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THESIS

THE SUCCESSION PROBLEM
IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

by

Cheng-yu Huang

June 1985

Thesis Advisor:

Claude A. Buss

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
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The Succession Problem in The People's Republic of China

by

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Captain, United States Army
B.S., United States Military Academy, 1976

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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
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

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ABSTRACT

↳ In light of Deng Xiaoping's advanced age, ~~(80 years old)~~ the Chinese leaders, without a historical precedent of smooth institutional succession or the ability to rely on legal documents, are, once again, facing the same pattern of uncertainty, instability, conflict and major policy change related to succession. This thesis ~~will explore~~ the problems and possible solutions of the succession issue. In the ~~introductory Chapter,~~ ^{first} five factors are identified as the major problems associated with the Chinese succession. However, only military, power base, and Deng's policy alternatives will be discussed in this thesis. Chapter II looks at the People's Liberation Army ^{is examined as a} as political and military institution on the one hand, and as a participant in the political succession struggle on the other. The concept of political power base ^{is} will be analyzed in Chapter III by examining Deng Xiaoping vs Hua Guofeng. ^{The next} Chapter IV deals exclusively with Deng's attempt to build a consensus that will avoid repeating turbulence associated with succession. In the ~~Conclusion,~~ ^{is} Chapter an attempt will be made to speculate the near term (5-10 years) outcome of PRC succession politics. At the conclusion of this thesis, an epilogue discusses the United States' near term interest(s) in PRC and recommends a policy alternative for the US policy makers.

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ABBREVIATION

CAC	Central Advisory Commission
CC	Central Committee
CCDI	Central Commission for Discipline Inspection
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CCPCC	Chinese Communist Party Central Committee
CR	Cultural Revolution
FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information Service
GLF	Great Leap Forward
JFJB	Jiefangjun Bao (the PLA newspaper)
MBT	Main Battle Tank
MC	Military Commission (Party)
MR	Military Region
NDSTIC	Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense
NPC	National People's Congress
PC	Party Congress
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
R & D	Research and Development

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ROMANIZATION

The official romanization system¹ currently enforced by the People's Republic of China is the PINYIN system. The Pinyin system has virtually replaced all other forms of romanization, even in the most common place-names and personal-names--"Peking" is now "Beijing", "Canton" is "Gúangzhou", "Mao Tse-tung" is now "Mao Zedong", and "Teng Hsiao-ping" is "Deng Xiaoping". Western publications are rapidly following suit and I have, therefore, used pinyin throughout, with minor exceptions. Where a personal name is both well-known in a traditional form and is almost unrecognizable in pinyin, I have retained the conventional spelling: thus, "Chiang Kai-shek" and "Confucius." Also, in the case of a title of a book or an article and the author's name, where pinyin is not used during publication, then, the original form will be maintained: "Chung Kung Yen Chiu" (Studies in Chinese Communism) is a monthly publication by the Nationalist Chinese on Taiwan and "Cheng, J. Chester" is a personal name. However, when quoting from translations or texts I have taken the liberty of substituting pinyin for the original romanization where a name appears. Here are some of the most difficult and

¹"Romanization of Chinese Names of Persons and Places", Beijing Review, 5 January 1979, pp. 18-20.

troublesome pronunciations in the pinyin system: "c" is pronounced like the "ts" in "tsar"; "x" is like the "sh" in "shore"; "zh" is like the "g" in "George"; and "q" is like the "ch" in "cheat".

I. INTRODUCTION

A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Throughout Chinese history prior to the establishment of the Republic, succession to the imperial throne could generally be achieved by transfer through inheritance within the family or employment of violence to overthrow the existing imperial family. Violent overthrow of an existing imperial family was marked by the decline of the old imperial family; followed by the growth of various new and shifting centers of power; and eventually by the capture of the "Mandate of Heaven" by one of the power contenders. It is interesting to note that the one that ultimately captured the "Mandate of heaven" was not necessarily the most powerful contender of the group. An example of this was Li Yuan, the founder of Tang Dynasty.

Yang Guang, the second and the last Emperor of Sui,¹ was a ruthless and ambitious person who murdered his own father and recklessly wasted imperial resources. In less than thirteen years, he was dethroned from the power center by a group of power contenders. Interestingly, among the major

¹After approximately 350 years of turmoil in China, Yang Jian, Yang Guang's father, reunified China in 581 A.D. and established the Sui Dynasty. The Sui Dynasty lasted from 581 to 618 A.D.

contenders to overthrow Yang Guang were Yang Xuangan of Shangdong; Li Me and Wang Shichong of Henan; Li Zhitung, Du Fuwei, and Shen Faxing of Jianghuai; Lin Shihong of Jiangxi; Liang Shidu, Gouzi, Xue Ju, and Li Zhi of the Northwest; and, lastly, Li Yuan of Taiyuan. Although Li controlled one of the most favorable positions within the empire, he did not become a contender for the empire until 618 A.D., two years after the disintegration of the Sui Dynasty and seven years after the first rebellion.² How, among many strong contenders for imperial power, were Li Yuan, the Duke of Tang, and his son, Li Shihmin, able to take the lead and to succeed when others failed?

The most common transfer of imperial power was through inheritance within the imperial family. But, even this widely accepted and well-defined institutional procedure did not necessarily entail political peace nor lack of violence. In order to become Emperor and gain legitimacy, many ambitious individuals within the imperial family have often resorted to violent measures to eliminate their competitors. As we have discussed earlier, Li Yuan was the founder of the Tang Dynasty. His second son, Li Shihmin, was the right-hand man who assisted Li Yuan in the defeat of the other contenders. According to the established

²Gou Tienyi, History, (Taipei: Ministry of Education Publication, 1963), pp. 103-107, (this is a history textbook used by all high schools in Taiwan).

institutional procedures, Li Shihmin's elder brother was the traditional rightful heir to the throne. However, in the year of 626 A.D., Li Shihmin managed to kill both his elder and younger brothers and force his father to abdicate from the throne. Thus, Li Shihmin became the second Emperor of the Tang Dynasty.

Not surprisingly, fratricide was not uncommon in the brutal court politics throughout Chinese history. Cao Zhi, a well-known poet, who was a loser in the struggle to succeed his father, Cao Cao, as premier composed the following poem prior to his elder brother's order to execute him:³

They were boiling beans on a beanstalk fire,
Came a plaintive voice from the pot,
O Why, since we sprang from the selfsame root,
should you kill me with anger hot?

Thus, historical precedent suggests that without a legal system of succession, adventurous men throughout the land or even within the same family will always, when opportunities arise, contest for the throne.

³Allegedly, Cao Zhi was ordered to either compose a poem within the time a person can walk seven steps or face execution. For the whole story see Lo Kuang-chung, Romance of the Three Kingdoms, trans. C. H. Brewitt-Taylor, (London: C. E. Tuttle Co., 6th ed. 1975), Vol. 2, p. 198.

B. RULES OF THE GAMES

Unlike western democracies with highly open, legalistic, and institutionalized procedures, the transfer of power in the People's Republic of China (PRC) has been marked by similar strife and contention as discussed in the last section. However, it would be wrong to say that the PRC and other socialist states do not have "rules of the game" in the form of legal regulations or constitutions. In fact, in comparing the constitutions of the United States and the PRC on the succession process, one finds that there are numerous similar legalistic features. There are many parallel characteristics in the terms, duty description, methods, and Presidential election procedures of the two countries:⁴

US CONSTITUTION

Section 1

. . . . (The President) and, together with the Vice-President, . . . be elected, as follows: Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress; The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot The Person having the greatest Number

⁴The content of the following comparisons are taken from Article II and Amendment XXII of the US Constitution, and Articles 79, 80, 81, and 84 of the PRC 1982 Constitution. Alpheus Thomas Mason and William M. Beaney, American Constitutional Law: Introductory Essays and Selected Cases, 5th edition, (Englewood: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1972). And The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1983), promulgated for implementation on 4 December 1982.

of Votes shall be the President No person except a natural born Citizen, . . . shall be eligible to the Office of President . . . neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of Thirty-five Years . . . in Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or his Death, Resignation, or inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice-President

Amendment XXII

No person shall be elected to the office of President more than twice

Section 2

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the US . . . and he shall have Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons He shall have Power . . . to make Treaties, . . . shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls

Section 3

. . . he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers.

PRC CONSTITUTION

Article 79

The President and Vice-President of the PRC are elected by the National People's Congress. Citizens of the PRC who . . . have reached the age of 45 are eligible for election as President or Vice-President of the PRC. The term . . . is the same as that of the National People's Congress, and they shall serve no more than two consecutive terms.

Article 84

In case the office of the President of the PRC falls vacant, the Vice-President succeeds to the office of President.

Articles 80 and 81

The President of the PRC . . . appoints and removes the Premier, Vice-Premiers, State Councillors, Ministers in charge of ministries . . . issues orders of special pardons; proclaims martial law; proclaims a state of war; and issues mobilization orders The President of the PRC receives foreign diplomatic representatives . . . appoints and recalls plenipotentiary representatives abroad, and ratifies and abrogates treaties and important agreements concluded with foreign states.

However, as history reveals itself, many aspects of formal documents, including those dealing with the most crucial elements of power, bear little relation to reality in PRC or any other Communist countries. Even more to the point, the leaders of PRC have never been prepared to be strictly bound by their own rules including those which were enacted in good faith. Given the conflict of interests between legality and personal political survival, communist leaders have repeatedly swept away legal encumbrances such as State and Party Constitutions in favor of personal gains. Four State Constitutions (1954, 1975, 1978, and 1982), a provisional State Constitution (1949), and five Party Constitutions changes (1956, 1969, 1973, 1977, and 1982) in the thirty-three years of the People's Republic do not lend strong credence to its legal obligations. Furthermore, without any attempt to seek constitutional legitimization, a former President of the State, Liu Shaoqi, was deposed; a Prime Minister, Hua Guofeng, was appointed; and a Deputy Premier, Deng Xiaoping, was deposed. Therefore, the "rules of the game," in the case of PRC's succession, will only be

kept and enforced when they are not being perceived as an impediment for the implementation of the political goal by the ruling elites.

C. THE POLITICS OF POLITICAL SUCCESSION

The transfer of power, not only in the PRC but also in other socialist states, has been regularly marked by bitter factional struggles and conspiratorial dealings among the political elites.⁵ Currently, Chinese leaders, without a historical precedent of smooth institutional succession or the ability to rely on legal documents, are, once again, facing the same pattern of uncertainty, instability, conflict, and major policy change related to succession.

The narrow discussion of a single successor to the position of the Chairman of the CCP or President of the PRC, is, unfortunately, an unrealistic assessment of the PRC's succession process. As we have witnessed in the past twenty years, Liu Shaoqi, the President of the PRC from 1959 to 1965, could neither protect his interests nor hold his

⁵A stronger case than the PRC is that of Soviet Union. After the death of Lenin, Stalin, the Party's General Secretary, jointed with Zinoviev and Kamenev to repress the Troskyites in order to consolidate his position; later, he collaborated with Bukharin, Tomsy, and Rykov to eliminate Zinoviev and Kamenev from the Party center. In the wake of Stalin's death, Khruschchev went through the same drill in order to win the top leadership position. For more detail on Soviet leadership power struggle see Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, rev. ed., enlarged, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 149-161 and 164-175.

position during the Cultural Revolution. Finally, he was purged and committed to a mental institution where he died in 1969 in disgrace.⁶ Lin Biao, Mao's chosen successor to the Chairmanship of the CCP in April 1969, died in mysterious circumstances in 1971. Finally, it appeared in 1976 that the PRC had found a solution to prevent a repetition of Mao's earlier tragedy by selecting Hua Guofeng as the Chairman of the Party, Chairman of the Military Commission, and Premier of the State. By 1977, it appeared that Hua, with the support of Ye Jianying and Li Xiannian, had established himself as the supreme leader of the PRC. But, again, the whole was different from the sum of its parts. Holding the top positions does not necessarily equate to power, stability, and survivability of one's political fortune in the PRC's political succession process.

Therefore, when studying succession in China, one must return to fundamentals. This means that one must grasp the essential features of Chinese politics and political culture. Fortunately, since the CR and the normalization of the Sino-US relationship, many details as well as the main

⁶Liu was posthumously rehabilitated at the 5th Plenum, 11th Party Congress, 1980. For more detail on Liu's fate during the CR see Adrian Hsia, The Chinese Culture Revolution, (New York: The Seabury Press, 1972), chapters IV-VIII. Also see Fox Butterfield, China: Alive in the Bitter Sea, (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 354.

outlines of the political process have been made available to students of contemporary Chinese politics.

This thesis will, in light of Deng Xiaoping's advanced age, explore the problems and possible solutions of the succession issue. Today, the situation is substantially different from what it was a decade ago. History does not inevitably repeat itself. However, the current Beijing leadership has not yet developed an institutionalized procedure for replacing political leaders of all echelons thereby rendering itself likely to repeat pre-1980 succession patterns. Moreover, the current political climate tends to reinforce the tendency toward factional disputes, conspiratorial dealings, and power struggles. Those in charge of the Party and state institutional apparatus monopolize the entire spectrum of Maslow's "hierarchy of needs". Thus, political power will continue to be equated with privileges and prosperity. Since political power generally derives from political struggles, the elements of military and political followings (power bases) are the vital ingredients to ensure success.

This thesis will first examine the operation of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) as political and military institution on the one hand, and as a participant in the political succession struggle on the other.

The concept of political power base will be analyzed in Chapter III. Specifically, Chapter III focuses on the

question of why Hua Guofeng, who appeared to have control of all the power positions, lost to someone who had been stripped of all political power. The process by which this reversal occurred raises many questions about the political survivability of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang in a post-Deng environment.

The Fourth Chapter deals exclusively with Deng's attempt to build a consensus that will, at best, avoid catastrophes and, at worst, implicate all potential rivals in any mistakes. Chapter Four is divided into three sections. The first section presents Deng's policy of distribution of power to ensure a winning coalition. The second section discuss Deng's policies of ideological redefinition and economic reform. And the third section analyzes Deng's military reform policies and their impact on reducing the PLA's influence in the internal political process.

In the concluding Chapter, an attempt will be made to speculate the near term (5-10 years) outcome of PRC's political succession. Realizing the danger and purely speculative nature in predicting the outcome of the complex problems associated with political succession, I will focus this Chapter along the lines of answering the question: Will China, after Deng Xiaoping, be able to maintain minimum political conflict and ideological oscillation while continuing to pursue modernization policies?

Finally, in the Epilogue Chapter, I will briefly and superficially discuss and analyze the issues that are likely to confront the US policy makers during the period of Chinese political succession. Furthermore, a policy alternative will be suggested at the closing of this Chapter.

II. THE MILITARY: A PARTICIPANT IN THE SUCCESSION PROCESS

A. MILITARY INSTITUTION: A DEFINITION

Military, as a societal institution in the Democratic Western world, is functionally specialized and professionalized in national defense and structurally separated from other sectors of society.⁷ In order to minimize the risk of military intervention, formal institutional arrangements are worked out to assure civilian supremacy and the political neutrality of the military establishment. The specialization and professionalization of the armed forces in military tasks is established as the legitimate institutional norms. Direct involvement of the armed forces in nonmilitary activities, such as economic development and social reform in the society at large, is considered the exception rather than the rule.

This chapter wishes to examine the operation of the People's Liberation army (PLA) as a political and military institution on the one hand and the political dynamics of internal rivalries and power struggle in China's political succession on the other.

⁷See an excellent work on this subject by Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957.)

B. A BRIEF HISTORY: 1940-1980

The experiences of the PLA in China from its inception to early 1980s evolved around distinctly different characteristics. Prior to 1976, Mao Zedong not only emphasized organizational penetration of the army by the Party to guarantee political control over it but also stressed the importance of a systematic use of the armed forces for a wide range of nonmilitary activities. Throughout the various stages of revolutionary movement and socialist construction, the Chinese military (in addition to shouldering the main burden of military tasks and national defense) has been mobilized to organize and indoctrinate the masses, to take part in agricultural and industrial production, and to support social and political reforms. Mao's military thinking persistently demanded that, as a matter of fundamental principle, the armed forces ought to function both as a "fighting force," and as a "working force," and that

Every Communist must grasp the truth, 'Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.' Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party.⁸

⁸Mao Zedong, Selected Works of Mao Zedong, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), II, p. 224.

The ability of the PLA to serve as a multifunctional force came under its severest test during the transitional period of 1947-1949, when the tide of the civil war turned in favor of the Communists. This development confronted the Communist forces with many urgent and difficult problems, such as the necessity of converting a large portion of military manpower to civilian uses in the newly occupied areas and managing the takeover of administrative control at all levels.⁹ Under Mao's call to turn the Army into a "working force," crash programs were set up to further enlarge the role of the army.¹⁰ In the meantime, army cadres were transferred in great numbers to civilian sectors to perform nonmilitary tasks. Indeed, the activities of the PLA in this transitional period were so extensive and diffuse on all fronts that it was virtually impossible to draw any meaningful distinction between the military and the nonmilitary.

In the course of the revolutionary wars, conflicts and tensions did emerge from time to time between Party and PLA leadership, between military commanders and political commissars, and among those with different perspectives and approaches to army-building. However, as will subsequently

⁹A Doak Barnett, Uncertain Passage: China's Transition to the Post Mao-Era, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 71.

¹⁰Barnett, p. 353.

be made clear, the strong preoccupation of the top leaders with the awesome tasks of war and revolution and their concern over the urgent and immediate problems of security and survival vis-a-vis the Nationalist Government prevented the conflicts and differences from developing into crisis proportions.

During the early fifties, the PLA played a key role in managing the administrative takeover by organizing the military control commissions which governed in the urban centers. Below the national government, the six regional military and administrative committees, which were dominated by the military, functioned as the highest local authority in the country until 1954.¹¹ To reduce the army's burden on the nation's shaky postwar economy and to strengthen local control, large numbers of soldiers were demobilized and transferred to the civilian sector. Many military units were detailed to help with agrarian reform. Later they also took part in the collectivization and communization campaigns at the grass roots level. The military was also actively involved in a series of massive movements to suppress counter-revolutionaries and class enemies in the postwar years.¹²

¹¹An excellent study on the PRC transition period of 1949-1955 is done by A Doak Barnett, Communist China: The Early Years, 1949-1955, 4th ed. (New York: Praeger University Press, 1968.)

¹²Richard C. Thornton, China: the Struggle for Power,

By the 1960's, the military's vast role in the political arena had become unmistakably clear. The PLA under the energetic leadership of Lin Biao was upheld as the model of political purity, selfless dedication, and correct work style for the entire nation to emulate. In 1964 and 1965, political work structures modeled on those of the PLA were systematically introduced into the civilian sector, and a large number of military cadres were transferred to lead the new organizations. When the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution (CR) threatened basic political stability and social order, the role of the PLA expanded still further. The PLA was enlisted to intervene militarily by imposing "military control" on government organs, economic enterprises, and educational institutions.¹³

After Mao's death, Deng Xiaoping's military supporters rallied to his side and negotiated his return to political power (Deng was purged once during the Cultural Revolution and once after Zhou Enlai's demise in 1976). However, in less than a half decade since his return to political spotlight, Deng alienated many military leaders who had supported his comeback. His principal protagonists raised

1917-1972, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), pp. 224-225.

¹³This theme will be discussed later in this paper. For an in depth analysis of Lin Biao incident see Michael Y. M. Kau, The Lin Biao Affair: Power Politics and Military Coup, (White Plain: International Arts & Sciences Press, 1975), thereafter, Kau, LPA.

objections about:

1. the evaluation of Mao,
2. reassertion of firm Party and government control over the military forces,
3. restriction of the PLA to an essentially military role,
4. professionalization of military ranks, thereby eliminating the over-aged, unskilled, and unqualified,
5. and modernization of national defense but only as a function of the modernization of the economy as a whole.¹⁴

Whether Deng will be successful in laying a smooth succession transition of power and policies is directly proportional to his ability to overcome many of the above mentioned objections and win the support of those who currently oppose him. The performance and development of the PLA since the establishment of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), however, has raised some serious questions regarding the Mao's model of "the Party commands the gun." At times, the military has tried to withdraw from nonmilitary work and political participation. At other times, the PLA has moved toward the other extreme of military interven-

¹⁴Richard D. Nethercut, "Leadership in China: Rivalry, Reform, and Renewal," Problems of Communism, (March-April 1983), p. 34.

tion and military rule. At one point the military has even come close to carrying out an "unconfirmed military coup d'etat." ¹⁵ Thus, in contrast with the Western model of military institutions, which stresses a high degree of professional specialization, organizational differentiation, and political neutrality, the Chinese model, as articulated by Mao, is marked by the multifunctionary, structural diffuseness, and politicization of the Military.

C. THE POLITICS OF THE PLA AND PARTY

In his excellent study of the military as a profession, Samuel P. Huntington advances the theory that "the distinguishing characteristics of a profession as a special type of vocation are its expertise, responsibility, and corporateness."¹⁶ According to this formulation, the professional is marked by his specialized knowledge and skills in a vocation which are acquired only through prolonged training and experience. As a result of this process, he internalizes a code of professional ethics and a sense of social responsibility through the process of

¹⁵The most notable examples of the military acted as arbiter between competing forces within the leadership are the PLA's intervention in the Cultural Revolution (CR) and later in the succession struggle with the "gang of four". See Ellis Joffe and Gerald Segal, "The Chinese Army and Professionalism," Problems of Communism, (November-December 1978), pp. 1-19.

¹⁶Huntington, p. 11.

socialization into the profession. He also develops a normative orientation supportive of the effective performance of the professional functions. The members of the profession tend to share a collective sense of organic unity, consciousness, and identity. Once the military becomes highly professionalized, therefore, the military man is likely to be proud of his special training and competence in military affairs and to guard jealously his professional autonomy, prerogatives, and authority against outside interference. Any external attempt to impose control over what the professional, in this case the military, defines as his legitimate activities is bound to be resented and resisted.¹⁷

D. PROFESSIONAL PLA PRIOR 1976: A NARROW SENSE

The history of the development of the PLA as a professional military establishment suggests considerable validity of Huntington's theoretical argument. Even in the late 1920's, when the Red Army had just been organized from scattered groups of guerrilla armies, the introduction by Mao of Party control and political work immediately met with considerable opposition from the military commanders who resented the dilution of their prestige and authority. At the Ku-t'ien Conference in December 1929, Mao had to

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 7-18.

reaffirm the strategic importance of political work and to criticize the "purely military viewpoint" of the military officers."¹⁸

Military professionalism began to emerge as a major policy issue following the end of the civil war in 1949, when the new regime shifted to an emphasis on institution-building and modernization. As the government and the Party assumed more and more of the administrative and economic functions that had previously been assigned to the military control commissions and the military and administrative committees at the local level, the PLA withdrew from its nonmilitary activities and moved toward specialization and professionalization in military affairs. The military confrontation with the United States in the Korean War further heightened the military's sense of the need to modernize as rapidly as possible so as to be able to cope effectively with modern warfare. Moreover, the introduction into China of "modern" Russian military equipment and related organizational forms helped establish the "advanced experience" of the Soviet Union as a model for the Chinese.¹⁹

¹⁸See William Whitson's excellent study on the opposition arised during Ku-t'ien conference in The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics 1927-1971, (New York: Praeger University Press, 1973), pp. 29-46.

¹⁹Ellis Joffe, Party and Army, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 1-45.

The trend toward differentiation between the military and the non-military sector was clearly reflected in the sweeping administrative re-organizations at the regional level in 1954. The six regional military and administrative committees (together with the six greater administrative regions) were abolished in order to centralize bureaucratic control; it was also decided that the regional and district military commanders should not hold key Party and administrative positions at the province level concurrently as they had in the past.²⁰

By 1954 the PLA had also developed an elaborate and highly centralized command and logistics system supported by a large number of military academies offering specialized, professional training. A conscription system was formalized in 1955 to emphasize the development of a regular professional army, downgrading the role of the militia. The adoption of the Regulations on the Service of Officers in February 1955 formally introduced into the PLA, as part of its movement toward regularization and professionalization, a highly stratified system of ranks with differential pay and privileges, modeled after the Soviet pattern²¹. As the newly emerged officer corps and the veteran military leaders

²⁰James C. F. Wang, Contemporary Chinese Politics: An Introduction, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall Inc., 1980), p. 148.

²¹Harlan W. Jencks, From Muskets to Missiles, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 49-50.

became increasingly committed to the course of modernization, they began to attack the informality, flexibility, spontaneity, and egalitarianism that had been such central aspects of the guerrilla tradition as and obsolete and dysfunctional. They argued that technical work should replace political work as the new military order.²² The military leaders also began to perceive the strength of the PLA primarily in terms of its professional and technological quality rather than its ideological commitment and extramilitary capability. Thus, in the military barracks the balance of priorities in training tipped in favor of professional and technical matters.

The increased emphasis on professionalism and modernization was also frequently articulated in the policy statements of military leaders. For instance, reporting to the Eighth National Party Congress held in September 1956, Peng Dehuai, then Defense Minister, declared:

We must intensify our study of modern military science and technique, the art of commanding a modernized army in battle, and new military systems. Unless we put greater effort into the study of these things, we shall not be able to master and make use of the most up-to-date weapons, or command a modernized army in battle, and consequently we shall not be able to build our army into an excellent modern revolutionary army.²³

²²Barnett, Uncertain Passage: China's Transition to the Post Mao Era, pp. 72-73.

²³Y. M. Kau, The People's Liberation Army and China's National Development, (White Plains: International Arts & Science Press, 1973), pp. xl-xli.

The growing demand for modernization and professionalization within the military eventually set the stage for the open struggle between "two lines" in the late 1950's: the Maoist line and the "revisionist" line on the role of the military.²⁴ The supporters of the Maoist line apparently sensed the challenges of professionalism as early as 1953, when a nationwide conference of the PLA's senior political work cadres was called to examine what they considered "deviations" from the "glorious tradition" of the Red Army.²⁵ A new set of Draft Regulations of Political Work was reported to have been adopted in April 1954 in an attempt to reassert the primacy of the Maoist line of army construction.

The attempt to control the challenge of professionalism was renewed in 1957 and 1958 through a series of major mass movements, such as the rectification campaigns, the movement to send "officers to the ranks," and the intensification of ideological training. But these efforts did not come to fruition until the whole nation was radicalized by Mao's push for the Great Leap Forward (GLF) and the communization movement in 1958. As the GLF gained momentum, the army was mobilized on a massive scale to take part in capital construction, perform relief work in flood and drought, and

²⁴Thornton, p. 237.

²⁵John Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army, (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 251.

help organize and streamline the management of rural communes. Beginning in 1958, the militia was once again reinvigorated through the mass movement to make "everyone a soldier." The troops and military academies were all caught up in an intensive campaign to study Mao's thought and military writings.²⁶ As the individual campaigns coalesced into the nationwide push to put "politics in command of everything" in 1958 and 1959, the Maoist line seems to have regained the level of strength it had achieved in the early 1950's.²⁷ It is worth noting, however, that if it were not for the fact that the massive campaigns happened to coincide with the purge of the top proponents of a modern army such as Peng, Minister of Defense, and Huang Keqing, chief of staff, the triumph of the Maoist military line over the "revisionist" line in the late 1950's might not have been possible.

The appointment of Lin Biao to be in charge of the Ministry of National Defense and the Party's Military Commission in September, 1959 marked a sharp return to the Maoist line. Under Lin's leadership the political work system and the Party organizations in the army underwent a major overhaul. Political education for the rank and file, stressing the study of Mao's thought, was restored as the

²⁶Jencks, p. 53.

²⁷Gittings, p. 198.

central task in the day-to-day activity of the army. In 1961 the Party reissued, with great fanfare, a comprehensive set of Political Work Regulations for the PLA in every service and at every level.²⁸ The Regulations reaffirmed the Maoist line as the "guideposts of both the political and the military work of the Army." By the mid-1960's the PLA had reemerged as a vigorous multifunctional "working force," taking a leading role in every mass movement and actively participating in every aspect of national life.²⁹

Even in the midst of this impressive success in putting the Maoist line back in command, however, the "sins" of professionalism continued to be a problem. As revealed during the Cultural Revolution, Lo Juiqing, the chief of staff from 1959 until 1966, was found to have pursued the same "revisionist" line on the development of the military advocated by his predecessor, the purged Huang Keqing. He was accused of sponsoring the mass campaigns for "great competitions in military skills" to enhance the priority of military professionalism, technological superiority, and technical training. It was said that he covertly undermined the political control over the PLA, encouraged the withdrawal of the army from nonmilitary work, and sabotaged

²⁸Kau, Political Work System of the Chinese Communist Military, (Providence: East Asian Language and Area Center, Brown University, 1971), pp. 217-224, (complete text of the political work regulations).

²⁹Gittings, p. 260.

the dual-control system in the PLA. And once again, in 1966, a major purge was required to rid the military establishment of the tendency toward a "purely military viewpoint."³⁰

The purges of key military leaders and the controversies between the "two lines" of the military in the 1950 and 1960s clearly points to a serious shortfall in the role of the PLA.

E. MILITARY IN COMMAND

A second source of challenge to the stability of the Maoist model stems from the multifunctionality of the PLA. Expansion of extramilitary functions enables the military to play a major role in political affairs and encourages the military to assume political power. In contrast with the danger from military professionalism, which involves a contravention of Mao's military thinking, the risk of military domination or intervention results from an overly enthusiastic application of Mao's doctrine with regard to the use of the military as a "working force." The dominant role played by the PLA over the Party and the other sectors of society prior to and during the CR typifies this latter type of problem.

³⁰For the purge of Peng and related development, see Ralph L. Powell, "The Party, the Government, and the Gun," Asian Survey, 6 (June 1970), pp. 441-471.

In the West, civilian supremacy over the military has been safeguarded by the segregation of the military establishment from civilian sectors organizationally as well as functionally and by an emphasis on the institutional norms of the military's political neutrality and professional autonomy. In other words, civil-military conflicts are inhibited by maximizing military professionalism and the norms of institutional specialization and autonomy. Samuel P. Huntington characterizes this pattern as the "objective civilian control" of the military.³¹ In the "totalitarian" model, represented by the Soviet Union, the military is also functionally specific and distant from other sectors. Yet the military is heavily penetrated by the party organizationally and is turned into a political arm in complete subordination to political control. Under such a system, civilian-military tensions are also kept at a minimum.³²

The Chinese model, while differing completely from the Western model, is similar to the Soviet model in one respect, that is, the organizational penetration of the military by the Party.

³¹Huntington, pp. 83-85.

³²Information derived from Prof. Huff's class discussion.

The pattern of military development in China since 1949 has vividly illustrated such dangers in the practice of the army's extramilitary role. Among the top leaders purged in the periodic outbursts of the struggle between "two lines," many have been professional military commanders or commissars with active ties to the military establishment. They include such prominent names as Kao Kang (Commander of the Northeast Military Region, 1955), Peng Dehuai (Defense Minister, 1959), Huang Keqing (Chief of Staff, 1959), Lo Juiqing (Chief of Staff, 1965), Li Qingxuian (Political Commissar of the Chengtu Military Region, 1967), Yang Jiangwu (Acting Chief of Staff, 1968), Huang Yunsheng (Chief of Staff, 1971), and of course, Lin Biao (Defense Minister, 1971). Their downfalls, it is worth noting, all took a very similar pattern. The charges against them invariably involved the sins of seeking power, establishing "mountain strongholds," and challenging the authority of Mao and the Party.

F. LIN BIAO: A CASE STUDY

Probably no case can better illustrate the basic characteristics and process of the development of the military as a participant in the power struggle better than the changing role played by the PLA under Lin Biao's leadership in the 1960's. Beginning in the late 1950's and particularly during the "three hard years," the PLA, started

to assume a more active role in support of the massive campaigns for production, construction, socialist transformation, and emergency relief.³³ By 1962, when the PLA's internal overhaul and reinvigoration had been completed, the army began turning outward even more, exerting conspicuous influence in society at large. From 1964 on army heroes were hailed as revolutionary models for the whole nation to emulate, as part of the movement to "Learn from the PLA." Between 1964 and 1966, an organizational structure modeled on the army's political work system was introduced into schools, trade organizations, factories, and even Party organs throughout the nation; and army cadres were transferred to man the newly organized political work departments in all sectors of civilian life³⁴

The power and influence of the military grew still further during the CR. As the regular Party apparatus and state bureaucracy were paralyzed by the Red Guards' violent attempts to seize power from the "powerholders" and "capitalistic roaders," the military emerged in early 1967 as the "mainstay of the dictatorship of the proletariat" The army was finally asked by the Party to intervene to maintain order when armed conflict seriously threatened the

³³Kau, LPA, pp. xx-xxi.

³⁴Powell, "Commissars in the Economy," Asian Survey, 3 (March 1965), pp. 125-138.

state. Since then, the army's formidable influence and presence have been maintained in every walk of life through the nationwide "three-support" and "two-military" campaign. The campaign mobilizes the army to support the broad masses of the left, industry, agriculture, and to obtain military control.³⁵

In April 1969, it was speculated that Lin Biao and his military followers even went so far as to force Mao and the already crippled Party to acquiesce at the Ninth Party Congress in the proclamation of Lin Biao as the official successor to Mao in the new Party Constitution. Later, Mao complained bitterly that the fine tradition of unified leadership by the Party and the primacy of "the Party controlling the gun" had been undermined by the PLA's enhanced position of power.³⁶ It is no exaggeration to suggest that by 1969, the military had virtually taken over the power of the Party and had practically imposed military rule over the entire nation.

The the military's growing domination over the political system followed the outbreak of the CR is clearly reflected in the membership compositions of the major political organizations at the time. Strong military representation was evident at all levels from 1967 through 1971, prior to

³⁵Kau, LPA, p. xxi.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 55-66.

the purge of Lin Biao and his generals.³⁷ For instance, in the powerful Political Bureau of the Ninth Central Committee reorganized in April 1969, 13 out of a total 25 seats went to military leaders (See Table I below). At the provincial level, the generals headed nearly three quarters of all the Party committees and revolutionary committees (see Table II below).

The large-scale military intervention in the most chaotic years of 1967 and 1968 was apparently viewed by Mao and the Party as a matter of necessity for political order and social discipline. But even after the Ninth Party Congress and the reestablishment of local Party committees, which took place at the provincial level between November 24, 1970, and August 19, 1971, the dominance of the army persisted (see Table III below). The representation of the PLA in the Provincial Party committee leadership was even greater than it had been in the provincial revolutionary committees, which had been organized earlier during the period of greatest disorder between January 31, 1967 and September 5, 1968. In 1970 when the operations of some central ministries were restored, among the 25 ministerial heads who could be identified, as many as 20 had been dispatched by the military.³⁸

³⁷James R. Townsend, Politics China, 2nd edition, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, Inc., 1980), pp. 266-268.

TABLE I
MILITARY IN THE POLITBURO

	<u>8th CC</u>	<u>9th CC</u>	<u>10th CC</u>	<u>11th CC</u>	<u>12th CC</u>
Year	1956	1969	1973	1977	1982
Total	23	25	16	26	28
Military	6	13	3	10	9
% Military	26	52	19	38	30

Note: Total members including alternate members.
CC: Central Committee.

Source: Townsend,
Politics China, Table XIII, p. 268.

Record of Chinese Communist Personnel, (Taipei:
National Political University, International Relations
Center, 1978), P. a171.

William de B. Mills, "Generational Change in China,"
Problems of Communism, (November-December, 1983),
pp. 16-35.

³Ting Wang, "The Emergence Military Class", in William Whitson, ed., The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970s, (New York: Praeger Publishers Inc., 1972), p. 118.

³See a very detailed study on the phanomonon of the interlocking directorate by Monte Bullard, China's Political

TABLE II
 PROVINCIAL-LEVEL REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES, 1968

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Other</u>
Chairmen	29	19 (66%)	10 (34%)
1st VC	29	22 (76%)	7 (24%)
Chairmen and all VC	220	94 (43%)	126 (57%)

Note: Military member including the political commissars.

1st VC: First Vice Chairmen

VC: Vice Chairmen

Source: Data from Richard Baum, "China: Year of the Mangoes,"

Asian Survey, 1 (January 1969), pp. 6-8.

The interlocking directorship³⁹ between the Party and the military had long been a salient feature designed for exercising dual control of the army, but the phenomena of the late 1960's which were similar in appearance were totally different in substance. The practice in the mid-1950's called for the provincial-level first Party

Military Evolution (1960-1983), (Boulder: Westview Press, forthcoming).

TABLE III
 PROVINCIAL LEVEL CCP COMMITTEES, 1971

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Other</u>
1st Secretaries	29	20 (69%)	9 (31%)
All Secretaries	158	94 (59%)	64 (41%)

Note: Military members including the political commissars.

CCP: Chinese Communist Party

Source:

Harry Harding, "China: The Fragmentation of Power,"
Asian Survey, 1 (January 1972), p. 3.

secretaries to serve concurrently as political commissars of their local military regions or districts.⁴⁰ Now the direction of penetration and control was completely reversed: it was the military commanders and commissars who served concurrently as Party secretaries and revolutionary committee directors.

⁴⁰Wang, p. 118.

In the wake of Lin Biao's abortive coup in September 1971, Mao and the Party began to undertake strenuous efforts to scale down the dominance of the PLA and to restore Party supremacy. By the early spring of 1973, a total of 48 top provincial-level Party leaders (5 first secretaries, 3 second secretaries, and 40 secretaries or deputy secretaries) had been removed. Among them were 35 military commanders and political commissars (representing 73% of those dismissed).⁴¹ Of the 195 full members and 124 alternate members of the Tenth CC elected in August 1973, the PLA accounted for only about 30 percent (see Table IV below). In the 25-member Politburo, the loss of military representation was even sharper between 1969 and 1973, when it fell from 52 percent to 19 percent, (see Table I).⁴² An unprecedented large-scale reshuffle of top military commanders (more than 40 ranking officers associated with Lin were purged) included the Chief-of-Staff of the PLA, political commissars of general logistics, the air force, and the navy.⁴³ In the fall of 1975, another large-scale transfer of military personnel took place, involving 83

⁴¹Paris H. Chang, "Changing Patterns of Military Role in the Chinese Politics," in William Whitson, ed., The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970s, (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1972), pp. 47-70.

⁴²My own calculation based on Bullard's "Appendix E: PRC Elites Holding Interlocking Positions," pp. 241-252.

⁴³Wang, p. 160.

leaders. Again they were relieved of their previous Party and administrative positions.⁴⁴ These moves clearly demonstrated Mao's determination to further weaken the power base of the PLA and to put them under the tighter control of the Party. While the military leaders were being purged or transferred out of the civilian posts in large numbers, Party and veteran cadres were quickly appointed to fill the vacated posts. However, as will be discussed later, a large number of Party leaders who were purged under military stewardship during the CR have been rehabilitated in the past dozen years.

While the balance between the civil and military personnel was being readjusted after the Lin Biao incident, Mao also launched a series of mass campaigns to help rectify the PLA's excessive expansion of power and function. The movement to "Learn from the PLA" in the 1960's was matched by a new campaign based on the slogan, "learn from the people of the whole country." The Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention were reissued in early 1972 in conjunction with the PLA's campaigns to study and eliminate its arrogance and disobedience.⁴⁵ The PLA was instructed to place equal emphasis on military and political training. In contrast with the frenzied movement

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 198.

⁴⁵Jencks, p. 111.

TABLE IV
MILITARY REPRESENTATION IN THE CC

	<u>8th CC</u>	<u>9th CC</u>	<u>10th CC</u>	<u>11th CC</u>	<u>12th CC</u>
Year	1956	1969	1973	1977	1982
CC	21%	45%	30%	27%	19%

Note: CC stands for the Central Committee

Source: Hong Yung Lee, "China's 12th Central Committee," Asian Survey, 6 (June 1983), p. 679.

to "put politics to the fore" during the CR, the PLA was told that "politics must be in command of and lead military affairs."⁴⁶ Although actions taken by Mao to curb the military did show considerable effect, statistically at least, in redressing the balance of power in favor of the Party, the fact remains that about one third of all the membership in key organs of power at the central and provincial levels were still controlled by military commanders and commissars. The excesses of military control and its monopoly of political power have apparently been

⁴⁶Kau, LPA, p. xiv.

organizational rules and to devise institutional structures and operational processes for the Party and the Army.⁴⁸

During the civil wars and the early 1950's, the urgency of military operations and post-war construction must have helped to keep power rivalries and political disputes at a lower level, making it easier to contain them within the framework of established institutional arrangements. But, factional politics based on personal loyalties and sectarian interests had not been eliminated. As Andrew Nathan had eloquently argued with massive documentation, factionalism never ceased to play a significant role, though at times latently, in the political and administrative processes of the Party and the military high command.⁴⁹

The outburst of power struggle during the CR cannot be considered in isolation from the special context of political disputes and factional relationships of the early sixties.⁵⁰ In fact, historical hindsight further shows that the sources of all struggles dated far back to the guerrilla years during which the Communist forces were divided between the "red bases" and the "white areas," and the Red Army was

⁴⁸Andrew J. Nathan, "A Factionalism Model for the CCP Politics," The China Quarterly, 53 (January-March 1973), pp. 37-38.

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 34-66.

⁵⁰Lowell Dittmer, Liu Shaoqi and the Chinese Cultural Revolution, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 1-6.

reduced, but, as will be shown later, the battle for political primacy remained inconclusive.

G. FACTIONALISM: AN INSTITUTIONAL NORM

Since the early years of the Communist movement, the leadership has been confronted with the serious problems of organizational discipline and the style of work in the Red Army. As early as 1929 at the Ku-t'ien Conference, Mao talked at length about such problems as the disregard of organizational discipline, individualism, and the roving-rebel mentality.⁴⁷ That factionalism, sectarianism, mountaintopism, departmentalism, and plittism were among some of the most frequently cited troubles which plagued the unity and operational efficiency of the Communist forces is well documented and elaborated in numerous Party literature and documents. These behaviors stemmed primarily from personal ambitions for power and status, unprincipled rivalries among small groups and cliques based on personal loyalties and ties, or competition among various organizations and institutions for promoting and protecting different vested interests or policy orientations.

To cope with these organizational problems, from the early years onwards enormous efforts were made by leaders like Mao, Liu Shaoqi, and Chen Yun to lay down elaborate

⁴⁷This information is taken from Prof. Huff's class.

broken down into autonomous and separate guerrilla columns. The legacy of personal contacts and loyalties developed through the common experience of the war years tend to have had a long lasting effect in shaping the patterns of personal as well as political associations and mutual commitments in the post-war years. As William Parish has pointed out, these personal relationships tends to emerge and exert greater influence in the political arena when the formal structures and ideological consensus have been weakened by political crisis.⁵¹

In the early sixties, Mao's efforts to cultivate special ties with Lin Biao and to enlist the support of the PLA were clearly related to his frustration and inability to return to the "first front" after having suffered a major political setback in 1959. The repeated failure to regain his control of the Party through the Socialist Education Campaign (1962-1963) and the "Four Clean-ups" (1965-66) apparently reoriented his antagonism to the Liu-Deng group from a policy viewpoint to a factional perspective.⁵² Clearly, it was under these circumstances that Mao began to abandon the normal procedures and channels of the political process and went outside the system by moving to Shanghai to seek

⁵¹William Parish, "Faction in Chinese Military Politics," The China Quarterly, 56 (October-December 1973), pp. 667-669.

⁵²Dittmer, p. 31-66.

extraordinary means of remedy and unconventional sources of support. He resorted to conspiring with the radicals and forming alliances of a factional nature with selected military leaders. This strategy of factional politics eventually proved to be useful for defeating his enemies, the "revisionist" power holders, through the turmoil and violence of the CR. But at the same time Mao created a worse dilemma for himself: Lin and his generals took advantage of the escalation of the factional politics that Mao had unleashed to conduct their own factional politics for strengthening and expanding their own power.

The details and mysteries surrounding Lin's coup attempt remain to be uncovered and studied. A careful reading of the available documentation regarding the case, however, conveys a distinct impression that divergence and tension over policy and ideology notwithstanding, the thrust of the life-and-death struggle was most likely triggered by the factional struggle for power and security between Mao and Lin. Its major impetus flowed from the chain of actions and reaction, challenges and responses which stemmed from the escalation of power balancing and political struggle. The problem was further compounded by the absence of a well-defined or institutionalized process of political succession. As a result the successor-designate was forced to consolidate his power base, and such efforts ran counter to Mao's jealously guarded power and authority. Having

aroused Mao's anger and suspicion with regard to his loyalty, Lin saw no alternative but to attempt to seize power by force and conspiracy to insure his own survival.⁵³

The downfall of Lin Biao and the purge of a large number of his close associates does not necessarily mean that the crisis of factional politics was also arrested. In fact, the large scale arrest and punishment of political suspects almost certainly planted more seeds for future factional conflict.

Developments in the 1970s indeed suggest a prevailing mood of tension, uncertainty, and anxiety in the nation. Since the demise of Lin Biao, waves of politically-charged mass campaigns have been launched one after another with unusual rigor. The campaign to "Go Against The Tide" and "Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius" of 1973 and 1974 were followed successively by those to "Study the Theory of Proletarian Dictatorship," "Restrict Bourgeois Rights," "Criticize Song Jiang," and "Revolutionize Education" in 1974 and 1975.⁵⁴ Although these campaigns was couched in ideological and policy terms, they were also directed at those leaders who might be identified with such wrong views

⁵³Kau, LPA, pp. xxiii-xxix.

⁵⁴Paris H. Chang, "China: Politics and Policies, Mao's Last Stand?" Problems of Communism, 4 (September-October 1977), pp. 4-11.

and policies, or at those who were simply viewed by the Maoists as disloyal or ambitious.

H. POST-MAO: DENG AND THE PLA TO THE 12TH PARTY CONGRESS

Since Mao's passing and the purge of the Gang of Four, PRC's elites have continued to clash over a wide range of important political and economic issues involving both ideology and power. Although Hua Guofeng succeeded Mao as Party Chairman in October 1976, he had great difficulties consolidating his power. See Chapter III for detail on the rise and fall of Hua Guofeng. Despite Hua's claim that he was Mao's hand-picked successor, his previous training and experience were limited. Furthermore, Hua's rapid rise to political prominence was at the expense of many distinguished veteran officials (including Deng Xiaoping) who were victimized by Mao.

Military cadres continued to form a large proportion of the new leadership elected at the 12th CCP National Congress in September 1982 although the proportion was slightly smaller than that of the 11th CCP Central Committee in August 1977. Of the 25 members and three alternate members of the Politburo elected at the First Plenum of the 12th CCP Central Committee, 12 (42.8%) were military men.⁵⁵ They

⁵⁵Military men in this discussion are those who have either served as uniformed soldiers or political commissars assigned to the military units.

were: Deng Xiaoping, Ye Jianying, Yang Dezhi, Wang Zhen, Xu Xiangquian, Nie Rongzhen, Yang Shangkun, Yu Qiuli, Wei Guoqing, Li Desheng, Zhang Tingfa, and Qin Jiwei.⁵⁶ Of the newly elected Central Committee members, 58 (28.1%) were military cadres serving in combat units or in the national defense industry system or were cadres who have military ranks and may return to the army someday. Of the newly elected alternate members of the CCP Central Committee, 26 out of 129 (20%) were serving officers.⁵⁷

The high percentage of military cadres in the CCP Central leadership posed a great threat to the Deng faction. Although Deng Xiaoping had been chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the highest commanding post in the PLA, since the Sixth Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee, a strong anti-Deng force still existed in the army which was composed of followers of conservatives, the "Whateverists" and the Maoists.⁵⁸ Quite a few military leaders were neutralized by being elected to the Central Advisory Commission at the 12th Congress. Others, who may have opposed certain aspects of his plan, were isolated and removed. Of the eleven Military Region commanders and

⁵⁶China Handbook, (Hong Kong: Kwong Yi Printing Press Ltd., 1983), p. 133.

⁵⁷deB. Mills, p. 28.

⁵⁸Paris H. Chang, "Chinese Politics: Deng's Turbulent Quest," Problems of Communism, (January-February 1981), p. 4, thereafter, Chang, "Deng's Turbulent Quest".

political commissars, and commanders of 29 Military Districts/Garrison, only a mere 7 out of a total 51 appointments were made prior to June 1981.⁵⁹ Some of the more important removals included Geng Biao (defense minister), Xu Shiyou (member of the Standing Committee of the CCPCMC), Zhang Caiqian (commander of Wuhan MR), Nie Fengzhi (commander of Nanjing MR), Li Zhenfeng (first political commissar of Wuhan MR), Wu Kehua (commander of Guangzhou MR), Xiao Wangdong (first political commissar of Jinan MR), and Xu Liqing (first political commissar of Chengtu MR).⁶⁰ Meanwhile, the die-hard Deng supporter Yang Shangkun took actual charge of the Central Military Commission (CMC) as vice-chairman of its Standing Committee.⁶¹ The substitution of Yu Qiuli for Wei Guoqing as director of the General Political Department (GPD) of the PLA and the substitution of Zhang Aiping for Geng Biao as defense minister were also indications that a continued power struggle and contradictions still existed in the army.⁶² However, in recent years the opposition of certain

⁵⁹CHINAaktuell, Supplement: PRC's Official Activities and Monthly Bibliography. (Hamburg: Institute of Asian Affairs, September 1984), pp. 43-44.

⁶⁰These are just some of the names obtained by comparing China Handbook 1978 and 1983.

⁶¹China Handbook, 1983, p. 133.

⁶²Richard D. Nethercut, "Leadership in China Rivalry, Reform and Renewal," Problems of Communism, (March-April 1983), p. 37.

segment of the PLA to certain of Deng Xiaoping's reforms (Deng himself having served considerable time as a military leader) has resulted in the modification or postponement of several of these reforms. On others, PLA resistance has had little or no effect. Radical revolutionary sentiment within the PLA has thus far been successful in blocking the reinstatement of military ranks, a measure strongly favored by Deng and professionally oriented elements of the military.⁶³ In the summer of 1982, an incident must have caused considerable embarrassment; the official news agency issued a Chinese-language transmission of a speech by Yang Dezhi, chief of the PLA's general staff. Among other matters, Yang was quote as saying that "in order to strengthen the modernization program in the army, we are planning to reinstate a system of military ranks." Four hours later, Xinhua re-broadcast Yang's speech in both English and Chinese. The transmissions were identical to the earlier broadcast except the sentence on reinstating ranks was omitted.⁶⁴

Deng, it will be remembered, was rehabilitated with the help of certain elements within the army. Chief among them are believed to be Ye Jianying, Wei Guoqing, and Xu Shiyou.

⁶³Chang Ching-wen "Peking's Restoration of Military Ranks," Issues and Studies, 8 (August 1984), p. 5

⁶⁴Xinhua, Beijing, 21 August 1981 in FBIS-China, 24 August 1981, p. U/1-2.

All three are old soldiers of considerable repute: Ye, one of the original ten marshals of the PRC; Wei, head of the GPD of the PLA; and Xu Shiyou, commander of the Guangzhou Military Region.⁶⁵ Given Deng's outspoken comments on military professionalism during the years before he was purged, it must be assumed that those who helped in his rehabilitation were sympathetic to at least some of his views. Yet within a few years after his rehabilitation, Deng's policies, deMaoization, lowered military modernization priority, and economic liberization, brought him into conflict with all of them.

Ye Jianying, thought to have argued forcefully for a modification of the deMaoification process, believed that otherwise troop morale would be irreparably damaged. In addition to his private statements, Ye pointedly absented himself from important meetings on several occasions, thus causing much public speculation.⁶⁶ Wei Guoqing, as a consequence of his position as head of the GPD and much concerned with matters of ideology and morale, clearly sided with Ye. Other of Deng's policies, such as his campaign to "seek truth from facts" (a part of the deMaoification process) downgraded the role of ideology and therefore affected Wei's and the GPD's interests. Wei also vigorously

⁶⁵Chang, "Deng's Turbulent Quest," pp. 2-3.

⁶⁶Kyodo, Tokyo, 13 February 1981 in FBIS-China, 18 February 1981, p. L/1.

opposed Deng's liberalization of art and literature, fearing a deleterious effect on army discipline and morality. It will be remembered that the attack on liberalization was begun by Liberation Army Daily under the direction of Wei's GPD.⁶⁷ Xu Shiyou's disaffection with Deng stemmed from these and at least one other source: he apparently wished to be named defense minister, but Geng Biao was appointed to the position instead.

Deng Xiaoping's chief supporters in the army may be assumed to have included Yang Dezhi, Deng's choice as chief of the PLA's general staff; Qin Jiwei, commander the Beijing Military Region; and Zhang Tingfa, the chief of the PLA's air force. All have spoken out against "leftism in the army,"⁶⁸ and Zhang has, in addition urged the military to "avoid endless quibbling over matters of the past. . . and look forward into the future."⁶⁹

Ye Jianying recently announced his retirement "from the first line"⁷⁰ of duty, and Xu Shiyou was removed as

⁶⁷Ellis Joffe, "Party and Military in China: Professional In Command?" Problems of Communism, (September-October 1983), pp. 56-57 and 60-61.

⁶⁸Renmin Ribao, 4 April 1981, in FBIS-China, 7 April 1981, p. K/18.

⁶⁹Ban Yue Tan, Beijing, 10 August 1981, in FBIS-China, 18 August 1981, p. K/20.

⁷⁰Wen Hui Po, 1 May 1982 in FBIS-China, 9 May 1982, p. U/1.

commander of the Guangzhou MR.⁷¹ Yet both remained personally powerful and were presumed to command the loyalties of substantial segments of the military. Wei Guoqing retained both his institutional and his personal power base after his removal in August 1982.

In the opinion of one former State Department analyst, the military's ideological debates of 1981-1982 produced no clear winner or prevailing line.⁷² The professionalist, pro-Deng group within the military had increased its power but still needed the support of others, and will make concessions, though not necessarily permanent ones, to gain its support.⁷³ Meanwhile, debate is likely to continue on Deng's policies and plans.

I. SUMMARY: THE SITUATION IN 1982

In the realm of political transformation, as long as the leadership continues to be committed to the goal of continued revolution and presses for radical change in political values, social structure, and policy priorities, "class enemies" and political opposition are bound to

⁷¹Hung-mao Tien, The Communist Party of China: Party Powers and Group Politics from the Third Plenum to the Twelfth Party Congress, (Baltimore: School of Law, University of Maryland Press, 1984), p. 23.

⁷²Richard D. Nethercut, "Deng and the Gun: Party-Military Relations in the PRC," Asian Survey, (August 1982), pp. 669-704.

⁷³Ibid.

emerge. Their emergence would naturally entail the need for the military to shoulder the extramilitary burdens of social reform and political control in support of the Party's quest for class struggle. During times of extensive political instability, the coercive power of the military is always needed to ensure internal security and to buttress political authority. The loyalty and subordination of the military to the revolutionary leadership under such circumstances becomes a prerequisite for political stability and the implementation of reform. However, as shown in this chapter, a close examination of the record prior to 1980 reveals some serious built-in problems in the role of the military. One of the powerful forces at work which will certainly strongly challenge the role of the military is the general trend toward institutionalization and professionalization that China has been experiencing since 1949 in every sector of the society. Institutionalization and professionalization are bound to enhance the influence and authority of professionals and bureaucrats. Within the PLA, the conflict between "red" and "expert" and between political work and military work has been evident for many years. There is no question that the continued advancement in military technology, especially since the PRC initiated her "open door" policy, is going to push the PLA further in the direction of specialization and centralization. In a more advanced, modernized stage, the responsible military

professionals cannot but view the diversion of the PLA to nonmilitary activities as dysfunctional and counterproductive for national security.

The record shows further that efforts to enlist the military for the performance of non-military tasks carry tremendous risks and consequences. Such efforts tend to upset the proper balance of Party-army relation, especially the ideal of Party supremacy and control over the military. Calling on the armed forces to share power or form a partnership in domestic politics for the purpose of sustaining the political system in crisis almost inevitably leads to a military takeover of the Party and government. Worse still, the involvement of the military in power struggles and political intrigue not only would factionalize and destroy the unity of the high command of the military but also would help spur the escalation of factional politics in other sectors of society.

Despite some success in reducing the power of the military and checking the factional struggle in recent years, a complete victory in restoring the correct Party-military relationship is by no means assured or in sight. Conversely, this does not mean that its political influence will remain at a lower ebb. It may very well be that the present Deng leadership is being given some time to show positive results with its policies. If such results are not forthcoming and if their effects are not felt in the

defense sphere, the military arm of the Party may reassert itself on policy and leadership issues. The military is still very powerful and omnipresent, and it will surely remain so in the years ahead. The role of the military as a key political player is now indisputable. Party leaders can not afford to ignore its voice nor can they survive politically without its approval and support.

III. POWER BASE: THE CASE OF HUA VS DENG

1976 was a year of death and destruction in more ways than one. Zhou Enlai passed away in January; Zhu De died in June; and Mao Zedong died in September 1976. Deng Xiaoping was purged in April and the Gang of Four was locked up in October. Violent demonstrations broke out in the heart of Beijing early in April and an earthquake devastated the area around Tangshan on 28 July 1976.⁷⁴ Following the death of Mao and the purge of the Gang of Four, Hua Guofeng emerged triumphantly from a relative unknown figure to the Chairman of the CCP, Chairman of the Military Commission of the CCPC, and the head of the government of the PRC. Very few China watchers would have predicted at that time that in less than three years he would fall from power and that in less than five years would drop completely from the political arena while Deng Xiaoping, the twice-purged "capitalistic roader", would return to dominate the political scene.⁷⁵ The process by which this reversal

⁷⁴For more detail see Jurgen Domes "The 'Gang of Four' and Hua Guofeng: Analysis of Political Events in 1975-1976," The China Quarterly, 71 (September 1977), pp. 473-477.

⁷⁵Parris H. Chang, "Chinese Politics: Deng's Turbulent Quest", Problems of Communism, (January-February 1981), pp. 1-23. Also Chang, "The Last Stand of Deng's Revolution", Journal of Northeast Asia Studies, June 1982, pp. 3-19. Richard D. Nethercut, "Deng and the Gun: Party-Military

occured raises many questions about the political surviveability of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang in a post-Deng environment. This chapter focuses on the question of why Hua, who controlled all the power positions, lost to someone who had none. The very answers to these questions may also be the solutions to a post-Deng's political arrangement for a smooth succession.

A. THE ROLE OF POWER BASE IN CHINESE POLITICS

Although the PRC is a communist state, political power does not automatically rest on those individuals occupying the key government or Party positions. The distinction of formal and informal power must be conceptually identified in the Chinese political arena. A high official in a key position may have the formal power but no informal power. Conversely, the head of a secret society or a Mafia family may have informal power but no formal power. In either case, the power is incomplete without having both. To a considerable extent, a political actor's formal power base rests on his informal power base. His informal power base consists of an accretion of alliances forged during his tours of duty in a series of formal positions. This series of positions is known in Chinese as a person's "background environment", beijing. As in any life history, some

Relations in the PRC", Asian Survey, 8 (September 1982), pp. 691-703.

background experiences are more crucial than others in forming strong ties. The most notable and durable bonds are those established through years of shared sacrifice for a cause and the camaraderie engendered by risking death together or owing one's life to another. The less celebrated but equally adhesive bonds are those background factors of kinship ties, common geographic roots, ancestral friendship, Shihjiao, and early subordinate-superior relationship. But, these bonds, once forged, must subsequently be cultivated if they are to become useful in political power maneuvering. An official with a broad, deep, and well-cultivated political base has a better chance of political survival and success.

B. A BRIEF HISTORY OF HUA

When Hua Guofeng⁷⁶ was transferred from Hunan to Beijing in 1971, he was relatively unknown outside China and a lesser known political figure in the PRC political arena. For more than 20 years Hua had been a competent but low-key provincial administrator. However, once in the political center, he rose to become the first person in the PRC and

⁷⁶The background information contained in this section is based on the following articles: Micheal Oksenberg and Sai-cheung Yeung, "Hua Guofeng's Pre-Cultural Revolution Hunan Years, 1949-1966: The Making of a Political Generalist", The China Quarterly, 69, (March 1977), pp. 3-53; Domes, "the Gang and Hua"; Dorothy Grouse Fontana, "Background to the Fall of Hua Guofeng," Asian Survey, 3 (March 1982), pp. 237-259.

CCP history to hold the premiership and the top Party and military posts concurrently.

Hua was born to a poor family in Jiaocheng County in 1924 in central Shanxi. He joined the CCP anti-Japanese guerrilla forces when he was 17 years old. His anti-Japanese activities during the next 10 years were unremarkable. In the fall of 1949, Hua was transferred south to Hunan province where he headed a work team. During this time he rose to the position of secretary of the Yiangying county party committee. His opportunity to make his mark came in 1951 when he was transferred within the province to become a party secretary in Mao Zedong's home county, Xiangtan. By 1955, he had been promoted to become the ranking Party secretary of Xiangtan Special District.

When the GLF was launched in 1958, Hua was a provincial vice-governor concerned with economic affairs. It was believed that when Peng Dehuai attacked the GLF at Lushan, Hua was the Hunan official who furnished information to help Mao repudiate the charges.⁷⁷ After the GLF, Hua continued to be active in rural work. In addition, he widened his experience by holding major responsibilities in the area of education reform. He also spent a number of years in charge of finance and trade work in Hunan which brought him into

⁷⁷Wang, Contemporary Chinese Politics, 2nd edition, p. 33.

close contact with Li Xiannian, then the Finance Minister and a Politburo member.

Little is known about Hua's activities during the CR. In the summer of 1967, he became a leading member of a preparatory group established to inaugurate the Hunan provincial Revolutionary Committee. He was appointed as a vice-chairman of the Committee when it was set up in 1968. At the close of the CR, Hua's star was certainly on the rise. In 1969, with high-level support from Beijing (most likely from Li or Mao), he was able to outmaneuver the very influential Hunan military leaders and be elected to the CCPC. In the 1970, when Party organizations throughout the PRC began to be reconstituted and the political influence of the military was reduced accordingly, Hua became the first secretary of Hunan province. A year later, in 1971, Hua was called to Beijing and assumed work of national importance. In 1973, he gained a seat on the Politburo of the CCPC, and in 1975 he acquired the additional posts of vice-premier and Minister of Public Security.

C. HUA'S BEIJING: AN EVALUATION

The background of Hua Guofeng was significantly different from those of other central political actors in the PRC (with the exceptions of the Gang of Four) which is one of the reasons it proved difficult to form an accurate estimate of his strength. From the perspective of a

bureaucratic career, his background was both "narrow" and shallow.^{7*} It was narrow in that his career experiences had been highly specialized and his potential political base was basically limited to one province and one functional system, namely, agriculture Hunan province. In contrast, Deng Xiaoping had experience that provided him with a political base in the PLA, Party, and government, as well as with the peasants and intellectuals. Whereas the narrow or broad dimension refers to the functional scope of Hua's and Deng's career experiences, the shallow or deep dimension refers to their temporal duration. This depth may be indexed on the basis of age and the number of years spent in the Party and the other functional areas. A common Chinese phrase, "ru chou wei gan de xiao zi" describes someone of shallow experience (a rookie, or "wet behind the ears"). Literally, it means that "the smell of your mother's milk is still fresh on you." Most cadres occupying the central positions have deep-rooted backgrounds that provide them with potential supporters scattered through every echelon of the hierarchy, especially at its upper levels. Hua's support, however, was mainly confined to the province of Hunan with some upper level support as a result of his legal position

^{7*}See Lowell Dittmer's article "Bases of Power in Chinese Politics: A Theory and An Analysis of The Fall of the Gang of Four", in World Politics, 1 (October 1978), pp. 26-60.

and his swift move to arrest of Gang of Four in 1976.⁷⁹ The rise of Hua to the center of the PRC political spotlight did not occur until 1971. Thus, bureaucratically speaking, he was what Deng called a "helicopter."

Notwithstanding the lack of broad experience and deep-rooted background, Hua commanded a strong political coalition in 1976 while Deng plead for his return. Deng wrote two letters to Hua, in October 1976 and in April 1977, to acknowledge Hua's position as the supreme leader and Mao's worthy successor to the CCP and PRC. Deng further expressed his humble admission of previous mistakes and requested he be assigned whatever work Hua might see fit (see Section E, Chapter III for the full text of the letter).

By September 1976, Hua seemed to have packed all the ammunition on his side. A quick overview of his supporters gave an appearance of great strength. The coalition under Hua had predominant control of the Politburo and thus control the Party decision-making mechanism. It also had wide support from leftist Party cadres.⁸⁰ One element of the coalition was the Maoist "Whatever" faction, whose members rose to political prominence during the CR and sought to defend whatever policy Mao favored.⁸¹ It also controlled

⁷⁹Chang, "Deng's Revolution", p. 5.

⁸⁰Fontana, "Hua's Fall", pp. 243-244.

Beijing, and had complete access to the extensive and sometimes embarrassing data on all Party members, as well as access to Mao's complete works for use in stressing Hua's legitimate inheritance from Mao. Another element of Hua's coalition was the "oil" or "petroleum" faction, a group of economists and technocrats who ran the Chinese economy under the late Premier Zhou's stewardship during 1966- 1976.⁸² The support from this group provided Hua further influence in government and economics. Reportedly, CCP Vice-Chairman Li Xiannian was the behind-the-scenes leader of the "oil" faction.⁸³ In addition, Hua's coalition drew support from Defense Minister Ye Jianying, further broadening his strength with the military. Finally, Hua had the support of the leftist Party cadres who had been promoted to power over the heads of those purged during CR. Of the CCP's estimated 39 million members in 1976, 18 million had joined during the years of CR.⁸⁴ Most of them had genuine reason to fear a change of course by the rehabilitated leaders who attempted to refute the legitimacy and legality of the younger leftists who replaced them during CR. In fact, any attempt

⁸¹James C. F. Wang, Contemporary Chinese Politics: Introduction, 2d ed., (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1985), pp. 32-34. Also Fontana, p. 239.

⁸²Ibid., pp. 240-241.

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 251.

by the rehabilitated cadres to negate the basic precepts of the CR would undermine the political rationale that had justified the existence of those leftist cadres. This, in turn, made the leftist party cadres dependent on Hua to defend the CR.

In addition to this coalition of supporters, Hua also expended considerable energy to identify himself completely with Mao. Among the first acts were to announce a burial hall for Mao and the publication of volume V of Mao's works.⁵⁵ Great emphasis was placed on his being Mao's "worthy successor" and Mao's personal choice. The famous note Mao assertedly gave to Hua earlier in 1976 declaring that "with you in charge, I'm at ease" was widely publicized.⁵⁶ In addition, at the 1977 Party Congress, Ye declared that Hua was the man capable of "leading our Party . . . triumphantly into the twenty-first century" and thus of achieving the fundamental goal of socialist modernization.⁵⁷

⁵⁵"Decision on the Publication of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong" and the "Preparations for the Publication of the Collected Works of Mao Zedong" Beijing Review, 42 (15 September 1976), pp. 3-4.

⁵⁶"Press Communique of the 11th National Congress of the Communist Party of China", Beijing Review 35 (26 August 1977), p. 11, and 36 (2 September 1977,), p. 24.

⁵⁷"Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution," Beijing Review 36 (2 September 1977), p.11.

D. A BRIEF HISTORY OF DENG

Deng Xiaoping,⁸⁸ one of very few first generation CCP leaders still alive, is, without a doubt, the most influential actor on the current PRC political stage. Deng was born in Sichuan province in 1904. When he was 16, he studied in France under a joined work-study program.⁸⁹ Among the students who later become prominent in the CCP were Zhou Enlai and Liu Xiaoqi. He returned to China in 19xx after spending a few months in the Soviet Union. By 1931 he had arrived at the communist base in Jiangxi where he served as propaganda officer. In 1936 he joined the Long March from Jiangxi to Shaanxi. During the Sino-Japanese war of 1937-1945, Deng was the political commissar of the 129th Division of the 8th Route Army. At the end of 1949 he was a secretary of the Party's Southwest Bureau and political commissar of the 2d Field Army in the Civil War. In 1952, Deng moved to Beijing to become a Vice-Premier and a member of the State Planning Commission. In September 1953 he was named Minister of Finance and Vice-Chairman of the Finance

⁸⁸China Handbook, 1983, p. 604

Wang, pp. 36-38; Hong-yung Lee, "Deng Xiaoping's Reform of the Chinese Bureaucracy," Journal of Northeast Asia Studies, 2 (June 1982), pp. 21-35

Michael Ng-Quinn, "Deng Xiaoping's Political Reform and Political Order", Asian Survey, 12 (December 1982), pp. 1187-1205.

⁸⁹Nora Wang, "Deng Xiaoping: the Years in France," The China Quarterly, 92 (December 1982), pp. 698-705.

and Economic Commission of the central government. During the mid-1950s, Deng rose to become a member of the powerful CCPCC Politburo. At the Eighth CCP Party Congress in 1956, he was promoted from the lowest ranking member on the Politburo of 13 to sixth ranking on the Politburo of 17. He also became General Secretary of the newly established Secretariat and was one of the youngest men on the CCPCC and the only man to be a member of both bodies. Deng remained the CCP's General Secretary until he was purged in 1966. As a Politburo member, General Secretary of the CCP, and Vice-Premier, Deng was the second highest victim of the CR. In 1973, apparently at the request of Zhou Enlai, Deng returned to the center stage of PRC politics. By 1975 he had not only regained his CCPCC positions but also was named Vice-Chairman of the Party's Military Affairs Commission, and Chief of Staff of the PLA. For the first time in his career, Deng had direct influence over the military at the national level. As Zhou's illness progressed, Deng assumed more of the responsibilities of the Premiership and was the natural successor to Zhou. But, once again, unpredictability, a hallmark of Mao era politics, resulted in Deng's second purge in April 1976.⁹⁰

⁹⁰The Truth Behind Tienanmen Riot, (Taipei: Institution of International Relations, 1976), Chinese.

In contrast to Hua, Deng's power base was both broad and deep. While Hua became "a rookie" in the CCPCC in 1973, Deng had already served that same organization for 12 years. Deng, a veteran of the Long March, had been the political commissar of the 2nd Field Army, whereas Hua was strictly a low level provincially oriented bureaucratic worker throughout the war years. While Deng's post-war service, until the CR, was entirely associated with national level policy making as an important actor in national politics, Hua worked diligently in the province of Hunan and was basically an unknown national political actor.

E. DENG VS HUA

Let us examine how the power base worked for each during the period from 1976- 1978.⁹¹ For many obvious reasons, Hua himself had little desire to see Deng restored. However innocent he may have been in the events surrounding the Tienan Men incident, it was an inescapable fact that Hua's rise to the top coincided with Deng's fall from power. But, as events from October 1976 to July 1977 indicated, Deng, even though he had fallen from the top, had not lost the support he had built up throughout the years of Party and government service. At the Politburo level, he was backed

⁹¹For the purpose of this discussion, the Third Plenum of 11th CCP Party Congress, September 1978, marked the official down fall of Hua. See Wang, p. 37, and Fontana, pp. 244-249.

by Xu Shiyou and Wei Guoqing (and possibly Ye Jianying as well). In fact, after the Tienan Men incident, Deng took refuge in the south under the protection of Xu Shiyou.⁹² At the popular level, there was a flurry of wallposters in January 1977, at the time of the first anniversary of Zhou Enlai's death, which called for Deng's rehabilitation.⁹³ Heavy hints were also passed to foreign visitors by high officials to the effect that Deng's return was imminent. It was also speculated that some of Deng's Politburo supporters resorted to a policy of noncooperation by refusing to attend Politburo level meetings in Beijing until the question of Deng was settled.⁹⁴ This was significant because that no CCPCC meeting could be held to ratify formally the momentous changes⁹⁵ of October 1976, until the decision to restore Deng had been taken.⁹⁶ Deng facilitated his own return by adopting a traditional humble demeanor. On 10 October 1976 Deng wrote a letter⁹⁷ to Hua stating his "wholeheartedly

⁹²Nethercut, p. 692.

⁹³Jurgen Domes, The Government and Politics of the PRC: A Time of Transition, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p. 145.

⁹⁴Fontana, p. 246.

⁹⁵Namely, Hua's informal assumption of the CCP Chairmanship and Chairmanship of CCPCC Military Affairs Commission.

⁹⁶Fontana, p. 247.

⁹⁷"Two of Teng Hsiaoping's Letters to Hua Kuo-feng" Issues and Studies, March 1984, pp. 94-96.

support" of Hua as CCP Chairman and Chairman of the CCPC
Military Affairs Commission. The letter read:

To Comrade Guofeng and the Central Committee in Care of
Comrade Dongxing:

I wholeheartedly support the Central Committee's decision concerning Comrade Guofeng's assumption of the Chairmanship of the Party's Central Committee and the Chairmanship of the Military Affairs Commission. I hail this extremely important decision as of great significance to the Party and the cause of socialism. Not only Comrade Guofeng is politically and ideologically the best suitable successor to Chairman Mao, but age-wise he can also ensure the stability of the proletarian leadership to last for fifteen or twenty years. How important is this to the whole Party, the whole army and the people throughout the country, and how could it fail to make people feel exultant! The recent struggle to abate the careerists' plot to usurp the Party and seize power occurred at a crucial moment immediately following the passing away of the great leader Chairman Mao. The Central Committee headed by Comrade Guofeng vanquished those bad elements and achieved a great victory. This is the victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie. This is the victory of the socialist road over the capitalist road. This is the victory to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat and to prevent capitalism from restoration. This is the victory to consolidate the great cause of the Party. And this is the victory of Mao Zedong Thought and Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. Like all the people throughout the country, I feel extremely happy about the victory of this great struggle and I cannot refrain from hailing aloud Long Live, Long Live, and Long Live. I use this brief letter to express the sincere feelings of my heart. Long Live the Great Victory of the Party and the Cause of Socialism.

Deng Xiaoping

October 10, 1976

With considerable reluctance, Hua gave way. In March 1977, during a Central Work Conference in Beijing, Hua made an announcement that Deng had nothing to do with the Tienan Men Incident. He went on stating that Deng had both achievements and mistakes on his record during the period when he was in charge in 1975 and that the CCPCC would give him an opportunity to work again.⁹⁸ On 24 March Li Xiannian informed a British editor that Deng had served China well in the past and still had much to give the country. On 10 April Deng wrote again to Hua and Ye, expressing his deep grief and profound mourning at Mao's passing. He also admitted that he had made mistakes in 1975 and was grateful and appreciative of the help Mao had given him to correct his mistakes. Deng further expressed his gratitude and promised to abide by whatever decision the CCPCC might make with regard to the time and the type of work he should be given. The full text of his letter is as follows:⁹⁹

Chairman Hua, Vice-Chairman Ye, and the Central Committee:

I completely support Chairman Hua's recent talks at the Central committee Work Conference; and completely support Chairman Hua's fundamental policy of "grasp the key link of class struggle and bring about great order across the country" as well as the measures to take care of various immediate issues and related working arrangements. Although I have done my small share in

⁹⁸Domes, p. 147.

⁹⁹"Two of Teng Hsiaoping's Letters to Hua Kuo-feng", pp. 95-96.

1975, there certainly were shortcomings and mistakes. Once again, I express my sincere acceptance of the great leader and great teacher Chairman Mao's criticism and guidance to me. I am grateful to the Central Committee's clearance that I had nothing to do with the Tienan Men Incident. I am particularly glad that Chairman Hua affirmed in his talks that the activities of the broad masses of people at Tienan Men on last year's Tomb-Sweeping Day were reasonable. As to the issue of my own work--what will be the suitable work for me to do and to begin at what time, I shall completely obey the Central Committee's deliberation and arrangement. Upon the passing away of the great leader and great teacher Chairman Mao, I have expressed in writing to the Central Committee my heartfelt grief and profound mourning. Generation after generation we must use Mao Zedong Thought to lead our whole Party, whole army, and all the people throughout the country in order to victoriously push forward the cause of the Party and socialism as well as the cause of international Communism. Upon the Central Committee's decision to have Comrade Hua Guofeng to assume the Chairmanship of the Party's Central Committee, and upon my knowing that the Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua had won the great victory to vanquish the "Gang of Four" by the most brilliant, the most resolute, and most correct ways and means, I have on October 10, 1976, expressed in writing my sincere support and my feelings of exultation to Comrade Hua Guofeng and the Central Committee.

Deng Xiaoping
April 10, 1977

After the initial round of political power play, the third Plenum of the Tenth Party Congress convened from 16 to 21 July 1977, and the following three major objectives were accomplished:

1. unanimous confirmation of Hua's appointments as conferred by the Politburo in October 1976;
2. restoration of Deng to all his posts, including Vice-Chairman of the CCPCC, Vice-Chairman of the CCPCC

Military Affairs Commission, and Chief of the General Staff of the PLA; 3. expulsion of the "Gang of Four" from all posts both inside and outside the Party and accusations that they had "feverishly attacked and fabricated accusations against Comrade Deng Xiaoping."¹⁰⁰

Once back in the active political arena, Deng lost no time consolidating his position, expanding his support base, and challenging Hua's leadership. Several of Deng's close associates, who had been purged in 1976, reappeared in July 1977.¹⁰¹ They were Hu Yaobang, Hu Qiaomu, Xi Zhongxun, and Chen Yun. Immediately upon their return to active political life, they began to reconstruct their political power bases. The initial goals were to gain control of the Party and the state bureaucratic apparatus while simultaneously nurturing support at the provincial level. Hu turned his attention to capturing the important office of the CCP bureaucratic headquarters, the CCPCC's General Office.¹⁰² The control of this Party organization would be a critical step toward faster rehabilitation of Deng's purged supporters, and

¹⁰⁰The Communique of the Third Plenum of the Tenth Party Congress can be found in Beijing Review, 29 July 1977, pp. 3-8.

¹⁰¹Shu-shin Wang, "Hu Yaobang: New Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party", Asian Survey, 9 (September 1982), pp. 808-809.

¹⁰²See Wang's Contemporary Chinese Politics, 1985, for the evolution of the CCPCC's General Office and its description, pp. 81-82, and Ibid., pp. 809-810.

subsequently would facilitate their return to key positions in the Party, state and provincial institutions, all this was directed toward building a network of support for Deng's final showdown with Hua.

Understandably, the key position of the CCPCC General Office was closely guarded by Hua. In fact, Mao had handpicked Wang Dongxing, a close supporter of Hua, as the office director. The initial penetration into the office came when Hu was appointed Deputy Director of the General Office at the Third Plenum of the 10th Party Congress. This appointment placed Hu under Wang's direct supervision. In October 1977, Hu moved a step towards direct confrontation with Wang position by replacing Gou Yufeng, a Hua supporter, as the head of the Organization Department in the General Office. Hu probably corrected many erroneous charges made by the Gang of Four, and many cadres were rehabilitated through his efforts. The official announcement to repudiate charges, and rehabilitate, Yang Shangkun, Bo Yibo, Tao Zhu, and Peng Dehuai was made during the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress in December 1978. In spite of Hua's opening statement that mass campaigns against the Gang of Four were to be stopped, the Third Plenum, nonetheless, officially called for a thorough investigation of individuals and incidents associated with the crime of Gang of Four to commit conspiracy to usurp Party and state Taking advantage of the growing number of rehabilitated cadres,

Deng quickly manipulated their appointments back to Party, state, province, and local key positions. According to Hong Yung Lee's account, from the 10th to the 11th Party Congresses, 85 rehabilitated cadres returned, constituting 25% of the total 11th CCPC membership.¹⁰³ The Third Plenum also promoted four senior veteran cadres to the Politburo, giving Deng's group a comfortable 44% of its total membership.¹⁰⁴ Other personnel changes and appointments were even more revealing. Chen Yun was named in charge of a 100-member Central Commission for Inspecting Discipline, which was to enforce discipline among Party members. Furthermore, he was appointed to head an ad hoc Financial and Economic Group, a body assigned overall responsibility for PRC economic and financial policy. This was a highly significant appointment in light of Chen's reputation as a highly regarded economist, and also as an outspoken critic of Mao's economic programs.¹⁰⁵ Thus, it was clear that by

¹⁰³Hong Yung Lee, "China's 12th Central Committee," Asian Survey, 6 (June 1983), p. 674.

¹⁰⁴The four senior veteran cadres are Chen Yun, Hu Yaobang, Wang Zhen, and Deng Yingchao. Other Deng supporters were: Wei Guoqing, Ulanhu, Fang Yi, Xu Shiyou, Wu De, Geng Biao, and Peng Chong. This information is found by using China Handbook, 1979, pp. 120-121, and Fontana's article, p. 239.

¹⁰⁵For an account of Chen Yun's career and his role at the Third Plenum, see Paris H. Chang's Power and Policy in China, 2nd enlarged edition, (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978), pp. 138-139.

the end of 1978, Deng had made considerable gains in the Party organization.

In addition, Hu was named to the newly restored post of CCPC Secretary General and, concurrently, replaced a Hua supporter, Zhang Pinghua, as Director of the CCPC Propaganda Department. As the Secretary General of the CCPC, Hu not only directed the Party headquarters but also supervised Party organization at all levels on a daily basis. In essence, Deng had clearly maneuvered Hu into the pivotal position in the Party where he would be better able to push and implement the programs and policies favored by Deng.

F. HUA'S FINAL ATTEMPT

Understandably, Hua did not stand idle while Deng pursued his strategy of capturing the key positions in the Party, state, and provinces. Hua, resisting Deng's efforts, on several occasions lent his support by visiting and appearing in public with those officials under attack.¹⁰⁶ In the same vein, Ye Jianying, the Chairman of the Fifth National People's Congress Standing Committee in 1978, urged his committee members to strive for national stability and unity. Hua's and Ye's efforts to avert Deng's power base

¹⁰⁶Examples were Zeng Shaoshan and Xie Xuegong, Party 1st secretaries of Liaoning and Tianjin provinces respectively. See Paris H. Chang, "Deng's Solution", pp. 6-7.

rebuilding were to no avail. The fragile and shallow support Hua had rallied around himself since 1976 began to crumble. Hua's inability to effectively counter Deng's political comeback can be summarized as follows: First, Hua had managed to convert his political capital among the various contending political groups into high formal positions for himself. These positions provided access to collegeal alliances and to bureaucratic constituencies. Hua used his new power to achieve some rather impressive policy gains: arrest of the Gang of Four and the enunciation and implementation of the "Four Modernizations" espoused by Deng in 1975. Although Hua was able to appoint his supporters to Party and government positions at various level, the tendency was to put all his energies into political maneuvering at the center, while Deng and the rehabilitated veterans wrestled the key Party and state bureaucratic positions away. Thus, Hua was unable to cultivate his formal positions by building strong collegeal alliances or by cultivating bureaucratic support networks. As a result, he remained in but not of the bureaucracy.

Second, the dilemma Hua faced during his ascendent to power was that on the one hand he had to legitimize his power by promoting Mao's stature, but on the other hand, he had to purge the very people Mao had personally supported during the CR. In general, the political beneficiaries of the CR would have had good reason to side with Hua. On the

other hand, all victims of the CR would have had the natural inclination to side with Deng. Because of Hua's dilemma, except for the prominent leaders at the top¹⁰⁷ and the mid-level officials personally planted by Hua, most of the other political beneficiaries of the CR tended to harbor deep misgivings about Hua. Hence, this group of disenchanted officials became easy targets to be influenced by Deng's group.

Third, an illusion of invulnerability was developed as a result of Hua's self-promoted image as Mao's chosen successor. Apparently, Hua had hoped that Mao's unique charisma and prestige could be transferred. On 20 December 1976, Chen Yonggui praised Hua at the Second National Conference to Learn from Dazhai in Agriculture: "Comrade Hua is loyal to the Party and selfless The whole Party, the whole army, and the people of all nationalities throughout the country take tremendous pride in once again having a wise leader of their own."¹⁰⁸

In like manner other articles praised Hua's "magnificent contributions, high proletarian mantle, political far sightness, rich experience in struggle, and exceptional

¹⁰⁷The four exceptions are: Wang Dongxing, Mao's former bodyguard and commander of "8341" garrison troop; Chen Xilian, commander of Beijing Military Region; Wu De, Mayor of Beijing; and Ji Denggui.

¹⁰⁸"Crux of 'Gang of Fours' Crime to usurp Party and State Power", Beijing Review, 1 (7 January 1977), p. 31.

organizational talent." On 9 May 1977, Ye asserted that Hua had "carried on Chairman Mao's traditional style of work."¹⁰⁹ And, like Mao, Hua began to provide inscriptions in his own calligraphy, reproduced for maximum circulation. On 1 August 1977, the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of PLA was marked by the publication of both Mao's and Hua's photographs in soldier's uniform.¹¹⁰ Hua even modified his appearance to resemble that of Mao. He attempted to confirm his Marxist credentials by having "re-published" certain articles he had written in his Hunan days. And most importantly, on 15 April 1977, the fifth volume of Mao's Selected Works edited by Hua was published.¹¹¹ This illusion-building apparently resulted in Hua's losing touch with reality and believing his own propaganda, and may explain the fundamental mistake in his strategy of holding on to power at the center while the foundation of his power base eroded away

In sum, the status of Hua's power base on the eve of his political eclipse consisted of the following: First, his inability to convert his political capital by building a

¹⁰⁹Yeh Chien-ying, "Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution", Beijing Review, 36 (2 September 1977), p. 24.

¹¹⁰Domes, pp. 143-144.

¹¹¹"Decision on the Publication of the 'Selected Works of Mao Tsetung' and the Preparations for the Publication of the 'Collected Works of Mao Tsetung'", Beijing Review, 42 (15 October 1976), pp. 3-4.

strong Party and bureaucratic network; then, his dilemma of legitimizing his position through Mao and purging some of Mao's most loyal supporters which cost him the loyalty of many mid-level CR beneficiaries; and finally, his illusion that he could transfer Mao's power base to himself. This proved to be devastating to Hua's own strategy of power base building.

G. CONCLUSION

In examining the problems associated with the power base in Chinese politics, this chapter has attempted to show that the fate of Hua conformed to the immanent logic of this substructure. The failure of Hua underlines the profound importance of broad and deep backgrounds and reliable political bases in PRC's political struggles. It may also illuminate the situation of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, whose background is somewhat broader than that of Hua, but not much deeper. Hu and Zhao rose to central leadership much like Hua. Assuming Deng realizes his proteges' precarious positions, the next chapter will be devoted to Deng's attempt to build consensus that will, under the best circumstances, avoid catastrophes and, under the worst circumstances, implicate all potential rivals in any mistakes.

IV. DENG'S SOLUTION

Since the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress (PC) in December 1978, Deng Xiaoping has moved ahead with his plan to develop a new generation of successors to carry out his policies. It would be naive to think Deng's considerable advances have been without periodic setbacks during the past five years. Nonetheless, the process of succession building clearly moved in a direction that favored his leadership and policy positions. This chapter will examine Deng's solutions. First, his policies of distributing of power to his supporters within the Politburo and other institutions to ensure a winning coalition. Secondly, his policies of ideological redefinition and economic reform will be analyzed. Finally, in the third section, Deng's policies of military reform and their impact on reducing the PLA's influence in the internal political process.

A. DISTRIBUTION OF POWER

Power distribution is neither an alien concept in the western states nor an unethical practice in a democratic government. What the communist states identify as power distribution, the democratic western governments may call "cabinet-building" or "executive appointments". By the

Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress, Deng had mounted a successful offense by discrediting Hua's associates.¹¹² At the Fifth Plenum in February 1980, Deng and his supporters were able to remove the "little Gang of Four": Wang Dongxing, Wu De, Ji Dengkui, and Chen Xilian.¹¹³ Then, in the fall of 1980, Deng advanced a program to reform the Party and government leadership systems.¹¹⁴ According to this new program, the CC, the Central Advisory Commission (CAC), and the CC Central Commission for Discipline were to be invested with equal power and would, therefore, counterbalance each other. If this new program worked as proposed, it would end the original system of concentrating power primarily in the CCPCC, CC Standing Committee and the Politburo. The CC would become the "executive" branch of the government to carry out the resolutions adopted by the PC. The CAC was designated as a supervisory organ which provided "suggestions, inspections and supervision." The title of the "watchdog" of the government was given to the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) which had the responsibility of maintaining Party discipline and

¹¹²Shu-shin Wang, "Hu Yaobang: New Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party," Asian Survey, 9 (September, 1982), p. 809.

¹¹³Chang, "Deng's Quest", pp. 9-10.

¹¹⁴Ng-Quinn, "Deng's Xiaoping's Political Reform and Political Order," Asian Survey, 12 (December 1982), pp. 1187-1205.

supervising the Party's work style.¹¹⁵ All three organizations were to be elected directly by the PC. In essence, Deng had formulated a system which not only redistributed power to individuals that basically supported his policies, but also devised, in theory, a check and balance structure much like that of U.S. system.

The policies advanced by Deng to distribute power within the Party were generally known as the "1980 Reform program." The idea was to remedy the shortcomings of the over-concentration of power, and the overlapping of Party and government.¹¹⁶ Behind this Party line were Deng's personal objectives to achieve the following goals: 1. to consolidate his and his successors' power position by transferring senior cadres to the CAC; 2. to achieve a faster power transfer and improve work efficiency through the policy of selecting "younger" and "technically competent" cadres to fill leadership posts; and 3. to create an environment wherein the shackles of Mao Zedong's Thought would gradually become a thing of the past.¹¹⁷ Naturally, Deng's programs provoked considerable criticism from the existing Party leadership. Unexpectedly, however, his programs also attracted strong opposition from some of the

¹¹⁵See Wang chapter 4, pp. 102-138 for more detailed description of the functions of these three offices.

¹¹⁶Chang, "Deng's Reform," p. 11.

¹¹⁷Hong Yong Lee, pp 676-677.

rehabilitated leaders.¹¹⁸ The main source of resistance to the reforms within the Party came from senior cadres who refused to take a back seat in the CAC. For instance, at the 12th PC, Ye Jianying stated:

Before the Party CC decides to ask me to exit, I'll perform my duties with all my efforts. I'll devote myself to the state, body and soul, and stop only when I die.¹¹⁹

Chen Yun, the highly regarded rehabilitated economist and a close supporter of Deng's economic reform from 1978-1981, said:

As there are not many young cadres qualified to take over leadership posts, it is impossible to ask all the old cadres to retire from their posts at the same time. To meet practical needs, some old cadres still have to stay on the front line."¹²⁰

As a result of this powerful septuagenarian opposition to Deng's reforms, Ye together with 15 other senior Party cadres aged over 70, were re-elected to the CCPCC Politburo at the 12th Party Congress in September 1982.¹²¹ Of greater concern for Deng was the CCPCC Military Commission and the

¹¹⁸Ibid., p. 677.

¹¹⁹Renmin Ribao, Sept 7, 1982, p. 4.

¹²⁰Renmin Ribao, September 7, 1982, p. 2.

¹²¹China Handbook, 1983, p. 133, the other cadres aged over 70 were: Li Xiannian, Yang Shangkun, Zhang Tingfa, Peng Zhen, Li Desheng, Liao Changchi, Wang Zhen, Wei Gouqing, and Ulanhu.

State Military Commission. Deng admitted in his Selected

Works:

. . . Our military comrades should remember, during the 1964 political work conference, I had brought up the question of promoting younger military cadres. At that time, the aging problem wasn't very urgent, but there was evidence of the aging problem Since then, 18 years have gone by . . . this question of replacing aging military cadres steadily becomes a grave concern.^{1 2 2}

Although some of the aging cadres were admittedly Deng's allies on many issues, Table V clearly demonstrates the seriousness of the aging problem which, in turn, indicates the strong opposition force to Deng's reforms.

Notwithstanding the opposition at the inner circle of the power structure, on the last day of the 12th PC, the Party Congress spokesman, Zhu Mozhe, reported that the new CCPC had been elected in line with the new cadre policy. He also gave the following statistics on the new members:

Sixty percent of the total members and alternate members were elected for the first time. Of these 211 first-time elected members and alternate members, more than two-thirds (140) were below 60 years old. The number of professional technicians rose from the previous 2.7% (9) to 17% (59).^{1 2 3}

^{1 2 2}Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping. (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing Co., 1983), p. 340. Chinese edition.

^{1 2 3}Xinhua, 11 September 1982.

TABLE V
CCPCC MILITARY COMMISSION, 1984

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>AGE</u>
Chairman	Deng Xiaoping	80
Perm. V. C.	Yang Shangkun	77
Vice-Chairman	Nie Rongzhen	85
	Xu Xiangquian	83
	Ye Jianying	87
Deputy Sec. Gen	Hong Xuezhi	71
	Yang Dezhi	74
	Yu Qiuli	70
	Zhang Aiping	74

Average age of this organization is 78. Source: cross reference between China Handbook, 1983, pp. 603-615 and CHINAaktuell, Supplement, September 1984, p. 230.


The 12th PC may not prove to have been a total success for Deng, but, based upon the turnover in the Politburo and the assignments of functional areas of responsibilities, Deng certainly scored an important victory in his effort to consolidate power.

The 12th NPC Standing Committee was packed with rehabilitated old cadres, almost all of whom were Deng's supporters. Although Hua Guofeng had been striped of all

power during the 6th plenum of the 11th Party Congress in June 1981, he was allowed to remain on the Standing Committee until September 1982 as a face saving gesture. After all, it was Hua who co-engineered the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976. Hua was officially ousted, and left the political scene after the 12th Party Congress. Among Hua's supporters, only Ye Jianying, Li Desheng and Ni Zhifu have survived. Given Ye's age and poor physical condition, his days of political life are limited. As for Li and Ni, there are indications that they have switched sides to support Deng since mid-1983. Other members such as Ulanhu, Nie Rongzhen and Xu Xiangqian have, in fact, become politically inactive. Even though Li Xiannian, a 75 year old supporter of Hua, was elected to the newly-restored position of President of the People's Republic, and chaired the 6th National People's Congress (NPC), his days are numbered. The weeding-out process desired by Deng may take a little while longer, but the composition of the 12th CCPC Standing Committee leaves plenty of room for the possibility of more substitution while Deng is still active. In short, the vast majority of the Standing Committee members appears to be closely allied with Deng. All of them are holding concurrent leadership positions in the Central Secretariat, Military Commission, and the State Council. Those who are openly at odds with Deng currently do not pose a long term threat to Deng's succession plan.

In addition to the Standing Committee, the restoration of the Central Secretariat at the 5th Plenum of the 11th CCP Party Congress, in February 1980, was one of the most important institutional changes since Deng's return to the political spotlight. The position of General Secretariat of the Central Secretariat was held by Deng from 1956 to 1966. It was abolished during the CR when Mao felt this organization became too influential under Deng's stewardship. Many of its functions were then turned over to the CCPC General Office and the Central Cultural Revolution Group under the control of the Gang of Four. Under the new Party Constitution (1982), restoring the Central Secretariat was an important step toward reinstitutionalizing Party power. Article 21 of the Party Constitution stipulates that "the Secretariat attends to the day-to-day work of the CC under the direction of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee".¹²⁴ The Constitution describes the Central Secretariat's authority in brief general terms, thus leaving considerable room for its expansion of activities. Since February 1980, the Secretariat has expanded considerably to facilitate Deng's power consolidation plan. At the 5th plenum of the 11th Party Congress, 11 people were elected to the Secretariat, with Hu Yaobang as the General

¹²⁴Wang, Contemporary Chinese Politics, 1985, p. 350-351.



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS - 1963 - A

Secretary.¹²⁵ The 12th Party Congress elected ten secretaries with the average age of the group at 64.¹²⁶ The replacements such as Deng Liqun, Chen Pixian, Hu Qili, Qiao Shi, and Hao Jianxiu are significant in at least two respects. They are relatively younger (average age 61) and better educated, thus fulfilling Deng's policy objective in recruiting younger and better qualified cadres and leaders. They are also known to be proteges of Deng, Hu, and Zhao. According to a biographic sketch published in Renmin Ribao and Beijing Review, both Hu Qili and Chen Pixian were closely associated with Hu Yaobang in the Communist Youth League while Hu was the First Party Secretary in the 1950s.¹²⁷ This group of day-to-day directors of the powerful CCPC Standing Committee is considerably younger and better educated than the Politburo members as a whole. Four of the previous secretaries were elected and promoted to the Politburo in September 1982. This move to replace four secretaries was considered necessary partly because of reassigning their major areas of responsibility while making

¹²⁵Others elected were: Wan Li, Wang Renzhang, Song Renquong, Fang Yi, Gu Mu, Yu Qiuli, Yang Dezhi, Hu Qiaomu, Yao Yilin, Peng Chong, and Xi Zhongxun.

¹²⁶The ten secretaries were: Hu Yaobang, Wan Li, Xi Zhongxun, Deng Liqun, Yang Yong, Yu Qiuli, Gu Mu, Chen Pixian, Hu Qili, Yao Yilin, and two alternates, Qiao Shi, and Hai Jianxiu.

¹²⁷Renmin Ribao, 3 April 1982, p.3, Beijing Review, 20 September 1982, pp. 22-24, and 20 September 1982, pp. 23-24.

room and giving opportunity to develop other upcoming confidants of Hu Yaobang.

Deng's power building was not confined to the center of the political stage. Since 1980, Deng has made personnel and organizational changes at every level. According to Hu Yaobang, there are five categories of people who should be excluded from leading posts in the Party and government bureaucracy. The five categories are: those rising to prominence by "rebellion"; those seriously factionalist in their ideas; those indulging in beating, smashing, and looting; those opposing the 11th CCPCC's 3rd Plenum line; and those seriously violating the law and discipline.¹²⁸ The implications are obvious. Most cadres who acquired positions during the CR will be removed; radicals opposing Deng's new Party line will be weeded out; those suspected of engaging in disruptive and corrupt activities will be ousted to ensure Party discipline. On the other hand, the Party cadre policy emphasizes the recruitment and promotion of those who have accepted Deng's policy line, who are younger, and who possess specialized skills and higher educational levels. Conversely, these criteria have become a convenient yardstick for eliminating Deng's political opponents. In short, the new cadre policy is to install a group of leading

¹²⁸Hu Yaobang, "Create a New Situation in All Fields of Socialist Modernization", Beijing Review, 37 (13 Sept 1982), p. 36.

cadres that will assist Deng in strengthening and broadening the power base of the future caretakers of his programs.

An examination of provincial leadership turnover since 1980 reveals a single fact--Deng has made personnel changes rivaled in scale but not in violence to those of CR. During the period from 1980 to 1984, Deng has replaced 23 out of 29 provincial leading Party secretaries and 27 out of 29 provincial leaders.¹²⁹ As a result of the mass turnover, only six (6) of the 29 provincial-level CCP secretaries/first secretaries who held office at the beginning of 1979 are still in power, and not a single chairman/governor/mayor survived Deng's personnel shuffling. (See Table VI below)

At the mass level, the problems associated with the personnel reform are not limited simply to replacing cadres one for one or strictly on the basis of one's loyalty. The main problems associated with the cadres' inadequate background in education, skill, and age are all too-deeply rooted, and are unlikely to be solved within a short time. Of the current 39 million Party members in 1982, only 15.8% had been educated at or above senior high school level, and those who had knowledge of modern technology are fewer

¹²⁹There are 29 administrative units in China: three separate municipalities, five autonomous regions, and 21 provinces. Each unit has a CCP Committee led by either a first secretary or a secretary. The governments of these units are led by mayors, chairmen, and governors, respectively.

TABLE VI
PROVINCIAL LEADERSHIP

<u>PARTY LEADERS</u>			<u>GOVERNMENT LEADERS*</u>		
<u>Province</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Since</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Since</u>	
Anhui	Huang Huang	3/83	Wang Yuzhao	4/83	
Beijing	Li Ximing	6/84	Chen Xitong	3/83	
Fujian	Xiang Nan	2/82	Hu Ping	4/83	
Gansu	Li Ziqi	4/83	Chen Guangyi	5/83	
Guangdong	Ren Zhongyi	11/80	Liang Lianguang	4/83	
Guangxi	Qiao Xiaoguang	2/77	Wei Chunshu	4/83	
Guizhou	Chi Biquing	7/80	Wang Zhaowen	4/83	
Hebei	Gao Yang	6/82	Zhang Shuguang	4/83	
Heilongjiang	Li Li'an	4/83	Chen Lei	12/79	
Henan	Liu Jie	4/81	He Zhukang	4/83	
Hubei	Guan Guangfu	4/83	Huang Zhizhen	4/83	
Hunan	Mao Zhiyong	6/77	Liu Zheng	5/83	
Jiangsu	Han Peixin	4/83	Gu Xiulian	4/83	
Jiangxi	Bai Dongcai	9/82	Zhao Zengyi	4/83	
Jilin	Qiang Xiaochu	11/81	Zhao Xiu	5/83	
Liaoning	Guo Feng	11/80	Quan Shuren	5/83	
NeiMongol	Zhou Hui	10/78	Bu He	4/83	
Ningxia	Li Xuezhi	5/79	Hei Boli	4/83	
Qinghai	Zhao Haifeng	4/83	Huang Jingbo	4/83	
Shaanxi			Li Qingwei	5/83	
Shandong	Su Yiran	12/82	Liang Buting	4/83	
Shanghai	Chen Quidong	2/80	Wang Daohan	4/81	
Shanxi	Li Ligong	3/83	Wang Senhao	4/83	
Sichuan	Yang Rudai	6/80	Yang Xizong	4/83	
Tianjin	Chen Weida	10/78	Li Ruihuan	10/82	
Tibet	Yin Fatang	5/80	Doje Cedain	4/83	
Xinjiang	Wang Enmao	10/81	Ismail Amat	9/79	
Yunnan	An Pingsheng	2/77	Pu Chaozhu	4/83	
Zhejiang	Wang Fang	4/83	Xue Ju	4/83	

Note 1: Provincial Party leaders are either holding the positions of first secretaries or secretaries. Provincial governmental leaders for provinces, autonomous regions, or municipalities are governors, chairmen or mayors respectively. Note 2: Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin are municipalities. Guangxi, Nei Mongol, Ningxia, Xizang and Xinjiang are autonomous regions. Source: The above information is taken from CHINAaktuell, Supplement, September 1984, p. 231.

still.¹³⁰ In order to bring more educated and professional personnel into the government and party organizations, numerous measures have been taken to train cadres and to raise educational standards in colleges. The Party reform, a broad based retraining campaign, includes programs for regular job training, rotating study on ideology and Party line, and part time studies at night through correspondence and radio broadcast courses.¹³¹ In addition to the informal programs, central and provincial party schools have been restored which offer a variety of educational and reorientation programs to improve the cadres' skills and professional knowledge.¹³²

Despite all the emphasis top Party leadership has given to the importance of education and professional skills, this new policy has not been accepted by many cadres. For example, an investigation conducted by the CCPCC Organization Department in April 1984 found that the ". . . policy toward intellectuals has not been conscientiously implemented and that the malpractice of not respecting knowledge and talented people has continued."¹³³ Also, on 8

¹³⁰Hu Yaobang, Beijing Review, 37 (13 September 1982), p. 36.

¹³¹"Party and Government Cadres to Receive Training", Beijing Review, 43 (25 October 1982), pp. 5-6.

¹³²David Bonavia, "Down but not yet out", Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 February 1983, p. 22.

¹³³Hsuan Mo, "Peking's Policy Toward Intellectuals: Who

July 1984, the Renmin Ribao carried this article in reference to Jiangsu province's attempt to implement the education policy:

. . . the implementation of policies is probably the most difficult thing to do. Nevertheless, the policy toward intellectuals is the most difficult to implement. Since the smash of the "Gang of Four" one of the major tasks emphasis by Comrade Xiaoping is the implementation of the policy toward intellectuals. It is also a task reiterated all the time by the Party Central committee in the past years. The departments concerned have examined the implementation of this policy once every year. Nevertheless, the result of this examinations has always been surprising. Take Kiangsu province for example: the problems discovered this year are surprisingly serious.¹³⁴

Deng Xiaoping apparently envisioned that implementation of his programs, as well as restoring and broadening his or his successors' power base, are primary step toward his ultimate goal: a smooth succession. During the period from 1976-1984, he has mapped out a strategy of rebuilding a stable power base that started at the very top and gradually expanded outward and downward.

Deng's initial effort from 1976 to early 1978 was to bring himself back into the PRC's political spotlight. 1978 to 1980, as discussed earlier, involved the struggle to gain control of the CCPC General Office, the Organization

is Hindering its Implementation?" Issues and Studies, 8 August 1984, p. 10.

¹³⁴Yeh Pan, "Why is it so Difficult?" Renmin Ribao, 8 July 1984.

Department, the Propaganda Department, CCPCC, and the Politburo. By the 5th Plenum of the 11th Party Congress (February 1980), Deng had virtually dominated the Party center. From the 5th Plenum of the 11th Party Congress to September 1984, wholesale changes of the CCPCC membership, provincial leaders, and provincial and municipalities Party secretaries were completed. Superficially, Deng appears to have managed the progress of personnel changes quite well at the national and provincial levels. But the problems of elderly cadres unwilling to retire, and the mass cadre members' lack of education, skill, and competence, are all too real and widespread. Nonetheless, under Deng's leadership and personnel policy direction of broadening the power base, the significant personnel changes the PRC has witnessed during the past six years will most likely continue to ensure a smooth succession transition from Deng to the next generation.

B. DENG'S POLICIES: A WELL FROG'S VIEW

The policies developed by Deng Xiaoping and advanced at the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Party Congress were emphasized again and again at the latest Party Congress Plenum (3rd Plenum 12th PC, October 1984) and the NPC session (6th NPC, June 1983). Deng's policies can generally break down into the following categories: ideological redefinition, institutional reform, personnel change, economic

development, and rectification of the Party style of work and organization in line with the new Party Constitution.

From the rise of Hua to the 3rd Plenum of the 12th Party Congress (October 1984), the ideological development in the PRC can generally be divided into two stages: maintaining the overall ideological continuity with the pre-Mao era and redefining of Mao's ideology.

The first stage of ideological development coincided roughly with the period of Hao Guofeng's relatively uncontested ascendancy up to the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Party Congress. This stage was highlighted by the publishing of Hua's "two whatevers" editorial in which "Whatever Mao had said and whatever Mao had done should be treated as a binding precedent."¹³⁵ Hua not only sought to maintain continuity with the broad outlines of Mao's thought, but also reaffirmed (with the exception of criticizing the Gang of Four for distorting the true reason behind the CR) the value of the CR under the dictatorship of the Proletariat.¹³⁶ Finally, at the 11th Party Congress, the

¹³⁵The "Two Whatevers" derives from an editorial jointly published by Renmin Ribao, and Red Flag on 7 February 1977. It stated: "Whatever policies Chairman Mao devised, we will resolutely support; and whatever directives Chairman Mao laid down, we will forever observe." Hua Guofeng reiterated the principle of the "Two Whatevers" later and said that "the criticism of Deng and the counterattack against the Rightist deviationist wind of reversing past verdicts were decided by the great leader Chairman Mao. The criticism is necessary."

¹³⁶Beijing Review, 42 (September 1976), pp. 3-4, 35

"triumphant conclusion" of the CR was announced. A strenuous effort to reaffirm the importance of the "key link" of class struggle was advanced through the slogan "grasp the key link of class struggle and establish great order across the land."¹³⁷ Hua's attempt to maintain a sense of continuity with Mao's ideology was linked closely to loyalty and legitimacy.¹³⁸ He had a vested interest in reaffirming Mao's reputation for infallibility precisely because his own position was justified by the criterion.

Just as Hua had an incentive to retain Mao's reputation for infallibility, Deng had an opposite incentive to expose Mao as quite fallible. Aside from obvious personal reasons, on a much broader issue, Deng had to redefine Mao's ideology before he could make any major changes in rebuilding the country. He began redefining Mao's ideology by attacking the Gang of Four. Indirectly, as the Gang of Four became proven wrongdoers, Mao's image was also being tarnished and discredited. By December 1977, it became apparent that Mao's legacy had been suppressed from the press. In fact, Mao's publications and quotations were used selectively to either discredit Mao's irrational decisions in his later years or to enhance the programs advanced by Deng to

(August 1977), pp. 6-13, and 3 (17 January 1977), pp. 29-32.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ See Chapter III for detailed justification.

redevelop and modernize the country. Of particular interest was the publication of Mao's 1962 speech to 7000 cadres, on 1 July 1978. In this speech, Mao "admitted he had made serious mistakes and should be criticized for the ill-fated GLF programs. . . he knew very little about 'economic construction' or about industry and commerce. . . and be held fully responsible for them."¹³⁹ Two other publications attracting equal attention and providing Deng with additional legitimacy were "Uninterrupted Revolution" and Mao's speech to a women's group in 1941.¹⁴⁰ The main points emphasized through these two publications were the importance of economic construction through science and technology, and the primacy of actual practice and investigation in justifying a theoretical viewpoint.

The final assessment of Mao came during the 6th Plenum in June 1981 when the CCPC approved the "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the PRC."¹⁴¹ This document represented a culmination of intensive discussion and debate about Mao's role in the Party. Based on official documents published, Mao's major mistakes can be broken down as follows:

¹³⁹Wang, Contemporary Politics, 1985, pp. 61-62.

¹⁴⁰Xinhua, 25 and 12 December 1978 respectively.

¹⁴¹Beijing Review, 27 (6 July 1981), pp. 10-39.

1. Comrade Mao Zedong and many leading comrades . . . had become smug about their successes, were impatient . . . the great leap forward and the movement for rural people's communes were initiated without careful investigation and study and without prior experimentation¹⁴² 2. Comrade Mao Zedong widened and absolutized the class struggle. . . . As a result, quite a number of the cadres at the grass-root level were unjustly dealt with in the latter half of 1964, and early in 1965 the erroneous thesis was advanced that the main target of the movement should be 'those Party persons in power taking the capitalist road.'¹⁴³ 3. The "cultural revolution" which lasted from May 1966 to October 1976, was responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the Party, the state and the people since the founding of the People's Republic of China. It was initiated and led by Comrade Mao Zedong.

The Party's evaluation of Mao's mistakes stretched for a period of 19 years (1957-1976). Considering that Mao's rise to the top began at the Zunyi Conference in 1935, about half of Mao's service as the top leader of the PRC was immersed

¹⁴²Mao was responsible for mistakes committed in the 1958 GLF and the commune programs. He was blamed for "leftist" errors in promoting unrealistic targets and issuing arbitrary decisions. The Party charged that Mao violated his own practice by initiating new experiments without thorough investigation, study, and prior experimentation. While the Party assessment noted that Mao had made self-criticism in 1962 for his mistakes in the 1958 disaster, this did not exonerate him from the error. See Huang Kechen's article in Beijing Review, "How to assess Chairman Mao and Mao Zedong Thought," 17 (17 April 1981), p. 22, and Wang Contemporary Politics, 1985, p. 65.

¹⁴³Mao was blamed for widening the erroneous policy of class struggle and mistakenly applying the theory of contradiction in the Socialist Education Campaign in 1963. The 1963 Socialist Education Campaign insisted that the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie was the main contradiction and focused on Party cadres and plunged the country into confusion and chaos. See Beijing Review, 27 (6 July 1981), p. 19-20, and Wang Contemporary Politics, 1985, p. 65.

in erroneous leadership work style. But, despite all the mistakes Mao committed (and twice against Deng personally), Mao Zedong's thought is still being preserved today.¹⁴⁴ While the philosophies and thoughts of Mao Zedong have been preserved, all of the published material emphasizes Mao's theories on seeking truth from facts and eulogizes Mao as a great Marxist and a great proletarian revolutionary, strategist, and theorist. By continuing to uphold Mao's thoughts in a selective manner, Deng has, in essence, redefined Mao's thought in supporting his policies of seeking truth from facts and has appeased a still formidable opposition force. Conversely, to repudiate Mao completely would have a negative effect on the history of the Party and would negate the theoretical system that has long guided the Party. And it would undermine the legitimacy of the PRC Party-State.

In December 1984, Renmin Ribao published an article entitled "Theory and Practice"¹⁴⁵ which argued that one should never take a dogmatic attitude toward Marxism. It concluded by stating, "We cannot expect the writings of Marx and Lenin in their time to solve our present-day problems." Even though the conclusion was changed the following day by

¹⁴⁴A list of some of the major publication in recent years can be found in "The CCP's Evaluation of Mao Tsetung and His Thought", Issues and Studies, February 1985, p. 35.

¹⁴⁵Renmin Ribao, 21 December 1984.

adding "all" before "our present-day problems," this article clearly indicated that the current leadership cannot avoid making certain changes to Marxist theories under the irresistible pressure of economic change. Needless to say, economic reform has been the top priority of the PRC leaders. While the search for a correct formula for successful modernization and industrial development continues, the current leadership under Deng has revised the economic programs several times since 1978. Aside from revising the economic programs, numerous personnel changes in the economic planning and management organizations have taken place to enhance the implementation of the reforms. The most notable changes were the replacement of Zhang Jinfu by Lu Dong in the State Economic Commission and the replacement of Yao Yilin by Song Ping in the State Planning Commission.¹⁴⁶ In considering the economic reforms, one must not forget that the economic and the political are closely linked. While the economic policies of the present leadership may be directed toward economic reform, one should remember that the results of economic reform have a direct impact on the political future of the reformers.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁶Both Song Ping and Lu Dong are believed to be Zhao Ziyang's proteges. See Wang's discussion on the importance of these two ministries as a vehicle to PRC economic reform.

¹⁴⁷As Mao had personally experienced in the late 1950's after the disastrous failures of the GLF.

The Sixth Five-Year Plan covers the period 1981-1985. In September 1982, the major economic goal was established by the 12th Party Congress to quadruple the total output value of industry and agricultural by the year 2000. In the last few years, a new system of "production responsibility" has widely replaced the commune system, resulting in sharp increases in productivity and in the average income of the peasantry. In the realm of industry, first experiment with granting greater autonomy to the factories were started by Zhao Ziyang in Sichuan province in 1978.¹⁴⁸ As a result of success in these experiments, greater enterprise autonomy was extended to other areas of the country, and by the end of that year, 2,600 plants had participated in such experiments. At the end of 1980, 6,600 factories, out of 85,000 state-owned enterprises, were experimenting with this program and had accumulated RMB29 billion in profits.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁸One of the major reforms was granting certain rights to the enterprises: 1. The right to retain part of the profits; 2. the right to expand production with funds that the enterprise itself had accumulated; 3. the right to retain 60% instead of 40% of the depreciation fund for fixed assets; 4. the right to engage in production outside the state plan; 5. the right of the enterprise to engage in the marketing of its products; 6. the right to contract with foreign governments and firms to export its products; 7. the right to issue bonuses to workers at the enterprise's own discretion; 8. and the right to fire workers who neglected their work. See Beijing Review, 6 April 1981, p. 23. for more detail on these rights.

¹⁴⁹Willy Kraus, Economic Development and Social Change in the People's Republic of China, (New York: Springer, 1982), p. 44-63.

Moreover, elements of a market economy were increasingly introduced into the commercial and service sectors of the economy.¹⁵⁰ In this context, private enterprises such as small restaurants, barbershops, photographers, and street vendors were again allowed to operate in the cities after late 1979. In late 1981, the number of people working in such private small enterprises stood at 1.13 million,¹⁵¹ and by late 1983, the number had reached 7.36 million, or almost 7 percent of the urban work force.¹⁵²

While these reforms represent a major step toward decentralization and market economy, implementation of these new policies has been hindered by various obstacles and has created many new problems. First, as a part of enlarging enterprises' autonomy and a step toward breaking the "iron rice bowl" mentality, a job-contract system was introduced in 1983.¹⁵³ Although the economists and reform supporters

¹⁵⁰This concept was introduced under the principle of "planned economy as the main factor, market economy as a supplement" by Li Xiannian in January 1982. See China News Analysis, 1227 (26 February 1982).

¹⁵¹Hsueh Muchiao ed., Almanac of China's Economy, 1982, (Beijing: Economic Management Publishing Corporation, 1982), Part 8, p. 6.

¹⁵²Domes, 1985, p. 205, and Jiefangjun Bao (JFJB), (Liberation Army News), 7 march 1984.

¹⁵³Under the new labor contract system, workers recruited in 1983 must be hired on a contractual basis that stipulates the type of duties, rights, and benefits. Workers can resign or can be fired if they fail to fulfill their obligations. See 3 February 1983 China Daily (English), p. 1, for a detailed description of the contract

applauded the breakthrough in the labor system, workers and demobilized military personnel have shown considerable opposition and resistance. Consequently, the system have been modified to apply only to the labor force employed since 1983.

A second major obstacle has been the irrational and indisciplined investment patterns since decentralization. Most investment made by enterprises has been concentrated on the highly profitable consumer goods industry. Many of them are wasteful duplications, seeking only quick profit. Consequently, thousands of small consumer goods plants have been built to compete for scarce raw material while investment in other key economic sectors has been inadequate. Some key economic sectors such as energy, transportation, and scientific research are currently the bottlenecks¹⁵⁴ in economic modernization and development.¹⁵⁵

system.

¹⁵⁴A most recent example of this bottleneck was reported in China Daily, (English) on 7 December 1984, p. 3. It states: "In Shanghai, Xinjiang and Jiangsu provinces, when the power industry's fuel reserves have been fallen nearly 50% The ministry of Water Resource and Electric Power blamed the power crisis to the failure of the coal industry to meet its commitments to the power plants.

¹⁵⁵Overinvestment is a very serious problem in the PRC's attempt to modernize and develop its economy. For detailed study and analysis of PRC's overinvestment problems see Chu-yuan Cheng, "Economic Reform in Mainland China: in Comparison to Yugoslavia and Hungary," Issues and Studies, September 1983; Joyce Kallgren, "China in 1983: The Turmoil of Modernization," Asian Survey, January 1984, pp. 60-80 Nicholas R. Lardy and Kenneth L. Lieberthal, eds., Chen

Third, the most troublesome of the new policies is in the area of agriculture. Since the reform began in 1978, the peasants, generally speaking, have benefited considerably in their cash income and standard of living.¹⁵⁶ The new policy, the responsibility system,¹⁵⁷ however, brought about unexpected population increase, decline of farmland per capita, and excessive deforestation.

Under the responsibility system the land is assigned to peasant households according to family size. More working hands in the family are considered beneficial both in terms of manpower supply and sideline operations. Thus, it rekindles the tradition of large families. This can be seen in comparing the PRC birth rate of PRC in 1980 of 1.07% to 1.45% in 1982. At this rate of growth, the total population projected for the year 2000 would be 1.3 billion.¹⁵⁸

Yuan's Strategy for China's Development, (White Plains: M.E. Sharpe, 1983); and an excellent recent publication by Hsin Chang, "The 1982-1983 Overinvestment Crisis in China," Asian Survey, December 1984.

¹⁵⁶Xinhua, 9 December 1984.

¹⁵⁷Under this system, the title deeds to land and the official ownership of large livestock, plow animals, and large tools remain with the production team. The team can decide whether to continue with collective production or to contract the means of agricultural production to a group of families or individual household. The subject of "Rural Responsibility System" was discussed under the titles of "Peasants' Initiative Unleashed by Contracts", "Is It A Retreat to Capitalism", "Gap Between Rich and Poor is Bridged", and "Will Farm Mechanization be Slowed" in Beijing Review, issues 44-47 in October and November 1984, pp. 18-21, pp. 23-23, pp. 24-27, and pp. 20-22 respectively.

The agriculture policy has two other serious side effects. A boom in housing construction has paralleled the rise in the peasants' standard of living. As the demand for housing space increases, land becomes more scarce. As land becomes more scarce, the competition between grain-growing and cash-crop agriculture becomes more sharp. From 1979 to 1983, the area sown with cash crops increased by 4.53 million hectares while total area for grains was cut by 6.67 million hectares.¹⁵⁹ Further diminishment of farm land will pose a serious threat to agricultural development. The other side-effect is that the increasing demand for fuel in the rural area has resulted in the widespread felling of trees and defoliation throughout the countryside. As a result, many areas in northeast and southeast China have been denuded of vegetation, with disastrous effects on the environment.

Fourth, the most serious problem of the economic reform is in personnel. Despite major personnel reshuffling and some mixed success in the economy since 1980, the economic reforms have aroused considerable resistance from every level of the Party and governmental bureaucracies. At one extreme of the spectrum, radical Maoists condemn the reform

¹⁵⁹Domes, The Government and Politics of the People's Republic of China, pp. 12-18.

¹⁵⁹"Fewer Grain Growers in Rural Area", Beijing Review, 13 (28 March 1983), p. 5.

as betraying Mao's teaching, blaming inequality of income, smuggling, profiteering, and other social evils on the economic reforms. The privileged bureaucrats and some army leaders view the reform as a direct threat to their authority and privileges. They have consistently sought to create troubles to stall or retard progress in the economic reforms. As a recent Beijing commentator's article indicates:¹⁶⁰

In answer to the call of Comrade Deng Xiaoping, . . . the entire Army is studying and implementing . . . and energetically supporting the country's economic reconstruction. This is very good and should be continued But, in our life and economic activities, we must strictly follow the principles of the "decision" and must not allow persons infected with departmentalism and individualism to avail themselves

One day earlier another commentator's article revealed the same type of problem in the state bureaucracy:¹⁶¹

Peasants going to cities to run tertiary industries is beneficial to both the town and countryside. What is there against it? It is a pity that some comrades are not yet convinced about this and are not enthusiastic in this matter. They either doubt the peasant's ability or worry that their business will be taken over by the peasants.

¹⁶⁰"Guard Against New Unhealthy Trends," Renmin Ribao, 7 December 1984, p. 4.

¹⁶¹"It is Good for Peasants to go to Cities to Run Tertiary Industry," Renmin Ribao, 6 December 1984, p. 2.

Economic reforms have been the centerpiece of Deng's reform programs for many of the reasons discussed in the preceding subsection. The leadership in Beijing recognizes that there is no simple, short-term solution to the complex and difficult economic problems. The GLF, CR, and immediate post-Mao economic plan have all demonstrated the harsh reality that clever slogans or good intentions cannot substitute for a gradual and consistent approach to economic problems. Even so, the most careful and pragmatic planning will not ensure success. Unless Deng and his supporters can solve some of the more pressing problems in the area of support from all levels of bureaucrats, resource and investment allocation, theory and practice incompatibilities, and over-population, economic progress will continue to be retarded and modernization development will continue to be at a slow pace. In light of power politics in the succession process, a successful or even perceived successful economic reform could, without a doubt, enhance the legitimacy of Deng's succession selections and his established succession procedures. However, if the economic problems of unemployment, inflation, over-population, price fluctuation, and a widening gap between rich and poor continue and becomes rampant, the opposition forces within the CCP could become powerful enough to seize opportunities to erupt the current policies and seriously challenge Deng or his successors.

C. MILITARY REFORMS

Although it is believed that civilian and military leaders agree on the importance of professionalization in the military, the issue of relative priority of military modernization within the Four Modernization programs is potentially the most divisive and explosive. When a western military person discusses military modernization, he talks about technology changes in the equipment and tactical and strategy changes associated with that dynamic process. But current military modernization, as articulated by Deng, means essentially for the military to change from what it "used to be" to "xian dai hua."¹⁶² In other words, everything associated with the military has to be changed. From one extreme where soldiers are required to become educated to the other extreme where the concept of guerrilla warfare has to take a back seat to complex, modern, three-dimensional combined arms operations. It appears that Deng envisions a two-pronged approach to the complicated issue of military modernization. On the less economically dependent approach, the policy is to make the PLA younger, more educated, technically competent, and politically dependable. More dependent on budget allocation is acquisition of modern weaponry. In the area of personnel

¹⁶²Xian dai hua is a slogan commonly used in China to express modern standards. Literally, it means to achieve today's standards.

change, the current leadership has devised the following solutions: demobilize and force retirement, recruit quality soldiers, and promote younger, educated leaders.¹⁶³ Hereafter, these solutions will be referred to as personnel solutions.

Personnel solutions are a part of the overall Party rectification effort. In a recent Secretariat of the CCPCC meeting, Hu Yaobang, the General Secretary, pointed out:¹⁶⁴

The first-stage party rectification has been carried out according to the fundamental tasks, principles, policy, and method. . . On the whole, party rectification work over the past year has developed healthily and achieved remarkable results. First-stage party rectification involves. . . various major units of the Army.

Looking back to the measures that have been taken in the area of personnel solutions (other than at the central leadership level), one must agree with Hu's overall assessment. To reduce the large number of aging officers of primarily peasant background (who joined the PLA during the pre-1949 era), with limited education, outdated concepts, and no desire to give up their post, in 1981 Deng established a general age guideline for corps commander at 50's, divisional commanders at 40's, and regimental commanders at 30's.¹⁶⁵ Later, other publications gave more

¹⁶³ Hongqi, 16 December 1982, pp. 4-10.

¹⁶⁴ "CPC Secretariat Discusses Party Rectification," Xinhua, Beijing, 26 November 1984.

precise age limits: corps commander, 55; divisional commanders, 45; regimental commanders, 35; battalion commanders, 30; and company commanders, 25.¹⁶⁶ Accordingly, a comprehensive retirement plan was drafted in 1983 to induce aging officers to retire.¹⁶⁷ In April 1983, FEER carried an article by V. G. Kulicarni which stated that 10-15% of aging PLA officers and noncommissioned officers had retired and been pensioned under the new retirement plan. At the soldier level, mass demobilization was also planned to rid the military of old, uneducated, incompetent, and ideologically undesirable soldiers. It has been estimated that the PLA's rapid demobilization reduced the PLA by about one million men between 1980 and late 1983.¹⁶⁸ This reduction-in-force policy constitutes only one half of the current personnel solutions. On the other side of the coin, a strong push has been made to promote younger

¹⁶⁵Deng's Selected Works, p. 342. Deng's address to Party secretaries in an all Party Secretaries Conference on 2 July 1981.

¹⁶⁶Zheng Ming, 66 (April 1983), p. 9. (A Hong Kong based magazine). Wang, pp. 176-177.

¹⁶⁷According to Bullard, there are six categories of personnel to be separated from the PLA: two categories of retirement (lixiu and tuixiu), demobilization (tuiwu), lateral transfer (zhuanye), becoming an advisor, and going on convalescent leave. Each of the categories is different in privileges and benefits based, upon past sacrifices and hardship experience during one's career. See Monte R. Bullard's Political-Military Evolution, pp. 32-34.

¹⁶⁸Ibid.

and more educated junior military leaders and enforce higher recruitment standards.

Since 1980, there have not been any published statistics on the total number of promotions of educated junior military leaders. But numerous sources have cited a number of model units for their success in promoting educated, youthful leaders. In early 1983, for example, about 200 college graduates were recruited and appointed to commanding positions at both the divisional and regimental levels of the missile units.¹⁶⁹ Also, according to several articles carried in Jiefangjun Bao (the PLA newspaper), "a certain communications regiments selected 16 graduates of universities and colleges to take charge"; "11 middle-aged intellectuals of the PLA navy political school were selected for leadership posts and more than 60 percent of the middle-aged intellectuals have become leading cadres." And, more recently, "central committee of the logistic department of the Nanjing MR has boldly promoted 311 intellectuals with both ability and political integrity to leading posts at various levels."¹⁷⁰

Along the same line, the current recruitment policy requires the rural enlistees to be middle school graduates

¹⁶⁹Ta Kung Pao, 20 April 1983.

¹⁷⁰Jiefangjun Bao, 21 April 1983, p. 2, 23 September 1982, p. 2., and 11 December 1984, p. 3, respectively.

and urban enlistees to be senior middle school graduates.¹⁷¹
To become an officer in the PLA, one must not only be a senior middle school graduate or technical school graduate, but also be a military academy graduate.¹⁷²

While there are no questions about the intentions and announced results of the personnel solutions initiated by the reformers, it is still too early to conclude that Deng and his supporters have triumphed over their opponents. Despite no apparent open opposition to Deng's personnel solutions, the million demobilized "undesirables", the widening economic opportunity, and the "gap" between the new urban recruits who are less disciplined and the "old-timer" superiors who are mostly malleable peasants, are all potentially volatile issues which can undermine the announced success.

Solutions to equipment modernization can generally be divided into the following two categories: quick fix and systemic long-term development effort. Within each of the solutions the planners are preoccupied with the potentially

¹⁷¹Middle school in PRC equates to US junior high school and senior middle school is the same as US high school. The difference in entrance requirements is because rural youths are only guaranteed eight years of schooling, whereas urban youths are guaranteed ten years. See Bullard, pp. 26-27, and Wang, p. 250.

¹⁷²Yang Dezhi addressed these standards at the 12th Conference of Military Academies and schools in February 1983. Xinhua, Beijing, 5 March 1983 in FBIS, China, 9 March 1983, p. K/8.

divisive issue of specifying particular military priorities among various areas of urgent need. According to Congressional hearings in 1980, between "41-63 billion US dollars"¹⁷³ was the estimated cost to modernize PLA. "3000-8600 medium tanks, 8000-10000 armored personnel carriers, 16000-24000 heavy duty trucks, 6000 air-to-air missiles, 700 mobile surface-to-air missile launchers, 200 air superiority fighters, and 240 fighter bombers"¹⁷⁴ are necessary to provide PRC with a confident capability to defend herself against the Soviet Union. Faced with the enormous costs and difficult choices of prioritization, Deng, not surprisingly, has repeatedly appealed to the PLA that it should "subordinate its work to the overall interests of national construction."¹⁷⁵ However, in an attempt to provide a psychological "quick fix"¹⁷⁶ and to

¹⁷³See Eugene F. Tighes' testimony in Hearings before the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economic in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China, 1979, Part V, 96th Congress, 1st Sess., 26 June 1979, pp. 120-126.

¹⁷⁴Ibid., For more detailed US Department of Defense assessment of PRC defense capabilities see Ronald G Mitchell and Edward P. Parris testimony, pp. 66-72.

¹⁷⁵Liu Huaqing, "Build a Powerful Navy, Develop China's maritime Undertakings," Xinhua, Beijing, 23 November 1984 in FBIS, China, 27 November 1984, p. K/5.

¹⁷⁶Defence-related equipment obtained from the west has negligible impact or has made relatively unimpressive improvement in the PRC's military capability during the early 1980s. However, the availability and accessibility of western military hardware to the Chinese give them a psychological boast. Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow,

appease the disgruntled military leaders, Deng has encouraged "buying from the west shopping trips" by high level PRC military delegations from 1980 to 1984.¹⁷⁷ In 1980, there were thirteen major negotiations involving the PRC and various western nations on equipment ranging from jet and frigates to Chinese DC-9 landing gear door production.¹⁷⁸ Furthermore, in 1983, twenty major agreements or negotiations were conducted with various western nations on electronic systems.¹⁷⁹ More recently, there have been "agreement-in-principle" with the US to acquire the I-HAWK surface-to-air missile system and the TOW wire-guided anti-tank missile system. Other major purchases of western military hardware included the following agreements: AMC jeep for Chinese production of 10,000 trucks, with follow-on production likely; purchase of Creusot-Loire 100mm gun

"Chinese Military Modernization: The Western Arms Connection", China Quarterly, June 1982, pp. 264-265. (pp. 253-279)

¹⁷⁷The Chinese shopping trips have been highly publicized. However, they have actually made very few purchases of foreign systems. In fact, Chinese arms imports in terms of US dollars actually declined considerably in 1982. They spent an average of \$114 million from 1973 to 1979 while in 1982 only \$40 million was spent on the imports. World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1972-1982, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, April 1984, p. 64.

¹⁷⁸Stuart and Tow, "China's Military Turns to the West", International Affairs, Spring 1981, pp. 292-293.

¹⁷⁹Wendy Friedman, Foreign Technology and China's Weapons Acquisition Process: Technical Note, (Menlo Park: SRI International, December 1984), pp. 81-83, (draft).

mount; and agreement in mid-June between the China State Shipbuilding Corporation and Ishifawajima-Harima Heavy Industries to co-operate in the modernization of China's marine diesel engine production. Moreover, the Chinese have bought Sikorsky helicopters from United Technologies.¹⁸⁰ The effectiveness of Deng's psychological quick fix solution is questionable. An analysis of recent literature on PRC foreign and national security objectives, however, suggests that in near the term (five to ten years), China does not perceive an imminent danger of military conflict from either the US or USSR.¹⁸¹ Also, a cursory examination of the final purchases and production/co-production contract, reveals the PRC is focusing on specific weaknesses such as mobility, coastal defense, and anti-tank capabilities.¹⁸² These findings are not intended to suggest that the PRC's interest

¹⁸⁰ Xinhua, 15 November 1984 in FBIS, China, 84-221, p. B/1.

¹⁸¹ See William Griffith, "Sino-Soviet Rapprochement?" in Problems of Communism, March-April 1983, pp. 20-29
Thomas Robinson, "China's Dynamism in the Strategic Triangle", Current History, September 1983, pp. 241-277
and Donald Zagoria, "The Moscow-Beijing Detente", International Affairs, Spring 1983, pp. 853-873.

¹⁸² On the mobility problems the Chinese encountered during the Sino-Vietnamese conflict see Jencks' "China's Punitive War on Vietnam: A Military Assessment", Asian Survey, August 1979, pp. 801-815. For deficiencies in anti-tank and coastal defense see James Gregor, "Western Security and the Military Potential of the PRC", Parameters, 1 1984, pp. 35-48. For a complete list of PRC defense needs see David Shambaugh "China's Defense Industries" in Pual Godwin, ed., The Chinese Defense Establishment, Boulder: Westview Press, 1983, p. 71.

in acquiring advanced foreign military hardware and technology is not real. Instead, it proves that Chinese reformers are fully aware that any major transformation in qualitative characteristics of the PRC defense posture will occur only after an incremental progression in the entire range of scientific and technological infrastructures. Therefore, it is appropriate, at this time, to turn our attention to the Deng's long-term military modernization solutions and problems.

As stated in the last subsection, under Deng's grand design to modernize the PRC, the PLA should "subordinate" its modernization effort to the overall interests of the nation. From a budgetary point of view, the PLA budget has steadily been cut back during the past half dozen years, which accurately reflects the low priority Deng has given to military modernization programs.

Nonetheless, the two-tracked program to both import advanced technology to overcome specific problems in the quick fix solution, and the incremental development of a modern indigenous military research, development and production capability, is apparently working. In the area of aerospace technology, after long negotiations, agreements have been reached between Chinese organizations and McDonnell Douglas to coproduce the DC-9 MD-80.¹⁸³ The Shanghai Aircraft

¹⁸³"China to Assemble 25 McDonnell Douglas MD-80s", Aerospace Daily, 12 January 1984, p. 60.

TABLE VII

MILITARY
BUDGET

<u>Year</u>	<u>Yuan</u>	<u>US \$</u>	<u>% of Govn't Spending</u>	<u>% of GNP</u>
1979	22.3	14.598	17.8	6.8
1980	19.4	--	--	--
1981	16.9	9.853	15.4	--
1982	17.9	9.464	15.8	4.2
1983	17.713	8.959	--	--
1984	17.87	8.189	--	--

Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1984/1985, London, 1984, p. 41.

Note: Military expenditures indicated in this Table: in billion yuan/ US dollar. 1979 actual military expenditure was higher than the amount had been budgeted as result of Sino-Vietnamese conflict.

Industrial Corporation will assemble the airliners using both US and Chinese components and subassemblies. Incremental improvements to current systems as a result of improving civilian electronics technology are seen in the main battle tank (MBT). The type-69 MBT which, is an

upgrade of the type-59 incorporates an infrared search light and a laser range finder. The steady advance of electronics absorption and integration in the civilian sector can eventually be translated into performance improvements for many outdated weapon systems in the PLA. Another encouraging sign is the organizational change and redefinition of the area of responsibility in Chinese weapons procurement organizations. This very change is an indication of the reformers' determination to make military modernization a long-term process. Of all the changes that have taken place in recent years, adding a state CMC, the reorganization of the Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (NDSTIC), and the Ministries of Machine Building are the most important.¹⁸⁴

Having reviewed and presented Deng's solutions to PRC military modernization and reform, one must ask the question: What impact does this have on the political succession process? More importantly, What are some of the

¹⁸⁴The NDSTIC performs the following functions: planning of defense related research and development; allocation of resources for R&D and supervision and construction of R&D facilities; design, building, and testing of military hardware prototypes; supervision of PLA training and in science and technology; interfacing between the PLA and the industrial ministries; and coordination and planning of R&D in the eight defense-related ministries of machine building. For a detailed discussion, see David Shambaugh, "China's Defense Industries", in Paul Godwin, ed., The Chinese Defense Establishment, (Boulder: Westview Publishing Company, 1983), pp. 46-62. Also see Wang, Contemporary Politics, 1985, pp. 159-160, and Xinhua, Beijing, in FBIS, 27 July 1983, pp. K/17-18 for the function of the State CMC,

problems this change will bring upon Deng's design for a smooth political succession? To answer these two questions, it is necessary to examine several critical factors, which can only be assessed in a partly speculative manner.

The first factor is personnel. Unfortunately, because of the lack of data, it is difficult to identify with certainty the strength of opposition among the demobilized and forcibly retired officers and noncommissioned officers. What is known generally is that there was at least one incident of outright rebellion by a group of demobilized soldiers in 1982 in Guangdong. Hu Yaobang confirmed, at least in substance, the problems associated with demobilized soldiers in an interview with Hong Kong based Ming Pao editor, Cha Lianying in December 1984:

Cha: But, people overseas fear that there will be unrest in the Army. Interference from the Army might possibly be a stumbling block to the implementation of the current policy.

Hu Yaobang: There were incidents, such as shootings by company or platoon leaders, in the PLA units 3 years ago. But no such incidents have been recorded in the past two years.¹⁸⁵

Furthermore, at least one Army Headquarters composed of mostly aging military leaders was reported in the JFJB: "At the Army Headquarters, we can see that most of the leading comrades are members of the old Eighth Route Army dating

¹⁸⁵Ming Pao, Hong Kong, 6 December 1984, in FBIS, 10 December 1984, p. W/4.

back to the War of Resistance against Japanese aggression."¹⁸⁶ Even on the reforms that seem to have substantial military support, progress is still lacking. A case in point is the reinstatement of military ranks which was announced in 1982 and officially included in the May 1984 Military Service Law.¹⁸⁷ During the 1 October 1984 National Parade at Tienanmen Square, there was no sign of rank on the uniforms of the soldiers.

On the positive side, numerous reports published by PRC official publications seem to lend credence to the policy of putting more educated soldiers in charge. In fact, recently, the author had an opportunity to visit the PRC Embassy in Washington, D. C. and interview the assistant military attache, a graduate of Jinan University in 1973. Although he does not have a rank, his duty position is equivalent to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the US military.

In the area of equipment modernization, although PLA leaders are accepting the cuts like good soldiers, the competition for scarce resources will certainly hinder military capability improvements, and can hardly improve

¹⁸⁶ JFJB, 5 August 1982, pp. 1-2.

¹⁸⁷ Xinhua, 4 June 1984, in FBIS-China, 84-110, p. K/1. The Military Service Law was adopted on 31 May 1984 by the Second Session of the Sixth National People's Congress. Article 8: "The system of military ranks is to be implemented in the Chinese People's Liberation Army."

military support of Deng in time of crisis. A recent article published by Xinhua certainly gave a strong indication of discontent within the military to Deng's reneging on one of his promises to modernize defense: "Despite the Navy's achievements, its building is lagging behind both in scale and degree of modernization. . . .we must speed up naval modernization."¹⁸⁸ On the other hand, the reformers expect that the current organizational changes and investment in the infrastructure, basic industries, training, and foreign technology absorption will build a solid foundation for the future.

Deng has made many radical changes in the past half decade in the area of military reforms and modernization. Clearly, with great efforts, Deng has been able to push the military in the general direction he wants. Equally clearly, he could not bring about a clear break with the past, and resistance is heavy, as indicated by the previous discussion. It seems that Deng hopes to nurture a generation of new military officers who hold similar loyalty and commitment to a stronger China through his policies. Success, on the one hand, depends heavily on Deng and his associates' efforts to contain military participation in the political decision process. On the other hand,

¹⁸⁸Liu Huaqing, P. K/7.

a measureable success in economic growth, translated into equitable economic benefits to the military, is essential in maintaining that fragile balance.

V. CONCLUSION

Although other elements such as limited historical precedence and the lack of institutionalized legal political succession were discussed briefly in the Introduction, the briefness of their treatment was not indicative of their lack of importance; rather, it was the author's intention to limit the scope of this thesis to the problems of the military as a participant, of the power base, and of Deng's policy alternatives. Moreover, after having narrowed the scope of the succession problems, the problems of military, power base, and Deng's policy alternative still cannot be covered fully in the short span of this research paper. However, this paper is intended to provide enough informational and analytical foundations about Chinese political succession procedures that it may be a building block for other students of contemporary Chinese politics.

In this concluding chapter, by way of summing up the salient points of this thesis, an attempt will be made to speculate the near term (5-10 years) outcome of PRC succession politics. Realizing the danger and purely speculative nature in predicting the outcome of the complex problems associated with political succession, I will focus this chapter on answering the question: Will China, after Deng, be able to minimize political conflict and ideological

oscillation while continuing to pursue its present modernization policies?

Before venturing into this question, one must make an assumption that Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang will stay healthy, at least through 1995. While this assumption may not sound too outrageous (Hu is 69; Zhao is 65), the experience of Zhou Enlai who passed away, unexpectedly, prior to Mao, taught everyone a hard lesson of "fate" over "science".

With this in mind, let us examine Hu's latest announced plan of succession:

It is Comrade Ziyang and I who assume responsibility in the Standing Committee of the CPC Central Committee. we consult Comrade Xiaoping, Chen Yun, and Xiannian on major issues and, as for other general affairs, we two make decisions on our own . . . I am now 70 years old . . . He (Zhao Ziyang) is 66 years old . . . Both of us cannot be expected to be working too far in the future. I myself have an idea- I will withdraw and get away gradually after the 13th CPC National Congress to be held in 1987.¹⁸⁹

Hu has described an institutionalized political succession procedure in which the succession problems are solved by redefining responsibilities into two tiers. Generally speaking, the last generation of leaders is given the honor to semi-retire while dealing strictly with the "major

¹⁸⁹"Hu Yaobang Talks with Ming Pao Publisher", Ming Pao, Hong Kong, 5 December 1984, p. 4, FBIS, 10 December 1984, p. w4. According to Hu, he is 70 years old by the traditional Chinese way of counting one's age.

issues." In contrast, the current generation of leaders has the responsibilities of not only taking care of day-to-day important issues, but also of cultivating a new generation of leaders who will guarantee the continuity of the existing policy. Although Hu did not mention specifically the responsibilities of the emerging younger leaders, no doubt the future of these younger leaders is directly related to their allegiance and loyalty to the existing policy and the current leadership. Obviously with Deng's approval, Hu Yaobang is describing an institutionalized procedure by which the current leaders hope that they will both establish historical precedents and legalize the succession procedures. As Deng held the difficult coalition of elderly elites together during the past half decade, his proteges, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, are feverishly building a new coalition of leaders while closely scrutinizing and cleansing leaders at all levels. When Deng and his coalition pass on, in the not too distant future, his proteges will move into the "major issues" decision role while their successors will step into the "day-to-day" important decision making role. In the long run, under the institutionalized succession procedures, the content of intra-elite conflict will become less and less determined by the quest for political, economic, and social changes and

more and more determined by bureaucratic politics.¹⁹⁰ However, in the short run, the importance of the military, the power base, and policy alternatives still cannot be oversimplified and ignored.

The power base, as illustrated by the fate of Hua Guofeng in Chapter III, underlines the importance of broad and deep backgrounds in PRC political maneuvering. Realizing his proteges' precarious positions, Deng's rectification plan since 1980 has been designed to strengthen the formal power base through building a strong institutional framework and bureaucratic procedures and minimizing the necessity to resort to the informal power base (where Hu and Zhao are weakest). On balance, Deng has succeeded in building a stronger formal power base for his successors since his return to power. He has, since 1980, replaced Hua Guofeng with Hu Yaobang as the Party General Secretary; replaced Hua Guofeng with Zhao Ziyang as the State Premier; replaced Hua Guofeng with himself as the Chairman of the Party Military Commission; replaced every military district and garrison commander; replaced all but two provincial leaders and 83% of the provincial party secretaries; replaced all but two military regional commanders and political commissars; replaced all of the

¹⁹⁰Bureaucratic politics is used here in the sense defined by Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), pp. 162-182.

State governmental ministers; replaced all but three positions in the important Central Party Organizations such as the CCPCC Secretariat Office, General Office and Propaganda Office. Most importantly, he has replaced 12 out of 24 members of the most powerful organization in the PRC, the Politburo. An analogous magnitude of personnel changes would be seen in the US if, as President, Ronald Reagan replaced 90% of the Congressional members; replaced all of the Supreme Court Justices; replaced all of the major military command commanders and the chiefs of staff of all services; and replaced most of the Secretaries in the Government's Bureaucratic Departments and all cabinet appointees.

Although Deng's massive change in both central and provincial leadership did not bring about an equivalent change in Hu's and Zhao's power positions, it replaced almost all of the leaders hardened by their experience in the CCP revolutionary era with a group of post-1949 "educated" bureaucratic administrators. Needless to say, because of the shortage of experienced, highly trained, and politically reliable junior administrators, one cannot expect all of those selected for central and provincial leadership positions to possess "star quality". In fact, one of the frustrating issues facing Deng and his supporters has been that the newly appointed officials, based on above mentioned criteria, have not all handled their

administrative responsibilities well. Furthermore, the few "elderly cadres" remaining in the Politburo still command a considerable informal power base of influence in the political and military arena. If Deng passes away in the near future and before Chen Yun, Ye Jianying, or Li Xiannian,¹³¹ there is a higher risk of these elderly cadres resurfacing and becoming potentially dangerous to Deng's design for a smooth succession.

While formal power base building and institutionalized succession procedure are progressing with minimal opposition, Deng has experienced many obstacles in the areas of military reform, modernization, and reduction of military influence in the political process. However, the continuing personnel turnover in the PLA and accelerated modernization benefits derived from success in the economic sector, will, undoubtedly, help to persuade the PLA to become more institutionalized and professionalized and less a participant in the political process. In the meantime, the question of the PLA's role at the time of Deng's demise will be the ultimate concern of Deng, Hu, and Zhao. While there is no secret about the close association Deng has had with the PLA over the last half century, the relationships

¹³¹An excellent article in China News Analysis discussed Li's power potential in factional struggles. China News Analysis, 1227 (26 February 1982), pp. 1-7. Although Chen Yun has sided with Deng in the past against Ye Jianying, Chen and Deng are at odds about certain economic policies.

between Hu and Zhao and the PLA are far more difficult to establish. Furthermore, the identities of the military successors at the top of the military establishment are equally difficult to determine. As indicated in Chapter II and Section A, Chapter IV, because the first generation of aging military leaders is loosely held together by Deng at the pinnacle of power, assessing their allegiance and loyalty to Hu and Zhao is not possible. One of Hu's and Zhao's foremost concerns with the military is the extent to which the "Gang of Four's" lack of military support contributed to their fall. Surely, Hu and Zhao can vividly recall the events in 1976, when the arrest of the "Gang of Four" was the direct result of many of Mao's military supporters, led by Ye Jianying, who not only did not support the radical Maoist, but also took the opportunity to get rid of them. At present, there are some indications of military opposition to the low priority given to national defence modernization. More importantly, there are unmistakably clear indications of top military elites' opposition to the issues of forced retirement and reinstatement of ranks. An examination of the top twenty-six positions in the PRC's military structure¹⁹² reveals that only five of the

¹⁹²The twenty-six top positions are: nine in the CCPCC Military Commission, eleven military regional commanders, three service commanders, PLA Chief of Staff, Directors of Logistical and Political Departments, and Minister of National Defense. See Appendix B Handbook of Chinese People's Liberation Army, Defense Intelligence Agency,

twenty-six leaders are in their mid- to late- 60s, and the average age of this group is about 74 years old. Furthermore, the roster at the power center, the CCP Central Committee, indicates that 58 out of 210 (28.1%) members elected to the 12th CCPCC are military cadres serving in combat units or former military cadres serving in the national defense industrial system; of the 129 alternate members of the CCPCC, 26 are serving officers.¹⁹³

While there are many obstacles to overcome in dealing with the military elites, there are two factors in favor of Deng's design. The continuing replacement of commanders and leaders below the military region level can only help to streamline and professionalize the military at its base. Thus, with a rapid increase in promoting younger, technically skilled, administratively competent, and professionally oriented bureaucrat-military leaders, the influence and credibility of the senior military leaders become further removed and hence weakened. The other factor favoring Deng's design is the opening up of the PLA to western technology and modern warfare. Among the many and varied reasons for introducing both western technology and modern warfare to the Chinese military, breaking "Mao's ideological shackle" seems to stand out. Despite the

November 1984, and CHINAaktuell, February 1985, pp. 127-128.

¹⁹³deB Mills, p. 28.

rhetoric of "People's War", the PLA is unquestionably moving in the direction of fighting combined arms warfare with high-technology weapons. After being exposed to the lethality of modern high-technology weapon systems, and witnessing the combat-power of the combined arms concept, the post-civil war generation finds the preaching of Mao's guerrilla warfare by the Long March generation military leaders less persuasive and, hence, less creditable. As a result, the ability of the Long March generation military leaders to influence the post-Civil War generation military leaders steadily diminishes.

Any hope to achieve success in Deng's design for a smooth succession, The element of economic reform is not only the most critical but also potentially the most explosive ingredient in Deng's design for a smooth succession. Success in economic reforms brings measureable changes such as higher incomes, improved standards of living, and incorporates advanced technology into defense-related production. Therefore, economic success breeds legitimacy and strengthens the institutionalized power base of Hu and Zhao. However, the problems of a rising rural population; overinvestment, inefficiency, and misappropriation associated with decentralized resource allocation; animosity developed as a result of the widening income gap and standard of living between urban and rural workers are some of the potentially explosive issues which

could easily be exploited by a coalition of forces and factions opposed to Deng's design. If the modernization should prove to be or even be perceived to be a failure, the wisdom of Deng's design and the legitimacy of Hu and Zhao would certainly be called into serious question. Moreover, the problems do not necessarily cease if economic reforms succeed. A successful economic modernization mean greater free market mechanisms injected into the Chinese economic system, which, fundamentally, would make Marx-Lenin-Mao ideology less compatible and justifiable with reality.

In sum, the problems of succession are clearly the foremost concern facing the Chinese planners today. Deng's design to promote younger, more educated, technically skilled, administratively competent, and ideologically reliable people along with two tiers of responsibilities has, in most cases, solidified the formal power base of the next generation of successors and thus removed the susceptibility of future intra-elite conflict to rely on an informal power base. In dealing with the problems of the military as a participant in the political process, Deng has, at least temporarily, restrained and curbed the military as an active force in Chinese politics. To maintain a proper balance in the solution of succession problems, the modernization programs must generate real and perceived success in the near term. Therefore, the outcome of Deng's design for a smooth succession relies heavily on

the successes in the modernization programs to provide the legitimacy and confidence to the successors.

VI. EPILOGUE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US

Since the focus of this thesis has been on the problems of succession in China, not on US problems in dealing with China, it is appropriate to briefly and superficially analyze and discuss the issues that are likely to face US policy makers. Furthermore, a policy alternative will be suggested at the closing of this discussion.

Before turning our attention to the current issues, we need a brief review of the evolution of Sino-US relations. Additionally, to deal with the Chinese effectively, it is essential to elevate the American public and government to a higher level of understanding of the basic and changing character of Chinese people and society. A starting point should be our recognition that the Chinese people and society are basically inward looking. Since the turning of the century Chinese has been struggling to develop and modernize. Unfortunately, in the early past experience of the 19th century, the Chinese attitude toward association with Americans was different from the Americans attitude. In dealing with China, America sought to give as well as get; but the Chinese, a proud people, although weak, neither enjoyed nor wanted help, especially America's "save-the-heathen" type of help. Americans found their experience with China adventurous, exhilarating, and rewarding. More importantly, Americans who did not want to

associate with the Chinese could avoid it. In contrast, the Chinese not only found contact with Americans forced upon them, but also suffered indignities and humiliation.

More recently, Americans have tended to shape their images of China to fit preconceptions and moods of the moment. We have witnessed the oscillating images of China as a "big-bad" aggressive "bully" about to overrun Asia, to a crippled "paper dragon" on the verge of internal collapse, and finally to our "ace-in-the-hole", the "China Card". On the other hand, the Chinese view of the US has also swung wildly from one extreme to the other. Undoubtedly, a mutual deep understanding and appreciation of each other's national characters is essential for the two nations to avoid overreactions such as unjustifiable hostility or unrealistic optimism. In dealing with the Chinese, US policy makers must base their policies on a more realistic and sophisticated view of the enormous complexity of variables shaping the image. Keeping this in mind, for the foreseeable future (5-10 years), what are our interests in China? And What should our policy be toward China?

In this thesis, the background and nature of PRC succession problems have been discussed and analyzed at some length; and a possible near term outcome of the succession process has been suggested. Because so many unknown and unpredictable variables influence the Chinese succession process, the suggestion in the Conclusion

Chapter, is not intended to be a final answer to the succession question. Mistakes or miscalculations by Deng or his successors could spark a domino reaction based upon individual and group preferences, unfulfilled expectations, ideological dilemmas, and inadequate institutional infrastructures, such reactions could severely damage and curtail the power of the successors and, in turn, damage the interest of the US. However, any attempt by the US to pursue manipulative policies designed to influence the interaction of domestic factions would most likely be counterproductive. On the other hand, if the US exercises constraint, provides external environmental stability, maintains a friendly no-alliance posture, and demonstrates a willingness and encouragement to help China with her fundamental problems, then, the interests of the US will be more effectively served.

Cases in point can be seen in the achievements in the realms of economic cooperation and cultural and educational exchange. Since 1980, China has absorbed 12 billion¹⁹⁴ US dollars in foreign investments. In October 1984, China, in addition to the original four special economic zones established in 1980, designated ten more special economic zone to attract foreign investments. Recently Deng Advised the leaders of Shanghai to "learn from Shenzhen"¹⁹⁵ and

¹⁹⁴ China Business Review, January-February 1984, p. 29.

restore Shanghai to its "pre-1949 status as a national centre of trade and finance"¹⁹⁶ like that of New York, Tokyo, and London. Moreover, it also has been reported that 42 Chinese corporations have been established and have signed contracts with 40 countries for engineering projects and labor services abroad. In the area of cultural and educational exchanges, tens of thousands of Chinese students and scholars have come to the US to study since 1979. Kenneth Prewitt and Michel Oksenberg summarized better than anyone else:

. . . it should be recognized that the US is opening its science and technology to Chinese mainly for reasons . . . (including) . . . strategic national interests, the opportunity to train the next generation of technologists in China, and the recognition that many problems transcend national boundaries and require an international community of scientists for their solution.¹⁹⁷

Our desire, therefore, to train the next generation of Chinese intellectuals and scientists is, bluntly stated, to "indoctrinate" the next generation of Chinese nation-builders to be able to relate to the American culture

¹⁹⁵Shenzhen is the special economic zone between Hong Kong and southern Guangdong which has achieved considerable success in absorbing foreign investments, technology, and foreign managerial skills. See China News Analysis, 1283 (15 April 1985), pp. 1-9.

¹⁹⁶Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁹⁷Kenneth Prewitt (ed.), Research Opportunities in China for American Humanists and Social Scientists, (New York: Social Research Council, 1982), p. 46.

and character and become less hostile toward the US. Simply put, a strong and modernized China that is non-hostile toward the US should be the goal of US policy makers. On the contrary, a weak, underdeveloped, isolated, and hostile China will more likely to be a destabilizing influence in East Asia.

Along the same line, the strategic consideration of "playing the China Card" prompted by Nixon and Kissinger and begun in July 1971 is potentially dangerous and should be avoided. There is no question about Beijing's role as a counterweight in offsetting Soviet influence in Asia and in complicating Soviet global military planning. However, the Soviets have become more aggressive in their overt military posture since the Shanghai Communique, as demonstrated by the invasion of Afghanistan, the establishment of a naval base at Cam Ranh bay, the enlargement of the Pacific Fleet to be the largest of the four Soviet Fleets, the stationing of SS-20 and Backfire bombers east of Urals, and the build-up, both qualitatively and quantitatively, in personnel and equipment in the southernmost Kuriles.¹⁹⁸ On balance, contrary to the strategic benefit the US supposedly derives from a closer "strategic partnership" with China, the Soviets have actually gained relative strength by

¹⁹⁸Anthony H. Coordesman, "The Military Balance in Northeast Asia", Armed Forces Journal International, November 1983, pp. 80-98.

feverishly building up every aspect of their Asian military posture. Therefore, by all indications, US interests can neither be served by a closer strategic relationship with China, nor benefited by manipulating the hostility and tension between the Soviet Union and China. Although the leverage of US policy makers to influence the Sino-Soviet relationship is limited, any subtle encouragement to the current attempts at Sino-Soviet rapprochement would help in reducing the possibility of an overt military confrontation between the Soviets and Chinese. If American policy makers want to pursue the goal of stability and peace in the East Asia region, a policy of non-manipulation and of continuing to seek improved relationship with both Beijing and Moscow is critical in reinforcing that goal.

In conclusion, under the present circumstances of uncertain Chinese internal politics and growing Soviet strength in East Asia, US policy makers should not "play the China Card" against the Soviet. Rather, emphasis should be placed on providing China with external stability through improving relation with Moscow while assisting the new generation of Chinese nation builders with their fundamental problems of modernization.

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