THE GROUP CONSENSUS PROBLEM

by

Kiduck Chung

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Kiduck Chang*

ORC 85-13 December 1985

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ABSTRACT

In a group consensus problem, there is a group with $K \geq 2$ members who are jointly responsible for the aggregation of their opinions. The group may or may not have a predefined real decision problem. French [1983] called the group consensus problem with a predefined real decision problem a group decision problem and the group consensus problem without a real decision problem a text-book problem.

Suppose a group with $K$ members are interested in forecasting demands for a commodity for a given time period. Production planning for this commodity depends on demands. Each group member may have his own opinion for demands in the form of probability distribution. In this case, the group has a real decision problem in which they should determine the amount of the commodity to be produced. Here the group consensus opinion is a probability distribution for demands obtained from the group members' prior opinions for demands.

On the other hand, a group may simply be required to give their opinions for others to use at some time in the future in as yet undefined circumstances. Here, there is no predefined decision problem. For example, a group of meteorologists are required to give a single forecast for weather without having any real decision problem. This is an example of the text-book problem. Savage [1954] suggested that the whole of statistical theory is directly or indirectly aimed at the solution of a version of the text-book problem.

The objective of this paper is to give a unified approach for these two problems. In this paper, all the group members are assumed to be Bayesians. Keywords:
THE GROUP CONSENSUS PROBLEM

1.1. Introduction

In a group consensus problem, there is a group with \( K \geq 2 \) members who are jointly responsible for the aggregation of their opinions. The group may or may not have a predefined real decision problem. French [1983] called the group consensus problem with a predefined real decision problem a group decision problem and the group consensus problem without a real decision problem a text-book problem.

Suppose a group with \( K \) members are interested in forecasting demands for a commodity for a given time period. Production planning for this commodity depends on demands. Each group member may have his own opinion for demands in the form of probability distribution. In this case, the group has a real decision problem in which they should determine the amount of the commodity to be produced. Here the group consensus opinion is a probability distribution for demands obtained from the group members' prior opinions for demands.

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The objective of this paper is to give a unified approach for these two problems. In this paper all the group members are assumed to be Bayesians.

The Group Decision Problem

Suppose the group is faced with a decision problem with an action space \( A \) and a state space \( \Theta \). The group members must jointly determine a decision or action from \( A \). The outcome of any action depends on the state of the world \( \theta \in \Theta \). Each member provides his beliefs
and preferences by a subjective probability for $\theta$, $p_\theta$, and utility function, $v_\theta$, defined on $A \times \Theta$, respectively. Thus each member has a preference ordering $\preceq$ for actions in $A$ defined by

$$a_1 \preceq a_2 \iff E[v_\theta(a_1, \theta)] \leq E[v_\theta(a_2, \theta)],$$

(1.1)

where $E$, denotes expectation with respect to the probability distribution $p_\theta$.

Most approaches (e.g., Bacharach [1975]) to this problem assume the existence of a group preference ordering $\preceq^G$ on $A$ such that there is a probability distribution $p_G$ and a utility function $v_G$ satisfying

$$a_1 \preceq^G a_2 \iff E_G[v_G(a_1, \theta)] \leq E_G[v_G(a_2, \theta)],$$

where $E_G$ denotes expectation with respect to $p_G$. However, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem (Arrow [1951], Kelly [1978]) shows that there is no fair way of forming a group preference ordering from the individual preference orderings alone. One interpretation of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is that, in general, there is no procedure for combining individual preference orderings into a group preference ordering that does not explicitly address the question of interpersonal comparison of preferences (Keeney and Raiffa [1976]). Hence Arrow's Impossibility Theorem requires that some constraints be given on the possible forms of the individual preference orderings in order to obtain a group preference ordering which is consistent with the seemingly innocuous Assumptions given by Arrow. (For these Assumptions, see Arrow [1951] or Keeney and Raiffa [1976]). The restriction on the form of the individual preference ordering, however, does not give a fair rule for combining the individual orderings except in the case that either the members share the same utilities, or they share the same probabilities (Raiffa [1968], Bacharach [1975]). Here "fair" means that the group consensus opinion should satisfy the Pareto Optimality Principle and the group consensus opinion can not be a single individual's opinion. The Pareto Optimality Principle is satisfied if there exists no alternative decision that some member would find better and none would find worse.

Bacharach [1975] considers the individual preference orderings derived from the expected utilities as given by equation (1.1). But he has arrived at an impossibility theorem, which says
that there is no fair way of combining the individual orderings when the individuals disagree on their utilities. When the group members share the same utilities, he showed that the group consensus probability is given by a linear opinion pool. But he needs a set of assumptions for the form of individual preferences, which are too strong in some cases. One of these assumptions is "column linearity", which says that, for any four actions $a_k$, $a_i$, $a_j$, $a_l$ in $A$, if $E,v,(a_k,\theta) - E,v,(a_i,\theta) = E,v,(a_j,\theta) - E,v,(a_j,\theta)$ for all $i$, then $a_k \leq^G a_i$ implies $a_k \leq^G a_j$.

Hence we can not consider Bacharach's result as a justification for the linear opinion pool in the case where the individuals share the same utilities.

In a different way from Bacharach, de Finetti claimed that, in a group decision problem, a collective action by several individuals, who agree on their evaluations of utility (by reducing it, for instance, to monetary terms) but not on those of the probabilities, must be optimal for a hypothetical individual whose opinion is convexly comprised among those of the real individuals concerned (de Finetti [1972], p. 196). He suggested this conjecture by an example of a simple hypothesis testing problem (de Finetti [1954]). But de Finetti's conjecture does not imply that the group consensus opinion must be a convex combination of the group members' opinions. Moreover, de Finetti's conjecture is not necessarily true when the group is not allowed to take a randomized action as will be seen in Example 1.3.

Let $X$ be the set of all probability mass or density functions for $\theta$. For any $x \in X$, the $i$th group member can determine an action $a_i(x) \in A$ which is optimal against $x$ in $i$'s opinion, that is,

$$E,v,(a_i(x),\theta) = \max_{a \in A} \sum_{x(\theta)} x(\theta)v,(a,\theta).$$

So for each $x \in X$, there corresponds $a_i(x)$ for $i=1, \ldots, K$. Then we can transform the utility $v$, on $A \times \Theta$ to a utility function $u$, on $X \times \Theta$, which will be discussed in Section 1.2. In this paper we will work with $u$, on $X \times \Theta$ rather than $v$, on $A \times \Theta$ to determine the group consensus opinion in a group decision problem. In other words, the group determines its consensus opinion from $X$ based on the individual utilities $u$, on $X \times \Theta$ and their prior opinions.
for θ under the Pareto Optimality Principle. This means that we transform the real decision problem with action space A and state space Θ to a decision problem with decision space X and state space Θ. We will discuss this in more detail in Section 1.2.

The Text-Book Problem

One approach to this problem is to introduce a supra decision maker and let him update his beliefs as in the expert problem (Keeney and Raiffa [1976]). However, his updated opinion is his subjective or personal probability. Hence there is no guarantee that the group members will agree with his opinion. His opinion is only data for the individuals concerned.

An alternative way is to let each group member assume the role of the supra decision maker and then report his updated opinion in turn. However, it does not solve the fundamental problem of combining their opinions, if, after several iterations of this process, the opinions of the group have not yet converged (Genest and Zidek [1984]).

The approach suggested in this paper is to treat the text-book problem as a version of the group decision problem. As mentioned before, the group decision problem can be considered as a decision problem with decision space X and state space Θ, where each group member has a utility function u, defined on X x Θ. In the text-book problem, there are no actions to be chosen by the group. But we can consider a group consensus opinion as a group decision to be determined by the group. It is assumed that each group member has a utility function u, defined on X x Θ. For each x ∈ X, u(x, Θ) is group member i’s utility for the group opinion x ∈ X when the state of the world is Θ ∈ Θ. The utility u(·,·) can be interpreted as i’s evaluation of probability distributions for Θ or i’s psychological value for the probability distribution which is chosen as a group consensus opinion. Group members will be more satisfied if the group consensus opinion gives high probability for the actual outcome Θ.

We can consider the text-book problem as a version of the group decision problem with decision space X and state space Θ, and individual utility functions u, defined on X x Θ. The only difference between the group decision problem and the text-book problem is that in a
A utility function $u_i$ is proper if
\[ \sum_{\theta} p_i(\theta)u_i(p_i, \theta) \geq \sum_{\theta} p_i(\theta)u_i(x_i, \theta) \] (1.2)
for all $x \in X$, where $p_i$ is $i$'s true opinion for $\theta$.

$u_i$ is strictly proper if the inequality in (1.2) is strict for all $x \neq p_i$ in $X$.

The above definition says that if an individual has a proper utility function, then he will announce his true opinion as his opinion for $\theta$, that is, he is honest in announcing his opinion.

For each $x \in X$, there corresponds an action $a_i^*(x) \in A$ such that
\[ \sum_{\theta} x(\theta)v([a_i^*(x), \theta]) = \max_{a_i \in A} \sum_{\theta} x(\theta)v([a_i, \theta]). \]
Notice that $a_i^*(x)$ is a Bayes action against $x \in X$ for the $i$th group member. For convenience we assume that $a_i^*(x)$ is unique for each $x \in X$. We will relax this assumption later.
Now define a function $u$, on $X \times \Theta$:

$$u_i(x, \theta) = v_i[a^*_i(x), \theta] \quad \text{for } x \in X \text{ and } \theta \in \Theta. \quad (1.3)$$

We can interpret $u_i(x, \theta)$ as $i$'s utility when $i$ uses distribution $x \in X$ and $\theta$ occurs. Let $p \in X$ be $i$'s true opinion for $\theta$. Then $i$'s expected utility for $x \in X$ is

$$\overline{u}_i(x) = \sum_{\theta} p(\theta) u_i(x, \theta)$$

$$= \sum_{\theta} p(\theta) v_i[a^*_i(x), \theta].$$

We can interpret $\overline{u}_i(x)$ as $i$'s expected utility when $i$ takes an action which is optimal against $x$, while his true opinion is $p$. Hence $\overline{u}_i(x)$ is $i$'s expected utility for $x$ when $i$'s true opinion is $p$.

Thus we can use $u_i$ defined by (1.3) as $i$'s utility function on $X \times \Theta$. From now on, we can assume that each member of the group has a utility function $u_i$ defined on $X \times \Theta$.

**Lemma 1.1.** $u_i$, defined by equation (1.3) is proper.

**Proof**

Suppose $i$'s true opinion is $p \in X$. Then for any $x \in X$

$$\overline{u}_i(x) = \sum_{\theta} p(\theta) u_i(x, \theta)$$

$$= \sum_{\theta} p(\theta) v_i[a^*_i(x), \theta]$$

$$\leq \max_{a \in A} \sum_{\theta} p(\theta) v_i(a, \theta)$$

$$= \sum_{\theta} p(\theta) v_i[a^*(p), \theta]$$

$$= \sum_{\theta} p(\theta) u_i(p, \theta)$$

$$= \overline{u}_i(p).$$

This is true for any $p \in X$. Therefore $u_i$ is proper. \(\square\)

Note that (i) $u_i$ is not necessarily strictly proper, (ii) if $v_i$'s are equivalent up to linear transformations, then $u_i$'s are also equivalent, and (iii) $u_i$ is strictly proper if and only if $a^*_i : X \rightarrow A$ is one to one.
Definition

We say that two utility functions \( u \) and \( u' \) on \( X \times \Theta \) are equivalent if there exist real numbers \( a > 0 \) and \( b \) such that \( u'(\cdot, \cdot) = au(\cdot, \cdot) + b \).

Actually, \( b \) could depend on \( \theta \) and the maximizing decisions would still be the same.

Example 1.1.

Let \( \Theta = \{0, 1\} \) and \( A = \{a : 0 < a < 1\} \), where \( a \in A \). Any distribution for \( \theta \) is represented by a real number \( x \in [0, 1] \), where \( x \) is a probability for the event \( \{\theta = 1\} \). So \( X = \{0, 1\} \).

Suppose \( v_r(a, \theta) = -(a-\theta)^2 \), i.e., a negative of the quadratic loss, and \( i \)'s true opinion for \( \theta \) is \( p, \in X \). For any \( x \in X \),

\[
\max_{a \in A} \{x \cdot v_r(a, 1) + (1-x) \cdot v_r(a, 0)\} = \max_{a \in A} \{-x(a-1)^2 - (1-x)a^2\} = -x(1-x)
\]

and \( a^*(x) = x \). Hence \( u_r(x, \theta) = v_r(x, \theta) = -(x-\theta)^2 \) for all \( x \in X \) and \( \theta \in \Theta \). We can easily check that \( u_r \) is strictly proper.  

Example 1.2.

Let \( \Theta = \{0, 1\} \) and \( A = \{a : 0 < a < 1\} \), where \( a \in A \) is an estimate of \( \theta \). Let \( X \) be the set of all probability densities for \( \theta \). Suppose \( v_r(a, \theta) = -(a-\theta)^2 \) and \( i \)'s true opinion for \( \theta \) is \( p, \in X \). Then for any \( x \in X \)

\[
\max_{a \in A} \int v_r(a, \theta) x(\theta) d\theta = -\min_{a \in A} \int (a-\theta)^2 x(\theta) d\theta \\
= -\min_{a \in A} \{a^2 - 2ax + ax^2\} \\
= -\min_{a \in A} \{(a - E_x \theta)^2 + E_x \theta^2 - E_x^2 \theta \},
\]

where \( E_x \) denotes expectation with respect to \( x \in X \).

From (1) we can see that \( a^*(x) = E_x \theta \) for all \( x \in X \); and hence
\[ u(x, \theta) = v[a, (x), \theta] = v(E_0, \theta) = -(\theta - E_0)^2. \]

This utility function \( u \) is proper, but not strictly proper, because any two probability densities with the same means have the same utilities. \( \Box \)

De Finetti's conjecture (de Finetti [1972]), which was mentioned in Section 1.1, is true if the transformed utility \( u \), on \( X \times \Theta \) is strictly proper, which will be proved by Theorem 1.3 in Section 1.4. However, his conjecture is not necessarily true if \( u \), is not strictly proper.

**Example 1.3.**

Consider a group with two members, say 1 and 2, who are faced with a real decision problem with an action space \( A = \{a_1, a_2, a_3\} \) and a state space \( \Theta = \{0, 1\} \). Suppose each group member has the same utility function \( v \) on \( A \times \Theta \) defined by Table 1.1.

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<tr>
<td>( a_2 )</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( a_3 )</td>
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Table 1.1. Utilities for action-state pairs, \( v(a, \theta) \).

Since any distribution for \( \theta \) can be represented by a real number \( x \in [0, 1] \), we have \( X = [0, 1] \), where \( x \in X \) is a probability for the event \( \{\theta = 0\} \).

Let \( \bar{v}(a|x) \) be the expected utility of an action \( a \in A \) with respect to \( x \in X \), that is, \( \bar{v}(a|x) = x v(a, 0) + (1-x) v(a, 1) \). In Figure 1.1 we plotted \( \bar{v}(a|x) \) for \( i = 1, 2, 3 \) as functions of \( x \in X \).
Suppose group member 1's [2's] probability for the event $\{\theta = 0\}$ is $\frac{1}{4}$ [3]. Let $\overline{v}_i(a)$ be $i$'s expected utility for an action $a$. Then

$$\overline{v}_1(a_1) = \frac{3}{4}, \overline{v}_1(a_2) = \frac{9}{4}, \overline{v}_1(a_3) = 1$$

and

$$\overline{v}_2(a_1) = \frac{9}{4}, \overline{v}_2(a_2) = \frac{3}{4}, \overline{v}_2(a_3) = 1.$$ 

So $a_3$ is a Pareto optimal action, that is, there is no action $a \in A$ such that

$$\overline{v}_i(a) \geq \overline{v}_i(a_3) \quad \text{for} \quad i = 1, 2$$

with strict inequality for at least one $i$. However, Figure 1.1 indicates that for any $x \in X$, $a_3$ is not optimal against $x$. Therefore, de Finetti's conjecture does not hold for this case.

Definitions

(i) $x \in X$ is a Pareto optimal (or admissible) decision if there is no $y \in X$ such that

$$\overline{u}_i(x) \leq \overline{u}_i(y) \quad \text{for all} \quad i = 1, \ldots, K \quad \text{with strict inequality for at least one} \quad i.$$
(ii) \( x \in X \) is a Bayes decision if there exists a \( \lambda \in \Delta \) such that

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{K} \lambda_i \overline{u}_i(x) = \max_{y \in X} \sum_{i=1}^{K} \lambda_i \overline{u}_i(y),
\]

where \( \Delta = \{ \lambda \in \mathbb{R}^K : \lambda \geq 0 \text{ and } \sum_{i=1}^{K} \lambda_i = 1 \} \).

Let us denote \( \mathcal{A} \) as a set of all the Pareto optimal decisions in \( X \) and \( \mathcal{B} \) as a set of all the Bayes decisions in \( X \).

In this paper we will prove the following conjectures:

1. If the group members have equivalent and strictly proper utility functions, then the Pareto optimal decision or the group consensus opinion is a convex combination of their true opinions.

2. If the group members have equivalent and proper (not necessarily strictly proper) utility functions, then for any decision \( x \in X \) there exists a convex combination of the group members' true opinions, which is at least as good as \( x \) to each member of the group.

Conjecture (1) says that \( x \in X \) is Pareto optimal if and only if \( x \) is a convex combination of the group members' true opinions. Let \( C \) be the set of all convex combinations of the group members' true opinions, i.e.,

\[
C = \{ x \in X : x = \sum_{i=1}^{K} \lambda_i p_i \text{ for } \lambda \in \Delta \},
\]

where \( p_i \) is \( i \)'s true opinion for \( \theta \). Conjecture (2) implies that for any \( x \in X \) there is an \( x^* \in C \) such that \( \overline{u}_i(x) \leq \overline{u}_i(x^*) \) for all \( i \). This means that a linear opinion pool of the group members' true opinions is a Pareto optimal decision or an optimal group consensus opinion under the Pareto Optimality Principle if the group members have equivalent and proper utility functions. Remember that the utilities of the group members defined by 1.3 in a group decision problem are proper as was shown by Lemma 1.1.
1.3 Single Event Case

Suppose a group with $K$ members are jointly responsible for combining their probabilities for an event $A$. As assumed before, each group member has a utility function $u_i$ on $X \times \Theta$, where $X$ is a space of probability distributions and $\Theta$ is a state space. In the single event case, $\Theta = \{ A, \overline{A} \}$ and $X = [0, 1]$. Each $x \in X$ denotes a probability for $A$. Suppose $i$'s true probability for $A$ is $p$, and let $\overline{u}_i(x)$ be $i$'s expected utility for $x \in X$. Then

$$\overline{u}_i(x) = p u_i(x, A) + (1 - p) u_i(x, \overline{A}).$$

Let $x_p$ be a maximizer of $\overline{u}_i(x)$ over all $x \in X$, that is,

$$\overline{u}_i(x_p) = \max_{x \in X} \overline{u}_i(x).$$

We assume that $i$ announces his opinion for $\Theta$ as $x_p$. Note that $x_p = p$ if $u_i$ is proper. In this section we will show that, for the single event case, a linear opinion pool of the group members' announced opinions, $x_p$, is an optimal group consensus opinion if either (i) the group members' utilities $u_i$ are proper or (ii) the group members' utilities $u_i$ are concave in $x$.

Here $u_i$, $i = 1, \ldots, K$ need not be equivalent. If $u_i$ are proper for all $i$, then a linear opinion pool of the group members' true opinions is an optimal group consensus opinion. If $u_i$ is improper, then $x_p \neq p$. However, a linear opinion pool of $x_p$, $i$'s announced opinion, for $i = 1, \ldots, K$ is an optimal group consensus opinion if $u_i$ are concave in $x$ for all $i$.

Lemma 1.2.

If $u_i$ is (strictly) proper, then $\overline{u}_i(x)$ is (strictly) increasing for $0 \leq x < p$, and (strictly) decreasing for $p < x \leq 1$, where $p$ is $i$'s true opinion for $A$. (Savage [1971], p. 786).

Proof

Let $f_1(x) = u_i(x, A)$ and $f_0(x) = u_i(x, \overline{A})$. Define

$$g(x, p) = pf_1(x) + (1 - p)f_0(x) \quad \text{for } x, p \in X.$$ 

Then $g(x, p)$ is $i$'s expected utility for $x \in X$ when his true probability is $p$. Let
0 \leq p, \leq x_1 < x_2 \leq 1 and suppose \( \overline{u}_i(x_2) > \overline{u}_i(x_1) \). Then, we have
\[
p_i \left[ f_i(x_2) - f_i(x_1) + f_0(x_1) - f_0(x_2) \right] > f_0(x_1) - f_0(x_2).
\]
If \( u_i \) is proper, \( g(x_1, x_1) \geq g(x_2, x_1) \) and \( g(x_2, x_2) \geq g(x_1, x_2) \). However,
\[
g(x_1, x_1) - g(x_2, x_1) = x_1 f_i(x_1) + (1-x_1) f_0(x_1) - x_1 f_i(x_2) - (1-x_1) f_0(x_2)
= x_1 [f_i(x_2) - f_i(x_2) + f_0(x_2)] + [f_0(x_1) - f_0(x_2)]
< (x_1 - p_i) [f_i(x_1) - f_i(x_2) + f_0(x_2)].
\]
By symmetry, we also have
\[
g(x_2, x_2) - g(x_1, x_2) < (x_2 - p_i) [f_i(x_2) - f_i(x_1) + f_0(x_1)].
\]
Hence, either \( g(x_1, x_1) < g(x_2, x_1) \) or \( g(x_2, x_2) < g(x_1, x_2) \), which is a contradiction.
Therefore, \( \overline{u}_i(x_1) > \overline{u}_i(x_2) \).

In the same way we can show that \( \overline{u}_i(x) \) is increasing for \( 0 \leq x \leq p_i \).

The proof for strictly proper utilities is similar.

Let us define a set \( C \) which consists of convex combinations of the group members' opinions, i.e.,
\[
C = \{ x \in X : x = \sum_{i=1}^{K} \lambda_i p_i \text{ for } \lambda_i \in A \}.
\]

Theorem 1.1.

(i) Suppose \( u_i \) is strictly proper for all \( i \). Then \( x \in X \) is admissible if and only if \( x \in C \).

(ii) Suppose \( u_i \) is proper for all \( i \). Then, for any \( x \in X \), there exists \( x^* \in C \) such that
\[
\overline{u}_i(x^*) \geq \overline{u}_i(x) \text{ for all } i = 1, \ldots, K.
\]

Proof

Suppose \( u_i \) is strictly proper for all \( i \) and let \( 0 \leq x < \min p_i = p_{\min} \). Then
\[
\overline{u}_i(p_{\min}) - \overline{u}_i(x) = p_i [u_i(p_{\min}A) - u_i(x, A)] + (1 - p_i) [u_i(p_{\min}\overline{A}) - u_i(x, \overline{A})]
\geq p_i [u_i(p_{\min}A) - u_i(x, A)] + (1 - p_i) [u_i(p_{\min}\overline{A}) - u_i(x, \overline{A})]
\]
for all $i = 1, \ldots, K$. So any $x < \min p_i$ is inadmissible.

Similarly $x > \max p_i$ is inadmissible.

Let $\min p_i < x < \max p_i$. Then, for any $y < x$, $\overline{u_i}(x) > \overline{u_i}(y)$ for all $i$ with $p_i \geq x$
and, for any $y > x$, $\overline{u_i}(x) > \overline{u_i}(y)$ for all $i$ with $p_i \leq x$. Hence $x$ is admissible. This completes the proof of (i).

The proof of (ii) is similar. \qed

Example 1.4.

Define $\Theta$, $A$, and $X$ as in the Example 1.1, that is, $\Theta = \{0, 1\}$, $A = \{0, 1\}$, and $X = \{0, 1\}$.

Remember that $a \in A$ is an estimate of $\theta$ and $x \in X$ is a probability for the event $\{\theta = 1\}$.

Consider a group of $K$ members with the same utility functions $v$ on $A \times \Theta$ defined by $v(a, \theta) = -(a - \theta)^2$ for $a \in A$ and $\theta \in \Theta$.

Then $u_i(x, \theta) = -(x - \theta)^2$ for all $i$. By Example 1.1, $u_i$ are strictly proper. Suppose $i$'s true opinion for $\theta$ is $p_i \in X$. Then $i$'s expected utility for $x \in X$ is

$$\overline{u_i}(x) = p_i u_i(x, 1) + (1 - p_i) u_i(x, 0)$$

$$= -p_i(x-1)^2 - (1-p_i)x^2$$

Suppose $K = 2$ and $p_1 = 1/3$ and $p_2 = 2/3$. Then

(i) for any $0 \leq x < p_1$, $\overline{u_i}(x) < \overline{u_i}(p_1)$ for $i = 1, 2$

and

(ii) for any $p_2 < x \leq 1$, $\overline{u_i}(x) < \overline{u_i}(p_2)$ for $i = 1, 2$.

Therefore $x \in X$ is Pareto optimal if and only if $p_1 \leq x \leq p_2$. \qed
If $i$'s utility function $u_i$ is proper, then his expected utility $\tilde{u}_i(x)$ is maximized at $x = p_i$.

If, however, $u_i$ is improper, then there exists $x_p \in X$ such that

$$\tilde{u}_i(x_p) \geq \tilde{u}_i(x) \text{ for all } x \in X \text{ and } \tilde{u}_i(x_p) > \tilde{u}_i(p).$$

Here $x_p$ is a maximizer of $i$'s expected utility. Remember that $x_p$ is $i$'s announced opinion.

**Lemma 1.3.**

If $u_i$ is (strictly) concave in $x$, then $\tilde{u}_i(x)$ is (strictly) increasing for $0 \leq x \leq x_p$ and (strictly) decreasing for $x_p < x < 1$, where $x_p$ is a maximizer of $i$'s expected utility.

**Proof**

Suppose $u_i$ is concave and let $x_p < x_1 < x_2$. Then $x_1 = \lambda x_p + (1-\lambda)x_2$ for some $0 < \lambda < 1$ and hence we have

$$\tilde{u}_i(x_1) = \tilde{u}_i(\lambda x_p + (1-\lambda)x_2) \geq \lambda \tilde{u}_i(x_p) + (1-\lambda)\tilde{u}_i(x_2).$$

Thus

$$\tilde{u}_i(x_1) - \tilde{u}_i(x_2) \geq \lambda [ \tilde{u}_i(x_p) - \tilde{u}_i(x_2) ] > 0.$$ 

Similarly, for any $0 < x_2 < x_1 < x_p$, $\tilde{u}_i(x_1) > \tilde{u}_i(x_2).

The proof for the strict concave utility is similar. \(\Box\)

**Theorem 1.2.**

(i) If $u_i$ is strictly concave in $x$ for all $i$, then $x \in X$ is admissible if and only if $x = \sum_{i=1}^{k} \lambda_i x_p_i$ for some $\lambda \in \Lambda$.

(ii) If $u_i$ is concave in $x$ for all $i$, then, for any $x \in X$, there exists a $\lambda \in \Lambda$ such that

$$\tilde{u}_i\left(\sum_{i=1}^{k} \lambda_i x_p_i\right) \geq \tilde{u}_i(x) \text{ for all } i.$$ 

The proof of Theorem 1.2 is similar to the proof of Theorem 1.1.
Theorem 1.2 indicates that the group consensus opinion is a convex combination of their announced opinions if the group members have concave utility functions. Here their announced opinions are not necessarily their true opinions.

We say that an individual with utility function \( u \) is conservative if

\[
p, \leq x_p \leq \frac{1}{2} \text{ for } 0 \leq p, \leq \frac{1}{2} ; \text{ and } \frac{1}{2} \leq x_p \leq p, \text{ for } \frac{1}{2} \leq p, \leq 1.
\]

We might conjecture that an individual with concave utility function is conservative. But this is not true in general. Suppose \( u(x, A) = \sqrt{x} \) and \( u(x, A) = \sqrt{1-x} \). Then \( u \) is concave in \( x \).

However,

\[
x_p = \frac{p^2}{p^2 + (1-p)^2} \quad \text{for all } 0 \leq p \leq 1.
\]

So, if \( p = \frac{3}{4} \), then \( x_p = \frac{9}{10} \). Hence an individual with this utility function is not conservative. (See Lindley [1982], p. 7, for further comments on square root utility.)

Suppose \( u \) is concave in \( x \) and differentiable. Then an individual with utility function \( u \) is conservative if and only if

\[
x \frac{\partial}{\partial x} u(x, A) + (1-x) \frac{\partial}{\partial x} u(x, \bar{A}) \geq 0 \text{ for } 0 \leq x \leq \frac{1}{2},
\]

and

\[
x \frac{\partial}{\partial x} u(x, A) + (1-x) \frac{\partial}{\partial x} u(x, \bar{A}) \leq 0 \text{ for } \frac{1}{2} \leq x \leq 1.
\]

Note that, if \( u \) is proper, then

\[
x \frac{\partial}{\partial x} u(x, A) + (1-x) \frac{\partial}{\partial x} u(x, \bar{A}) = 0 \text{ for all } x \in X.
\]

However, if an individual is scored by a proper scoring rule for his opinions and his utility for the scores is concave, then he is conservative.
1.4. General Random Variable Case

In this section we will consider the group consensus problem with general state space Θ. As before we define X as the set of all probability mass or density functions for θ. Also we assume that each group member has a utility function u, defined on X x Θ. Of course in a group decision problem w, is proper for all i.

In Section 1.4.1, we will show that a linear opinion pool is an optimal group consensus opinion or a Pareto optimal decision in X if the group members' utility functions u, are equivalent and proper.

However, if the group members disagree on their utilities and there does not exists a group utility function, we cannot have such a strong result as stated above. In Section 1.4.2, we will show that, if the group members' utility functions u, on X x Θ are concave in x, then any Pareto optimal decision in X or group consensus opinion is a Bayes decision in X.

In some cases, the group members' utility functions on X x Θ may not be concave. But in Section 1.5 we show that a quadratic approximation of u, is concave in x. Therefore, if the group members' opinions are close enough and their utility functions u, are smooth, then we can assume that the group members' utilities are concave in x, at least approximately.

1.4.1. Equivalent and Proper Utility Functions

In Section 1.3, we have considered the group consensus problem in which a group is concerned with a single event. Now we generalize the results of Section 1.3 to a general random variable case. A group with K members are jointly responsible for combining their opinions for an unknown quantity θ or a set of mutually disjoint and exhaustive events. Thus the state space Θ consists of the values which the unknown quantity θ can take or Θ is the set of events under consideration. Each group member's opinion is given by a probability mass or density function for θ. Also each group member has a utility function u, defined on X x Θ. Let p, ϵ X be i's true opinion for θ. Then his expected utility for x ϵ X is given by:
\[
\bar{u}(x) = \begin{cases} 
\sum_{\omega} p(\omega) u(x, \omega) & \text{if } \Theta \text{ is discrete.} \\
\int_{\Theta} p(\omega) u(x, \omega) d\omega & \text{if } \Theta \text{ is continuous.} 
\end{cases}
\]

In this section, we will prove the following conjectures:

1. If the group members have equivalent and strictly proper utility functions on \( X \times \Theta \), then the Pareto optimal decision or the group consensus opinion is a convex combination of their true opinions.

2. If the group members have equivalent and proper (not necessarily proper) utility functions on \( X \times \Theta \), then for any decision \( x \in X \) there is a convex combination of the group members' opinions, which is at least as good as \( x \) for each group member.

Remember that the group members' utilities defined on \( X \times \Theta \) are always proper in the group decision problem. First, we will show that the Pareto optimal decision or the optimal group consensus opinion is a convex combination of the group members' true opinions if the group members have equivalent and strictly proper utility functions.

**Theorem 1.3.**

If the \( u_i \) are equivalent and strictly proper, then \( x \in X \) is admissible if and only if

\[
x = \sum_{i=1}^{k} \lambda_i \beta_i, \text{ for some } \lambda \in \Lambda.
\]

For the proof of the Theorem 1.3 we need following Definitions and Lemmas.

**Definitions**

Let \( S \) be a subset of \( \mathbb{R}^k \).

(i) \( s \in S \) is admissible in \( S \) if there is no \( s' \in S \) such that \( s_i < s_i \) for all \( i \) with strict inequality holding for at least one \( i \), where \( s_i \) is \( i \)th component of \( s \).

(ii) \( s \in S \) is Bayes in \( S \) if there exists a \( \lambda \in \Lambda \) such that
Let us denote $\mathcal{A}$ a set of all the admissible points in $S$ and $\mathcal{B}_0$ a set of all the Bayes points in $S$. Let

$$S = \{ s \in \mathbb{R}^K : \text{there exists an } x \in X \text{ such that } s_i = \bar{u}_i(x) \text{ for all } i \}.$$ 

Then the set of all Pareto optimal decisions in $X$ and the set of all the Bayes decisions in $X$ defined in Section 1.2 correspond to $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{B}_0$, respectively. That is, $\mathcal{A} = \mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{B} = \mathcal{B}_0$.

**Lemma 1.4.**

Let $S^*$ be the convex hull generated by $S$. Then

1. $\mathcal{A} \subseteq \mathcal{B}_0$.
2. If $s^* \in S^*$ is Bayes in $S^*$, then $s^* = \sum_{j=1}^{r} \xi_j s^{(j)}$, where $r \leq K$; $s^{(j)} \in S$ for all $j = 1, \ldots, r$; $\xi_j > 0$ for all $j$ and $\sum_{j=1}^{r} \xi_j = 1$.

**Proof:** See Blackwell and Girshick [1954].

Under the same conditions of the Theorem 1.3 we have the following Lemmas.

**Lemma 1.5:** $\mathcal{B}_0 \subseteq S$.

**Proof**

Suppose $s^* \in S^*$ is Bayes against $\lambda \in \Lambda$. Then, by Lemma 1.4, $s^* = \sum_{j=1}^{r} \xi_j s^{(j)}$, where $r \leq K$; $s^{(j)} \in S$ for all $j = 1, \ldots, r$; $\xi_j > 0$ for all $j$ and $\sum_{j=1}^{r} \xi_j = 1$. Moreover, for each $j$ there corresponds $x^{(j)} \in X$ such that $s^{(j)} = \bar{u}_i(x^{(j)})$ for all $i$. Since $u_i$ are equivalent, we can assume that $u_i = \bar{u}$ for all $i$, where $\bar{u}$ is a strictly proper utility function on $X \times \Theta$. Let us define a function $g(x, p)$ by:
\[ g(x, p) = \sum \delta p(\theta) u(x, \theta) \] for \( x \) and \( p \) in \( X \).

Then \( g(x, p) \) is linear in \( p \) and \( g(x, p) < g(p, p) \) for all \( x \neq p \). Moreover,

\[ \overline{u}_i(x) = \sum \delta p_i(\theta) u(x, \theta) = g(x, p_i). \]

Now we have

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{K} \lambda_i s_i^* = \sum_{i=1}^{K} \lambda_i \sum_{j=1}^{r} \xi_j s_{ij}^{(U)} \\
= \sum \lambda_i \sum_{j} \xi_j \overline{u}_j(x^{(U)}) \\
= \sum \lambda_i \sum_{j} \xi_j g(x^{(U)}, p_i) \\
= \sum_{j} \xi_j \sum \lambda_i g(x^{(U)}, p_i) \\
\leq \sum_{j} \xi_j g(\sum \lambda_i p_i, \sum \lambda_i p_i) \\
= \sum_{j} \xi_j g(\sum \lambda_i p_i, \sum \lambda_i p_i)
\]

with equality holding if and only if \( x^{(U)} = \sum \lambda_i p_i \) for all \( j \).

Since \( s^* \) is Bayes against \( \lambda \), \( x^{(U)} = \sum \lambda_i p_i \) for all \( j \). So

\[ s_i^* = \sum \xi_j s_{ij}^{(U)} = \sum \xi_j \overline{u}_j(x^{(U)}) = \sum \xi_j \overline{u}_j(\sum \lambda_i p_i) = \overline{u}_i(\sum \lambda_i p_i) \]

and hence \( s^* \in S \). \( \square \)

Lemma 1.6: Let \( S_0 = \{ s \in S : \text{there is a } \lambda \in A \text{ s.t. } s_i = \overline{u}_i(\sum \lambda_i p_i) \text{ for all } i \} \). Then \( S_0 \subset S \).

Proof

Let \( s^0 \in S_0 \). Then there exists an \( x \in X \) such that \( x = \sum \lambda_i p_i \) for some \( \lambda \in A \) and

\[ s_i^0 = \overline{u}_i(x) \] for all \( i \). We have

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{K} \lambda_i s_i^0 = \sum_{i=1}^{K} \lambda_i \overline{u}_i(x)
\]
because \( g(y, \sum_i \lambda_i p_i) \) is maximized at \( y = \sum_i \lambda_i p_i \). Thus

\[
\sum_{i=1}^K \lambda_i s_i^0 = \max_{y, \lambda} g(y, \sum_i \lambda_i p_i) = \max_{y, \lambda} \sum_i \lambda_i g(y, p_i) = \max_{y, \lambda} \sum_i \lambda_i \sum_j p_j(y)u_j(y, \theta) = \max_{y, \lambda} \sum_i \lambda_i s_i = \max_{y, \lambda} \sum_i \lambda_i s_i.
\]

The last equality follows from Lemma 1.5. Therefore \( s^* \in A \).

Conversely, suppose \( s^* \in A \), then \( s^* \in S \) by Lemma 1.5. Hence there is an \( x^* \in X \) such that \( s_i^* = \bar{u}_i(x^*) \) for all \( i \). However,

\[
\sum_{i=1}^K \lambda_i s_i^* = \sum_{i=1}^K \lambda_i \bar{u}_i(x^*) = \sum_i \lambda_i g(x^*, p_i) = g(x^*, \sum_i \lambda_i p_i) \leq g(\sum_i \lambda_i p_i, \sum_i \lambda_i p_i)
\]

with equality holding if and only if \( x^* = \sum_i \lambda_i p_i \). Therefore \( s^* \in S_0 \). ∎

Lemma 1.7: \( S_0 \subseteq A \).

Proof

If \( s^0 \in S_0 \), then there is an \( x^0 \in X \) such that \( x^0 = \sum_i \lambda_i p_i \) for some \( \lambda \in A \) with \( s_i^0 = \bar{u}_i(x^0) \) for all \( i \). Suppose \( s \) is inadmissible in \( S^* \), then there is an \( s^* = \sum_{j=1}^\infty \xi_j s^{(j)} \) for some \( \xi \) with \( \xi \geq 0 \) and \( \sum_{j=1}^\infty \xi_j = 1 \) such that (i) \( s^{(j)} \in S \) for all \( j \) and (ii) \( s_i \leq s_i^* \) for all \( i \) with holding at least
one strict inequality. Since \( s^{(j)} \in S \) for all \( j \), for each \( s^{(j)} \) there corresponds an \( x^{(j)} \in X \) such that \( s^{(j)} = \bar{u}_i(x^{(j)}) \) for all \( i \). Hence

\[
\sum_{i=1}^K \lambda_i s_i^* = \sum_{i=1}^K \lambda_i \sum_{j=1}^\infty \xi_j s^{(j)}_j
= \sum_i \lambda_i \sum_j \xi_j \bar{u}_i(x^{(j)})
= \sum_i \lambda_i \sum_j \xi_j g(x^{(j)}, p_i)
= \sum_j \xi_j g(x^{(j)}, \sum_i \lambda_i p_i)
\leq \sum_j \xi_j g(\sum_i \lambda_i p_i, \sum_i \lambda_i p_i)
= g(\sum_i \lambda_i p_i, \sum_i \lambda_i p_i)
= \sum_i \lambda_i g(\sum_i \lambda_i p_i, p_i)
= \sum_i \lambda_i g(x^0, p_i)
= \sum_i \lambda_i s_i^0.
\]

Therefore, \( \sum_i \lambda_i s_i^* \leq \sum_i \lambda_i s_i^0 \) with holding equality if and only if \( x^{(j)} = x^0 \) for all \( j \). This implies that \( s^* = s^0 \), which contradicts the assumption that \( s^0 \) is dominated by \( s^* \). Hence \( s^0 \) is admissible in \( S^* \).

**Proof of Theorem 1.3:**

By the previous Lemmas we have \( \mathcal{A}_s = \mathcal{A}_S = S_0 \). Hence \( \mathcal{A}_S = \mathcal{A}_S \) and \( \mathcal{S}_S = \mathcal{S}_S \), because \( \mathcal{A}_S \subseteq S \) and \( \mathcal{S}_S \subseteq S \). Thus \( \mathcal{A}_S = S_0 \), that is, \( s \in S \) is admissible in \( S \) if and only if \( s \in S_0 \). Equivalently, \( x \in X \) is admissible if and only if \( x = \sum \lambda_i p_i \) for some \( \lambda \in \Lambda \). This completes the proof of the theorem.
We can easily see that de Finetti's conjecture (de Finetti [1972]), which was mentioned in Section 1.3 is true if the group members' utilities $u_i$ are equivalent and strictly proper.

Example 1.5.

Consider a text-book problem in which a group with $K$ members are required to give a probability density for a continuous random variable $\theta$. Let $p_i$ be $i$'s probability density for $\theta$. Suppose each group member $i$ has same utility function $u_i$ on $X \times \Theta$ for $i = 1, \ldots, K$, where $X$ is the set of all probability densities for $\theta$. If $u_i(x, \theta) = \log x(\theta)$, then

$$u_i(x) = \int u_i(x, \theta)p_i(\theta)d\theta = \int p_i(\theta) \log x(\theta)d\theta.$$ 

Now we have

$$\max_{x \in X} u_i(x) = \max_{x \in X} \int p_i(\theta) \log x(\theta)d\theta = \int p_i(\theta) \log p_i(\theta)d\theta,$$

and hence $u_i$ is strictly proper.

Since $u_i$ is strictly concave, we can show that $\mathcal{F} = \emptyset$, that is, $x \in X$ is an admissible decision if and only if $x$ is a Bayes decision. (See Theorem 1.6.) For any $\lambda \in \Lambda$, 

$$\sum_{i=1}^{K} \lambda_i u_i(x) = \sum_{i=1}^{K} \lambda_i \int p_i(\theta) \log x(\theta)d\theta = \int [\sum_{i=1}^{K} \lambda_i p_i(\theta)] \log x(\theta)d\theta \leq \int [\sum_{i=1}^{K} \lambda_i p_i(\theta)] \log [\sum_{i=1}^{K} \lambda_i p_i(\theta)]d\theta$$

with equality holding if and only if $x = \sum_i \lambda_i p_i$.

Therefore $x \in X$ is an admissible decision if and only if $x \in C$. \qed

Now is the time to prove the conjecture that for any decision $x \in X$ there is a convex combination of the group members' true opinions, which is at least as good as $x$ for each
member of the group. Let

$$C = \{ x \in X : x = \sum_{i=1}^{K} \lambda_i p_i \text{ for some } \lambda \in \Delta \}.$$ 

Theorem 1.4.

Suppose \( u_i \) are equivalent and proper. Then for any \( x \in X \), there exists an \( x^* \in C \) such that \( \overline{u_i(x^*)} \geq \overline{u_i(x)} \) for all \( i \).

Proof

Without loss of generality we can assume that \( u_i = u \) for all \( i \), where \( u \) is strictly proper. Let \( \epsilon > 0 \). We can find a strictly proper utility function \( s \) on \( X \times \Theta \) such that

$$|s(x, \theta)| < \epsilon/2 \text{ for all } x \in X \text{ and } \theta \in \Theta.$$ 

This can be done by letting

$$s(x, \theta) = \frac{1}{M} \left[ -2x(\theta) + \int_{\Theta} x(\theta) d\theta \right]$$

for large \( M > 0 \). Then \( s \) is strictly proper and bounded.

Now define a utility function \( u^* \) by

$$u^*(x, \theta) = u(x, \theta) + s(x, \theta)$$

for all \( x \) and \( \theta \).

We can see that the utility function \( u^* \) is strictly proper. Now let

$$\mathcal{A} = \{ x \in X : x \text{ is admissible in } X \text{ for } u^* \}$$

Then \( \mathcal{A} \) is complete, because \( u^* \) is bounded from above and the maximizers of \( \sum_{i=1}^{K} \lambda_i \overline{u_i(x)} \)

are always in \( X \) for all \( \lambda \in \Delta \) (see Berger [1980]). Therefore, for each \( x \in X \), there exists \( x^* \in C \) such that \( \overline{u_i(x^*)} \geq \overline{u_i(x)} \) for all \( i \).

From the definition of \( u^* \) we have

$$\overline{u_i(x)} + \sum_{\theta} p_\theta(x, \theta) s(x, \theta) \leq \overline{u_i(x^*)} + \sum_{\theta} p_\theta(x^*, \theta).$$
and hence
\[
\bar{u}_i(x) \leq \bar{u}_i(x^*) + \sum_{\theta} p_i(\theta) [s(x^*, \theta) - s(x, \theta)] \\
\leq \bar{u}_i(x^*) + \sum_{\theta} p_i(\theta) [s(x^*, \theta) - s(x, \theta)] \\
< \epsilon + \bar{u}_i(x^*)
\]
for all \( i = 1, \ldots, K \).

Since \( \epsilon \) is arbitrary, we have the Theorem. \( \square \)

**Example 1.6.**

Consider a group decision problem as in the Example 1.2, where \( \Theta = [0,1] \), \( \mathcal{A} = [0,1] \), and \( X \) is the set of all probability densities for \( \theta \). Suppose there are \( K \) group members with same utility functions \( v_i \) on \( \mathcal{A} \times \Theta \) such that \( v_i(a, \theta) = -(a - \theta)^2 \) for all \( a, \theta \), and \( i \). Then the induced utility function \( u_i \) on \( X \times \Theta \) is \( u_i(x, \theta) = -(\theta - E_x \theta)^2 \), which is proper but not strictly proper. Here \( E_x \) denotes expectation with respect to \( x \). Let \( p_i \) be \( i \)'s opinion for \( x \in X \). Then \( i \)'s expected utility for \( x \in X \) is

\[
\bar{u}_i(x) = -(\theta - E_x \theta)^2 \\
= -E_i \theta^2 + 2E_i \theta E_x \theta - E_x^2 \theta,
\]

where \( E_i \) denotes expectation with respect to \( p_i \).

Note that \( \bar{u}_i(x) = \bar{u}_i(y) \) if \( E_x \theta = E_y \theta \).

Now we want to show that Theorem 1.4 is true for this example. Since \( u_i \) is strictly concave in \( x \), \( \mathcal{A} = \emptyset \). Let \( x \in X \setminus C \), where \( C \) is the set of all convex combinations of \( p_1, \ldots, p_K \). Without loss of generality we can assume that \( x \) is an admissible decision. Then there is a \( \lambda \in \mathcal{A} \) such that

\[
\sum_{i} \lambda_i \bar{u}_i(x) = \max_{y \in X} \sum_{i} \lambda_i \bar{u}_i(y).
\]

Let \( x^* = \sum_{i} \lambda_i p_i \). Then \( \sum_{i} \lambda_i \bar{u}_i(x) = \sum_{i} \lambda_i \bar{u}_i(s^*) \), because \( u_i \) is proper. Now

\[
\sum_{i} \lambda_i \bar{u}_i(x) = \sum_{i} \lambda_i (\bar{u}_i(s^*) - E_i \theta^2 + 2E_i \theta E_x \theta - E_x^2 \theta).
\]
\begin{align*}
&= -\sum \lambda_i E_i \theta^2 + 2E_\theta \sum \lambda_i E_i \theta - E_\theta^2 \\
&= -E_\theta \theta^2 + 2E_\theta \theta E_\theta \theta - E_\theta^2 \theta
\end{align*}

and
\begin{align*}
\sum \lambda_i \tilde{u}_i(x^*) &= \sum \lambda_i (-E_\theta \theta^2 + 2E_\theta \theta E_\theta \theta - E_\theta^2 \theta) \\
&= -\sum \lambda_i E_i \theta^2 + 2E_\theta \theta \sum \lambda_i E_i \theta - E_\theta^2 \theta \\
&= -E_\theta \theta^2 + 2E_\theta^2 \theta - E_\theta^2 \theta \\
&= -E_\theta \theta^2 + E_\theta^2 \theta.
\end{align*}

Hence \( E_\theta \theta = E_\theta \theta^2 \). So \( \tilde{u}_i(x) = \tilde{u}_i(x^*) \) for all \( i \).

As a corollary to Theorem 1.4, if there exists a group utility function \( u_G \), which is proper by Lemma 1.1, in a group decision problem, then the linear opinion pool is optimal for the group. Here the group utility function \( u_G \) need not be a functional form of individual utility functions \( u_i \), \( i = 1, \ldots, K \). Hence Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is not relevant here.

1.4.2. Concave Utility Functions

In Section 1.4.1, we have shown that a linear opinion pool of the group members' opinions is an optimal group consensus opinion or a Pareto optimal decision in \( X \) if the group members' utility functions on \( X \times \Theta \) are equivalent and proper. However, if the group members disagree on their utility functions \( u_i \) for \( i = 1, \ldots, K \) and there does not exist a group utility function, we cannot have such a strong result as Theorem 1.4. In the rest of this section we will show that, if the group members' utility functions \( u_i \) on \( X \times \Theta \) are concave in \( x \), then any admissible (or Pareto optimal) decision in \( X \) is a Bayes decision in \( X \). We will consider the quadratic approximation of the utility functions \( u_i \), in the next section and show that the quadratic approximation of \( u_i \) is concave in \( x \).
Theorem 1.5.

If \( u_i, i = 1, \ldots, K \), are concave in \( x \), then any admissible decision in \( X \) is a Bayes decision in \( X \).

**Proof**

Let \( s^* \in S^* \) be admissible in \( S^* \). Then, by Lemma 1.4, there is a \( \lambda \in \Lambda \) such that \( s^* \) is Bayes against \( \lambda \) and \( s^* \) is represented by

\[
s_i^* = \sum_{j=1}^{r} \xi_j u_i(x^{(j)})
\]

for some \( x^{(1)}, \ldots, x^{(r)} \) and \( r \leq K \). Since \( u_i \) are concave, we have

\[
s_i^* \leq \overline{u}_i(\sum_{j=1}^{r} \xi_j x^{(j)}) = \overline{u}_i(x^0),
\]

where \( x^0 = \sum_{j=1}^{r} \xi_j x^{(j)} \). However, \( \sum_{i=1}^{K} \lambda_i s^*_i \geq \sum_{i=1}^{K} \lambda_i \overline{u}_i(x^0) \), because \( s^* \) is Bayes against \( \lambda \). Therefore \( s_i^* = \overline{u}_i(x^0) \) for all \( i \) and hence \( s^* \in S \). This implies that \( \mathcal{A}_s \perp \mathcal{A}_g \).

Let \( s \in \mathcal{A}_s \) and suppose \( s \) is inadmissible in \( S^* \). Then there exists \( s^* \in S^* \) such that \( s_i \leq s^*_i \) for all \( i \) with holding at least one strict inequality. Since \( s^* \in S^* \), there is a sequence \( x^{(1)}, x^{(2)}, \ldots \) in \( X \) such that \( s_i^* = \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \xi_j u_i(x^{(j)}) \) for all \( i \). Then

\[
s_i^* \leq \overline{u}_i(\sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \xi_j x^{(j)}) = \overline{u}_i(x^*),
\]

where \( x^* = \sum_{j} \xi_j x^{(j)} \). This means that \( s \) is dominated by \( (\overline{u}_i(x^*), i = 1, \ldots, K) \in S \), which is a contradiction. Therefore \( \mathcal{A}_s = \mathcal{A}_s \perp \mathcal{A}_g \). It is easy to show that \( \mathcal{A}_g \cap S = \mathcal{A}_g \).

Hence \( \mathcal{A}_s \perp \mathcal{A}_g \). \( \Box \)
Theorem 1.6.

If \( u_i, \ i = 1, \ldots, K \), are strictly concave in \( x \), then \( \mathcal{I} = \emptyset \).

Proof

The proof of the Theorem depends on following Lemmas.

Under the same condition as Theorem 1.6, we have Lemma 1.8 and Lemma 1.9.

Lemma 1.8.

If \( x \) and \( y \) in \( X \) are Bayes against \( \lambda \in \Delta \), then \( \overline{u}_i(x) = \overline{u}_i(y) \) for all \( i \) with \( \lambda_i > 0 \) if and only if \( x = y \).

Proof

Suppose \( x \) and \( y \) are Bayes against \( \lambda \) and \( \overline{u}_i(x) = \overline{u}_i(y) \) for all \( i \) with \( \lambda_i > 0 \). Since \( u_i \) are strictly concave, if \( x \neq y \), then for any \( 0 < \alpha < 1 \),

\[
\overline{u}_i(\alpha x + (1-\alpha)y) > \alpha \overline{u}_i(x) + (1-\alpha)\overline{u}_i(y) = \overline{u}_i(x)
\]

for all \( i \) with \( \lambda_i > 0 \). Hence

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{K} \lambda_i \overline{u}_i(\alpha x + (1-\alpha)y) > \sum_{i=1}^{K} \lambda_i \overline{u}_i(x),
\]

which is a contradiction. So \( x = y \).

The converse is trivial. \( \Box \)

Lemma 1.9: If \( x \in X \) is Bayes, then \( x \) is admissible.

Proof

Suppose \( x \) is Bayes against \( \lambda \in \Delta \). If \( \lambda_i > 0 \) for all \( i \), then \( x \) is admissible. We can assume that \( \lambda_i > 0 \) for \( i = 1, \ldots, l \) and \( \lambda_i = 0 \) for \( i = l+1, \ldots, K \) for some \( 1 \leq l < K \).

Suppose \( x \) is inadmissible, then there exists \( y \in X \) such that

\[
\overline{u}_i(y) = \overline{u}_i(x) \text{ for } i = 1, \ldots, l; \text{ and } \overline{u}_i(y) \geq \overline{u}_i(x) \text{ for } i = l+1, \ldots, K.
\]
with at least one strict inequality holding. By Lemma 1.8, \( x \neq y \), which contradicts the assumption that \( x \) is dominated by \( y \). Therefore \( x \) is admissible.

This completes the proof of Theorem 1.6. \( \square \)

By the above Theorems the determination of the group consensus opinion is equivalent to the determination of the Bayes point in \( X \) or the determination of \( \lambda \in \Lambda \), which can be interpreted as the weights given to the group members, if the group members have concave utility functions.

Now we consider the relaxation of the assumption that \( a_i^*(x) \), which was defined in Section 1.2, is unique for all \( i \) and \( x \). In a group decision problem with action space \( A \), state space \( \Theta \), and individual utility functions \( v_i \) on \( A \times \Theta \), we defined an action \( a_i^*(x) \) by

\[
\sum_{\theta} x(\theta) v_i[a_i^*(x), \theta] = \max_{a \in A} \sum_{\theta} x(\theta) v_i(a, \theta)
\]

for each \( x \in X \), where \( X \) is the set of all probability mass or density functions for \( \theta \). We assumed that \( a_i^*(x) \) is unique for each \( x \) and defined a utility function \( u_i \), on \( X \times \Theta \) by

\[
u_i(x, \theta) = v_i[a_i^*(x), \theta] \text{ for } x \in X \text{ and } \theta \in \Theta.
\]

Now suppose that \( a_i^*(x) \) is not necessarily unique for \( x \in X \). Let \( \delta_i \) be \( i \)'s decision rule such that \( i \) takes an action \( \delta_i(x) \) among the actions which are optimal against \( x \). Then we can define

\[
u_i(x, \theta) = v_i[\delta_i(x), \theta] \text{ for } x \in X \text{ and } \theta \in \Theta.
\]

It is easy to show that the utility function \( u_i \), defined as above is proper for any such decision rule \( \delta_i \). Furthermore, for any \( \delta = (\delta_1, \ldots, \delta_n) \), where \( \delta_i \) is \( i \)'s decision rule, the results developed thus far are true. Therefore, if each group member chooses a decision rule \( \delta_i \), then we have the same results as the results obtained under the assumption of uniqueness of \( a_i^*(x) \).
1.5. Quadratic Approximation

In Section 1.4, we have shown that (i) if the group members have equivalent and proper utility functions, then a Pareto optimal decision or a group consensus opinion is a linear opinion pool, and (ii) if the group members' utilities are concave in $x$, then a Pareto optimal decision is a Bayes decision. In some cases, however, the concavity assumption is too strong to be satisfied for all group members. The objective of this section is to show that under certain conditions each group member's utility function is nearly concave.

Suppose the state space $\Theta$ is finite and suppose that $u$ is proper and differentiable three times. Now consider an individual with utility function $u$ and true opinion $p \in X$. If $\Theta$ consists of $n$ elements then $p$ is an $n \times 1$ vector. His expected utility for $x \in X$ is

$$
\tilde{u}(x) = \sum_{\theta} p(\theta) u(x, \theta).
$$

The Taylor expansion of $\tilde{u}(x)$ is:

$$
\tilde{u}(x) = \tilde{u}(p) + (x-p)^t \nabla \tilde{u}(p) + \frac{1}{2} (x-p)^t H(p) (x-p) + R(x),
$$

where $H(p)$ is a Hessian matrix of $\tilde{u}(x)$ at $x = p$ and $R(x)$ is the remainder term. Let

$$
v(x) = \tilde{u}(p) + (x-p)^t \nabla \tilde{u}(p) + \frac{1}{2} (x-p)^t H(p) (x-p).
$$

Theorem 1.7.

Suppose the third partial derivatives of $\tilde{u}(x)$ are bounded. Then $v(x)$ is concave in $x$ if $p$ is a (relative) interior point of $X$.

Proof

Since $u$ is proper, $\tilde{u}(x)$ is maximized at $x = p$ and hence it should satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker condition:

$$
\left[ \frac{\partial \tilde{u}(x)}{\partial x} \right]_{x=p} - \mu
$$
for all \( j = 1, \ldots, n \) for some real number \( \mu \). Since \( \tilde{u}(x) \leq \tilde{u}(p) \) for all \( x \in \mathbb{X} \), we have

\[
(x-p)'\nabla \tilde{u}(p) + \frac{1}{2} (x-p)'H(p)(x-p) + R(x) \leq 0.
\]

We know that \( \nabla \tilde{u}(p) = \mu 1 \), where \( 1 = (1, \ldots, 1)' \). So \( (x-p)'\nabla \tilde{u}(p) = 0 \). Therefore

\[
(x-p)'H(p)(x-p) \leq -2R(x) \quad \text{for all } x \in \mathbb{X}.
\]

(1)

For any \( x, y \in \mathbb{X} \) and \( 0 < \lambda < 1 \),

\[
v(\lambda x + (1-\lambda)y) \geq \lambda v(x) + (1-\lambda)v(y) \iff (x-y)'H(p)(x-y) \leq 0.
\]

So we should prove that \( (x-y)'H(p)(x-y) \leq 0 \) for all \( x, y \in \mathbb{X} \).

Let \( z = p + \frac{1}{M} (x-y) \), where \( \max_{j} \frac{1}{p_j} < M < \infty \). Then \( x_j \geq 0 \) for all \( j \) and \( \sum_{j=1}^{n} x_j = 1 \). So \( z \in \mathbb{X} \). By (1)

\[
(z-p)'H(p)(z-p) \leq -2R(z).
\]

So

\[
(x-y)'H(p)(x-y) = M^2(z-p)'H(p)(z-p) \leq -2M^2R(z).
\]

Now the remainder term \( R(z) \) is

\[
R(z) = \frac{1}{3!} \sum_{i < j} \sum_{k} (x_i-p_i)(x_j-p_j)(x_k-p_k) \frac{\partial^3}{\partial z_i \partial z_j \partial z_k} \tilde{u}[p + \theta(z-p)]
\]

\[
- \frac{1}{3!} M^3 \sum_{i < j} \sum_{k} (x_i-y_i)(x_j-y_j)(x_k-y_k) \frac{\partial^3}{\partial z_i \partial z_j \partial z_k} \tilde{u}[z + \theta(z-p)]
\]

for some \( 0 < \theta < 1 \). So

\[
M^2R(z) = \frac{1}{6M} \sum_{i < j} \sum_{k} (x_i-y_i)(x_j-y_j)(x_k-y_k) \frac{\partial^3}{\partial z_i \partial z_j \partial z_k} \tilde{u}[p + \theta(z-p)]
\]

and hence \( M^2R(z) \to 0 \) as \( M \to \infty \). Therefore

\[
(x-y)'H(p)(x-y) \leq 0 \quad \text{for all } x, y \in \mathbb{X}.
\]

\( \square \)
In Theorem 1.7, we assume that the third partial derivatives of $\tilde{u}(x)$ are bounded. But, if $p$ is a local maximum point of $v(x)$, then we can show that $v(x)$ is concave without the assumption of Theorem 1.7.

Corollary 1.

If $p$ is a (relative) interior point of $X$ and $p$ is a local maximum point of $v(x)$, then $v(x)$ is concave in $x$.

Proof

For any $x \in X$ sufficiently close to $p$ and $v(x) \leq v(p)$. So

$$(x-p)'\nabla \tilde{u}(p) + \frac{1}{2} (x-p)'H(p)(x-p) \leq 0.$$ 

Since $\nabla \tilde{u}(p) = \mu I$, $(x-p)'\nabla \tilde{u}(p) = 0$ and hence $(x-p)'H(p)(x-p) \leq 0$ for all $x$ sufficiently close to $p$.

For given $x, y$ in $X$ let $z = p + \frac{1}{M}(x-y)$, where $\max_j \frac{1}{p_j} < M < \infty$. Then $z \in X$ and $(x-p)'H(p)(x-p) \leq 0$ for sufficiently large $M$. So

$$(x-y)'H(p)(x-y) = M^2(x-p)'H(p)(x-p) \leq 0$$ 

for all $x, y \in X$. 

Thus far we have considered only the proper utility functions. However, we can obtain the same result under some smoothness assumptions for the improper utility functions. Suppose $\tilde{u}(x)$ is maximized at $y_0 \neq p$. A Taylor expansion of $\tilde{u}(x)$ around $y_0$ is given by:

$$\tilde{u}(x) = \tilde{u}(y_0) + (x-y_0)'\nabla \tilde{u}(y_0) + \frac{1}{2} (x-y_0)'H(y_0)(x-y_0) + R(x)$$

$$v(x) = \tilde{u}(y_0) + (x-y_0)'\nabla \tilde{u}(y_0) + \frac{1}{2} (x-y_0)'H(y_0)(x-y_0).$$
Corollary 2.

Suppose \( y_0 \) is a (relative) interior point of \( X \). Then \( \nu(x) \) is concave in \( x \) if (i) \( \tilde{u}(x) \) satisfies the condition of Theorem 1.7 or (ii) \( y_0 \) is a local maximum point of \( \nu(x) \).

Note that (i) if \( u \) is quadratic and \( y_0 \) lies in interior of \( X \), then \( u \) is concave and (ii) the Hessian matrix \( H(y_0) \) need not be negative (semi)definite in order that \( \nu(x) \) be concave.

Example 1.7.

Let

\[
\tilde{u}(x) = -x_1 - x_2 + x_1^2 + 3x_1x_2 + x_2^2.
\]

Then \( \tilde{u}(x) \) is maximized at \( x = (-\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}) \) and the Hessian matrix at \( x = (-\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}) \) is

\[
H(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}) = \begin{bmatrix} 2 & 3 \\ 3 & 2 \end{bmatrix}.
\]

Notice that \( H(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}) \) is not negative semi-definite. However,

\[
(x-y)'H(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})(x-y) = -2(x_1 - y_1)^2 < 0
\]

for all \( x, y \in X \). So \( \tilde{u}(x) \) is concave in \( X \). \( \square \)

If the group members' opinions are close enough and their utility functions are smooth, we can approximate each member's expected utility \( \tilde{u}_i(x) \) by a quadratic form:

\[
\nu_i(x) = \tilde{u}_i(p_i) + (x-p_i)'\nabla \tilde{u}_i(p_i) + \frac{1}{2} (x-p_i)'H_i(p_i)(x-p_i), \quad (1.4)
\]

where \( p_i \) is \( i \)'s true opinion. Here we assume that \( \tilde{u} \) is proper. But we can replace \( p \), in equation (1.4) by a maximizer of the expected utility \( \tilde{u}_i \) if \( \tilde{u} \) is not proper. The above Theorems say that \( \nu_i(x) \) is concave. Hence any Pareto optimal decision is a Bayes decision.

Since \( (x-p_i)'\nabla \tilde{u}_i(p_i) = 0 \) for all \( i \) and \( \tilde{u}_i(p_i) \) are constants, we can approximate \( \tilde{u}_i(x) \) by
\[ v_{\lambda}(x) = (x-p)^{\top}H_{\lambda}(p)(x-p). \]

For \( \lambda \in \Lambda \), let

\[ V_{\lambda}(x) = \sum_{i=1}^{K} \lambda_{i}v_{\lambda}(x) = \sum_{i=1}^{K} (x-p)^{\top}H_{\lambda}(p)(x-p). \]

Suppose \( x^{*} \in X \) maximizes \( V_{\lambda}(x) \). Then there is a real number \( \mu \) satisfying

\[ \nabla V_{\lambda}(x^{*}) = \mu 1. \]

This is a Kuhn-Tucker necessary condition for the optimality. Since \( V_{\lambda}(x) \) is concave, it is also sufficient condition for the optimality. Now we have

\[ \sum_{i=1}^{K} \lambda_{i}H_{\lambda}(p)(x^{*}-p_{i}) = \mu 1 \]

and hence

\[ x^{*} = \left( \sum_{i=1}^{K} \lambda_{i}H_{\lambda}(p_{i}) \right)^{-1} \left( \sum_{i=1}^{K} \lambda_{i}H_{\lambda}(p_{i})p_{i} - \mu 1 \right) = \sum_{i=1}^{K} A'_{i}(p_{i})p_{i}, \]

where \( A'_{i} = \lambda_{i} \left( \sum_{i=1}^{K} \lambda_{i}H_{\lambda}(p_{i}) \right)^{-1}H_{\lambda}(p_{i}). \)

Suppose \( A' = \{ a_{i} \times k, l=1, \ldots, n \} \) for \( i=1, \ldots, K \). Then

\[ x_{j}^{*} = \sum_{i=1}^{K} a_{j}^{*}(p_{i}-p_{j}) = \sum_{i=1}^{K} a_{j}^{*}p_{i} - \mu \sum_{i=1}^{K} a_{j}^{*} = \sum_{i=1}^{K} a_{j}^{*}p_{i} - \mu, \]

because \( \sum A' = 1 \) and hence \( \sum a_{j}^{*} = 1 \) and \( \sum a_{j}^{*} = 0 \) for \( i \neq j \).

Since \( \sum_{j=1}^{n} x_{j}^{*} = 1 \), we have
\[
\mu = \frac{1}{n} \left( \sum_{j=1}^{K} \sum_{i=1}^{\tilde{K}} a_{ij} p_{ij} - 1 \right).
\]

Thus

\[
x_j^* = \sum_{i=1}^{K} \sum_{l=1}^{\tilde{K}} a_{jl} p_{jl} - \frac{1}{n} \left( \sum_{j=1}^{K} \sum_{i=1}^{\tilde{K}} a_{ij} p_{ij} - 1 \right)
\]

\[
= \sum_{i=1}^{\tilde{K}} \left( a_{ji} - \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{\tilde{K}} a_{ij} + \frac{1}{n K} \right) p_{ij}
\]

\[
= \sum_{i=1}^{\tilde{K}} \sum_{j=1}^{K} a_{ij} p_{ij},
\]

(1.5)

where \( a_{ij} = a_{ji} - \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{\tilde{K}} a_{ij} + \frac{1}{n K} \) and \( \sum_{i=1}^{\tilde{K}} a_{ij} = 1 \) for all \( j = 1, \ldots, n \).

We can partition the equation (1.5) by

\[
x_j^* = \sum_{i=1}^{K} a_{ij} p_{ij} + \sum_{i=1}^{\tilde{K}} a_{ij} p_{ij},
\]

where \( \sum_{i=1}^{K} a_{ij} = 1 \) and \( \sum_{i=1}^{\tilde{K}} a_{ij} = 0 \). If \( a_{ij} \) for \( i \neq j \) are small compared with \( a_{ij} \), then

\[
x_j^* \approx \sum_{i=1}^{K} \beta_{ij} p_{ij},
\]

(1.6)

where \( \beta_{ij} = a_{ij} \) and \( \sum_{i=1}^{K} \beta_{ij} = 1 \) for all \( j \). We call (1.6) a generalized linear opinion pool. (\( \beta_{ij} \) may be negative.)

1.6. Determination of the Pareto Optimal Decision

We have shown that (i) a Pareto optimal decision or a group consensus opinion is a linear opinion pool if the group members have equivalent and proper utility functions \( u_i, i = 1, \ldots, K \) defined on \( \mathbf{X} \times \Theta \), and (ii) a Pareto optimal decision is a Bayes decision if the group members' utilities are concave. Unfortunately, the results of the previous sections do not provide a normative rule for choosing the Pareto optimal decision for the group. Now we want to discuss
the determination of the Pareto optimal decision, i.e., the group consensus opinion. However, as Barlow, Mensing, and Smiriga [1984] pointed out, the determination of the Pareto optimal decision is problem dependent. That is, there is no normative rule which can be reasonably applied to all problems. Here we want to suggest two methods for determining the Pareto optimal decision which, I think, are reasonable.

Method 1

Let \( L_i(x) = \overline{u}(x) - \overline{u}_i(x) \) for \( x \in X \), where \( x_i \) is a maximizer of \( i \)'s expected utility, \( \overline{u}_i(x) = \sum p_i(\theta)u_i(x, \theta) \). Then \( L_i(x) \) is \( i \)'s expected loss-in-utility when the group consensus opinion is \( x \), while his true opinion is \( p \) (or his announced opinion is \( x_i \)). Let

\[
I_i(x) = \frac{L_i(x)}{u_i(x_i)} = 1 - \frac{\overline{u}_i(x)}{\overline{u}_i(x_i)}.
\]

Then \( I_i(x) \) is \( i \)'s percentage expected loss-in-utility when the group consensus opinion is \( x \in X \).

Now suppose that the group agree to assign weight \( w_i \) for the \( i \)th member of the group, where \( w_i \geq 0 \) and \( \sum_{i=1}^{K} w_i = 1 \). In most cases \( w_i = 1/K \) for all \( i \). Then the group may wish to minimize

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{K} w_i I_i(x) = \sum_{i=1}^{K} w_i [1 - \frac{\overline{u}_i(x)}{\overline{u}_i(x_i)}].
\]

(1.7)

If \( x^* \in X \) minimizes (1.7), then \( x^* \) is Bayes against \( \lambda = (\lambda_1, \ldots, \lambda_K) \), where \( \lambda = \frac{1}{\alpha} \frac{w_i}{\overline{u}_i(x_i)} \)
and \( \alpha \) is a constant which makes \( \sum_{i=1}^{K} \lambda_i = 1 \). If \( u_i \) are equivalent and proper, then \( x^* = \sum_{i=1}^{K} \lambda_i p_i \).

This method normalizes the group members' utilities by

\[
u_i(x, \theta) = \frac{u_i(x, \theta)}{\overline{u}_i(x_i)}\]
where \( \nu_i \) is \( i \)'s normalized utility function. In this case
\[
\max_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \nu_i(x) = 1 \quad \text{for all } i.
\]

Method 2

In this method we assume that the group members' utilities are proper, that is, each group member's announced opinion is his true opinion. We introduce a supra decision maker \( N \) who has the responsibility for determining the Pareto optimal decision or the group consensus opinion. We assume that \( N \) does not have his own opinion about \( \theta \) and he wants to minimize his judgement about the group members' expertise or state of knowledge about \( \theta \). Barlow, Mensing, and Smiriga [1984] called this assumption as a minimal judgement assumption. Under this assumption, if \( N \) were to take only one group member's advice, say \( i \)th member, then he would simply adopt \( i \)'s opinion \( p_i \) as his decision. However, \( N \) needs to make some judgements about the group members because \( N \) could not take only one individual's opinion in a group consensus problem. So \( N \)'s problem is to make a group consensus opinion while minimizing his judgements about the group members.

If \( N \) only takes one group member's advice, say \( i \), then \( N \) would adopt \( i \)'s utility function \( u_i \), and compute
\[
\max_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \sum_{\theta} p_i(\theta) u_i(x, \theta).
\]

Of course \( N \)'s decision which maximizes (1.8) is \( p_i \). So, if \( N \) only takes \( i \)'s opinion, then we can consider \( u_i \) as \( N \)'s utility function. Now let us define \( N \)'s utility function. Let \( u_N(x, \theta; i) \) be \( N \)'s utility for the consequence \( (x, \theta) \) when \( N \) only takes \( i \)'s advice. Then
\[
u_N(x, \theta; i) = A_N(i) u_i(x, \theta) + B_N(i),
\]
where \( A_N(i) > 0 \) and \( B_N(i) \) are coefficients assessed by \( N \) to standardize \( i \)'s utility function. Now \( N \)'s expected utility (with respect to \( \theta \)) is
\[ u_N(x; i) = A_N(i) \sum \theta p_i(\theta) u_i(x, \theta) + B_N(i) \]
\[ = A_N(i) \bar{U}_i(x) + B_N(i). \]  
(1.9)

Let \( w_i, i=1, \ldots, K \) be the weights of the group members given by \( N \). Then \( N \)'s expected utility for \( x \in X \) is
\[ \bar{u}_N(x) = \sum_{i=1}^K w_i A_N(i) \bar{U}_i(x) + \sum_{i=1}^K w_i B_N(i) \]
\[ = \sum_{i=1}^K w_i A_N(i) \bar{U}_i(x) + B_N. \]  
(1.10)

\( N \) may wish to maximize (1.10). For this \( N \) should assess \( w_i \) and \( A_N(i) \) for \( i = 1, \ldots, K \).

Now consider a special case that the group members' utility functions are proper and local. A utility function \( u \) is local if \( u(x, \theta) = u(x(\theta), \theta) \) for all \( \theta \in \Theta \), that is, the utility for the consequence \( (x, \theta) \) depends only upon the probability density of the true state and not upon the density of the states which could have obtained but did not. Bernardo [1979] proved that, for a continuous case, a proper and local utility function \( u \) must be of the form:
\[ u(x, \theta) = A \log x(\theta) + B(\theta), \]
where \( A \) is an arbitrary constant and \( B(\cdot) \) is an arbitrary function of \( \theta \). For the discrete case, see Mathai and Rathie [1975].

If the group members' utility functions are proper and local, then \( N \)'s utility is given by
\[ u_N(x; i) = A_N(i) \sum \theta p_i(\theta) \log x(\theta) + B_N(i). \]  
(1.11)

The utility \( u_N(x; i) \) given by (1.11) is equivalent to
\[ u_N(x; i) = -A_N(i) \sum \theta p_i(\theta) \log [p_i(\theta)/x(\theta)] + B_N(i), \]  
(1.12)

where \( B_N(i) = B_N(i) + A_N(i) \sum \theta p_i(\theta) \log p_i(\theta) \). Let
\[ I(x; y) = \sum \theta (\theta) \log [y(\theta)/x(\theta)] \]  
for \( x, y \in X \).

\( I(x; y) \) is called the (directed) divergence of \( x \) from \( y \) and is a measure of discrepancy (Mathai and Rathie [1975]). Kerridge [1961] interpreted \( I(x; y) \) as a measure of the error
made by the observer in estimating a probability density or mass as \( y \in X \), which is in fact \( x \in X \). So \( u_N(x; i) \) in equation (1.12) can be interpreted as an error made by N by taking \( x \in X \) while the true distribution is \( p \), in N's opinion. Thus N's expected utility

\[
u_N = \sum_{i=1}^{K} w_i u_N(X; i)
\]

\[- \sum A_N(i) \sum \theta p_\theta \log \{ p_\theta(x) \} + \sum j B_N(j),\]

can be thought as an expected error made by N when he takes \( x \in X \) as his opinion. Here \( w_i \) can be interpreted either as a probability that i's opinion \( p_i \) is a true probability density/mass in N's opinion, or as a probability that N takes i's opinion \( p_i \), if N were allowed to take only one group member's opinion.

Now return to the general case. Suppose N judges that \( w_i = \frac{1}{K} \) for \( i = 1, \ldots, K \). This means that N has no preferences among the group members' opinions prior to learning their opinions. It also seems reasonable that N would be indifferent between the consequences \( (p_i, i) \) for \( i = 1, \ldots, K \), where \( (x, i) \) denotes a consequence that N takes i's advice alone but forecasts \( \theta \) using \( x \). So N would normalize his utility by letting

\[
u_N(p_i, i) = 1 \quad \text{for all } i = 1, \ldots, K. \tag{1.13}
\]

Suppose also that N judges

\[
\min_{1 \leq i < K} u_N(p_s, i) = u_N(p_j, i) = 0 \quad \text{for all } i = 1, \ldots, K. \tag{1.14}
\]

This means that N is also indifferent between the consequences \( (p_i, i) \) for \( i = 1, \ldots, K \).

For the alternative interpretation of the equations (1.13) and (1.14), suppose that each group member is asked to evaluate the group members' opinions. Then ith group member may evaluate the opinions by the expected utilities \( \overline{u}_i(p_i) \) for \( s = 1, \ldots, K \). We have

\[
\max_{1 \leq i < K} \overline{u}_i(p_j) = \overline{u}_i(p_i) \quad \text{and} \quad \min_{1 \leq i < K} \overline{u}_i(p_s) = \overline{u}_i(p_j).
\]
Thus the equations (1.13) and (1.14) imply that N standardizes the group members’ evaluation for the other group members’ opinions by letting

$$\max_i \bar{\nu}_i(p_i) = 1 \text{ and } \min_i \bar{\nu}_i(p_i) = 0 \text{ for } i = 1, \ldots, K,$$

where \( \bar{\nu}_i \) is i’s standardized utility function. Let

$$M_i = \max_i \bar{\nu}_i(p_i) \text{ and } m_i = \min_i \bar{\nu}_i(p_i).$$

Then from the equations (1.13) and (1.14), we have

$$A_N(i) M_i + B_N(i) = 1$$

and

$$A_N(i) m_i + B_N(i) = 0$$

for \( i = 1, \ldots, K \). Hence

$$A_N(i) = 1/(M_i - m_i) \text{ and } B_N(i) = -m_i/(M_i - m_i)$$

for \( i = 1, \ldots, K \). N’s expected utility for \( x \in X \) is

$$u_N(x) = \frac{1}{K} \left( \frac{1}{M_i - m_i} \bar{\nu}_i(x) - \frac{m_i}{M_i - m_i} \right). \tag{1.15}$$

N would take an opinion which maximizes (1.15). If \( x^* \in X \) maximizes (1.15), then \( x^* \) is a Bayes decision against \( \lambda = (\lambda_1, \ldots, \lambda_K) \) with \( \lambda_i = 1/(M_i - m_i) \).

If \( u_i \) are proper and equivalent, then

$$x^* = \sum_i \lambda_i p_i = \frac{1}{\alpha} \sum_i \frac{p_i}{M_i - m_i},$$

where \( \alpha \) is a constant such that \( \sum \lambda_i = 1 \).

Note that, if \( u_i \) are proper and local, then

$$M_i - m_i = \max_i I(p_i; p_i) \text{ for } i = 1, \ldots, K,$$

where \( I(p_i; p_i) \) is a measure of the error made by using \( p_i \) when \( p_i \) is i’s true distribution. \( I(p_i; p_i) \) is also interpreted as a measure of the distance from \( p_i \) to \( p_i \), as assessed by i. This
measure of distance is asymmetric, which seems reasonable. With this in mind we can interpret \((M_i - m_i)\) as a maximum distance from \(p_i\) to other group members' opinions as evaluated by \(i\). \(N\) gives a weight \(\lambda_i\) to the \(i\)th group member proportional to the inverse of the maximum distance assessed by \(i\). Thus \(i\) receives small weight if the maximum distance from his opinion to the other members' opinions is large.

1.7. Summary

We have considered a group consensus problem in which the group members are jointly responsible for combining their opinions for an unknown quantity \(\theta \in \Theta\). If the group has a predefined real decision problem, we call it a group decision problem. If the group members are simply required to give their opinions for \(\theta\) without having any real decision problem, we call it a text-book problem. In this thesis we treat the text-book problem as a version of group decision problem. We assumed that each group member \(i\) has a utility function \(u_i\), defined on \(X \times \Theta\), where \(X\) is the set of all probability mass or density functions for \(\theta\).

In a group decision problem with action space \(A\), state space \(\Theta\), and individual utility functions \(v_i\), defined on \(A \times \Theta\), \(i\)'s utility function \(u_i\), on \(X \times \Theta\) is derived from \(v_i\), on \(A \times \Theta\) and it was shown that \(u_i\) is proper.

In a text-book problem, there is no action space \(A\) and hence no individual utility functions \(v_i\), on \(A \times \Theta\). But we assume that each group member \(i\) has a utility function \(u_i\), on \(X \times \Theta\), which is assessed by \(i\).

We summarize the main results according to the state space: single event case and general random variable case.

Single Event Case

1) If the group members' utility functions \(u_i\), on \(X \times \Theta\) are strictly proper for all \(i\), then a Pareto optimal decision in \(X\) must be a convex combination of the group members' true
opinions, i.e., a linear opinion pool of their true opinions.

(2) If \( u_i \) are proper for all \( i \), then a linear opinion pool of the group members' true opinions is a Pareto optimal decision in \( X \). Here a Pareto optimal decision may not be a convex combination of the group members' true opinions. However, for any decision \( x \in X \), there exists a convex combination of the group members' opinions which is at least as good as \( x \) for each member of the group, that is, there exists \( x^* \in X \) such that \( x^* \) is a convex combination of the group members' true opinions and \( \overline{u}_i(x^*) \geq \overline{u}_i(x) \) for all \( i \).

(3) If \( u_i \) are strictly concave (not necessarily proper) in \( x \) for all \( i \), then a Pareto optimal decision in \( X \) must be a linear opinion pool of the group members' announced opinions. Here we assume that each group member \( i \) announces the opinion which maximizes his expected utility \( \overline{u}_i(x) \) over all \( x \in X \). If \( u_i \) is proper, \( i \)'s announced opinion is his true opinion.

(4) If \( u_i \) are concave in \( x \) (not necessarily proper) for all \( i \), then a linear opinion pool of the group members' announced opinions is a Pareto optimal decision in \( X \). Moreover, for any decision \( x \) in \( X \), there is a convex combination of the group members' announced opinions which is at least as good as \( x \) for each member of the group.

**General Random Variable Case**

(1) If the group members have the equivalent and strictly proper utility functions \( u_i \) on \( X \times \Theta \), then any Pareto optimal decision in \( X \) must be a linear opinion pool of the group members' true opinions.

(2) If the group members have the equivalent and proper (not necessarily strictly proper) utility functions \( u_i \), then linear opinion pool of the group members' true opinions is Pareto optimal decision in \( X \). Moreover, for any decision \( x \) in \( X \), there is a convex combination of the group members' true opinions which is at least as good as \( x \) for each member of the group.
(3) If \( u_i \) are concave in \( x \) for all \( i \), then Pareto optimal decision in \( X \) is Bayes decision in \( X \).

(4) A quadratic approximation of \( u_i \) is concave in \( x \). If the group members' opinions are close enough and their utility functions \( u_i \) are smooth, we can assume that \( u_i \) is concave in \( x \) for all \( i \), at least approximately. Hence Pareto optimal decision in \( X \) is Bayes decision in \( X \) in most reasonable cases. We also discuss the form of Pareto optimal decisions for concave utility cases.

Finally, in Section 1.6, I suggested some methods of determining Pareto optimal decision. However, I do not claim that the methods suggested in this paper are normative rules which can be applied to all problems. The determination of Pareto optimal decision is problem dependent.
REFERENCES


