow-Beijing coalition. Judging from its previous pattern of behavior, the United States would assume a largely defensive strategy in the Pacific, leaving the continent to China and, in the Pacific, attempting to hold an island perimeter based on Japan. Most of American effort would then be placed on maintaining the position of the United States in Europe and, to a lesser extent, the Middle East.

Neither of these extremes can be confidently predicted, and, in any case, either could occur at any point between 1985 and 2010. But in three decades, a major revolution in Asian politics might have taken place -- the Chinese program of economic modernization might have succeeded in making Beijing an economic, political, and military superpower. In such an event, the direction of Chinese foreign policy, and not merely the dynamic of U.S.-Soviet relations, would govern the American national security orientation.

If the Chinese were to link their economic modernization with strategic cooperation with the United States, the American burden in Asia could be considerably eased. Ideally for Washington, Peking could come to shoulder more and more of the regional burden of containing the U.S.S.R., while the United States concentrated on Europe and the Middle East. The
integration of Japan into this alliance structure would ease Tokyo's domestic political pressures against a major rearmament. This three-cornered alliance would undoubtedly raise fears in other areas of Asia (e.g., Indonesia and Malaysia), but the United States would remain well suited to acting as a political buffer between the smaller Asian and Pacific states and China.59

This type of policy does not seem as likely as one of increased Chinese independence from the U.S.-Soviet competition. The fluctuation in Chinese relations with Moscow and Washington during the past 20 years provides an indication that the PRC, above all, wishes to control rather than be controlled by the superpower relationship. This means adjusting policy to favor the weaker or (from a Chinese standpoint) less aggressive of the two superpowers, thus buying time to improve China's independent standing (through economic modernization, among other devices). China might then turn inward, confident in its own security and relatively passive in foreign affairs. This would create something of a political vacuum in Asia, but one that the United States would be in a relatively strong position to fill or to see filled (e.g., by ASEAN).

If, however, the PRC sought to use its newly-developed economic, political, and military status to seek regional domination, the United States would have difficult choices to make, particularly if the U.S.S.R. independently continued its expansionist pressures elsewhere. It is conceivable that the
United States and the Soviet Union could cooperate to restrain Chinese ambitions, but the evidence from the 1960s is not very promising on this point. With the possible exception of Vietnam, much of China's expansionist pressure would be likely to affect nations friendly to the United States -- e.g., Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and (indirectly) Japan. This course would once again raise questions of the ultimate U.S. line of security in the region and whether American interests in the Pacific required a reasonable order of power on the continent.60

D. Japanese Foreign and Defense Policy

Unlike the People's Republic of China, which may become a great industrial power within another 30 years, Japan already possesses the world's second- or third-ranking national economy. But Japan rose to this position after World War II in a politically benign environment deliberately created by the United States. To the extent that Japan expresses its foreign policy interests today, it does so as an economic and not as a political or military power. Tokyo depends on its security relationship with the United States for regional military protection, in return for which the United States gains important access to the geopolitically most important location in the western Pacific. The Japanese economy (and hence Japanese political stability) rests upon maintenance of an American-supported international order that allows Japan
unimpeded trade and access to raw materials (especially petroleum).

In 2010, will Japan remain satisfied with this "economistic" approach to the world and with a continuing security dependence on the United States? Washington, hard pressed to fulfill its regional and global military commitments, undoubtedly will encourage Japan to ease the American burden in the Pacific region. From the U.S. standpoint, Japan, ideally will increase its military capability to the point where it could play a major or even decisive role in the naval and air security of the northwestern Pacific and northeast Asia. The United States, in turn, would have shifted its focus to the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, and to maintaining the long-distance flow of oil and trade to the Japanese home islands. The concept here would be to encourage a modest sense of Japanese national responsibility for defense without reviving more ambitious goals or frightening other states in the region.

The United States must also be prepared to deal with the "baseline case" in 2010 -- i.e., the possibility that Japan will have responded with only modest defense improvements, intended to placate Washington rather than to address the Soviet threat. In these circumstances, Tokyo will argue that its principal contribution should continue to be its strong economy, coupled with economic assistance to strategically important Asian or Pacific states (e.g., Thailand, Pakistan). Everything being equal, if other U.S. commitments (notably in
the Middle East) are pressing, the United States might still follow its pattern of drawing down forces in the Pacific, even though Japan could not fill the gap.

As Shibusawa Masahide has noted of Japan: "...the economistic orientation developed out of a deep-seated fear that the country might one day take up another kind of goal or perception -- of a kind that once brought disaster to the whole region." But what if this reluctance is overcome by 2010? One of two minority contemporary Japanese politics would then likely become dominant: a pacifistic neutralism or a Japanese Gaullism.

The first case --"unarmed neutrality" -- has been a potent force in Japanese politics since the 1950s, one held primarily by the Japanese Socialist Party. According to this position, the Soviet Union does not represent an inherent military threat to Japanese security; to avoid provoking the U.S.S.R., Japan should resist American pressure to become part of U.S. global strategy and should ultimately seek to terminate the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty; arms control and disarmament represent the best means of enhancing Japan's security and world peace. If Tokyo ever embraced such a national policy, the existing strategic position of the United States in Asia and the Pacific would collapse. (This would be a far more severe blow in the region than even an equivalent shift by China, although the latter situation might have more serious long-term global repercussions.) The United States would lose its maritime anchor in the western Pacific and,
accordingly, its geopolitical leverage over the Soviet military in the Far East. If the United States were to maintain its regional position at all, this would require Washington to develop much closer ties with Beijing (e.g., to gain basing rights) -- and thus to pay much greater attention to the regional balance of power, as well as to reassure other friendly nations that the United States would not abandon them as part of a regional entente with China. Failure to adjust to the shift in Japanese policy likely would result in Chinese accommodation to the Soviets or hostility to the United States -- and thus risk the collapse of the global balance of power, with predictable consequences in Europe and the Middle East.

The other long-term Japanese alternative -- a resurgence of overt nationalism -- might result from increased fears of the Soviet military threat and consequent doubts about the American commitment to Japan. Japanese Gaullists, if they maintained a security relationship with the United States, would want to do so on the basis of an equal partnership. Under these circumstances, Japan would seek to acquire an offensive military capability to match its economic status -- including aircraft carriers, tactical bombers, and possibly even nuclear weapons. Surprisingly, such a policy revision by Tokyo would mandate an increase rather than a reduction in the American regional commitment -- although not necessarily in deployed military forces -- to reassure other friendly states (including China) that Japan did not represent a military threat to them. Even though such a Japanese defense
buildup might originally be aimed at deterring the Soviet Union, there is no guarantee that Tokyo's future policy would retain that character. Also, the United States could not count automatically on Japanese participation in a conflict that did not involve directly Japan's interests. The very purpose of Japanese Gaullism, like its French counterpart, would be to allow Japan to remain neutral in a U.S.-Soviet conflict taking place in other regions (e.g., Europe).

AMERICAN ALTERNATIVES: ISOLATIONISM OR UNILATERALISM

Decisions about the United States' orientation in foreign policy are not driven simply by necessity. The American government enjoys considerable flexibility in determining which regions it will emphasize at any given time; indeed, the penultimate purpose of foreign and defense policy is to provide as much freedom of national action as possible. At any time, the United States thus has the option of introducing radical rather than incremental changes into its national security policy. The major alternative policies which the United States, based on its historical tendencies, might adopt by 2010, are isolationism and unilateralism.

Traditional American isolationism originated in the 19th Century. It was based on the premise that events outside of a certain geographic sphere (whether that of the national territory itself, the North American continent, or at most the Western hemisphere) represented no threat to the military security or the moral integrity of the American regime. In
fact, national involvement in the affairs of other nations (excluding perhaps trade and missionary work) tended to be corrupting to the American character, in and of itself.65

The more contemporary versions of isolationism can best be defined as anti-interventionism -- the major trends and events in world affairs are essentially outside of the control of the United States, and American attempts to intervene only make the situation much worse (Vietnam being the example usually cited). Opponents of American intervention do not demand precisely a return to Fortress America, but they contend that world events are just as uncontrollable for U.S. adversaries, and hence it is both more efficient and morally correct to allow historical forces rather than clumsy and counter-productive American involvement to protect the nation's security.

Ultimately, any 21st Century isolationism would be based on the assumption that the existence of nuclear weapons precluded the possibility of major war between the two superpowers -- hence avoiding the pre-1945 controversy of whether domination of Eurasia by hostile powers represented a direct and major threat to U.S. national security. Most importantly, such isolationism would hold that nuclear weapons can only be "used" to deter direct and major threats to U.S. national security. Even at its most ambitious, American isolationism probably would regard Western Europe as the only region outside of North America worth the nuclear guarantee.
In this case, American political and military commitments to the Pacific, Asia, and the Middle East would be terminated.

More likely, the American turn to isolationism would be caused in part by the fear that U.S. involvement on the continent of Europe would lead to nuclear war. (Traditional isolationism was, above all, anti-European in character.) An isolationist withdrawal from Europe, by definition, would mean a complete withdrawal to Fortress America, since under these conditions there would be no sense for the United States to add new commitments in Asia, the Pacific or the Middle East.

The development of a truly isolationist American foreign policy by 2010 is highly improbable. There are strong unilateralist trends, however, which conceivably could become a major political element in the next 30 years. Traditional American unilateralists, growing out of the expansionist sentiment of the 19th Century, did acknowledge the importance of overseas interests and did insist that the United States' position as a great nation depended upon the willingness to defend those interests. Above all, however, unilateralism shunned alliances and international commitments that would have limited American freedom of action.

Present-day unilateralists hence would prefer to depend solely upon U.S. resources for national defense rather than to rely on unstable allies that might involve the United States in a conflict against American best interests. Such allies are often seen as unwilling to pay their fair political,
economic, and military shares of the common defense. In the unilateralists' view, the United States should prefer to protect its interests alone, and, necessarily, only through a bilateral security arrangements. Multilateral or universal structures strictly are to be avoided. Unilateralism also tends to emphasize maritime over continental interests and to be suspicious of balance-of-power politics (which necessarily have a strong continental emphasis) because of its inherent multinational character.

The NATO alliance thus always has been the bete noire of unilateralists: it is permanent, multilateral, continental -- and unnecessary, because the West European nations clearly have the resources to defend themselves without help. Asia and the Pacific represent a much more attractive alternative. This is a region of extensive and growing trade and economic activity, and, moreover, it is one in which the Soviet threat is more manageable than in Europe. (The military balance in Europe depends primarily on the opposing ground forces, which favors the continental Soviet state; U.S. interests in the Pacific and along the Asian coast can be defended best by naval and air forces, where the insular American state has the advantage.) With the demise of the SEATO pact, the United States is free to develop bilateral security arrangements that best suit its overall policy objectives. There is no need to develop overly close relations with China, for example, because China ties down Soviet forces merely by its presence and because the United States has no necessary reason to
support Chinese policy elsewhere in Asia. The potential for political creativity in the Asian/Pacific region is also much greater than in the stultified environment of Europe. Twenty-first Century unilateralists, much like their 19th Century counterparts, would see America's future as lying in the west.
FOOTNOTES


4. See the famous "long telegram" to the State Department by George F. Kennan in February 1946, Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1946, Volume VI, pp. 696-709, and his "Mr. X" article "The Sources of Soviet conduct," in Foreign Affairs 25 (July 1947): 566-82.


8. See the two published volumes of Henry Kissinger's memoirs, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1979) and Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1982) for the most thorough (and sympathetic) account of this policy.


11. Which is not to say that the existence of nuclear weapons can not play an important, even decisive, role in times of crisis or conflict below the level of all-out war.

13. For a broad political overview of Roosevelt's pre-war and wartime strategies, see Dallek, especially p. 269-313 and 362-405.


32. Pelz, p. 141.


35. Classic accounts of this period are Tyler Dennett, Americans in East Asia (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1922); and Foster Rhea Dulles, America in the Pacific: A Century of Expansionism (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1932).


40. Ibid., p. 514.


42. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 764.

43. Ibid., pp. 764-5.

44. Ibid., p. 765.


46. Ibid., p. 5.

47. Recent criticisms of the Reagan Administration's defense policy include Jeffrey Record, "Jousting with Unreality,"


56. For a recent public airing of these differences by former senior government officials, see the speech by Henry Kissinger, and the exchange between Helmut Schmidt and James Schlesinger, in Robert Hunter, ed., NATO: The Next


58. Of course, a united Western Europe would also presumably have conflicts of interest with the Soviet Union -- but these would more likely occur in a regional rather than global context. A united Western Europe in 2010 might be capable of deterring a direct Soviet attack -- but the Soviets, with the United States out of Europe, would itself have the option to shift some military resources to other areas.


61. For an explanation of the basis of Japan's "economistic" foreign policy, see Shibusawa Masahide, Japan and the Asian Pacific Region (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), pp. 22-6.

62. Ibid., pp. 176-7.


64. Ibid., pp. 165-8.


66. The various Mansfield amendments of the early 1970s calling for reductions in the withdrawal of U.S. forces in Europe are an example of anti-European isolationism. It should be noted that this pressure was being generated by many of the same individuals who were pressing for an American withdrawal from Asia (Vietnam).

67. For an excellent account of traditional unilateralism, see William C. Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search
68. One of the most prominent unilateralistic critics of NATO is Irving Kristol.
Evolving Alliance Structures

Chapter 1:

Introduction

There is a continuing analytical debate as to the nature of alliances in the nuclear age and the structure, existing and projected, of the international system in which they function. So far, it has produced no satisfactory answer to the question of the effect nuclear weapons have had on alliances and the international system. Nuclear weapons have changed radically the relationship between their possessors and the close allies of these countries. They have made military force, as a means for achieving political ends in a Clausewitzian sense, much less useable between nuclear-armed alliances. But outside the central balances of nuclear deterrence, force remains useable as a political instrument by nuclear and non-nuclear powers alike.

The single most important feature of the international system in the last quarter of this century and the first quarter of the next is that it really comprises, and will comprise, two systems and two kinds of alliances. In the nuclear system, the relationships between opposing nuclear alliances are relatively non-Clausewitzian, while the characteristics of these alliances are historically unprecedented and uncertain. In the non-nuclear system, the relationships between opposing alliances remain Clausewitzian, and the characteristics of their alliances are relatively
traditional and fairly predictable. The interaction between the nuclear and non-nuclear systems and alliances is governed by rules that are still being evolved and which remain imperfectly understood.

Operating Assumptions (1): Systemic Characteristics

Because of these uncertainties, the assumptions underlying this analysis of alliance structures in the early years of the next century need to be made explicit. The first is that the international system will evolve over the next twenty years in the broad directions established during the last forty years. The potential for radical transformations exist as, for example, in a successful Soviet bid for hegemony or its defeat. But the chances for such transformations seem limited as are the prospects of predicting their characteristics. The implications of these limits in our foreword projections will however be considered. The dominant structural features of the post-1945 international system(s) that affect the nature of alliances are as follows.

Five Features

First, the balances of nuclear deterrence have proved extraordinarily stable, almost meta-stable. This applies particularly to the stability of the superpower balance of deterrence, which has evolved to include four (three Western and one Soviet) nuclear powers. It is historically unprecedented for two great powers, each having extensive alliance commitments, albeit of varying value, to avoid a
direct major war for forty years. Yet this is what the United States (plus NATO) and the Soviet Union (plus the Warsaw Pact) have done.

By way of comparison, it may be noted that the Peloponnesian War between the Athenian Alliance (enforced by Athens) and the Lacedaemonian Confederacy (a voluntary one led by Sparta) lasted for twenty-seven years, including the Peace of Nicias (creating a cold war situation) and capped years of competition. Similarly, the third and final Punic War between Rome and Carthage that destroyed the latter capped many years of competition, including two major wars. More recently, the 1815 Vienna Conference settlement, following the Napoleonic Wars, preserved a mutually acceptable balance of power for nearly forty years, but it was then shattered by a series of limited Great Power conflicts from 1854 to 1871. The resulting European balance, by then including Germany and Italy, also lasted for about forty years until 1914, but it was increasingly disturbed by Balkan conflicts and by extra-European wars involving the two new non-European Great Powers, the United States and Japan.

The near-total avoidance of armed conflict, not only between but within the two European alliances, is doubly remarkable, given the historical prevalence of conflict in this part of the world. Since 1945, military forces have been used within these alliances only by the Soviets to crush revolts in their East European Empire and in minor clashes between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. The freezing of the
East-West division of Europe along the boundary established in 1945 is also historically unprecedented. The only major modification of this boundary was the unification and neutralization of Austria in 1955. While this division is increasingly unacceptable to the Europeans on either side of it, it remains difficult to see how it can be altered or removed.

The meta-stability of the balances of nuclear deterrence involving China is also distinctive, although for different reasons. China has remained a very weak power militarily and economically, although a large one in terms of size and population. She has had only a minimal nuclear force since the mid-1960s. From 1949 to about 1963, China was a Soviet ally, who fought the U.S. and her allies for three years in the Korean War and later threatened the use of force against Taiwan. Yet the U.S. never used nuclear weapons against China. She seriously threatened to do so only to end the Korean War and to deter China's potential military action against Taiwan. Following the Sino-Soviet split and President Nixon's 1971 Peking visit, China became an antagonist of the Soviets and an ally (of uncertain extent) of the U.S. Chinese differences with the Soviets are about as great as they could be, including cultural, ideological, racial and territorial ones. Chinese and Soviet border guards clashed in 1969, and China launched a 1979 punitive expedition (none too successfully) against the Soviet's major Asian ally, North Vietnam. Despite
this, the Soviets have not used nuclear weapons against China, although they apparently contemplated doing so in 1969.

The second feature of the post-1945 international system has been that outside these central nuclear balances, conventional force has been used in a traditionally-Clausewitzian fashion by the nuclear powers, their allies, and by states acting independently. The only restraint on this use of force has been the need for the nuclear powers to avoid direct confrontation threatening conflicts between their forces. Theoretical predictions that a relatively stable balance of nuclear deterrence would make the world safer for limited conventional conflicts have thus proved correct.

The third feature resulted from the first two. This was that alliances within the central nuclear balance were much closer than any previously known. This applied particularly to the formal U.S. alliance with NATO-Europe (plus Canada) and to the informal U.S. alliance with the West European neutrals, as well as to the Soviet alliance forced on East-Europe. But it also applied to the superpowers' key alliances elsewhere, mainly in the Pacific. The U.S. was closely allied to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, while the U.S.S.R. was closely allied to a North Vietnam that eventually managed to seize control of the South. The U.S. also had a close alliance with Israel, a country widely believed to be a nuclear weapon power although formally denying it. The Soviets also had a formal close alliance with Cuba.
Alliances outside the nuclear balances bound their partners as much, or as little, as in the pre-nuclear age, with one exception. Alliances between the three nuclear powers with global interests (the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and China) and regional powers outside the central balance proved less binding than in the past because they could be overridden by these three powers' interests, individual and collective, in avoiding conflicts risking the use of nuclear weapons.

The fourth feature was that the resulting structure of the international system defied easy categorization. Militarily, it was still a bipolar system, insofar as the U.S. and U.S.S.R. remained the only two global nuclear superpowers able to project their power anywhere they wished. But it was also becoming an increasingly multi-polar system, with three more overt nuclear powers (plus India), and other covert ones (Israel, perhaps South Africa). Access to advanced conventional weapons through alliance ties (especially with the superpowers) and purchase plus local manufacture of such weapons were creating a new category of regional great powers, such as Israel and Syria in the Middle East. These powers could defeat any superpower intervention short of a full-scale attack and could make even this a costly, though not necessarily unaffordable, proposition. In addition, a new type of regional military power was emerging that did not fit traditional categories. It could best be described as small but sophisticated. These were powers, especially air and naval ones, operating limited quantities of advanced
conventional weapons systems. A typical example would be Argentina in the Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982.

The fifth feature is that interstate conflict has become increasingly motivated by traditional calculations of gain and loss, in terms of the balance between economic, ideological, political, psychological and military considerations. This does not mean that ideological considerations have ceased to be important -- the end of ideology notion. On the contrary, ideological considerations have become more, rather than less, important but have also come to include much more complex ideological clashes than that between democracy and Soviet Marxism-Leninism. There has also been growing competition for economic resources, a competition which is likely to increase in intensity.

Operating Assumption (2): Geopolitics

The second assumption is that these five features of the international system mean that geopolitical considerations retain their validity. This is particularly true for the navies of the major maritime powers like the United States. Their three objectives remain projecting political power and, where necessary, military forces, securing the supply of essential war materials located overseas and denying their opponents the ability to perform these tasks in wartime. They achieve these objectives through the deployment of naval plus related air and ground forces. In wartime, these must control sea lines of communication (SLOC). Major navies thus remain
MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
constrained by the basic features of maritime geography, particularly the existence of natural choke points, such as the Malacca Straits and the Greenland-Iceland-U.K. (GIUK) gap, (now also known as the Greenland-Iceland-Norway [GIN] gap) and of natural focal points for shipping, like South Africa’s Cape of Good Hope. These features mean that there is a certain pre-determined quality to U.S. maritime strategy, including the alliance requirements it generates. As an insular maritime power, the U.S. must seek to control as many of these key maritime areas as possible, so as to ensure that in peacetime she and her allies can enjoy free passage through them for civil and military purposes and, in wartime, continue to use them while denying them to enemy forces. U.S. alliance commitments have increased the importance of some of these areas. For example, Japan’s economy depends on oil imports, of which some 90% comes from the Persian Gulf via the Malacca Straits. So long as Japan remains a vital U.S. ally, keeping the Malacca Straits open will remain a vital U.S. interest.

These same geopolitical calculations mean that much of Soviet maritime strategy has an equally pre-determined, though somewhat different, character. As a land power, the Soviet Union’s wartime interest lies in sea-denial rather than sea-control. For example, in the event of a protracted conventional NATO-Warsaw Pact war, the Soviets would win if they could prevent enough U.S. reinforcements reaching NATO-Europe to allow Soviet-Pact forces victory. But in peacetime or in more limited conflicts outside Europe, Soviet
interests are mixed. They wish to deny the U.S. and her allies use of the sea to further their purposes but also wish to preserve their ability to use it to further Soviet purposes. As the Soviet Navy has expanded, so has the Soviet interest in preserving their ability to use it in a classic power-projection mode. The large Soviet quasi-civil merchant fleet has reinforced their interest in preserving the traditional rights of maritime powers.

An additional, unique, Soviet interest is the preservation of sanctuaries for their SLBM/SSBN force in the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk. They therefore need to draw down U.S. forces that could be employed to threaten these sanctuaries, either by tying them down elsewhere or destroying them before they can attack Soviet SLBM/SSBN forces. The U.S. needs to preserve these forces and their ability to make such attacks effective. These conflicting objectives reinforce the importance of geopolitical considerations because of the relevant natural barriers, including the GIUK gap and the exits to the Sea of Okhotsk controlled by Japan and South Korea.

Operating Assumption (3): Naval Forces

The third assumption is that the nature of naval forces and the main types of naval powers will evolve along the directions already established in the early 1990s, but with the possibilities for change that will be noted. For the purposes of this analysis, navies can be divided into three
categories: superpower, great power and minor but sophisticated. Only the two superpowers can maintain major power projection forces built around fixed-wing carrier/battleship (CV/BB) battlegroups plus their supporting forces and facilities, including space-based communication and surveillance facilities. Only they can also maintain major submarine fleets -- mostly nuclear-powered -- and including attack, cruise-missile and fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSN, SSGN and SSBN). Only a few of America's allies can maintain sophisticated naval forces plus supporting air elements that are primarily oriented toward Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW). These are (within NATO), Britain, France, Italy and West Germany, plus, on a much smaller scale, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Holland and Norway. Of these forces, only those of Britain and France possess the power projection capability provided by smaller carriers. Even this capability is very limited, although it is potentially significant, as the Royal Navy demonstrated in the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War. Outside NATO, Japan has the largest ASW-oriented Navy, although it is still small relative to the demand placed on it. Australia's Navy remains small.

The category of minor but sophisticated and potentially significant naval powers is a large one, requiring careful definition. The development of the anti-ship missile capable of being launched by aircraft, fast attack craft and submarines, as well as from shore batteries, has created a revolution in naval warfare comparable to that brought about
by the introduction of the torpedo. Both gave small navies an unprecedented ability to inflict damage on large navies. But the anti-ship missile, especially when carried by modern strike aircraft, has sharply increased the potential cost to the large navy of a conflict with a small one. For these powers, the anti-ship missile has extended the range of shore-based artillery from the traditional three miles in the days of cannon to at least 60 nautical miles (the standard range for the surface-/submarine-launched U.S. Harpoon). Their strike aircraft can launch these missiles within combat radii of 400 miles, as Argentina did against the Royal Navy.

Moreover, again as demonstrated by Argentina, the smaller diesel-electric attack submarines possessed by such naval powers can further increase the risks of engaging their forces. Although Argentina had only three Type 209 submarines and lost one in the first days of the war, they continued to pose a threat to the British Task Force which constrained its operations. Some reports even suggested that they successfully launched torpedoes against the British carriers but that these torpedoes failed to explode. Although not used in this war, mines also have proved to be very effective weapons for smaller naval powers. Germany and Turkey demonstrated this during the Gallipolli campaign in World War I. On March 18, 1915, the major British-French attempt to force the Straits with naval forces alone was defeated by minefields and coastal batteries, particularly an unsuspected field of only twenty mines. This minefield sank
three pre-dreadnought battleships and damaged three others (plus a battlecruiser) and thus defeated the attack.

The effectiveness of attacks by small, sophisticated navies against superpower or great power navies remains a subject of intense analytical debate. Clearly, as the U.S.N. has argued, fixed wing carrier battle groups will retain unique capabilities for defense against such attacks, including offensive strikes to suppress attacking forces and their bases. But even for such battle groups, the potential risks of engaging in such a conflict are significant. In the broader political context, it is this increased risk potential that is likely to be particularly important in terms of both the military cost and political consequences. It has thus become much riskier for even the two naval superpowers to use, or consider using, these forces against small, sophisticated navies. As the majority of these belong to countries opposed to, or potentially opposed to the Soviets, this development may work to the advantage of the U.S. It will also affect her maritime interests in alliances, actual and potential.

The definition of such navies is dependent on a combination of factors, including their sophistication, geographical location and size. In terms of regional balances, their capabilities relative to their opponents is also important. These navies will be considered in more detail as the regional alliance structures are examined but include, for example, those of Israel and Cuba.
China and India are in a class by themselves as naval powers. China's forces are primarily coastal defense ones but are large in numbers, especially Fast Attack Craft and diesel submarines. Their modernization has begun and if continued could, at relatively modest cost, make the Chinese navy a formidable force to engage in Chinese waters. It could also enable China to offer modest but significant assistance to selected allies with detached naval forces. India is becoming a major regional naval power in the Indian Ocean, with a balanced surface fleet enjoying significant air support.

Operating Assumption (4): U.S. Interests

In the Twenty First Century, the American approach to alliances will be one equivalent to that bluntly stated by a Nineteenth Century British statesman: England has no eternal friends, only eternal interests. U.S. commitments to alliances, formal or informal, will be based on increasingly hard-headed calculations of self-interest, albeit enlightened self-interest. Realpolitik considerations will be reinforced by those of domestic politics. The shift of population (and voters), as well as economic activity, away from the Atlantic-oriented East Coast and towards the Pacific- and Central American-oriented Sunbelt will continue. Over time, this is likely to change the U.S.-NATO-Europe alliance into something rather different from the one now approaching its fortieth anniversary.
Absent a major transformation of Soviet objectives, the fundamental U.S. strategic policy will have to remain the containment of an expansionist Soviet Union. The basis of this strategy will be that articulated by its intellectual father, George Kennan. The U.S. must identify the centers of military and industrial power in the world from which effective attacks could be launched on the U.S. or on her truly indispensible resource suppliers and ensure that these do not fall under hostile control. In the late 1940s, Kennan identified five such power centers: the U.S., Great Britain, Germany plus Central Europe, the Soviet Union and Japan. In the late 1980s there are still five power centers, but their composition has changed somewhat. These are now the U.S., West Europe, the Soviet Union plus her East European Empire, Japan plus South Korea and Taiwan, and China. These will remain the five power centers into the early part of the next century, with China probably becoming a more effective power than she is at present. A sixth area, those portions of the Persian Gulf region containing oil supplies, is, and will remain, an indispensible resource center for West Europe and Japan which the U.S. cannot allow to fall under Soviet control.

To keep the pentagonal balance of power tilted in her favor, the U.S. will need to maintain her post-war alliances (albeit in modified form) with West Europe and Japan, to develop her embryonic alliance with China and preserve access to Gulf oil. As another Nineteenth Century statesman,
Bismarck, put it: security is leading a four power alliance in a world of five powers.

The only truly essential U.S. alliances will be those with these three power centers -- West Europe, Japan and China -- plus those needed to secure Gulf oil. Additional alliances may be concluded to support these vital ones but will remain means to this end. Such alliances will include those needed to secure control over the maritime choke and focal points. The U.S. will also need to make alliances when necessary to secure access to crucial raw materials located overseas, under the sea or on the seabed. Whom these crucial raw material suppliers will be is difficult to predict, because while existing suppliers can be readily identified, new ones may become available, and access is usually, though not always, likely to be available through international markets.

The U.S. will also wish to ensure that, as far as possible, new (necessarily smaller) emerging power centers remain free from hostile control, whether Soviet or indigenous.

The U.S. approach to alliances, both central and peripheral, will thus be flexible, traditional, pragmatic, and nonideological. It is also likely to be cautious, skeptical and selective. The approach will be closer to George Washington's valedictory warning against entangling alliances than to John Foster Dulles' "pactomania."
This approach to alliances will also be that favored by West Europe (at least its major powers), Japan and China (unless domestic political upheavals cause temporary disturbances, as happened during the Cultural Revolution in China). This approach may be modified in the three democratic power centers, particularly the U.S., by the vagaries of the democratic process. But it will still be the dominant one.

In contrast, the Soviet approach to alliances will remain an uneasy combination of the traditional and the Imperial-ideological ones. The Soviets remain unique in retaining an interest in forcibly imposing their style of government (however defined) on other countries, denying the legitimacy of all alternative governments. It has become increasingly difficult to distinguish between Soviet ideological and imperial motives in doing so, and the two are largely compatible. But the balance which future Soviet governments will strike between these two approaches to alliances will have an important effect on how these develop.

Soviet predilections for turning allies into imperial colonies and ideological clones will make governments cautious about entering into close alliances with the Soviets for fear that these will prove fatal. Soviet difficulties in keeping puppet regimes in power, especially in the more distant portions of their Empire, will suggest that it is also dangerous to become part of this Empire. The combined effect is likely to be to make it much harder for the Soviets to reach and maintain effective alliances. If, instead, they
develop an ability to conclude genuine alliances, tolerating their alliance partners' form of domestic government, they will be much more effective in furthering their interest.

An Analytical Framework

These four operating assumptions, including the five systemic features, indicate the following analytical framework. First, the U.S. alliance with West Europe, including NATO, will be examined, as will the Soviet alliance with East Europe and the relationship between West and East Europe. Second, U.S. alliances with the other two power centers will be considered, followed by, third, U.S. alliances with Persian Gulf powers and, fourth, other individual countries.
PART I - MAJOR U.S. ALLIANCES - EUROPE

Chapter 2:
NATO/West Europe

For the U.S., West Europe will remain the crucial power center because it will be the largest one, economically and militarily, after the superpowers and yet will still be vulnerable to Soviet land power. Predictions for the future of the U.S. alliance with NATO-Europe vary -- from those assuming that it will continue unaltered in essentials to those anticipating its imminent demise with, or without, U.S. help. The fundamental features of the U.S. interests in, and alliances with, West Europe therefore bear restating, since it is these which will determine the nature of the American-European alliance in the next century.

Basically, this is an alliance enforced by the alternative of Soviet control, direct or indirect, over part or all of West Europe. The U.S. cannot afford to allow this to happen, because it would almost certainly tilt the superpower balance irreversibly in the Soviet Union's favor over the long haul. West Europe's total economic and population base remains the largest single prize the Soviets can hope to gain and one that they could mobilize for military purposes. While the U.S. economy might be able to cope, albeit with considerable difficulty, with the loss of access to West European markets and capital, it would be seriously weakened. For the West Europeans, Soviet control would compromise their
essential values of independence and democracy. Under any circumstances, except perhaps an imminent Soviet threat to their physical survival, the alternative of an alliance with the U.S. must be overwhelmingly preferable for them.

If West Europe's survival is threatened, acceptance of Soviet control might appear to be an unavoidable price to pay to remove this threat. Significant sections of West European, especially West German, opinion have favored this view in the past and will probably do so in the future. Although it is undiplomatic to say so, the fact is that the U.S. could not afford to allow West Europe to surrender to Soviet control, a fact of which its governments will remain well aware.

The initial U.S. guarantee of West Europe's political independence recognized these realities, and it was formalized in the April 4, 1949 North Atlantic Treaty. But while this treaty remains the centerpiece of the U.S. alliance with West Europe, the American guarantee is really far broader. Formally, the U.S. is committed only to take such action as it deems fit in the event of an attack on any of the twelve original signatories of the NATO Treaty, plus Greece and Turkey (after 1951) West Germany (after 1954) and Spain (after 1982). Effectively, the U.S., since the early 1950s, has been committed to the defense of all of West Europe with conventional and nuclear weapons. The U.S. may regard some West European allies as more valuable than others, but it is committed to the defense of all of them, though not necessarily to the same degree, because it cannot offer
graduated guarantees of differing degrees of independence for differing parts of the continent.

This alliance has experienced six successes and six problems which will shape its evolution into the next century. It has succeeded in: deterring any Soviet military attack; maintaining West Europe's political independence from the Soviet Union; enabling West Europe to recover economically and socially from World War II; helping the creation of democratic governments in four countries previously lacking them (West Germany, Greece, Spain and Portugal); permitting the development of two National Nuclear Forces (NNF); and creating an unprecedented peacetime military alliance of North America and West Europe. Historically, this is a remarkable set of achievements. Putting the Alliance's problems in perspective, these have been: first, a replacement of initial cohesion in the face of a clear and present Soviet threat with disagreement over the extent of this threat and the means to achieve the alliance's objectives; second, a questioning by the successor generation of the need for the alliance to secure West Europe's independence; third, an increasing West European reluctance to fund defenses at the level needed to balance the Soviet/Pact military buildup; fourth, a failure to reunify Germany; and, fifth, a NATO-European reluctance to consider their security in a broader global context, as reflected in their concept of divisible detente.

To these five problems may have to be added, sixth, a combination of an established West European inability to match
U.S. advanced military technologies, caused by a secular downturn in their economic growth rates as compared to those of the U.S. Extrapolating long-term trends from the experience of the recent past frequently produces inaccurate predictions. But the current evidence suggests that this is occurring. If it does, its implications for the nature of the alliance in the next century could be profound.

The U.S. will regain much of the pre-eminence in the relationship that was eroded, although never lost, in the 1970s. Militarily, the U.S. will remain qualitatively superior, able to provide or withhold the benefits of advanced technology systems as it sees fit. The current intra-Alliance debate on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) illustrates both the advantages and disadvantages to the U.S. of its superiority. On the positive side, it gives her the ability to move the alliance in the directions she wishes on major issues and reaffirms the indispensability of the U.S. politico-military guarantee of West Europe's independence. On the negative side, the West European awareness of this situation creates unavoidable resentment. All dependency relationships are difficult, but this one is particularly difficult for the major West European powers to accept, because the modern international system was Eurocentric for some four and one-half centuries (1496-1945) and has been superpower dominated for only the last forty years. Additionally, the rise of U.S. power has been unprecedentedly rapid, with America becoming a superpower less than fifty
years after the Spanish-American war first marked her emergence as a great power.

The basic features of the post-war U.S.-West European alliance are as follows. Structurally, its core is the 1949 NATO Treaty establishing a peacetime military alliance between the U.S., Canada and NATO-Europe. Although not formally part of the alliance, the three major European neutrals (Austria, Switzerland and Sweden) effectively are covered by the U.S. guarantee the Treaty formalizes. They also field sizeable military forces to defend their armed neutrality. The nature of the tacit U.S. guarantee of Finland and Yugoslavia has remained intentionally ambiguous but is essentially similar: the U.S. guarantees their political independence and territorial integrity against a Soviet/Pact military attack or the use of the threat of such an attack to obtain political advantages or control. Finland's need to be uniquely sensitive to Soviet interests creates a special situation which does not alter her ultimate dependence on this U.S. guarantee. The fact of Yugoslavia's Communist government does not alter a similar dependence.

Territorially, the effect of the U.S. guarantee has been to freeze the division of Europe along boundaries established by the wartime Grand Alliance against Hitler's Germany. These impose an artificial division on Europe (notably Germany) for which there is no historical precedent. No proposals, official or unofficial, for ending this division wholly or
partly have been able to reconcile Western and Soviet interests.

Militarily, two major changes have occurred. One is that the U.S. has permanently committed a force of four divisions to NATO Europe, a force which, with its air support, has fluctuated for more than thirty years between about 250,000 and 400,000 military personnel, plus some 625,000 dependents and civilian personnel. This commitment was not part of the 1949 NATO Treaty. It was made only after the 1950 North Korean invasion of South Korea suggested an imminent danger of a Soviet attack on West Europe. The other change is that West Europe's military forces, including West Germany's, have been rebuilt. There is not now, as there was in 1945, a military vacuum in Western Europe. The cumulative effect of the buildup of large NATO conventional forces (plus theatre nuclear forces) has been to create a credible balance of deterrence thus far. This statement needs qualifying, however.

Because NATO forces thus far have deterred a Soviet Warsaw Pact attack, there is no guarantee that they will continue to do so in the future, particularly if there is continued reluctance on the part of NATO-Europe to take the measures needed to counterbalance the Soviet Pact military buildup. But so long as the military forces in place are backed up by effective U.S. strategic nuclear forces, it will remain the case that any Soviet Pact attack on West Europe will stand a high probability of starting World War III. Only
in the most exceptional circumstances would the risks the Soviets would run make the potential gains from such an attack worthwhile.

Future Evolution: Alternative I
A Continuation of the Existing Alliance Structure

These three features of the Alliance suggest that the possibilities for its change are limited. Four broad alternatives exist.

The first alternative is the most likely one. This is that the Alliance will continue unchanged in its essentials, although modified in detail. That is, the U.S. will continue to guarantee the independence of West Europe with her strategic nuclear forces. To make this guarantee as credible as possible, she will continue to station significant nuclear and conventional forces in NATO Europe. The size of these conventional forces will remain about that established in 1950, with some fluctuations below this nominal level, or will be formally adjusted, more likely down than up. Given the continuing U.S. debate over her NATO commitment, this may seem a surprising prediction, but critics of this commitment have been able to propose only two major changes in it.

One is a reduction in the size and cost of U.S. forces stationed in NATO Europe or otherwise necessitated by this commitment. The other is a withdrawal of the U.S. guarantee. It is generally accepted that if U.S. forces were withdrawn from NATO-Europe or reduced to very low levels (perhaps under
50,000-100,000) the credibility of the U.S. guarantee would be very sharply reduced. Those favoring total troop withdrawal thus also tend to favor withdrawal of this guarantee. This alternative will be considered below. But the importance of West Europe to the U.S. makes it a less likely one. This leaves the most likely possibilities for change being those in force levels and in the nature of the guarantee.

The range for downward adjustments in U.S. NATO-related forces is limited severely by the size of the Soviet threat, by constraints on NATO-Europe's ability to provide substitute forces, and by the role of U.S. forces in deterrence, as well as in defense. The most likely area for reductions will be U.S. Army troops committed to Europe, plus supporting air assets. This reduction could be as large as the 1970 Mansfield Resolution proposal for a reduction of the nominal force of 300,000 Army personnel to 150,000. Such a cut would tend to reduce sharply the credibility of the U.S. guarantee, since the four divisions/300,000 Army personnel level has come to symbolize this guarantee. But much would depend on the circumstances of such a reduction. For example, if it occurred as a result of U.S. involvement in a war caused by Soviet attack against an area, such as the Persian Gulf, recognized as one in which U.S. and NATO-Europe interests were involved, the credibility of the U.S. guarantee might not be weakened. Under these circumstances too, NATO-Europe might compensate for the U.S. withdrawal.
If, on the other hand, reductions occurred because the U.S. decided to reduce the economic burden of the guarantee, this would tend to reduce its credibility. But in practical terms, even a force of 150,000 U.S. troops (counting air support) plus their dependents, would represent a significant deterrent force. Forces of 100,000 or less would tend to represent much less of a deterrent, however. So, reductions to this level would be likely to lead eventually to total withdrawal.

The range of adjustments in the guarantee is similarly limited by circumstances. Given the crucial U.S. interest in preserving the independence of West Europe as a whole, it is difficult to divide this guarantee without destroying it. This is particularly true now that the guarantee has existed for nearly forty years. Paradoxically, as France's Charles DeGaulle realized, this fact cuts both ways for individual European states. Their independence is guaranteed by the U.S. whether they want it to be guaranteed or not. But because the U.S. has to guarantee them in its own interests, they can engage in a wide range of activities in opposition to U.S. interests without destroying this guarantee. Currently, Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou is demonstrating the possibilities for Gaullist-style maneuvers. The main U.S. means of limiting these are likely to be economic rather than military ones.

This suggests that, while the essential structure of the U.S. guarantee and the territory it covers will remain the
same in this first alternative, the formal Alliance structure may be modified. Some NATO members may follow France's example and leave the military command structure but not the Alliance, while insisting that NATO installations be removed from their territory. Others may leave the Alliance totally. They may also, as France has done, return later to a close military cooperation with the Alliance. Indeed, a French return to the command structure and reacceptance of NATO installations on her territory is not impossible. Other states, such as Sweden, might even join NATO, if they perceived themselves sufficiently threatened by the Soviets.

Alternative II
A Continued U.S. Guarantee with Much Reduced or Zero Forces

The second alternative would be an Alliance in which the U.S. provides either no guarantee of West Europe's independence, or only a limited one, and has withdrawn all, or almost all, of her forces from NATO Europe on a phased basis and has assisted the major European powers to construct effective Strategic Nuclear Forces of their own. These could include upgraded British and French National Nuclear Forces (NNF), West German NNF and some form of integrated European NF, perhaps on the lines of NATO's existing two-key system, but with warheads in the custody of a European nuclear command authority. This alternative has been extensively discussed in unofficial American circles as a means of allowing the U.S. to
concentrate her resources on the protection of her interests while freeing her from the burden of guaranteeing a West Europe that, economically, is perfectly capable of providing for her own defense and deterrent forces.

In principle, the attractiveness of such an arrangement seems clear. In practice, it might not prove so attractive. A truly independent West Europe might oppose U.S. actions to protect her interests while supporting the Soviet Union's as a counterweight to the U.S. Such a West Europe also would remain vulnerable to Soviet exploitation of her military, economic and political leverage, so that she would become, to use the cliche, Finlandized. The actual relationship of a Soviet-dominated West Europe to Moscow would more probably be a tributary one.

To return to the basic point made earlier, West Europe is too valuable a power for the U.S. to allow the Soviets to control or gain access to its resources. The U.S. thus is compelled to guarantee West Europe's independence. Even in this second alternative alliance structure, the U.S. could hardly avoid the necessity of back-stopping West Europe's nuclear deterrent and her conventional forces with a U.S. nuclear guarantee. To fail to do so would be to take a major gamble with the future of the United States itself. It is conceivable, however, that the U.S. and West Europe might agree to redefine the military means by which the U.S. guarantee was implemented, so as to produce a modified second alternative.
In this event, most or all of U.S. ground forces would be withdrawn. U.S. air, sea and space forces would be retained for missions beyond the technical capabilities of the West/NATO-Europeans. Their nuclear forces would be built up to superpower levels based on British and French NNF. If a means could be found for West Germany to acquire NNF without precipitating a nuclear or conventional pre-emptive Soviet strike, this also would be done. The U.S. would retain strategic offensive and defensive forces adequate to deter and defeat Soviet (or other) attacks on West Europe as well as on the U.S. These strategic offensive and defensive forces would also ensure that the Soviets and the West Europeans both understood that the U.S. would continue to guarantee West Europe's independence and ensure that the Soviets could not gain control over its resources, directly or indirectly.

Alternative III
No U.S. Guarantee

The third alternative would be a withdrawal of the U.S. guarantee, followed by Soviet acquisition of control over West Europe. A variant would have the same basic structure but with retention of a close U.S./U.K. Alliance, possibly going as far as a political union. It is extremely unlikely, though not impossible, that the U.S. would take this action, because it would not be in her long-term interest to do so.

In theory, West Europe could emerge, with U.S. assistance, as a united political and military power with her
own S/TNF and conventional forces large enough to deter or
defeat a Soviet Pact attack without a formal U.S. guarantee.
But, as already noted, the crucial importance to the United
States of not allowing the Soviets to control West Europe's
resources for her own purposes means that the U.S. might still
not be able to avoid the necessity of offering a guarantee to
this West European superpower. If circumstances arose where
its independence was seriously threatened by the Soviets, the
U.S. would probably decide that it was in her interests to
issue enough of a guarantee to deter Soviet attack. Such a
guarantee could also become necessary if West Europe was
moving towards a genuine alliance with the Soviets, as a
result of major domestic political shifts leftwards. These
are not impossible and could combine with Gaullist rightward
shifts to produce acceptance of the argument, already being
made, that West Europe's interests are threatened more by the
U.S. than by the U.S.S.R.

Alternative IV
NATO Enlarged to Include Pact Members and Guaranteed by the
U.S.

It is conceivable, although unlikely, that the Soviet
Union could agree to the reunification of Germany. A future
Soviet government might do so if the costs of retaining direct
control over the GDR became prohibitive, or potentially so.
An illustrative scenario would be a serious rebellion in East
Germany occurring simultaneously with one in Poland. If West
Germany aided East Germany, this could force the Soviets to
choose between an invasion of West Europe to retain control of East Europe or withdrawal from part, or all, of East Europe. If faced with such a choice, at present it seems likely that the Soviets would invade West Europe. But circumstances could alter this case. Most obviously, a combination of improved U.S. and NATO-Europe nuclear and conventional forces, a credible U.S. guarantee and China's military modernization would make invading West Europe a gamble too unpredictable in its outcome to be worth taking. The Soviets might then decide to withdraw from East Germany plus, possibly -- though even less likely, other Pact countries as the lesser of two evils. To mitigate its adverse effects, the Soviets would almost certainly seek U.S. guarantees of the resulting European settlement designed to stabilize the situation while limiting the adverse effects to themselves.

Such a settlement could take two main forms. The neutralization of the areas from which the Soviets withdrew, or their inclusion in NATO, or some mix of the two. The neutralization solution would follow the precedent of the 1955 Austrian Peace Treaty, in which Soviet withdrawal from her Zone of Control was matched by U.S., U.K. and French withdrawal from their Zones. Austria was then established as a unified, armed and neutral state aligned de facto but not de jure with NATO, with her independence guaranteed by all four powers. For the Soviets, the least undesirable form of German reunification would indeed be one on Austrian lines. That is, one establishing an armed by nominally-neutral reunified
Germany, with four-power guarantees of her independence and non-nuclear status. All foreign armed forces and nuclear weapons would be withdrawn from German territory, and both halves of Germany would withdraw from their respective alliances. Such a solution would also be attractive to much of German opinion on the left. The Soviet hope would be that such a Germany could eventually be brought within their political orbit, partly through their common interests in dominating Mitteleuropa. This, in turn, could help enforce (the Soviets would hope) the loyalty of the remaining members of the Pact—at least so long as they feared Germany more than Russians.

The main danger in this solution would be the uncertainties established by formalization of Germany's status as a wanderer between East and West. For obvious historical reasons, this is an alternative that would generate apprehension in the two superpowers, in the two halves of Europe and among responsible Germans. These apprehensions would be strongly reinforced by the incentives such a Germany would have to acquire her own NNF, coupled with the difficulty of preventing this.

A variant on the neutralization solution would be an Austrian solution for East Germany, while West Germany remained a member of NATO with allied forces on her territory. Whether such a solution would be stable over the long term is an open question. German interests would be better served by combining her military forces, and then she could calculate...
that such a combination, if presented as a fait accompli under appropriate political circumstances, need not lead to a withdrawal of the U.S. and NATO guarantee of the unified Germany's security.

Accordingly, a more stable solution would be an integration of the unified Germany and her military forces into an enlarged NATO. This would be an extension of the proposition while the U.S. contains the Soviets for the sake of NATO and herself, NATO contains West Germany for the sake of the Soviets, East Europe and herself. Many Germans would also concede, privately, that NATO also serves to restrain the more destabilizing elements in German society and culture from seizing control again. The re-emergence of German romantic nationalism, this time on the left of the political spectrum, underlines the importance of this rather different form of containment. For all of these reasons, the Soviets might well regard the extension of NATO to a unified Germany as the best available alternative, in the circumstances specified, to their continued control of East Germany.

A similar logic could be applied by the Soviets to other members of the Warsaw Pact, if they decided that these too could no longer be controlled at acceptable costs. That is, that they would pose less of a threat to the Soviets, and whatever remained of their East European empire, as part of NATO than on their own. The Northern Tier countries to which this could apply would be, in the order of difficulty for the Soviets of retaining control over them, Poland, Hungary and
Czechoslovakia. Historically, all of these countries have been part of Europe and continue to be pulled towards West Europe by cultural, economic, political and security considerations.

The alternative would be an Austrian solution for one, two or all three of these countries. In Poland’s case, this could look like a particularly attractive solution to a Soviet Union forced to liquidate part of its empire. Poland has always had the misfortune to be the buffer between the Germans and Russians. She was twice partitioned between the German, Hapsburg, and Russian Empires and once between Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union. One result has been a visceral Polish distrust of Germans and Russians. An Austrianized Poland might thus pose less of a threat to the Soviets than one that was part of NATO. This consideration would be reinforced by the fact that a Soviet withdrawal from Poland would still leave her holding a 200 mile deep strip of former Polish territory, annexed in 1945, while Poland would be holding a similar strip of former German territory which she was forced to acquire by Stalin.

If an Austrian solution were applied to Czechoslovakia or Hungary, or both, this would recreate a Soviet version of the Little Entente established by France to contain Germany in the 1920s. But like the Little Entente, it would depend for its effectiveness on a guarantee by a friendly great power. All three countries would remain bitterly hostile to the Soviets after their post-war occupation ended. Historically too,
Hungary has been significantly more opposed to Russia than to Germany. She fought the Russians in both World Wars and her unsuccessful 1956 revolution. An American guarantee of a 21st Century-version of the Little Entente therefore would probably be necessary if it were to contain a unified Germany as the Soviets would require it to do.

The U.S. might well share the Soviet interest in guaranteeing any such revisions to the existing division of Europe. It is probably not in long-term U.S. interests for a totally independent European superpower to emerge, especially not one inevitably dominated by a reunified Germany. Such a European superpower would introduce a major new element of unpredictability into an international system which is already quite unpredictable enough. This point should not be overstated. Overall, the interests of such a European superpower would be essentially compatible with, but not identical to, those of the U.S. But, and it is an important but, it would create the possibility of stronger opposition to particular U.S. policies with which the European superpower disagreed. There is also the obverse danger that even a European superpower, and certainly anything less, might not really be strong enough politically and militarily to contain the Soviets without some form of U.S. guarantee.

The Inescapability of the U.S. Alliance with West Europe

The U.S. seems unlikely to be able to avoid the necessity of continuing to issue some form of guarantee of even an
enlarged NATO plus, if established, some Austrianized former members of the Pact. But the demands such a guarantee would make would probably be much less than those of the current one. The conventional military balance would be much more favorable to an enlarged NATO. Over time, nuclear forces could be considerably strengthened, building on the core of British and French NNF. As in Alternative II, U.S. ground forces might be modestly reduced and her efforts concentrated on SNF (offensive and defensive), plus Rapid Deployment-type forces.

It bears repeating that Alternative IV does not seem a highly probable one. However, it could just occur for the reasons noted. It is of considerable analytical importance, because it underlines the inescapability of an American guarantee of even a larger and more powerful NATO -- one presumably better able to take care of its own defense against the Soviets. The U.S. cannot afford to take any chance of the Soviets gaining control over West Europe's resources, either against its opposition or with its cooperation. As all of the other Alternatives also have shown, for these reasons the U.S. cannot avoid guaranteeing West Europe. This guarantee seems likely to endure, in one form or another, well into the 21st Century.

Further consideration of the nature of possible NATO-Warsaw Pact relations will be deferred until after developments in the Soviet-Pact relationship have been analyzed.
Chapter 3:

Soviet Alliances - The Warsaw Pact

The Warsaw Pact, formally established in 1955, is a nominal alliance disguising Soviet Imperial control over an enlarged Czarist Empire in Mitteleurope and the Balkans. Subject to the proviso that it is an enforced arrangement, the Pact, as here, is usually described as an alliance for the sake of convenience. Because its evolution both to its present form and into the next century has had and will have important similarities with (as well as differences from) the past experience of its members, these must be taken into account. The following analysis thus outlines the salient features of the main, post-war, Soviet Imperial alliance and the alternative routes along which it is likely to develop.

Background

Essentially, the Pact is the result of a Soviet attempt to establish control over as much of Central Europe, including Germany, as possible, in order to avoid a repetition of the German invasions of World War I and II. Such control serves both defensive and offensive purposes, ensuring that a future land war in Europe will be fought as far as possible on European, especially German, territory and not on that of the Soviet Union. It also offers the basis for Soviet attempts to extend their political influence over West Europe -- if necessary with military means. More broadly, from the Soviet viewpoint, it is an attempt to control the one power center in
the international system that has historically repeatedly threatened Russia: the area occupied by Prussia, Poland and the Hapsburg monarchy. Major conflicts between this power center and Russia have included those involving the Prussian Knights of the Teutonic Order, culminating the first Battle of Tannenburg (actually fought against the Poles in 1410); the Polish occupation of Moscow in 1610; Napoleon's 1812 invasion, launched from Poland with a multi-national European army (with Polish and Prussian contingents); the German-Austro-Hungarian campaigns of 1914-1918, culminating in their victorious imposition of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk; the Polish defeat of the Soviet invasion of 1910-1921; and the German (including Austrian)-Hungarian, etc. invasion of 1941-1945.

Marshall Stalin's means of controlling this power center was the Soviet Army plus, for internal control, the NKVD. Soviet military operations against Germany had given him control over all of the countries that were to form the Warsaw Pact except Czechoslovakia, which fell to a Communist Party coup d'état in 1948. Stalin also imposed a territorial re-shuffle reminiscent of Eighteenth Century balance-of-power diplomacy by moving the border of Russia 200 miles into Poland, and that of Poland 200 miles into German Prussia. The result was a re-establishment of the Nineteenth Century Czarist Empire in Central Europe and the Balkans, together with its extension Westward. In Central Europe, Stalin added to control of the new Poland that of East Germany (including
what was left of Prussia) and Hungary. In the Balkans, Bulgaria, a traditional Russian ally, came under direct Soviet control, as did Rumania, which had been variously allied with and against Russia in the Nineteenth Century and had been anti-Soviet in the inter-war years. Albania also came under Soviet control. Stalin had earlier annexed the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which had enjoyed a brief independence from Russian rule in the inter-war years.

Like NATO’s membership, that of the Pact was thus arbitrarily determined by the positions of the armies of the Grand Alliance in 1945. Also like NATO, the Warsaw Pact’s members have a long history of internecine conflicts, notably Prussia against Poland and Hungary against Rumania (over control of Transylvania). But while NATO’s internal unity in the face of a clear Soviet threat has been partly supplemented by traditional rivalries, Eastern Europe’s continued occupation by Soviet forces has ensured that opposition to the Soviets has replaced these.

Past Evolution - Four Structural Problems

The three main features shaping the future of the Pact’s evolution are as follows. First, successive Soviet governments have not only failed to create the basis for a genuine alliance with their Pact partners but have largely destroyed the bases for such an alliance that once existed. In 1945 there was widespread fear of Germany, plus a popular desire for the establishment of more democratic and egalitarian governments or, in Czechoslovakia’s case, the
restoration of one. Difficult though it may now be to remember, the Soviets had the potential to become popular liberators in much of East Europe. There was also widespread support for the political ideology of Marxism-Leninism, as variously defined by its proponents in Europe (West as well as East). To these two bases for an alliance was added a third, East Europe's interest in rebuilding their economic and living standards at rates, and eventually to levels, comparable with those of West Europe.

These bases for a genuine alliance have been destroyed long since by Soviet policies. As a result, the Pact faces four major structural problems. The first problem is that fear of the Soviet Union has replaced fear of Germany, especially for East Europe's successor generation (those under 40 years old). The immediate, overwhelming threat to the security of all of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) members is their continued military occupation by Soviet forces. This prevents them from developing domestic and foreign policies appropriate to their needs and exposes them to the danger of a nuclear or major conventional war (or both) initiated by the Soviets to defend their interests.

This is not to say that residing in these countries there are not considerable residual fears of the two existing German states and of their potential if unified. These fears remain considerable. But they are mitigated by West Germany's containment within the framework of the NATO Alliance, and especially by the U.S. guarantee. East Europe has a major
interest in the retention of this restraining framework for as long as the existing division of Europe lasts and, subsequently, in any restructuring of the superpower-European relationship. The experience thus far with the balances of nuclear deterrence also suggests that an independent Poland could feel reasonably confident of deterring any potential re-emergence of German revanchism (as the Soviets call it) with their own National Nuclear Forces (NNF). Poland would be emulating France in developing NNF within an Alliance framework. This would primarily deter Russians but also would serve to deter Germans.

This is also not to deny that historical differences between Pact members continue to exist. The Polish population currently hates Russians more than Germans, but remains anti-German as well as anti-Russian. The same is true, though to a lesser degree, of the Czech and Hungarian populations. Territorial differences exist among East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, as well as between Hungary and Rumania. But these are secondary, manageable differences as compared with their primary agreement on the need to end Soviet occupation.

The second structural problem is that none of the Soviet-imposed Communist Party Governments in East Europe enjoys any degree of domestic legitimacy, except Hungary's. The government of Premier Kadar was formed after the Soviets crushed the 1956 rebellion with force, executing its two leaders, Iimre Nagy and Colonel Paul Maleter. But because of
the revolt, Khrushchev and his successors allowed the Kadar government a limited freedom to develop a less centralized economic system, plus a relatively less repressive domestic regime. Political dissent was muted by memories of the cost of the failed rebellion. To lessen the support that such a repetition could get from Hungary's Army and Air Force, these forces have been kept at low strengths, additionally minimizing the defense burden at around 2½% of GNP. The principal claim that the Kadar government has to legitimacy is that it is the guardian of the gains from a failed revolution against Soviet occupation and the best guarantee against a repetition of this emphasizes the legitimacy problem.

This problem becomes even clearer when it is remembered that Poland's Communist government only enjoyed legitimacy after the Polish revolt of 1956, which stopped short (just) of using force. Unfortunately, Premier Gomulka was unable to preserve the legitimacy his government then enjoyed. Under his successors, the Party was proved so incompetent that it had to be replaced in 1981 by the military government of General Jaruzelski.

In Czechoslovakia, the 1968 Prague Spring saw Premier Dubceck successfully create legitimacy for the Party by responding to popular demands, only to be removed by a Soviet/Pact invasion because his government was too popular and was beginning to share political power outside the Communist Party.
Even East Germany's Premier Honecker has begun to seek legitimacy by cultivating the intra-German detente and appealing to German and Prussian traditions, including those of Frederick the Great, the Eighteenth Century soldier king.

This lack of domestic political legitimacy has been, and will continue to be, particularly serious and de-stabilizing in the longer run. It means that the East European governments increasingly will be unable to command the loyalty of their populations, especially during major crises. How far Soviet and indigenous forces can command their obedience may become an important question, especially if some of these troops refuse to obey Soviet orders. It also means that some of these governments, especially in Poland, will find themselves caught between a rock and a hard place -- between the demands of their population and those of the Soviets. The loss of the considerable intellectual legitimacy which Marxism/Leninism once enjoyed will exacerbate these problems. So too will its ideological replacement by nationalism, a trend evident for three decades now.

The third structural problem is the poor performance of the East European economies, particularly the failure of the detente-era attempt to develop export-led growth financed by Western loans. This has left these economies worse off. Not only have they not grown as hoped, they are now heavily in debt to the West and unable either to repay their loans or raise new ones. Poland's situation, with her GNP reduced by 20% - 25%, dramatizes this problem. These existing economic
problems are expected to increase as the Soviet rate of economic growth slows down and as she becomes less able to supply the energy and raw materials required by East Europe. Prices for these will rise sharply, but they may later cease to be available altogether.

These economic problems will increase domestic political problems and have adverse military effects as well. The latter will include reduced East European capabilities for taking the defense burden off Soviet shoulders. In this sense, it is the Pact which has the real burden-sharing problem.

The fourth structural problem is the uncertain political loyalty and combat effectiveness of NSWP military forces. This is a problem even under normal circumstances. It has become a major one during domestic crises in individual East European countries. It would clearly become a particular problem if there were a serious chance of war starting between NATO and the Warsaw Pact because of Soviet action. Peacetime estimates of NSWP forces' political reliability probably underestimate the potential extent of the problem, because the situation is so scenario dependent. For example, East German forces are usually assessed as being the most effective and loyal. But it is extremely difficult to predict how they would function in a situation involving potential conflict with West Germany. They could remain effective and loyal Soviet allies, remain loyal but become ineffective, turn into
effective and loyal allies of West Germany or fragment into contending groups.

Differences - Northern and Southern Tiers

The core of the NSWP members remains the four Northern Tier countries: East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Of these states, the two most crucial ones in strategic terms are East Germany and Poland, because of their geographical location and their military forces. For the Soviets, their Polish problem remains a major one. The 1956 revolution was followed by the Solidarity revolt of the late 1970s, which continues to this day. The four most powerful institutions in Poland are now the Catholic Church, the Solidarity movement, the Polish Army and the Soviet Army.

East Germany appears domestically stable but could develop some symptoms of the Polish disease in the next few years.

Hungary appears to have been temporally neutralized following the 1956 Revolution, but it is relatively less important economically and militarily. Since 1968, Czechoslovakia has been neutralized politically but at heavy economic costs. Her military forces, never regarded as very effective, have become even less so. Thus, from the Soviet viewpoint, the Northern Tier countries combine crucial importance and major instability, actual or potential, in at least two and probably three cases: Poland, East Germany and Hungary.
In contrast, the Southern tier is both less important and more stable. It comprises only two states, Rumania and Bulgaria. Albania left the Pact in the 1950s, after Soviet forces were withdrawn, later forming an alliance with China. The Albanian government, although claiming to be the last orthodox defender of Stalinist-Marxism-Leninism, appears to be a reversion to the traditional personal authoritarian regimes of the area.

The Rumanian government is similar domestically, but has engaged in well-publicized differences with the Soviets on foreign policy and defense issues since Soviet forces were withdrawn. Thus far, the Soviets have tolerated Rumania's peculiar position because it does not involve major costs for them and generates significant benefits, by providing a nominal example of Soviet toleration of dissent from a genuine ally. Rumanian dissent is carefully calibrated so as not to be unacceptable, and the alliance is supported by the two countries' Communist Party governments common interests in remaining in power.

Bulgaria's government is the most loyal ally Moscow has. This is partly because of the historic Bulgarian Alliance with Russia and partly because the Bulgarian government relies on Soviet forces to stay in power. These forces dwarf any potential local opposition.

The only useful generalization about the structure of the Soviet alliance with these Southern Tier states is a negative one. This is that it is very much a product of circumstances
that are unlikely to be repeated. The implication is that neither the Rumanian nor, indeed, the Yugoslavian situations are likely to be reproduced. Both were established through a fortuitous combination of circumstances at a time of major uncertainties in Soviet policies. The withdrawal of Soviet forces, which enabled Rumania to establish her unique position in the Pact and Albania to leave it, occurred during the post-Stalinist succession struggle. Stalin's earlier reluctance to crush Tito, following his 1948 declaration of Yugoslavian independence, was caused by two factors. One was a reluctance to accelerate the pace of Stalin's confrontation with the U.S. in such a way as to jeopardize the Soviet Union's potential acquisition of more valuable territory. The other was his belief that he later could eliminate Yugoslavia's independence whenever it was convenient to do so. Both Stalin and Khrushchev (and their successors) then found that the situation created by their actions, or lack of them, had become part of a new status quo which could not be altered without incurring greater costs than were then warranted.

The fact that Rumania's unique position has subsequently proved particularly useful to the Soviets does not seem likely to encourage them to reproduce her combination of domestic Stalinism and economic development (based on indigenous oil resources) with external dissent. The Brezhnev regime's intervention in Afghanistan underlined this point. To maintain a pro-Soviet regime there, where none had existed before the late 1970s, the Soviets have maintained a force
averaging over 100,000 men for over five years, while incurring some significant costs in their relationships with the U.S. and the Islamic world.

**Future Developments**

There are four alternatives for the development of the Soviet/East European Alliance. In order of probability, these are: first, a continuation of some form of Soviet imperial control based on military force; second, a Soviet attempt, successful or unsuccessful, to extend this control to most or all of West Europe; third, a Soviet decision that part or all of their alliance has become more of a liability than an asset and that they will withdraw their forces imposing it; fourth, the development of a genuine alliance based on common interests.

The first alternative is the most likely one, because of the meta-stability of the balance of nuclear deterrence. This makes the potential costs of U.S. and/or NATO military intervention in favor of any East European country attempting to expel Soviet forces unacceptable as a deliberate act of policy. Without such assistance, none of these countries, individually or in combination, can defeat Soviet forces. These regrettable realities are well-known to the governments and peoples of East Europe. They were brutally demonstrated by the free hand enjoyed by the Soviet Union in suppressing the 1956 Hungarian Revolt and confirmed by the further lesson given to them in the U.S.S.R. occupying Czechoslovakia in 1968.
and Afghanistan in 1979. So long as this situation continues, Soviet control of East Europe, however unacceptable to its populations and governments, will remain unavoidable.

The form that such control will take seems likely to be a continuation of the Brezhnev regime's compromise between Stalin's rigid, and Khrushchev's more flexible, control. Under Stalin, each East European dictatorship was a miniature reproduction of his own and was hermetically sealed off from its neighbors, Eastern as well as Western. Under Khrushchev, after 1956, a policy of polycentrism was followed. Each East European Communist Party was encouraged to follow separate roads to Socialism deemed suitable to their particular societies. Provided Communist Party control was preserved, considerable freedom was allowed in economic policies and intellectual life. Under Brezhnev, especially in the 1970s, these freedoms were tightened but not to Stalinist levels. Local Communist Party leaders who encountered major domestic difficulties were removed in favor of ones better able to cope with these problems.

Brezhnev and his successors' East European policy was thus one of muddling through. It showed tactical flexibility in the methods used to obtain their strategic objective of controlling East Europe. Unfortunately for East Europe, this policy affords a considerable possibility of continuing success for the next twenty years or more.

The second alternative would be a result of this control being jeopardized seriously and permanently. This could occur
because of the long-term effects of West Europe's relationship with East Europe, coupled with major short-term problems. The relationship between the two halves of Europe will be discussed more fully in the next chapter. For now, it is sufficient to note that simply by continuing to exist alongside East Europe, West Europe poses a permanent challenge to Soviet control -- by demonstrating the existence of an infinitely preferable alternative. This is particularly true for the Northern Tier countries. These are European in terms of their history and culture.

If, as seems probable, the economic and social problems predicted for the Warsaw Pact materialize, then the gap in living standards between East and West Europe could increase still further. It is possible that the Polish experience with a serious drop in living standards, including shortages of basic necessities, could be repeated. Under these circumstances, the existing source of instability in East Europe will be powerfully reinforced. A likely catalyst for change could then be the frequently-postulated scenario of a national revolt against Soviet occupation in East Germany and/or Poland which a West German government might be forced to support. Faced with the possible loss of control over East Germany alone, or Poland as well, the Soviets could conclude that the costs of this occurrence exceeded the potential costs of an invasion of NATO-Europe. Their objective thus would be to impose direct control over all or part of West Europe.
Given the enormous gamble this would represent, it is difficult to see why the Soviets would not want to deal with their West European problem as comprehensively as possible, making predictions as to where they might decide to stop if their military campaign was successful or difficult. British and French NNF though, might lead the Soviets to refrain from trying to take control of these countries and to offer a halt at some appropriate geographical boundaries, such as the Rhine and the Alps. If successful, the result of such an invasion would be an extension of the Warsaw Pact westward. The attractions of West Europe for the Eastern European countries would have been removed. Its example, however, would remain. All of the existing problems with East Europe would also remain but in much more acute forms. Considerable damage would have been done to Europe by even a purely conventional war. The U.S. and any remaining Western European states would become garrison societies.

If unsuccessful, the Soviets would be unlikely to secure a restoration of the status quo ante bellum. Their forces might then be forced to withdraw from some or all of the Northern Tier countries which, under these circumstances, would be almost certain to join NATO.

If the Soviet attack led to a limited nuclear exchange, this could still produce either of these two outcomes, but with a much greater loss of life and physical damage to Europe (East and West), as well as, possibly, to the U.S.S.R.
and the U.S. themselves. A major nuclear exchange would create a situation beyond the scope of this analysis.

The third alternative is Soviet withdrawal from all or part of East Europe. This has already been considered in the discussion of NATO's possible eastward extension. Here it is appropriate to consider this alternative in combination with the fourth, the Soviet establishment of a genuine alliance with East Europe. As noted earlier, there is no possibility of this occurring so long as the existing Soviet enforced alliance structure is maintained. This applies particularly to the Northern tier countries. Not even a Soviet withdrawal would change this situation. There is, however, one change, unlikely but still possible, that could create the conditions for the emergence of a genuine alliance between Russia and East Europe. This would be a revolutionary change in domestic Soviet politics which replaced the Communist Party with some form of democratic government.

There is no prospect of this occurring at present, and it is difficult to see how it could happen in the time frame studies. But it is not impossible. One way in which this could come about would be an unsuccessful attack on NATO Europe which lead to a very limited nuclear exchange, including attacks on Soviet population centers which, in turn, triggered a successful mass revolt. Another would be an erosion or collapse of the Communist Party regime which assisted the emergence of a democratic government. Such a government might be able to establish a genuine alliance with
the smaller Eastern European countries to guard against excessive German influence over Mitteleuropa. This would still preclude the possibility of stationing Soviet forces outside their borders. Even more speculatively, a democratic Soviet government might find itself unable to maintain control over some of the major ethnic groups colonized by Czarist Russia in the last century. A breakup of the domestic Russian empire could lead to a real alliance of European Russia with the rest of Europe, in order to balance the resulting increase in the number and power of the Islamic countries and of China.

Probable Directions

The first alternative, a continuation of the Soviet Alliance forced on East Europe, is the most likely one. It could include some modest variations in the form which Soviet control took but not in its substance. It would create an increasingly unstable situation. But the ability of Soviet military and policy forces to contain this should not be underestimated. From 1815 to 1917, their less-capable Czarist predecessors maintained control over Poland despite the results of 1830 and 1863 and helped the Hapsburgs to suppress the 1848 Hungarian Revolution.

A real threat to this control could create the second alternative, a Soviet attempt to extend their control over all or most of West Europe. The first alternative, plus the possibility of the second, means that the U.S. will be
compelled, for reasons of self-interest, to continue to guarantee West Europe, including NATO. This would remain true in the event that the third alternative materialized, a Soviet withdrawal from part or all of East Europe. Such a withdrawal could occur as a result of an unsuccessful attack on West Europe or if the Soviet government decided that the cost of controlling East Europe outweighed the gains. The prospects of this occurring are not high but would be significant. The fourth alternative could not occur without a revolutionary change of domestic Soviet policies. This possibility, though very unlikely in the next several decades, cannot be ruled out. Its implications therefore bear brief consideration.
These will exist at two levels—one military, the other politico-economic. The military relationship will be dominated by the two superpowers, the politico-economic relationship by the two halves of Europe.

The most likely military relationship will be a continuation of the current one, wherein further Soviet westward expansion is contained by U.S. (plus British and French) nuclear forces and NATO conventional forces. (These may be deployed in the alternative configurations noted above.) Combined, the two create a balance of deterrence and defense capabilities sufficient to deter this occurrence except under the kinds of circumstances noted above—i.e., a revolutionary domestic change in East or West Europe or a collapse of NATO–Europe's defense efforts.

This is not to suggest that the Soviets will not try to increase their military advantages and those of the NSWP over NATO and to translate these into political and economic advantages. The Soviets will do both. But, judging from the experience of the last forty years, they will continue to encounter one of the major changes nuclear weapons have wrought in the international system.

Nuclear weapons have altered the correlation between the relative balance of military forces and the ability to translate a favorable balance into political advantages.
Ultimately, this ability rested on the potential for using military superiority to win a war; so that the threat of war could be used to extract concessions. But nuclear weapons have made it much harder to use such compellent threats—both because of the damage they could inflict and because of their escalation potential.

These two characteristics were noted, in principle, by the early theorists of nuclear deterrence but have become of major practical importance as the number, range and destructive capability of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems expanded. Thus far, nuclear weapons have proven as ineffective for compellence as they have proven effective for deterrence.

This has been particularly true in the European theater, because of the sheer size of the nuclear and conventional (plus chemical) forces deployed by the two alliances. These make it difficult to limit a local conflict and to predict the outcome of a theater-wide one. They also create unresolvable uncertainties over the confidence with which such predictions can be made. Soviet predictions may be, for example, that their military capabilities give them a ninety percent probability of conventionally defeating NATO within two weeks, while withholding their TNF and deterring NATO's release of their TNF. But it is difficult to use such capabilities as a compellent threat against NATO-Europe when its governments know that there is an unknown, probably unknowable, uncertainty about the validity of such Soviet predictions of
victory at acceptable costs. Additionally, if they prove wrong, it will almost certainly be too late to do anything about it. This makes it extremely difficult to use such predictions for political gains.

It is also important in the NATO context to note (given the existence of the allied nuclear forces) that since West Germany's completion of her re-armament, NATO's military inferiority to the Warsaw Pact has not been perceived by her governments as being so great as to allow the Soviets political leverage. (This perception may no longer be accurate, but it is still widely held.) The question of how much real or perceived conventional military superiority is needed to gain particular kinds of political concessions remains insufficiently understood. But, empirically, it seems to be considerably more superiority than the Soviets have achieved thus far against NATO.

NATO's INF modernization has demonstrated the limits on the use of superior forces for political purposes within this central nuclear balance. The Soviets tried to use their superiority to first stop and then reverse NATO INF deployment and to impose penalties for deployment (i.e., primarily for compellence). So far, the Soviets have failed to achieve any of these objectives, although they remain heavily committed to doing so.

The balance of deterrence between the two alliances thus seems preservable by NATO, despite Soviet attempts to upset it. If it is preserved, the military relationship between NATO and
the Warsaw Pact may well be modified, however, by NATO's development of conventional technologies and doctrine designed to strike much deeper into Pact territory--popularly labelled Emerging Technologies (E.T.) and Deep Strike. These will emphasize the Northern Tier Pact members' interests in avoiding war and, in the longer run, removing themselves from the Pact. This would reinforce the developments in the political relationship.

The Intra-European Relationship

Over the next twenty years, this will become increasingly close, particularly between West Europe and the four East European states historically part of Europe: East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. This will happen for two main reasons. First, the differences in circumstances between the two halves of Europe are not only now very great indeed, but certain to increase. Second, the successor generation, defined as those born after World War II ended, is emerging in East as well as West Europe.

The combined effects of these developments will be to create an unprecedented situation, wherein East Europe will be economically dependent on West Europe and the U.S. and determined to share the West's political and economic freedoms. There will also be, in both halves of Europe, an increasing sense of a common European identify and interests, defined as being sharply different from those of either superpower. What could be called the new pan-European
nationalism will exist parallel with the traditional nationalisms and will complement, not supplement, them.

The contrast between the current and prospective situations of West and East Europe is so stark that it needs emphasizing. West Europe has enjoyed a forty-year economic boom which, despite interruptions, has given its population an unparalleled, albeit varying, standard of living. All its governments are now reasonably stable and fairly democratic, except for Turkey's stable authoritarian (but periodically democratic) one. None of its members have gone to war with one another for forty years except, marginally, Greece and Turkey in Cyprus.

Over the next twenty years, its expectations must be for continued economic growth, provided access to Gulf oil is maintained, and for the less-developed countries--Spain and Portugal, Greece and Turkey--which have been Europe's marginal members to become fully part of Europe. While some of its democratic governments may collapse under political and economic stress (a possibility even in Britain), their replacements will be only moderately authoritarian and therefore responsive to public opinion, similar to General deGaulle's Fifth Republic. NATO-Europe's relationship with its protecting superpower will remain one of resented dependency. But the continued arguments within the alliance will continue to demonstrate that it is a genuine one whose members, individually and in groups, are free to advance their interests and criticize its superpower member. This
collective determination (under U.S. guidance) of the alliance's future course is likely to ensure that this is a sound and domestically acceptable one.

Historically, these are unprecedented achievements and prospects. They emphasize that whatever problems West Europe (and the U.S.) has had and will encounter are likely to remain essentially manageable.

East Europe's current situation is not only much less favorable but is likely to get worse. It is this loss of hope for future improvement that has important implications for intra-European relations. For the past forty years, most of East Europe has been occupied by Soviet military and security forces; the only exceptions now being Albania and Rumania. For forty years, their economies have been exploited by the Soviets. The replacement of Stalin's terror by Khrushchev's polycentrism held out hopes for economic development and political liberation that were then crushed by Brezhnev's return to neo-Stalinist orthodoxy. His successors have shown no signs of being able or willing to introduce even moderate economic and political reforms in East Europe, along the lines that they permitted Hungary to continue. So, of the East European Communist Party governments, only those of Hungary and East Germany -- whose standard of living is the highest in the Pact -- may be able to meet their populations' aspirations. These are and will continue to be fed by the increasing interaction between East and West Europe.
This is an obvious but extremely important phenomena. What Sir Winston Churchill once rightly called an Iron Curtain now divides Europe only in a military and political sense. Culturally and economically, West Europe and the Northern Tier countries are essentially interdependent--different members of the same body--not dissimilar to the different states comprising the Union. Understandably, this phenomenon is farthest advanced in the relations between the two halves of Germany. These demonstrate the accuracy of former F.R.G. Chancellor Willy Brandt's description of them as one German nation divided into two states--an implicitly-temporary division.

But, while the two halves of Europe are economically interdependent, the gap between the two halves is already great and is widening. In 1975, the per capita income of the U.S.S.R. and East Europe was $2,590, that of West Europe $10,000. In the year 2000, these are projected as $4,800 and $10,000 respectively; i.e., by the end of the century, the U.S.S.R. and East Europe will have nearly reached West Europe's 1975 level of per capita G.N.P. By way of comparison, the North American figures are for 1975, $7,100 and for 1980, $14,500. These gross economic disparities are clearly potentially revolutionary, especially given that these illustrative figures conceal an East European per capita G.N.P. significantly higher than that of the U.S.S.R.

These figures further suggest that West Germany may be pioneering a new kind of strategic policy in the nuclear age,
in which economic power partly replaces military power as an extension of diplomacy. The F.R.G. is already "buying" citizens from the G.D.R. and is extending what, in the past, would have been called subsidies (a.k.a. low-interest loans) to her. Such economic diplomacy has historical roots in the customs union (Zollverein) that laid the foundations for German unification in the last century.

Over the next twenty years, the economic imbalance between West Europe (plus the U.S.) and East Europe (plus the U.S.S.R.) will produce a strange situation. The Northern Tier Pact members will depend economically on a West Europe against which they are militarily allied with the U.S.S.R. Such an alliance is unlikely to remain a dependable one, militarily or politically.

For the U.S., such a situation will be advantageous. It will also be an unstable one which could be stabilized only by a withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces from the four Northern Tier countries and the creation of a new European security structure. The U.S., therefore, will need to retain her alliance with the West European power center to achieve negative and positive objectives.

Negatively, she must deter or defeat a Soviet attack on West Europe. As these intra-European considerations emphasize, there is a considerable danger that the Soviets may come to feel that such an attack is a less undesirable option than the continued erosion of their position in East Europe. This could be a particular danger if, after ten or fifteen
years of the developments suggested above, there is a major political and military revolt in Poland and/or East Germany. The Soviet leadership's attitude could then come to resemble that of Imperial Germany's, or even Austria-Hungary's in 1914: war is inevitable and it is better for it to come now rather than later, when the balance has become even more unfavorable. The Soviets are also particularly sensitive to these kinds of fundamental shifts in the correlation of forces—political, economic and military. It will also remain the case that only U.S. forces will be able to maintain high deterrence of such dangerous Soviet action.

Positively, the U.S. will wish to be in a position to facilitate the emergence of a new or at least much modified European security system. This would not only lessen the danger of a Soviet attack on West Europe—either with or against some NSWP members—it would offer the U.S. a real chance of shifting the overall balance of power in favor of the alliance systems she supports. The value of such a shift would be considerable.

Relations between NATO and the Pact are thus likely to evolve in ways which will reinforce the already strong case for the U.S. alliance with West Europe. It further suggests that recurrent and understandable U.S. irritation with these allies and with the costs of American contributions to their defense should not obscure the value of the potential long-term prize of East Europe, or, more precisely, an alliance with its Northern Tier members.
PART II
U.S. ALLIANCES WITH ASIAN POWER CENTERS

Chapter 5:
The Japanese Power Center

Japan, South Korea and Taiwan

The success of U.S. containment policy has added South Korea and Taiwan to the Japanese power center initially identified by George Kennan. Since the United States' 1950 decision to defend South Korea, the U.S. guarantee of her independence has assumed a unique importance as one that American forces have fought successfully to complement. In alliance terms, the U.S. guarantee of Japan and South Korea thus has become, effectively, a single one. Taiwan has also been covered by this guarantee since 1950. It is likely to be extended for as long as Taiwan wishes to remain independent of mainland China. She is likely to remain independent well into the next century, even if developing cooperative relationships with China in the intervening years. To understand how the structure of these U.S. alliances will evolve, it is necessary here, as elsewhere, to summarize the salient background features.

Historical Background

The current Far Eastern alliance system, unlike the European one, lacks deep historical roots. Relations between China, Japan and Korea (the Hermit Kingdom) were conspicuous
by their absence. Each of the three states regarded the other with extreme cultural disdain, symbolized by the Chinese description of all foreigners as barbarians. Japan's attempted invasion of Korea in 1594 was defeated by the first ironclads, while China's attempted invasion of Japan in the thirteenth century was defeated by a providential storm -- the Divine Wind (Kamikaze).

Until the middle of the Nineteenth Century, the Far East lacked any real alliance system. The ones that emerged thereafter were in response to the expansion of the European Imperial powers-- mainly Britain, France and Russia plus the U.S. This forced the indigenous powers to modernize in order to preserve their independence. Japan did so first, followed about a century later by China and a now-divided Korea.

Japan's modernization was important because it demonstrated the often uneasy combination of adapted Western technology and organization (civil and military) with traditional cultural and social values. These could produce behavior, even in the international system, that appeared irrational by Western standards but was rational by those of the national culture. Japan's use of Kamikaze suicide aircraft in the closing stage of the Pacific War was the most dramatic example of this phenomena. But it was also evident in her 1941 decision to go to war with the U.S. Predictions about the future evolution of alliances in the Far East thus must be qualified by noting the possibility of cultural differences generating conduct that may not appear rational in
terms of the rules of the great game of international politics. Japan's expressed reluctance to re-arm, in part, may be an example of this—obeying U.S. post-war conditioning over-faithfully. (It is also good business, however.)

In sharp contrast, modern Japan's previous record was one of enthusiastic adoption of a Western-style imperial expansion, based on military forces. With British and German assistance her feudal army and navy were transformed into a modern military still imbued with the samurai spirit. These armed services won the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) and, quite remarkably, the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5). These victories gained her control over Formosa and Korea. They defeated Russian attempts to establish a warm water naval base at Port Arthur, desired as a supplement to their one at Vladivostok. From a Soviet viewpoint, it is also significant that Japan was able to defeat Russia partly because of her 1902 alliance with Britain, underlining the importance of her post-1945 alliance with the United States.

Japan's participation on the Allied side in World War I provided her, at little cost, additional Chinese concessions and former German territories in the Pacific. But the 1929 crash exposed the weak economic foundations for Japan's great power status. Like her British mentors, she was an island rich in people but poor in natural resources, dependent on processing imported raw materials re-exported as finished goods. To protect her economy and population, Japan needed
both control over essential raw material supplies, including oil, and guaranteed access to adequate export markets.

In geopolitical terms, she had three options for doing so in the 1930s. The first was to expand into Soviet Siberia, the second was to expand into China and the third was to expand in the Pacific into French Indo-China, British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. The first option was deemed too risky, militarily, as was the third, until Germany's occupation of France and Holland in 1940 left Britain weakened and preoccupied with her war with Italy as well as Germany. Japan therefore chose the second option—establishing a protectorate over Manchuria (Manchukuo) in 1932, annexing Chinese Mongolia in 1935 and occupying additional areas in 1937-39.

Japan's decision to go to war with the U.K., the U.S. and their allies was triggered by President Roosevelt's August 1940 embargo of oil shipments. Japan recognized that war was the only way it could gain control of essential oil supplies. But war was also a profoundly irrational decision, since, by any standards of economic and potential military power, Japan was grossly outclassed by the U.S. and had no means of preventing her mobilization of this military base. At best, the Japanese government hoped that a rapid conquest of a defensible Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere would lead the U.S. to accept this fait accompli as less costly than defeating Japan. As the Japan's naval Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto, a former naval attaché
in Washington, told the government, this was a futile hope. At worst, the Japanese government felt it had no alternative to war, even if it ended in defeat, because this was the only culturally and socially acceptable alternative. In addition, any individual who opposed it likely would be assassinated. Japan's defeat underlined the fragility of her great power status.

**Post-War Developments**

The long-term pattern of the post-war Pacific settlement has been similar to that in Europe. The Soviets have destroyed their potential for forming genuine alliances and have replaced traditional rivalries and wartime animosities with a common fear of the Soviet Union.

In 1945, the Japanese were hated by the Koreans, the Chinese and all the Asian countries they had occupied, as well as by the Americans, British, Australians and New Zealanders. Stalin's objectives here, again as in Europe, appeared to be an initial expansion of the Tzarist Empire, to be followed by additional increases in the territory under direct or indirect Soviet control. Although Soviet forces barely participated in the war against Japan, which was terminated with the aid of atomic weapons, Stalin insisted on his territorial price for full participation. This comprised the Southern half of the Sakhalin Island (the Northern half had been annexed by Tzarist Russia), the Kuril Islands, formerly part of Northern Japan and, on a supposedly temporary basis,
North Korea. Stalin also continued to work for the victory of Mao-Tse-Tung's Communist Party against the Nationalist General Chiang Kai-Chek in the Chinese civil war that had been under way since 1927. Stalin's long-term goal appears to have been indirect control over China via a pro-Soviet Communist Party intimidated by Soviet military and economic power, a unified Korea also under indirect Soviet control and a Finlandized Japan, intimidated by Soviet control of the adjacent territories.

In approving, if not ordering, North Korea's attack on South Korea, Stalin presumably anticipated a rapid victory complementing Mao's 1949 victory--following which the remaining Nationalist Chinese had fled to Taiwan (formerly Japanese Formosa). Here, also as in Europe, Stalin's actions combined with the emergence of the balance of superpower nuclear deterrence to bring about a different situation from one that he wished, and one that was historically unprecedented. The U.S. and her allies defeated both the initial North Korean invasion and, eventually, the subsequent Chinese one. President Eisenhower's serious threat to use nuclear weapons to end the war helped bring about the 1953 armistice. This armistice formalized the division of Korea into North and South, similar to Germany's division into East and West.

Like the European settlement, that in the Pacific has remained territorially the same, in essentials, since the end of World War II. The only major changes have been the formal
establishment of two Koreas and the establishment of Taiwan as a separate Chinese state, guaranteed by the U.S. against a military takeover by China. In the late 1970s, the U.S. returned to Japan the Ryukyu archipelago, including Okinawa.

The main political change was the reversal of China's position from a Soviet ally to a Soviet adversary. This will be discussed more fully in the next chapter on China. From the viewpoint of the U.S. alliance with Japan, the crucial effects of this were: first, that Chinese hostility to the Soviets is based on fundamental differences of interest and ideology. It thus seems likely to be permanent, absent radical changes in Soviet policies. Although possible, these are not likely. Second, China's post-Maoist governments seem likely to continue the Four Modernizations policy. There may be interruptions, but these are unlikely to be on the scale of the Cultural Revolution. Third, China's politico-military interests will continue to make a military takeover of Taiwan, even if feasible, too costly to be worthwhile.

Current Alliance Structures

The post-1950 structure has remained extremely stable, reflecting the influence of the balances of nuclear deterrence between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and between China and the U.S.S.R. The United States guarantees the political independence and military security of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. These guarantees are primarily against the politico-military threat posed by the Soviet Union and her
ally in the area, North Korea. But they are also against the threat of Chinese military interventions against South Korea or Taiwan. This threat has diminished sharply as compared to the 1949-71 period but could re-emerge at some time in the future.

To implement this guarantee, the U.S. has stationed ground forces in South Korea since the 1953 armistice. The withdrawal of all U.S forces by 1949 had been a major factor in the North Korean decision to invade, especially in combination with an apparent U.S. disavowal of any interest in maintaining the South's independence. The nominal level of these forces has been reduced from two divisions to one division, plus air support, totaling some 40,000 personnel. The U.S. has also publicly committed herself to the early use of tactical nuclear weapons, should this be necessary to defeat a second North Korean invasion. Supporting U.S. forces are stationed in Japan. Taiwan's security is primarily guaranteed by the U.S. Seventh Fleet's ability to deny passage to an invading Chinese force.

As in NATO-Europe, U.S. forces, especially ground forces, function in a deterrent and defensive role. Their presence symbolizes the U.S. commitment to the defense of these three countries while increasing the likelihood that it would be honored. They also provide a significant increase in military capabilities for defense, especially in areas where local forces remain deficient. This is particularly true of
advanced naval forces, space-based assets and, to a lesser extent, of air forces.

The reconstruction of the three U.S. allies' economies has created a regional economic and military power center of historically unprecedented proportions. In 1941, Japan was the only one with an industrial economy, and even this was a very limited one. In 1985, Japan has the second largest Gross National Product (GNP) in the world, surpassed only the by the U.S. South Korea and Taiwan, meanwhile, have become Newly Industrializing Countries (NIC), moving into increasingly advanced technological fields. In terms of GNP, population and military forces, this power center is becoming comparable to the major NATO-Europe members. For 1983-84, its totals were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GNP ($) (Billions)</th>
<th>Population (Millions)</th>
<th>Total Armed Forces (Thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>$1,178.90</td>
<td>120.8</td>
<td>245.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Korea</td>
<td>76.64</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>622.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>49.83</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>484.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>$1,305.37</td>
<td>182.0</td>
<td>1,351.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

as compared to NATO-Europe's major powers totals of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GNP ($) (Billions)</th>
<th>Population (Millions)</th>
<th>Total Armed Forces (Thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td>$ 652.57</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>495.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>510.99</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>471.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>448.96</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>325.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>352.85</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>375.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>$1,965.37</td>
<td>230.0</td>
<td>1,667.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
South Korea and Taiwan spend, respectively, 6 percent and 7.8 percent of GNP on defense. Domestic, political and economic considerations had kept Japan's defense spending from exceeding 1 percent of GNP until 1985. Once this ceiling was lifted, however, Japan's defense spending is expected to rise to levels comparable to those of the major NATO-Europe military powers, with the Japanese Defense Ministry proposing a rise to 5 percent of GNP in Fiscal 1986-90.

The implication for U.S. containment policy is clearly that, in the future, the Japanese power center will assume, if it has not already done so, an importance comparable to that of NATO-Europe. Like NATO-Europe, this power center will remain dependent on the ultimate U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee, plus very advanced defense systems, but increasingly will be able to do more for its own defense. Unlike NATO-Europe, this power center contains two countries that are already willing to do a great deal for their own defense. Japan, too, seems likely to be willing to do somewhat more for her defense, although not reaching South Korea's or Taiwan's levels of effort in this decade.

Like the U.S. guarantee to NATO-Europe, that to the Japanese power center has proved a brilliant success, permitting the rebuilding and enlargement of a center of economic and military power whose fundamental interests dictate an alliance with the U.S. and against the Soviets. A further similarity with the U.S. guarantee to NATO-Europe is that it has not been tested by direct or indirect Soviet
attack (the U.S. only guaranteed South Korea's security after the North's attack). There is thus considerable analytical merit in the description of this U.S. alliance as the Pacific NATO and the core of a potentially larger alliance structure. Before future developments are considered, the evolution of Soviet policy towards this area must be summarized.

**Soviet Policies 1945-85**

The Soviet failure to develop any genuine alliance over a forty-year period is a striking one, particularly in the post-Stalin era. Stalin's establishment of Communist Party control in North Korea created a curious and unique relationship between the Soviet Union and a pro-Soviet Communist Party government. North Korea is the only hereditary Communist government--one in which President Kim IL Sung's son, Kim Chong IL, is replacing him as its head. While Soviet military occupation forces enabled President Kim to establish Communist Party control, they were withdrawn before the Korean War started and were never re-introduced. Since then, his government has remained closely allied to the Soviets, largely because this offers him the best chance of achieving his objective of unifying Korea under his control. But the extraordinarily personal nature of his regime suggests that this objective could change in the future. If it did, it is not clear that Soviet military forces could enforce an alliance on North Korea unless they were used to re-occupy her.
They would almost certainly be opposed by North Korean forces which could be supported by China, the U.S. and South Korea.

It is also worth noting that the North Korean government's alliance with the Soviets is not in the interests of its population, who would benefit far more from a reunification of Korea under the South's control. This has not been a major factor in the past forty years but could become one in the next twenty years. Korea has been a unified kingdom for many centuries and, historically, has opposed, successfully, all attempts at foreign domination except for Japan's forty-year occupation.

Soviet support for a North Korean government determined to conquer the South has forced the Republic of Korea (ROK) into an inescapable and unusually close alliance with the U.S. Unlike the two German governments, those of Korea are total antagonists. There thus has been no possibility of any relationship except one of absolute antagonism between the U.S.S.R. and the ROK.

For different reasons, there has been no basis for an alliance between the Soviet Union and Taiwan. Partly, this is because of ideological differences--Taiwan's government and population are strongly opposed to Communist governments--and partly because of internal differences. The indigenous Taiwanese population and the Mainland Chinese emigrés are both Chinese and therefore inclined to oppose Russians. Even though the Taiwanese government has major differences with Peking, it supports China's opposition to the Soviets. For
these reasons, there is no real basis for Soviet-Taiwanese alliance. It is also doubtful whether the Soviets would be willing to meet Taiwan's crucial need in an alliance partner--the ability to deter or defeat a Chinese military annexation of Taiwan.

The real surprise, therefore, has been the Soviet failure to develop, if not an alliance, at least a partially co-operative relationship with Japan. The basis for one exists, given Japan's interest in the return of Kurils and in economic cooperation, mainly for Siberian development. Soviet military interests dictate retention of the Kurils for both defensive and offensive purposes. They are a major asset in preserving the Sea of Okhotsk as an SSBN sanctuary, in threatening Japan with invasion, and in giving the Soviets the potential to engage Japanese forces attempting to block the Soviet Pacific Fleet exiting through the La Perouse, Tsugaru and Tsuashima (Korea) Straits. The Soviets have given these military interests absolute priority, refusing to consider the return of the Kurils, much less southern Sakhalin. In recent years, they have also increased their occupation forces to over ten thousand personnel.

This has combined with the general Soviet military buildup in the Far East to worsen Soviet-Japanese relations. Japan has objected particularly to the Soviet buildup of their Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF), especially Tu-22M Backfire bombers and SS-20 Intermediate-range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM). She was particularly angered by the Soviet refusal as part of
any INF agreement to consider any limits on SS-20s deployed in
the Far East. Even by Soviet standards, the Russians have
been unusually insensitive to the effects of their military
activities on Japanese interests.

Economic cooperation has proved much less successful than
hoped for by Japanese business. In theory, Japanese capital
and technology should have been able to help develop Siberia's
natural resources, which could help meet Japan's need for
these while generating hard currency with which the Soviets
could repay Japanese loans. In practice, the Soviets have
proven to be unsatisfactory partners, demanding too much for
too little and unable to get their centralized economy to
deliver the requisite goods on schedule.

The Soviet failure to develop better economic and
political relations with Japan during the relatively favorable
climate of the 1970s suggests that she will be unable or
unwilling to do so in the 1980s and beyond. On the contrary,
the deterioration in relations seems likely to continue. It
is being reinforced by an action-reaction cycle, wherein the
Soviet military buildup and associated incidents compel a
reluctant Japan to increase her defense forces—a reaction
used to justify further additions to Soviet forces. Recent
incidents have included the Soviet shooting down of KAL Flight
007 in 1983 and record numbers of intrusions by Soviet Air
Force units into Japanese airspace.

The longer-term effect of these past developments in
alliance structures can now be considered.
Future Evolution

There is remarkably little scope for change in the existing structure of alliances. The U.S. guarantee to Japan and South Korea is as inescapable as is that to West Europe. The U.S. cannot allow these power centers to fall under Soviet control. South Korea has an additional, unique importance, as the only ally for whose independence the U.S. has successfully fought since World War II. For the U.S. to renege, or attempt to renege, on this guarantee would be to open up to question all U.S. guarantees, even of her own territorial integrity. The U.S. guarantee of Taiwan is in a different category. So long as Taiwan wishes to remain independent of China, it will be in the U.S. interest to preserve this independence. It will also remain relatively easy, militarily, for her to do so. Opposed amphibious invasions have a long history of failure. There is, though, some small possibility that the evolution of Taiwanese and Chinese domestic policies may make some form of cooperation or union between them possible. This might lessen, and eventually even eliminate, the need for a U.S. guarantee some time well into the next century.

Besides its economic and population assets, the Japanese-ROK-Taiwan power center is of major military importance. This importance is increasing, as the Soviet Union is becoming a Pacific power with a regional proxy power in the form of North Vietnam, which is controlling South Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. As noted earlier, Japan and
South Korea control the three straits which the Soviet Pacific Fleet must traverse to enter the Pacific from its Vladivostok base. Their control would therefore be crucial in any limited regional war involving Soviet forces, or in a larger general war. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan thus would act as unsinkable aircraft carriers for U.S. and allied air and naval operations against Soviet forces, including ASW operations against Soviet SSNs, SSGNs and SSBNs. A U.S. loss of these assets to the Soviets would be a major defeat.

The military means for securing these U.S. politico-military interests seem likely to remain unchanged in essentials. Continued deployment of one U.S. division in South Korea (Second Infantry), plus supporting forces, will be necessary for deterrence as well as defense. So will support forces in Japan, plus one Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) in the Japan/Okinawa area. The U.S. Seventh Fleet will have to be strengthened to offset Soviet increases in their forces which could compromise the U.S. ability to meet its commitments to preserve the independence of the Japanese-ROK-Taiwan power center.

Two recurring contentious issues will be the size of U.S. ground forces in South Korea and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. In a substantive sense, both are really non-issues.

U.S. forces in the ROK are of relatively modest size, given the importance of the United States' commitment there in global as well as local terms and the size of the North Korean military threat. While some marginal downward adjustment, if
absolutely essential, might be possible, any significant reductions would be dangerously destabilizing. The Carter Administration's unsuccessful attempt to remove all U.S. ground forces demonstrated this. Although strongly supported by the President and some of his close advisors, the proposal met such intensive and well-grounded opposition from within the U.S. national security establishment and from U.S. allies, including but not limited to the ROK, that it had to be dropped. The political costs to the Administration were considerable and should discourage any serious revival of this proposal for at least a decade. It will probably be raised, however, at intervals by U.S. critics of South Korea's human rights record.

An important side-effect of the Carter Administration's proposal and its subsequent discussion will be to increase the already considerable incentive for the ROK government to acquire NNF or an option to do so, despite U.S. opposition. Realistically, though, the U.S. does not have a withdrawal option in South Korea, unless she wishes to disengage as a superpower. West Europe (under the circumstances discussed in Chapter 2) might be able to survive without U.S. forces on the ground. South Korea would be unlikely to do so.

U.S. arms sales to Taiwan will remain unavoidable but will be a source of considerable diplomatic friction with China. In a delicate balancing act, the U.S. will have to provide the weapons systems needed by Taiwan to maintain her defenses against a Chinese conventional invasion and so deter
it, without unduly disturbing the development of Sino-American cooperation in areas of common interest. While China's interests dictate opposition to such arms supplies, her government also understands that these are required by America's interests. Indeed, any Chinese government is likely to regard a U.S. willingness to continue such supplies as an indication of the value of an alliance with an America that understands what its interests are and stands prepared to defend them. Conversely, any American inclination to withhold such supplies is likely to create Chinese doubts about the value of an alliance with an America unable to understand its interests and unwilling to defend them.

Moreover, like the U.S. guarantees to NATO-Europe, Japan and South Korea, that to Taiwan dates from the foundation of America's containment policy, making it difficult to withdraw without adversely affecting the credibility of the remaining guarantees from this era. Since these preserve two of the major power centers from Soviet control, it is difficult to see how U.S. interests would be served by undermining them through casting doubt on the United States' guarantee of Taiwan or on her willingness to implement this guarantee with arms supplies. So the U.S. will continue to supply these arms, while the Chinese continue to object, though not strongly enough to jeopardize whatever degree of alliance with the U.S. which they see as necessary.

While there are considerable similarities between the Pacific-"NATO" and NATO-Europe, as noted above, there is also
a crucial difference. This is that the U.S. deploys only very limited forces on the territory of the Pacific-"NATO" members, and those that are deployed are welcomed by their host countries, particularly the ROK. They, thus, avoid all of the problems associated with the large deployment of U.S. forces on NATO-European territory. The absence of these economic and political problems means that, in turn, there is relatively little domestic U.S. criticism of the U.S. deployments needed to defend Pacific-"NATO." What criticism there is, centers on Japan's failure to bear an appropriate burden of her own defense. What level of burden this would be is uncertain, but U.S. critics would probably be satisfied if her share of GNP allocated to defense was at least that of West Germany and preferably that of the U.K. -- i.e., in the 4-5 percent range rather than 1 percent or less. A combination of continued U.S. pressure for such an increase, plus the continued Soviet military buildup seems likely to produce the desired result by the end of the decade.

The success of the U.S. strategy for the defense of Pacific-"NATO" evolved as a response to local conditions, and other demands on U.S. forces may well lead to suggestions that it be adopted in NATO-Europe. That is, that the U.S. reduce its ground forces there, providing air, sea and other sophisticated forces that NATO-Europe cannot provide, while relying on it to provide more ground forces. These options were discussed in Chapter 2. Any comparison of U.S. Pacific-"NATO" and NATO-Europe strategies will make an
increasingly convincing political case for the adoption of the Pacific strategy in West Europe along the lines of Alternative 2, i.e., a reduction of U.S. ground forces by about half. Depending on the global balance of power, this might also come to make military sense. It would accelerate Japan's emergence as a superpower.

Japan as a Superpower

To paraphrase the description of West Germany in the 1960s, Japan is an economic giant and a military pigmy. The political obstacles to Japan's re-emergence as a major military power have been formidable and understandable. But Japan's geopolitical situation makes such a re-emergence unavoidable. Her Soviet neighbor has become a Pacific, as well as a European, military superpower in the past years, posing an increasing threat to Japan's security. Japan has become an economic superpower but remains totally dependent on imported raw materials, including oil and natural gas (98 percent), minerals (90 percent) and coal (77 percent). Soviet control over Persian Gulf oil suppliers would give the U.S.S.R. control over Japan. Any significant interruption in these or other oil supplies, e.g., from Indonesia, would cripple the Japanese economy. The 1973 OPEC oil embargo demonstrated Japan's vulnerability. The Japanese government has also come to understand that the U.S. no longer has the capability, unaided, to protect these Japanese interests. The logic of Japan's situation has led the Nakasone government to
break the psychological barrier of the limit of 1 percent of GNP that can be spent on defense. It will force Japan, however reluctantly and slowly, to become a major military power.

This will be a two-stage process. First, Japan will have to assume major responsibility for her own immediate defense, rather than assisting the U.S. to defend her homeland. Second, she will have to assume increasing responsibility for her extended security interests, particularly the protection of her SLOC from the Persian Gulf, and for military, as well as economic, support for friendly governments controlling essential raw material supplies. For psychological and practical reasons, neither stage will be easy. Japanese industry has benefited enormously from having virtually a free ride in defense at America's expense.

Nonetheless, the logic of Japan's situation, plus U.S. pressure reflecting changing American domestic demands, are almost certain to force Japan to assume these increased defense responsibilities. By way of comparison, it is worth noting that the barriers to West Germany's rearmament, beginning in 1955, were considerably larger both within the FGR and her NATO partners. They were overcome, however, by the even-greater fears of the Soviet politico-military threat. So as this threat increases in Japanese perceptions, she will develop a defense policy more appropriate to her geopolitical situation.
But, as she does so, her economic, technological and population base will make her a conventional military power of unprecedented size, perhaps even comparable to the superpowers. It is even conceivable that Japan could acquire her own National Nuclear Forces, for which she already has a highly developed technical base. There is no reason to suppose that this would be any less manageable or any more destabilizing than the development of British and French NNF were.

Japan's military potential is a major long-term asset for the U.S. because of its size and sophistication. The U.S. thus has a major interest in protecting it while it matures, in the same way that she protected the emergence of West Germany's military potential.

Additional Nth Powers

To Japan's potential as a nuclear weapons power must be added those of South Korea and Taiwan. Both have the combination of the requisite technological base and real threats to their security which have characterized other powers with NNF. Moreover, as with Japan, there is no reason to suppose that the evolution of these NNF could not be accommodated. This would be done reluctantly, since U.S. interests are presently better served by the absence of NNF in this power center. Whether this will remain the case is unclear.

Whether the emergence of one or more Pacific NNF would strengthen or weaken the U.S. alliance with these powers is
also unclear. But, on balance, it seems likely that, if anything, it would strengthen the alliance while increasing the stability of the balance of deterrence against Soviet aggression.

**Soviet Alliances**

Without a major change in Soviet policies, the U.S.S.R. will remain confined to its curious alliance with North Korea. If the anticipated Soviet economic problems materialize, they will be in a less favorable bargaining position vis-a-vis Japan. An oil-short U.S.S.R. will be in no position to help meet Japan's oil needs. Soviet attempts to increase the areas under her control, either directly or via North Vietnam, will increase fears of her intentions in the Japan-ROK-Taiwan power center.

**Balances of Deterrence--Nuclear and Conventional**

In synergistic combination, these are likely to remain stable despite the increase in Soviet forces relative to those of the U.S. The overall balance of conventional forces is probably more favorable now to the U.S. and her allies than it was before or immediately after the Korean War. The balance of nuclear forces has moved against the U.S. but still not by enough to make a direct Soviet military attack on this power center worth the risks involved. Partly, this is because of the emergence of Chinese NNF, which will increase significantly in the next twenty years.
Conclusions

The structure of the U.S. alliance with the second power center containing the Soviets will remain unchanged, except for Japan's emergence as a major military power. This is because the fundamental interests of the U.S. and her allies have been and are likely to remain the same. They cannot afford to allow this power center to fall under Soviet control. Both its governments and its peoples are opposed to this. Its governments are also aware that only U.S. military power can provide the ultimate nuclear guarantee against this during this century and well into the next. Chinese military power may add to this U.S. guarantee of their independence but could also threaten it and, so, can never be a substitute.

Therefore, this is a truly inescapable alliance, perhaps even more inescapable than the U.S. one with West Europe. This conclusion is reinforced by the absence of any alternative alliances for Japan and South Korea. Like West Germany, South Korea wants unification on acceptable terms. But unlike a unified Germany in some alternative European security system, a unified Korea would still be totally dependent on a U.S. guarantee of her independence against Russia. Japan's total dependence on imported raw materials makes her dependent on a U.S. guarantee of access to these as well as of her immediate physical security. The alternative would be the recreation of a much larger Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere extending to the Persian Gulf. This
would be too demanding even for Japan's resources over the next twenty years, as well as being politically unacceptable. (In the next century, it could become acceptable to the extent that it was feasible. Post-war Japanese antipathy to the use of force runs counter to their cultural values of several previous centuries.) Taiwan would like to rejoin mainland China, but on terms preserving her independence and her free-market economy. These terms are unlikely to be acceptable to China in the next twenty years but might be so thereafter.

There are thus no alternative alliances that could give the Japan-ROK-Taiwan power center what its members need in terms of security and economic interests. There is also little the Soviets (or the Chinese) have that these countries need and cannot get anywhere else. The Soviet hold over East Europe, especially East Germany, is a major bargaining asset in their relationship with West Europe, particularly West Germany. They have no comparable leverage against Pacific-"NATO." The Soviets have only the Kurils, which Japan can survive without.
Chapter 6:
China

The U.S. debate over the value of the China card reflects the fundamental uncertainty over her potential military and economic strength and her political stability. At best, she could become a giant Korea in the next twenty years -- with a relatively low per capita income but massive total GNP. This would create a base for modernized military forces, nuclear and conventional, whose quantity would substantially offset their qualitative deficiencies. Her development along these lines would be accompanied by internal political stability and external policies based on hard-headed self-interest. At worst, her economic development could be halted or reversed by an inability to hold down the birthrate below the increase in GNP, which, if coupled with political mismanagement, could lead to massive famines -- an exacerbated version of the disasters of the Chinese Civil Wars (1911-1949) and the Cultural Revolution.

China thus could become either a major power centre, militarily, economically and politically, or cease to be one, potentially or actually. There is also relatively little in China's background to indicate which of these alternatives is more likely to materialize.

On the positive side, Chinese civilization is one of the oldest in the world, providing an organized societal framework for economic development. The business success of the
overseas Chinese communities and of Hong Kong, plus the progress made under the Four Modernizations policy also indicate good potential for economic development under favorable circumstances. Militarily, the Chinese, up until the middle of the last century, had a long record of fielding forces as effective as any contemporary powers and of producing skilled leaders -- including the dozen of strategic writers, Sun Tzu-Tsee. Chinese Communist forces maintained their discipline in the Korean War despite heavy casualties and inferior equipment.

On the negative side, none of these factors can guarantee that China can make the extraordinarily difficult transition to sustained economic growth, however modest. It is only in the post-war era that other non-Western societies have joined Japan in doing so. And, if China cannot do so, she will be of only marginal significance either as an ally or as an adversary.

On balance, though, China seems more likely to emerge as a major power center. Her post-Maoist political leadership appears to be acutely aware of political realities, particularly China's dangerous military weakness as compared to the Soviet Union and her regional proxy, North Vietnam. The Soviet's 1979 invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, which shares a short border with China, has underlined the Soviet threat to her security. This threat can only be held at bay with modernized Chinese military forces which require a modernized economic and technical base. On the assumption
that the Four Modernizations, or some variant of them, will be kept in place by force of circumstances, China's roles in alliance systems can now be considered.

The Chinese-American Entente

China's long-term interests are to maintain her political independence and territorial integrity, to acquire assets assisting her economic growth, to protect (as feasible) the overseas Chinese communities in the Pacific, to regain control over Hong Kong and Taiwan and to establish China as a regional and global great power. In the longer run, it is probable that China would wish to regain much or all of the territory acquired in the Nineteenth Century from the decaying Manchu Dynasty by the Tzars.

Her best means of achieving these objectives in the next twenty years is a continued development of selective cooperation with the U.S. and her European and Japanese allies. China's chief enemy, the Soviet Union, is also their main enemy; and, historically, a common powerful enemy has been the firmest foundation for lasting alliances even between otherwise dissimilar and potentially antagonistic powers. A striking example of this was the Triple Entente between autocratic Russia and republican France (the 1984 Dual Alliance), joined by democratic and Imperial Britain, which had traditionally fought the French (for some seven centuries) and had major colonial conflicts with France and Russia. Like the 1904 Franco-British entente, the Sino-American
relationship is likely to fall short of a formal alliance — one, because of their remaining differences and two, because both governments will wish to preserve their freedom to act as their interests, real and perceived, dictate. But they will also wish to act together against their common Soviet enemy.

The Sino-American detente will thus develop along the lines established since President Nixon's 1971 Peking visit. Economic and technical cooperation will expand as far as possible within the limits imposed by China's very limited foreign currency reserves and Western security restrictions. A particularly important feature of this will be the training of Chinese students in the U.S., who already compose the largest single group of foreign students. The longer-term effects of this are potentially profound. These students will have seen an economic and social system which, whatever its defects, is providing the basic societal goods which the Chinese want for themselves, although allocating them differently. They will also have seen a society in which, despite past discrimination, the Chinese community has acquired substantial and increasing economic and political power, particularly on the West Coast.

In complete contrast, the Soviet economic and social system is clearly incapable of providing these goods, offering a model only admirers of the late, unlamented, Joseph Stalin would wish to adopt. It is also a society characterized by a racial xenophobia against the Chinese comparable to the extreme American and European views of a so-called Yellow
Peril at the turn of this century. This is reinforced by societal memories of Russia's long domination by the Mongolian Golden Hordes.

In terms of basic Chinese interests, the U.S and her allies thus can provide what she needs, while the Soviets cannot. There is also a relative absence of conflict between Chinese interests, especially strategic ones, and those of the U.S., in contrast to the major conflict between Chinese interests and those of the Soviet Union. There is thus an extensive basis for Chinese entente with the West and none for one with the Soviets. There is also a major societal barrier to a Chinese-Soviet alliance, in the form of Russian racial prejudice. These broader considerations reinforce and are reinforced by the narrower military ones.

The Military Dimension

The basic elements of Chinese military power and of the Sino-Soviet military balance are familiar. But their significance for China's importance as a U.S. ally tends to be overstated in the short-run and underestimated in the long-run of the next twenty years.

At present, China fields mass infantry armies with very limited armoured and artillery support (118 infantry, 13 armoured and 33 field/anti-aircraft artillery divisions). Modern logistic support is minimal. Equipment consists of older Soviet models, Chinese-manufactured and adapted -- e.g., Type-59 and T-69 main battle tanks. The Air Force and the
Naval Air Force (NAF) similarly rely on older Soviet-model types from the 1950s (some 3,500 J-6 B/D/E/Mig-19 and 300 J-7/Mig-21) with 1960s models being introduced (30 J-8/Mig-23). The Navy is a coast defense force with only 36 major surface combatants (old Soviet-type DDG/FFG with Styx-type SSM) large numbers (750) of Fast Attack Craft and a mainly-diesel submarine force (about 100). China's NNF are minimal, comprising some 6 ICBM (DF-5/6), 60 IRBMs (DF-3) and 50 MRBMs (DF-2), plus 120 H-6/Tu 16 medium bombers. One Xia-class SSBN has been deployed with 12 SLBM (CSS-N-3 modified DF-3), and four more are under construction, with a total of perhaps twelve planned. Two Han-class SSNG with six SLCM (1,600km range) are deployed and could, if their missiles are nuclear armed, function in a strategic as well as tactical nuclear mode. Tactical nuclear weapons are probably available in limited numbers.

As against these forces, the Soviet Far Eastern Theatre fields a total of 52 divisions (7 tank, 45 motor rifle), 4 Tactical Air Forces with 2,700 aircraft (440 bomber, 1,500 fighter/strike) and the Pacific Fleet. This is the Soviet Navy's second largest fleet, with 88 major and 220 minor surface combatants, 102 submarines and 31 SSB/BN. Additional Soviet S/TNF, including one-third of their SS-20 IRBMs, are deployed, or deployable, against China.

Since the Soviet buildup in this Theater, following the Sino-Soviet split, a balance of deterrence, nuclear and conventional, has been preserved. Although theoretically very
much less stable than that between the Warsaw Pact and NATO/West Europe, this balance has survived for the last twenty years or more, despite clashes between para-military border guards on the Ussurri River and serious Soviet consideration of a pre-emptive nuclear strike against China, both of which occurred in 1969.

This balance will remain stable as long as the Soviet calculation remains that the potential costs of neutralizing China, militarily and economically, outweigh the considerable benefits of doing so. From the Soviet viewpoint, their problem is that their nuclear and conventional forces could guarantee them a fairly-rapid, initial elimination of most of China's nuclear forces and the centers for their manufacture, plus occupation of major industrial centers in Manchuria. But this could cost the Soviets the loss of her Vladivostok base--the key to the Far Eastern Theater--her military installation in the Sakkaline Islands and major damage to Siberian industrial assets, including the Khabavorsk-Vladivostok, Bratsk and Novosibirsk ones.

In addition, and perhaps even more importantly, the Soviets would lose their only access routes to Siberia's economic wealth, the two railroads. Of these, the older Trans-Siberian Railroad runs within 50-100 miles of the Sino-Soviet border. the new Bailal-Angara (BAM) railroad runs further north but is not yet fully operational. Both are extremely vulnerable to nuclear attack, which could put them out of action for several years. They are also vulnerable to
conventional attack, especially with precision guided munitions (PGM). Since further Soviet economic development depends on access to Siberian resources, the loss of access to these would compromise her ability not only to recover from her initial losses but to supply her military forces occupying China. Over the longer haul, she would also find it difficult to maintain her Pact forces deployed against NATO at their then-existing strengths.

Thus, ironically, the Soviet development of Siberia as a major economic and military center has created a hostage to the Chinese whose value increases every year. The loss of this center would cripple them as a superpower. So even the opening stages of Soviet military campaign against China could impose costs outweighing the gains. The longer-term costs would be even more prohibitive. The size of China's territory and her population, even after the initial attack, would be so large as to threaten the Soviets with the kind of defeat they inflicted on the Germans in 1941-45. This danger would be increased by the possibilities for U.S. and allied assistance to the Chinese, similar to that which was crucial to Stalin's success.

Deterring a Soviet attack against China alone, or against her and the Japanese power center, thus will remain a major U.S. strategic objective. It is one that should prove achievable at modest costs. The stakes involved in Soviet attack on China would be second only to those in an attack on the U.S. and NATO, as would be the uncertainties. While the
concept of deterrence through uncertainty (of the outcome) can be abused as an excuse for inadequate military forces and imprecise political commitments, it is an accurate description of the triangular nuclear balance between China, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. and of the four-power conventional balance which adds the Japan power center. It is impossible to predict with any accuracy the overall outcome of a serious Soviet attack on China. But the difficulties of limiting it, make it more likely than not that it would involve the whole Pacific Theater. This would pit the Soviets plus the (North) Vietnamese against China, Japan, South Korea and, almost certainly, Taiwan. It is not clear that the Soviets would win such a conflict, in any meaningful sense. It also is unlikely that its effects could be limited to the Pacific. Even if, as in the Korean War, the Soviets refrained from attacking West Europe, its members would almost certainly increase their defense spending sharply (a tripling in two years proved possible in 1950-52), thus lessening the Soviet military advantage. Politically, this could adversely affect no interest in supporting a Soviet victory against China.

Over the next twenty years, the U.S. interest will thus be in building up China's economic and technical base, and with it, her military forces. She will also wish to encourage her allies to do so too. Politically, they may be able to avoid some of the domestic legislative difficulties that U.S. defense technology transfers can counter. They are also, especially France, much less troubled domestically about the
use of this technology, or of weapons systems, should this occur.

An appropriate model for the development of U.S. and allied military relations with China is theirs with Egypt since the 1973 Camp David Accords. Sale of military assistance transfers to China will be limited, at least initially, by political and economic considerations. But the level of advanced technologies Egypt has been able to absorb is indicative of what China could absorb over the next decade. This includes U.S. M-60A3 Main Battle Tanks, M-113A2 Armoured Personnel Carriers, U.S., U.K. and French Anti-Tank Guided Weapons (ATGW); U.S. F-4E and F-16 C/D, French Mirage 2000 and Chinese F-6/7 Fighter/Strike Aircraft, and Attack Helicopters with ATGW. Tactical missiles supplied, include U.S. Sparrow and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles (AAM), Maverick air-to-surface missiles (ASM) and French Exocet AM-39. Naval force modernization includes 4 Luda DDG and new FAC, plus coastal defense modernization with Harpoon and Ottomat NSS.

The upgrading of China's naval and air forces to these levels would give her immunity against conventional naval attacks on her coastline, along or near which a large proportion of her industry is concentrated. She would strengthen her ability to hold the Paracel Islands which she occupied in the mid-1970s. These are also claimed by (North) Vietnam and may be of major economic importance. Large oil, natural gas and mineral reserves are believed to exist in the adjacent territory, including the Continental shelf which,
thanks to their possession, China can claim under the revised Law of the Sea.

In strategic terms, China's ability to threaten the Soviet's major regional ally, North Vietnam, would be sharply increased. Her capital, Haiphong, would be extremely vulnerable to a Chinese combined-arms attack, once her forces were adequate for this. Even the Soviet Pacific Fleet would have difficulty in relieving Haiphong and would almost certainly suffer crippling losses in trying to do so, successfully or unsuccessfully. This would be even more likely as China's modernization program extends to her attack submarine force, diesel and nuclear, includes LRCM, and develops her mine warfare capabilities.

The geopolitics of the Pacific island powers, now including micro-states, means that even relatively modest Chinese combined-armed forces would be able to render valuable aid to governments threatened by Soviet-backed insurgency movements. Such assistance, like that rendered by America's NATO-Europe allies in Africa, would have the advantage of not suffering from the domestic political constraints imposed on U.S. aid. China will also wish to strengthen her ability to protect the overseas Chinese communities, including those in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Borneo and the Philippines.

The Long-Term Prospect

If China's economic and military modernization can be sustained for the next decade and war with the Soviets
deterred, the basis will have been laid for her emergence as a unique kind of superpower. In particular, the worst deficiencies of her NNF should have been remedied so that these are more than minimal and have adequate survivability, China should then be able to replicate the growth patterns of South Korea and Taiwan.

The meta-stability of the balances of nuclear deterrence make it likely that the Sino-Soviet relationship will remain a hostile one, but one in which the potential risks to either side of using force to settle their major difference of interest will continue to outweigh the gains. They will continue, however, their conflict in the Far East and, where possible, globally. The long history of conflict between North Vietnam and China makes it probable that China will restore Vietnam to its traditional tributary relationship when a favorable opportunity arises. The Soviets will try to prevent her from doing so. China will thus become an increasingly important Pacific power, particularly in the South China Sea -- a name she will wish to translate into reality. This will assist in the containment of any further expansion of Soviet power southwards.

For the Soviets, the existence of increasing Chinese power to the East should act as a powerful deterrent against attempts to gain control of West Europe. The danger is that this possibility, under certain circumstances, could contribute to Soviet calculations that it would be better to do so now (whenever now is), rather than later, either
directly or indirectly, via military seizure of Persian Gulf oil. This could also neutralize the Japanese power centre. It will be up to the U.S. to deter such calculations or defeat their implementation.

Over the longer haul, the future of the Sino-American entente looks likely to be a positive one. Their interests are essentially complementary, not conflicting. With careful management, the U.S. thus should be able to assist in China's emergence as a fourth power center containing the Soviet one. This would produce the optimal balance of power situation for the U.S., wherein she would lead a coalition of four power centers against the Soviet one.

The central four-power alliance structure would require supporting U.S. alliances with the more peripheral powers. These will now be summarized.
These U.S. alliances will, by force of circumstances, be much more transitory. The majority of the governments with whom they will be concluded will be unstable to a greater or lesser degree, because of internal and external threats. Many of them will also lack military forces which are really reliable, either politically or in terms of combat effectiveness. As appropriate, the U.S. will thus be forced to adopt, albeit reluctantly and with difficulty, the historical attitude of great powers to peripheral alliances--win some, lose some. She will also need to distinguish between her alliances with governments, which may prove expendable, and with states, which may or may not be expendable. The result will lead undoubtedly to some very strange alliances, such as those caused by the Iraq-Iran War. In this, Iraq attacked America's former key ally, Iran, producing a bizarre alliance in support of Iraq (to prevent an Iranian victory) including the U.S.S.R., France, Saudi Arabia and, to a limited extent, the U.S. China now supplies arms to both combatants.

U.S. alliances in the Persian Gulf are peripheral because they have many of the above features. Gulf oil resources are
emphatically not peripheral; they are central to the U.S. alliance with the West European and Japanese power centers. But the alliances to preserve their access to these reserves must necessarily be ones of convenience.

Through a bitter historical irony, the one U.S. alliance in the Middle East that is totally binding is hers with Israel, a country conspicuously lacking in natural resources. The U.S. is bound to this alliance by an historical debt that can never be repaid: the failure of the Western powers to prevent or seriously mitigate the Nazi holocaust. Whatever the Realpolitik arguments may be against this alliance, now or in the future, the answer to them will be inescapable. As that master of Realpolitik, former Secretary of State Kissinger put it, the U.S. is committed to the physical survival of the Zionist population of Israel, although not necessarily the preservation of her existing boundaries. This moral argument is reinforced by three practical ones. First, Israel is the regional superpower of the Middle East with conventional forces far superior to any other regional ones. She is also generally believed to be a nuclear weapons power, although she officially denies this. To the extent that the U.S. government shares this belief, it must support Israel, for fear that if it does not, she might be forced to use her NNP. Second, Israel's government is one that shares fundamental Western values, such as democracy and free speech. This adds a different dimension to the alliance, especially in terms of domestic U.S. and West European policies. This is
not an alliance with a society and government whose values are alien but with one whose values are common and understandable, although not always identical. Third, domestic U.S. politics, with its strong Jewish lobby, powerfully reinforces these considerations. This lobby hampers U.S. tactical diplomatic flexibility in the Middle East but has contributed much, in a broader sense, to keeping her wide-ranging strategic policies on the right track.

With these qualifications, U.S. interests and alliances in the area can be considered.

Gulf/ME Power Centers

The basic U.S. approach to these will be a variation of the Kennan one, asking what the crucial U.S. interests are and which alliances can protect and advance them.

The U.S. has only two vital interests--preserving the physical survival of Israel's Jewish population and access to Gulf oil supplies for West Europe and Japan. For the foreseeable future this means preventing Soviet military forces or those of her allies from occupying Israel and the Gulf oil-producing areas. To preserve these interests, the U.S. will have to engage in tactical alliance with those governments and groups which share her objectives. This will pose considerable political and military problems for several reasons. The majority of the governments in the area are neither stable nor democratic and are unlikely to become either in the next twenty years. Their populations are
usually fragmented along religious and/or tribal lines and frequently run across state boundaries. Considerable numbers of foreign workers are required to maintain the oilfields. The oil-producing area is not only not stable now: there is little prospect of it becoming stable. Given this indigenous instability and Soviet attempts to exacerbate it, the U.S. will frequently find herself compelled to intervene militarily in order to support her interests. Because of the domestic political difficulties in doing so with the requisite flexibility, the U.S., here as elsewhere, will have to cultivate proxy forces for this task. Those of Britain and Pakistan have proved extremely capable thus far and have been joined by those of France.

These three countries will also assist the U.S. in developing her Rapid Deployment Forces' (RDF's) ability to intervene on a larger, although still modest, scale in the Gulf. Should this prove necessary -- e.g., if the Soviets threaten direct military intervention in the Gulf -- then U.S. GPF in NATO will form the nearest available reserves of personnel and equipment. The U.S. would also seek at least symbolic NATO forces to make the intervention an allied, rather than a purely American, operation, as in the Korean War.

The basic problem the Middle East poses for U.S. alliance policy is that there is no basis for a stable long-term alliance with any of its governments except that of Israel. This problem is compounded in the Gulf by the absence of any
strong local powers, since the 1979 fall of the Shah shattered Iran's strength. Historically, the existence of vast wealth, plus the inability of local forces to defend it, has usually led an outside power to take over. Since the Soviets are militarily well able to do so, they will have to be deterred from doing so by the U.S.

In alliance terms, Israel thus is uniquely valuable to the U.S., for reasons of self-interest, as well as for moral reasons. She has the only stable governmental system and economy in the area, even though both have experienced instability recently. She is also the only state with fully modern, combat-effective, armed forces. The U.S. thus has no alternative but to maintain her alliance with Israel over the long run, while minimizing the damage this does to shorter-term U.S. alliances with the Arab states. Jordan's remarkable survival under King Hussein suggests that she may be the one other stable country in the area, although always threatened with annexation by Syria. If she is, the U.S. should maintain her long-term alliance with Jordan. She may also be able to maintain those with the small Gulf oil Shiekdoms and Oman because only the U.S. can offer them what they need: effective military protection without annexation. These societies are also small enough to be fairly stable, to be protectable (with help) from destabilization and to be developed (not necessarily modernized in toto) with U.S. technical assistance. These states are also crucial for
control of the Straits of Hormuz, which has to be kept open to preserve West European and Japanese access to oil.

Because of their relative stability, the U.S. alliances with Israel, Jordan and the Gulf Sheikdoms (plus Oman) will be her most permanent ones in the Middle East. Even so, not all of them can be expected to last. The more transient U.S. alliances will be with the other governments in the area. Some may last a relatively long time, as has been the case in the past with those with Iran (1945-1979) and Egypt (1973 to the present). But the instability of these governments and societies means that they are always liable to termination by events outside the control of the alliance partners. Their termination in one form, however, need not preclude their renewal in another, as circumstances change yet again. Over a twenty-year period, the U.S. and her allies will also be in a better position to offer regional powers, here as elsewhere, access to the goods they desire, including advanced military technology.

It is also important to note that in the Middle East, as elsewhere, the U.S. is interested in alliances for their contributions to her long-run strategic objectives. Provided these are not jeopardized, the U.S. does not need alliances for their own sake and can settle for dealing on the basis of mutual self-interest. Local alliances always run the risk of involving the U.S. in local quarrels, on the principle of my enemy's friend is my enemy, my enemy's enemy is my friend.
For these reasons, the U.S. alliance with Saudi Arabia will remain a unique one. She possesses both the largest oil reserves of any Middle Eastern country and Islam's Holy Place, Mecca. Her government thus far has been successful in its attempt to achieve economic and technical development without disrupting traditional societal structures, including political and religious ones. Given the high level of per capita GNP generated by Saudi oil revenues, even with lower oil prices, the economic basis for the continuation of these policies is assured. They will remain threatened, however, by the two ideologies of Islamic fundamentalism and radical Marxism-Leninism. The former is exported by Iran, the latter by the Soviet Union. Both pose internal, rather than external, security problems which will be exacerbated by outside powers' interventions. The presence of a large number of foreign workers in Saudi Arabia makes these security problems even more serious.

The U.S. ability to help her Saudi allies deal with these problems is limited, although not negligible. Against direct external military attack by the Soviet Union and her regional allies, or by Iran, the U.S. can provide military forces and political guarantees for deterrence and defense purposes. But her deployable conventional forces remain much smaller than those of the Soviets, raising legitimate doubts about the credibility of these guarantees. Unfortunately, there is no chance that the U.S. Congress will fund significant increases in these forces unless there is a further major deterioration
in superpower relations. The U.S. can also continue to assist in the development of effective Saudi military forces. But the possibilities for this must realistically be regarded as limited, albeit useful. U.S. allies can continue to assist the Saudis with their security against internal threats to stability externally supported. Pakistan supplies two regular divisions, and Britain and France supply specialized advisers plus technical support.

Ultimately, though, the success or failure of these efforts will depend on the Saudi government's ability to respond appropriately to these threats to its security. The post-war history of the region suggests that if it does so successfully over the next twenty years, it will be unusually skillful and lucky. If it fails to do so, the U.S., West Europe and Japan will be forced to take appropriate actions to secure their interests. This might, for example, include the assumption of physical control of the oilfields by a multinational force under U.S. leadership. Such a force could include NATO/West European, Japanese, Jordanian and Pakistani contingents, making it a multi-religious as well as multinational force.

These developments would not be desirable but could become unavoidable. Other developments that could be forced on the U.S. could include a maintenance of her alliance with Egypt, accompanied by an Egyptian annexation of Libya, to deal with the problems caused by Colonel Quadhfi or a termination of this alliance by a fundamentalist Egyptian government. It
is even possible that, in the event of an even more formidable resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. could agree on a partition of the Middle East into spheres of influence and control, respectively, as in Europe. This could secure their interests in access to oil supplies and, for the Soviets, territorial expansion without the risks of a major regional conflict that could escalate to the use of nuclear weapons, or out of control, that would accompany unilateral Soviet military intervention. There is a partial precedent for such an agreement in the U.S.-U.S.S.R. partition of Iran during World War II.

Conclusion

These potential developments are illustrative of the problems facing the U.S. in developing alliances in the Middle East and elsewhere in the Third World, outside the four major power centers. Neither the U.S. government nor any others, including the Soviet Union's, are fully in control of regional developments. Indeed, the regional governments are often not in full control of their population and territory and are also vulnerable to violent overthrow. The U.S. thus will have two primary interests in developing alliances, first as a means of securing access to raw materials essential for herself plus the West European, Japanese and Chinese power centers. These are mainly oil but also include minerals. Second, in a few special cases, including Israel, Jordan and the Gulf Shiekdoms, the U.S. will wish to use alliances to assist in
the emergence and maintenance of stable governments. The secondary U.S. interest in alliances will be a relatively temporary means of advancing these primary interests. Such temporary alliances may last for months, years or even decades and may be with governments or factions or both. Because of domestic political constraints, the U.S. is likely to have to make increasing use of allies and their forces to provide some of the kinds of assistance needed. These patterns will be repeated in the other Third World areas—Africa, the Pacific and Latin America.
Chapter 8:

Africa

The U.S. has two kinds of interests in this continent: geopolitical and resource interests. These interests overlap in the Maghreb area of North Africa, from Mauritania to Libya and in South Africa and Namibia. Other states containing areas of value are Nigeria and Zaire (natural resources) and Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan (geopolitically important for their potential to control access routes to the Red Sea). The U.S. has no other major long-term security interests in Africa, although humanitarian interests will lead to periodic attempts to mitigate the worst aspects of the continent's relapse into barbarism.

France retains an extensive alliance structure with her former colonies -- Francophone Africa -- backed up by a 25,000-strong Rapid Intervention Force. This has been used extensively, including in Gabon (1964), Chad (1968-1985), Mauritania (1977-1978), Djibouti (1976-1977), Zaire (1977-1978), and the Central African Republic (1979). France retains strategic bases in Dakar, Gabon, Central African Republic, Djibouti and Reunion Island. Britain also retains significant links with some of her former colonies, notably Kenya and Nigeria, as does Belgium with the Congo and Zaire. Protecting America's African interests will require the maintenance of good working relations with these NATO-European
allies and a willingness to make mutually acceptable trade-offs for their assistance in Africa.

South Africa's position as the dominant power in the South will make a continued tacit U.S. alliance with her white government an unavoidable necessity, reluctantly accepted and of uncertain duration. It may last, though, for much or all of the next twenty-five years.

Other U.S. alliances with African governments or local factions will be useful but necessarily transitory. Governments will remain liable to sudden overthrow and the exigencies of domestic politics will produce sharp shifts in political allegiances. The U.S. thus should be able to make quick but often transitory gains at the expense of the U.S.S.R. and vice-versa, except where the Soviets attempt to cement new alliances with the help of Cuban/Pact proxy forces. The U.S., together with her allies, will have to prevent this where it would jeopardize their interests and reverse it where it has already occurred.

It may be, though, to the U.S. benefit for Soviet proxy forces to become bogged down in African conflicts in countries where this would not affect U.S. interests too adversely. This may be the case in Ethiopia. Soviet/Cuban/Pact intervention together with their client Mengitsu's government's disastrous agricultural policies, plus its genocidal conduct of the civil war against the Eritreans, have provided a far more powerful case for containment than could the U.S. Government. This applies particularly to the more
rational African and Arab governments, as well as to the U.S. legislature and media.

The transitory nature of U.S. alliances in Africa will result from its increasing Balkanisation. Africa, especially south of the Sahara, is characterized by religious and ethnic divisions, weak social and political structures and acute economic underdevelopment. The incompetence of post-independence governments has exacerbated these problems, while the quality of these governments has gone from bad to worse. The long-term prospect is thus for a continuing slide into anarchy and starvation, except for a few localized islands of development that are based on resource centres. Tragically, there is little the U.S. or her allies can do to prevent this collapse, despite national and international pressures to do so.

The U.S. also faces a major domestic political constraint on her ability to act to defend her interests in Africa. This is the racial factor. So here, even more than elsewhere, the U.S. will have to rely on her allies to take those actions necessary to defend her interests but which she will be unwilling to take herself. A recent example was the 1977-78 French and Belgian intervention in Zaire.

Such actions, including overt military as well as covert political, economic and military intervention, will be necessary because of internal instability and Soviet intervention with Cuban/Pact proxy forces. Havana's total dependence on Moscow means that Moscow can order the dispatch
of the Cuban "Africa Corps" against Havana's wishes, while if only for logistical reasons, Havana cannot commit it without Moscow's consent. But Havana may have become a significant contributing factor in Moscow's decisions to intervene, since Castro enjoys increased international standing where these succeed.

So, Cuba (in Africa and South America) and Vietnam (in Asia) are Soviet examples of the Serbaian syndrome. Like Serbia vis-a-vis Imperial Russia before World war I, they may be able to increase their more powerful ally's involvement in regional conflicts, setting in train events that neither can wholly control. They thus pose a significant threat to the stability of regional balances of deterrence.

Since the U.S. has a major interest in preserving their stability and, with it, a relatively favorable distribution of power, she must place a high priority on neutralizing these two Soviet allies. The relative gains from neutralizing Cuba would be particularly valuable given her ability to exploit and create instability in two continents.

This is especially necessary now that the Politburo, as heir to the Tzarist colonizers of Asiatic Russia, has come to understand what the European imperial powers discovered early on in their intervention in Africa: its internal weaknesses mean that the investment of small quantities of disciplined military forces (imperial, proxy and local) yields large political, economic and territorial gains. The investment of some 20,000 Cuban/Pact forces, under Soviet control, in each
of Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia, to secure them for Moscow continues the classic imperial pattern of intervention in Africa. So does the challenge to the Soviet-supported tribes by their local rivals, supported by a loose coalition of regional and external actors, including the U.S., South Africa, Israel and China.

In the Maghreb, the U.S. interest is in maintaining access to its resources and ensuring that whatever government controls the Southern side of the Straits of Gibralter (currently Morocco's) cannot help the Soviets to close the straits in wartime. But Morocco is engaged in a struggle for control of the Maghreb with Algeria and the Polisario Front she supports. It is illustrative of the nature of U.S. alliances in the Third World that, while she would prefer a continuation of Moroccan control, she could probably work out a *modus vivendi* with Algeria if this proved necessary.

Libya's pro-Soviet intervention in African as well as Arab affairs has recently been evident in Chad and the Sudan. This underlines the importance to U.S. alliance policy of neutralizing the Gadaffi government, preferably through intervention by Egypt. The immediate gains for U.S. naval forces would be considerable, as would the longer term gains for regional stability (or less instability), in the Arab and African worlds.
Africa South of the Sahara

In Nigeria, the U.S. interest lies in maintaining her allies' access to oil and in assisting Nigeria's development. Despite these efforts, Nigeria will remain a potential regional great power, rather than an actual one. A major disruption in Middle East oil supplies would, of course, make her oil reserves of major importance. It could lead to increased Soviet attempts to destabilize her government and replace it with a pro-Soviet one supported by the Cuban "Africa Corps." These attempts would have to be countered by the U.A. and her allies.

Similarly, they will need to ensure that the mineral resources of Zaire remain accessible.

In South Africa-Namibia, the U.S. faces an intractable problem in attempting to reconcile the rights of the white and non-white populations. So long as the white South African government remains in power, the U.S. will have to deal with it. It controls natural resources, particularly mineral ones, of major importance to the U.S. and her allies. South Africa is also the dominant military power in the region and is believed to have national nuclear forces, developed in clandestine collaboration with Israel. In geopolitical terms, South Africa is of crucial importance because she controls the Cape route from Asia and the Middle East to America and Europe. The term control requires careful operational definition from the viewpoint of future U.S. alliances.
The U.S. interest lies in ensuring that the government of South Africa lacks the combination of hostile intentions and military capabilities which could lead it to interdict shipping under certain circumstances, particularly oil tankers using the Cape Route. A friendly South African government is preferable, as at present; but a less friendly or even moderately hostile government would not threaten this U.S. interest unless it possessed significant air, missile and naval capabilities. Since a non-white government could not provide these indigenously, it could only be expected to do so with Soviet assistance. The U.S. thus, in the future, might have to prevent the establishment of Soviet military forces in South Africa that could threaten the Cape Route.

Overview

In Africa, the structure of alliances will be particularly fluid, because of domestic instability and local, low-level, conflicts. This means that the U.S. will need to combine tactical flexibility with a firm pursuit of her long-term strategic interests, as outlined here. Her only dependable alliance will be with her NATO-European allies with African interests, plus the means and the will to protect them. Two potential additional allies with similar qualifications are Israel and China, although both may differ, on occasion, with the U.S. on the means to pursue essentially similar ends.
Chapter 9:
Pacific and Indian Oceans

These alliance systems will be composed of three types of states: mainland, major island and minor (island) states. Their governments and societies are more stable than Africa's but will remain vulnerable to domestic disturbances and outside intervention, especially by the Soviets.

The Soviet Union will retain significant advantages in its ability to influence, or intervene in, the contiguous Indian subcontinent. Its Vietnamese client also provides the U.S.S.R. considerable leverage, in addition to a naval base in South East Asia. The U.S., as the dominant maritime power, should retain a significant advantage in maintaining and extending her alliances with the island and micro-states. She should also retain her advantage in being able create genuine alliances with these states and with the developing mainland states.

In the Indian Ocean, the basic pattern of alliances will remain determined by the conflict between Moslem Pakistan and (predominantly) Hindu India. Successive Indian governments have aligned with the U.S.S.R., pushing Pakistan and the U.S. into an alliance powerfully reinforced by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. So long as this continues, as it will probably do for the next twenty-five years, so will the war. The Soviets will keep killing Afghanistanis, while the U.S., the Moslem states and China keep supplying the
Afghani freedom fighters with enough weapons to keep them going but not enough to provoke major Soviet attacks on their bases in Pakistan.

There is a significant chance that this limited conflict will escalate. The Soviets may decide to end the war more quickly, by destroying these Pakistani bases or by launching a major military operation to carve a pro-Soviet Blaluchistan out of Pakistani (and perhaps also Iranian) territory. This could give them the warm-water port long sought by Tzarist and Communist governments alike. Such a move could well be accompanied by an invitation to India to join in the partition of Pakistan by annexing Kashmir. A rump Pakistan would be left nominally independent but under effective Soviet control.

Since the Soviet ability to invade the Persian Gulf would be much strengthened by such an attack, deterring or defeating such an attack must remain a major U.S. priority, second only to deterring or defeating a direct attack on the Gulf. Unfortunately, it is also an objective that can only be obtained by the threat or use of U.S. military forces. There are no regional ones remotely capable of halting a major Soviet, let alone a Soviet-Indian, attack on Pakistan. Indeed, the only forces available are Pakistan's, plus an unpredictable possibility of modest assistance from Iran. Given the weakness of the conventional U.S. forces available, she could be forced to use nuclear weapons to halt a Soviet attack on Pakistan. Additional possibilities for nuclear use are created by Indian and Pakistani national nuclear forces.
For the U.S., her alliance with Pakistan is thus of major geopolitical importance. This means, in turn, that the biggest alliance gain the U.S. could make would be to persuade the Indian government that it can benefit more from an alliance with the U.S. than from one with the U.S.S.R. Although difficult, such a reversal of alliances would be no more impossible than others that have occurred in the post-war period and earlier.

The objectives of the Indians governing what is now India are essentially the same as those of the British were, governing the Raj stretching from Pakistan to Burma. These are to protect its territorial integrity, particularly against external Russian threats, to preserve some minimal order among its vast and diverse population, to feed it and to develop its economy. Over the next twenty-five years, the U.S. is in a much better position to contribute to these objectives than is the U.S.S.R.

This is particularly true because the Soviet objective, over the same time-frame, is to Balkanize India by exploiting its North-South and East-West divisions to create weaker states which would be more susceptible to Soviet influence or control. They have already attempted to exploit, thus far unsuccessfully, the creation of an independent Bangladesh out of East Pakistan.

Such a Balkanization is a real possibility. The existing Indian state was created by the 1947 partition of the British Raj, together with New Delhi's assumption of direct control
over the semi-independent princely states. The resulting entity has no tradition of central government or national or cultural unity. Indeed, British Imperial rule over India only became fully effective in the years following the 1857 Indian Mutiny.

The basis for an alliance between the U.S. and Indian governments thus exists. Whether one can be created will depend on the ability of the two governments to recognize that their real long-term interests are complimentary. In particular, the Indian government needs persuading that however deeply felt its conflict over Kashmir is with Pakistan, it is essentially a marginal one for India. Neither Pakistan nor the U.S. can (or wants to) threaten India's survival. The Soviets both can and want to do so.

Militarily, the value of a U.S. alliance with India would be considerable. Her armed forces are the third largest in the region, after those of China and Vietnam, and she is emerging as a significant naval power in the Indian Ocean. India has also maintained diversity in her arms suppliers, who include the U.S.S.R., Britain, France and Italy.

The U.S. may therefore seek an alliance with India without compromising that which it has with Pakistan. The search will not be easy but may be assisted by Soviet actions that demonstrate the U.S.S.R.'s threat to India's independent existence.

If India does become Balkanized through a combination of internal and external forces, the U.S. will have to deal with
the successor states in the same way in which she came to terms with Bangladesh. The U.S. would retain her ability to assist their independence in addition to their economic and military development.

One important qualification is that the value of an alliance with any government of India would be limited by the limitations on its power. It has been said that India is ungovernable. While this may be going too far, the ability of the central government to move the subcontinent in the directions it desires, particularly those of economic development and national unity, remain limited by its sheer size. The U.S. thus should not expect too much from an alliance with India.

In the Eastern Indian Ocean, the U.S. and allied interests lie in obtaining bases and facilities for air and naval forces in the territories of the micro-states. Although euphemistically referred to as alliances, these arrangements are closer to protectorates. These provide the French bases in the Mauritius and the U.S.-U.K. base at Diego Garcia. Here, as elsewhere, the U.S. benefits from the presence of allies who can take actions which the U.S. finds it difficult to take because of domestic political constraints.

The creation of micro-states has posed new problems for the U.S., while creating new opportunities with the evolution of the 200-mile zone of economic control. On the negative side, the small (under 150,000 people) populations of micro-states scattered over a large area, makes them
vulnerable to Soviet attempts to exploit their internal weaknesses (both overtly and covertly) to secure base facilities plus some degree of political control. U.S. efforts to counter this, expose it to criticism as a neo-colonialist power. These efforts have been handicapped also by a reluctance, among some U.S. policy makers, to recognize the micro-states' geopolitical importance. On the positive side, the continuing, although diminished, U.S. naval superiority furnishes the United States with the ability, where combined with the requisite political will, to protect friendly governments and bring pressure to bear on unfriendly ones. For example, as the opportunity arises, it should be possible to ensure that the government of Madagascar -- a county with important harbors -- becomes pro-Western, thereby denying the Soviets the use of their Seychelles base.

The position of Indonesia and Australia as both Indian and Pacific Ocean powers emphasizes the way these two oceans form a single entity in terms of maritime strategy.

In the Pacific, the U.S. position remains a strong one, despite the Soviet-North Vietnamese defeat of South Vietnam and the occupation of Laos and Cambodia. The U.S. objective will be to prevent further North Vietnamese territorial expansion and, eventually, to enforce their withdrawal from the occupied territories, but without committing large U.S. ground combat forces. The two major U.S. regional alliances in the area are with the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and ANZUS.
The five ASEAN members -- Indonesia, Malaysia, the Phillipines, Singapore and Thailand -- plus Brunei, form an emerging economic and political power centre which is acquiring modest but useful military capabilities. In maritime terms, its key members are Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, which control the Straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok, the first and last being the choke points through which Gulf oil flows to Japan. Singapore is also emerging as a regional center for advanced technology, civil and military, while Indonesia has considerable oil and mineral resources, actual and potential.

The Indonesian government, like that of the Phillipines, faces a formidable problem in making its writ run within its large and scattered territory, let alone in countering Soviet support for the numerous indigenous revolutionary groups that are bound to exist in such territories. In recent years, though, this problem has become a serious one in the Phillipines, because of the incompetence of the Marcos government and the country's continuing internal divisions. This illustrates the importance for the U.S. of distinguishing between the need to ally with a particular state and the necessity of supporting its current government. It may be that U.S. interests would be better served, at some point, by expediting the replacement of the Marcos government with a different and more effective one. Here, as elsewhere, however, the U.S. needs to proceed cautiously in attempting to influence local political developments in directions intended
to benefit her interests as well as those of the inhabitants. Such attempts are notoriously difficult to conduct successfully in a government as open as that which the U.S. has become and one as prone to believe that the transition from autocracy to democracy can be simple and easy. As the fall of the Shah demonstrated, the alternative to a moderate authoritarian regime may be much worse -- in Iran’s case, a totalitarian theocracy.

The Soviet takeover of the former U.S. air and naval base at Cam Ranh Bay as a forward base for their Pacific Fleet and its support forces underlines the importance of the Pacific component of the U.S. global containment policy. In geopolitical terms, the ASEAN countries represent an extremely valuable set of assets. They are also potentially vulnerable to Soviet efforts to acquire control over them by means short of those which would be likely to trigger a U.S. use of nuclear weapons to defeat them. Insofar as they lie outside the central balances of nuclear deterrence, they thus represent a destabilizing combination of value and vulnerability.

The value of the Australia-New Zealand-U.S. (ANZUS) alliance in supporting ASEAN is considerable, despite the current United States-New Zealand differences. Australia is a major asset, actual and potential, being fully developed, and possessing a stable political and social system and a significant military mobilization base. The ANZUS alliance (plus Britain and France) is of increasing importance in
protecting the newly independent Pacific micro-states against Soviet intervention. Their strategic importance was painfully demonstrated in the 1941-45 Pacific campaigns, when considerable allied losses were incurred regaining territories lost to Imperial Japan because of initial weakness.

In the Pacific, as elsewhere, America’s allies may be more willing and more able to take actions protecting the common interests than is the United States. They may also be more sensitive to local political, social and economic circumstances. But the U.S. also needs to show the necessary alliance leadership, demonstrating an awareness of her real interests plus a willingness to support her allies when they act in the common interest and to punish them when they act against it. The current crisis over the New Zealand government’s refusal to allow the visit of nuclear-armed warships thus has important substantive, as well as symbolic elements. While it is important that the U.S. not react in a counterproductive manner, it is also important that she be seen to react, and that her reaction eventually secures, if possible, the lifting of this restriction on her freedom of movement in the area.

Overview

Of the U.S. regional alliance systems outside the central balances of nuclear deterrence, the ASEAN-ANZUS one is second in importance only to her Middle Eastern one. Pakistan is the link between the two systems. The ASEAN-ANZUS system controls
the Gulf oil routes to Japan at their most vulnerable choke points, after the Straits of Hormuz. The ASEAN-ANZUS countries contain the Pacific’s greatest concentration of economic resources, actual and potential. Australia and New Zealand are fully developed, Singapore is successfully developing and the other ASEAN members have the potential to do so, albeit more slowly. They thus represent a future barrier to Soviet expansion which the U.S.S.R. will wish to break and the U.S. to preserve while it develops.

To do so, the U.S. will need to utilize allied assistance plus that from China. America’s willingness and ability to contain the Soviets in this key part of the Pacific will also do much to shape Chinese perceptions of the value of her tacit alliance with the U.S. The more effectively her containment policy is complemented, the greater the attractiveness of the U.S. alliance will be to China, and vice-versa.

The extent to which the U.S. global alliance system is interconnected is further emphasized by China’s interest in the United States’ ability to maintain her guarantee of Pakistan’s territorial integrity against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Here again, a U.S. failure to do so would lessen the value of the American card to China, and vice-versa.

Elsewhere in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the local powers are mostly micro-states. The U.S. relationship with these must be more in the nature of protectorates, but ones in which the local governments and populations are genuine allies. Their ability to protect themselves against external threats
To their security, particularly external support of indigenous rebel groups, will remain very limited. The U.S. and her allies thus will have to provide such protection, thereby re-emphasizing the importance of her alliances with Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand. China is a valuable potential addition to these allies, particularly for the protection of those territories where there exist significant overseas Chinese populations.
Chapter 10:
The Caribbean, Central and Latin America

These three areas form a single geopolitical unit containing three distinct kinds of U.S. alliance systems: in the Caribbean, the U.S. is the protector of another group of (mainly) micro-states; in Central America, she is the leader of an asymmetrical alliance of five small states (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica, plus Panama); and in Latin America proper, plus Mexico, she is the leader of a genuine alliance of one regional great power and four middle powers (Brazil, plus Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela). The opposing Soviet-enforced alliance is a relatively recent creation comprising one regional middle power, Cuba, (since 1961) and one small power, Nicaragua (since 1979).

As the Monroe Doctrine recognized back in 1823, and as successive generations of Latin American intellectuals and politicians have lamented, South America was destined by geography to be a natural U.S. sphere of influence. It became so almost exclusively once the U.K. and the other European colonial powers she tolerated withdrew from the Caribbean. The United States, however, has been slow to grasp the full alliance implications of the combined effects of this withdrawal, of the demise of the old-style U.S.
gunboat-and-intervention relationship with South America and of the rise of Soviet-Cuban intervention.

Essentially, in South America, the U.S. has to construct and lead three distinct but interrelated alliance systems. Her objectives, here as elsewhere, are to exclude hostile external influences (largely Soviet ones); nullify, if possible, or deal with, if necessary, hostile indigenous forces and assist in, to the limited extent she can, the region's economic, social and political development. Her dilemma lies in avoiding the old mistake of assuming that South American governments could be relied upon to do whatever the U.S. ordered, especially when the orders were enforced by the U.S. Marine Corps, and the new mistake, in the 1970s, of assuming that the U.S. could atone for past interventions by a hands-off approach, tempered only by judicious support for the forces of progressive, inevitable, social change.

Her solution, still emerging in the 1980s, is an extension of her classic containment strategy to South America -- deploying U.S. economic and military power to counter that of the Soviets. It recognizes that the weaker the local forces, the more they will need U.S. support (direct and indirect), although this support need not be large, particularly in terms of ground combat forces committed over time. While providing such support where it is truly indispensable, the U.S. expects the societies it is helping to develop their own self-help capabilities as fast and as much as possible. This creates the basis for alliances that are
genuine in terms of perceived common interests, even if asymmetrical in terms of power.

The containment strategy thus plays the ultimate American trump card in the great game of alliances: the U.S. can tolerate genuine alliances, despite all of their problems; the Soviets cannot, because they cannot tolerate dissent externally any more than they can internally.

As applied to South America, the containment strategy requires that the U.S. develop an appropriate alliance structure for each of the three main regions. The Caribbean states are mostly small or micro-states with minimal or non-existent military or para-military forces. Yet, they control major sea lines essential to U.S. security through the Yucatan Strait and the Mona Passage. They thus pose, in an extreme form, the micro-state security problem -- high geopolitical value plus low, or non-existent, indigenous defenses against Soviet attempts to gain political control.

Grenada's experience between 1979 and 1983 exemplified this problem. A democratically-elected government, defended by some 200 policemen, was overthrown by a Cuban-supplied revolutionary group, perhaps 50 strong. They controlled a strategically-placed island, with a population of 113,000, turning it into a major potential Soviet/Cuban base. In retrospect, the surprising, indeed alarming, feature of the Grenada experience was that it took the U.S. four years to gather the political will to neutralize this base, which was defended by only 800 Cuban military construction troops under
Soviet direction. Even then, it took a radical split in the Grenadan government, threatening the security of the neighboring micro-states and U.S. students on the island, to trigger a U.S. invasion. This had to be ordered over the protests of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, who argued that it would stretch U.S. military resources too thinly.

The JCS position demonstrated a disturbing inability to grasp the elementary principles of geopolitics and the Clauswitzian use of military forces for political ends, as well as of the basic structure of politico-military power in the Third World.

The domestic weaknesses of the Caribbean countries mean that the U.S. is compelled to act as the protecting power of the region against the Soviets and their Cuban proxies. There is no possibility of the U.S. turning over part of its protective role to regional allies. The Caribbean countries' existing economic weaknesses make the prospect for economic development to more than minimal levels problematical at best, despite the countries' small populations. This situation offers, prospectively, the possibility of good returns on relatively modest U.S. assistance, such as the Reagan Administration's Caribbean Initiative. The small population of the Caribbean countries, when combined with economic underdevelopment, also denies them, for the foreseeable future, the ability to field more than police-style defense forces. The U.S. thus will have to assume the primary responsibility for their security from external threats.
Besides the Soviets, these threats include the international drug trade.

In Central America, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. are engaged in a competition typical of both classic imperial rivalry and of the Cold War. Exploiting the naivety of the Carter Administration and of the Nicaraguan anti-Somosa forces, the Soviet-supported Sandanistas seized control of the successful revolution and are now attempting to export it. From the Soviet perspective, it is a situation in which they can only lose a newly acquired and expendable asset, the Sandanista government, but may be able to make considerable initial gains (similar governments in El Salvador et al.) and even larger long-term ones (assisting the establishment of a pro-Soviet government in Mexico). The Soviets are also tying down the U.S. in a region where they have no vital interests to lose and where their direct involvement of resources and prestige has been carefully limited.

Unfortunately, the U.S. has no alternative but to contain this Soviet diversionary expansion of their influence. This has had, however, the advantage of focusing the attention of U.S. policymakers on the region and has produced, so far, more successful results more quickly than might have been expected. Whatever its shortcomings, the Duarte government of El Salvador was democratically elected, enjoys considerable popular support, as well as that of the military, and is making reasonable progress in dealing with massive domestic problems, whilst defeating the Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan
supported rebels. These events have also focused the attention of El Salvador’s neighbors on the potential for further Soviet-backed attempts at destabilization. The result is that the U.S. is establishing, for the first time, a genuine alliance with the Central American States.

If, in addition, the Sandanista government can be overthrown by the Nicaraguan contras (with U.S. aid), the U.S. will have further strengthened its alliance with the states of Latin America. It would also drive home the point that the U.S. will stand by its allies, not desert them, while expecting them to earn U.S. support not expect it on the basis of reflexive anti-(Soviet) Communism.

In Latin America, the U.S. is also trying to create a genuine alliance, also with some success. Ironically, this is shown by the emergence of the Contadora group of four powers (Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico and Panama) unsuccessfully attempting to find a basis for reconciling U.S. and Nicaraguan interests. As the verbal support for these efforts of some NATO-European governments shows, the existence of a real alliance can be measured by the extent of the dissent it tolerates. Despite the historical legacy of resentment against Yankee dominance, real and imagined, the bases exist for an effective U.S.-Latin American alliance. The regional great powers should remain strong enough to defeat Soviet attempts at intervention via support for local revolutionary movements, although the domestic costs of doing so may be high, as in Argentina’s so-called secret war. The region
lacks the kinds of major conflicts that cause trouble in alliances by forcing the U.S. to chose sides. The one exception is the Anglo-Argentinian conflict over the Falklands/Malvinas Islands. The geographical isolation of Latin America is also advantageous for the U.S., so long as she retains her maritime supremacy.

The major and worrying exception to this favorable alliance situation for the U.S. is Mexico. In geopolitical terms, Mexico is America's Achilles heel, a weakness the Soviets are attempting to exploit. She has a large, poor population (78,000,000) sharing a long common border with a rich U.S. where there is a large legal, and much larger illegal, Hispanic population. Illegal immigration, especially from Mexico, is becoming a major national security problem to which U.S. policymakers have so far failed to respond effectively. Internally, Mexico has all of the ingredients needed for another of her revolutions. The ruling group, the IPR has become notably incompetent and spectacularly corrupt, expectations of oil-led economic development have been dashed by the fall in oil prices, which make it difficult to service international loans, and there is a large proletariat (rural and urban) much of it unemployed.

The U.S. nightmare and the Soviet dream would be a Sandanista- or Castro-style government in Mexico. Recognizing the seriousness of the problem is the start of its management by the U.S. In alliance terms, the creation of an effective
American-Mexico alliance will be one of the major challenges for the U.S. through to 2010.

When compared with the emerging U.S. alliance systems in South America, the Soviet alliance system here, as elsewhere, is characterized by its enforced nature. The Soviets are not creating the basis for a genuine alliance, except with small but important revolutionary groups.

The distinctions between the interests of these groups and of the people they claim to be liberating is one that the U.S. will have to emphasize to its South American allies and to key relevant domestic audiences. Fidel Castro's revolutionary defense of Cuban interests was always bound to lead him into an alliance with the Soviets, particularly as he was almost certainly a Soviet agent of influence prior to his assumption of power. But this definition of Cuba's interests remains sharply at variance with the real interests of Cuba, in terms of interstate relations and of her population, particularly those men drafted to fight for the Soviet Empire in Africa and Latin America. The situation is similar in Nicaragua. To the extent that the Sandanistas are not simply obeying their Soviet controllers and suppliers, they clearly believe their revolutionary rhetoric and its definitions of Nicaraguan interests. This definition is, however, increasingly rejected by the Nicaraguan population. In Grenada, a similar situation developed with the New Jewel revolutionary government.
The U.S. utilized this deep division between the objectives of a Soviet-supported Grenadian revolutionary government and the population to secure the latter's support for their liberation and the installation of a democratically-elected government. A similar development in Nicaragua would be equally popular, both there and among the American electorate. This has important implications for U.S. policy towards Cuba and her South American alliance systems.

So long as Fidel Castro remains in control with Soviet support, and so long as superpower relations remain in the abnormal normality of the Cold War, a U.S. liberation of Cuba will remain a venture whose risks outweigh the considerable gains. These have increased sharply as the Soviet use of Cuba as a surrogate and as a base for intervention has increased. Neutralizing this intervention is becoming increasingly costly, compared to the alternative of neutralizing it at the source.

In terms of long-term U.S. interests, the Soviet alliance forced on Cuba must be regarded as an unacceptable state of affairs, to be remedied when favorable circumstances permit. This is doubly so because of the U.S. obligation to the interests of the Cuban population in securing democratic self-government and independence. And Cuba is very vulnerable to U.S. seapower.

In alliance terms, the removal of the Soviet-controlled government of Cuba would be of major substantive and symbolic significance, particularly following the fall of a similar
government in Grenada and the probable fall of the one in Nicaragua. Substantively, it would greatly ease the security problems facing the U.S. and her allies on two continents, South America and Africa. Symbolically, it would show that no Soviet-controlled government outside East Europe could depend on Soviet support to protect them from their own people. It would imply that not even the Communist Party governments of Eastern Europe, perhaps even the CPSU itself, could feel secure in the long run.

The U.S. strategy of horizontal escalation tacitly recognizes the advantages that would accrue from liberating Cuba, by implying that this could occur in retaliation for Soviet aggression of a sufficiently serious nature. U.S. policymakers should not lose sight of this point, which is so important in geopolitical and alliance terms.

Elsewhere in South America, the prospect for the successful U.S. development of an effective and appropriately-differentiated alliance structure seems excellent. As with all effective alliances, this one will encounter short-term difficulties and differences contributing to its long-term stability. From a geopolitical viewpoint, it should be added that if the U.S. cannot protect her interests in the continent nearest to her, where her advantage in seapower is greatest, she would be admitting that she could not continue to function as a superpower, and she thus would be advised to sue for terms from the Soviets.
PART IV

CONCLUSIONS

Chapter 11:

Naval Considerations

The nature of the future alliance systems means that an important distinction has emerged between the USN's contribution to achieving U.S. objectives in the central and in the peripheral alliances. Because the Navy has concentrated on the former, it may now need to give more attention to the latter. This will have important implications for training, especially of senior naval personnel, as well as modest but significant ones for procurement.

In the central U.S. alliance system, the USN's role is to help deter, or, if deterrence fails, win total war with the U.S.S.R. If this occurs, it may remain a largely conventional one. The USN would then have to perform the classic wartime functions of a sea power: helping to contain its land power adversary where it is strongest and to attack it where it is weakest.

The importance of these USN major war functions cannot be stressed too highly. The U.S. must win a major war with the U.S.S.R. for the same reason she has been, and will be, compelled to lead what is now a coalition of four power centers against the Soviet one: the U.S. is the only
superpower which can hold the balance against the Soviet superpower in a Cold War or win a hot war. America's allies can tilt the balance in her favor in both conflicts, but they cannot win either without her. The USN must thus be prepared for a protracted conventional war with the U.S.S.R., as well as for a shorter nuclear one. Understandably, the Navy's resources, analytical as well as material, have been focused on this central alliance role, although more consideration needs to be given to the utilization of America's major alliance assets in a long conventional war.

But in terms of U.S. alliance objectives, the USN's contribution to achieving these may be greatest in the peripheral alliances. This certainly has important implications for planning, training and procurement. Securing U.S. objectives in the peripheral alliances would also maximize the USN's and United States' chances for victory in total war.

For a maritime insular power like the U.S., its Navy is its primary means of power projection, along with associated ground and air forces. These mainly consist of the U.S. Marine Corps, the 82nd Airborne and 101st Air Assault Divisions and the Special Forces, plus some of the Army's new light infantry divisions. Yet, because the USN is optimized for winning a major war, it may be less effective in its power projection role than is necessary or desirable. Maximizing its effectiveness in this role, which is likely to be its main role between now and 2010, will not require major shifts in
procurement. It will require increased emphasis on preparing to fight more limited conflicts, particularly rapid interventions in support of regional allies (directly and indirectly), and on neutralizing Soviet forces and proxies in their power projection attempts.

To suggest that a U.S. Navy optimized in terms of training and material to win a war with the Soviet Navy may not be adequately prepared for the limited wars it is likely to be fighting is to apply a lesson regularly and painfully relearned by the major navies of the world.

Most recently, it was relearned by the Royal Navy in the Falklands War. A Navy optimized for ASW in the Atlantic in conjunction with land-based and U.S. carrier air support found itself fighting a land-based Argentinian Air Force over 8,000 miles from the U.K., while covering an opposed amphibious landing. It is illustrative of the kind of problem the USN can lessen by considering its role in supporting U.S. geopolitical interests. The Royal Navy had made no serious preparations for this war, even though it had been a real possibility for over a decade. A similar lack of preparation for a conflict that was also a real possibility affected U.S. operations in Grenada.

Historically, this is a familiar problem. Naval and military forces configured for one kind of operation usually encounter difficulties in mounting other kinds of operations. These difficulties are increased if, as in the kinds of operations the USN may well be required to undertake, the
technical difficulties are compounded by the need to balance military and political considerations.

In this century, the most important failure to overcome such problems was that of the British and allied forces at Gallipoli. The total naval and military resources available were almost certainly adequate to force the Dardenelles Straits but were not fully deployed to do so. Those that were available were badly employed by local commanders and their staffs, who were unable to understand the nature of the operation they were engaged in or the value of their objective.

Three striking examples of the kinds of problems encountered are illustrative. First, the November 3, 1914 bombardment of the Outer Defences was not followed up but alerted the Turkish-German defenders to the weakness of the Straits. Second, the January 1915 despatch of the new battleship Queen Elizabeth, whose 15-inch main battery was regarded as potentially decisive (as it would have been in a naval engagement) proved ineffective against land fortifications. The British also risked losing their best capital unit, at a time when their margin of supremacy over the German High Seas Fleet was minimal or non-existent. Third, was the failure to treat expendable pre-dreadnought battleships as expendable. In the March 18, 1915 attack, the Anglo-French naval forces lost three pre-dreadnoughts (one an antique) and sustained moderate to serious damage to four pre-dreadnoughts and one dreadnought battle cruiser totally
unsuited for this operation. In terms of the allied reserves of pre-dreadnoughts (about 60), after allowing for other commitments and taking into account the value of the objective, these losses were negligible. In terms conventional naval thinking, which regarded the loss of even pre-dreadnought battleships as major, they seemed catastrophic. The British Commander, Admiral De Robeck, broke off the attack and withdrew.

During World War II, the difficulties in mounting amphibious operations corresponding to those now required for power projection were overcome, but only through a process of trial and error and at a high cost in lives and equipment. The U.S. could not afford comparable costs in future limited wars. The 1942-45, U.S. defeat of Japan in the Pacific and the Allied D-day landings were preceded by the initial Guadalcanal landings, where U.S. forces came dangerously close to defeat, and the Dieppe Raid, a disaster for the Anglo-Canadian forces involved.

During the Cold War, naval operations that differed from those the navies involved had regarded as their main tasks have included, for the USN, the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the 1962 quarantine of Cuba and the liberation of Grenada. For the Royal Navy, they have included the Korean War, the 1956 capture of Port Said (with the French Navy), the confrontation with Indonesia, the so-called "Cod War" with Iceland and the Falklands War.
These historical examples emphasize that successful maritime power projection operations require, besides adequate forces, appropriate equipment and training, neither of which can be safely improvised. They also require a clear understanding of the relationship between the costs of achieving the military objectives and the value of the political ones involved. This understanding is particularly difficult to achieve, since it requires clear, effective communications between the senior military and political authorities, each with very different terms of reference. Achieving such an understanding was one of the major British successes in the Falklands War.

The U.S. thus will need to prepare for such operations at an intellectual as well as an operational level. The importance of having senior naval and military commanders who understand the principles of power projection operations cannot be overstated. It is clearly impossible to predict precisely when, where and how U.S. forces will have to engage in these operations. What can be done in advance is to identify the forms they are likely to take, the U.S. and allied geopolitical interests that will have to be protected, the kinds of opposition likely to be encountered and the equipment and training U.S. forces will require. Thereafter, U.S. power projection forces will have to be adapted to deal with particular contingencies as they arise.

The capabilities of appropriately-trained power projection forces under commanders who understood the military
and political aspects of their operations was demonstrated by the British in their creation of an Empire that eventually controlled a quarter of the world's population. Their power projection operations in the Eighteenth Century (really to 1815) will be particularly relevant to the U.S. from 1985 until 2010, because her situation will be similar. The British were containing a superior European land power, France, through a series of alliances supported primarily by their superior economic resources and only modestly (after 1712) by British Army detachments. While France was contained within Europe, Britain used her superior maritime forces to launch selective attacks on French overseas possessions and allies with the British Army and its local allies. These operations yielded large gains for moderate military investments, even though undertaken in the face of a French navy that was only slightly inferior in quality and numbers.

A striking example of intelligent improvisation in power projection operations were those conducted by the British and their American colonies from 1754 to 1760, securing British control of French Canada. The forces involved were not trained specifically for these operations but were trained for and, particularly in the case of the senior commanders, experienced in this type of operation. They were thus able to adapt to the different challenges that arose.

From a naval viewpoint, major changes in the structure of alliances or of naval power seem unlikely. The USN will, need to remain sensitive, though, to changes in naval
technology and tactics which may increase the potential costs of its power projection operations or jeopardize U.S. and allied interests.

Such changes would include improvements in the capabilities of smaller naval powers to deny passage through key transit points or to threaten maritime assets, notably oil tankers and drilling rigs. The structure of the international naval and air arms trade means that the USN will need to monitor developments in weapons systems sold by U.S. allies as well as by the Soviets, while allowing for the possible use of U.S.-supplied weapons against U.S. or allied forces. In their different ways, the French Exocet missile and Iran's use of U.S. equipment against Iraq are typical of the problems likely to be increasingly encountered in the future.

It will be for the USN to consider the operational implications of power projection operations against small or medium-sized naval and air powers, with or without Soviet support, direct and indirect. But three illustrative examples of the kinds of questions that need to be posed are as follows.

First, under what circumstances are U.S. political authorities likely to authorize or restrict the commitment of CV/BB battle groups to combat? What are likely to be the political, as well as naval, implications of serious damage to, or loss of, a U.S. capital unit? Whatever the ability of U.S. battlegroups to defeat or withstand attack, there is always the danger of the attack which succeeds against the
odds. (In 1941, the Royal Navy crippled Germany's newest battleship, Bismarck, with one torpedo hit from an uncoordinated strike by fifteen obsolete Swordfish torpedo-bombers.)

Second, are the Navy's knowledge of and its ASW capabilities against modern diesel-electric (DE) submarines adequate? These submarines represent one of the main weapons of small, sophisticated, naval powers. Yet, the U.S. is retiring the last of its DE submarines and thus will have to rely on her allies for its knowledge of their capabilities. This may create a number of problems, including the inevitable tendency of any service to underestimate the effectiveness of a weapons system they have discarded. (In the interwar years, the U.S. Navy removed the torpedo tubes from its cruisers while the Japanese retained and improved theirs, which later proved surprisingly effective in combat.)

Third, are U.S. mine warfare capabilities, offensive and defensive, adequate to deal with the threats likely to be encountered in interventions or in situations that could trigger them? Mine warfare was a traditional strength of the Russian Navy, costing the Japanese two battleships in the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War. The Red Fleet has built on this legacy. The effectiveness of mine warfare was demonstrated in World War II by the U.S. and German Navies' operations against their enemy's merchant and combat fleets. In the Cold War, mines have three political advantages. They are passive
offensive weapons, they can be laid covertly and their ownership is deniable. These advantages were demonstrated in the recent episode of the (probably) Soviet mines, laid (probably) by their Libyan ally to disrupt shipping using the territorial waters of America's Egyptian ally.

Overview

The main naval implications of the future structure of alliances is that the USN's chief role will be as an instrument of power projection. The Navy will have to support U.S. allies and secure U.S. interests while preventing the Soviets from supporting their allies. So the wars the USN is most likely to fight will be at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, ranging from shows of force, through interventions and blockades, to wars with small and medium naval powers, sometimes supported by the Soviets. Historical experience strongly suggests that unless the USN has thought through and trained to fight such conflicts, at best it will risk heavier casualties, at worst, defeat.

The risks of defeat in limited conflicts are significant because of the domestic political constraints in the United States on the full employment of its military power and the understandable sensitivity to American casualties. Despite this, the U.S. must be prepared to fight such conflicts where necessary to protect her interests and maintain her alliance systems, which are the long-term assets needed to defeat the Soviets. To reconcile these two conflicting requirements, the
USN will need to be able to fight and win limited conflicts quickly and with relatively low casualties.

It will be for the USN to develop the operational requirements for executing power projection operations. These requirements are likely to be more demanding in the training than the material area. They will include the need to consider how small-but-sophisticated hostile navies plus the Red Fleet might oppose such operations, exploiting political as well as technical U.S. vulnerabilities. Here, as elsewhere, the relevant U.S. allies will be a major asset in terms of their additional naval expertise, as well as in supplying regional information.

This emphasis on the USN's role in limited power projection conflicts is not meant to lessen the importance of the Navy's overriding objective, defeating the Red Fleet in a full-scale war, conventional or nuclear. But success in these lesser conflicts will also increase the chances that U.S.-U.S.S.R. conflict could be kept primarily conventional, increasing, in turn, the USN's need to develop a coherent maritime strategy for this eventuality. If, though, the USN concentrates all its energies, particularly its intellectual ones, on defeating the Red Fleet in a total war, it may be less able to defeat the Soviets in the great game of alliance building. And the meta-stability of the balance of nuclear deterrence makes it likely that this game will be played from now until 2010.
Thus far, the U.S. has won it. To maintain this record of success, the U.S. Navy has to be prepared to win the naval wars of power projection and to aid the other elements of the United States' power projection forces in their preparations for winning.
Chapter 12:  
Twenty-First Century Alliances

This analysis has sought the answers to two questions. First, how will the structure of alliances evolve between now and 2010? Second, what will be the naval implications of this evolution, particularly on U.S. geopolitical objectives and the naval means used to secure them? The introduction of nuclear weapons has created a sharp distinction between the nuclear alliances -- with new rules of (limited) competition -- and non-nuclear alliance with traditional rules of (unlimited) competition. So the answers to both questions fall into two parts: one dealing with the nuclear, central alliances, and the other with the non-nuclear, peripheral, alliances and the USN's role in each.

The central alliance systems have been, and will be, characterized by stable balances of nuclear deterrence. Nuclear forces have proved largely unusable for the achievement of political objectives in the traditional Clausewitzian sense. They have also deterred the large-scale use of conventional forces. Since the nuclear alliance systems have proved meta-stable, their structure will remain essentially the same through 2010.

The peripheral alliance systems have been, and will be, characterized by unstable balances of conventional deterrence and, where nuclear proliferation occurs, potentially unstable balances of (small-scale) nuclear deterrence. Conventional
forces have remained eminently usable in the traditional
Clausewitzian manner, both by local powers and by the nuclear
powers, directly and by proxy. So, the conventional alliance
systems have proved extremely unstable, particularly where the
U.S. has failed to oppose Soviet intervention. The basis for
a more stable structure of peripheral alliances, however, is
emerging and can be secured by appropriate U.S. and allied
efforts.

The naval objectives of the U.S. and the role of the USN
in securing them are thus a mixture of the very new and the
very old.

In terms of the nuclear alliance systems, the U.S. has to
deter a major war, nuclear or conventional, and win it if
deterrence fails. Primarily, this means deterring or
defeating a Soviet attack on West Europe. The Navy helps
secure this objective by contributing to the United States'
strategic and theater nuclear forces and by providing the
escorting forces for U.S. reinforcements to Europe. It also
provides much of the power projection forces needed to
implement the strategy of horizontal escalations.

The U.S. alliance with Western Europe will remain the key
to the U.S. alliance system's containment of the U.S.S.R. The
U.S. commitment to preserve West Europe's independence will
also remain active, although the number of U.S. ground forces
in NATO-Europe may be reduced. The USN will thus have to
preserve its ability to defeat the Soviet Navy and protect
U.S. reinforcements to Western Europe.
Any major changes in the European alliance system would most likely take the form of one or more Warsaw Pact members joining an enlarged NATO or, in East Germany's case, uniting with West Germany, although neither of these occurrences is highly likely to take place in this time frame. U.S. interest would dictate a continued guarantee of an enlarged NATO and hence a continuation of the USN's contribution to deterring or defeating an attack on America's European ally.

U.S. objectives and the Navy's contribution to them in her alliance with the Japan-ROK-Taiwan power center are the same, in principle, as those in West Europe -- to deter or defeat a Soviet attack on it. In addition, the U.S. has to guarantee the ROK against an attack by North Korea, which might be supported by either China or the U.S.S.R., and Taiwan against a Chinese attempt at forcible reunification. As a hedge against future uncertainties, the U.S. must also provide a guarantee of this power center against China should she become hostile, an unlikely but possible development.

In geopolitical terms, the rationale for the U.S. guarantee of the European and Asian power centers remains George Kennan's, as modified in this analysis: there are only five power centers in the world. Two of them are the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. So as long as the Soviets remain a threat to essential American interests, the U.S. must prevent the U.S.S.R. from gaining control of any of the other three centers, West Europe, Japan and China. The extent of the threat the Soviets have posed with their own resources (and
East Europe's) emphasizes that the U.S. cannot afford to allow the Soviets to control even one more power center.

This is particularly true in terms of maritime strategy. The European power center controls the Soviet access routes to the Atlantic, the Japanese power center controls those to the Pacific. Soviet control of either would enable them to seize control over their access to the relevant ocean, denying the U.S. the control of the seas essential for her security. Europe and Japan are also the only centers other than the superpowers to possess modern naval forces. These include Europe's modest but very useful power projection forces. Their synergistic value, when combined with those of the U.S., is surprisingly high and extends over all the major oceans. Europe, as a whole, is the world's third largest naval power while Japan is, potentially, the fourth.

The fifth power center, China, is an emerging but (subject to the reservations noted in Chapter 6) potentially major one. Provided China can continue to build a balance of nuclear deterrence versus the Soviets, the Sino-Soviet competition in Asia and India will be played in the traditional mode. In maritime terms, China can become an important U.S. ally, helping contain further Soviet expansion in South-East Asia, neutralizing their Vietnamese ally and, in wartime, accelerating the destruction of the Soviet's Pacific Fleet and its Vladivostok base.

The U.S. alliance with the European and Japanese power centers (plus the unofficial one with China) has been
remarkably successful to date. Soviet attempts to control or
destroy them have been deterred or defeated. Above all, the
U.S. has created genuine alliance systems, based on a
combination of common primary interests (independence and
survival) and a tolerance for divergent secondary interests.
It is the U.S. ability to tolerate differences that is the
central difference between her system of genuine alliances and
the Soviet Union's one of enforced alliances.

The Soviet failure to create genuine alliances may be
its geopolitical Achilles heel. This is particularly striking
and serious in East Europe, but it is also evident in the
Third World. The two main Soviet allies there are the
pro-Soviet governments of Cuba and Vietnam, maintained in
power by their military and police forces with substantial
Soviet support. These allies, under Soviet direction, have
conquered considerable territory but are experiencing
difficulty in holding it.

The major U.S. objective outside her central (nuclear)
alliance with the other three power centers must be to
continue this rollback of existing Soviet Imperial conquests
and to prevent new ones. In Mackinder's terms, the U.S. is
the insular sea power competing for supremacy with the
heartland land power, the U.S.S.R. Accordingly, the U.S. must
identify those areas which are of crucial geographic and
economic importance and ensure that these are under her
control or the control of friendly governments. These areas
include the key straits through which shipping must pass, the
major oil production centers and those for essential minerals. To secure this control, the U.S. must use the USN, USMC and those rapidly-deployable components of her Army and Air Force.

The Navy will thus have two central roles to play in securing U.S. strategic objectives between now and 2010. First, within the nuclear alliance structure, the USN must, with allied support, deter or defeat the naval element of a Soviet attack on one or more of the three U.S.-allied power centers. In addition, the USN must contribute to the defeat of the land and air elements of the Soviet attack by an appropriate projection of U.S. and allied power against the U.S.S.R.'s weak points -- the classic strategy of maritime powers. Second, within the peripheral but important alliance systems, the USN must act as the main U.S. power projection force to support U.S. allies in the Third World. This will continue to be characterized by internal instability, the use of force to secure political objectives, and Soviet intervention, directly and indirectly.

Because the first role is crucial, the USN has usually concentrated on it, particularly on winning the first phase of a major war by destroying the Soviet Fleet. More attention thus needs to be given to the second phase, destroying Soviet land and air power, and the optimal strategic deployment of U.S. and allied power projection forces.

The second role is, however, the one the USN is likely to be most active in between now and 2010. The meta-stability of the nuclear alliance system will probably be maintained,
making the main arena of competition between the U.S.-led
alliance systems and the Soviets, the Third World. So, the
USN likely will have to act, repeatedly, in a traditional
maritime power projection role involving it in the full
spectrum of limited conflicts.

The importance of adequate preparation, particularly in
terms of training, is underlined by the history of such
operations. When undertaken by properly-trained forces, these
operations have yielded large politico-military gains for
relatively modest military investments and limited casualties.
When undertaken by forces unprepared for such operations,
these operations have failed to produce the hoped for gains
and incurred large losses.

The USN and USMC have had considerable experience with
this kind of operation, starting with those of 1801-1805
against the Barbary Pirates. The 1898 Spanish-American War
was rightly regarded by Assistant Secretary of the Navy (and
future President) Theodore Roosevelt and those senior Navy
officers who had understood Admiral Mahan's explanation of
Britain's use of maritime power as a singularly successful
power projection operation. In the inter-war years, the
Marine Corps pioneered amphibious warfare techniques used so
successfully in World War II. In the Cold War they acted in
every conceivable power projection role from the symbolic to
the limited war ends of the conflict spectrum. Until the
Vietnam War, the commitment of USN and USMC forces was always
successful in achieving its politico-military objectives,
although there were some failures to commit them when U.S. interests would have been served by doing so. One of these, of course, was allowing Castro to consolidate his power and thereby turn Cuba into a Soviet base.

But in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, there has been an understandable but unfortunate American unwillingness to face the unavoidable necessity of containing the Soviet Union by maintaining her alliance systems, central and peripheral, and protecting her geopolitical interests with power projection forces. This unwillingness to think in geopolitical terms reached its zenith in the Carter Administration which at one point considered abolishing the Marine Corps. Its reductions in the shipbuilding portions of the defense budget were so serious as to threaten the USN's continuing contribution to the central U.S. alliances -- an occurrence which focused the Navy's attention on preserving its maritime capabilities at all costs.

Now that the Reagan Administration has restored the U.S. commitment to containment and funded the 600 ship navy, it is important that the USN be fully prepared for its power projection role. In material terms, its preparations are adequate, although capable of improvement, given the considerations suggested in this analysis. In intellectual terms, its preparations may not be adequate. It is not clear that the USN, especially its senior officer corps, fully understands and appreciates the importance of its power
projection role and its vital contribution to the U.S. alliances system underpinning her basic interests.

The failure to articulate the case for a 600 ship navy in its most convincing geopolitical terms is suggestive of such a lack of understanding. However, this is also lacking in much of the U.S. analytical, political and media communities.

It is thus doubly important that the Navy have within its own ranks the necessary understanding of its contribution to U.S. alliances, particularly the neglected one to the peripheral alliances. This is necessary, first, for the successful conduct of the majority of the operations the USN will be required to undertake between now and 2010; and, second, for the Navy to justify its requirements and explain its operations to the relevant American and allied constituencies.

This second consideration assumes a particular importance in the light of the USN/USMC losses incurred in two power projection operations which failed to achieve their primary objectives: the Vietnam War and the recent Lebanon "peacekeeping" operation. The services primarily responsible for this type of operation must know why they are necessary, how they are to be conducted and what their costs are likely to be. They must also know when they are not necessary, not feasible, or not feasible at acceptable costs, within the parameters desired by the President and his advisors.

Historically, however, service advisors with a professional understanding of the operational problems involved often have
been more realistic in their assessments of the potential costs and benefits of power projection operations than have the political authorities. Moreover, because these operations are politico-military ones, the relationship between military and political considerations is necessarily a complex one, in which means affect ends and vice-versa. The USN/USMC must be able to advise on the importance of a geopolitical objective and on the feasibility of securing it.

The level of understanding of the principles of maritime power projection that will be required of the USN is a high one. It requires the kind of understanding of Mahan's exposition of these principles and of their application to U.S. strategic policy that Teddy Roosevelt and his colleagues had. One institution well able to develop it within the United States Navy is one of the lasting legacies of the Roosevelt-Mahan era, the U.S. Naval War College.

Overview

For the U.S. Navy, the future structure of alliances means that it will have to function in the classic maritime power projection mode required by America's insular position. Her post-war alliance system designed to contain the U.S.S.R., or, if necessary, defeat her in a total war, will remain essentially unchanged because the basic structure of the international system it reflects is not likely to change. Through 2010, the five power centers will remain the U.S., the
U.S.S.R., West Europe, Japan and China. The U.S. will still have to lead a four-power alliance against the U.S.S.R., maintaining the central, nuclear alliance systems. Outside this, the U.S. will have to support her geopolitical interests in her peripheral but important alliances in the Middle East, Africa, the Pacific and Indian Oceans and South America.

This situation has two important implications for the USN and the associated U.S. power projection forces. First, in terms of their contribution to the central U.S. alliance system, they should develop the followthrough for the defeat of the Red Fleet that will remain their overriding objective. Once this had been achieved, a prolonged (largely) conventional war would see the U.S. implementing its horizontal escalation strategy, utilizing its superior alliance system. Second, in terms of its contribution to the peripheral U.S. alliance system, the USN should refine its ability to fight and win limited conflicts.

To maximize its effectiveness in its power projection mode, the USN should develop a full understanding of the principles of geopolitics and maritime strategy as developed and applied by other naval powers from the Roman to the British Empires. The extent to which these principles and the policies of earlier maritime powers indicate both what the U.S. should do until 2010, and how the USN should do it, is remarkable. Properly prepared at the intellectual and operational levels, the USN will be able to adapt to the full range of contingencies which it will be asked to meet and will
be able to act in support of U.S. geopolitical interests. Ultimately, these include the victory of the U.S. alliance system over the U.S.S.R.
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