THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. RESPONSES TOWARD THE REGION

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AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: The Iran-Iraq War and the Development of U.S. Responses Toward the Region

AUTHOR: Garret L. Albert, Civilian, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Iran-Iraq war, which began in September 1980, and the evolution of regional, Soviet and U.S. responses are addressed in this study. Although the Gulf war is presented as the latest manifestation of a millenia-long struggle, this outbreak has the potential of involving other regional states in the conflict, curtailing the vital flow of Gulf oil to the free world and drawing the Superpowers into an armed conflict. The primary U.S. objectives for the region are described as maintaining the cost-effective flow of Gulf oil to the allies, insuring the security of friendly governments in the region and preventing the Soviet Union from capitalizing on the war to the detriment of the West. To facilitate these objectives, the U.S. seeks a near term negotiated settlement to prevent either side, and especially fanatic Tehran, from becoming victorious and destabilizing the Gulf. The author concludes that the U.S. must avoid the caprices of changing U.S. administrations and can best develop a viable policy toward the region in consultation with allies and friendly Gulf states.
Mr. Garret L. Albert received a BS with honors in Engineering Geology from Bowling Green University, Ohio in 1959 and was later a graduate teaching fellow at the University of Maine. He served in Army Intelligence and Special Forces during the 1961 Berlin Crisis and holds a commission in the Army Reserves. After a short period as a Maine State Engineering Geologist, Mr. Albert taught Geology and Mathematics at Ricker College and at Loring Air Force Base for Ohio State University. In 1964, he joined the Central Intelligence Agency as a Junior Officer Trainee and transferred to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 1966. Mr. Albert served as a Senior Analyst on the Headquarters, U.S. European Command Intelligence Staff (J2), Stuttgart, Germany from 1971-73, and later provided DIA support to the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks at Vienna, Austria. He is currently a Senior Operations Specialist with DIA's Plans and Programs Office, Attaches and Operations Directorate.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Iran-Iraq, or Gulf war began in September 1980, has claimed up to an estimated one million killed or wounded and has resulted in tens of thousands of prisoners on both sides. It has also cost billions of dollars and has ruined the economies of both countries. Pride and ambition have thrown Saddam Hussein's Iraqi Baathist regime against Ayatollah Khomeini's vindictive, fundamentalist Shiite theocracy. The conflict has included such atrocities as teenage Iranian human wave attacks sent against Iraqi entrenched machine guns and poison gas. (21:41)

The war is being fought in one the world's most critical geopolitical arenas. While it still remains a regional conflict and is only indirectly related to the Superpowers' cold war, it contains the potential danger of involving the entire Gulf area. (11:31) Such an occurrence could be disastrous to the region as well as the rest of the world. A decisive victory by either side could well result in a dangerous hegemony by the victor, which would increasingly destabilize the region's moderate Arab regimes, inhibit the flow of oil to the West and thereby provide the scenario for a potential Superpower confrontation. (49:52,58) Although an overwhelming Iraqi victory could support the
spread of Hussein's Baathist Arab socialism throughout the region, precipitate an internal crisis in Iran, and at least strongly influence the more moderate Arab state's leadership in the Gulf area, the fanatic ideological dimensions of an Iranian victory would be particularly destabilizing. *Interalia,* Khomeini would be able to increase the effectiveness of his efforts to topple all the moderate Arab regimes on the Persian Gulf, capriciously control the flow and price of Gulf oil and possibly induce the Soviet Union to move into Iran, thereby precipitating a Superpower conflict. (47:68)

This paper addresses the history, background and military developments of the Iran-Iraq war, the destabilizing effects of a potential victory by either side, but especially Iran, upon the region and the Superpowers, and the development of U.S. policy in response to the conflict. Because this war may be considered as the latest phase of an animosity rooted in the distant past, an historic framework assists in its comprehension.
The ongoing war between Iran and Iraq, which began on 22 September 1980, has been characterized as the latest outbreak of a millenia-long struggle between the two countries and their geographic predecessors. The lush Tigris-Euphrates river valleys of ancient Mesopotamia were the object of conquest by the inhabitants of the generally barren Zagros mountains to the east since before Christ. Well known Persian brutalities, documented since the Babylonian period, have provided much grist for the historic Iraqi fear and hatred of Iran. Later, the Persian Sassanids, who ruled the area now knows as Iraq, were defeated by Arab-Islamic armies at the battle of Qadisiya in 637. (8:5) The Persian empire ended with the defeat of its armies at the battle of Nihawand in 642. (16:8) Even though the conquering Arabs implanted Islam into Persia and considered Arabism and Islam a single unity, differences between Arab and Persian language, religion (since 1501) and culture were never overcome. These differences still exacerbate the ancient animosity between the two countries. (53:8)

"Cultural nationalism," although a generalization, provides some rationale for the political rivalry between Iran and Iraq. In addition to a racial difference, the
Farsi (Persian) language of Iran belongs to the Aryan family of Indo-European languages, whereas the Arabic language of Iraq is a member of the Semitic family. (53:7) Also, whereas Iran has been the great proponent of the Shiite branch of Islam, Iraqi rulers espouse their "special" Baathist-Sunni branch. While fundamental Shiites insist upon restricting their religious ruler to a direct descendant of Muhammed, the Sunnis accept the best qualified man from Muhammed's tribe as their religious leader. (53:8) This difference in religious interpretation continues to fuel the mutual antagonism between the two countries.

There are also political and economic factors that evolved from these religious interpretations. During the sixteenth century, the Persian Safavid rulers, who were primarily secular, left religious matters to the Shiite theologians. With their steady acquisition of money and land, the Persian Shiite clergy grew extremely powerful and, although independent of the king, became tremendously influential in secular politics. No such wealth and political power was allowed to fall into Sunni clerical hands in the neighboring Arab states, and any political ruler that removed previously acquired wealth and power from their Shiite clerics became extremely unpopular among fundamentalist Shiites, who labeled such rulers "Satanic." In Arab states with sizeable Shiite populations, Sunni rulers have often suspected their
Shiites (who do not trust secular non-Shiite rulers) of being overly influenced by Iran and being anti-Arab. This suspicion has often led to the oppression of the more intransigent Shiites and helps explain Khomeini's antagonism toward local Arab rulers. (16:9)

Another basic difference that evolved is between the Pan-Islamism of Iran and the Pan-Arabism of Iraq. Pan-Islamists espouse an ideal political harmony among all Muslims without political or ethnic divides. They despise any form of nationalism and have even drawn disparaging parallels between Pan-Arabism and Zionism. The idealistic Pan-Islam goal would have the 800 million Muslims peacefully united from Senegal to the Philippines under a single political leader. In contrast, Pan-Arabists are only concerned with Arabic-speaking peoples, and want to unify the Arab-speaking Muslims of the Middle East into a single, modern secular nation, thereby excluding Iran. (53:6)

Several anomalies between Iran and Iraq are also evident. While large numbers of Persians live in Iraq, large numbers of Arabs also live in Iran, particularly in the Khuzistan (Arabistan) province. Although the ruling class of Iraq is Sunni, this sect constitutes only about 20 percent of the Iraqi population; not only is approximately 55 to 60 percent of the population Shiite, the most holy Shiite shrines are also in Iraq (Najaf and Karbala). (53:9)
Meanwhile, in "Shiite" Iran, many of the non-Farsi speaking minorities (Baluchis, Arabs, Kurds and Turkomens) remain Sunni. These anomalies provided both Baghdad and Tehran with visions of exploitable irredentism. (24:8) However, both Arabs and Persians recognize that while the Arabs converted the Persians to an early form of Islam, the culture of Persia provided the basis for the later development of the "classical Islamic civilization." (22:2) Nevertheless, this last anomaly is far from enough to repress their mutual animosity.

Cultural and social differences between Iran and Iraq, and their historic geographic predecessors, have contributed to many changes in their mutual border. Although it has remained in the same approximate position since the middle of the seventeenth century, conflicts over the current border began with the Ottoman-Safavid clashes in the sixteenth century and have erupted sporadically ever since. (8:5) The principal issue has concerned control over the Shatt al Arab river which begins at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and flows southeastward for about 120 miles to the Persian Gulf. There have been at least six agreements and treaties to define the boundary along the Shatt, including those in 1639, 1823, 1847, 1937 and 1975. (25:1)
The Shatt is Iraq's principal waterway to the sea and Basra, Iraq's only useable commercial port, lies along the Shatt within 50 miles of its mouth. Because Iraq has a low, swampy and virtually unuseable coastline of less than 50 miles, and is confined by Iran to its east and Kuwait to its south, Basra and the Shatt will probably continue to remain Iraq's economic outlet for the foreseeable future. Since Iraq realizes that it lacks strategic depth and that its economic and geo-strategic assets are so exposed, Baghdad perceives that it could easily be strangled along this 50 mile "window to the world" by hostile neighbors. (22:6)

Although the Shatt may not seem as economically or strategically important to Iran, transportation by way of the Shatt from the Iranian port city of Muhammara to the Persian Gulf is still considered vital by Tehran. (30:99) As a result, control of the Shatt and its neighboring region has remained a contentious issue with Iran, especially after oil was discovered in Khuzistan in 1908. Iran was never satisfied with the restrictions of the Constantinople Accords of 1913 which delineated the boundary at the low water line along the Iranian shore. In 1937, a new treaty recognized the boundary in the middle of the navigable Shatt channel around Abadan utilizing the "Thalweg principle," while the rest of the border along the Shatt remained along
the eastern shore's low water mark, as before. (22:7) Iran remained dissatisfied and, in 1975, pressured Iraq to acquiesce to the terms of the Algiers Agreement of that year, that denoted the thalweg of the entire Shatt as the border between the two countries. (30:97) In return, the Shah promised to drop Iranian support for the ongoing Kurdish rebellion in Iraq and to return certain disputed territories along the central border region which, in fact, were never returned. (8:5)

In 1968, Baathism emerged to power in Iraq under Saddam Hussein as a radical form of Arab socialism that was "destined to overthrow the 'archaic' monarchies" that prevailed in the region. (53:109-114) When Britain withdrew from the Gulf in late 1971, there was no longer a foreign presence to control the natural rivalry between the region's two strongest countries. (24:7) This placed the Shah as the "defender and protector of the regional status quo." (22:8)

The Shah's effectiveness in squelching Iraqi hegemony, thereby demonstrating the power of a unified Iran, was not lost on Baghdad. Even though Hussein was furious that he was forced to sign the 1975 Algiers Agreement that adopted the thalweg principle for the entire Shatt, he complied with the Shah's 1978 request to expell the dissident Khominei from Iraq. This, and the "mysterious" murder
of one of Khomeini's two sons in 1977 as well as Hussein's "personally ordered execution" of the leading Iraqi Shiite theologian in 1980 formed at least part of the basis for Khomeini's hatred for Hussein's Iraqi Baathist government. (18:33)

A series of disruptive events quickly evolved with the onset of the Iranian revolution. After replacing the Shah in 1979, Khomeini called upon the Shiite majority in Iraq to overthrow Hussein's Baathists. Khomeini also promoted violent attacks upon Baathists by the Shiite Daawa Party in Iraq. Tehran's support for riots in several Shiite cities in Iraq, association with a grenade attack on an Iraqi deputy premier and refusal to pull back from occupied Persian Gulf islands (in spite of a demand to do so by U.N. Secretary General Waldheim) caused Baghdad to react; in April 1980, Iraq took advantage of revolts in several Iranian provinces by supporting Arab dissidents against the new Iranian regime, especially in Khuzistan. (8:6) Also, Hussein reportedly had the head of Iraq's Shiite majority executed and had Khuzistani Arab terrorists seize the Iranian embassy in London. (53:11) A crescendo of border incidents between the two countries then set the stage for the war that followed. (8:6)
CHAPTER III
DECISION FOR WAR

Several factors have been cited that probably influenced Iraq's decision to attack Iran and start the war. (22:9) The first event was the revolution which transformed Iran into a dangerous state of turmoil, thereby threatening the Baathist regime in Baghdad. Hussein, a Sunni, had never felt secure and was particularly threatened by the potential of either a direct attack by Iran or a Khomeini-inspired internal uprising by Iraq's Shiite majority. Hussein also thought that the threat would increase after Khomeini suppressed his own opposition and consolidated his power. (8:6) A second factor was the 1975 Algiers Agreement which Iraq believed it was forced to accept. Baghdad did not consider that the border along the thalweg of the Shatt was negotiated fairly, and declared the agreement "null and void" just before the invasion of Iran. A third factor was the Camp David Accords which provided Iraq with the opportunity to replace Egypt as the leader of the Arab World. An event as dramatic as Egypt's seizure of the Suez Canal could propel Hussein into the Arab leadership role against Israel. His sponsoring of the Baghdad Summits earlier in 1980 was a first step in achieving this role. A forth factor was the perceived preoccupation of both the United States and the
Soviet Union with the hostage crisis and the Afghanistan invasion, respectively. (22:9)

Certain misconceptions were also held by both sides. Hussein reportedly misperceived that the Khomeini government would sue for peace after the Iraqi invasion. He also expected an irredentist revolt of the Khuzistan Arabs and the collapse of the Iranian army after it was stripped of its pro-Shah officers. (29:176) Other Iraqi misconceptions included that Khomeini was not yet firmly entrenched in power, Iranian society was too fractured to support a war, the Iranian armed forces were disaffected and were opposed to the Ayatollah, and the military hardware was nearly totally inoperative for lack of spare parts. (18:36)

The Iranians also miscalculated Iraqi resolve. Khomeini's emotional appeal to the Iraqi Shiites did not cause them to overthrow the Hussein government, as Tehran expected, nor did it cause the predominantly Shiite Iraqi army to defect or mutiny. As in the case of Iraq's misconception, the expected irredentism did not materialize. (29:176)

In apparent "mortal fear" for its security and as a result of serious miscalculations, Iraq launched the preemptive strike against Iran on 22 September 1980. Baghdad stated its war objectives on 28 September 1980, which included that Iran:
- recognize Iraq's legitimate and sovereign rights over its land and waters (i.e. the Shatt al Arab)

- refrain from interfering in Iraq's and other regional states' internal affairs

- adhere to the principle of good neighborly relations

- return to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) the Iranian-occupied islands of the Persian Gulf. (22:15)

Iranian war objectives were provided on 26 September 1980, which demanded Iraq:

- end its aggression by unconditional withdrawal from all Iranian territory

- acknowledge its war guilt and pay reparations

- remove the Baathist government, "...God wants us to share, together with the nation of Iraq, in the honor of toppling Saddam and his executioner regime." (22:16)
The initial Iraqi assault pushed 50 miles into Iran within a few days. However, the Iraqi army quickly bogged down as Iranian resistance developed and Iraq's mostly raw draftees began to feel the effects of Iran's numerically superior, zealous "raw manpower," which was not demoralized, as Baghdad had expected. Also, Iranian aircraft were effectively protected by the Shah's reinforced concrete shelters; the bombed runways were repaired within hours and Iran was able to fly limited counter-strike sorties by the second day of the war. (18:36) Nevertheless, within a week, 30,000 Iraqi soldiers were in Iran's Khuzistan province and near their major objectives of Khorramshahr and Abadan. In the face of rapidly building Iranian resistance, Iraq finally took Khorramshahr on 10 November after suffering 6,000 casualties, but could not take Abadan. The Iranians suffered heavily as well and renamed Khorramshahr "Khuninshahr," or "City of Blood." Meanwhile, on 7 November, Iran successfully cut Baghdad's oil exports by coordinated attacks on Iraqi oil facilities. (18:37) With the capture of Khorramshahr, the Iraqi army lost momentum. While both sides participated in a prolonged artillery duel (the "phony war"), Iraq established a defensive line and rebuilt its
arsenal while Iran mustered over 100,000 additional troops. (17:26)

Iran began a series of counterattacks in January 1981. During the next spring, Iran launched a multidiisional thrust along a 45 mile front against disorganized Iraqi forces. By September 1982, the Iranians had forced the demoralized Iraqi army back to the approximate original staging area from where Iraq began the war. During the offensive, the Iranians used human wave attacks, including old men and boys, against Iraqi defensive positions, and virtually destroyed most of the Iraqi divisions. (18:37)

Throughout 1983, both sides continued to pound each other in their war of attrition. By early in 1984, Iran had over 500,000 soldiers at the front and was within 100 miles of Baghdad before Iraq succeeded in halting the advance. In September 1984, Iraq was at a low point; Hussein's attempts at a negotiated settlement were rebuked (as they still are) by Khomeini. Baghdad was beginning to perceive that it was fighting an unwinnable and yet unending war. (17:26)

To overcome the deadlock in the war of attrition, both sides have attacked the other's oil producing and handling facilities as well as oil tankers. In addition, Iraq began to use chemical weapons (possibly as early as 1981) to stop the Iranian "human wave" attacks. Even Iran made some preparations to use chemical weapons with the
importation of a chemical plant from Sweden, while Iraq reportedly made an effort to develop nuclear weapons. (18:38)

Both Iran and Iraq have been able to replace and, in the case of Iraq, improve their weapon stockpiles lost as a result of the war. The Soviets continue to supply arms to Iraq; China, North Korea and the Warsaw Pact have also provided Baghdad with Soviet-made weapons. (18:40) China alone is said to have sold over three billion dollars worth of arms to Iraq since the war broke out. (7:40) Egypt is also reported to have sold Iraq 2.5 billion dollars worth of weapons. (35:41) The French have provided Baghdad with a reported nine billion dollars worth of weapons, and are the largest supplier to either side. As a result of French qualitatively and quantitatively improved exports to Iraq, Baghdad has a bigger and more modern force than in September 1980, when the war began. (18:40) By October 1984, French built and supplied Exocet missiles were reportedly responsible for confirmed damage to 60 ships in the Gulf war, with an additional 52 ships possibly damaged by the Exocet. (37:13) These missiles were reported to have been carried on the French-built Super Etendard fighter aircraft. (5:136) Spain has also provided Baghdad with combat helicopters, and a 3 December 1984 arms transfer table lists unknown numbers of MIG 29 fighter aircraft on order from the Soviet Union. (59:1,8) Furthermore, if the Israelis had not bombed the
French-provided Osirak reactor, some speculate that Iraq might have eventually developed a nuclear weapons capability. There were also reports that West German-supplied chemical plants were converted by Baghdad to produce nerve gas. (18:40)

Iran has also received some weapons and spare parts, but well below the volume provided to Iraq. Tehran's major suppliers have been Israel, China and U.S. equipment from South Korea, Vietnam and several West European-based dealers. Illegal channels have also been reported to supply weapons directly from the United States. (18:40) Additional arms may also have been provided by Taiwan. (38:18)

Even though Iraq has an estimated six-to-one military materiel advantage over Iran, Baghdad has not been victorious. (5:137) Iraq's battlefield tactics have been characterized as being severely flawed, and its superior weapons have not yet been able to overcome the nearly three-to-one population advantage of Iran. (50:130) Nevertheless, by January 1985, one estimate placed Iranian losses possibly as high as 600,000 killed in combat with an additional 500,000 to 600,000 seriously wounded, while Iraq has lost an estimated 60,000 to 80,000 killed and from 165,000 to 210,000 wounded. (10:9) Meanwhile, Iran has continued to be generally on the attack for the past three years and "decisive results stem from the attack." (18:42)
However, Iran appears to be showing signs of some stress, in spite of its aggressiveness and outward intransigence. (52:14) Although originally confined to Iraq, there are now reports of growing dissent in both countries. (37:21) Tehran may be beginning to realize that its threatened "final offensive" against Iraq may be limited to thrusts in scattered sectors due to material shortages. (12:717) The increasing effectiveness of the U.S. effort to halt all military equipment to Iran is apparently having sobering effects upon some Iranian moderates. (57:28)
CHAPTER V
CONSIDERATION OF AN IRANIAN VICTORY

Although an Iranian military victory appears somewhat remote at the present time, Baghdad could still make a major mistake on the battlefield which could cause it to lose the war. (10:15) In addition, Saddam Hussein's regime could conceivably be overthrown by internal dissidents or a successful Iranian terrorist attack, and a pro-Iranian Shiite administration could succeed him. (1:56)

At least as long as Khomeini remains in power, an Iranian victory calls for a change from a Baathist to a fundamentalist Shiite government in Baghdad; this, in turn, would conceivably result in a tremendous boost to fanatic fundamentalist revolutionary Muslims throughout the region. (50:134) Khomeini's vindictiveness has been well demonstrated and among the immediate targets of his wrath would probably be the moderate Arab states along the Persian Gulf. (50:142) Former U.S. Ambassador to Oman Marshal Wilkney feels that, for self protection, the region's states would move away from their generally pro-Western stance to demonstrate their independence of U.S. influence. (60:462) Nevertheless, a victorious Tehran would presumably still support pro-fundamentalist dissidents' promotion of internal
unrest and subversion throughout the area, regardless of the moderate Arab states' efforts to mollify Khomeini. (50:142)

Although the possibility of a face-saving, negotiated settlement of the war appears extremely remote while Khomeini remains in power, there seems to be some evidence that high-level moderating influences are present within Iran. (38:17) Nevertheless, there are still no indications that Khomeini has modified his intransigence. (8:3) Even if Khomeini dies in the near term, estimates suggest that the fundamentalists will remain in power for some time. If not overthrown in a subsequent power struggle, their influence might still eventually diminish enough to allow Iranian factions suppressed by Khomeini to reemerge. (47:69)

The bazaar merchants and former big landlords in Iran were disenfranchized by the Shah's "White Revolution" of 1962-63. Nevertheless, these forces still exist within Iran and constitute a potential future moderating influence. (46:7) Their discouragement with the Khomeini theocracy and its associated excesses might well cause some of them as well as other elements of the population to choose a more moderate form of government. Admittedly remote at present, the future emergence to power of one of the late Shah's sons can not yet be totally ruled out. Nevertheless, these options would gain more viability after Khomeini leaves power.
CHAPTER VI
REGIONAL RESPONSES

The views of the Gulf states toward the war run the spectrum from unquestioned support for Iraq to near neutrality. None, however, would want to experience an Iranian victory. As a result of its geographic position, Kuwait provides the greatest support for Iraq. Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman want to maintain at least correct relations with Tehran, which they see as a long term power in the region, regardless of the war's outcome. All Gulf states would feel threatened if either Iran or Iraq would emerge a clear victor, but especially if non-Arab Iran were to win the war. Khomeini's conditions for victory call for the unconditional abrogation of Hussein and the replacement of the Iraqi Baathist government with a virtual Shiite theocracy. Baghdad, under Shiite control, would then be able to provide additional support for Khomeini's demands that all Arab governments in the region are illegitimate and should be replaced. At least dissident activities by Iranian-supported Shiites could be expected throughout the region.

As a result of this realization, the moderate Gulf states had provided up to 27 billion dollars to Iraq by January 1984. They also opened their ports and lines of
communication to and from Iraq after the port of Basra was closed by the war. (16:86)

The Gulf war and the thwarted Iranian attempt to assassinate Bahrain's ruling family, provided the rationale for Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to convince other Gulf states to form the Gulf Cooperation Council in early February 1981. (22:87) The other GCC states include Oman, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE.

The Steadfast Alliance is another organization that resulted from the Gulf war. Its members, which include Libya, Syria, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Peoples' Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), have provided some support to Iran. In addition, both Iran and the PDRY have expressed the desire to have full diplomatic relations with one another. The pro-Soviet PDRY has a history of regional destabilization. With or without an Iranian victory, Iranian relations with the PDRY could result in increased Soviet influence in Tehran as well as develop the PDRY as an Iranian surrogate against Oman. (22:87)

Saudi Arabia has a growing population of about 400,000 Shiites in its eastern province. A severe internal threat to the Saud family could well emerge with an Iranian victory. (8:28) Most Saudi workers at the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) are Shiites and, although extensive security measures have been taken, the targets are just too
numerous to be adequately protected. (24:13) Even though the Saudis rely on harsh punishment and redundancy of facilities to inhibit the effectiveness of sabotage, events such as the Mecca Mosque incident, especially with the continued presence of 1.5 million pilgrims accentuates Saudi fear that the regime would not be able to guarantee the security and viability of the nation in the face of an Iranian victory. (8:29) There are indications that, without the United States arms sales and the presence of AWACS and KC-10 refueling tankers, Saudi Arabia would already be requesting direct U.S. fighter aircraft support to defend its oil facilities. (8:28)

Kuwait has been characterized as a true "hostage" of the war and a "special problem." (22:48) Because of its small size and geographic situation it is powerless to stop a thrust from Iran, only 50 kilometers to the east. (24:20) Iran has already committed acts of sabotage within Kuwait. (8:30) At the same time, Iraq would like to annex Kuwait or at least establish some "special relationship" with the small country. (22:50) Kuwait is also the only Gulf state with diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. (8:31) Because of the support Kuwait has given to Iraq, it would be particularly vulnerable to Khomeini's wrath. (24:19)

Although U.S. AWACS surveillance and Saudi Arabian fighter aircraft protect both Bahrain and Qatar from an
Iranian air attack, the greatest threat to these small countries appears to be by subversion and sabotage. Iran has continued to claim Bahrain since the seventeenth century. (24:20) With a minority Sunni government and a fundamentalist Shiite popular majority, Bahrain would be especially vulnerable to subversion. This has already been demonstrated in an Iranian-planned plot to overthrow the ruling family in December 1981. (8:31) Additional Bahraini vulnerability was underscored by a large Shiite demonstration that took place in August 1979. (24:20)

Among the seven emirates of the UAE, Abu Dhabi is the most vociferous in trying to avoid direct confrontation with its historically largest trading partner, Iran. Although a member of the GCC, the UAE argues that the GCC has neither the early warning nor the tactical air capabilities to stop an Iranian attack. UAE members add that they are not really covered by "Saudi security umbrella." Furthermore, some UAE members share oil facilities with Iran and don't want to anger Tehran. (8:31) Iranians dominate the UAE population. Only 13 to 20 percent of the entire UAE population hold UAE citizenship. The feeling in the UAE of vulnerability to internal unrest that would probably accompany an Iranian victory is very real. (24:23)

Oman's greatest liabilities with regard to a potential Iranian victory are its ties to the United States and
the United Kingdom, and its close proximity to Iran across the Strait of Hormuz. (8:32) However, because of its distance from the Gulf war, Oman may not feel as threatened as the other Gulf states. (24:24) Oman also maintains diplomatic relations with Tehran and does not wish to break these "correct" relations. (8:32) However, even though its non-Omani population is very small at the present time, ambitious internal development plans will probably increase the percentage of foreigners and raise the future potential for internal unrest. (24:24) Meanwhile, the Omani government does not want a "visible U.S. presence" but, in the event of an Iranian attack, does want concerted GCC defensive action with heavy Saudi participation. With an Iranian threat, Oman would consider expanding its defensive role beyond its own borders. (8:32) Nevertheless, Oman may be overlooking the potential threat from the PDRY, which could act as a surrogate of Iran with respect to developing Iranian-PDRY and Iranian-Steadfast Alliance relations. (22:87)

The Iran-Iraq war has provided Israel with some respite in its confrontation with the Arabs. The war has moved Iraq's attention away from its western border and greatly curtailed Baghdad's support to the Israeli front. (22:51) As a result, Israel has supported the continuation of the Gulf war and has even provided aid to Iran. However,
a clear victory by either side is not in Israel's favor, considering Khomeini's desire to participate in a military confrontation with Israel. (24:30)
CHAPTER VII
SOVIET RESPONSES

Between the two antagonists in the Gulf war, only Iran shares a border with the Soviet Union, and separates the Soviets from the Gulf and their coveted warm water port. Moscow has always considered the northern part of Iran within its "sphere of influence." (8:10) Tehran, however, remains strongly anti-Soviet. Iran's location and current intransigent leader provide the Soviets with understandable chagrin. This concern would increase considerably with an Iranian victory. (45:438)

To inhibit a potential preponderant influence of the United States in the region from evolving out of the Gulf war, Leonid Brezhnev presented the following series of principles in December 1980:

All powers would agree...

- Not to set up military bases in the Persian Gulf and on contiguous islands and not to deploy nuclear or any other weapons of mass destruction there;
- Not to use or threaten to use force against the Persian Gulf countries and not to interfere in their internal affairs;
- To respect the status of nonalignment chosen by the Persian Gulf states and not to draw them into military groupings of which nuclear powers are members;
- To respect the inalienable right of the region's states to their natural resources;
- Not to create any impediments or threats to normal trade exchange and the use of maritime communications connecting the states of this region with other countries. (22:69)

On close examination, the Brezhnev pronouncement contains the same overall approach to the region that was presented by the Soviets in 1972, i.e., "...establish that the Soviet Union is an Asian power with Asian security concerns, force the Western countries out of the region because they are not Asian, and establish a basis for collective military intervention" with, of course, Soviet participation. (22:70)

Khomeini has already taken several actions that illustrate his hostility to the Soviet Union. In 1980 he unilaterally abrogated a 1921 Treaty of Friendship between the two countries, he outlawed the Iranian Communist Tudeh party and provided some support to the rebels in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union continues to recognize the 1921 treaty which empowers them to intervene in Iran if Soviet security were threatened. Russia, and later the Soviet Union has invaded Iran five times, twice in the twentieth century. (47:68) If Iran, bolstered by a victory over Iraq, appeared to be potentially threatening its northern neighbor's security, another invasion might become viable, especially if Iran did not request military assistance from the United States. (49:32) Over 20 Soviet divisions are already sta-
tioned near the Iran Border to facilitate such an invasion. (8:10)

The Soviet Union has a number of other advantages over the West besides its common border with Iran. The most important include less Soviet dependence upon Gulf oil than the West, and official diplomatic ties with both Iran and Iraq. This places the Soviets in a slightly better position to act as a potential mediator if a negotiated settlement begins to appear possible. Also, in the event of an Iranian victory, other regional states may rely upon the Soviet Union to restrain an increasingly hostile Tehran. (24:35) It has also been suggested that the Kremlin may wish to divide up Iran with the West, using a formula whereby the Soviet Union would annex the northern portion as a new satellite, and the West would take the southern portion, similar to the division of Germany after the Second World War. (49:52,58) However, if the Soviets remain bogged down in Afghanistan, or if Iran calls for U.S. military assistance in anticipation of a Soviet attack, the Soviet Union will probably act more cautiously and opt to take less direct action against Iran, e.g. short of invasion. (49:6)
CHAPTER VIII
DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. RESPONSES

When the Iran-Iraq war began on 22 September 1980, the primary concern of the United States was the need to protect U.S. and world access to the oil reserves in the region at reasonable prices. (61:457) A close second concern was to keep the Soviet Union from capitalizing on opportunities growing out of the Gulf war to the disadvantage of the West. (8:10) Three major objectives toward the region evolved. The primary objective was to maintain a sufficient level of Persian Gulf oil shipments available at reasonable prices so as not to disrupt Western economies; the second was to insure the security of friendly Gulf oil-producing governments; and the third was to have a balanced settlement of the crisis that provided neither Iran nor Iraq with close Soviet ties while concurrently providing the U.S. and its allies with the potential for building upon correct relations with both antagonists. (50:140) Although these objectives remain extant, the style of achieving them has changed somewhat.

Four successive U.S. administrations have developed the following strategies that reflect the dependence of the industrialized world and the world economy upon access to oil from the region.
- agreed with the other Western Nations to share oil if disruption occurs;

- placed over 400 million barrels of oil in the strategic petroleum reserve with the intention to have 750 million barrels by fiscal year 1985 (to ultimately have one billion barrels) and to be willing to draw it down in any shortage;

- provided advanced weapons to conservative Persian Gulf states to strengthen their position;

- improved U.S. military capabilities in the region while maintaining a low "public profile;"

- opposed a clear victory for either Iran or Iraq, albeit recently providing a modicum of support for Iraq. (8:8)

Several factors modified an initial U.S. response to the crisis. The most important factors included:

- the need to protect the U.S. hostages which were still being held in Tehran at beginning of the war;

- the need to avoid a U.S.-Soviet confrontation;

- the need to keep the already frustrated U.S. public from becoming more angry by any pro-Iranian tilt by the Carter administration during an election year;

- the need to keep the Arab world from increasing its perception that the U.S. was pro-Tel Aviv-Tehran and anti-Arab. (22:59)

A major potential breakthrough in the hostage affair developed in early September 1980 when U.S. officials (including Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher) met in West Germany with Sadiq Tabatabai (who represented Khomeini) to discuss preliminary generalities regarding the release of the hostages. On 12 September, Khomeini also referred to such conditions. (22:58) At this time, the U.S.
administration felt that any pro-Iraqi tilt would not only have squelched a favorable settlement of the hostage crisis, but would have endangered their lives. (24:35) To keep the dialogue alive with Khomeini, the Carter administration had to assure Iran that it was neutral regarding the Gulf war, providing that there was no interference with the oil flow through the Strait of Hormuz. (24:36) The United States also realized that an Iraqi victory could destroy all central authority in Iran, stimulate the reemergence of the Communist Tudeh party and possibly facilitate a Soviet move southward. However, an Iranian victory would pose an intensified fundamentalist Shiite threat to the Arab oil producers in the region. (24:35-36) The succinct statement by Dr. Kissinger that, "the ultimate American interest in the war... is that both sides should lose," emerged early in the conflict. (21:48) The fact that the U.S. had virtually no influence in either Baghdad or Tehran at that time also supported de facto U.S. neutrality. (22:59)

Nevertheless, the need to contain the war so that World access to Gulf oil could be maintained came into sharp focus late in 1980 when Iran bombed Iraqi oil facilities and threatened to "punish" other states perceived to be assisting Baghdad. Although the already disrupted Iraqi and Iranian oil shipments posed no threat to the West's "economic strength and political cohesion," President Carter stated
that it was "imperative that there be no infringement" upon other countries' shipments of oil out of the Persian Gulf. (22:58)

In response to a request from Saudi Arabia, four Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) reconnaissance aircraft (in addition to the one previously provided) were loaned to thwart a possible Iranian attack; thereby, the Carter administration quickly shifted from its purely neutral policy. (16:89) The U.S. decision to honor the Saudi request for AWACS was based upon an interpretation of the January 1980 "Carter Doctrine," which had been developed as a reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, sharp deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations, and U.S. concern that the Soviets would exploit the confusion after the fall of the Shah and move into Iran. Furthermore, AWACS were not considered "offensive weapons" and, therefore, would not overly concern the Soviets. The Carter Doctrine specifies that, "...any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region... will be repelled by any means, including military force." (8:8) The Soviet move into Afghanistan was considered by the U.S. administration as representing the first step in a Soviet plan to sweep southward to acquire its historically desired warm water port. (8:10) The United States was convinced that the region was going to witness increasing instability and characterized it
as an "arc of crisis," at the same time U.S.-Soviet relations were plummeting and the United States could no longer rely on Iran as a regional surrogate. (41:476)

The Carter Doctrine clearly established the Persian Gulf and the surrounding region as an area of vital strategic interest to the U.S. (26:35) However, the doctrine has been criticized as only addressing loss of allied access to the oil fields by direct Soviet seizure and ignoring other facets of the issue such as a producer-inspired boycott, instability within the area and exorbitant war zone insurance rates. (22:88)

Nevertheless, the U.S. decided to capitalize on the presence of the U.S. naval task force which had been sent in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and stationed nearby in the Arabian sea. American warships and aircraft would only be used, however, if Iran attempted to blockade the Strait of Hormuz. In order to provide a military force that was more politically acceptable to the Gulf states, the task force of 30 U.S. warships was quietly doubled with additional warships from France, Britain and Australia as well as with additional U.S. units. As a further measure, the United States quickly strengthened its newly developed Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). (16:89-90)

In late 1980, the Carter administration again reminded both Iran and Iraq that the United States was
determined to prevent the war from cutting off the oil supply. (16:90-92) The United States also considered providing military spare parts to Iran to counter spare parts that the Soviet Union was sending to Iraq and to prevent an overwhelming victory by Iraq. Also, a trade of the hostages for the 240 million dollars worth of military equipment owned by Iran, but frozen with the other Iranian assets in the U.S., was also offered by the Carter administration. Nevertheless, none of these offers were accepted by Tehran, and the hostages were not freed until the inauguration of President Reagan. (16:90)

During the first 18 months, the war stayed well within accepted Western-defined limits, i.e. it did not spread to the other countries of the Gulf and it appeared to be moving toward a military impasse. (50:128) The Reagan administration began by generally maintaining the stance begun by the previous administration, while attempting to strengthen U.S. presence in the area by devising a "Strategic Consensus" concept "as a bulwark against Soviet penetration." (41:477) The "Strategic Consensus" concept was based on the assumption that the Gulf states perceived the Soviet Union as their greatest threat. (60:457) Meanwhile, the new administration concluded an access agreement with Pakistan to use air and naval facilities, built up the RDF, held military exercises in several Arab
and African countries and sold the previously loaned AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia. Although the Reagan administration did not provide Iran or Iraq with any military equipment, the U.S. wanted to improve diplomatic relations with Iraq. Washington publically acknowledged an Iraqi move toward a more moderate stance and, in June 1981, harshly censured Israel in the United Nations Security Council for its attack on the nuclear reactor near Baghdad. (16:94)

However, because of Iran's military victories in 1982, continued hostility toward Washington, and complete rejection of all attempts to negotiate a settlement, the U.S. drew toward Baghdad when it appeared that Iraq might be defeated. This tilt was increased when Iraq threatened heavy attacks on Iranian oil facilities and Iran promised that if such attacks continued, it would close the Gulf to "everybody." (50:129) In response, the Reagan administration announced that it would take action to keep the Gulf open, emphasized the potential effectiveness of the U.S. carrier task force stationed nearby, and began consultations with U.S. allies and friendly governments in the Gulf region to establish contingency plans in case the region and oil shipments became threatened by an expansion of the war. (50:129)

In early 1984, Iraq extended the combat zone to the Gulf to cut Iran's vital shipping links. These attacks on
the extensive Iranian oil facilities on Kharg Island and foreign ships in the area had little effect upon Iranian oil shipments at that time. However, Iran retaliated anyway by attacking foreign ships in the southern Gulf to "punish" Iraq's supporters in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. (21:45)

In the spring of 1984, the U.S. reacted to the new Iranian threat to Gulf shipping by supplementing the Saudi AWACS with KC-135 aerial tankers in order to provide the Saudi F-15 fighter aircraft with an increased range great enough to protect oil tankers in the lower Gulf. Four hundred Stinger surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) for defense against the Iranian F-4 Fighter aircraft and 200 associated launchers were also provided by the U.S. (21:44)

Because of Iraqi use of chemical warfare and to maintain a balance of force between the two antagonists, the United States has still not provided any weapons to Iraq. (1:56) The United States did, however, reestablish full diplomatic relations with Iraq in November 1984 to tilt further away from Iran and to help counter Soviet regional designs. (13:4)
CHAPTER IX

PROBLEMS WITH U.S. RESPONSES

As pointed out by Ambassador Wiley, there are several problems with current U.S. policies and actions toward the region which could only become exacerbated by an Iranian victory. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there has been a U.S. misconception that the Gulf countries perceive the Soviet threat as their "principal security problem," i.e. the "Strategic Consensus" concept. (58:457) He concludes that this misconception has led to the faulty perception by this U.S. administration that the Gulf states would work closely with the U.S. to build such a Strategic Consensus to stop the Soviet threat. Both Ambassador Wiley and J. E. Peterson (Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C.) agree that the U.S. Strategic Consensus approach will not work. They emphasize that Israel, not the Soviet Union, is considered by the Gulf states to be their greatest threat and has frequently demonstrated this threat as an invader of Arab lands and "oppressor of their Palestinian Arab brothers." (40:484) The West has been characterized as naive in its approach to the region by these Arab moderates; i.e., a separate peace between Israel and Egypt (Camp David) has had only a negative effect upon even the most moderate Arabs which view the Accords as a further U.S.-Israeli stra-
strategy to divide and conquer the Middle East. (2:55)
Ambassador Wiley adds that moderate Arab states have a legitimate concern that overt (especially military) cooperation with the U.S. as Israel's "prime supporter" would have dangerous repercussions upon their internal political stability and their relations with other Arab states. (58:457)
In addition, the Gulf states fear that a close association with U.S. regional interests would, in fact, result in a counter-productive increase in Soviet military activities in the Gulf, and actually promote the risk of a Superpower confrontation.

Several other factors have inhibited the positive growth of the U.S. image in the area. The Arabs perceive a total lack of fairness in the U.S. policy towards the Palestinian problem. Other Arab concerns include an uneasiness over potential U.S. economic domination (instead of cooperation), and a fear that the West is exporting its massive inflation, which the U.S., especially, must learn to control along with its waste of energy. (2:49) Also the U.S. pullout from Lebanon did little to shore up the Arab's image of U.S. steadfastness toward the region. (50:140)

This combination of U.S. liabilities has been characterized as a compelling reason for the Gulf states to downplay direct U.S. security assistance and treat U.S. military intervention as a "contingency of last resort."
Such drawbacks are also considered to have caused U.S. allies' reluctance to be too closely identified with U.S. actions toward the Gulf. (50:140)
CHAPTER X
IMPROVEMENTS IN U.S. RESPONSES

Certain recent modifications in the U.S. approach have been identified as helping to improve the posture of the U.S. in the region. Although the broad U.S. policy objectives with regard to the area are endorsed by U.S. allies and regional friends, they disagree with the "blend of political action and military force" proposed by the U.S. to meet these objectives. (50:140) Gulf security to GCC members as well as to the West will remain a problem of the highest importance, although also with extremely high associated risks and "a misstep would be catastrophic." (41:484) As a result, worried Arab rulers are generally supported by our allies in wanting a U.S. presence, but not if it is too obvious, hence their request for an on, or better, "over the horizon" U.S. military presence. (52:34)

One identified improvement to the overall posture of the West in the Gulf region has been an increased interaction between the United States, and its allies and regional friends. As a result of Arab reluctance to include U.S. forces in regional contingency planning, the Gulf states are being forced to become "properly responsible for their own first line defense." Although not yet proven to be that militarily effective, the GCC has added some modicum of
security to the region while avoiding the stigma of being too closely allied with the U.S. (50:141) In addition, some U.S. officials have indicated that the developing U.S.-West European dialogue concerning the Gulf war has tended to provide a more flexible, less alarmist and less confrontational application of Western policy toward the region. (50:142)

Ambassador Wiley outlines several additional actions that he feels should be taken to achieve U.S. security goals in the Gulf. To be sustainable, any U.S. policy must avoid wide policy fluctuations by being insulated from uninformed opinions that appear to characterize changes in U.S. administrations. An effective U.S. policy must build alliances with friendly countries in the region through better understanding of their security concerns, such as:

- greater legitimacy of their security concerns with respect to Israel;
- greater emphasis on the threat of internal subversion; and
- greater recognition of the political liabilities created for friendly Arab regimes by an overt and visible U.S. military presence on their soil. (60:461)

He adds that one way to mollify their fears of an Israeli attack would be to provide GCC states with purely defensive weapons, i.e., "antiaircraft systems." Ambassador Wiley indicates further that U.S. concentration on enemy "overt aggression" toward the Persian Gulf rather than "internal subversion" may emphasize the wrong threat.
Concerning USCENTCOM forces, he perceives that over-the-horizon Navy, Marine and Air Force units would appear better suited to perform a "highly mobile intervention force" role in the region than logistic-dependent Army units would because of the great distance to the United States. As a result, he feels that a "Strategic Alliance" in the region should stress U.S. sea and air power working in cooperation with indigenous GCC ground forces; however, the U.S. should still maintain as low a profile "as possible" during regional training and logistics exercises to avoid destabilizing the area. (60:462)

Other critics add that, to improve our limited diplomatic leverage in the area, the United States should continue to pressure our Western European allies, Japan and others to improve diplomatic activity that would bring an end to the war without allowing a clear winner to emerge. Our allies should be reminded that a closure of the Gulf could cause them to lose access to their primary source of energy. (21:47) While the United States imported between 31 and 34 percent of its oil in 1984, only two to four percent came through the Strait of Hormuz. In comparison, Japan must import all of its oil with 56 to 57 percent coming through the Strait while, in 1984, Western Europe imported 65 to 67 percent of its oil with 19 to 21 percent coming through the Strait of Hormuz. (8:35) Both Great Britain
and France have much experience through past dealings with Iran and Iraq, and both would prove valuable negotiators. However, France should be reminded that the military equipment that it has provided to Iraq, especially the Exocet missile, has been counter-productive in bringing an end to the war. (37:13) Turkey, which shares a border with Iran and Iraq, has managed to maintain a near balanced relationship with both Baghdad and Tehran; there is speculation that Ankara would be a viable conduit of future diplomatic communications as well as able to act as an acceptable negotiator to both sides. (27:9) Although Japan, the United Nations and others have already offered to negotiate a diplomatic settlement to end the war in 1984 and were turned down by a consistently intransigent Iran, a willingness to facilitate negotiations should be continuously communicated to both antagonists. (31:29)

At the same time, several authors stress that the U.S. should further develop normal, commercial, economic and cultural ties with the moderate Arab governments in the region. Many Western-oriented Arab leaders maintain their pro-Western direction, despite a popular opposition to the West within their countries, because these leaders received their education in the United States. Other successful efforts to increase mutual understanding can only enhance the effective application of U.S. policies toward the
Persian Gulf, regardless of the outcome of the Iran-Iraq war. (2:56) However, with a worst-case Iranian victory, all approaches toward the Gulf would have to be carefully reexamined as developments unfolded.
CHAPTER XI
CONCLUSION

Since Iran and Iraq have a long history of mutual animosity that dates back thousands of years, the Gulf war should be studied in its historic context to be more fully comprehended. At the same time, however, the Iran-Iraq war remains unlike previous wars between the antagonists' Arab-Persian predecessors because of its world-wide implications and dangers. The Gulf war has already demonstrated its potential to curtail Gulf oil shipments vital to the West; if expanded, it could easily involve other regional governments in the conflict and provide the catalyst for a military confrontation between the two Superpowers.

If either Iran or Iraq were to gain a decisive victory, it would probably tempt the victor to attain hegemony in the region. Iraq's ambitious leader, Saddam Hussein, has made it known that he would like to become the head of the Arab world, at least in the region. If he were to win, his personal, harsh form of Baathist Arab Socialism would tend to undermine the Gulf's traditional, moderate Arab governments. Hussein's regional hegemony would place Baghdad's Baathists in control of Gulf countries' policies, threaten Western access to the region's oil (at least at reasonable
prices), and possibly provide the impetus for Soviet adventurism into a disorganized and militarily weakened Iran.

On the other hand, an Iranian victory led by the fanatic Shiite Khomeini and his fundamentalist Mullahs would probably prove to be a worse situation. Khomeini's definition of victory includes the death of Hussein and the replacement of Iraq's Baathist government with an Iranian-style fundamentalist Shiite theocracy. Iran could then be joined by the newly formed, pro-Iranian Shiite government in Baghdad to facilitate his promise to overthrow all the remaining traditional Sunni governments along the Persian Gulf. His hegemony over the entire Gulf would perceivably evolve into a regional hatred for the United States (as well as the Soviet Union) and a fanatic bloc with full control of a major portion of the West's oil. Khomeini has also promised a combined "Pan-Islamic" move against Israel.

Such a regionally-threatening Tehran may also precipitate a southern thrust by the Soviet Union to protect its border and, if it perceives no U.S. moves toward intervention, an attempt to secure its historically-coveted warm water port. Such a Soviet move, especially if coupled with a threat to the West's access to Gulf oil, could easily spark a Superpower confrontation.

To meet its objectives in the region, the United States should continue its efforts to try to stop the war.
through diplomatic negotiations so that neither Iran nor Iraq emerges as a winner. The U.S. should redouble its pressure on its allies and the United Nations to assist in establishing a basis for such negotiations. Western Europe and Japan should be reminded of the Gulf region's importance to their economies, and that the U.S. should have assistance in the defense of its allies' vital source of energy. Such assistance should at least include both direct military support for U.S. forces positioned to defend access to the region's oil at reasonable prices, and diplomatic efforts to end the war with no clear winner. Efforts should be also increased to stop those who are sending "destabilizing" weapons to Iran or Iraq, explaining that it can only prolong the war and inhibit the flow of oil that they themselves need (i.e. request France to stop sending Exocet missiles to Iraq).

At the same time, the United States should try to keep the Soviet Union from making substantial gains in the region which would be at the expense of the U.S. and the West. In this effort, the region should continue to be the site of U.S. and allied military exercises to remind the Soviets (as well as others) that the United States and its allies consider this area vital to their security. The U.S. should also continue to measure and evaluate the proper military force and supporting logistic structure needed to
meet regional contingencies. The role of the U.S. Army in the Persian Gulf area and its required logistics tail should be studied in particular. It may prove more valid to convince the GCC to develop its own effective ground force with U.S. equipment for a regional role. Also, assistance to improve GCC members' security against internal threat should be offered. Augmentation of U.S. military presence in the area with allied units would tend to mollify fears of too much unilateral U.S. presence. Meanwhile, the U.S. should continue to try to convince GCC members that if they expect effective U.S. (or allied) military assistance when it is requested, they will have to provide for the prepositioning of military equipment.

The United States should continue to improve its security policy toward the region to develop a more accurate consensus with the moderate Arab states. To prove effective, it appears that U.S. policies should be characterized by "evolutionary" rather than "revolutionary" changes, and be based upon the knowledge of regional experts in the U.S. and carried out in consultation with its allies. To develop a true "consensus", the U.S. should recognize the basis for GCC member's fears about becoming too closely allied with the U.S., well known to be a close supporter of Israel, and understand that an overt U.S. presence on their soil would be locally and regionally destabilizing. The U.S. should
consider providing the moderate Arab states with purely
defensive weapons and early warning systems to allay their
fears of Israeli aggression, and to demonstrate a more even-
handed approach to the Arab-Israeli problem.

Meanwhile, the U.S. should try to reestablish
correct diplomatic relations with Iran and work through
friendly surrogates that have embassies in Tehran toward
this end. The U.S. should also promise and deliver economic
and agricultural assistance to both Iran and Iraq if they
agree to negotiate an end to the war.

Finally, the United States should make every effort
to develop closer ties with Iranian political refugees, to
communicate with disenchanted and disenfranchised elements
in Iran so that information may be acquired that would prove
useful in developing more appropriate U.S. strategies toward
Tehran and the region.

In summary, it appears that once the United States
and the moderate Arab countries improve their understanding
of each other's perceptions and make accommodations for each
other's requirements, both will be able to work together
more easily toward a viable security arrangement for the
Persian Gulf. If either antagonist becomes the victor, but
especially of Khomeini's Iran wins, any such U.S.-GCC
security arrangement will be severely tested.
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